

THE OPEN COURT

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INDEX OF VOLUME XIII.

MAIN CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Abstraction, Intermediate Forms of. Th. Ribot.....	349
Abstraction Prior to Speech. Th. Ribot.....	14
Abstraction, The Higher Forms of. The Psychology of Images. Th. Ribot.....	433
America and Germany, The Estrangement Between. Impressions of a Recent Visit to the Fatherland. Maximilian P. E. Groszmann.....	616
Americanism and Expansion. Paul Carus.....	215
Animals, The Intelligence of. Do Animals Possess General Ideas? Th. Ribot.....	85
Bonney, The Hon. Charles Carroll. A Basis for Reform, 513.—The Delays and Uncertainties of the Law. 705.	
Browning-Barrett Love-Letters, The. H. M. Stanley.....	731
Buddhist Nativity Sutta, A Further Note on. Albert J. Edmunds.....	379
Candlin, The Rev. George T. The Emperor of China. A Poem.....	124
Carruth, Prof. W. H. The Religion of Frederick the Great. Illustrated....	580
Carus, Dr. Paul. Santa Claus. The Significance of Myths in the Religious Instruction of Children. 45.—Rationalism in the Nursery. 98.—A Modern Instance of World-Renunciation. With Illustrations of the School of the Countess M. de S. Canavarro, of Ceylon. 111.—The Cross and Its Significance. With Illustrations. 149.—The Moral Education of Children. Imagination and Love of Truth, Worldly Prudence, Square Dealing, Sympathy with Animals. 176.—Parenthood; or, the Duties of Parents Toward Their Children. 211.—Americanism and Expansion. 215.—The Cross in Central America. With Illustrations. 224.—Americanism in the Roman Church. 253.—The Cross Among the North American Indians. With Illustrations. 296.—State Conferences of Religion. 313.—Peace on Earth. A Problem of Practical Diplomacy. 360.—Plato and the Cross. With Illustrations. 364.—International Good-Will. 373.—The Filipino Question. 375.—For the Re-establishment of International Friendship. Rejoinder to Mr William Vocke's Article. 405.—The Cross of Golgotha. Historical and Archæological. With Illustrations. 472.—Death and Resurrection. Evolution of the Notions of the Body from the Earliest Periods to the Present Day. With Illustrations. 495.—The Philippine Imbroglío. 504.—Staurolatry; or, The History of Cross-Worship. With Illustrations. 546.—Is Religion a Feeling of Dependence? 563.—Playful Instruction, and Genius. 566.—The Fatherland; or, The Significance of Germany for Civilisation. 577.—The German in America; or, The Community of Interests Between American and Teutonic Civilisation. 626.—The Significance of Naming Things in the Nursery. 669.—The Crucifix. Its Origin and Development. With Illustrations. 673.—The Nativity. Similarities in Religious Art. With Illustrations. 710.—Anticipate the School. Suggestions for the Treatment of Children. 747.	
Charbonnel, Victor. An Explanation. In Reply to the Article, "The Reason Why Abbé Charbonnel Failed.".....	36
Children be Kept at School, That. Martin Luther. Trans. W. H. Carruth. 423	

	PAGE
Children, The Moral Education of. Imagination and Love of Truth, Worldly Prudence, Square Dealing, Sympathy with Animals. Paul Carus.....	176
Christianity, The Birth of. John the Baptist and Jesus of Nazareth. H. Grätz	650
Christians, Can Soldiers Be? Martin Luther. Translated by W. H. Carruth	525
Christ of St. Paul, The. Moncure D. Conway.....	517
Clement, Ernest W. The Cross in Japanese Heraldry.....	742
Condillac. The Philosophers' Philosopher. L. Lévy-Bruhl.....	257
Confucius. A Study of His Character and Philosophy. Teitaro Suzuki.....	644
Conway, Dr. Moncure D. The Wisdom of Solomon. Sophia Solomontos. 21.—The Gospel on the Parisian Stage. Revival of the Mediæval Mysteries and Passion-Plays. 449.—The Christ of St. Paul. 517.	
Cross Among the North American Indians, The. Illustrated. Paul Carus... 296	296
Cross and Its Significance, The. Illustrated. Paul Carus.....	149
Cross in Central America, The. With Illustrations. Paul Carus.....	224
Cross in Japanese Heraldry, The. Ernest W. Clement.....	742
Cross of Golgotha, The. With Illustrations. Paul Carus.....	472
Crucifix, The, Its Origin and Development. With Illustrations. Paul Carus	673
Death and Resurrection. With Illustrations. Paul Carus.....	495
Documents from the Early Centuries, Human. The Oxyrhynchus MSS. With a Fac-Simile Reproduction of the Lost Ode of Sappho. C. H. Levy.....	185
Dreyfus Literature, Some. Theodore Stanton.....	121
Edmunds, Albert J. A Further Note on the Buddhist Nativity Sutta.....	379
Eliot, Henrietta R. Heraclitus Transfigured. A Poem.....	57
Emperor of China, The. Gloria Fatalis. A Poem. George T. Candlin....	124
Encyclopædists, The. With Portraits. L. Lévy-Bruhl.....	129
Explanation, An. In Reply to the Article, "The Reason Why Abbé Charbonnel Failed." Victor Charbonnel.....	36
Fatherland, The. The Significance of Germany for Civilisation. Paul Carus.	577
Fiamingo, Prof. G. M. Italian Anarchism.....	485
Filipino Question, The. Paul Carus.....	375
Frederick the Great, The Religion of. With Illustrations. W. H. Carruth..	580
French Philosophy at the End of the 18th Century—Condorcet. L. Lévy-Bruhl.	340
French Philosophy, Modern. With Portraits. L. Lévy-Bruhl.....	411
German in America, The; or, The Community of Interests Between American and Teutonic Civilisation. Paul Carus.....	626
Germany and the United States. William Weber.....	599
Gifford Lectureships, The. With Portrait. R. M. Wenley.....	72
Good-Will, International. Paul Carus.....	373
Gospel on the Parisian Stage, The. Revival of the Mediæval Mysteries and Passion-Plays. Moncure D. Conway.....	449
Groszmann, Dr. Maximilian P. E. The Estrangement Between America and Germany. Impressions of a Recent Visit to the Fatherland.....	616
Halsted, Dr. George Bruce. Hidalgo and Morelos the Forerunners of Mexican Independence.....	118
Heraclitus Transfigured. A Poem. Henrietta R. Eliot.....	57
Infants and Deaf-Mutes. The General Ideas of. Th. Ribot.....	164
Instruction, Playful, and Genius. Paul Carus.....	566
International Friendship, For the Re-establishment of. Rejoinder to Mr. William Vocke's Article. Paul Carus.....	405
Italian Anarchism. A Study in European Social Problems. G. M. Fiamingo	485
Japan and the United States, On the Relations Between. Count Terachima..	251
Japanese Calligraphy. With Illustration. The Rev. Shaku Soyen.....	120
Jesus, An Illustrated Life of, by James J. Tissot. Clifton Harby Levy.....	1
King Baulah. The Egyptian Version of the Story of King John and the Abbot of Canterbury. Charles C. Torrey.....	559
Koran, Rhyme and Rhythm in the. William F. Warren.....	641
Lane, Charles A. Liberty. A Poem.....	697
Law, The Delays and Uncertainties of the. C. C. Bonney.....	705
Lévy-Bruhl, Prof. L. Montesquieu. 28.—Voltaire. With Portrait. 65.—The Encyclopædists. With Portraits. 129.—Jean Jacques Rousseau. 193.—Condillac. 257.—French Philosophy at the End of the Eighteenth Century—Condorcet. 340.—Modern French Philosophy: the Ideologists	

and Traditionalists. 411.—Maine De Biran. With Portrait of Victor Cousin. 458.	
Levy, Clifton Harby. An Illustrated Life of Jesus by J. James Tissot. With Portrait and Seven Illustrations. 1.—Human Documents from the Early Centuries. The Oxyrhynchus MSS. With a Fac-Simile Reproduction of the Lost Ode of Sappho. 185.	
Liberty. A Poem. Charles A. Lane	697
Luther, Martin. That Children Should be Kept at School. Translated by W. H. Carruth. 423. Can Soldiers be Christians? Translated by W. H. Carruth. 525.	
Maine De Biran. With Portrait of Victor Cousin. L. Lévy-Bruhl	458
Mexican Independence, Hidalgo and Morelos the Forerunners of. George Bruce Halsted.....	118
Mohammedanism and Christian Missions. Pierre Jay Prize Essay. W. P. Reeve.....	279
Montesquieu. L. Lévy-Bruhl.....	28
Nativity, The. Paul Carus.....	710
Nursery, The Significance of Naming Things in the. Paul Carus.....	669
Oswald, Dr. Felix L. A Revelator of Science. The Late Ludwig Büchner..	465
Paganism in Mexico, Survivals of. With Illustrations. Frederick Starr.....	385
Parenthood; or, the Duties of Parents Toward Their Children. Paul Carus.	211
Peace on Earth. A Problem of Practical Diplomacy. Paul Carus.....	360
Philippine Imbroglia, The. Paul Carus.....	495
Plato and the Cross. With Illustrations. Paul Carus.....	364
Rationalism in the Nursery. Paul Carus.....	98
Reeve, The Rev. W. P. Mohammedanism and Christian Missions; Pierre Jay Prize Essay. Carroll.....	279
Reform, A Basis for. Charles Carroll Bonney.....	513
Religion, Is It a Feeling of Dependence? Paul Carus.....	563
Religion, State Conferences of. Paul Carus.....	313
Ribot, Prof. Th. Abstraction Prior to Speech. The Beginnings of the Evolution of General Ideas. 14.—The Intelligence of Animals. Do Animals Possess General Ideas? 85.—The General Ideas of Infants and Deaf-Mutes. A Psychological Study. 164.—The Origin of Speech. A Study in the Evolution of General Ideas. 202.—The Evolution of Speech. A Study in the Psychology of Abstraction. 267.—Intermediate Forms of Abstraction. A Study in the Evolution of General Ideas. 349.—The Higher Forms of Abstraction. The Psychology of Images. 433.	
Roman Church, Americanism in The. Paul Carus.....	253
Roman Church, Paganism in The. Th. Trede.....	321
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. L. Lévy-Bruhl.....	193
Saint Paul and the Theatre Hat. William Weber.....	247
Santa Claus. The Significance of Myths in the Religious Instruction of Children. Paul Carus.....	45
School, Anticipate the. Paul Carus.....	747
Science, A Revelator of. An Appreciation of the late Ludwig Büchner. Felix L. Oswald.....	465
Shaku Soyen, The Rev. Japanese Calligraphy. With Illustration.....	120
Solomon, The Wisdom of. Sophia Solomontos. Moncure D. Conway.....	21
Speech, The Evolution of. A Study in the Psychology of Abstraction. Th. Ribot.....	267
Speech, The Origin of. A Study in the Evolution of General Ideas. Th. Ribot	202
Stanley, H. M. The Browning-Barrett Love-Letters.....	731
Stanton, Theodore. Some Dreyfus Literature.....	121
Starr, Prof. Frederick. Survivals of Paganism in Mexico. With Illustrations	385
Staurolatry; or, The History of Cross-Worship. Paul Carus.....	546
Suzuki, Teitaro. Confucius. A Study of His Character and Philosophy.....	644
Terachima, Count. On the Relations Between Japan and the United States.	251
<i>Timeo Danaos</i> . The Recent German-American Mass-Meetings and British Intrigue. William Vocke.....	399
Torrey, Prof. Charles C. King Baulah. The Egyptian Version of the Story of King John and the Bishop of Canterbury.....	559

	PAGE
Trede, The Rev. Th. Paganism in the Roman Church.....	321
Vocke, William. <i>Timeo Danaos</i> . The Recent German-American Mass Meetings and British Intrigue.....	399
Voltaire. L. Lévy-Bruhl.....	65
Warren, William F. Rhyme and Rhythm in the Koran.....	641
Weber, The Rev. William. Saint Paul and the Theatre Hat. 247.—Germany and the United States. A Discussion of the Political Situation. 599.	
Wenley, Prof. R. M. The Gifford Lectureships. With Portrait.....	72
World-Renunciation, A Modern Instance of. With Illustration of the School of the Countess M. de S. Canavarro, of Ceylon. Paul Carus.....	111

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.

Achelis, Dr. Th. Ethics.....	383
Adams, Prof. Henry Carter. The Science of Finance.....	127
Allard, Paul. Saint Basile.....	447
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals of the.....	446
Anderson, Dr. Jerome A. The Evidence of Immortality.....	768
Andoyer, H. and M. M. Tisserand. Cosmography.....	316
Annual Literary Index, The.....	704
Batifol, M. l'Abbé Pierre. <i>Six Leçons sur les Évangiles</i>	447
Bennett, W. H., M. A. A Primer of the Bible.....	447
Bernard-Leroy, Dr. Eugène. <i>L'illusion de fausse reconnaissance</i>	448
Bibelot Series.....	318
Binet, Dr. Alfred. The Psychology of Reasoning.....	571
Binet, Dr. A. and Dr. V. Henri. Intellectual Fatigue.....	256
Bonney, Hon. Charles Carroll. Arbitration.....	383
Boppe, Hermann. Obituary.....	320
Bourlet, M. C. Algebra, 316.—Plane Trigonometry, 316.	
Brogie, Duc de. Saint Ambroise.....	447
Bryant, William M. Life, Death, and Immortality.....	380
Budde, Prof. Karl. Letter on America, published in the <i>Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	575
Buddha, Scenes from the Life of. Art Institute Exhibit.....	695
Buddhist Missionaries of Japan in San Francisco, California.....	759
Bürklen, Prof. O. Th. Collection of Mathematical Formulæ.....	191
Buy, Dr. Jean du. The Ethical Teachings of Jesus.....	447
Campbell, Dr. Douglas Houghton. The Evolution of Plants.....	320
Canavarro, Countess de S. Temple to Be Erected.....	384
Carruth, Prof. W. H. <i>Sammlung Götschen</i> . 313.—Auswahl aus Luther's deutschen Schriften. 764.	
Carus, Dr. Paul. Buddhism and Its Christian Critics, 319.—The Ethical Problem, 319.	
Charbonnel, Victor. The Will to Live.....	56
Chrystal, Dr. G. Introduction to Algebra.....	52
Church of the Latter-Day Saints, The.....	638
Clark University, Worcester, Mass. Tenth Anniversary.....	511
Coleridge's <i>Ancient Mariner</i>	126
Cone, Orello, D. D. Paul: the Man, the Missionary, and the Teacher.....	63
Confucius, Temple of, in Shanghai.....	795
Conway, Moncure D. The Christ of St. Paul.....	576
Crooker, Rev. Joseph Henry. A Plea for Sincerity in Religious Thought.....	691
Dantec, Dr. Félix Le. Individual Evolution and Heredity.....	256
Davids, Prof. T. W. Rhys. Buddhism.....	382
Descartes's <i>Discourse on Method</i>	761
De Morgan, Augustus. The Study and Difficulties of Mathematics, 51.—Elementary Illustrations of the Differential and Integral Calculus, 572.	
Devine, Dr. Edward Thomas. Economics.....	127
Diderot and the French Encyclopædia. Frederick May Holland.....	758
Doehlemann, Dr. Projective Geometry.....	191
Duprat, Prof. G. L. <i>L'Instabilité mentale</i>	447
Dugas, Dr. L. <i>La timidité</i>	511
Dutton, S. T. Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home.....	703

	PAGE
Divedi, Manilal N. Obituary.....	378
Eliot's <i>Silas Marner</i>	126
Encyclopædia of the Mathematical Sciences, Both Theoretical and Applied... 119	119
Espinas, Dr. Alfred. Origin of Technology.....	511
Farrand, Wilson. Tennyson's <i>Princess</i>	126
Fisher and Schwatt, Drs. Text-Book of Algebra.....	640
Ford, Henry James. The Rise and Growth of American Politics.....	128
Ford, Nellie Walton. Nature's By-Ways: or Natural Science for Primary Pupils.....	315
Fords, Howard and Hulbert. Educational Nuggets.....	640
French, Charles Wallace. Macaulay's <i>Essay on Milton</i>	126
Fulliquet, Georges. <i>Essai sur l'Obligation Morale</i>	54
Funk and Wagnalls Co. The Jewish Encyclopædia.....	382, 704
Geisler, Kurt. Mathematical Geography.....	191
Gérard-Varet, L. <i>L'ignorance et l'irréflexion</i>	448
German-American Mass Meetings, The. Hon. J. Reinhardt.....	637
Giddings, Franklin Henry, M. A., Ph. D. The Elements of Sociology.....	60
Göschel, G. J. Literary Classics, and Literary and Scientific Manuals.....	190
Gourd, Prof. J. J. <i>Les trois dialectiques</i>	448
Guiraud, Jean. Saint Dominic.....	318
Hadamard, Jacques. <i>Leçons de Géométrie Élémentaire</i> , 57.—Plane Geometry, 316.—Solid Geometry, 316.	
Hallberg, L. Eugène. Sainte Mathilde.....	447
Harkness, Prof. J. Introduction to the Theory of Analytic Functions.....	319
Hart, Albert Bushnell, Ph. D. Source-Book of American History.....	508
Heinemann, A. H. "The Indian Question.".....	320
Henri, Dr. V. and Dr. A. Binet. Intellectual Fatigue.....	256
Herckenrath, Prof. C. R. C. The Problems of Esthetics and Ethics.....	55
Hillyer, Dr. H. W. Laboratory Manual.....	704
Hodgson, Shadworth H. Metaphysic of Experience.....	127
Holland, Frederick May. Diderot and the French Encyclopædia.....	758
Horn, E. Saint Etienne.....	127
Hüppe, Dr. Ferdinand. The Principles of Bacteriology.....	573
Ingersoll, Col. Robert G. Obituary.....	512
Janet, Dr. Pierre. <i>Névroses et idées fixes</i>	447
Joly, M. Henri. <i>Saint Ignace de Loyola</i>	127
Jones, Dr. Jenkin Lloyd. Jess.....	767
Junker, Dr. Friedrich. Differential Calculus.....	191
Kentel, F. P. <i>Der Schädel des Secundus Arbiter</i>	318
Kidd, Benjamin. The Control of the Tropics.....	128
Koenigs, M. Mechanics.....	316
Krause, G. <i>Grundprinzipien für Lösung der sozialen Frage</i>	316
Kursheedt, M. R. <i>Legislative Reform</i>	693
Lang, Andrew. Myth, Ritual and Religion.....	444
<i>L'année de l'église</i> . Year-book of the Catholic Church.....	509
Lesêtre, Henry. <i>Saint Henry</i>	318
Lévy-Bruhl, Prof. L. History of Modern Philosophy in France.....	697
Lewis, Edwin Herbert. Introduction to the Study of Literature.....	380
Lichtenberger, Prof. Henri. The Philosophy of Nietzsche. 54.— <i>F. Nietzsche: Aphorismes et fragments choisis</i> . 768.	
Macaulay's <i>Addison</i>	126
Mackintosh, Dr. Robert. From Comte to Benjamin Kidd.....	639
Mahler, Dr. G. Plane Geometry.....	191
Malapert, Paulin. <i>Les Éléments du Caractère</i>	54
Mercier, Dr. D. <i>Cours de philosophie</i>	768
Mill, John Stewart, his Unpublished Correspondence with Gustave d'Eichthal	56
Mixe Idol, The.....	574
<i>Monist, The</i> . April Number.....	255
Morgan, Mary. Rondeaux, Sonnets and Translations.....	447
Morley, Prof. F. Introduction to the Theory of Analytic Functions.....	319
Müller, Prof. F. Max. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy.....	574
Netto, Professor. <i>Kombinatorik</i>	119

	PAGE
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spake Zarathustra.....	124
Noa, Frederic M. The Pearl of the Antilles.....	382
Nys, Désiré. The Notion of Time.....	318
Peet, Stephen D. The Emblematic Mounds of Animal Effigies.....	58
Peritz, Ismar, J. Woman in the Ancient Hebrew Cult.....	317
Péres, Dr. Jean. <i>L'art et le réel</i>	448
Pfungst, Dr. Arthur. Translation of T. W. Rhys Davids's <i>Buddhism</i> . 382.— <i>Ein Deutscher Buddhist. Oberpräsidialrat Theodor Schultze</i> . 505.	
Philosophic Nuggets. Carlyle, Amiel, Ruskin, and Kingsley.....	768
Piat, Abbé C. <i>La Personne Humaine</i> (Human Personality).....	54
Pillon, F. The Philosophy of Charles Secrétan.....	56
Pringsheim, Professor. Irrational Numbers, and Convergency.....	119
Quick, Rev. R. H. Life and Remains. Edited by F. Storr.....	704
Regnaud, Paul. <i>Comment Naissent Les Mythes</i>	56
Rijnhart, Rev. Peter. Assassination of.....	192
Robertson. John M. A Short History of Freethought, Ancient and Modern..	702
Roberty, Prof. E. De. <i>Les fondements de l'éthique</i>	511
Robinson, Prof. James Harvey. Petrarch. The First Modern Scholar and Man of Letters.....	124
Sacred Books of the East, An American Edition of.....	56
Salmond, Prof. S. S. F. The Critical Review of Theological and Philosophical Literature.....	127
<i>Sammlung Göschen</i>	313
Schmitt, Dr. Eugen Heinrich. <i>Friedrich Nietzsche an der Grenzscheide zweier Weltalter</i>	125
Schubert, Prof. Hermann. Mathematical Essays and Recreations. 52.—The Foundations of Arithmetic. 119.—Arithmetic and Algebra. 190.—Col- lection of Examples in Arithmetic and Algebra. 190.—Tables of Four- Place Logarithms. 190.— <i>Mathematische Mussestunden</i> . 446.	
Seymour, Rev. William Wood. The Cross, in Tradition, History and Art... 60	
Shakespeare's Macbeth. 126.—Merchant of Venice. 126.	
Simon, Dr. Max. Plane Analytical Geometry.....	191
Smith, Dr. William Benjamin. Infinitesimal Calculus.....	319
Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report for 1896. 318.—Annual Report for 1897. 510.	
Sporer, Dr. Benedikt. <i>Niedere Analysis</i>	190
Stanley, Hiram M. Psychology for Beginners.....	574
Starr, Prof. Frederick. The Mixe Idol. 574.—American Indians. 699.	
Streamers, Volney. Voices of Doubt and Trust.....	767
Strong, Dawson M. The Metaphysics of Christianity and Buddhism.....	507
Strong, Frances L. All the Year Round: A Nature Reader.....	315
Tannery, Jules. <i>Leçons d'arithmétique, théorique et pratique</i>	125
Tan Tek Soon. The Chinese Problem.....	637
Tarde, G. The Laws of Society: A Sketch of Sociology.....	55
Theology, Summer School of.....	384
Thomas, Dr. Félix P. <i>L'éducation des sentiments</i> . 448.— <i>Morale et Édu- cation</i> . 575.	
Tille, Prof. Alexander. The Works of Nietzsche.....	53
Tisserand, M. M. and H. Andoyer. Cosmography.....	316
Titsworth, Rev. Judson. The Moral Evolution.....	702
Topinard, Dr. Paul. Science and Faith.....	763
Trede, Rev. Th. <i>Das Heidenthum in der römischen Kirche</i>	384
Trine, Ralph Waldo. In Tune with the Infinite.....	382
Van Dyke, Dr. The Gospel for a World of Sin.....	703
Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class.....	766
Vedra, Yarmo. Heliocentric Astrology.....	767
Warren, Henry Clarke. Obituary.....	376
Watson, Thomas E. Story of France.....	314
Wenley, Dr. R. M. Preparation for Christianity in the Ancient World.....	765
Whitney, Emily. The Victory of the Will. <i>La volonté de vivre</i>	510
Wilde, Oscar. The Ballad of Reading Gaol.....	445

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
AN ILLUSTRATED LIFE OF JESUS, BY J. JAMES TISSOT.

BY CLIFTON HARBY LEVY.

AT least two great Frenchmen have gone to Palestine for the purpose of presenting the world with the life of Jesus. The result of Ernest Renan's pilgrimage was a romance charming in style, incisive in method, but yet so radical a departure from orthodox conceptions that it is considered by many anything but a true life of Jesus. Twelve years ago another Frenchman went on a pilgrimage to Palestine for a similar purpose, but he was an artist and at the same time a devout believer in the Scripture. The result of M. James Tissot's work is a remarkable illustrated life of Jesus which follows closely the lines of Holy Writ and tradition.

In 1885 James Tissot was a well-known figure in the art circles of Paris and London. He had painted any number of charming studies in the life of men and women of society. He was a thoroughly French artist in the mode of attack, a realist—yet not bound down to a theory so closely as to be a mere photographer. Every one of these early paintings is instinct with life, is full of sentiment, is an epitome of some phase of human thought or action. It was during this year that he was completing a series of paintings dealing with "The Woman of Paris." One picture in the series was to be that of a choir singer. So as to get the correct background and environment as well as the spirit of this composition, the artist visited the Church of St. Sulpice in Paris. While attending service in this church the deeply emotional character of the artist was stirred by the solemn mass, and, at the climax of the service, it seemed to him as if he saw a great picture which was not upon the walls of the church. In it were ruins of a modern

castle into which two peasants, man and woman, had strayed. Oppressed by the failure of all their efforts, they threw down the small bundle of their belongings and sat amid the ruins bowed in



JAMES TISSOT.

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despair. From force of habit or the very depths of suffering, they called upon God, and in answer to this prayer a being seemed to glide toward them through the ruins. In that being they see Jesus covered with the mantle upon whose border is represented the pic-

ture first of the "Fall of Man" then of "The Passion" denoted by the kiss of Judas. Jesus leans his head upon the shoulder of the man, extends his bleeding hands as if to say, I am the sacrifice. I am the solution, the only solution, of life and its problems. (P. 4.)

This picture so beset the artist that it brought on a fever, after his recovery from which he was compelled to paint what was for him an unprecedented composition, a sacred allegory.

Thereafter James Tissot was forced to abandon the earlier spirit with which his work had been animated, although he had already turned the half century of his life. It was impossible for him to paint or etch, as he had before, pictures of women with Gainsborough hats or men and women reclining upon the deck of a steamer; his spirit was changed, there was a metamorphosis of the entire being.

It is true that up to this time M. Tissot had been a Catholic more by courtesy than by conviction, that he had been interested deeply in the problems of spiritualism, hypnotism, and thought-transference, but some such moment as this one in the church was required to affect the whole spirit of the artist's work.

After completing his painting of "The Inward Voices" or "The Ruins," as it might be called, he determined to paint the real Jesus if it were possible. To do this he recognised the absolute necessity of a pilgrimage to Palestine. He was dissatisfied with the ordinary presentation even of the figure of Christ, for it seemed to him that in hardly any instance had even the greatest artists been able to free themselves from slavery to their environment and native country. It has been remarked over and over again that every land has a Jesus of that land; that the French painters paint French Jesuses, the Italian painters, Italian, the Dutch school, Dutch. M. Tissot wished to paint Jesus the Jew of the first century, not of the nineteenth or any other period. He went to Palestine intent upon this design of painting a picture of the real Jesus and perhaps his apostles. After his preliminary studies when he was about to return to Europe with the sketches gathered during his travels of a few months, he felt dissatisfied at the incompleteness of his work and decided to return and make perhaps fifty more. But when these were complete neither the conscience of the artist nor of the believer was satisfied, and it was only after ten years of labor and the completion of three hundred and sixty-five paintings and one hundred and fifty pen and ink drawings that M. Tissot was content to exhibit and publish his



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THE RUINS.

work as a real reconstruction of the life and surroundings of Him whom Christendom worships.



JESUS AND HIS MOTHER.

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These paintings and drawings have now been brought to the United States and are being exhibited under the auspices of the



A VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS.

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American Art Association in New York, Chicago, Boston, Pittsburg, Washington, Philadelphia, and other cities.

The pictures have also been reproduced in several volumes, being grouped in chronological order under various heads. The



JESUS ADMONISHING THE APOSTLES

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first division deals with the "Childhood of Jesus" in most sympathetic fashion. Here the artist has been forced to utilise the types which he had gathered from his studies of the inhabitants of Palestine, and especially of Jewish children, that he might give the

world as realistic and truthful pictures as were possible of Jesus, the boy at Nazareth. That composition entitled "Jesus and His

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JESUS ASLEEP DURING THE STORM.



Mother" is perhaps one of the best illustrations of the artist's method of furnishing the actual Oriental background and costume,

as well as a poetic presentation of the figures and their expressions. (P. 5.)

In the next grouping, dealing with the "Ministry of Jesus," we have the most complete study of those three years of ministry that had yet been given to the world by the hands of a master artist. He begins with the forerunner of Jesus, John the Baptist, (p. 6) and outlines each incident in the career of Christ that has been chronicled either by legends or Scripture. In the picture, for instance, of "Jesus Ministered to by Angels" we have a strange, mystic conception far different from the usually accepted interpretation of the statement. Here it is not a ministry by food and drink, but a ministry of the touch, a transference of spirit, so to speak. This picture is not reproduced.

In the Oriental grouping, where Jesus is admonishing the apostles, we have the background of waving palms and that dignified figure of the leader addressing his disciples as he understood the character of each and every one. The faces of the apostles themselves are character studies of no small value; the coloring of the original adds infinitely to the effect which must be imagined when seen in a black-and-white reproduction. (P. 7.)

The picture of "Jesus Asleep During the Storm" serves as a striking instance of the artist's combination of truth and sentiment. The boat, which is tossed high by the waves, is just such a boat as Jesus must have used on this perilous journey. The figure of Jesus himself sleeping so calmly while the crew rushes about mad with terror is doubtless intended by the artist to typify the wonderful serenity which is one of the leading characteristics of the Jesus of the New Testament. (P. 8.)

But, M. Tissot has not forgotten any of the minor characters in the great Christian tragedy. Not a parable fails of illustration to make it both clear and comprehensible. His pictures of the minor personages are as striking as those of the leading characters, for he recognises the fact that nothing is of slight importance to Christendom which bears upon those three years of activity. His drawings of Mary Magdalene, before and after her conversion, are eloquent commentaries upon the significance of Jesus's attitude towards her and her class, as well as of her personal change of life. (P. 10.)

The later groupings of the paintings under the headings "Holy Week," "The Passion," and "The Resurrection," include many compositions illustrative both of careful archæological study and deep devotion. The artist found it necessary to restore Jerusalem



MARY MAGDALENE AFTER HER CONVERSION.
Copyright by James Tissot, 1898.

itself in the light of modern discoveries in order to paint Jesus and the closing scenes of his career there. The Temple of Jerusalem itself is no small triumph in reconstructive archæology. Calvary



ELI, ELI, LAMA SABACHTHANI.

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has also been restored, giving to Christendom the truer conception of that place as a little mound, not more than twenty-two feet high, upon which the final scene of the tragedy was enacted. The artist

omits nothing of all the events appertaining to that final week. The arrest, the various trials before conviction, and the supreme sufferings afterwards are all pictured in detail. In fact, some critics have objected to the too great detail with which this theme has been treated. They object to the pictures dealing with "The Driving of the First Nail," "The Driving of the Nails Into the Feet," "The Elevation of the Cross," etc. But the artist replies: "If men are to understand all of the sufferings which that most horrible of Roman customs, crucifixion, brought upon Jesus, they must see each and every act."

Possibly the finest of all this series is that painting of the last moments when the martyr quotes from the Psalms the memorable phrase, "Eli, Eli, lama Sabachthani!" (P. 11.)

In dealing with the Resurrection the artist employs most simple devices picturing the several appearances of Jesus to those who had believed in Him.

In the book in which the pictures are reproduced each composition is accompanied by an extract from the Gospel furnishing the basis of that picture. These extracts are taken from the Vulgate and the authorised version, appearing on the left and right hand sides of the pages, respectively. In addition to the Biblical basis of the compositions the artist has found it necessary to write a large number of notes explaining the reasons for which he paints each picture as he does, at the same time giving very full accounts of the customs of the Jews at the time of Jesus, by which it is made possible to understand otherwise inexplicable incidents.

The work of M. Tissot will interest not merely the believers in Christianity, who are desirous of knowing all they can about the founder of the faith, but inasmuch as the artist has not relied merely upon intuition, but has studied the ground carefully and has listened to the instructions even of the rabbis in Jerusalem upon important points, it interests also the Jews and other students of history who desire to understand this important epoch more fully.

There can be no doubt of the value of these ten years of labor spent upon a period of which the world knows so very little. The objection raised by some who have seen the paintings, that Jesus seems so human, will not be considered anything but praise by those who regard him as one of the world's greatest men. The fact that this artist who was seeking the truth was compelled to paint Jesus first as a child, then as a man, in order that he might present him first as a martyr and then as a God, is no small trib-

ute to the conscientiousness with which, Christian believer though he be, M. Tissot has done his work.

When these pictures were exhibited in Paris in 1894, and in London two years following, they created a great sensation, and it is probable that their effect in the United States will be no less remarkable.

ABSTRACTION PRIOR TO SPEECH.¹

BY PROF. TH. RIBOT.

SAVE in extremely rare cases,² where the mind, like a mirror, passively reflects external impressions, intellectual activity may always be reduced to one of the two following types: associating, combining, unifying; or dissociating, isolating, and separating. These cardinal operations underlie all forms of *cognition*, from the lowest to the highest, and constitute its unity of composition.

Abstraction belongs to the second type. It is a normal and necessary process of the mind, dependent on attention, i. e., on the limitation, willed or spontaneous, of the field of consciousness. The act of abstraction implies in its genesis negative and positive conditions, and is the result of both.

The negative conditions consist essentially in the fact that we cannot apprehend more than one quality or one aspect, varying according to the circumstances, in any complex whole,—because consciousness, like the retina, is restricted to a narrow region of clear perception.

The positive condition is a state which has been appropriately termed a “psychical reinforcement” of that which is being abstracted, and it is naturally accompanied by a weakening of that which is abstracted from. The true characteristic of abstraction is this partial increment of intensity. While involving elimination, it is actually a positive mental process. The elements or qualities of a percept or a representation which we omit do not necessarily involve such suppression. We leave them out of account simply because they do not suit our ends for the moment, and are complementary.³

¹ Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.

² For example, in moments of surprise and in states approximating to pure sensation.

³ Schmidkunz, *Ueber die Abstraction*. Halle: Stricker, 1889. This little work of forty-three pages contains a good historical and theoretical exposition of the question.

Abstraction being, then, in spite of negative appearances, a positive operation, how are we to conceive it? Attention is necessary to it, but it is more than attention. It is an augmentation of intensity, but it is more than an augmentation of intensity. Suppose a group of representations $a + b + c = d$. To abstract from b and c in favor of a , would ostensibly give $a = d - (b + c)$. If this were so, b and c would be retained unaltered in consciousness; there would be no abstraction. On the other hand, since it is impossible for the whole representation d to be suppressed outright, b and c cannot be totally obliterated. They subsist, accordingly, in a residual state which may be termed x , and the abstract representation is hence not a but $a + x$ or A . Thus the elements of abstract representations are the same as those of concrete representations; only some are strengthened, others weakened: whence arise new groupings. Abstraction, accordingly, consists in the formation of new groups of representations which, while strengthening certain elements of the concrete representations, weaken other elements of the same.¹

We see from the above that abstraction depends genetically upon the causes which awaken and sustain attention. I have described these causes elsewhere,² and cannot here return to their consideration.

It is sufficient to remark that abstraction, like attention, may be instinctive, spontaneous, and natural; or reflective, voluntary, and artificial. In the first category the abstraction of a quality or mode of existence originates in some attraction, or from utility; hence it is a common manifestation of intellectual life and is even met with, as we shall see, among many of the lower animals. In its second form, the rarer and more exalted, it proceeds less from the qualities of the object than from the will of the subject; it presupposes a choice, an elimination of negligible elements, which is often laborious, as well as the difficult task of maintaining the abstract element clearly in consciousness. In fine, it is always a special application of the attention which, adapted as circumstances

¹ Schmidknecht, *loc. cit.* This author, who rightly insists upon the positive character of abstraction (which is too frequently considered as a negation) observes that no concept, not even that of infinity, is in its psychological genesis the result of negation, for, "in order to deduce from the idea of a finite thing the idea of infinity, it is first necessary to abstract from that thing its quality of finality, which is certainly a positive act; subsequently, in order to reach infinity, it is sufficient either constantly to increase the time, magnitude, and intensity of the finite which is a positive process; or to deny the limits of the finite, which is tantamount to denying the negation."

² *Psychology of Attention*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.

require to observation, synthesis, action, etc., here functions as an instrument of analysis.

A deeply-rooted prejudice asserts that abstraction is a mental act of relative infrequency. This fallacy obtains in current parlance, where "abstract" is a synonym of difficult, obscure, inaccessible. This is a psychological error resulting from an incomplete view: all abstraction is illegitimately reduced to its higher forms. The faculty of abstracting, from the lowest to the highest degrees, is constantly the same: its development is dependent on that of (general) intelligence and of language; but it exists in embryo even in those primitive operations which are properly concerned with the concrete, i. e., perception and representation. Several recent authors have emphasised this point.¹

Perception is *par excellence* the faculty of cognising the concrete. It strives to embrace all the qualities of its object without completely succeeding, because it is held in check by an internal foe,—the natural tendency of the mind to simplify and to eliminate. The same horse, at a given moment, is not perceived in the same manner by a jockey, a veterinary surgeon, a painter and a tyro. To each of these, certain qualities, which vary individually, stand in relief, and others recede into the background. Except in cases of methodical and prolonged investigation (where we have observation, and not perception) there is always an unconscious selection of some principal characteristics which, grouped together, become a substitute for the totality. It must not be forgotten that perception is pre-eminently a *practical* operation, that its mainspring is interest or utility, and that in consequence we neglect—i. e., leave in the field of obscure consciousness—whatever at the moment concerns neither our desires nor our purposes. It would be superfluous to review all the forms of perception (visual, auditory, tactual, etc.), and to show that they are governed by this same law of utility; but it should be remarked that the natural mechanism by which the strengthened elements and the weakened elements are separated, is a rude cast of what subsequently becomes abstraction, that the same forces are in play, and are ultimately reducible to some definite direction given to the attention.

With the image, the intermediate stage between percept and concept, the reduction of the object represented to a few fundamental features, is still more marked. Not merely is there among the different representations which I may have of some man, dog, or tree, one that for the time being necessarily excludes the others

¹ See especially Hoeffding, *Psychologie*. German translation. Second Edition, pp. 223 et seq.

(my oak tree perforce appears to me in summer foliage, tinted by autumn, or bereft of leaves,—in bright light or in shade), but even this individual, concrete representation which prevails over the others is no more than a sketch, a reduction of reality with many details omitted. Apart from the exceptionally gifted men in whom mental vision and mental audition are perfect, and wholly commensurate (as it would seem) with perception, the representations which we call exact are never so, except in their most general features. Compare the image we have, with our eyes closed, of a monument with the perception of the monument itself; the remembrance of a melody with its vocal or instrumental execution. In the average man, the image, the would-be copy of reality invariably suffers a conspicuous impoverishment, which is enormous in the less lavishly endowed; it is here reduced to a mere schema, limited to the inferior concepts.

Doubtless it may be objected that the work of dissociation in perception and representation is incomplete and partial. It would be strange and illogical indeed if the abstract were to triumph in the very heart of the concrete; we do but submit that it is here in germ, in embryonic shape. And hence, when abstraction appears in its true form, as the consciousness of one unique quality isolated from the rest, it is no new manifestation but a fruition, it is a simplification of simplifications.

The state of consciousness thus attained, by the fixation of attention on one quality exclusively, and by its ideal dissociation from the rest, becomes, as we know, a notion which is neither individual nor general, but abstract,—and this is the material of generalisation.

The sense of identity, the power of apprehending resemblances, is, as has justly been said, “the keel and backbone of our thinking”; without it we should be lost in the incessant stream of things.¹ Are there in nature any complete resemblances, any absolutely similar events? It is extremely doubtful. It might be supposed that a person who reads a sentence several times in succession, who listens several times to the same air, who tastes all the four quarters of the same fruit, would experience in each case an identical perception. But this is not so. A little reflexion will show that besides differences in time, in the varying moods of the subject, and in the cumulative effect of repeated perceptions, there is at least between the first perception and the second, that radical difference which separates the new from the repeated. In fact, the

¹W. James, *Psychology*. Vol. I., p. 459.

material given us by external and internal experience consists of resemblances alloyed by differences which vary widely in degree,—in other words, analogies. The perfect resemblance assumed between things vanishes as we come to know them better. At first sight a new people exhibits to the traveller a well-determined general type; later, the more he observes, the more apparent uniformity is resolved into varieties. "I have taken the trouble," says Agassiz, "to compare thousands of individuals of the same species; in one case I pushed the comparison so far as to have placed side by side 27,000 specimens of one and the same shell (genus *Neretina*). I can assure you that in these 27,000 specimens I did not find two that were perfectly alike."

Is this faculty of grasping resemblances—the substrate of generalisation—primitive, in the absolute signification of the word? Does it mark the first awakening of the mind, in point of cognition? For several contemporary writers (Spencer, Bain, Schneider, and others) the consciousness of difference is the primordial factor; the consciousness of resemblance comes later. Others uphold the opposite contention.¹ As a matter of fact this quest for the *primum cognitum* is beyond our grasp; like all genetical questions, it eludes our observation and experience.

No conclusion can be formed save on purely logical arguments, and each side advances reasons that carry a certain weight. There is, moreover, at the bottom of the whole discussion, the grave error of identifying the embryonic state of the mind with its adult forms, and of presupposing a sharp initial distinction between discrimination and assimilation. The question must remain open, incapable of positive solution by our psychology. The incontestable truth with regard to the mind, as we know it in its developed and organised state, is that the two processes advance *pari passu*, and are reciprocally causative.

In sum, abstraction and generalisation considered as elementary acts of the mind, and reduced to their simplest conditions, involve two processes:

1. The former, *abstraction*, implies a dissociative process,

¹ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*. Vol. I., Part 2, Chapter II.—Bain (in the last chapter of *Emotions and Will*), says that nothing more fundamental can possibly be assigned as a mark of intelligence than the feeling of difference between consecutive or co-existing impressions. "There are cases, however, where agreement imparts the shock requisite for rousing the intellectual wave; but it is agreement so qualified as to be really a mode of difference. For review and ample discussion of this problem see Ladd's *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, Chapter XIV. The earlier psychologists, in considering the 'faculty of comparison' which acts by resemblance and difference, as primordial, had observed the same fact, although they described it in different terms.

operating on the raw data of experience. It has subjective causes which are ultimately reducible to attention. It has objective causes which may be due to the fact that a determinate quality is given us as an integral part of widely different groups.

"Any total impression whose elements are never experienced apart must be unanalysable. If all cold things were wet and all wet things cold, if all liquids were transparent and no non-liquid were transparent, we should scarcely discriminate between coldness and wetness and scarcely ever invent separate names for liquidity and transparency. . . . What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind. One might call this the law of dissociation by varying concomitants."¹

2. The latter, *generalisation*, originates in association by resemblance, but even in its lowest degree it rises beyond this, since it implies a synthetic act of fusion. It does not, in fact, consist in the successive excitation of similar or analogous percepts, as in the case where the image of St. Peter's in Rome suggests to me that of St. Paul's in London, of the Pantheon in Paris, and of other churches with enormous dimensions, of like architecture, and with gigantic domes. It is a condensation. The mind resembles a crucible with a precipitate of common resemblances at the bottom, while the differences have been volatilised. In proportion as we recede from this primitive and elementary form, the constitution of the general idea demands other psychological conditions which cannot be hastily enumerated.

And thus we reach the principal aim of our inquiry which purports, not to reinforce the time-worn dispute as to the nature of abstraction and generalisation, but to pursue these operations step by step in their development, and multifarious aspects. Directly we pass beyond pure individual representation we reach an ascending scale of notions which, apart from the general character possessed by all, are extremely heterogeneous in their nature, and imply distinct mental habits. The question so often discussed as to "What takes place in the mind when we are thinking by general ideas?" is not to be disposed of in one definite answer, but finds variable response according to the circumstances. In order to give an adequate reply, the principal degrees of this scale must first be determined. And for this we require an *objective notation* which shall give them some external, though not arbitrary, mark.

¹ W. James, *Psychology*. Vol. I., pp. 502 and 506.

The first distinguishing mark is given by the absence or presence of words. Abstraction and generalisation, with no possible aid from language, constitute the inferior group which some recent writers have designated by the appropriate name of *generic images*¹—a term which clearly shows their intermediate nature between the pure image, and the general notion, properly so called.

The second class, which we have termed *intermediate abstraction*, implies the use of words. At their lowest stage these concepts hardly rise above the level of the generic image: they can be reduced to a vague schema, in which the word is almost a superfluous accompaniment. At a stage higher the parts are inverted: the representative schema becomes more and more impoverished, and is obliterated by the word, which rises in consciousness to the first rank.

Finally, the third class, that of the *higher concepts*, has for its distinguishing mark that it can no longer be represented. If any image arises in consciousness it does not sensibly assist the movement of thought, and may even impede it. Everything, apparently, at least, is subordinated to language.

This enumeration of the stages of abstraction can for the present only be given roughly and broadly. Every phase of its evolution should be studied in itself, and accurately determined by its internal and external characteristics. As to the legitimacy, the objective and practical value, of this schematic distribution, nothing less than a detailed exploration from one end to the other of our subject, can confirm or overthrow it.

We shall go over certain of the lower forms, dwelling upon these at some length, because they are usually neglected, or altogether omitted. This is the *pre-linguistic* period of abstraction and generalisation: words are totally wanting; they are an unknown factor. How far is it possible without the aid of language to transcend the level of perception, and of consecutive images, and to attain a more elevated intellectual standpoint? In replying empirically, we have three fairly copious sources of information: animals, children who have not yet acquired speech, and uneducated deaf-mutes. We shall speak of this in subsequent articles.

¹This term is borrowed from the well-known works of Galton on composite photographs, which are scarcely more than twenty years old. Huxley in his book on Hume (Chapter IV.) appears to be the first who introduced it into psychology, as shown by the following passage: "This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what takes place in the formation of compound photographs—when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which they differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed a *generic* portrait of the six is produced. Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are generic. . . . And hence it follows that our ideas of the impressions in question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those impressions; while at the same time they may exist in the mind independently of language." Romanes employs the word "recept" for "generic images," as marking their intermediate place between the "percept" which is below, and the "concept" which is above them.

“THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON.”

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE *Wisdom of Solomon*¹ probably appeared not far from the first year of our era. It is written in almost classical Greek, is full of striking and poetic interpretations and spiritualisations of Jewish legends, and transfused with a piety at once warm and mystical. Solomon is summoned much in the way that the “Wandering Jew,” Ahasuerus, is called up in Shelley’s “Prometheus,” yet not quite allegorically, to testify concerning the Past, and concerning the mysteries of the invisible world. He has left behind his secularist Proverbs and his worldly wisdom; but though he now rises as a prophet of other worldliness, not a word is uttered inconsistent with his having been a saint from the beginning, albeit “chastised” and “proved.” In fact he gives his spiritual autobiography, which is that of a Son of God wise and “undefiled” from childhood. His burden is to warn the kings and judges of the world of the blessedness that awaits the righteous,—the misery that awaits the unrighteous,—beyond the grave.

The work impresses me as having been written by one who had long been an enthusiastic Solomonist, but who had been spiritually revolutionised by attaining the new belief of immortality. It does not appear as if the apparition of Solomon was to this writer a simple imagination. Solomon seems to be alive, or rather as if never dead. “For thou (God) hast power of life and death: thou ledest to the gates of hell, and bringest up again.” “The giving heed unto her (Wisdom’s) laws is the assurance of incorruption and incorruption maketh us near unto God: therefore the desire of Wisdom bringeth to a Kingdom.”

The Jewish people idealised Solomon’s reign long before they idealised the man himself; and indeed he had to reach his halo

¹ *Sophia Solomonica.*

under personified epithets derived from his fame,—as “Melchizedek,” and “Prince of Peace.” The nation sighed for the restoration of his splendid empire, but could not describe their Coming Man as a returning Solomon, because the priests and prophets,—a gentry little respected by the Wise Man,—steadily ascribed all the national misfortunes to the shrines built to other deities than Jahveh by the royal Citizen of the World. Thus grew such prophetic indirections as “the House of David,” “Jesse’s branch,” and finally “Son of David.”

But this idea of the returning hero does not appear to have been original with any Semitic people; it is first found among them in the Oriental book of Job, who longs to sleep in some cavern for ages, then reappear, and, even if his flesh were shrivelled, find that his good name was vindicated (xiv.). This idea of the Sleeping Hero (which is traced in many examples in my work on *The Wandering Jew*) appears to have gained its earliest expression in the legend of King Yima, in Persia,—the original of such sleepers as Barbarossa and King Arthur, as well as of the legendary Enoch, Moses, and Elias, who were to precede or attend the revived Son of David. Solomon, whose name probably gave Jerusalem the peaceful half of its name (*Salem*) would no doubt have been central among the “Undying Ones” had it not been for the Parliament of Religions he set up in that city. But he had to wait a thousand years for his honorable fame to awaken.

In the *Wisdom of Solomon* the Queen of Sheba is also recalled into life. She is, as Renan pointed out, transfigured in the personified Wisdom, and her gifts become mystical. “All good things together came to me with her, and Wisdom goeth before them: and I knew not that she was the mother of them.” She is amiable, beautiful, and gave him his knowledge:

“All such things as are secret or manifest, them I knew. For Wisdom, which is the worker of all things, taught me: for in her is an understanding spirit, holy, one only, manifold; subtle, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt, loving the thing that is good, quick, which cannot be letted, ready to do good, kind to man, steadfast, sure, free from care, having all power, overseeing all things, and pervading all intellectual, pure, and most subtle spirits. For Wisdom is more moving than motion itself; she passeth and goeth through all things by reason of her pureness. For she is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty: therefore can no impure thing fall into her. For she is the brightness of the everlasting

light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. And alone, she can do all things; herself unchanged, she maketh all things new; and in all ages, entering into holy souls, she maketh them intimates of God, and prophets. For God loveth only him who dwelleth with Wisdom. She is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of stars; compared with the light she is found before it,—for after light cometh night, but evil shall not prevail against Wisdom." (vii. 21–30.)

In *Sophia Solomontos* Solomon relates his espousal of Wisdom, who sat beside the throne of God (ix. 4). But there remains with God a detective Wisdom called the Holy Spirit. Wisdom and the Holy Spirit have different functions. "Thy counsel who hath known except thou give Wisdom, and send thy Holy Spirit from above?" This verse (ix. 17) is followed by two chapters (x., xi.) relating the work of Wisdom through past ages as a Saviour. But then comes an account of the severe chastening functions of the Holy Spirit. "For thine incorruptible Spirit is in all things (i. e., nothing is concealed from her), therefore chastenest thou them by little and little that offend," etc. (xii. 1, 2.)

There is here a slight variation in the historic development of the Spirit of God, and one so pregnant with results that it may be well to refer to some of the earlier Hebrew conceptions. The Spirit of God described in Genesis i. 2, as "brooding" over the waters was evidently meant to represent a detached agent of the Deity. The legend is obviously related to that of the dove going forth over the waters of the deluge. The dove probably acquired its symbolical character as a messenger between earth and heaven from the marvellous powers of the carrier pigeon—powers well known in ancient Egypt—it also appears that its cooing was believed to be an echo on earth of the voice of God.¹ We have already seen (viii.) that Wisdom, when first personified, was identified with this "brooding" spirit over the surface of the waters, and also that in a second (Jahvist) personification she is a severe and reproving agent. But in the second verse of Genesis there is a darkness on the abyss, and both darkness and abyss were personified. In the rigid development of monotheism all of these beings were necessarily regarded as agents of Jahveh—monopolist of all powers. We thus find such accounts as that in 1 Samuel 16, where the Spirit of Jahveh departed from Saul and an evil Spirit from Jahveh troubled him.

Although the Spirit of God was generally supposed to convey

¹ Bath Kol,—“daughter of a voice.”

miraculous knowledge, especially of future events, and superior skill, it is not, I believe, in any book earlier than *Sophia Solomontos* definitely ascribed the function of a detective. There is in Ecclesiastes (x. 20) a passage which suggests the carrier: "Curse not the King, no, not in thy thought; and curse not the rich even in thy bedchamber; for a bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that which hath wings shall tell the matter."¹ This was evidently in the mind of the writer of *Sophia Solomontos* in the following verses:

"Wisdom is a loving Spirit, and will not (cannot) acquit a blasphemer of his words: for God is a witness of his reins, and a true beholder of his heart, and a heaver of his tongue; for the Spirit of the Lord filleth the world, and that which containeth all things hath knowledge of the voice; therefore he that speaketh unrighteous things cannot be hid, neither shall vengeance when it punisheth, pass by him. For inquisition shall be made into the counsels of the ungodly: the sound of his words shall come unto the Lord for the disclosure of his wickedness, the ear of jealousy heareth all things, and the sound even of murmurings is not secret."

Here we have the origin of the "unpardonable sin." The Holy Spirit detects and informs, Jahveh avenges, and if the offence is blasphemy Wisdom, the Saviour, cannot acquit (as the "Loving Spirit" of God it is for her *ultra vires*). This detective holy spirit appears to be an evolution from both Wisdom and Satan the Accuser, in Job a son of God. By associating with Solomon on earth, Wisdom was without the severe holiness essential to Jahvist conceptions of divine government; in other words, personified Wisdom, whose "delight was with the sons of men" (Prov. viii. 31) was too humanised to fulfil the conditions necessary for upholding the temple at a time when penal sanctions were withdrawn from the priesthood. A celestial spy was needed, and also an uncomfortable *Sheol*, if the ancient ordinances and sacrifices were to be preserved at all under the rule of Roman liberty, and amid the cosmopolitan conditions prevailing at Jerusalem, and still more at Alexandria.²

¹ This may, however, have been flotsam from the Orient. Mahanshadha, a sort of Solomon in Buddhist tales, had a wonderful parrot, Charaka, which he employed as a spy. It revealed to him the plot to poison King-Janaka, whose chief Minister he was. (*Tibetan Tales*, p. 168.)

² M. Didson (*Christian Iconography*, Bohn's ed., i., p. 464) mentions a picture of the thirteenth century in which the dove moving over the face of the waters (Gen. i.) is black, God not having yet created light. It may be, however, that the mediæval idea was that the Holy Ghost, as a heavenly spy, was supposed to assume the color of the night in order to detect the deeds

With regard to Wisdom herself, there is a sentence which requires notice, especially as no unweighed word is written in the work under notice. It is said, "In that she is conversant with God, she magnifieth her nobility; yea, the Lord of all things himself loved her." (viii. 3.) This seems to be the germ of Philo's idea of Wisdom as the Mother: "And she, receiving the seed of God, with beautiful birth-pangs brought forth this world, His visible Son, only and well-beloved." The writer of *Sophia Solomontos* is very careful to be vague in speculations of this kind, while suggesting inferences with regard to them. Thus, alluding to Moses before Pharaoh, he says, "She (Wisdom) entered into the servant of the Lord, and withstood dreadful kings in wonders and signs" (x. 16), but leaves us to mere conjecture as to whether he (the writer) still had Wisdom in mind when writing (xvii. 13) of the failure of these enchantments and the descent of the Almighty Word, for the destruction of the first-born:

"For while all things are quiet silence, and that night was in the midst of her swift course, thine Almighty Word leaped down from Heaven out of thy Royal throne, as a fierce man of war into the midst of a land of destruction; and brought thine unfeigned commandment as a sharp sword, and standing up filled all things with death; and it touched the heaven, but it stood upon the earth."¹

The Word in this place (*ὁ παντοδύναμός σου λόγος*) is clearly reproduced in the Epistle to the Hebrews (i. 5). "The Word of God is living, and active, and sharper than any two-edged sword;" and the same military metaphor accompanies this "Word" into Revelation xix. 13. This continuity of metaphor has apparently been overlooked by Alford (*Greek Testament*, vol. iv., p. 226) who regards the use of the phrase "Word of God" (*ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ*) as linking Revelation to the author of the fourth Gospel, whereas in this Gospel Logos is never followed by "of God," while it is so followed in Hebrews iv. 12.

This evolution of the "Word" is clear. In the "Wisdom of Solomon" Wisdom is the creative Word and the Saviour. The Word leaping down from the divine throne and bearing the sword of vengeance is more like the son of the celestial counterpart of

done in darkness without itself being seen. In later centuries this dark dove was shown at the ear of magicians and idols, the inspirer of prophets and saints being the white dove.

¹ Cf. Gospel of Peter: "They behold three men coming out of the tomb, and the two supporting the one, and the cross following them, and the heads of the two reached to the heavens, and that of him who was being led went above the heavens."

Wisdom, namely, the detective Holy Spirit (called in i. 5 "the Holy Spirit of Discipline"). But in the era we are studying, all words by able writers were living things, and were two-edged swords, and long after they who wrote them were dead went on with active and sundering work undreamed of by those who first uttered them.

The Zoroastrian elements which we remarked in Jesus Ben Sira's "Wisdom" are even more pronounced in the "Wisdom of Solomon." The Persian worshippers are so mildly rebuked (xiii.) for not passing beyond fire and star to the "origin of beauty," that one may suppose the author, probably an Alexandrian, must have had friends among them. At any rate his conception of a resplendent God is Mazdean, his all-seeing Holy Spirit is the Parsê "Anahita," and his Wisdom is Armaîti, the "loving spirit" on earth, the saviour of men.¹ The opposing kingdoms of Ahuramazda and Angromainyu, and especially Zoroaster's original division of the universe into "the living and the not-living," are reflected in the "Wisdom of Solomon," i. 13-16:

"God made not death: neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. He created all things that they might have their being; and the generations of the world were healthful; and there (was) no poison of destruction in them, nor (any) kingdom of death on the earth; (for righteousness is immortal): but ungodly men with their deeds and words evoked Death to them: when they thought to have it their friend they consumed to naught, and made a covenant with Death, being fit to take sides with it."

In the moral and religious evolution which we have been tracing it has been seen that the utter indifference of the Cosmos to human good and evil, right and wrong, was the theme of Job; that in Ecclesiastes the same was again declared, and the suggestion made that if God helped or afflicted men it must depend on some point of etiquette or observance unconnected with moral considerations, so that man need not omit pleasure but only be punctilious when in the temple; that in Jesus Ben Sira's contribution to his fathers' "Wisdom," the moral character of God was maintained, moral evil regarded as hostile to God, and imaginary sanctions in-

¹ Invoke, O Zoroaster, the powerful Spirit (Wind) formed by Mazda (Light) and Spenta Armaîti (earth-mother), the fair daughter of Ahuramazda. Invoke, O Zoroaster, my Fravashi (deathless past), who am Ahuramazda, greatest, fairest, most solid, most intelligent, best shapen, highest in purity, whose soul is the holy Word.

"Invoke Mithra (descending light), the lord of wide pastures, a god armed with beautiful weapons, with the most glorious of all weapons, with the most fiend smiting of all weapons.

"Invoke the most holy glorious Word."—*Zendavesta*. (Vend. Farg. xix. 2.)

vented, accompanied by pleadings with God to indorse them by new signs and wonders. Such signs not appearing, and no rewards and punishments being manifested in human life, the next step was to assign them to a future existence, and this step was taken in the *Wisdom of Solomon*. There remained but one more necessity, namely, that there should be some actual evidence of that future existence. Agur's question had remained unanswered—

"Who has ascended into heaven and come down again?
Such an one would I question about God."

To this the reply was to be the resurrection from death claimed for the last of the spiritual race of Solomon.

MONTESQUIEU.

(1689-1755.)

BY PROFESSOR L. LÉVY-BRUHL.

THE eighteenth century in France, at least as regards philosophy, may be divided distinctly in the middle. It was about 1750 that Rousseau, Diderot, Buffon, and Condillac, began to produce their chief works. It was in 1751 that d'Alembert published the preliminary discourse to the *Encyclopædia*. Voltaire covers nearly the whole of the century. But Montesquieu belongs only to the first half. He was born in 1689 and saw the end of the reign of Louis XIV. The *Lettres Persanes* appeared under the Regency, and are full of allusions to the king who had just passed away. Montesquieu's last and most important work, *L'Esprit des Loix*, dates from 1748. He died in 1755.

Accordingly, Montesquieu exercised an influence upon the other "philosophers" of the age without feeling theirs, especially as he spent the latter years of his life almost uninterruptedly in his mansion at La Brède. Paris, though loved in his youth, then palled upon him, and his visits there were but brief. He thus ceased to be in direct contact with his fellow-writers, a fact which he does not seem to have very much regretted. To tell the truth, he always occupied a distinct and separate place in the literary world. In those days a man of letters was usually a poor devil who scribbled for bread and aspired to a pension, and whose language on some subjects too often reflected his obligations, his hopes, or his disappointments. Voltaire, who early comprehended the necessity of being independent, succeeded in this by acquiring wealth; but that wealth came rather late, and the period which preceded was not without troubles and bitterness. Montesquieu, on the contrary, was exempted from the two-fold struggle for existence and for position. He belonged to an honorable family of magistrates.

He was heir to one of his uncles, who bequeathed to him, together with his name, his judicial office in Bordeaux. He made money on his vineyards, and left to his children a fortune which had prospered in his hands.

The personal circumstances of Montesquieu had their significance. Bold assertions, which would have seemed more offensive in the mouth of a man not so "well-to-do," were more easily tolerated coming from him. He uttered them in a calmer tone, with more gravity and moderation. Even after he had sold his office, the fact of having been a magistrate left him some authority. When he expresses the opinion, that a reform of the penal law or of criminal jurisprudence would be desirable, it is quite another thing than if the reform were demanded by an "unqualified individual" who ran the risk of being sent to the Bastille if his ideas offended a minister of state. There is, however, another side to the picture, and class-prejudices are found in Montesquieu. He supports the privileges of the nobility, and endeavors to defend the sale of judicial offices. But he was, for all that, liberal-minded, devoted to the public good, and desirous of advancing his contemporaries towards justice and humanity.

The *Lettres Persanes* undoubtedly owed much of their swift and brilliant success to their vivacious style and pungent satire, as well as to their description of scenes of harem-life: but at the same time they foretell the author of *L'Esprit des Lois*. Reflections on the nature and principles of government, on the foundations of society and on natural justice, on the law of nations, on Roman policy, on the English constitution, and on penal laws, are all cunningly introduced into the *Lettres Persanes*. If we read them over after *L'Esprit des Lois* we seem better able to see through the complex and rather secretive nature of Montesquieu, who quite reveals himself. Voltaire, who had no sympathy with him, and yet devoted considerable attention to him, not kindly but discerningly, defines Montesquieu as a statesman, a philosopher, a wit, and a citizen. The philosopher, the statesman, the citizen, already show themselves in the *Lettres Persanes*; the wit also appears in *L'Esprit des Lois*, though he occupies there a subordinate place.

It took Montesquieu twenty years to work out the plan and gather the materials of what he calls his masterpiece. He prepared himself for it by wide and varied reading, which became more fruitful as he grew surer of what he wished to do. He travelled over a great part of Europe, made a long stay in Italy, and a longer one in England. He undoubtedly did not derive from

these travels all the profit one might expect. The account of his journey to Austria and Italy, recently published by Baron de Montesquieu, was rather disappointing; and though we have no account of his journey to England, he has said enough on the subject elsewhere to show that, even on things he was most interested in, he did not gather information with the accuracy and precision of a man of science. But at that time most writers were less particular in that respect than in our days. In England Montesquieu frequented a society dissolute in morals, infidel in religion, sceptical in philosophy, but withal extremely intelligent. He was able to see and to understand what he saw. Inaccuracy in the details did not prevent his observations from giving a general impression of veracity which was not disputed by his contemporaries. Every one knows that Montesquieu was nowhere better appreciated than in England.

L'Esprit des Lois is a grand, lofty, and enigmatic title. It is interpreted, at least partially, by the sub-title: "Of the relation which the laws should bear to the constitution of each government, to manners, climate, religion, trade, etc.," although the unfinished enumeration leaves some perplexity in our minds. It is nothing less than a political and social philosophy, conceived after a new plan, and Montesquieu was quite justified in choosing as the motto of his book: *Prolem sine matre creatam*.

His predecessors, to whom he alludes in his preface, had not the same object in view. Some, as Grotius and Puffendorf, treated especially the theory of the law of nations. Others, like Hobbes, spoke as philosophers on the origin of society and the nature of the state; or, like More and other Utopian dreamers of the sixteenth century, set up an ideal city in contrast to the real states they had before their eyes. Harrington, Algernon Sidney, and Locke, had written entirely from an English point of view. Locke's two treatises *On Civil Government* go back to first principles only in so far as it was necessary to vindicate the Revolution of 1688 and the conditions imposed upon the prince of Orange, afterwards William III.

The work of Montesquieu is entirely different. It deals with political realities, and takes its materials from history and from observed facts; herein Montesquieu stands apart from the dreamers, but he differs also from Locke in not devoting his attention to the practical, or at least immediate, application of his theories. His aim is to study, as a philosopher, and in a strictly methodical way, that body of realities which was afterwards to become the subject

of social science or sociology. Thus the *Esprit des Loix* is, properly speaking, neither a philosophy of politics, nor a philosophy of history, nor a philosophy of law, nor a philosophy of political economy; for none of these sciences is there considered by itself, but all of them are studied in their natural relations so as to deduce the principles which are common to them. Montesquieu's originality consists in having fully perceived in the various series of social phenomena that solidarity by which each of these contributes to limit the others, and is in its turn limited by them. For instance, if the government of a country is a monarchy, the laws concerning education, luxury, trade, the condition of women, the liberty of citizens, etc., will necessarily be adapted to that political form; in a republican country they will be different. Social phenomena are thus subject to fixed attendant conditions, and can form only definite systems.

In a word, there are *laws of laws*: the political, civil, and penal *laws* of any society are regulated, in their nature, their development, and even their form, by natural laws, that is, according to Montesquieu's celebrated definition, by the necessary relations derived from the nature of things. A profound thought, which tends to nothing less than subjecting to scientific form and method a vast domain hitherto neglected or regarded as inaccessible. A profound thought also, to seek the manifestation of those "laws of laws" in the mutual dependency of the various orders of social phenomena. Montesquieu thus assumes a point of view superior to that of the jurist, the historian, and the politician, and from which he overlooks them all. He shows, by means of history, how laws are modified in accordance with political forms,—and in accordance with not only these, but also with the climate, the nature of the soil, the facilities for trade, etc. This was already a remarkable attempt towards a sociologic synthesis. Well could Montesquieu speak of the "majesty" of his subject. The conception is a fine one, and we may easily understand that it should have produced a deep impression at the time of its appearance.

The performance, unfortunately, did not equal the conception. It undoubtedly has great merits. Despite a subject so austere and so unfamiliar to the very great majority of his readers, Montesquieu succeeded in not seeming dull to his contemporaries. He avoids the danger of being a doctrinaire and the no less formidable one of seeming partisan. He really looks upon all this political and social material with the eyes of a philosopher. Uneven as the work is, it is full of things both new and striking, which command

attention, and bear the impress of vigorous thought. All this is true, but, it must be confessed, it does not prevent *L'Esprit des Lois* from being but a poor fulfillment of the beautiful plan stated in the preface and the first chapters. There are several reasons for this incongruity. Some are in the very nature of the subjects; others, in the character and spirit of Montesquieu himself.

Auguste Comte has clearly shown that Montesquieu's attempt could not have been successful, because it was premature. In order that scientific sociology might be established, it was essential that biology should be sufficiently advanced: for social phenomena, although not reducible to physiological phenomena, are yet closely united with the latter. In order to study social phenomena to any purpose, it is indispensable to be already reasonably well acquainted with the laws of the development of the human race and of its organic, intellectual, and moral functions: laws which biology alone can discover. Now, at the time when Montesquieu wrote, biology as a science did not exist; hardly had chemistry, on which biology, in its turn, is immediately dependent, begun to be a science. It was therefore inevitable that Montesquieu should be unacquainted with the method which would have been suitable for the science of which he had conceived the idea; that he should seek a model among the methods of sciences already existing in his time, i. e., among the mathematical and physical sciences; and, as such a method is wholly unsuited to the investigation of sociologic laws, that there should be a sort of perpetual contradiction between Montesquieu's right *apprehension* of the subject he treats, and the wrong *method* he applies to it.

That Montesquieu knew and admired the method of Descartes is beyond doubt. To be convinced of this, one only need to remember the lectures on physics and physiology, which he delivered before the Academy of Bordeaux. In the *Lettres Persanes*, many a maxim reveals the Cartesian dictum: "The maker of nature gave motion to matter; no more was needed to produce the wonderful variety of effects we behold in the universe." Finally, in his preface to *L'Esprit des Lois*, Montesquieu explicitly announces his intention of using the deductive method. "I have laid down the general principles, and I have seen that particular cases adapt themselves to these as of their own accord, that the histories of all nations are but the consequences of them, and that each particular law is connected with some other law, or depends upon some more general one. . . . After I had found out my principles, all that I was seeking came to me." Montesquieu there-

fore really places, as Descartes does, the essential part of method in the system which derives the particular from the universal, the complex from the simple, the consequence from the principle, in short, in deduction.

In fact, however, nothing is less deductive than *L'Esprit des Loix*. The reader will rather think himself in the presence of something badly put together, fragmentary, and desultory. This impression is somewhat lessened as we look closer, but it does not disappear altogether. It may be so vivid that competent judges (not to mention Voltaire himself) have gone so far as to compare Montesquieu to his fellow-countryman Montaigne, and to say that these two Gascons, though extremely witty and deeply skilled in the art of style, were unacquainted with the art of composition. This is going too far, at least as regards Montesquieu; nevertheless, the mere fact of its having been possible, without any absurdity, to draw a comparison between Montaigne and a writer who piqued himself upon following the Cartesian method is significant enough. Shall we say that Montesquieu wished, at any cost, to avoid monotony, to keep awake the reader's interest, and to puzzle him by the curious arrangement of books and chapters? This may be, but a deeper reason may explain the condition of Montesquieu's book. If it is wanting in continuity, it is because the deductive reasoning, on the one hand, and the facts on the other hand, do not connect. The deduction remains purely abstract, and the facts, of which Montesquieu collected such a vast number, and the importance of which he duly felt, have nothing to do with the demonstration. Montesquieu usually infers a consequence from a given principle by reasoning alone. For instance, from the notion of a despotic or republican government, he infers the condition of women to be thus and so. In support of his conclusion, he quotes indifferently either a law in China, or one among the ancient Greeks, or an anecdote borrowed from the Travels of Charadin. He does not perceive that a fact thus set apart from its surroundings has no scientific or sociologic value whatever.

Montesquieu therefore lacked a method enabling him to treat of sociological facts in the proper way. How can we wonder at this, when sociologists in our days have not yet been able to agree on their method? And yet they have before their eyes the comparative method employed in biology, which has given such favorable results, but which was unknown in the time of Montesquieu. As he had no idea of this comparative method (the only one applicable, however, when we study organic beings), he conceives

social facts to be of the nature of physical phenomena, which are the same in all times and places. A given physical experiment, being performed under the same conditions must give the same result, be it in London, in Paris, or in Peking. From this beginning, Montesquieu thinks himself justified in borrowing his examples indifferently from Tacitus or Confucius. He arrives in this manner at the abstract idea of mankind as always and everywhere like unto itself, an idea which continued to prevail during the eighteenth century in France, though it was opposed by the celebrated theory of the influence of climate, a theory of which Montesquieu himself is the author.

Thus, if Montesquieu often seems to lack system, it is not for want of endeavor to acquire it. One might even reproach him with being too systematic (for instance, in his theory of constitutions) had he not, fortunately, a taste for facts. In him the historian and the keen observer of political things happily compensate for the philosopher badly prepared to build a sociologic system. The original conception of the whole belongs to the latter; but it was the former who wrote the more permanent parts of *L'Esprit des Lois*.

* * *

In less than two years *L'Esprit des Lois* ran through twenty-two editions. It was immediately translated into the chief European languages. When Montesquieu died, in 1755, it was a public grief, not only for France, but for all thinkers abroad. And yet it is a fact that *L'Esprit des Lois*, though much admired, was never popular even in France. This disfavor does not include either the *Lettres Persanes*, which still amuse and interest in our days, the *Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur et de la Décadence des Romains*, which have maintained a place among French literary classics. There must therefore be, in *L'Esprit des Lois*, notwithstanding the beauties of the work, something peculiar which repels, or at least fails to attract, the reader. It surely cannot be the subject, for the French public in general is fond of political and sociological topics. It seems rather to be the fluctuant and indecisive method, neither frankly abstract nor positively historical. French minds are fond of "trenchant styles of writing." They may also have been puzzled by the way in which the books and chapters are broken up and scattered. They are accustomed to books composed in a simpler and more lucid way.

Let us make haste and say that the influence of a work of this kind is to be measured not by the number but by the quality of its

readers. The influence of *L'Esprit des Loix* was wonderfully great. Governing statesmen, as a rule, take little notice of political philosophers, whom they look upon as dreamers, lacking in common sense and ignorant of practical politics; and they are little disposed to take into account any unsolicited advice. Montesquieu had the rare good fortune to become an authority in their eyes, and to be often quoted by them. Many of his views on political liberty, on constitutional monarchy, on the distribution of powers, on penal procedure, on religious toleration, etc., have found their way into the laws of several European countries. His prestige did not suffer as much as that of the other philosophers of the eighteenth century from the reaction which set in towards the beginning of the nineteenth. Many sound minds even thought they found in him the happy medium which they were seeking between the Revolution and the equally untenable counter-revolution. He became the patron saint of liberal doctrinaires.

From a scientific point of view, he really introduced the philosophy of government which was to have such a great development in France. True, he stands distinctly apart from the "philosophers" who were to succeed him. He does not, like nearly all of them, despise everything between the Roman period and the sixteenth century. He does not look upon the Middle Ages as a disgrace to humanity. On the contrary, he speaks of the feudal laws with esteem, and even with a warmth which was rare in him. He would have liked to study this "splendid subject," and the word "Gothic," which was soon to become a synonym of all that war rude and barbarous, is used by Montesquieu to designate the government he most praises. His education as jurist and his knowledge as historian guard him here against rash and unjust assertions. Others were bold where he was prudent, extravagant where he was moderate. They attempted to introduce into France the morals and principles of the ancient republics. They attacked not simply intolerance, but religion itself. In a word, they did all that Montesquieu abstained from doing, and which he would perhaps have criticised most severely.

Nevertheless, it was he that opened the way for them, and after him, strengthened by his example and by his authority, they were able without much difficulty to establish themselves in the domain of political and social sciences. The "philosophers" understood this, and, in spite of all differences of ideas and tone, they always claimed him as one of themselves.

AN EXPLANATION.¹

BY VICTOR CHARBONNEL.

IN *The Open Court* for May, 1898, following a generous article by Mr. Theodore Stanton, in which he gave an account of my rupture with the Catholic Church, you placed before your readers what appeared to you to be the reasons for the check I received in my attempt to organise a parliament of religions in Paris, and for my subsequent withdrawal from Catholicism. I wish to thank you for the generous sympathy which you manifested for me personally in that article, and also to compliment you on the discretion with which you treated some very delicate questions. But at the same time I must confess that your reproaches, although expressed in a friendly spirit, affected me profoundly.

You think that I am wanting in calmness and prudence, that I am an enthusiast, that I acted impatiently, and that from all these causes I was incapable of so difficult an undertaking as the organisation of a parliament of religions. This criticism, to be sure, was enveloped in a eulogy. The graceful terms in which it was written prevent my taking offence. And yet it nettled me.

It is perhaps true that I have not the qualifications of a skilful organiser; but I have never had an excessive ambition to organise a parliament of religions at Paris. Such a work could not depend upon me, nor upon any one man. A committee would have been necessary for the undertaking. All that I ever pretended to do on my own account was to broach the idea, to propose it for examination, and to have it discussed. I wished only to play the rôle of a writer who advocates what he believes to be a good thing, nothing more. Others, I thought, would come after me, wiser and more influential, who would realise the idea in a practical organisation.

¹ Translated from the MS. of M. Charbonnel by I. W. Howerth, Ph.D., the University of Chicago.

Now you may see in a book I published under the title of *Congrès universel des religions en 1900: histoire d'une idée*, how this great idea of a new Parliament of Religions was welcomed by the Catholic world of Europe. Scarcely had I published an article upon the subject in the *Revue de Paris* (Sept. 1, 1895) when the bishops expressed their most emphatic disapproval. The cardinal archbishop of Paris, M. Richard, declared that he would inflict upon me severe punishment if I continued to advocate such a project, a project which he pronounced "heretical."

Now you must admit that even with some patience I was justified in finding this rigid prohibition of presenting in Europe as worthy of consideration what was an accomplished fact in America, a bit tyrannical. I was to be severely punished for merely saying a word in favor of a Parliament of Religions in Europe, a project which you had realised easily in America, even with the participation of Catholic bishops. Frankly, the difference between us was too great. I maintained with tenacity my right to place before the public through the journals and the reviews, and by means of lectures, this religious and social question. If I appeared to put into my work too much passion it was doubtless because I was aware of the extraordinary restraint which the Catholic authorities wished to exercise over my words prior to any action in the matter.

The government of the Catholic Church in Latin countries has become purely political and administrative. It is a bureaucracy without any true religious vitality. Everything is decided by an arbitrary act of power, by authority. Ideas are not left to free public discussion. No, everything is ordered or prohibited at once without letting in the light upon it. It is merely an absolute authority which demands blind, unreflecting submission. When in Anglo-Saxon countries you admit authority in matters religious it is only after the problem has been examined by individuals independently, and then only for announcing a supreme decision. Authority does not precede nor suppress free thought: it follows and sanctions it. It was my wish that in Latin countries authority should wait before pronouncing upon a parliament of religions the outcome of a full and moderate discussion, as in Anglo-Saxon countries. That was not an extraordinary desire, you must admit. But it was strenuously combated and rejected by Catholic prelates. You will understand, then, why I felt some indignation, and how it came that I thought there was some deception practised. It must have seemed to you, however, that I could easily raise the

question of a Parliament of Religions, for in your article in *The Open Court* you asserted that I wished to draw from it consequences too large, and in place of making it, as in Chicago, "a presentation pure and simple," I wished to utilise it as a means of renovating the Church by insinuating into it a more liberal spirit. I failed, according to you, because the dignity and integrity of each church represented in a parliament must remain intact, and you believe that I was wrong to pretend to change through this reunion of 1900 the Catholic Church and its traditions.

Yes, I did indeed embarrass the project of a parliament of religions, and I ought to have acted perhaps with less impetuosity. I feel myself that it was a bold thing to try to give it a liberal signification. But that is due to intellectual conditions peculiar to France. Ideas among us interest and arouse more than facts. We philosophise too much, perhaps, before acting, while you Americans act, looking later to the care of philosophising. No sooner had I published a few articles on the Parliament of Religions when all the press began to occupy itself with the religious philosophy connected with this interesting project. It began to discuss tolerance, liberty of conscience, Christianity, religions, God Himself, and also the actual conditions of the Catholic Church, the new Catholicism of the United States, Christian Socialism and a dozen other subjects more or less connected with the main idea of a Parliament of Religions. I was then induced forcibly to express my liberal understanding of modern Catholicism. If I did so with some heat it was in the face of the hostile bishops, and in defence of my freedom. Hence there resulted an appearance of revolt. And if I showed an excessive zeal in spreading liberalism, and in modifying the spirit of the Church, it was because the campaign of the press put me under the necessity of explaining the philosophical import of a Parliament. Hence, it appeared to you that I was preoccupied with my own personal sentiments of liberalism.

Moreover, who would have dreamt that this struggle would have lasted two years—from September, 1895, to October, 1897, the date at which I left the Church? In these two years, by articles and lectures, in which I sought to reason with my adversaries, and to which the bishops replied only by threats, there were numerous occasions for losing patience. "Singular thing"! the non-Catholic journals remarked, when at last I made known my determination, which I had too long postponed. I am very desirous of recognising the justice of your criticisms, but I find that they are

in contradiction to the judgment of all the liberal minds in France which have followed my struggles, and my evolution of conscience.

I come now to what I believe you most severely condemn in your article in *The Open Court*, that is, the accusation of duplicity which I made against certain Catholic prelates, and particularly against Cardinal Gibbons. "Duplicity" is a strong word, and I do not remember ever to have used it in controversy. But I still affirm that bishops who were at first favorable to a parliament of religions did not show themselves firm enough when other bishops of an uncompromising spirit opposed the project strongly, and that they used too much skill and diplomacy in freeing themselves from responsibility. They went so far as to deny words which they had spoken in the presence of others. They abandoned me after having encouraged me and urged me into the struggle. The whole matter is all a painful history which the Catholics of Europe themselves have severely judged and condemned.

I do not wish to recriminate as to Cardinal Gibbons, for whom I have always had the greatest respect, but as to what concerns him I must place before your eyes and under the eyes of your readers two documents which will enable you to judge the case without any long comments from me.

I had written in the *Revue de Paris*, September 1, 1895, that Cardinal Gibbons, passing through Paris on his way to Rome, had encouraged me to propose publicly the question of a parliament of religions in 1900, and that on his return from Rome in a personal interview he had assured me of the good disposition of Leo XIII. toward the project.

On the 10th of September, 1897 (two years after), Cardinal Gibbons sent this letter to the editor of the *Revue de Paris*:

"My attention has been recently called to an Italian translation of a passage in the *Revue de Paris* which personally concerns me. In this passage there is put into my mouth words of encouragement to M. Charbonnel on the subject of a parliament of religions at Paris in the year 1900, and I am made to say to him 'The Pope will be with you, I am sure of it.' I was very much astonished and troubled by these purely gratuitous assertions. I have already formally denied them in the journal *Le Monde*, affirming that they represent thoughts which I have never had, words which I never pronounced, sentiments which I have never entertained. I renew to-day this denial in regard to all that is affirmed in the passage referred to, and in particular the sentence 'The Pope,' etc."

Now my visit to Cardinal Gibbons took place in the *Seminaire Saint-Sulpice* in Paris, and M. Bonet-Maury, professor in the faculty of Protestant theology, was present at one of these visits as representing the Protestants in the preliminary conference in regard to the organisation of a parliament of religions. He wrote to M. Ernest La Visse, editor of the *Revue de Paris*, to confirm the report which I had made of the words of Cardinal Gibbons, and M. La Visse published the following note in reply to the Cardinal's letter: "We publish a letter in which Cardinal Gibbons formally denies the allegation of M. Charbonnel in his article upon the *Congrès Universel des Religions en 1900*. M. Charbonnel requests us to say that he maintains all his assertions. The words of encouragement given by the Cardinal to the idea of a new congress of religions are attested expressly by M. Bonet-Maury, professor in the faculty of Protestant theology, who was present at the interview." (*Revue de Paris*, Feb 1, 1898.)

M. Ernest La Visse, professor in the Sorbonne and editor of the *Revue de Paris*, and M. Bonet-Maury are persons whose authority and good faith will not be questioned. Moreover, is it not natural to suppose that Cardinal Gibbons on being questioned in regard to a new parliament or congress of religions would encourage the promotion of such an idea? One who had taken so great a part in the parliament of religions in Chicago ought to be, unless he meant to deny his past, with the promoters of a second parliament at Paris. Again I say that I do not wish to be unjust towards Cardinal Gibbons. I only deplore that there is in Catholicism a *raison d'église* as there is in government a *raison d'état* which obliges men of power to use subterfuges, diplomacy, and reticence, and to suppress or deny their real sentiments.

You will accept, and your readers will accept, this *Explanation* in so far as it is just, but remember at least that the cause of a parliament of religions is more difficult to defend in Europe than in America, and that doubtless any one else besides myself, with a different personality, would have failed. During the years since I left the Church and abandoned the project no one has taken it up. There has been absolute silence.

Some liberal Catholics, such as M. Anatole, M. Le Roy-Beaulieu, M. Etienne Larny, M. l'abbé Fremont, wished indeed to act in concert with M. Auguste Sabatier, Dean of the Faculty of Protestant Theology, M. Bonet-Maury, professor in the same faculty, and M. Zadoc-Kahn, Grand Rabbi, to transform the first project

of a parliament to a universal congress of religions, and to hold such a universal congress.

Here are the very clear and broad declarations which we sought to have accepted by a committee of thirty adherents, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Independents:

A UNIVERSAL RELIGIOUS CONGRESS IN 1900.

The parliament of religions which was held in Chicago in 1893 on the fourth centennial of the discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus will be judged in the future as one of the most important events in the religious and moral history of humanity. The solemn assembly of one hundred and seventy representatives of the principal religions of the world proclaimed the modern aspiration of the soul after tolerance and religious peace, for a fraternal union of all men of good will. That was in the general order of civilisation a great and salutary advance.

Some generous minds have conceived the project of renewing at Paris in 1900 what took place in Chicago in 1893, and to affirm by a *Congress* of religions the work of peace so happily begun by the *Parliament* of religions. But an opposition difficult to meet and moreover respectable in its motives has been made by different theologians who see in the fact of a congress where all religions will be admitted on conditions of parliamentary equality the danger of recognising a sort of doctrinal equality and moral equivalence of religions. Historical events, however, would not be exactly reproduced at different dates and in countries profoundly different in ideas, customs, and national spirit.

The project of a congress of religions, that is to say, of a congress in which churches and religious confessions would be represented by official delegates, has therefore been given up.

However, the idea of a great religious manifestation in 1900 on the border line of the two centuries could not be abandoned without regret. If it is necessary to give up the idea of a representation regularly established by the religious societies, could not men of different religious beliefs have a reunion in which, in conditions of personal independence which should leave intact all rights and all confessional pretensions, they might study the many problems of the modern conscience?

Priests or laity, all those who are interested in the social and religious future of humanity, could be admitted to this reunion.

Their persons and their words would only represent them-

selves and not their religious confessions. They would be representatives in their moral influence without being in any degree official and responsible representatives. It would be a *congress* of religious men and not a *congress of religions* or of religious forms. It would be a *universal religious congress*.

These considerations have decided us, believers and religious thinkers, to take the initiative in a Universal Religious Congress to take place in 1900 in Paris or in Versailles.

I.

The moral ends of this Universal Religious Congress would be as follows :

1. To affirm the natural legitimacy and perpetual nature of the religious sentiment, the educative virtue and the social power of religion in the progressive realisation of the human ideal.
2. To proclaim religious liberty, the sacred right of every man to tolerance and respect, and to protest against all fanaticism of race, of religion or of irreligion.
3. To seek, in the absence of doctrinal unity, a fraternal union of all men established upon the single fact that they are religious, and to elevate in different religions the things which unite above those which divide, the sentiment of religious fraternity above differences of creed.

II.

The rules of this Universal Religious Congress are to be as follows :

1. The Universal Religious Congress which will meet in 1900 in Paris or Versailles will be organised by an international and inter-religious committee which will be made up so far as possible from representatives of all the great religions of humanity, and also from certain freethinkers who without belonging to any regular denomination are in sympathy with the manifestations of religious ideas.
2. The congress will have two kinds of sessions : first, those which will take place in the morning, closed to the public and reserved only for members of the conference ; second, those which will take place in the afternoon and be open to the public. The first will be devoted to the study of the condition of religion in the different countries and in different races, and the discussion of some of the more important religious problems of the present time. The second will have for their object the exposition by selected speakers of the general philosophy of religion.

3. The right will not be denied to any members of the congress who may claim the liberty of announcing their present faith or that of their co-religionists. But the length of their discussions will be limited.

4. All criticism, disputation, and polemic, doctrinal or personal, will be interdicted. Each speaker will be expected to speak in a positive sense, in an affirmative exposition of his faith or his thought, and never in a negative sense by talks against the faith or thought of others.

5. The congress, in short, will be directed in a spirit of large tolerance and mutual respect according to the rules of parliamentary equality. This equality will not imply the philosophic and moral equality of different religious doctrines nor indifference in the matter of faith, for the reason that it is not founded upon the value of religions but upon the respect due to the human soul.

III.

The programme of the Universal Religious Congress will be finally determined by a committee on organisation. From the ends to be accomplished by the congress it can be foreseen what the principal subjects of this programme will be.

1. The natural legitimacy and ineradicable nature of the religious sentiment.

The psychology of religious phenomena and the proof of their irrefutability can only be made after the testimony of all humanity in such a congress. No philosopher or sociologist could fail to recognise the greatness and importance of a declaration from men of all countries and every land that they are naturally and invincibly religious. They will set forth the profound relations of religion with the individual moral life, with the family life, with political and social life, with the arts, the sciences, and all the general progress of civilisation. Thus will be proclaimed the psychological, moral, social, and esthetic value of religion and the benefit of its influence.

2. Religious liberty.

It will be considered in its principle, in its history and its progress. The actual conditions of practical, religious tolerance in the entire world will be impartially discussed, as well as the obstacles which are still opposed to a universal respect of conscience.

3. The religious fraternity of all men.

The congress will declare that religion is, and ought to be,

among men a principle of love and peace, and not a principle of hatred and war, a bond and not a cause of discord; that humanity may, and ought to, find the sentiment of its moral unity in a common aspiration which lifts all hearts toward God, in a common seeking after that God who is nowhere left without a witness: And finally that there is a religious fraternity by which the idea of the brotherhood of man is completed and confirmed in the notion of the fatherhood of God.

* * *

Mark well the spirit and conciliatory tone of this programme. When it came to signing it, before delivering it to the journals to be spread abroad over the entire world, Catholics (especially M. Anatole, M. Leroy Beaulieu, and M. Etienne Larny) demanded the privilege of submitting it to Pope Leo XIII. For this purpose they sent a messenger from Paris to the Pope. After his visit, in which they were given to understand that they would have formidable opposition at Rome, they renounced the attempt, refused to sign it, and withdrew without explanation.

I was profoundly saddened by this occurrence, for it is to me a proof that the best minds and most noble and generous souls will be in the future powerless to change the dogmatic absolutism and the political authority of the Catholic Church. There is to be seen here the bitter war which the Jesuits and a majority of the French bishops are making at this very moment against what is called "Americanism," that is to say, those ideas of American Catholicism such as are represented by Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishops Ireland and Keane. The life of Father Hecker, translated into French, has brought on an extremely bitter controversy. The Jesuits have tried to have this book put in the index, thus condemning Cardinal Gibbons and Mr. Ireland, who recommended the work by a letter of introduction. It has been said from a reliable source that Rome is near yielding. This is a grave affair, and shows the sad spectacle of the Church of Europe delivered into the hands of the Jesuits. You spoke in your article of the anguish I felt before breaking with the clergy and the Church of Rome. No one will ever know what a sorrow it was for me to lose, one after another, all my illusions, all my hopes, but I am sure I have accomplished, not without cruel conflicts of conscience, a great duty in separating myself from a Catholicism which is scarcely religious or Christian, and which is above all an ecclesiastical organisation for the oppression and destruction of all the intellectual, moral, and social energies, of a believing humanity.

SANTA CLAUS.

BY THE EDITOR.

THERE seems to be a period in the evolution of the child in which it is given to believing in the personification of ideas. I know a little boy to whom Santa Claus, during a certain period of his life, was, and remained, in spite of all explanations, a real person whom he knew as well as his Papa and his Mamma. I tried to explain to him the meaning of Santa Claus. I took occasion to tell him that all the various Christmas presents were given him by his parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, and friends, and that they had to buy them in the stores. In this connexion I saw fit to mention that the idea of Santa Claus was simply an allegorical expression of the love of parents and grandparents who wished to give Christmas joy to good little children.

The Christmas gifts are here; they are the realities which the children see, and on these concrete things hangs their conviction of the reality of Santa Claus.

Children are right from their standpoint, which views the reality back of an abstraction in the allegory of a personification.

When I explained to the little fellow that Santa Claus was such love of parents and others as prompts them to give to children Christmas presents, the child understood every word, and even appreciated the fact that every present must be paid for by somebody. Nevertheless, Santa Claus remained a real figure in his imagination and continued to play a most important part not only in his games but also generally in his whole world-conception, so much so that his highest ambition was to become Santa Claus himself as soon as he grew up.

A little incident will serve as an instance of how mature thoughts for a long time lie side by side with childlike conceptions. Once when the little boy asked me about details of Santa Claus's habitation and machine shops, I again gave him the explanation of

Santa Claus's ideal nature, whereupon the child said: "Yes, I know that Santa Claus means love of papas and mamas for their children, but I do not mean that kind of Santa Claus; I now mean the real Santa Claus."

The reply of the little fellow reminded me of the views of many adult children who do not as yet understand that all abstractions are real. Thus they are still in need of the method of personification to make them appear real to their mind.

There is among a certain class of educators the notion prevalent that we ought to abolish in child education all the fairy tales and with them the dear old figure of Santa Claus. But I have observed that in the absence of the traditional characters which by the experience of centuries have become typical representations of certain spiritual realities of life, children are apt to form their own personifications, which of course will be cruder, less poetical, and less defined than the old ones. While I gladly allow that the rationalising influence should watch over the development of a child by constantly keeping before his mind rational explanations of the various fairy tale figures, I should not regard it as advisable to crush or cripple the child's imagination. We need not fear that it will not be corrected in time. I have the confidence that a child will naturally overcome the childishness of fairy-tale personifications, and we need not shock his mind by suddenly disillusioning him. The child will overcome in later years the superstition of a literal acceptance of fairy tales and will preserve the poetry of the story.

It is neither necessary nor advisable to pull out the first teeth because they have no roots and will not endure. According to the laws of nature the development of the second teeth begins before the first teeth fall out. In the realm of the spiritual development, therefore, we ought not to be zealous iconoclasts; we need not pull out and violently remove that which is immature and temporary, but care ought to be taken that the germs of a higher conception be planted and that at the disappearance of the old the new and more purified thought be ready to take its place.

The little boy of whom I speak understood only in part what I told him about Santa Claus. He believed that he understood it all. He acquired an idea that parental love, and children's joys, and the family Reunion at the christmas festival were great realities in life, but he did not see that in their presence the figure of what he called the real Santa Claus as a bodily being living in the Rocky Mountains and travelling over the country in his reindeer sleigh

had become redundant—without however having lost its significance.

Is not the same true of mankind as a whole? The evolution of human civilisation has also its fairy-tale period, and we are only now emerging from its fanciful visions. There are still many among us who believe that unless the letter of a myth be true there can be neither beauty nor truth in religion. They think, like genuine adult children, that if Santa Claus were not a real definite individual there could be no Christmas presents nor any true Christmas joy. Their belief in a God and Heaven is more like the children's belief in Santa Claus than a genuine faith in the grand realities that are symbolised in these names. Heaven and hell to many are not spiritual, but material; they are conceived, not as conditions, but as places.

Thinking men among the church people of the old stamp are often struck with the truth that God and immortality are part and parcel of our life and that they are traceable everywhere in reality itself. But then, like the little boy of whom I spoke before, they understand and accept the new light, and yet stick at the same time to the materialistic view. All the Christmas presents are due to the love of parents and friends, yet in addition to it there is an individual person who provides for them, and he is the real Santa Claus. They grant that God is the eternal in the transient; the immutable law in the changes of the phenomenal world; yet in addition claim that he may be an individual being.

The conception of God is ultimately based on fact, but the notion that God is an individual being is an illusion; and if thinking people still cling to this error, it is as if a naturalist, travelling in the desert, explained to his fellow travellers the causes of a mirage, yet they, having understood the whole explanation, would add: "That may all be very true; the mirage as we see it is due to all these causes which we can plainly trace in diagrams and calculate according to the laws of the refraction of light in the different strata of the heated air, but that does not disprove the theory that there might be some real haven of peace, full of beauty and bliss, in that very same place where the mirage appears. The cosmic order may be uncreate and the condition of the wonderful harmony of the world, it may be God: yet this God might at the same time be a concrete being and as much an individual ego-consciousness as we are. Further, heaven and hell may be conditions of the soul, but there may be also a heaven that is as real and concretely material a place as this earth is;" and then they believe that the spir-

itual reality of heaven and hell, as it exists in us, would be of no avail unless there were some material reality in addition, unless they were geographical localities on our own planet or somewhere else in space. Such people have not yet outgrown the mythological phase of their development, and, after a careful consideration of their state of mind, I have come to the conclusion that they are still in need of a sensual conception of religious truths, and, as a rule, if they lost the belief in the letter, they would also lose the belief in the spirit, for their comprehension of things spiritual is as yet undeveloped.

The most important religious idea is the God-idea, and it is natural that this deep and intricate conception should cause great difficulties to the educator.

The question arises, Would it be right to teach the child those childlike conceptions of the Deity which we ourselves no longer believe; or shall we, with agnostics, tell them we do not know whether God exists or not; or, finally, shall we with freethinkers ridicule the belief as unworthy of credence?

Perhaps all these methods are somewhat faulty, and the best principle would be to let the children watch the performance of religious worship of various denominations, and when they ask about the significance of prayer, sermons, hymn-singing, thanksgivings, and benedictions, give them at first an explanation of the ideas which induce some people to go through these ceremonies and sometimes through strange rituals. If the children's interest in religious problems is aroused, tell them of other beliefs, including idolatrous practices and superstitions, which can easily be illustrated by pictures. But while imparting your information, be always careful not to present your own views ready made, but let the children work out the question for themselves. Give them such help as will render the solution of the various problems easier to them, but see to it that they do the thinking themselves.

The question will soon be asked, "Does God exist?" and of course the children's God is an invisible individual who hovers in the air as he is pictured in Bible illustrations. A God such as the children believe in, of course, does not exist, but for that reason it would be very wrong to tell the child, "No, God does not exist;" for while the child's idea of God is wrong, there are notions connected with it which are true. The child asks also whether or not there is an invisible presence that watches him, whether or not his acts when he is alone remain concealed from the world, and here the difficulty appears to lay the foundation for a higher con-

ception of God than is the popular view of the traditional personification.

Meet the question, "Does God exist?" by the counter question, "What do you understand by God?" and thus lead the child to a description of its childlike views, which will give you a chance to point out the true and to discard the false.

A little chap of scarcely three years was once quite shocked when he heard that the air above us grew thinner and thinner and that at last there was no air left. No one can breathe there and we should, if carried up, immediately die. The source of his anxiety became apparent when with suppressed tears he exclaimed in a state of tension, "But, then the Good Lord must die?" "No, my boy," I said, "the Good Lord cannot die; He has not a body as we have; He has no lungs; He need not breathe in order to exist. His existence does not depend on a body like ours. He is not an individual as you are and as I am. If He were, He would not be God. He is not a man. He is God." The child felt greatly relieved and it helped him to come a step nearer to the truth.

Such occasional explanations should as a rule come only in response to questions, for then, and then alone, will they be appreciated. Religious instruction should consist mainly in setting the child's mind to thinking and solving the problems that the child perceives himself. He will ask, "What does God want us to do?" which means for adult people, "What significance does the God-idea possess in human life?" And when the child answers this question in the child's language, that "God wants us to be good," he will naturally come to the definition that "God is all that prompts to goodness."

We can fairly abstain here from entering into further details because the individuality of the child will require much individualising on this most important subject. All I would claim, however, is this, that a child—especially if his other education has been in lines analogous to those pointed out here—can be made to see (1) that God is present in everything that is good, (2) that God is the principle of goodness, (3) that this God is not an individual being but an eternal and ubiquitous presence; (4) that this God is everywhere, and not nowhere, that although He is not a material body, he is a most effective reality and not a nonentity; that he is not only good, but that His goodness includes that He is also formidable, as his goodness implies that badness leads to badness and the sequence of sin is sin's curse. And lastly, that, be we ever so much alone, we yet always remain in the presence of God. All our actions

persist in their effects, and we can nowhere and under no circumstances escape the results of our acts.

Children can be led up to these results and easily made to understand them without our entering into deep philosophical discussions. At the same time the corollaries of these views can be pointed out. Children that grow up under these impressions will remain reverent without being superstitious. They will naturally understand the right use of prayer. They will not pray for a change of weather, but for strength of heart; and although they may have been brought up to say grace before dinner, they will not pray with any expectation of changing the will of God. Their prayer will be a realisation of self-control; it will be self-criticism exercised by suffering their acts to pass by in the review of a searching self-examination and will result in self-discipline, rendering them determined to pursue the right way of action.

It will be advisable on general principles to let children know at an early age that, as there are different nations, so there are different religions; and we must always be careful not to misrepresent others. We may say why we do not share other people's views, but do not pronounce any condemnation without good and sufficient reasons. A comparison between different religions will be very serviceable in educating the child's independent judgment.

The right God-conception renders us more efficient in life; it makes us independent and energetic. The wrong God-conception makes us superstitious and dependent. It is said that during the naval engagement of the Chinese-Japanese war the commander of one of the great Chinese vessels went down into his cabin to pray for help to his Joss, when he ought to have been on the captain's bridge looking out for the enemy and commanding his men. There is no use in praying when we ought to act. He who believes that prayer can work miracles, and trusts that God will at his special request change the course of nature, deserves to go to the wall; for the highest prayer, nay, the only true prayer, is to attend to the right thing at the right time—in a word, to do one's duty.

You need not make atheists of your children nor creed-duped believers. Teach them the facts of life, point out the path of right conduct; make them critical and thoughtful without treating the errors of others in a cynical spirit, and you can safely leave the rest of their religious development to their own judgment.

MISCELLANEOUS.

NEW POPULAR WORKS IN MATHEMATICS.

We spoke at length in the last *Open Court* of the high character of the educational work of the great English mathematician DE MORGAN. The Open Court Publishing Company has, in the interest of exact and sound popular education, recently selected one of his most characteristic productions for re-publication. It is entitled *The Study and Difficulties of Mathematics*, a work of some 284 duodecimo pages, treating in a lively and fascinating style of all the main difficulties of elementary mathematics from counting and systems of numeral notation to quadratic equations and the theory of proportion.

The book might appropriately be termed *The Spirit of Mathematics*. The principles of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, etc., are not presented as dead rules and mechanical systems, but as things of natural growth, which can be followed with the same delight and with more accuracy even than the development of a flower or a plant. The artificial and formal rigor of presentation which is the ideal of the finished scholar and master of a province but is so confusing and disheartening to the tyro, is here replaced by the treatment of simple specific types, from which the abstract generalisations are *collected* as in any other science. This is the real method of learning; formal, rigorous proof is unintelligible and an actual hindrance, a stumbling-block, until experience has made the mind familiar with the general extent of the propositions to be proved. Demonstration clinches knowledge, but it is useless in the discovery and in the inculcation of knowledge; we count our chickens after they are hatched. Many students can give faultless proofs of propositions in mathematics over which they have no practical power and with which they have really no acquaintance. Their education has begun at the wrong end.

To all such unfortunate beings, who are desirous of correcting the sins of their youth and of resuming in an economical manner the study of a science which lies at the basis of every rigorous world-conception, as well as to all elementary teachers who are seeking light and fresh views, and to all students who have grown "stale" in the mental athleticism of certain modern mill-systems, we cordially recommend this little book of De Morgan. What formerly made them frown will here make them smile; the joy of knowledge will supplant the pain of ignorance. They will not find everything in the book, but what they do find they will understand, retain, and be able to put to profitable intellectual use. They will find advice on how to pursue their studies in the higher branches, they will obtain an insight into the philosophy of the subject, its history and development; they will

discover that science is not an ogre designed by the Evil One to overawe and frighten mortals, but a thing of confidence and beauty that has come from little and simple things and is destined to work their salvation.

The work has been brought down to date by a few notes on modern text-books of algebra, logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and pangeometry. A picture of De Morgan is given as a frontispiece, an index has been supplied; the type is distinct and the binding pretty.¹

* * *

*The Mathematical Essays and Recreations*² of Professor Schubert, of Hamburg, Germany, is a collection of six articles bearing the following titles: (1) "The Definition and Notion of Number"; (2) "Monism in Arithmetic"; (3) "On the Nature of Mathematical Knowledge"; (4) "Magic Squares"; (5) "The Fourth Dimension"; (6) "The History of the Squaring of the Circle."

The first three articles are concerned with the construction of arithmetic as a monistic science, all the consequences of which flow as a matter of pure logic from a few simple principles. Number is defined as the result of counting. Fractional numbers, negative numbers, irrational numbers, imaginary numbers, complex numbers, are all extensions of the primitive result, made according to what Hankel calls the "principle of permanence," and Schubert "the principle of no exception," which means that the operations conducted with them and the rules governing them shall be so treated as to form no exception to the operations and rules springing from the original real results. Arithmetic thus takes the general shape of a system of mental fictions, which have consistency and coherency among themselves, and of which the results admit of interpretation and application to real facts, but which have no actual counterparts in reality. It is what philosophers call a nominalistic view of science. It has its æsthetic and logical advantages, and high didactic value to the mature student and to the teacher. After one has reached the heights, there is no satisfaction comparable to that of a broad survey of the land below. Professor Schubert is one of the most successful teachers of Germany, and as there are few treatises in English that give this point of view, his sketch of monistic arithmetic will be found exceedingly suggestive.

The article on the "Fourth Dimension" is popular and shows clearly what is meant by "dimension" in science and what the legitimate function of a "fourth dimension" is in mathematics; of the claims of spiritualism to this beautiful and convenient concept, it disposes definitively. The article on "Magic Squares" is a pleasing recreation. That on the "Squaring of the Circle" gives the history of one of the most instructive and interesting episodes in the history of human thought. Both these essays are very complete popular accounts of their subjects,—more complete perhaps than any generally accessible accounts in English.

* * *

The new *Introduction to Algebra*³ by Dr. G. Chrystal, professor of mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, can hardly be called a popular book, but it deserves mention for its many innovations in elementary text-book writing and for its sound qualities of independence and common sense. In the year 1886

¹ Published by the Open Court Publishing Co., 324 Dearborn Street, Chicago (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.) Pp. 288. Price, \$1.25 (5s.).

² Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Pp. 148. Price, cloth; 75c. (3s.); paper, 25c. (1s. 6d.).

³ London: Adam & Charles Black. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 437. Price, \$1.25.

Professor Chrystal wrote a little text-book of "elementary algebra" which filled two volumes of nearly 600 pages each. It broke completely with English tradition. Algebra, instead of being presented as a mere jumble of disconnected rules, was set forth as a coherent science, all the principles of which were deduced systematically from a few fundamental laws: it was made a science of pure form; it was brought into connection with the remaining branches of mathematical knowledge, and no device was scorned which subserved the ends of illustration and clearness. It was filled with citations of the sources and historical notes, and so became both a manual and general reference book of the highest order.

Professor Chrystal is an algebraist *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Not only is much algebra, and all of algebra, a pre-requisite in his world-view to entrance into Heaven, but it is also necessary to entrance into the Infinitesimal Calculus. But the world rebelled. While his book was successful it was felt in the abysmal subconscious depths of the average timorous citizen that 1,100 pages of matter, not to be read as a novel was too much, even for salvation; and that if the same view was taken of every science, a life-time would be absolutely insufficient even as a *preparation* for the Nirvāna of knowledge. And so Professor Chrystal wrote his *Introduction to Algebra* "for the use of Secondary Schools and technical Colleges," that common people might gain some conception of the shape that algebraic science has been taking in the last century.

The book is naturally, even familiarly, written. One is struck by the author's insistence on practical points of view, by his genetic conception of education, by his easy introduction of modern notions. Examination puzzles are eschewed; only seldom are its readers required to

"wisely tell what hour o' th' day
The clock doth strike by Algebra."

But the most notable feature of the book is its constant use of graphical illustration. It seems astonishing that this most powerful engine of education should not have been the common possession of elementary teachers a century ago. It is now really time for the schools of the Pithecanthropoi to adopt it. And yet Professor Chrystal must apologize for the unusually large amount of space he has devoted to its employment!

The book, in fine, deserves to be widely used. Where school-boards still insist on the retention of pre-historic treatises, where publishing companies still make a business of exploiting ignorance, independent teachers should surround themselves with and study such books as Professor Chrystal's. These books exist, and they should be used, by stealth if necessary.

T. J. McCORMACK.

RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL PUBLICATIONS.

The philosophy of Nietzsche, which has for years been the dominant fad in Germany, has spread beyond the borders of the Fatherland, and been exciting increased interest in foreign countries. The Macmillan Company are now publishing a translation of *The Works of Nietzsche*, under the editorship of Alexander Tille, lecturer at the University of Glasgow, and based on the final German edition published by Naumann of Leipsic. Although Nietzsche's intellectual career naturally and logically terminated in insanity, his productions constitute one of the most remarkable phenomena in recent philosophy. He is disconnected, bizarre, freaky, erratic, but interesting and highly suggestive. His works are, owing to their highly condensed, epigrammatic, and elliptic style, exceedingly difficult to trans-

late, and even in German difficult to understand. The Macmillan translation begins with the later works of Nietzsche, and the first volume is made up of "The Case of Wagner," "The Twilight of the Idols," and "Nietzsche Contra Wagner," translated by Thomas Common, and treating of music, civilisation, and Christianity. The second volume contains "A Genealogy of Morals" and Nietzsche's Poems, translated by William A. Housemann and John Gray. (Price, \$2.00 each.)

Nietzsche's point of view is that man is a being predominantly physiological, and that the value of his art, civilisation, and religion, should be measured by the standard of physiology. But one drift of thought pervades the essays of the first volume, says the editor: "Physiology as the criterion of value of whatever is human, whether called art, culture, or religion! Physiology as the sole arbiter on what is great and what is small, what is good and what is bad! Physiology as the sole standard by which the facts of history and the phenomena of our time can be tried, and by which they have to be tried and to receive the verdict on the great issue: decline, or ascent?"

The philosophy of Nietzsche is a bold and independent protest against the reigning beliefs and systems of the age. It is not a universal system so much as the passionate expression of an intensely sensitive nature. Original he is, and it is not difficult to explain his large following. Henri Lichtenberger, professor in Nancy, France, has recently written a brochure of 182 pages on *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (F. Alcan, Paris, 2 fr. 50c.), which will be found valuable to students of this strange philosopher. Professor Lichtenberger, while not uncritical, is still an admirer of the German dreamer, and contends that we can entertain nothing but feelings of respect for the daring thinker who, amid the tortures of an incurable illness, never descended to anathematising existence, and who, under the perpetual menace of death or insanity, sustained to the end his impassioned hymn in honor of fecund and eternally youthful life. Appended to Professor Lichtenberger's work is a bibliography of the works of Nietzsche and of the various publications which treat critically of his philosophy.

* * *

We have three French works to mention in the domain of ethics: (1) *La Personne Humaine*, by the Abbé C. Piat (Price, 7 fr. 50 c.); (2) *Essai sur l'Obligation Morale*, by Georges Fulliquet (Price, 7 fr. 50 c.); (3) *Les Éléments du Caractère*, by Paulin Malapert (Price, 5 fr.).¹

The work of M. Abbé Piat, a distinguished professor of philosophy in the Catholic University of Paris, on *Human Personality*, is an interesting specimen of the connecting links which are being forged between the old and the new psychology. The Abbé is struck with the profound modification which has been effected by the reigning philosophy in the old definition of personality, and with the transformations which it has wrought in all our notions of human conduct and human destiny. He accepts with good grace the results of modern psychology, and asks to what extent they are likely to modify the laws of the old psychology. It is his opinion that the psychology which is really fundamental has nothing to do with physiology, that the old definition of personality has not been demolished by the new observations and experiments, but on the contrary can readily be adapted to the new facts, and that modern science has merely confirmed and perfected the religious work of the centuries. He objects to the exclusively empirical method, and would have people *reason* at the same time that they *observe*.

¹ All published by F. Alcan, Paris.

The second work, an *Essay on Moral Obligation*, by Dr. Georges Fulliquet, is a book of some 454 pages, and includes a psychological study, a critical study, and a historical study, of ethical facts. Modern science has threatened the security and stability of the old ethical systems, and Dr. Fulliquet accordingly seeks for a foundation of the science of morals that will stand the assaults of criticism. There is duty, and duty must have its limits. The result is that he finds obligation to be not a bond created by life, but a power, or rather an experience, imposed by God. He has reformulated the doctrine of innate ideas in ethics. The historical part of his work will be found the most valuable.

We have many good works on ethology, or the study of character, notable among them being the studies of MM. Perez, Ribot, Paulhan, and Albert Lévy. But the subject is an illusive one, and has by no means been exhausted; it cannot even be said that it has as yet found its explanatory principles in any branch of modern psychology. Accordingly, the third work above-mentioned, by Dr. P. Malapert, entitled *The Elements of Character and Their Laws of Combination*, does not pretend to be a definitive treatise on the subject, but merely presents the results of his personal observations and reflections. He believes that the character of a man is constituted of a certain number of essential traits, such as sensibility, intelligence, and activity, and that each of these functions is the basis of a definite number of specific forms, which are equally well defined. These elements in their turn are combined with one another according to certain constant relations which give rise to a plurality of genera, species, varieties, and types of character. Character, he believes, is innate in a sense, and yet subject to individual evolution, and to the control of the will.

* * *

To all who are desirous of understanding the elaborate system of sociology which has been promulgated by Monsieur G. Tarde, and which has attracted universal attention in recent years for the skill and originality with which its author has worked out its various complicated details, we can recommend the little *résumé* of his views which has been recently published under the title of *The Laws of Society: a Sketch of Sociology*.¹ It will save the reading of his difficult and larger works, *The Laws of Limitation*, *The Universal Opposition*, and *The Logic of Society*, and will give what many have doubtless failed to obtain,—a clear conception of the peculiar dialectic of M. Tarde. The social philosophy of M. Tarde is founded almost entirely upon the laws of imitation, which are the foundation of social permanency, and, with the subsidiary laws of opposition and adaptation, the condition of all social and scientific progress. Imitation in society is merely the psychological counterpart of repetitions in the material universe. Be society what it may, the individual genius who invents and gives direction to intellectual and social movements is the starting-point from which everything proceeds. Psychology is the basis of sociology.

* * *

Of the recent minor works in French philosophy, we may mention:

1. *The Problems of Esthetics and Ethics*,² by C. R. C. Herckenrath, Professor of French in the Gymnasium of Groningen, in Holland, who has merely endeavored in a pleasing and condensed manner to set forth the status of present philosophical inquiry and opinion on such questions as the sentiment of the beautiful, the sublime, the tragic, the comical and grotesque, morality, etc.

¹ *Les Lois Sociales: Esquisse d'une Sociologie*. By G. Tarde. (Félix Alcan. Paris. Price, 2 fr. 50 c.)

² *Problèmes d'Esthétique et de Morale*. Félix Alcan. Paris. Pp. 163. Price, 2 fr. 50 c.

2. *The Unpublished Correspondence of John Stuart Mill with Gustave D'Eichthal*,¹ during the years 1828-1842 and 1864-1874,—a correspondence which deals with Mill's early interest in Saint-Simonism, and with the philosophical questions which occupied the later years of his thought.

3. *The Philosophy of Charles Secrétan*,² by F. Pillon, one of the able editors of the *Année Philosophique*,—a critical estimate of a very talented thinker whose influence was entirely national, whose metaphysics was a philosophical theory of Christian dogmatology, and whose ethics was a philosophical theory of Christian morals.

4. An original treatise on folk-lore,³ by Paul Regnaud, professor of Sanscrit in Lyons,—a work which discusses the Vedic sources of the legend of Hop o' my Thumb, the Hindu legend of the Deluge, etc., etc., and so forms an interesting chapter in ethnical psychology.

5. The second edition of M. Victor Charbonnel's *The Will to Live*,⁴ which is a collection of vivacious and scholarly essays on the religious problems of the day, and which will be of interest to those of our readers who have read M. Charbonnel's article in the present *Open Court*. μκρκ

AN AMERICAN EDITION OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.⁵

The colossal undertaking which was inaugurated in 1876 by Prof. Max Müller and the Clarendon Press of Oxford, the publishing of a series of translations of the great Sacred Books of the East, has, through the recent revival of religious studies in this country, been so frequently cited as to acquire almost a popular reputation. The necessity of an "American Edition" was thus made apparent. This edition is not authorised by the original publisher, but it would appear from a preface especially written for the American Series by Prof. Max Müller, and from the portrait of the Professor which forms the frontispiece, that it at least has the personal sanction of the great philologist. How, under these circumstances, "the copyright" to the reprint can have been obtained is an enigma. In any event, the American Edition is a fact. It has its *raison d'être*, and probably its practical justification, in its cheapness. The expensiveness of the original edition virtually excluded its possession by persons of ordinary means. After works of such an international character have had a sufficiently large sale to cover the largest portion of their original expense, they should be immediately cheapened and placed within easy reach of the public. Under such circumstances the temptation of "reprinting" would be one that could not be conscientiously withstood by people having the cause of Christianity at heart.

The volumes which have appeared in the series up to date are *The Upanishads*, by Prof. Max Müller; *The Sacred Laws of the Aryas, as Taught in the*

¹ *John Stuart Mill, Correspondance Inédite avec Gustave D'Eichthal. (1828-1842-1864-1874.) Avant-Propos et Traduction*, by Eugène D'Eichthal. Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 239. Price 2 fr. 50 c.

² *La Philosophie de Charles Secrétan*, by F. Pillon. Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 197. Price, 2 fr. 50 c.

³ *Comment Naissent Les Mythes*. By Paul Regnaud. Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 249. Price, 2 fr. 50 centimes.

⁴ *La Volonté de Vivre*. By Victor Charbonnel. Paris: Armand Colin & Cie. Pp. 310.

⁵ New York: The Christian Literature Company.

Schools of Apastamba, Gautama, Vāsishtha, and Baudhāyana, translated by the late Georg Bühler; and *The Zend-Avesta*, translated by James Darmesteter—Part I., *The Vendidad*; Part II., *The Strózahs, Yasts, and Nyáyis*. While the letter-press is not as good as that of the original edition, it is tolerably clear, and upon the whole the work will serve the same purpose as its prototype. "We may well hope," says Prof. Max Müller in the Preface, "that a study of the Sacred Books of the East may produce a kindlier feeling on the part of many people, and more particularly of missionaries, towards those who are called heathen, or even children of Satan, though they have long, though ignorantly, worshipped the God who is to be declared unto them, and that a study of other religions, if based on really trustworthy documents, will enable many people to understand and appreciate their own religion more truly and more fairly." μκκκ.

HERACLITUS TRANSFIGURED.

(500 B. C.)

The salt sea laps the shores of many lands—
 Now whipping the black sky with sharp, white spray,
 Now seeping noiseless through the level sands,
 In shallow pools, where little children play;
 Now glassing the fierce heat of tropic skies,
 Now, where the sun doth neither set nor rise,
 Heaped into frozen tumult, far and lone—
 But, in all moods and climes, the Sea is One.

And as its waves surge to their utmost height,
 Only to break and form new waves again—
 As Fire devours things precious in our sight,
 To give what Nature else might seek in vain—
 As dead, to living leaves, their lost life give,
 So we, in dying, do most truly live.
 Eternal change still grinds relentless on,
 And on its wheel Birth, Life, and Death, are One.

(1899 A. D.)

Life, in new forms, forever is new born—
 The pushing green things break the cold spring sod;
 The hour-old lambs, beneath the dappled dawn,
 With awkward gambols, warm their timid blood;
 The babe's first cry, with fond rejoicings blent,
 Gladdens the home, but—spending, yet unspent—
 Beneath our feet, or in the farthest sun—
 Life, through expression manifold, is One.

HENRIETTA R. ELIOT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

LEÇONS DE GÉOMÉTRIE ÉLÉMENTAIRE (Géométrie plane). By *Jacques Hadamard*
 Paris, Colin et Cie., 1898. Pp. xvi + 308.

One of the most interesting and promising movements of the present time, in the line of elementary mathematics, is that headed by M. Darboux, dean of the

Faculté des Sciences at Paris. Under his direction have already appeared four volumes of a *cours complet de mathématiques élémentaires*, this of M. Hadamard's being the latest.

Those who have read the preceding works, especially the masterly *Leçons d'arithmétique* by Jules Tannery, and the equally valuable *Leçons d'algèbre élémentaire* by Bourlet, know with what breadth of view, scholarship, and freshness and vigor of style these secondary school subjects have been treated. For M. Hadamard's work it is only fair to say that it maintains the reputation already won for the series.

The work is not at all of that timid kind which fondles a student all through his course, never letting him walk alone, and always keeping him in the well-worn paths of Euclid and Legendre. On the contrary, it places him as soon as possible upon his own resources, it opens the door to the anharmonic ratio, to poles and polars, to inverse figures, and, in general, to the elementary notions of recent geometry, and it even ventures to set before him the non-Euclidean theory of parallels. And all this is done with such clearness and simplicity as to convince any doubting teacher that many of these modern ideas may well crowd a considerable amount of inherited matter from our courses.

It is refreshing, too, to find that the author follows such writers as Petersen and Rouché and de Comberousse in laying before the student the best methods of attack. The era of leaving the beginner to grope entirely in the dark in the solution of a problem should be drawing to a close.

It is also a pleasure to see a work which is honest in its definitions, one which confesses that a straight line is undefinable to a beginner, one which defines the area of a curvilinear plane figure before it begins to theorise upon it, and one which believes in learning no definition to-day which must be unlearned to-morrow.

On the whole, the work deserves to rank as one of the notable text-books of the year.

State Normal School, Brockport, N. Y.

DAVID EUGENE SMITH.

THE EMBLEMATIC MOUNDS OR ANIMAL EFFIGIES. By *Stephen D. Peet*, of the "American Antiquarian," Chicago, Ill. American Antiquarian Office, 1898. "Prehistoric America," Vol. II.

This book treats of an interesting topic of which very little is known. The author was for many years a resident of the State of Wisconsin, and is well known as the editor of the oldest journal devoted to archæology published on the continent, the *American Antiquarian*, he is more familiar with the effigies than any man living, for he has made them a study for several years. These effigies are more numerous in that State than in any other, though a few are found in Ohio and Illinois, Iowa and Minnesota, in which States they make the migrating route of the effigy builders. They were formerly very numerous. When the country was new, they were plainly visible and their outlines easily recognised. The only person who has written upon them was Dr. I. A. Lapham who surveyed many groups, but did not undertake to explain their significance.

His report was published by the Smithsonian Institution, as among the earliest "Contributions" and is now out of print.

Dr. Peet entered the field determined to find out the significance of the effigies but had no clue whatever as there are no traditions concerning them.

His first discovery was that of a game drive, which was composed of a series of long mounds arranged in parallels near a ford on the Rock River. It was at-

tended by effigy mounds on the bluff, from which an extensive view over the prairies, in either direction, could be gained. A Buffalo effigy was noticed near the ford, the entire group suggesting that this was the place where the unknown people entrapped buffaloes (or at least shot into them as they were driven into the traps).

The next discovery was that the effigies represented not only the larger animals, such as buffaloes, elk, bear, deer, which were followed as game, but also many smaller animals and birds, such as squirrels, minks, foxes, wolves, turtles, lizards, swallows, pigeons, eagles. These latter animals were placed sometimes near the game drives but oftener on hill tops near the lakes and rivers, conveying the idea that they were, not merely imitations and works of fancy, but had some religious significance, probably as clan totems.

Taking this as a clue, the author was able to trace out the various clans which once inhabited the State, and ascertain their location, the extent of their habitat, as well as the names which they bore. He was able also, by studying the groups, to identify the village sites, burial places, and council houses, the dance grounds, the garden plots, the corn fields, the sugar bushes, the lookout stations of the different clans, as the effigies showed how thoroughly the totemistic system was incorporated into the life of the people.

There is no place in the world where clan totems are placed upon the soil and made to mark the homes and represent the clan life of a people as they do here. This fact made the study fascinating. Besides this the effigies are interesting as works of art, for they are close imitations of the shapes and attitudes of the various animals and are like a picture gallery or museum on a large scale. Even such small animals as the squirrel, the fox; such birds as the swallow, pigeon, eagle, duck, swan, and wild geese, which still abound in the region, are represented in characteristic attitudes, most of them in Alto relief. The earth was thrown up and moulded so as to represent the animals, sometimes as at rest, sometimes as if in motion or in flight, expressing in each case the different moods of the wild animals.

The book was written in the field, chapter after chapter; and as a result one is obliged to follow the author in his explorations and catch the ideas as they gradually dawned upon his mind. There is no hint as to the people who built these effigies until near the close of the volume. In one of the last chapters the author speaks of the Rock Inscriptions and Cave Drawings which have been found in Iowa and Minnesota by means of which the mythological divinities of the Dakotas have been identified. Some of these have been discovered in the effigies, and the natural conclusion is that the Emblematic Mounds were erected by the Winnebagos who were a branch of the Dakotas. This conclusion is given in the second edition which has just been published, thus making this edition more valuable than the first which was published in 1890 before the author's explorations had ceased. Many of the effigies have been destroyed, as the State has become a great summer resort, and cottages have been erected where the effigies formerly stood.

It is fortunate that such perishable monuments as these were plotted and drawn before they were destroyed, for it is probable that in a few years the clue to the system embodied in them would have been lost, and no one could have ascertained to any certainty the object for which they were erected. There was a system of religion embodied in them which was very powerful and quite similar to that which is represented by the paintings which appear on the tents of some of the living tribes. The world is full of the monuments, and America is not by any means lacking, but many Americans, ignorant of the interesting things that are at their own doors, travel many miles over sea and land to study the monuments in

the ancient countries of the East, which are no more interesting or instructive than these.

P. C.

THE CROSS, IN TRADITION, HISTORY, AND ART. By the *Rev. William Wood Seymour*. With Illustrations. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company. Price, \$7.50.

We cannot help feeling a certain reverence in reviewing a book whose author died before its completion, leaving the labor of giving it the last touches of revision and making it ready for publication to the friendly hand of a literary executive.

The book of the Rev. William Wood Seymour, embodying years of his labor, has become his monument, and the monument of a beautiful book full of thought and adorned with appropriate illustrations is certainly greater than obelisks or pyramids or crosses of marble.

The book is a stately volume of nearly five hundred pages, in large octavo, and printed on the best calendered paper. It discusses the use of the cross as a religious symbol. The pre-Christian cross in Africa, Asia, Europe, and America, is briefly and certainly not exhaustively dealt with. The main bulk of the book is made up of the legends of the cross (pp. 83-113), the story of the invention of the cross (pp. 114-133), and the cross in Christian art (pp. 151-349). Another hundred pages are devoted to the cross in heraldry, on coins, etc., and in church ceremonies. The tenth chapter, on "the Puritan opposition to the cross," is treated "more in sorrow than in anger." The mention of the southern constellation which bears the name of the cross, the cross in nature, as found in flowers, and supposedly also in the hexagonal stars of snowflakes, form the conclusion of the work.

We cannot say that the author shows extraordinary critical ability, and we cannot help adding that he has omitted the ventilation of several important problems in the history of the cross, while he treats subjects of little consequence with much complacency and at great length. But the reader who at the start is prepared to find the book written from a somewhat antiquated standpoint and written with a love for the details of the monumental records which the belief in the cross has produced, will not only not be disappointed but richly rewarded, for the work betrays an artistic enthusiasm for beautiful forms and their rich ritualistic display which at once gives one the conviction that none but an Episcopalian clergyman can have been its author.

P. C.

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY. A Text-Book for Colleges and Schools. By *Franklin Henry Giddings*, M. A., Ph. D., Professor of Sociology in Columbia University, New York; Author of "The Principles of Sociology." New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1898. Pages, xi, 353. Price, \$1.10.

The purpose intended to be fulfilled by the present work, which is not a mere abridgement of the author's *Principles of Sociology*, is the providing of a text-book for the study of the nature and laws of human society. Such a study Professor Giddings thinks is preferable to the plan now adopted in schools and colleges of giving either a thorough course in some one subject or a superficial course in many subjects comprised in the province of economic, legal, and political science. It would "familiarise the pupil with the principal forms of social organisation; with the thoughts, the sympathies, the purposes, and the virtues that make society possible; with the benefits that society confers; and with the conduct that worthy membership of society requires." These facts and principles underlie all details

of law and politics, all sound political economy, and all public morality, as the author affirms, and they constitute the science of Sociology as set forth in this text-book, which is intended to give an elementary description of society in clear and simple scientific terms.

Although specially written to carry out this purpose, the present work follows the lines of the earlier one above referred to. Attention is called, however, to important developments of sociological theory now first presented, and it is to a consideration of these special features of *The Elements of Sociology* the present notice will be devoted. An analysis of the practical activities of social populations and of the motives from which they spring forms one of those features. It is preceded by a consideration of the composition and unity of a social population to which it is a necessary supplement; as an organic structure is valueless if it does not manifest its functional attributes in some phase of practical activity. As pointed out by the author, population is increased from two sources,—birth and immigration, and we may discover what are the practical activities of mankind by observing what things children become interested in, learn to do, and are taught to do as they grow to manhood; and then what immigrants become interested in and learn to do as they become adapted to the ways and conditions of the country where they have settled. Now, as the first years of a child's life are occupied chiefly "in getting acquainted with people and things and establishing preferences,—that is to say, likes and dislikes," so it is with the immigrant. He has to get acquainted with the new country in which he has established himself, and with its native inhabitants. Both have to become used to their new world, and hence the first great practical activity of life is *appreciation*. The second of these activities is *utilisation*, or "the process of trying to control, adapt, and use the things of the external world." This is followed by *characterisation*, which consists in so shaping one's own character as to make it more and more nearly adapted to the kind of world in which one lives; and then by *socialisation*, or "the systematic development of acquaintance and of helpful social relations." These four simple practical activities give rise by their combination to certain complex activities, which are termed by the author economic, legal, political, and cultural. Each, again, has its special motive, which works out its aim by a particular method. Thus appreciation operates by response to stimuli to acquire the information it seeks and by imitation; utilisation employs attack, impression, imitation, and invention, to obtain the gratification of its desire or appetite; characterisation has for its motive the desire for complete satisfaction, and its methods are persistence, accommodation, and self-control; finally, the method of socialisation for the realisation of its motive,—the pleasureableness of acquaintance, companionship, and sympathy, is assimilation. All of these methods are modes of "one universal method which is found in every form of matter and in every state of mind," and is called conflict, which may be the primary conflict which results in complete destruction or subordination, or the secondary conflict where the contending objects are much alike and nearly equal in power. Progress is a continual change in the proportion of secondary to primary conflicts, and as the normal tendency of conflict is towards equality and the milder forms of strife, it necessarily terminates in a kind of equilibrium which is called toleration, and is maintained through the reassertion and renewed activity from time to time of the socialising motives.

A complete summary of the author's analysis of the practical activities of social populations and of the motives from which they spring has been given, owing to its fundamental importance. The chapter on Co-operation, which is also one of the

special features of the present work, shows the dependence of co-operation on the like-mindedness and the consciousness of kind which constitutes the cement of society. The essential social fact is like-mindedness which "necessarily tends to establish and to perfect co-operation. All co-operation depends upon like-mindedness. All the higher and complicated modes of co-operation depend upon the extension of like-mindedness and the expansion of the consciousness of kind." The importance of the principle of like-mindedness is evidenced by the development of the social mind which is defined by Professor Giddings as "that sympathy and concurrent intelligence of the like-minded which results in common purposes and concerted acts." The integration of the social mind passes through various stages which form three large groups: Sympathetic like-mindedness with impulsive social action; Formal like-mindedness, as exhibited in tradition and conformity; and Rational like-mindedness, giving rise to public opinion and social values. For the laws which operate to give these results we must refer our readers to the book under review, stating only the law of combination and of means which the choices of people under different social conditions exemplify. It is thus stated by the author: "A population that has only a few interests, which, however, are harmoniously combined, is conservative in its choices. A population that has varied interests, which are as yet inharmoniously combined, is radical in its choices. Only the population that has many, varied, and harmoniously combined interests is consistently progressive in its choices."

In the chapter on The Character and Efficiency of Organisation the author formulates the laws of liberty, afterwards tracing the early history of Society and its development through different forms, from what he calls the horde to the ethnic nation. The first stages of civilisation are identified with "sympathetic and formal like-mindedness throughout a population that is believed to have the capacity for assimilation," and its essential spirit is affirmed to be a passion for homogeneity. Civilisation itself is described by reference to its essential elements, but if the principle expressed by Lewes be true, that a thing is what it does, then civilisation must be the putting an end "to innumerable forms of conflict, to innumerable unnoticed wastes of energy," and the liberation, for other expenditures, of enormous stores of mental and physical force, which have been the cause of endless variation, differentiation, and progress in later times. Progress is thus identified with rational like-mindedness, which is the product of doubt, scepticism, and denial in the social mind, that is, of unlike-mindedness, followed by discussion and subsequent agreement. Under such conditions a solid organisation becomes "ever more variable, flexible, adaptable, in a word progressive." Finally, the author shows that all successful experiments in democracy are identifiable with the development of ethical like-mindedness. He points out what are the necessary modes of equality upon which fraternity and liberty depend, and concludes that the appreciation of them by the community, and "a practical application of them involve both intellectual agreement and a unity of purpose which, while containing elements of sympathy, contain also the judgements born of rational criticism of the social problem. Such unity is a mode of like-mindedness in which reason and conscience predominate."

In conclusion, reference may be made shortly to Professor Giddings's analysis of the psychological causes of social phenomena, which he regards as a new contribution to psychology and to sociology. He points out that though philosophy may be monistic, science in its account of man must always be dualistic, that is, it includes two parallel interpretations, one physical and the other psychological. Thus the laws which affect the physical aspects of society and the several stages of evo-

lution in its physical sense have their psychical counterparts. Social activity, like all other modes of motion in the universe, follow the line of least resistance, and so mental activity proceeds in the lines of least difficulty. Applying the rule to particular stages of evolution, the author states that "in the social passion for homogeneity, we see the process of integration; in the development of discussion and of criticism, we see mental differentiation and segregation. These higher intellectual processes, therefore, are differential consequences of mental activity in the paths of least effort as truly as physical differentiation is a consequence of equilibration in the lines of least resistance." Professor Giddings brings his excellent text-book to a close by reference to the action of natural selection and survival on the ultimate forms of society, its final paragraph with which this notice may fittingly end, being, "social causation is a process of psychical activity conditioned by physical processes and cosmic law." C. S. W.

PAUL: THE MAN, THE MISSIONARY, AND THE TEACHER. By *Orello Cone, D. D.* Author of "Gospel-Criticism and Historical Christianity," "The Gospel and Its Earliest Interpretations," etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1898. Pages, xii, 475. Price, \$2.00.

Although the subject of Dr. Cone's work is not new, yet it is so many-sided that something new may always be found to say in relation to it. Moreover, the personality of Paul is so attractive and his life experiences so interesting, that much of what has already been said will bear constant repetition. Much depends on the point of view and on the mode of treatment. Dr. Cone remarks that although a man of God, a providential man, in the eminent sense of the words, Paul must remain inexplicable until he is interpreted with due regard to his natural antecedents and his intellectual and religious environment. He could not escape from the atmosphere in which his spirit drew the breath of life. This is undeniably true and the author has done well to choose this as his point of view. He has done well also in basing his discussion of Paul's writings on those which are generally accepted as genuine—the Epistle to the Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, 1 Thessalonians and Philippians. The doubtful authenticity of the Acts justifies the author also, in preferring to consider the missionary work of Paul from the internal evidence supplied by the Epistles, rather than from the precise statements contained in the former work.

The book under review is divided into three parts, which treat respectively of The Man, The Missionary, and The Teacher. Of this the first part, which deals with the formative influences which affected Paul and his teaching, his personal traits and his conversion, will be the most interesting to the general reader, who prefers to hear of the appearance, the manners, and the character of an individual rather than to learn of his opinions, which are subordinated also to a knowledge of his doings. The environment almost forms part of the man himself and it, therefore, enters into the consideration of the personality which is usually the most attractive feature of biographical sketches. Unfortunately, in the case of Paul we know little of the social surroundings in the midst of which he passed his early life. That he was of humble parentage and learned the art of sail-cloth manufacture, which was one of the chief occupations of Tarsus, the Cilician city where he was born, may reasonably be inferred from remarks made in his epistles. His literary culture was almost entirely limited to Hebrew, what little acquaintance with Greek he possessed having been acquired, in Dr. Cone's opinion, from its colloquial use and the reading of the Greek translation of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha. This he did to some purpose, however, for, as pointed out by Dr. Cone, Paul was so indifferent to the actual meaning of passages in the Old Testament as to employ the incorrect Septuagint version whenever it gave a sense better suited to his object than that of the Hebrew. That he had had a careful biblical training according to the Jewish theology of the period, is shown by his use of the allegorical mode of interpretation, various examples of which to be found in his writings are referred

to by the author; who mentions, moreover, that Paul learned from his Jewish teachers the interpretation known as typological, the principle of which is "that events and persons of a past time may be regarded as prefiguring occurrences and individuals of a later age." He was evidently influenced also by Hellenistic ideas derived partly from the book known as the Wisdom of Solomon, but they were "subordinated to his gospel of the cross, and come out of his Christian consciousness transformed." Other features of his teaching show how deeply he was impressed by the ideas received from his Pharisaic instructors. Such are the establishment of the Messianic kingdom and the doctrine of the resurrection of the righteous at the coming of the Messiah, and the belief in a supersensible world of spiritual existences, good and bad, who intervene in earthly affairs and affect the fortunes of individuals. Rabbinical traditional lore was familiar to him, and he quotes from the Hagadah as if it were equally valid with the Old Testament as the word of God. The Hagadah constituted largely, indeed, the background of the apostle's thought, but, says Dr. Cone, "he rose above the pettiness and formalism and legal bondage of his race, above Pharisaism, the Hagadah, and Alexandrian speculation, and became by the strength and soundness of his intellectual and moral character one of the great religious forces of the world."

As to Paul's personal traits, the author accepts the opinion that his physical appearance was not imposing, although he thinks the traditional description of the apostle as "short, bald, bow-legged, with meeting eyebrows, hooked nose," overdrawn. The "infirmity of the flesh" referred to in Galatians is regarded as epileptic. The question whether Paul ever married is answered in the negative by Dr. Cone, on the ground of the opinion expressed by the apostle as to the relation of husband and wife in 1 Cor. vii. 1 and 9. He possessed the gift of continence, which is not surprising when we consider his intensity of conviction and resoluteness of purpose where his religious belief was concerned, and he would that all men had the same gift, although when absent marriage was permissible. The apostle's personality appears strongly in his literary style which, says the author, is characteristic of the man in a greater degree than that of most writers. His intense preoccupation with his theme made him careless of the logical connexion of his thought. He had no time to consider whether he was consistent with himself or no, but he was greater, says Dr. Cone, "than all speculation, and all paradoxes, and all theologies. He could afford to perpetrate antinomies and to write in a style which, like himself, was both Hebraic and Grecian. It was because he was both Greek and Hebrew, and had a far seeing vision, which looked beyond the making of a theology, and a great love that embraced mankind, that he became the conqueror of the world."

The conversion of Paul, which is rightly spoken of by the author as the most important event in Christian history next to the birth of Jesus, is said to be involved "in the obscurity that attaches to all spiritual processes which the subject of them cannot adequately explain to himself, much less to others." Dr. Cone points out that Paul nowhere mentions a conversion, but speaks of Christ as "seen" of him and "revealed" in him, and that some of the apostle's revelations were received during a suspension of his normal consciousness. His Christian belief, however, rested on the conviction that Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God, the true Messiah, and that Jesus had been raised from the dead by divine power. What occurred at the martyrdom of Stephen and perhaps of other Christians made a strong impression on him, and the transformation may have been completed by a vision of Christ which, in the conditions to which he was subject, would be regarded as representing an objective reality. But it is time to bring to an end this incomplete notice of Dr. Cone's work, which gives in its second and third parts an excellent account of Paul's missionary labors and a keen criticism of his doctrinal teaching, concluding with a chapter on Christian eschatology with particular reference to Paul's special ideas.

C. S. WAKE.



VOLTAIRE.

(1694-1778.)

From an engraving in the possession of Jean Baptiste de Poilley.

Frontispiece to the Open Court for February, 1899.

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VOLTAIRE.

(1694-1778.)

BY PROF. L. LÉVY-BRUHL.

WE must not turn to Voltaire for an original conception of the universe that connects the whole of reality with a first principle, or for a constant concern for the metaphysical problems upon which both science and action depend. It is a well-known fact that Voltaire was not akin to such men as Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza. These lived only to seek disinterestedly after truth. If they influenced the world it was from afar, and through a slow diffusion of their principles—a result all the deeper and more durable coming as it did from a greater height. Voltaire wished for immediate effects. He was not above the world: he was, on the contrary, what the Germans call a *Weltkind*. He loved wealth, success, honors: he was eager for literary fame. He lived in the midst of controversy, and was never weary of it. He was full of craft and cunning, and curious regarding the most trifling as well as the most important objects.

In spite of all, his contemporaries, and the greatest among them, Kant for instance, did not think they ought to deny Voltaire the name of philosopher. Let us not be more exacting than they. Let us acknowledge, as they did, that the philosophy of Voltaire, though not strictly reduced to a system, is nevertheless diffused through his work, and is the very soul of it. It is expressed in his novels, in his historical works, and even in his tragedies, as well as in his essays and in the philosophical dictionary. It is indeed characterised rather by wide range than by depth. Voltaire was addressing the public at large. He preaches and rails indefatigably: his satires are sermons, and his sermons, satires. He makes use, in a thousand different shapes, of the process familiar to all great

journalists, of whom he was the first: namely, repetition. He is thus led to an extreme simplification of his philosophy, and reduces it to a small number of propositions, which require no effort to be understood. But, just as we make an effort in order to grasp clearly the meaning of some abstruse metaphysician, in spite of his obscurity, so should we endeavor to bring out Voltaire's philosophical thought, in spite of the excessive zeal for clearness by which it is often distorted.

Is this philosophy, as has been said, an engine of war against the Church and the Roman Catholic dogmas? No doubt it is that, but not that alone. It aims not only to destroy, but also to build up. As Voltaire was much better fit for the former task than for the latter, he was infinitely more successful in it. But this is no reason either for suspecting his sincerity when he seeks to be constructive, or for dismissing without a word an effort, the trace of which has not yet disappeared. Voltaire's religious philosophy, for instance, is even in our days that of many people who do not acknowledge or sometimes even suspect that it is so.

The philosophy of Voltaire varied, but less than might have been expected in the course of so long a life from such a mobile nature as his, so keenly alive to every new impulsion of the spirit of the age. Thus, in his *Traité de Métaphysique* (1734) he admits free-will, and later on, in the *Philosophe Ignorant* (1766) he confesses that Collins had converted him to determinism. He changed his opinion also on the question of the eternity of the world. His semi-pessimism became more bitter as he grew older. But on the main points of his doctrine, on God, the soul, morals, the essential principle of religion, Voltaire was always consistent with himself. He saw most of the Encyclopædists follow after Diderot and go even much farther; in spite of their urgent entreaties, and at the risk of seeming a conservative and almost a reactionist, he refused to swerve from his theories. In a man so careful of his popularity as Voltaire was, this is a sure proof of his attachment to a body, if not a system, of philosophical ideas.

Introduced when still a mere youth to the society of the *Temple*, Voltaire was initiated into the philosophy of the "libertines," and was thus in direct connexion with the anti-religious movement in the seventeenth century. He was well acquainted with Fontenelle and Bayle, not quite so well with Malebranche, and but slightly with Descartes, though he often mentions him. He seems to see in Descartes only the author of the hypothesis of vortices and plenum: one wonders whether he ever read the *Discours de la Méthode* and

the *Méditations*. He certainly did not enter deeply into them. It was in England that Voltaire became fond of philosophy. Locke and Newton were his masters in the art of thinking. On his return to France, full of what he had learned, he undertook the introduction of Newton's physics and Locke's empiricism. The zeal and talent of such a disciple contributed in no small degree to make them known and admired. It is true he did not present to his readers the entire works of either Locke or Newton; he rather "adapted" them, according to his own taste and to the supposed taste of the public. The success was considerable, and one cannot tell whether the *Lettres Anglaises* did more for the European fame of Locke and Newton, or for the reputation of him who expounded their doctrines so skilfully.

After having contributed, more than any other man, to spread in France the discoveries of Newton, Voltaire ceased to concern himself with astronomy and physics. But he never ceased to seek in Newton's physics a help for his demonstration of the existence of God.

In Voltaire's philosophy, the ontological proof has disappeared, since he does not admit innate ideas. There remain therefore the cosmological proof and the proof by means of final causes. For the former, it is precisely Newton's physics on which he relies for support. Newton in fact says: "There is a Being who has necessarily been self-existent from all eternity, and who is the origin of all other beings. This Being is infinite in duration, immensity, and power: for what can limit him?" But may not the material world be that very Being? You might suppose so, answers Voltaire, should you, as the Cartesians do, admit the plenum, and the infinity and eternity of the world. Nothing is so easy as to pass from this to materialism, that is, to a doctrine which makes matter the eternal substance, and knows no other God. (Thus, to Voltaire, the words materialist and atheist are almost always synonymous.) But the Newtonians, from the very fact of their admitting a vacuum, admit that matter has had a beginning, that motion needs a first cause, in short, a creating God. Still, when Voltaire later on came to think that the universe must be eternal as the very thought of God who caused it to exist, this argument lost some of its force, or at least ought to have been restated in a different form. If Voltaire did not think of it, it was probably because he was fully satisfied with another proof, concerning which he never changed his mind: i. e., the proof based on final causes.

No doubt he was the first to laugh at the abuse made of the

consideration of finality. "Noses were made to wear spectacles; therefore we have spectacles. Legs were obviously instituted that they might be clad, and so we have knee-breeches; stones, that they might be cut; swine, that they might be eaten, and so on." But never did Voltaire find anything ridiculous in the thought that the whole of nature bears witness to Him who created it. "When I observe the order, the prodigious contrivances, the mechanical and geometrical laws which reign over the universe, the innumerable means and ends of all things, I am overcome with admiration and awe. Nothing can shake my faith in this axiom: 'Every piece of work implies a workman.'" This workman we have already met with: it is Fontenelle's "watchmaker." Voltaire uses almost exactly the same expressions as Fontenelle: "When we behold a fine machine, we say that there is a good machinist, and that he has an excellent understanding. The world is assuredly an admirable machine; therefore there is in the world an admirable intelligence, wherever it may be. This argument is old, and is none the worse for it."

Voltaire thinks to give this argument a deeper basis by adding that "nature is art," which means that there is, properly speaking, no nature, since all existing things are the work of some great unknown Being who is both very powerful and very industrious. He thus carries to its utmost limits the clear notion of finality, which is borrowed directly from the analogy between the order in the universe and the productions of human art. But of what value is this analogy? German philosophy, on the contrary, likes to show that the idea of finality is an obscure one, because the way in which nature engenders and animates beings resembles in no wise the industry of man. Man makes use of materials and springs, and puts together pieces of various origins: he works from the outside, whereas nature works from the inside. Instead of explaining nature by means of art, we ought rather to interpret art by nature: for, if we do not understand the organising and restoring power of nature, neither can we explain the creating genius of the poet or the artist; the finality of nature is not clear, as Voltaire thought it to be: it is mysterious. We cannot help supposing it to exist, says Kant; but no more can we understand What it is.

Voltaire was not aware of these difficulties. His proof seemed to him flawless, and he steadily maintained to the last the existence of God, even against his friends. This is not only because God is needed for social ethics. From a purely theoretical point of view, when Voltaire weighs the reasons for or against atheism and the-

ism, he thinks the latter preferable to the former. "In the opinion that there is a God we meet with difficulties, but in the contrary opinion, there are absurdities." For instance, to come back to Newton, who plays so large a part in Voltaire's natural theology, the atheist, as we have said, is a materialist: he acknowledges the existence of infinite matter, of a plenum; he therefore stands in contradiction with Newton. Now Newton certainly has spoken the truth: atheism is therefore untenable. Voltaire's reasoning is perhaps over-simplified, on account of his constant endeavor to be clearly understood even by the most careless reader. But the leading idea is an interesting one: to give up such of our metaphysical ideas as are incompatible with well-grounded scientific truths. This is precisely what we do in the present century.

The idea of humanity is the basis of Voltaire's philosophy of history. As early as 1737, in his *Conseils à un Journaliste*, he expressed the wish that a universal history should really correspond to its title, and that in it the whole of mankind should be studied. It would be desirable for Orientalists to give us outlines of the Eastern books. The public would not then be so totally ignorant of the history of the larger part of the globe; the pompous name of universal history would not be bestowed upon a few collections of Egyptian fables, of the revolutions of a country called Greece, not larger than Champagne, and of those of the Roman nation which, vast and victorious as it was, never ruled over so many states as the people of Mahomet, and never conquered one-tenth of the world. Later on, in the preface to his *Essai sur les Mœurs*, he openly criticises Bossuet. He reproaches him with forgetting the universe in universal history, with mentioning only three or four nations, which have now disappeared from the earth, with sacrificing these three or four powerful nations to the insignificant Jewish people, which occupies three-fourths of the work, and lastly, with passing over Islam, India, and China without a word. Voltaire wished to secularise universal history, hitherto subordinate to theological dogma.

But his own conception of universal history remains practically incomplete, since what he knows of the history of the New World is next to nothing. And above all, he lacks a central principle that would enable him to understand this universal history in its unity. He can but repeat that "man has always been what he is." He implicitly believes in this uniformity of the species, which prevents him from understanding the little he knows of remote antiquity. Some of the religious rites of the Babylonians are offensive to our idea of morality. Voltaire does not hesitate to assume that

historians lied in relating them. The men that he sees everywhere are perfectly similar to those around him, though disguised, some as Greeks or Romans, others as Chinese, Persians, Turks, or Hindoos. He sees everywhere the public credulous and deluded, and the world going on its usual way, at once tragic and ludicrous. His romances are the exact counterpart of the *Essai sur les Mœurs*. *Candide*, *Zadig* *la Princesse de Babylone*, complete the idea of humanity given in Voltaire's historical works. He does not derive his knowledge of mankind from history: on the contrary, he transfers to history the humanity that he already knows, from observations of his contemporaries.

He does not however deny progress; but he has a most peculiar notion of it. The idea of slow and gradual evolution, of successive stages that must needs be travelled in order to reach a certain point, does not appear in his works. Progress, with him, does not consist in a law of development. It began less than a century ago, with the awakening of natural philosophy, and above all, with the enfranchisement of reason. No doubt antiquity possessed great thinkers, but it was nevertheless a prey to superstition. "There is not a single ancient philosopher who now serves to instruct young people among enlightened nations." As for the Middle Ages he despatches them in short order. "Imagine the Samoyeds and the Ostiaks having read Aristotle and Avicenna: this is what we were." Ignorance, misery, and theology: the whole of the Middle Ages was in these three plagues, and Voltaire cannot tell which of the three is the worst. According to him, scholasticism, the wars of religion, the plagues, famines, and *autos-da-fe*, are all intimately related; and we are hardly yet rid of them. Witches had been condemned to the stake in Germany as late as the seventeenth century. There were still in France trials like that of Calas and La Barre. Therefore, when Voltaire speaks of the Middle Ages, it is never in the tone of the historian: passion always intervenes. He is little acquainted with this period, but what he knows of it is sufficient to make him loathe and despise it. Nor does he study it, being persuaded beforehand that such study would only confirm him in his feeling.

Is it surprising that Voltaire, being thus disposed, misapprehended the art of the Middle Ages, and was unaware of the grandeur of the age of Saint Louis, and of the prosperity of France before the Hundred Years' War, etc.? We must however also acknowledge, it seems, that his prejudice did not prevent him from giving a picture, which is often accurate, of the general history of

Europe since Charlemagne. And though the *Essai sur les Mœurs* may not be adequate to the idea of a philosophy of history, the very conception of the work was an original one, and many of the views expressed in it by Voltaire were fruitful for the historians who came after him.

This is not the proper place to speak of Voltaire as an economist, a criminalist and commentator of Beccaria, a writer on the theory of taste, and lastly, as the author of the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, applying to the most varied subjects his eager curiosity. Though it is difficult to draw the line between his philosophy, properly so called, and the rest of his works, we must here content ourselves with stating his philosophical ideas, in so far as they may be grouped into a system. Now, from all that we have said it appears that his principle is empiricism tempered by the idea of universality. Voltaire thinks, as Locke does, that nothing is given us beyond and independent of experience. But at the same time he is, perhaps unconsciously, faithful to the Cartesian tradition, and maintains that nothing is theoretically true or practically just, unless it be universally accepted by reason. The union of these two elements is effected in the idea of *humanity*, which is both an empirical and a universal one. From this point of view, Voltaire's philosophy, in spite of its gaps and inconsistencies—which, by the bye, are less serious than they are often said to be—offers a real unity. Science, morals, history, religion, politics, are all subjected by him to a criticism, which is sometimes hasty and partial, but which proceeds from an unchanging principle: to oppose to the products of historical evolution, varying according to places and times, and often irrational and absurd, the standard of what is purely human and universally accepted by reason.

Thus, over against the positive religions, he sets up natural religion, which contains nothing but the human ideal of morality. The real name of Voltaire's God is: Justice. It is a noble name. We may venture to believe that the great German philosophers of the end of the eighteenth century, influenced, like everybody else, by Voltaire's prestige, retained something of his thought on this point. No doubt the influence of Rousseau told still more strongly upon them; no doubt they went more deeply into the ideas of experience, reason, justice, and truth, which Voltaire did not sufficiently analyse. But though he was too little of a philosopher to build a system as they did, he succeeded in spreading critical and humanitarian ideas all over Europe, and even in gaining for them a temporary ascendancy.

THE GIFFORD LECTURESHIPS.

BY PROF. R. M. WENLEY. *

THE recent appointments of Prof. William James by the University of Edinburgh, and of Prof. Josiah Royce by the University of Aberdeen, to the Gifford lectureships, have called the attention of many Americans to this foundation. It is so remarkable in itself as to merit notice in such a magazine as *The Open Court*; and some account of the deed of gift, of the incumbents, and of the results achieved may not be unwelcome from one who has had the privilege of listening to seven of the distinguished lecturers.

More than ten years ago Scotland was startled by the intelligence that Lord Gifford, one of the judges of the Supreme Court, had by will left \$400,000, to be divided among the four universities, for the purpose of founding lectureships on what he designated Natural Theology. Before passing to consider this sign of the times, its results, and the personality of the donor, it may be well to determine the precise nature of Adam Gifford's wishes by reference to the testamentary deed—which is in itself a sufficiently striking document:

"I having been for many years deeply and firmly convinced that the true knowledge of God, that is, of the being, nature, and attributes, of the Infinite, of the All, of the First and Only Cause, that is, the One and Only Substance and Being, and of the true and felt knowledge (not merely nominal knowledge) of the relations of man and the universe to Him, and of the true foundations of all ethics or morals, being, I say, convinced that this knowledge, when really felt and acted upon, is the means of man's highest wellbeing, I have resolved to institute and found lectureships or classes for the promotion of the study of said subjects among the whole people of Scotland. . . . The lecturers appointed shall be subjected to no test of any kind, and shall not be required to take any oath, or to emit or subscribe any declaration of belief, or to make any promise of any kind; they may be of any denomination whatever, or of no denomination at all (and many earnest and high-minded men prefer to belong to no ecclesiastical denomination); they may be of

any religion, or, as is sometimes said, they may be of no religion, or they may be so-called sceptics, or agnostics or free-thinkers, provided only that the "patrons" will use diligence to secure that they be able, reverent men, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth.

"I wish the lecturers to treat their subject as a strictly natural science, the greatest of all possible sciences, indeed, in one sense, the only science, that of Infinite Being, without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so called miraculous revelation. I wish it considered just as astronomy or chem-



LORD GIFFORD.

istry is. I have intentionally indicated, in describing the subject of the lectures the general aspect which personally I should expect the lecturers to bear, but the lecturers shall be under no restraint whatever in their treatment of their theme; for example, they may freely discuss (and it may be well to do so) all questions about man's conceptions of God or the Infinite, their origin, nature, and truth, whether he can have any such conceptions, whether God is under any or what limitations, and so on, as I am persuaded that nothing but good can result from free discussion. . . . My desire and hope is that these lectureships may promote and ad-

vance among all classes of the community the true knowledge of Him Who Is, and there is none and nothing beside Him, in Whom we live and move and have our being, and in Whom all things consist, and of man's real relationship to Him Whom truly to know is life everlasting."

From the document just quoted, it is sufficiently evident that Gifford was a noteworthy man. At a time when many of his compatriots still stood hedged in by an obscuring ecclesiasticism, he was freely and fearlessly revolving the highest problems and arriving at conclusions which none but the most tolerant, open-minded, and strenuous, could be expected to adopt. We know from his friends—he is without biographer—that he delighted to escape from the exacting routine of a large legal practice in order to be free to live alone in peaceful communion with his beloved books. And from the same source we can glean partial and fragmentary information about the authors and studies that went to the moulding of his intellectual career. For, like so many Scots, he seems to have been impelled by mastering intellectuality, which was called forth into active exercise by the profoundest questions respecting the origin, nature, and final cause of human life. These predilections led him into many fields of literature, and he read omnivorously. But amid all his literary and philosophical acquaintances two swayed him, not exclusively, but with a subtle spell of which the others did not possess the secret. Devotion to Plato, saturation in Spinoza, tell a plain tale regarding his speculative tendencies; and this becomes even clearer when one calls to mind that Spinoza figured as his most constant companion. Indeed, what the Romantics said of Spinoza might be applied with equal fitness to this, his late Scottish disciple—he was a God-intoxicated man. Little wonder, then, that he slowly, but with certainty, arrived at monistic conclusions, and became firmly convinced that God is the one reality, this universe but the sphere of divine self-expression. Very naturally, too, he came to drift far from the dogmatic faith wherewith he had been early indoctrinated. We are unaware that he ever formulated his results and the reasons of his dissent. But we do know that he lost faith entirely in what is called the "supernatural," and rejected the miraculous element in the Bible. It may therefore be inferred that the liberal conditions of his bequest, like the subjects he prescribed for study and investigation, were dictated by his own dearest interests, as well as by an earnest desire that, in the coming time, others might find opportunity to enjoy benefits that he had longed to share.

In one respect the bequest had peculiar opportuneness. In

Scotland, all the chairs devoted to the study of religion and matters theological were, and still are, upon a confessional basis. In other departments of knowledge the four universities are free to select the best specialists available, and, on the whole, they make the most of their liberty. But in the cases of the Biblical languages; of theology—philosophical, systematic; of apologetics; of New and Old Testament criticism; of the History of the Church, of Dogma and of Religion, the professorships are open only to clergy who have pledged themselves to the Westminster Confession of Faith. Nor is this all. The situation finds further aggravation in the fact that the dissenting communions maintain theological colleges of their own, with the result that the university chairs are practically confined to ministers of the Established Church, the vast majority of whom possess slight expert acquaintance with the subjects mentioned. The Gifford bequest thus seemed destined to fill a gap at once in the matter of study and in the manner of presentation. How far it has contributed to this result we shall see later.

Lord Gifford showed further wisdom in the provisions he laid down for patronage. He might easily have entrusted this to a small body, composed largely of laymen—the kind of body which is more than likely, when elections come to be made, to lie under the influence of one or two partisans, or academico-political wire-pullers. Whether he foresaw this or not—and he must have had plenty of evidence before him—he wisely avoided the danger by remitting elections to the senates of the universities. That is to say, every professor on the teaching staff has an equal voice in determining who the incumbent shall be. While this may conceivably result in occasional trials of strength between the “humanists” and the “scientists,” it is practically certain to issue in elections which are reputable, if no more. And to their credit, be it said, the senates have to this point used their privilege with emphatic freedom from presuppositions, with an eye to the representation of divergent schools of thought, and with a catholicity of choice which guarantees that men of widely varied interests shall have opportunity to express their ideas. Moreover, no special favor has been extended to Scotchmen; indeed France is the one great contributor to the Science of Religion and the Philosophy of Religion (which have now driven antiquated Natural Theology from the field) whose resources have not been tapped. As witness of catholicity, take the present incumbents. At St. Andrews, Wellhausen, of Marburg, the Old Testament scholar; at Glasgow, Fos-

ter, of Cambridge, the physiologist; at Aberdeen, Royce, of Harvard, the idealist philosopher; at Edinburgh, James, of Harvard, the psychologist. A similar breadth of sentiment and of selection had marked the appointments since their commencement, in 1888. The list may be of interest; for the majority of the discourses are available in published form.

Taking the universities in the order of seniority, we first come to St. Andrews. Here the lectureship was initiated by Andrew Lang, who, though his reputation is chiefly that of a critic and litterateur, had given hostages to fortune in the shape of his well-known works, *Custom and Myth*, and *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*. His lectures have never been published as such. But it is understood that the materials employed have been worked over in his recent book, *The Making of Religion* (Longmans, 1898). Mr. Lang was succeeded by the greatest of living British philosophical teachers, in the person of Dr. Edward Caird, then professor of philosophy in the University of Glasgow, now master of Balliol College, Oxford. Dr. Caird's prelections immediately saw the light; and *The Evolution of Religion* has taken its place, not merely as one of the most important of the Gifford series, but as the leading work in English embodying the neo-Hegelian view of the development of religion (The Macmillan Co., 1893). After an interval, during which the lectureship was unfilled, Dr. Lewis Campbell, best known as the editor of *Plato* and biographer of Jowett, followed Dr. Caird. His lectures naturally dealt with his chosen field—the civilisation and literature of Greece, and are now announced for publication under the title, *Religion in Greek Literature*. The present incumbent, as has been said, is Professor Wellhausen, of Marburg. Different interests—anthropology, philosophy, classical literature, and Hebrew literature—have thus been represented at St. Andrews; the single criticism that could be offered by the carper is that three Oxford men, whose traditions had exposed them to similar moulding forces, have occupied the foundation.

Glasgow placed Max Müller at the head of her roll, and did him the honor, thus far extended to no other lecturer, of appointing him for a second term. His lectures, thoroughly characteristic of his life-work, appeared regularly at yearly intervals from 1889 (Longmans & Co.). When Professor Müller's term of office expired, this university had a successor ready to hand in the person of her distinguished head, John Caird, the most eloquent of Scottish divines, and the venerated leader of the liberal party in theological thought. He had already been approached by the Univer-

sity of Edinburgh, but preferred to accept the invitation of his *alma mater*. His painful, and as it was to prove final, illness, struck him down while he was in the midst of his second course; his lectures are now being edited by his brother and fellow-Hegelian, Dr. Edward Caird. True to its tradition as the headquarters of British Hegelianism, this university next invited Prof. William Wallace, the translator and elucidator of Hegel, biographer of Schopenhauer, and leader of Oxford Hegelianism. I listened to his lectures, which were amongst the most remarkable displays of wit and learning that I ever witnessed. He spoke for the greater part without even notes, and the effect was almost weird, as the late Henry Drummond said to me. Professor Wallace's lamentable death, by a bicycle accident, followed soon after his term of office ended, and it is a thousand pities that little remains in a condition for publication. These prelections having represented what might be called the left-wing tendency of contemporary British thought, it was but fair that, on the succeeding occasion, the more orthodox party should have its opportunity. This was recognised by the appointment of Prof. A. B. Bruce, who is best known to Americans as the editor of the Theological Translation Fund Library, and to Scotsmen as the most inspiring of teachers to be found in the theological colleges of the dissenting denominations. His first course of lectures was published a year ago under the title *The Providential Order of the World* (Scribner's). The scientific men, who had not hitherto been recognised at Glasgow, have their protagonist in the new incumbent, Professor Foster, of Cambridge. Science of Religion in the strict sense; Philosophy of Religion from the standpoint of a right-wing Hegelian theologian and from that of a Hegelian metaphysician; and Natural Theology according to a convinced supernaturalist, have thus been heard in this university. It remains to be seen what the scientific investigator, in the strict sense, will provide.

Like Glasgow, Aberdeen began with a man whose reputation had long been securely settled. Dr. E. B. Tylor, of Oxford, the leading British authority on early civilisation, and the earliest investigator to recognise the importance of animism in the early stages of religious growth, received the initial appointment. Dr. Tylor's lectures have not been published. He was followed by Dr. A. M. Fairbairn, principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, the most celebrated divine and liberal theologian of the Congregational communion. Although Dr. Fairbairn had long been known for his strictly theological writings, it was an open secret that he had

never abandoned those studies in the Philosophy of Religion which were foreshadowed in his first, and now scarce-book, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History* (1877). Among the English divines no wiser selection could have been made. Dr. Fairbairn's lectures have not seen the light as yet; but doubtless he is retaining the material for use in his promised book on "Comparative Religion" in that successful series, the International Theological Library (Scribner's); and his present visit to India will give him new opportunities for investigation and collection of information. Dr. Fairbairn was followed by Dr. James Ward, the most eminent of British psychologists. The Cambridge thinker has never been a prolific writer, and his lectures are still unprinted. Professor Royce, whose *Religious Aspect of Philosophy* gives more promise than some of his more recent writings, is just now entering upon the office for 1899. Aberdeen can claim the same catholicity of selection as her sisters. Anthropology; speculative theology; philosophy in the modern British line; and American neo-Hegelianism, have each received recognition.

The youngest, and largest, of the universities still remains. Perhaps to make amends for absence of academic recognition on her part, Edinburgh chose to begin with her world-famous local philosopher, Dr. J. Hutchinson Stirling, the man who first introduced Hegel to the English-speaking peoples in his characteristic book, *The Secret of Hegel*, known to and appreciated at its full value by Emerson and Carlyle. The veteran took up his task with typical zeal, and soon after his incumbency published that curious, stimulating, but often crabbed book, *Philosophy and Theology* (Scribner's). The influential scientific wing at this university after having invited Lord Kelvin and Helmholtz, without success, secured representation at the vacancy by the election of the eminent Cambridge physicist, Sir G. G. Stokes, president of the Royal Society. From the point of view of the plain man, Stokes's lectures are among the most satisfactory yet given; but they sadly lack information on phases of the subject later than Paley; and one "impertinent" (or pertinent) critic has had the audacity to describe them as "without form and void." They are published in two small volumes under the title, *Natural Theology* (A. & C. Black). Sir George Stokes left the vacant chair to the incumbent, whose lectures—strangely enough as some think,—caused more discussion and ill-will than any yet delivered. Such turned out to be the good or evil fortune of Prof. Otto Pfeleiderer, the eminent speculative theologian of Berlin. His lectures were immediately

printed with the title *Philosophy and Development of Religion* (Scribner's). They contain an admirably clear summary of views he had propounded years before in his *Urchristenthum* and *Religionsphilosophie*. Familiar as they must have been to all experts, they had not then reached the mass of the "nation of sermon-tasters," hence the pother. Determined to err on the safe side on the next occasion, Edinburgh called back to service her eminent emeritus professor of metaphysics, Alexander Campbell Fraser, the editor of Berkeley and Locke, and the surviving representative of Berkeleyan tendencies among British thinkers. His lectures derived power from his great age, and the pathos with which an old man views the profound questions of religion pervades them through and through. They have received publication in two volumes (Scribner's), and, as they happen to give expression to those conservative views that have recently won a large party in Britain and the United States, they have been received with distinguished favor (Scribner's). Like the prelections of Sir George Stokes, they follow more or less closely the lines of the old Natural Theology, though with a philosophical insight and sense of proportion to which the physicist could not pretend. Professor Fraser found a successor in the one professed master of the Science of Religion who has held the appointment to this date—Professor Tiele, of Leyden. With the exception of Dr. E. Caird's lectures, his first volume has generally been regarded as the most important contribution yet made from the foundation. The complete work, under the title *Elements of the Science of Religion*, will extend to two volumes, of which the first, *Morphology of Religion*, has recently been given to the public (Scribner's). The second part, *Ontology of Religion*, is awaited with keen expectation. Prof. William James, of Harvard, is now just about to enter upon his incumbency; and if, as is reported, he intends to devote attention to the psychology of the founders of religions, one may predict an intellectual and literary feast for the auditors, and later for the readers. For Professor James is the psychologist who writes like a novelist, and own brother to the novelist who writes like a psychologist. Edinburgh has not failed in her dispensation of the trust. Metaphysics of the Hegelian and British schools; physical science, represented by a great leader who never lost his faith; speculative theology set forth by its most winning living exponent; the Science of Religion voiced by a Saul amongst its prophets; and the "new psychology," witnessed to by its wittiest and most suggestive master, have passed to the rostrum in turn.

In conclusion, what are we to say of the results so far achieved? We may begin by looking at the less favorable aspect of the matter.

As was to be anticipated, neither the foundation itself, nor the lecturers appointed, nor the lines pursued by the incumbents, have escaped attack. At the first blush, the average man scouted Gifford's will as the testament of a crank. What need could there be to institute lectures in connexion with religion, when three or four competing churches existed in every village of the land? Why give such prominence to "unsettling" discussions, and especially, why remove all safe-guards? When the terms of the bequest were announced, one heard these and similar questions constantly. Now they are no longer asked; the "sensation" has passed, and the average man is busy over another occurrence of the hour, one probably more suited to his capacity, or less removed from the field of his *bourgeois* vision. Yet again, when the machinery came to prove itself in the ordinary course of work, the centre of criticism shifted. The *personnel* and the subject matter of the prelections at once fell under review, as was to be expected in a country where university matters attract widespread attention and offer fertile suggestion to the busybody and the "letter-to-the-editor" bore. Curiously enough, the *personnel* has received unfavorable comment from the free-thinker so called; while, less curiously, the orthodox—though not the "unco' guid," as the Scotch Pharisee is called—have entered their protest against the freedom used by some lecturers. In the former case, it has been objected, for instance, that ministers of the churches *ought* not to be appointed. In other words, the patrons have been accused of unfaithfulness to their trust in electing men like Principals Caird and Fairbairn, or Professors Campbell and Bruce. This criticism has raged chiefly round the appointment of the last—in some ways, it seems to me, an excellent testimonial for him. It implies that Dr. Bruce had something to say from his standpoint that might be weighty. The contention of these critics has been that one whose signature stood below the Westminster Confession had thereby unfitted himself for exercising that impartiality for which Lord Gifford was so solicitous. It must be obvious, of course, that this objection holds with reference to Christianity alone. The signatory of the Confession retains perfect liberty to treat precisely as he chooses all matters that fall without the dogmas of the Church. In short, he is as competent as his neighbor to discuss "natural theology" in the old sense of the term, and, be it said, he is almost certain to turn out better informed. Besides, Gifford himself had decreed, "they

may be of any religion, or of none." This criticism has proceeded mainly from the "letter-to-the-editor" bore, and may be dismissed as not worth the ink spilt upon it. Closely connected with it, however, is another objection that seems to be better based. Under the wisely liberal administration of the late Principal Caird, the chapel of the University of Glasgow had become a unique institution. From Sunday to Sunday during the academic year, the pulpit was in the occupancy of distinguished men belonging to all denominations. When the principal himself received election it was but natural that, in order to reach as large an audience as possible (it often ran to several thousands) the lectures should be incorporated with the regular Sunday service. And when the Rev. Professor Bruce followed, it was equally natural that the custom should be retained. As the Scottish universities are Presbyterian, the service was substantially that of the Church of Scotland. Hence, Roman Catholics, Freethinkers, Anglicans, Unitarians, and others objected that it was no part of the founder's intention that, in order to hear a lecture, auditors should have to submit to an alien religious service. On the whole, this objection has some reason; although the critics apparently forgot the peculiar circumstances, which must cease on the appointment of another layman, and the equally prominent fact that but a very small percentage of the hearers could have been outside Presbyterianism, Scotland being, with the exception of Sweden, the most unanimous country in the world in this matter.

While these criticisms, being on the surface, did not excite much attention, others, proceeding from traditional quarters, and directed to the subject matter of the lectures, caused commotion from time to time. The learned professor of theology at Glasgow indulged in a tilt with Prof. Max Müller, in which the theologian had all the best of the linguist. Much adverse comment was passed upon the "flippancy" of Professor Wallace's lectures, and the same thing happened at St. Andrews in one or two cases. But the real fight did not come till Professor Pfeiderer's occupancy of the Edinburgh lectureship. Though the opinions of the great Berlin theologian had long been known to students in Scotland, they had not reached the mass of the public till he found this occasion to present them. They caused much heart-searching, and prominent theologians of the three chief Presbyterian communions delivered public replies, which were afterwards printed in book form. For the Church of Scotland, Professor Charteris, the occupant of the chair of New Testament criticism in the University of Edin-

burgh, was the spokesman. For the Free Church, Principal Rainy, of New College, Edinburgh, and Prof. Marcus Dods, of the New Testament chair in the same institution; for the United Presbyterian Church, Prof. James Orr, of the Church History chair in the Theological College. The purport of their joint volume is indicated by its title, *The Supernatural in Christianity*, and by the titles of the three lectures it contains:—Principal Rainy on the “Issues at Stake;” Professor Orr on “Can Professor Pfeleiderer’s View Justify Itself?” and Professor Dods on “The Trustworthiness of the Gospels.” Professor Charteris, who was prevented by illness from lecturing, affixed a preliminary statement, which well exhibits the general tenor of the argument. After admitting that Pfeleiderer’s conclusions are not new, and after paying a tribute of respect to the lecturer’s ability, he continues: “There seems to many of us to be a call to say, at the earliest possible moment, with all possible personal respect for the lecturer, that we object to many things clearly stated in those Gifford lectures. Perhaps I may be allowed to speak for myself, and say that I object to the lecturer’s presupposition that the Incarnation is to be disbelieved because it is not, according to his conception of history, founded on our experience. Further, I object to his assumption that all the more marvellous incidents in the Gospel history of Jesus Christ are of later invention than the others. I object to his extraordinary assertion that St. Paul believed in a merely spiritual resurrection of Jesus Christ. I object to his almost as extraordinary assertion in regard to Baur’s view of the Fourth Gospel, that ‘all further investigations have always only contributed anew to confirm it in the main.’ . . . Objection may well be taken to the lecturer’s attempt to borrow all the ethics of the Christian revelation, and to appropriate all its highest hopes, and to make them parts of a speculative system which I know not whether to call Deism or Pantheism, which seems to deny any revelation except what may be found in gathering the lessons of history and science. . . . Therefore, I, for one, am glad that some men have come forward to protest, in the name of the Christian Church in Scotland, against this attack upon their faith. . . . *I hope steps may be taken by the Senatus to prevent any future lecturer on Natural Theology from making an attack on the records of the Christian faith.*” The words I have italicised contain the secret of the difficulties to which the lecturers are exposed. Of course any Senate which took such steps would be directly traversing Lord Gifford’s most explicit injunctions. But the question still remains, What is Natural Theology? Professor Charteris evi-

dently clings to the old—and now abandoned—view, that Natural Theology deals with all questions of religion which can be treated apart from revelation; and that *there are other problems which consort only with special revelation*. Every authority on the History of Religion now teaches that all religion is one revelation; or, if you choose to put it in another way, that there is no peculiar revelation. The distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion is held to be a false abstraction; and so the records of the Christian faith cannot claim exemption any more than the Avesta, or the Qu'uran, or the Jewish Prophets, or the Book of Mormon. The central point of interest is that Lord Gifford endowed Natural Theology just at the moment when it had ceased to exist, or had died of inanition, and when its subject matter had been parcelled out to its successors—Science, and especially Philosophy, of Religion. At the same time it may very well be conceded to the critics that lecturers would be well advised to confine their attention to other matters for a time. Biblical criticism has not done its work yet; we are only on the threshold of a competent grasp of the history of dogma; and till these sources are fully exploited it is impossible to reinterpret Christianity in that positive spirit which is the major demand of our age. If Philosophy of Religion and Science of Religion are to be barred from consideration of Christianity, it is a bad day for the maintenance of our religion. But the time has hardly come as yet for the new interpretation. We do not understand the position which we now occupy. But the Gifford lecturers, and their critics, are doing an indispensable work in calling attention to the widely altered and still rapidly changing conditions of the entire problem. Every question presents two sides; and Pfeiderer and his critics happen to be alike right and alike wrong. Time alone can overtake the requisite synthesis. I do not think it is so true of any age as of our own, that special pleaders on opposite sides have had the misfortune to be born too soon.¹

One criticism I might be permitted to pass on my own responsibility. It is unfortunate, I think, that the terms of the bequest forbid any permanent appointment, and that an appointment for two years is rapidly coming to be of use and wont. In these circumstances it is inevitable that election should be made of distinguished men who, immersed in other specialties, have not had either the time or the unbidden inclination to devote the necessary

¹ What I mean happens to be aptly illustrated by three articles in *The New World*, September, 1898; Professor Pfeiderer reasserts his position; Mr. Denison very cleverly upholds Professor Pfeiderer's critics; while Prof. Henry Jones gives some hint of the clue that we seek for discovery of the larger synthesis.

preliminary years to investigation of religious phenomena. Thus there happens to be more than a danger that the lectures should become interesting rather than authoritative. Physicists, physiologists, even psychologists and philosophers *von Fach*, have more than enough to occupy them in their own field. Thus when they are led to accept Gifford lectureships they are apt to make special preparation under pressure, with the not unexpected consequence that they evince lack of broad knowledge, a deficiency which results from imperfect handling of evidence that may be quite familiar to those who have devoted their life-study to religion. Stimulation may be the consequence; but another unavoidable issue lies in the vulnerable points which are exposed to attack, and successful attack, by learned men who are obscurantists by nature or by the force of circumstances. This, it seems to me, is the weakest point in the Gifford machinery. If four experts could be placed in a position to devote their entire time and energy to "Natural Theology," I feel sure that the results would be more commensurate with the greatness of the opportunity which Lord Gifford created. And this view is gaining ground rapidly in Scotland.

However this personal opinion may be, the mere fact that the lectureships exist is cause for rejoicing. For they afford occasion for the free ventilation of subjects that many have come to consider too odoriferous for common converse. They restore dignity to a department of learning that has too long been, in many eyes, the happy hunting ground of "theologues," as the contemptuous word stands. And they afford the most eminent thinkers of the time a point of vantage from which they may, without false sentiment, and without false pride, unburden themselves on subjects which, after all has been said, have no peers in fundamental importance.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ANIMALS.¹

BY PROF. TH. RIBOT.

IN the immense realm of the invertebrates, the highest psychical development is, by general acknowledgment, met with among the social Hymenoptera; and the capital representatives of this group are the ants. To these we may confine ourselves. Despite their tiny size, their brain, particularly among the neuters, is remarkable in structure—"one of the most marvellous atoms," says Darwin, "in all matter, not excepting even the human brain." Injuries to this organ, which are frequent in their sanguinary combats, cause disorders quite analogous to those observed in mammals. It is useless to recall what every one knows of their habits their organisation of labor, varied methods of architecture, their wars, plundering and rape, practice of slavery, methods of education, and (in certain species) their agricultural labors, harvesting, construction of granaries, etc.² We, on the contrary, must examine the exceptional cases in which the ants depart from their general habits; for their ability to abstract, to generalise, and to reason, can only be established by new adaptations to unaccustomed circumstances. The following may serve as examples:

"A nest was made near one of our tramways," says Mr. Belt, "and to get to the trees, the leaves of which they were harvesting, the ants had to cross the rails, over which the cars were continually passing and re-passing. Every time they came along a number of ants were crushed to death. They persevered in crossing for some time, but at last set to work and tunnelled underneath each rail. One day, when the cars were not running, I stopped up the tunnels with stones; but although great numbers carrying leaves were thus cut off from the nest, they would not cross the rails, but set to work making fresh tunnels underneath them."

¹Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.

²For details see Romanes, *Animal Intelligence*, Chapters III. and V.

Another observer, Dr. Ellendorf, who has carefully studied the ants of Central America, recounts a similar experience. These insects cut off the leaves of trees and carry them to their nests, where they serve various purposes. One of their columns was returning laden with spoils.

"I placed a dry branch, nearly a foot in diameter, obliquely across their path, which was lined on either side by an impassable barrier of high grass, and pressed it down so tightly on the ground that they could not creep underneath. The first comers crawled beneath the branch as far as they could, and then tried to climb over, but failed owing to the weight on their heads. . . . They then stood still as if awaiting a word of command, and I saw with astonishment that the loads had been laid aside by more than a foot's length of the column, one imitating the other. And now work began on both sides of the branch, and in about half an hour a tunnel was made beneath it. Each ant then took up its burden again, and the march was resumed in the most perfect order."

They also show considerable inventiveness in the construction of bridges. It appears from numerous observations that they know how to place straws on the surface of water, and to keep them in equilibrium or unite their several ends together with earth, moisten them with their saliva, restore them when destroyed, and to construct a highway made of grains of sand, etc. (Réaumur.) They even employ living bridges: "The ground about a maple tree having been smeared with tar so as to check their ravages, the first ants who attempted to cross stuck fast. But the others were not to be thus entrapped. Turning back to the tree they carried down aphides which they deposited on the tar one after another until they had made a bridge over which they could cross the tarred spot without danger."¹

I shall cite no observations on the intelligence of wasps and bees, but I wish to note one rudimentary case of generalisation. Huber remarked that bees bite holes through the base of corollas when these are so long as to prevent them from reaching the honey in the ordinary way. They only resort to this expedient when they find they cannot reach the nectar from above; "but having once ascertained this, they forthwith proceed to pierce the bottoms of all the flowers of the same species." Doubtless association and habit may be invoked here, but before these were produced, was there not an extension of like to like?

For the higher animals I shall also restrict myself to the upper

¹ Romanes. *Animal Intelligence*, Chapter III.

types. We shall of course reject all observations relating to "performing" animals, all acquisitions due to education and training by man, as also the cases in which, as in the beaver, there is a perplexing admixture of instinct so called (a specific property), and adaptation, varying according to time and place.

The elephant has a reputation for intelligence which may be somewhat exaggerated. His psychology is fairly well known. We may cite a few characteristic traits that bear upon our subject. He will tear up bamboo canes from the ground, break them with his feet, examine them, and repeat the operation until he has found one that suits him; he then seizes the branch with his trunk and uses it as a scraper to remove the leeches which adhere to his skin at some inaccessible part of his body. "This is a frequent occurrence, such scrapers being used by each elephant daily." When he is tormented by large flies he selects a branch which he strips of its leaves, except at the top, where he leaves a fine bunch. "He will deliberately clean it down several times, and then laying hold of its lower end he will break it off, thus obtaining a fan or switch about five feet long, handle included. With this he keeps the flies at bay. Say what we may, these are both really *bona fide* implements, each intelligently made for a definite purpose."

"What I particularly wish to observe," says an experienced naturalist, "is that there are good reasons for supposing that elephants possess abstract ideas; for instance, I think it is impossible to doubt that they acquire through their own experience notions of hardness and weight, and the grounds on which I am led to think this are as follows. A captured elephant, after he has been taught his ordinary duty, say about three months after he is taken, is taught to pick up things from the ground and give them to his mahout sitting on his shoulders. Now for the first few months it is dangerous to require him to pick up anything but soft articles, such as clothes, because the things are often handed up with considerable force. After a time, longer with some elephants than others, they appear to take in a knowledge of the nature of the things they are required to lift, and the bundle of clothes will be thrown up sharply as before, but heavy things, such as a crowbar or piece of iron chain, will be handed up in a gentle manner; a sharp knife will be picked up by its handle and placed on the elephant's head, so that the mahout can also take it by the handle. I have purposely given elephants things to lift which they could never have seen before, and they were all handled in such a manner as to

convince me that they recognised such qualities as hardness, sharpness, and weight."

Lloyd Morgan, who, in his books on comparative psychology, is evidently disposed to concede as small a measure of intelligence to animals as possible, comments upon the above observation as follows:¹

"Are we to suppose that these animals possess abstract ideas? I reply—That depends upon what is meant by abstract ideas. If it is implied that the abstract ideas are *isolates*; that is, qualities considered quite apart from the objects of which they are characteristic, I think not. But if it be meant that elephants, in a practical way, 'recognise such qualities as hardness, sharpness, and weight,' as *predominant* elements in the constructs they form, I am quite ready to assent to the proposition."

I agree fully with this conclusion, adding the one remark that between the pure abstract notion and the "predominant" notion so called, there is only a difference of degree. If the predominant element is not isolated, detached, and fixed by a sign, it is certainly near being so, and deserves on this ground to be called an abstract of the lower order.

The observation of Houzeau has been frequently quoted respecting dogs, which, suffering from thirst in arid countries, rush forty or fifty times into the hollows that occur along their line of march in the hope of finding water in the dry bed. They could not be attracted by the smell of the water, nor by the sight of vegetation, for these are wanting. They must thus be guided by general ideas, which are doubtless of an extremely simple character, and, in some measure, supported by experience."

It is on this account that the term "generic image" would in my opinion be preferable for describing cases of this character.

"I have frequently seen not only dogs, but horses, mules, cattle, and goats, go in search of water in places which they had never visited before. They are guided by general principles, because they go to these watering places at times when the latter are perfectly dry.² Undoubtedly it may be objected that association of images here plays a preponderating part. The sight of the hollows recalls the water which, though absent, forms part of a group of sensations which has been perceived many times; but since the generic image is, as we shall see later, no more than an *almost*

¹C. Lloyd Morgan. *Animal Life and Intelligence*, Chapter IX., p. 364.

²Houzeau, *Études sur les facultés mentales des animaux*, Vol. II., p. 264 et seq. The same author gives an example of generalisation in bees.

passive condensation of resemblances, these facts clearly indicate its nature and its limits.

I shall merely allude without detailed comment to the numerous observations on the aptitude of dogs and cats for finding means to accomplish their aims, the anecdotes of their mechanical skill, and the ruses (so well described by G. Leroy) which the fox and the hare employ to outwit the hunter, "when they are old and schooled by experience; since it is to their knowledge of facts that they owe their exact and prompt inductions." The most intelligent of all animals, the higher orders of monkeys, have not been much studied in their wild state, but such observations as have been made, some of which have been contributed by celebrated naturalists, fix with sufficient distinctness the intellectual level of the better endowed. The history of Cuvier's orang-outang has been quoted to satiety. The more recent books on comparative psychology contain ample testimony to their ability to profit by experience¹ and to construct instruments. A monkey, not having the strength to lift up the lid of a chest, employed a stick as a lever. "This use of a lever as a mechanical instrument is an action to which no animal other than a monkey has ever been known to attain." Another monkey observed by Romanes, also "succeeded by methodical investigation, *without assistance*, in discovering for himself the mechanical principle of the screw; and the fact that monkeys well understand how to use stones as hammers, is a matter of common observation." They are also skilful in combining their stratagems, as in the case of one who, being held captive by a chain, and thus unable to reach a brood of ducklings, held out a piece of bread in one hand, and on tempting a duckling within his reach, seized it by the other, and killed it with a bite in the breast."²

One mental operation remains which must be examined separately, and in its study we shall pursue the same method, wherever it occurs, throughout this work. The process in question has the advantage of being perfectly definite, of restricted scope, completely evolved, and accessible to research in all the phases of its development, from the lowest to the highest. It is that of *numeration*.

Are there animals capable of counting? G. Leroy is, I believe, the first who answered this question in the affirmative, in a passage which is worth transcribing, although it has been often quoted.

¹ Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Vol. I., Chapter III.

² Romanes, *loc. cit.*, Chapter XVII.

“Among the various ideas which necessity adds to the experience of animals, that of number must not be overlooked. Animals count,—so much is certain; and although up to the present time their arithmetic appears weak, it may perhaps be possible to strengthen it. In countries where game is preserved, war is made upon magpies because they steal the eggs of other birds. . . . And in order to destroy this greedy family at a blow, game-keepers seek to destroy the mother while sitting. To do this it is necessary to build a well-screened watch-house at the foot of the tree where the nests are, and in this a man is stationed to await the return of the parent bird, but he will wait in vain if the bird has been shot at under the same circumstances before. . . . To deceive this suspicious bird, the plan was hit upon of sending two men into the watch-house; one of them passed on while the other remained; but the magpie counted and kept her distance. The next day three went, and again she perceived that only two withdrew. It was eventually found necessary to send five or six men to the watch-house in order to put her out of her calculation. . . . This phenomenon, which is repeated as many times as the attempt is made, is one of the most extraordinary instances of the sagacity of animals.” Since then the question has been repeatedly taken up. Lubbock devotes to it the three last pages of his book *The Senses of Animals*. According to his observations on the nests of birds, one egg may be taken from a nest in which there are four, but if we take away two the bird generally deserts its nest. The solitary wasp provisions its cell with a fixed number of victims. Sand wasps are content with one. One species of *Eumenes* prepares five victims for its young, another species ten, another fifteen, another twenty-four; but the number of the victims is always the same for the same species. How does the insect know its characteristic number?¹

An experiment, methodically conducted by Romanes, proved that a chimpanzee can count correctly as far as five, distinguishing the words which stand for one, two, three, four, five, and at command deliver the number of straws requested of her.²

Although the observations on this point are not yet sufficiently varied and extended to enable us to speak of them as we should wish, it must be remarked that the cases cited are not alike, and

¹At the end of the passage in question there is an extraordinary account of the arithmetical powers of a dog, which Lubbock explains by “thought reading.” I omit this instance, since we are deliberately rejecting all rare or doubtful cases.

²*Mental Evolution in Man*, Chapter III., p. 58.

that it would be illegitimate to reduce them all to one and the same psychological mechanism.

1. The case of insects is the most embarrassing. It is but candid to state a *non liquet*, since to attribute their achievements to unconscious numeration, or to some special equivalent instinct, is tantamount to saying nothing. Besides, we are not concerned with anything relating to instinct.

2. The case of the monkey and his congeners stands high in the scale: it is a form of *concrete* numeration which we shall meet again in children, and in the lowest representatives of humanity.

3. All the other cases resemble the alleged "arithmetic" of G. Leroy's magpie and similar observations. I see here not a numeration, but a perception of plurality, which is something quite different. There are in the brain of the animal a number of co-existing perceptions. It knows if all are present, or if some are lacking; but a consciousness of difference between the entire group, and the diminished defective group, is not identical with the operation of counting. It is a preliminary state, an introduction, nothing more, and the animal does not pass beyond this stage, does not count in the exact sense of the word. We shall see in a subsequent article that observations with young children furnish proofs in favor of this assertion, or at least show that it is not an unfounded presumption, but the most probable hypothesis.

We may now without further delay (while reserving the facts which are to be studied in the sequel to this article) attempt to fix the nature of the forms of abstraction, and of reasoning, accessible to the higher animal types.

1. The generic image results from a *spontaneous* fusion of images, produced by the repetition of similar, or very analogous, events. It consists in an almost passive process of assimilation; it is not intentional, and has for its subject only the crudest similarities. There is an accumulation, a summation of these resemblances; they predominate by force of numbers, for they are in the majority. Thus there is formed a solid nucleus which predominates in consciousness, an abstract appurtenant to all similar objects; the differences fall into oblivion. Huxley's comparison of the composite photographs (cited in the last article) renders it needless to dwell on this point. Their genesis depends on the one hand on experience; (only events that are frequently repeated can be condensed into a generic image;) on the other hand on the effective dispositions of the subject (pleasure, pain, etc.), on inter-

est, and on practical utility, which render certain perceptions predominant. They require, accordingly, no great intellectual development for their formation, and there can be no doubt that they exist quite low down in the animal scale. The infant of four or five months very probably possesses a generic image of the human form and of some similar objects. It may be remarked, further, that this lower form of abstraction can occur also in the adult and cultivated man. If, e. g., we are suddenly transported into a country whose flora is totally unknown to us, the repetition of experiences suggests an unconscious condensation of similar plants; we classify them without knowing their names, without needing to do so, and without clearly apprehending their distinguishing characteristics, those namely which constitute the true abstract idea of the botanist.

In sum, the generic image comes half way between individual representation, and abstraction properly so called. It results almost exclusively from the faculty of apprehending resemblances. The rôle of dissociation is here extremely feeble. Everything takes place, as it were, in an automatic, mechanical fashion, in consequence of the unequal struggle set up in consciousness between the resemblances which are strengthened, and the differences, each of which remains isolated.

2. It has been said that the principal utility of abstraction is as an instrument in ratiocination. We may say the same of generic images. By their aid animals reason. This subject has given rise to extended discussion. Some writers resent the mere suggestion that ants, elephants, dogs, and monkeys, should be able to reason. Yet this resentment is based on nothing but the extremely broad and elastic signification of the word reasoning—an operation which admits of many degrees, from simple, empirical consecutiveness to the composite, quantitative reasoning of higher mathematics. It is forgotten that there are here, as for abstraction and for generalisation, *embryonic* forms—those, i. e., which we are now studying.

Taken in its broadest acceptation, reasoning is an operation of the mind which consists in passing from the known to the unknown; in passing from what is immediately given, to that which is simply suggested by association and experience. The logician will unquestionably find this formula too vague, but it must necessarily be so, in order to cover all cases.

Without pretending to any rigorous enumeration, beyond all criticism, we can, in intellectual development, distinguish the following phases in the ascending order: perceptions and images

(memories) as point of departure; association by contiguity, association by similarity; then the advance from known to unknown, by reasoning from particular to particular, by analogical reasoning, and finally by the perfect forms of induction and deduction, with their logical periods. Have all these forms of reasoning a common substrate, a unity of composition? In other words, can they be reduced to a single type—of induction according to some, of deduction according to others? Although the supposition is extremely probable, it would not be profitable to discuss the question here. We must confine ourselves to the elementary forms which the logicians admit, or despise, for the most part, but which, to the psychologists, are intellectual processes as interesting as any others.

Without examining whether, as maintained by J. S. Mill, all inference is actually from particular to particular (general propositions being under this hypothesis only simple *reminders*, brief formulæ serving as a base of operations) it is clear that we have in it the simplest form of mental progress from the known to the unknown. At the same time it is more than mere association, though transcending it only in degree. Association by similarity is not, as we have seen, identical with formation of generic images; this last implies fusion, mental synthesis. So, too, reasoning from particular to particular implies something more than simple association; it is a state of *expectation* equivalent to a conclusion in the empirical order; it is an anticipation. The animal which has burned itself in swallowing some steaming food, is on its guard in future against everything that gives off steam. Here we have more than simple association between two anterior experiences (steam, burning; and this state “differs from simple associative suggestion, by the fact that the mind is less occupied with the memory of past burns than with the expectation of a repetition of the same fact in the present instance; that is to say, that it does not so much recall the fact of having once been burnt as it draws the conclusion that it will be burnt.”¹

Otherwise expressed, he is orientated less towards the past than towards the future. Granted that this tendency to believe that what has occurred once or twice will occur invariably, is a fruitful source of error, it remains none the less a logical operation (judgment or ratiocination) containing an element more than association: an inclusion of the future, an implicit affirmation ex-

¹J. Sully, *The Human Mind*, I., 460. The author gives excellent diagrams to represent the difference in the two cases. For reasoning from particular to particular, cf. also J. S. Mill, *Logic*, II., Chapter III., p. 3; Bradley, *Logic*, II., Chapter II., p. 2.

pressed in an act. Doubtless, between these two processes,—association, inference from particular to particular—the difference is slight enough; yet in a study of genesis and evolution, it is just these transitional forms that are the most important.

Reasoning by analogy is of a far higher order. It is the principal logical instrument of the child and of primitive men: the substrate of all extension of language, of vulgar and empirical classifications, of myths, of the earliest, quasi-scientific knowledge.¹ It is the commencement of induction, differing from the latter, not in form, but in its imperfectly established content. "Two things are alike in one or several characteristics; a proposition stated is true of the one, therefore it is true of the other. *A* is analogous to *B*; *m* is true of *A*, therefore *m* is true of *B* also." So runs the formula of J. S. Mill. The animal, or child, which when ill-treated by one person extends its hatred to all others that resemble the oppressor, reasons by analogy. Obviously this procedure from known to unknown will vary in degree,—from zero to the point at which it merges into complete induction.

With these general remarks, we may return to the logic of animals or rather to the sole kind of logic possible without speech. This is, and can only be, a *logic of images* (Romanes employs a synonymous expression, *logic of receipts*), which is to logic, properly so-called, what generic images are to abstraction and to generalisation proper. This denomination is necessary; it enables us to form a separate category, well defined by the absence of language; it permits us, in speaking of judgment and ratiocination in animals, and in persons deprived of speech, to know exactly what meaning is intended.

It follows that there are two principal degrees in the *logic of images*.

1. Inference from particular to particular. The bird which finds bread upon the window, one morning, comes back next day at the same hour, finds it again, and continues to come. It is moved by an association of images, *plus* the state of awaiting, of anticipation, as described above.

2. Procedure by analogy. This (at least in its higher forms in animal intelligence) presupposes mental construction: the aim is definite, and means to attain it are invented. To this type I should refer the cases cited above of ants digging tunnels, forming bridges, etc. The ants are wont to practise these operations in

¹In *re* analogy, consult Stern's monograph, *Die Analogie im volksthümlichen Denken*, Berlin, 1894.

their normal life; their virtue lies in the power of *dissociation* from their habitual conditions, from their familiar ant-heap, and of adaptation to new and unknown cases.

The logic of images has characteristics which pertain to it exclusively, and which may be summarised as follows:

1. As material it employs concrete representations or generic images alone, and cannot escape from this domain. It admits of fairly complex constructions, but not of substitution. The tyro finds no great difficulty in solving problems of elementary arithmetic (such as: 15 workmen build a wall 3 metres high in 4 days; how long will it take 4 men to build it?), because he uses the logic of signs, replacing the concrete facts by figures, and working out the relations of these. The logic of images is absolutely refractory to attempts at substitution. And while it thus acts by representation only, its progress even within this limit is necessarily very slow, encumbered, and embarrassed by useless details, for lack of adequate dissociation. At the same time it may, in the adult who is practised in ratiocination, become an auxiliary in certain cases; I am even tempted to regard it as the main auxiliary of constructive imagination. It would be worth while to ascertain, from authentic observations, what part it plays in the inventions of novelists, poets, and artists. In a polemic against Max Müller, who persists in affirming that it is radically impossible to think and reason without words, a correspondent remarks:

“Having been all my life since school-days engaged in the practice of architecture and civil engineering, I can assure Prof. Max Müller that designing and invention are done entirely by mental pictures. I find that words are only an encumbrance. In fact, words are in many cases so cumbersome that other methods *have* been devised for imparting knowledge. In mechanics the graphic method, for instance.”¹

2. Its aim is always practical. It should never be forgotten that at the outset, the faculty of cognition is essentially utilitarian, and cannot be otherwise, because it is employed solely for the preservation of the individual (in finding food, distinguishing enemies from prey, and so on). Animals exhibit only *applied* reasoning, tested by experience; they feel about and choose between several means,—their selection being justified or disproved by the final

¹ *Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought, delivered at the Royal Institution* appendix, p. 6, letter 4; Chicago, 1888. It should, however, be remembered that the writer who thus uses the logic of images has a mind preformed by the logic of signs: which is not the case with animals.

issue. Correctly speaking, the logic of images is neither true nor false; these epithets are but half appropriate. It succeeds or fails; its gauge is success or defeat; and as we maintained above that it is the secret spring of æsthetic invention, let it be noticed that here again there is no question of truth or error, but of creating a successful or abortive work.

Accordingly, it is only by an unjustifiable restriction that the higher animals can be denied all functions beyond that of association, all capacity for inference by similarity. W. James (after stating that, *as a rule*, the best examples of animal sagacity "may be perfectly accounted for by mere contiguous association, based on experience"), arrives virtually at a conclusion no other than our own. After recalling the well-known instance of arctic dogs harnessed to a sledge and scattering when the ice cracked to distribute their weight, he thus explains it: "We need only suppose that they have individually experienced wet skins after cracking, that they have often noticed cracking to begin when they were huddled together and that they have observed it to cease when they scattered."

Granting this assumption, it is none the less true that associations by contiguity are no more than the *material* which serves as a substratum for inference by similarity, and for the act which follows. Again, a friend of James, accompanied by his dog, went to his boat and found it filled with dirt and water. He remembered that the sponge was up at the house, and not caring to tramp a third of a mile to get it, he enacted before his terrier (as a forlorn hope) the necessary pantomime of cleaning the boat, saying: "Sponge, sponge, go fetch the sponge." The dog trotted off and returned with it in his mouth, to the great surprise of his master. Is this, properly speaking, an act of reasoning? It would only be so, says James, if the terrier, not finding the sponge, had brought a rag, or a cloth. By such substitution he would have shown that, notwithstanding their different appearance, he understood that for the purpose in view, all these objects were identical. "This substitution, though impossible for the dog, any man but the stupidest could not fail to do." I am not sure of this, despite the categorical assertion of the author; yet, discussion apart, it must be admitted that this would be asking the dog to exhibit a man's reason. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding contrary appearances, James arrives at a conclusion not very different from our own. "The characters extracted by animals are very few, and always related to

their immediate interests and emotions." This is what we termed above, empirical reasoning.

G. Leroy said: "Animals reason, but differently from ourselves." This is a negative position. We advance a step farther in saying: their reasoning consists in a heritage of concrete or generic images, adapted to a determined end,—intermediary between the percepts and the act. It is impossible to reduce everything to association by similarity, much less by contiguity, alone; since such procedure results necessarily in the formation of unchangeable habits, in limitation to a narrow routine, whereas we have seen that certain animals are capable of breaking through such restrictions.

RATIONALISM IN THE NURSERY.

BY THE EDITOR.

WHEN rationalism, as a religious movement, first dawned on the world, it was exaggerated to such an extent and carried into such improper fields, that it became ridiculous as a theory and a religion. Reason, however, we must remember, is the most essential feature of the human soul, and the proper training of reason is indispensable. It is of such importance that it ought to begin at an early date, and the application of reason should extend to all the questions of life, secular and religious.

As to the use of reason in religion we must distinguish between what is rational and rationalistic. The rational ought to be welcome, while the rationalistic is a misapplication of the rational.

There are some great religious teachers, such as St. Augustine and Luther, who unqualifiedly declare that religion must from its very nature appear irrational to us. They claim that reason has no place in religion, and must not be allowed to have anything to do with it. The ultimate basis of a religious conviction, they urge, is not knowledge but belief,—a view which in its utmost extreme is tersely expressed in the famous sentence, *Credo quia absurdum*,—I believe because it is absurd. In opposition to this one-sided conception of the nature of religion, rationalists arose who attempted to cleanse religion of all irrational elements, and their endeavors have been crowned with great results. We owe to their efforts the higher development of religion, and must acknowledge that they were among the heroes who liberated us from the bondage of superstition. Nevertheless, the rationalistic movement, or that movement in history which goes by the name of Rationalism, is as one-sided as its adversary. Without any soul for poetry, its apostles removed from the holy legends the miraculous as well as the supernatural, and were scarcely aware of how prosaic, flat, and insipid religion became under this treatment. On the one hand they received the

accounts of the Bible in sober earnestness like historical documents; on the other hand they did not recognise that the main ideas presented in religious writings were of such a nature as to need the dress of myth. We know now that the worth and value of our religious books does not depend upon their historical accuracy, but upon the moral truths which they convey. We do not banish fairy-tales from the nursery because we have ceased to believe in fairies and ogres. These stories are in their literal sense absurd and impossible, yet many of them contain gems of deep thought; many of them contain truths of great importance. The rationalistic movement started from wrong premises and pursued its investigations on erroneous principles. Our rationalists tried to correct the letter and expected thus to purify the spirit. But they soon found it beyond their power to restore the historical truth, and in the meantime lost sight of the spirit. They were like the dissector who seeks to discover the secret of life by cutting a living organism into pieces; or like a chemist, who, with the purpose of investigating the nature of a clock, analyses the chemical elements of its wheels in his alembic. The meaning of religious truth cannot be found simply by rationalising the miraculous element in the holy legends of our religious traditions.

Rationalism is a natural phase of the evolution of religious thought, but it yields no final solution of the problem. In a similar way our classical historians attempted in a certain phase of the development of criticism to analyse Homer and the classical legends. They rationalised them by removing the miracles and other irrational elements, and naïvely accepted the rest as history. The historian of to-day has given up this method and simply presents the classical legends in the shape in which they were current in old Greece. Legends may be unhistorical, what they tell may never have happened, yet they are powerful realities in the development of a nation. They may be even more powerful than historical events, for they depict ideals, and ideals possess a formative faculty. They arouse the enthusiasm of youth and shape man's actions, and must therefore be regarded as among the most potent factors in practical life.

We regard the rationalistic treatment of Bible stories as a mistake, yet for that reason we do not accept the opposite view of the intrinsic irrationality of religion. We do not renounce reason; we do not banish rational thought from the domain of religion. Although we regard any attempt at rationalising religious legends as a grave blunder, we are nevertheless far from considering reason

as anti-religious. On the contrary, we look upon reason as the spark of divinity in man. Reason is that faculty by virtue of which we can say that man has been created in the image of God. Without reason man would be no higher than the beast of the field. Without rational criticism religion would be superstition pure and simple, and we demand that religion shall never come in conflict with reason. Religion must be in perfect accord with science; it must never come into collision with rational thought. Reason after all remains the guiding-star of our life. Without reason our existence would be shrouded in darkness.

If children hear stories that are irrational there is no need of telling them flatly that the story is not true, but it will be wise to ask the question, Is that possible? Children are sure to take certain things as facts without thinking of applying criticism. Their little souls are as yet blanks. How is it possible to expect in them the critical attitude of a scholar? If children see pictures of angels, or devils, or fairies, they will believe them to be as they see them, without questioning the possibility of such beings.

It was characteristic of a child's mind when a little three year old boy once asked one of his aunts, "Have you ever seen an angel?" and she replied, "No, have you?" "Yes," he said confidently, "in my picture book." That things can be pictured which are not realities, is an idea that has not as yet entered the mind of a young child. And it will be wise not to tell him directly that certain pictures are unrealities, but to guide his opinion and help him to form his own judgment.

Children are liable to lose the moral of a fairy tale if they are told at once that fairies and ogres are unrealities. It will for a time be sufficient to tell them it is a story and never mind whether it actually happened or not. And if the moral of the story now and then finds application in their experiences they will learn to appreciate it, and yet distinguish between poetry and reality. They will acquire a taste for poetry without falling a prey to romanticism.

There is a difference between true and real. Real is a thing that is concrete and actual; history is real, and all things real are instances of general laws. A truth is the recognition and correct knowledge of a general law; and the lesson of a general law in the moral world may sometimes be better set forth in an invented story than in incidents that have actually happened. In this sense a story, a myth, a legend, may be unhistorical, unreal, and even absurdly impossible, and yet be true in its significance. Children do

not, of course, at once appreciate this distinction between truth and historical actuality, and one of my little boys for a long time refused to listen to "stories that were not true," as he said. He objected to fairy tales as not being based upon facts, preferring to hear the account of the invention of steam engines or of the landing of the Pilgrims. It almost seemed for a long time as though he had no sense for poetry; but by and by he learned to like certain fairy tales whose spirit he appreciated—for instance, of the boy who knew no fear and who, when he went abroad to learn what fear was, gained a kingdom.

Parents must develop the critical sense of their children without destroying poetry and the enjoyment of fiction. If children prefer the one or the other extreme, let them freely develop it and fear not that they will become over-credulous or over-critical, that they will become superstitious through a belief in fairy tales, or prosaic on account of their objection to stories that are not true. Every child passes through successive phases in its mental development, and it will only assimilate the impressions and information for which its budding mind is ready. If these phases show an occasional onesidedness, parents need not worry, for mankind, at large, also had its phases, and the religious evolution of the race necessarily passed through the mythological and dogmatic period.

The same rule that applies to fairy tales holds good in the realm of religious legends and stories. The parents' rule might be: Give the children every chance of forming their own opinion, and let them acquire information of all kinds in whatever way life may offer it to them. Let children go to churches, witness religious processions, attend Sunday-school, but preserve under all conditions their independence of judgment without directly forestalling the decision to which they are ultimately liable to come. Parents who wish to insist on a rational comprehension of religious truths need not be in a hurry to influence the souls of their little ones. If they give them outright the results of free investigation instead of merely stimulating their critical powers by questions and suggestions, they are liable to make them shallow, and instead of making them rational will make them rationalistic.

One of my little boys, now eight years old, recently learned to skate on the ice. He could do it so long as he remained unconscious of himself, but he gave up at once after his first accident, because the thought of falling frightened him. When I told him that he could do it if he only had confidence in himself, he answered, "Isn't there a truth in the story of St. Peter's walking on

the See of Galilee? He sank when he lost faith, and he walked on the water when he had the confidence that he could do it. He added at once, "I do not believe that he walked on the water, but the story is good, isn't it?"

As to credulity in the common walks of life, it will always be wise to distinguish between what actually is true and what a person has stated to be true, or what he may believe to be true. The distinction is subtle to a child's mind in the beginning, but as soon as he understands it, he will utilise it and it will become a trait of character that in future life may be of great importance. He will learn to respect the right of others to believe as they please, although he may come to the conclusion that the belief itself has no foundation and is unacceptable to himself.

MUTUAL EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.

An only child is apt to be spoiled, and why? Because he does not have the benefit of the mutual education that brothers and sisters in their common plays as well as in their quarrels naturally bestow upon one another. If he is not self-willed, and if his peculiarities do not manifest themselves in naughtiness, he will as a rule be over-sensitive,—which in later life may prove almost more disastrous; for he will be liable to fret without any cause when others unwillingly or unwittingly offend him.

Parents that have several children should not be grieved if their boys, or even their girls, sometimes quarrel among themselves. There are few brothers who would not now and then come to blows, and there is no harm done in their childish quarrels, so long as they are kept within proper limits, and parents should interfere as little as possible, except to counterbalance the greater strength of the elder ones, to prevent their having toys which might turn out to be dangerous weapons, and in general to see to it that no serious harm be done. There is no better system of education than that which springs from the conflict of interests that originates within the sphere of the children's own experiences.

No teachings in words can better explain to a child that the rights of others must be respected, than the practical experiences, be they ever so trivial, which give meaning to the moral exhortations of the golden rule and of practising justice. The child must feel the resistance of others, in order to learn that there are limits imposed upon us in society by the rights of our fellows. Therefore, if parents see their children quarrelling they should not be

anxious about them. Every blow that one little brother gives or receives is a moral lesson which will bear fruit in time.

While the quarrels of children are not to be regarded as an evil, they should not be fostered or produced. They should only be suffered, and parents should not be alarmed at occasional outbreaks of anger. Far from fostering quarrels, parents should see to it that their children love and respect one another, and it is easy enough for them to do so. They should never in the presence of one child speak slightly of their other children, but always in respectful and loving terms. Every word of contempt or ill-will, even of deserved reproach, if listened to by a brother or sister, sinks much more deeply into their hearts than adult people as a rule are apt to believe. It is remembered, and though it may remain unnoticed for a long time, it will finally come out in one shape or another when least expected. It may be true that most of the grudges and ill-will that brothers sometimes show one another are due to the carelessness of parents who reprove the little fellows in the presence of their brothers. Parents, therefore, ought to make it a rule to treat children throughout in the presence of their brothers and sisters, and also of strangers, not very differently from adult people. Whatever reproaches have to be made ought to be done, at least as far as possible, in private, and not for the purpose of humiliating the child.

Children are apt to scold one another, but their words have not the same weight that those of parents and nurses have. Their revilings, therefore, cannot do the same harm. On the contrary, if parents or nurses show their disapproval of using names, bickerings in the nursery will be remembered as deterring examples.

When little children interfere with the plays of their older brothers and sisters, taking away their toys and running off with them, the older children naturally grow indignant and are apt at once to beat their weaker playmates. Then of course it is time to interfere and give them a lesson in patience. And the best method to keep older children in good humor, is to teach them to look upon their smaller companions with the eyes of grown up people. When a baby of two years runs away with her four year old sister's doll, it is better to let her carry off her spoils, and taking the elder child in your arms, to say: "Now let us watch baby and see what she is doing with dolly. I'll see to it that she does not break it. Now look how she carries the doll. Would any mamma carry her baby by the leg? She does not yet know how to treat babies, but we will teach her. You are the elder, you must tell her how."

Possibly for the first time children may not prove amenable, but by and by they will learn to take fatherly or motherly interest in the queer ways of their younger sisters and brothers, and that will help them to bear with their smaller companions if they unduly interfere with the rights of their elders and provoke their anger.

Of course, children should always be watched, especially if they have dangerous toys in their hands, such as iron tools which may easily become weapons, but at the same time they ought to enjoy their liberty as much as possible, so as to educate one another by mutual assistance and interest—as well as by friction.

I remember a children's party given in the days of my own childhood in celebration of the birthday of one of my little friends. Our host had received a game called "Reynard the Fox," and he had invited all his little comrades to play the new game. But he had cleverly arranged it so that none of his guests had the least chance of winning, and he alone bore off all the honors and prizes of the day. He was an only child, and that too without a mother who might have checked his ambitious plans, and the outcome of the children's party was general dissatisfaction and finally an actual rebellion against the host who tried to usurp all the power. At last his father interfered to restore order, and settled the dispute in a manner which was not to the taste of the spoiled child. When I recounted the story at home and informed my parents about the little tricks which my friend had used to insure his victories, they pointed out to me the lesson that the host should always look to the interests of his guests, and that it was a matter of honor on his part to let them be satisfied and go home with the pleasant feeling of having been well entertained. The vanity of gaining all the honors of the day spoiled the birthday party of my little friend for himself and others. Had he been wise enough to suffer his guests to gain all the prizes, he would have increased their friendship and would probably have enjoyed the day much more than he hoped to do and might have done by winning all the prizes, even if his guests had not demurred.

I do not remember whether as the host of a children's party I was better than my spoiled friend, but I am sure that it was an experience which made a deep impression on my mind, and it seems to me that parents should improve all the opportunities they have of guiding children's inclinations in the right way by utilising their own experiences.

FEAR AND CIRCUMSPECTION.

It happens that children sometimes are frightened by phantoms of their own imagination, and being naturally weak and feeling that they are unable to protect themselves, may at the idea of a fancied danger fall into hysterics. What is to be done if such a state supervenes, or if symptoms appear which indicate its approach,—a state in which the child is overpowered by all kinds of presentiments and would be impervious to argument?

The best plan is *not* to deny at once the reality of the imagination which is the immediate cause of the sudden fright, for that fancied fearful object is a reality to the child, and to deny it would be to cut off all means of curing it. The best way is to consider it temporarily as being real, or at least possible, and accept the state of things imagined. Place yourself in the child's position, and thence start for further operations. That is the first condition which insures the child's confidence, so that it will be willing to follow you, and you will then have easy play to examine the state of affairs, which will of course result in the discovery that there was no cause for fear.

A few examples will illustrate the case.

A little girl frequently fancied she saw bears and tigers whenever she happened to awake in the night. Presumably she dreamed of some danger, may be on account of having eaten too much for supper or having eaten the wrong kind of food. At any rate, she frequently awoke crying in the night, and in her fear interpreted the dim outlines of a dress or a curtain as a fearful beast that was about to attack her. The best thing to do is to deal tenderly with such fancies and remove the child as far as possible from the object that has caused her excitement. Then, if you can do so without disturbing the other children, light the lamp and let it fall full on the thing that has given rise to her fear. Be slow, and express your opinion first as a kind of preliminary assumption that the bear may after all be mamma's skirt or the curtain moving in the draft; and when this comforting probability is understood, follow up your advantage and declare it to be a good joke that a harmless piece of cloth should look like a fearful animal. Make the child smile at the incongruity of her fancy, and her laugh will cure the horror of the dream and dispel the nightmare as sunshine dissolves the mist.

One day I walked with one of my little boys along a wooded creek. It was winter, and the trees were leafless and dry. Now it

happened that a trunk of a tree which had lost its crown and was encircled by strong vines, looked, from a certain position, like a man, or rather like a tramp (for he looked very ragged) bending over a broken bicycle. The vines were so queerly shaped that the illusion was almost perfect. My little boy stood aghast for a moment. "There is a bad man," he said, "with a bicycle," and he pointed to the strange sight. I could not help at once tracing the figure to which he referred, but I knew at the same time that it was a tree and not a real man, for a man would not have stood so motionless as did that weird, ragged looking figure in the valley. The fear of the little boy was great, and he did not know what to do,—whether to run away or to hide, and as his imagination was easily worked up I felt that there was danger of an hysterical outbreak. The first thing to be done was to remain very calm myself. Calmness produces calmness, as irritation will produce irritation. Mental states are by imitation as much catching as contagious diseases. Now I told the little fellow to stand perfectly still and watch that tramp in the valley. At the same time I took him in my arms, which of course alleviated his immediate fears, and while he watched that tramp-like figure I called his attention to the fact that he stood perfectly still and did not move, except as a tree will in a gentle breeze. When he had grown calmer, I proposed to walk towards the man and see what he did. But the little fellow was still too much afraid and said, "Let us go away as quickly as we can." But that seemed to me very undesirable. Although we were on our way home, I saw clearly that I had first to disillusion him as to the cause of his fear. As he would not walk towards the strange figure directly, I thought it wisest to approach it indirectly, and while we moved some steps to the side, the tree ceased to look like a man and appeared more like a tree. At the same time the figure remained motionless as before. This increased the courage of the boy and I at once took advantage of it. "I don't believe it is a man," said I, "let us go and see." He still objected. I again changed our position to a place which presented another view of that queer tree, and the confidence of the boy grew more and more. The hysterical condition disappeared completely and there remained only a certain awe of the weird appearance; but it seemed to me advisable to dispel that awe too and leave no trace of it. Even now it seemed to me advisable not to approach the tree directly and quickly, but slowly, as Indians would do when deer-stalking or stealing upon an enemy. The approach made in this careful way increased his confidence, for we stopped whenever

new doubts arose which manifested themselves in renewed hesitation ; and at last I said "it would be fun if the wild man would turn out to be merely a tree stump. Really, I believe it is only a tree. What do you think ?" And he thought that it was really a tree and his fright changed slowly into fear, then into awe, then into circumspection, then into a strong suspicion of the causelessness of his fear, and at last into good humor at the situation. When we came to the place and stood before the leafless tree, which had no longer any resemblance to a man or a bicycle, we had a hearty laugh and I did not fail to impress on the boy the ridiculousness of the situation. Lest the experience should vanish from his memory, I sometimes reminded him of the incident, recommending him in all similar cases first to look closely at the frightful apparition. Perhaps then it will dissolve into nothing, just as an imagined highwayman changed into a rotten stump.

Another instance of fear that I found necessary to allay in the same little boy, happened on the farm to which we were accustomed to go. When he first encountered a pig, he was so frightened at its grunt that he could not be induced to walk into the yards in which the swine were kept with the cows and sheep. As it did not seem to me advisable to yield to his fear, I carried him to the fence on my arm, where he felt safe, and explained to him that pigs are very much afraid of men and even of little boys if they only courageously hunted them. So when a pig approached the fence I drove it away, which gave the little boy a great deal of pleasure to see his old enemy put to flight. I at once made use of his elated state of mind and pursued the pig. When he saw that the pigs were really cowards, I put him on the ground and gave him a stick and let him give chase himself. First he would not go to the ground ; but having repeatedly witnessed the wild flight of chased pigs, he ventured the feat, stick in hand, still clinging, however, to his papa's hand. Of course, I took care that the first pigs he met with were not too large and that they would quickly retire at our approach. The little boy's courage grew with his success, and after a few repeated pig hunts he lost all the fear he had entertained, and I now found it necessary to give the boys, him as well as his little brother, a warning not to be too bold with pigs when they were alone, because the big ones might not be quite so cowardly as they thought, and might turn out to be ugly.

Make it a rule never to excite fear in children, and never show fear yourself in their presence. On the contrary, set children an example of calm behavior in instances where either you yourself

become involved in an actually perilous situation or where the child's imagination sees a mere show of danger.

Unfortunately most of the help employed in a house, especially the servants in the kitchen, show an extraordinary fear of mice, which is transferred to the children. If a child observes but once a scene of excitement, because a little mouse happens to be heard, parents will have a great deal of trouble to eradicate the evil effect. This impression will probably last forever, and can only be counteracted by carefully superadding the ridiculousness of such fear.

* * *

The elimination of fear in education should not, however, promote audacity and foolhardiness; on the contrary we must begin at an early age to caution children and make them look out for and anticipate dangers.

When taking a walk with children, it is advisable to think aloud, and to tell them why we walk here and there, why we look out when crossing the tracks, or crossing streets; and to point out to them the dangers that must be avoided. Circumspection must be one of the fundamental ideas in a child's mind, especially in our days when civilisation begins to grow more and more complex.

If you have electric wires in the house, either for lighting or for bells, it is advisable to improve the occasion whenever a repair is made, or whenever an opportunity may offer itself, to show to children the sparks that appear when wires touch. If the current is too weak to do any harm, it is even advisable to let children touch wires and receive a shock. At any rate, they ought to be informed of the dangers to which they expose themselves in touching wires. They ought to know that as the electricity in the wires of a bell are weak, so the electricity in the wires of a street railway are very powerful and would, if touched, unfailingly kill a man. It is not exactly necessary to tell children the terrible accidents that frequently happen, but it is necessary to give them full information about what might happen. When they grow older, attaining an age at which the imagination is no longer apt to be overstrung, they should also be told of the accidents whenever and wherever they happen, and how they happen, so that they will learn to avoid them.

It will be useful under all circumstances to impress short rules upon the minds of the children, never to touch a wire that might happen to dangle from a pole, and never to step on a wire that

might touch the ground, and the connexion of which cannot be traced. It might be harmless, but it might be a live wire.

The same rules, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to innumerable other situations. If parents visit factories or machine shops with their children, as in my opinion they ought to do from time to time, they should give due warning not to touch any running machinery and especially to be on the lookout with regard to belts. Before they approach the machinery they should watch it for a moment so as to know how far its sphere of danger reaches. In smithies and near fire-places of any kind, children must be taught never to step on iron, because even the dark-looking irons may still be hot, and it will be instructive to touch with a piece of wood some hot iron which, having lost its reddish blaze, appears to the uninitiated eye quite harmless. The wood will quickly catch fire, and the child should learn that if it stepped on that same iron the heat would soon burn through the shoe into the flesh, and perhaps to the bone.

Of course, these little lessons in caution should not be given so as to make the children timid; and, as a rule, it will be time to devote special attention to them as soon as the child has lost its natural fear. First teach children courage, then show them the need of circumspection.



A MODERN INSTANCE OF WORLD-RENUNCIATION.

BY THE EDITOR.

COUNTESS M. de S. Canavarro, now of Ceylon, is a woman of rare qualities, which not only deserve our sympathy but also arouse our interest from a purely psychological point of view. About two years ago we read the New York newspaper reports of her departure for a new home with surprise, and, we must confess, not without serious misgivings and doubts as to the advisability of her bold step, for she was about to leave her American home and sever all family ties for the purpose of educating the women of an island in the far East, among the very antipodes of her adopted country, and to take upon herself new duties which meant uphill work and hard labor. We do not know much about her, except what the newspaper reporters in America and in Ceylon have to say and what we have gleaned from several personal letters giving life to the dry facts of the work which she is doing in public, and exhibiting a noble soul filled with the desire of living not for herself but for the benefit of mankind. The flame of her life is burning to give others light, and she finds her highest satisfaction in so employing herself that the good that is in her may spread.

The Countess was probably raised in the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, presumably on the peninsula which is severed from Europe by the Pyrenees. She lived the greater part of her life in the far West of the United States of America, and we may not be wrong when saying that she acquired here a sense for being practical and doing work methodically and with energy. No doubt there is much of the "I will" spirit in her. How she became estranged from the belief of her childhood is not known to us; apparently she felt a desire for a broader religion, less narrowed by dogma and yet affording her free scope for religious devotion




that shows itself in the practical work of sympathetic love. The hunger of her soul for unselfish usefulness found, after much vain search, the most appropriate expression in the doctrine of the Shakyaphilosopher, whom his followers call Buddha, the Enlightened One, or Tathagata, the perfect teacher and master. If she were asked what is her religion, she would confess herself a Buddhist; but she has repeatedly declared that she is not antagonistic to any other religion, least of all to Christianity. In one of her letters, recommending a Christian book as worth reading and considering, she says:


"The author is painstaking, truthful, and spiritual. Who can say more! What know we puny mortals of the spirit of man! 'Judge not lest ye be judged.' All believe they have the truth—every denomination, great and small alike, believe the truth is held in their special dogma. I believe I possess the truth, but I am not ready to say that no one else has it. To me truth is like the ocean, like eternity, embracing all things, not confined to any one thing. So wherever I turn, I gather jewels of the law."

The Countess went to Ceylon, not for the purpose of opening a campaign in the interest of a militant Buddhism or endeavoring to make converts, or counteracting Christian missions, nothing of the kind,—but simply to do educational work. She purchased a beautiful garden with a modest but pretty one-story building, and opened a school, an orphanage arranged for boarding pupils and admitting day scholars.


The newspapers of Ceylon, reflecting the opinion of her new countrymen, English as well as Singhalese, express great admiration for her executive ability and business talents. We have to add that although she had devoted all her own means to the enterprise, she still needs money and assistance. She has received help (so far as we know) from various sources, but new needs produce new demands, and the burden of caring for everything grows too much for her shoulders. She wrote for help to America, and we are informed that Miss Shearer, an American lady who saved the money for the long journey from her scant salary as a governess, has now gone to join the Countess and share the burden of the work, and we hope that she will be as buoyant and enduring as the Countess Canavarro herself when confronted with the many sacrifices which such a devotion necessarily demands.

We repeat that the religious devotion of Countess Canavarro not only deserves our sympathies (and we wish sincerely that she would receive more help from sympathetic friends), but is an object of interest to the psychologist. The Countess has lost the dogmatic





beliefs of her old Christian faith, and her motives are not dominated by a hope of acquiring saintship in heaven. Her belief in immortality is the Buddhist conviction that our deeds live,—a conviction which is so frequently denounced by the militant missionaries of Christianity as the dreariness of nihilism. She is a living example of the religious devotion which is recorded in the history of every, but especially the Christian, faith, and her character will help us to understand similar personalities of the past who have almost become mythological to us in the matter-of-fact atmosphere of the present age.



A BUDDHIST FESTIVAL.

MISCELLANEOUS.

HIDALGO AND MORELOS THE FORERUNNERS OF MEXICAN INDEPENDENCE.

To-day hangs over the entrance of the palace of Dictator President Diaz in Mexico City the most sacred church bell of all the myriad church bells of this be-churched country—the sacred bell on which the priest Hidalgo sounded the tocsin of revolution against Spain in 1810. I have been examining a marvellous collection of manuscripts offered to me for three thousand dollars gold, and cheap at the price, were it not for the too obvious evidence that they have been stolen from the secret archives of the Government here in Mexico. One is a holograph letter from Hidalgo to Morelos, explaining the withdrawal of his army after his fight before the Capital, a withdrawal which proved the beginning of disasters which finally cost him his life. Hidalgo here says he did not retreat defeated; far from it. His army of roughly a hundred thousand, mostly pure natives, say Aztecs, on capturing the city of Guanajuato had slaughtered the Spaniards and now again in the fight before the Capital the whole body of Spaniards, estimated at three thousand men, had been killed, only one officer, on horseback, escaping.

Hidalgo says that finding his horde uncontrollable, he feared to trust them in an attack on the great city, and with some idea of training them he deviated from the advance movement.

The idea spread among them that perhaps they had been defeated, and the vast army melted like snow.

Hidalgo was not long after captured, tried, unfrocked, and executed (1811). The hero priest Morelos, after four years of victory, was defeated (in 1815) by Iturbide, who was afterward (in 1821) destined to finish the work of liberation from Spain, when he reigned for a brief space as emperor (1821–1824). Morelos, confined in a corner room of the winter palace of Cortez in Cuernavaca, afterward so dear to Maximilian, was then himself tried for heresy, that he might first be unfrocked and degraded from the priestly office, before suffering death as a traitor. These manuscripts are of historical interest, some contain the original and only record of this strange trial, hitherto an undivulged secret.

Here are all duly recorded the changes, the questions, the answers of Morelos. A few excerpts from these marvellous answers will show the hero wrestling vainly with his fate. "You charge me here," says Morelos, "with disbelief in an actual hell in a future life. Yet further on you equally charge me with maintaining that

the late Pope is burning now in the eternal fires of hell. These two charges contradict each other.

"Again you charge me with being a Lutheran, yet further on you charge me with rejecting the authority of the Bible. These two charges likewise contradict each other, for Luther bases his entire position on the authority of the Holy Scriptures as against the Pope and the Catholic Church."

No wonder it was wished that this trial might be kept secret. Morelos confesses to having hoped for aid from the United States, but says that no such aid came.

The whole manuscript is fascinating. These few lines may be perhaps even now the only part of it which will ever reach the world.

GEORGE BRUCE HALSTED.

CITY OF MEXICO.

AN ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF MATHEMATICS.

The publication of an *Encyclopædia of the Mathematical Sciences, Both Theoretical and Applied*,¹ under the auspices of the Scientific Academies of Munich, Vienna, and Göttingen, is announced by Teubner, of Leipzig. The Encyclopædia is to fill six volumes containing from four to five installments each, published at the rate of one volume a year.

To judge from the character and the number of the collaborators, the work will be a monument of erudition, and will constitute the most complete existing reference work of the mathematical sciences. On its historical, philosophical, bibliographical, and didactic sides also it will be exhaustive, particularly in regard to the developments of the present century (Vol. VI.). The applications of pure mathematics to mechanics, physics, astronomy, geodesy, engineering, and the industrial sciences are to be considered in the fourth and fifth volumes. The first three volumes, which are devoted to pure mathematics, will treat of arithmetic and algebra, analysis, and geometry. The scientific committee to whose charge the execution of the work has been committed are Prof. W. Dyck, of Munich; Prof. G. von Escherich, of Vienna; Prof. F. Klein, of Göttingen; Prof. L. Boltzmann, of Vienna, and Prof. H. Weber, of Strassburg. The editors are Dr. Heinrich Burkhardt, of Zürich, and Dr. W. Franz Meyer, of Königsberg, Prof. A. Schoenflies, of Göttingen, and A. Sommerfeld, of Clausthal.

We are in receipt of the first article on *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, by Prof. H. Schubert, of Hamburg, with whose views our readers are familiar from our mention in the last *Open Court* of his latest English essays² on the same subject. The remainder of the first installment (112 pp.) is taken up by Professor Netto, who writes on *Kombinatorik*, and by Professor Pringsheim, who treats of *Irrational Numbers, and Convergency*.

¹ *Encyclopædie der mathematischen Wissenschaften mit Einschluss ihrer Anwendungen. Mit Unterstützung der Akademien der Wissenschaften zu München und Wien und der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, sowie unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Fachgenossen*, herausgegeben von Dr. Heinrich Burkhardt, O. Professor der Mathematik an der Universität Zürich, und Dr. W. Franz Meyer, O. Professor der Mathematik an der Universität Königsberg i. Pr. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1898.

² *Mathematical Essays and Recreations*. Just published in the Religion of Science Library. Pp. 149. Paper, 25 cents. Cloth, 75 cents.

JAPANESE CALLIGRAPHY.

Calligraphy is an art in Japan, and specimens of beautiful handwriting upon silk are as much used for wall decorations as pictures. The main value of orna-

ments of this kind consists, of course, in the sentiments expressed, which must be couched in epigrammatic brevity. The verses are usually only four lines in length. These literary productions that greet the eye of the visitor to Japanese households are not limited to one subject, but touch upon all the various interests of life, and it is natural that words of moral advice and religious comfort should predominate. They remind us of a similar custom which in former generations more than at present prevailed in Christian countries, of having Scripture verses on the walls or over the doors.

As an instance of this kind of Japanese literature, we present to our readers the reproduction of a poem by the Rt. Rev. Shaku Soyen, a Buddhist abbot of Kamakura, Japan, one of the delegates to the Parliament of Religions in 1893, whose contributions to *The Open Court* and *The Monist* will be remembered by our readers.

The outline drawing represents Buddha, the omnipresent law of love and righteousness, as a father cherishing the animate creation like a child, in paternal affection, and bears a certain resemblance to the Roman Catholic representation of St. Joseph with the Christ child.

The illustration is made by Shaku Sokwatsu, one of the Rev. Shaku Soyen's disciples. The whole card is, both in its calligraphic style and



Dzizo-Son.

Buddha as omnipresent, fatherly love. Picture by Shaku Sokwatsu, with calligraphic writing by the Rev. Shaku Soyen, of Kamakura.

its sentiment characteristic of Japanese religious poetry. The following lines translate the Rev. Shaku Soyen's verse almost literally:

Throughout the three worlds I am everywhere.
 All creatures as my loved children I cherish.
 And though e'en time and space may perish,
 I shall ne'er cease to embrace them in prayer.

SOME DREYFUS LITERATURE.

The long, cruel, and complicated trial and punishment of Alfred Dreyfus, with all its many attending circumstances of suicides, law suits, debates in the Chamber and Senate, duels, etc., have naturally produced a large mass of books, pamphlets, and leaflets which touch on every phase of this historic affair and offer biographical sketches more or less complete of all the principal actors on the scene. I propose calling the attention of your readers to some of the more notable of these publications, all of which, I may add, are issued by Mr. P. V. Stock, who has made a speciality of Dreyfus literature, Galerie du Théâtre Français, Palais Royal, Paris.

One of the earliest, if not the earliest, French publicists to declare in print that Dreyfus was innocent and that a judicial error had been committed was M. Bernard Lazare, who brought out a very thorough examination of the whole case under the title "L'Affaire Dreyfus." A second brochure followed a year later. The two together form an exceedingly strong argument which has been confirmed in almost every point by the new facts made public during the past year. M. Lazare devotes himself especially to the task to prove, what we now know to be quite true, that the *bordereau* was not at all the work of Dreyfus.

But perhaps the most valuable contribution to this collection are the two volumes *Le Procès Zola*, which together fill a thousand pages and give the stenographic report *in extenso* of the celebrated Zola trial, extending from February to April, 1898. The first volume opens with the famous letter "J'accuse," addressed to President Faure. It was this letter and the trial which followed which finally forced public opinion to take sides and eventually brought about the revulsion of sentiment which will soon give Dreyfus his liberty.

Another somewhat similar volume forms an important volume in this series. I refer to *La Révision du Procès Dreyfus*, the stenographic report of the three days' discussion last October before the Supreme Court, when the question of a retrial of Dreyfus came up for consideration. Of all the books concerning this case, this one is perhaps the most convincing of the innocence of Dreyfus, due, in large measure, to the fact that we have here an examination of the case, as far as the facts were then known, by a body of cool, trained lawyers and judges.

Captain Paul Marin has probably written more than any other one man on this subject. His volume *L'Histoire Populaire de l'Affaire Dreyfus* is perhaps the best short account of the whole case down to the moment it was placed in the hands of the Supreme Court. Four other volumes by the same author are devoted to Picquart, Du Paty de Clam, Captain Lebrun-Renault, to whom Dreyfus is said both to have confessed and not to have confessed his guilt, and Esterhazy.

Some of the ablest writers and best known men of France appear in this collection. Here belong such names as M. Francis de Pressensé, the brilliant foreign

editor of the *Temps*; Professor Albert Réville, who fills the chair of church history at the College of France; M. Joseph Reinach, ex-Deputy; M. Duclaux, director of the Pasteur Institute; Senator Trarieux, ex-Minister of Justice; M. Yves Guyot, editor-in-chief of the *Siècle*; M. Philip Dubois, the able editorial contributor of the *Aurore*, and many others.

M. de Pressensé's *Un Héros* is a warm defence of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, written in the author's best style. Though occupied chiefly with M. Picquart, the volume gives a more or less connected account of the whole Dreyfus imbroglio and offers incidentally sketches of most of the early prominent leaders in the revisionist movement. To an American, a peculiar interest is added to this book by the fact that the author was once *chargé d'affaires* of the French Legation at Washington, and is to-day one of the best authorities in France on American politics. The volume is ornamented with an excellent portrait of M. Picquart.

Professor Réville's *Les Etapes d'un Intellectuel* was one of the first of these pro-Dreyfus volumes to make an impression on the French public mind. The author's prominent position and his ability as a writer held the attention. The book shows how a thoughtful man, starting out with the belief of all France that Dreyfus was guilty, little by little began to change his mind till he became thoroughly convinced that he is innocent. The history of the conversion is given in the form of a diary, the date at the head of each entry adding point to the development that would otherwise be lost.

M. Joseph Reinach's share in this literary reawakening of France is large. Besides three or four tracts, and almost daily newspaper articles, he has brought together into a volume—*Vers la Justice par la Vérité*—some of these contributions to the press. Grouped under heads—"The Uhlan," "The Forgers," "The Legend of the Confession," etc.—these short, incisive, and often humorous comments, attacks, arguments, are as original as they are convincing.

Just as M. Reinach's articles first appeared in the *Siècle*, one of the chief organs of the Dreyfus press, so the clever "Billets de la Province" saw light in the columns of this same sheet. M. Michel Colline was one of the earliest journalists to declare Dreyfus innocent, even before Henry's suicide opened the eyes of many who were hesitating. His articles are dated and it is interesting to see now how correct was his judgment on facts then obscure but now as bright as the noonday sun. An excellent little preface is a sort of *résumé* of the book and the whole agitation. This is unquestionably one of the best written and most ably argued pamphlets called out by "the affair."

From the start, one of the ablest and most active defenders of Dreyfus has been M. Yves Guyot, ex-Deputy and ex-Minister, editor-in-chief of the *Siècle*. *La Revision du Procès Dreyfus* contains all the facts and judicial documents on which the friends of Dreyfus based their demands for a new trial. The fac-simile of the bordereau, of Esterhazy's handwriting and of that of Dreyfus, all three placed in parallel columns, is an interesting document to look at. The exact similarity between the two first is evident to even the most unpractised eye.

But the most interesting pamphlet from the pen of M. Guyot is that entitled *Les Raisons de Basile*, being the series of letters sent to the *Siècle* last summer by M. Ferdinand Brunetière, of the French Academy and editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and M. Guyot's answers. Of course Brunetière was opposed to a retrial and though his arguments are presented in fine French and with a brilliancy for which their author is noted, the Henry suicide utterly routed the academician

and left the journalist victorious. Brunetière felt so ashamed of the absurd plight that when Guyot tried to bring out the controversy in book form, Brunetière called on the court to interfere. So the pamphlet is suppressed and a law suit is on the point of being begun. By the way, the name Basile is used in French to designate "a calumniator, a bigot, and a niggard." Doubtless the title of the pamphlet is one of the reasons why Brunetière wishes to suppress it.

But before M. Brunetière made the huge blunder of entering upon his anti-Dreyfus campaign in the *Sixième*, he had already shown on which side he stood in an unfortunate article published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, entitled "Après le Procès," and referring to the Zola trial, which had then just ended. This article has called forth a clever reply by M. Ducloux, of the Institute, which he entitles "Avant le Procès," and in which poor Brunetière is again put in a pitiable position, a sad warning given to those who are expected by their very nature and calling to be on the right side when unpopular, but who take a cowardly course and get on the wrong side. But as the right is sure to triumph in the long run, this time-serving has left Brunetière in a most unenviable posture, whereas if he had stood with the rest of "the intellectuals," he would have been to-day with the winning instead of with the losing side.

A score of small pamphlets of unequal value and ability and touching on various phases of the subject under consideration deserve a word here. There is a letter of Senator Troiseux to M. Cavaignac, Minister of War at the moment when it was written; M. Dubois's clear presentation of Picquart's part in the case, M. Jean Testis's account of Esterhazy's relations with Schwarzkoffen, an anonymous author whose "Le Syndicat de Trahison"—the title is of course ironical—consists of a series of brief sketches of the chief friends—Zola, Ranc, Guyot, Labori, Clemenceau, Pressensé, etc.—of the agitation; Henry Leyact's "Lettres d'un Coupable," meaning the letters of Esterhazy and being of course a pendant to "Lettres d'un Innocent," a heart-rending volume giving the letters of Dreyfus to his wife; and M. Villemar's "Dreyfus Intime," which throws some light on the more private side of the existence of the prisoner of Devil's Island.

This Dreyfus affair has also called forth a certain number of pamphlets giving the history of other cases where the courts of France have condemned innocent men. Thus M. Rasul Allier has republished in a brochure his learned article, which appeared last January in the *Revue de Paris*, entitled "Voltaire et Calas," in which is retold that infamous judicial mistake of the eighteenth century recounted in all the histories of that period. Voltaire, and with him Condorcet, was also the Zola of the abominable imprisonment and execution of General Lally-Tollendal about the middle of the last century, whose history is presented in this series of publications by M. Alfred Meyer. The case resembled that of Dreyfus in many respects. "L'affaire Fabus et l'affaire El-Chourfi" and "Le Dossier du Lieutenant Fabry" are two more pamphlets presenting historic instances of the mistakes of courts martial. These pamphlets must set the most sluggish mind to thinking, and should lead to the conclusion that courts, and especially military ones, are not infallible.

When the time comes for the future historian to recount the existence of the Third French Republic and pass judgment on its various acts, this abominable Dreyfus business will doubtless come in for its proper share of attention. His task will be easily performed, for he will find already presented, explained, and commented upon in every sense all the incidents of this long and tragic drama. He will consult many of the works mentioned above and others appearing almost

daily. It may be that he will even be appalled at the mass of printed matter bearing on this one event. But however that may be, perhaps some contemporaries are also curious to know all the facts of this complicated case. It is for them that I have signalled the existence of this already formidable body of literature devoted to this one incident in the history of the day.

THEODORE STANTON.

PARIS, FRANCE.

THE EMPEROR OF CHINA.

GLORIA FATALIS.

The heir of ancient glories past our scan;
Dowered with thy arrogant name—"Of Heaven the Son";
Proud ruler of the proud! thy reign begun
In ruinous times; Corruption's cankerous ban
Circling thy very throne, yet fain the van
Of progress would'st thou lead, and teach to shun
Her imminent doom thy realm. Ill-fated one!
Cowed by the fierce will of a harridan.

Thy friends lie stricken in blood, in exile smart,
Immured in splendor thou, curbed like a child.
Leaning thy pale cheek on thy feeble hand,
Thy heart with bitter thoughts and longings wild
Torn and distracted; in thy spacious land
Lives no such piteous creature as thou art.

GEORGE T. CANDLIN

TIENTSIN, NORTH CHINA.

BOOK-REVIEWS AND NOTES.

PETRARCH. *The First Modern Scholar and Man of Letters, A Selection from His Correspondence with Boccaccio and Other Friends. Designed to Illustrate the Beginnings of the Renaissance. Translated from the Original Latin together with historical Introductions and Notes, by James Harvey Robinson, Professor of History in Columbia University, with the Collaboration of Henry Winchester. Rolfe: New York and London. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1898. 8vo. Pages, 434.*

The translations include one of the autobiography, and are thoroughly accurate, while always readable. The comments are written from the standpoint of scholarly liberalism, and go far to prove the claims of Petrarch to recognition as "the cosmopolitan representative of the first great forward movement in European thought." The book is handsomely printed and illustrated with copies of a portrait, possibly from the life, of a page from Petrarch's own manuscript of the *Iliad*, and of his own artistic sketch of Vancluse.

F. M. H.

In our review of the English translation of the *Works of Nietzsche* we omitted to mention the publication of the volume *Thus Spake Zarathustra, a Book for All and None*. In the judgment of the translator, Professor Tille, "this as-

founding prose-poem is the strangest product of modern German literature. It is a kind of summary of the intellectual life of the nineteenth century, and it is on this fact that its principal significance rests. It unites in itself a number of mental movements which, in literature as well as in various sciences, have made themselves felt separately during the last hundred years, without going far beyond them. By bringing them into contact, although not always into uncontradictory relation Nietzsche transfers them from mere existence in philosophy, or scientific literature in general, into the sphere of the creed or *Weltanschauung* of the educated classes and thus his book becomes capable of influencing the views and strivings of a whole age. His immense rhetorical power and rhapsodic gift give them a stress they scarcely possessed before. His enthusiasm and energy of thought animate them, and his lyrical talent transforms them into 'true poetry' for the believers in them. He makes the freest use of traditional wisdom, of proverbs and sayings of poets and philosophers that can easily be traced to their original source, partly by repeating them but slightly altered, partly by transforming them considerably, partly by turning them into their contrary, or even into more than that, by giving them a new point altogether, while keeping nine-tenths of their old form. And this close connection with the wisdom of the century gives a person who is well read in German literature of the present century quite a peculiar pleasure in reading the book." The scouters will take an opposite view; and as is always the case when new prophets claim the future, there will be many who would as soon seek enjoyment in the reading of Revelation as in that of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. (New York: Macmillan, Pp. 499. Price, \$2.50.)

Dr. Eugen Heinrich Schmitt has just published a study of Nietzsche entitled *Friedrich Nietzsche an der Grenzscheide zweier Weltalter*. (Leipzig: Alfred Janssen, 1898. Pages, 151.) It is the work of an admirer.

* * *

Attention was called in the January number of *The Open Court* to the remarkable series of text-books of elementary mathematics now publishing under the direction of M. Darboux, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences of Paris, and we have a few words to add to that review concerning the important work that constitutes the first number of the series, the *Leçons d'arithmétique, théorique et pratique*, by Jules Tannery, Associate Director of the Scientific Department of the École Normale Supérieure.¹ The book begins with the consideration of the notion of number, counting, notation, the fundamental operations, etc., and gradually proceeding from these more concrete and more familiar data of mathematical experience, ultimately carries the student into the purely abstract regions of the subject; whereas at the beginning, therefore, the work, although fuller and more readable, treats of the same subjects as the usual text-books, at the end we are led to the consideration of such advanced doctrines as the elementary theory of numbers, which, although briefly treated, is made to appear in its modern form as a science and not as an aggregate of disconnected theorems. As to fractions, they are regarded as systems of two whole numbers, and thus an important subject is kept entirely within the domain of arithmetic proper, and made to pave the way for the introduction of imaginary numbers in algebra. Following Dedekind, irrational numbers are defined by stating between what larger and smaller rational numbers they lie. These numbers are thus assigned their natural places in the number-continuum. The fundamental propositions regarding limits are also developed, and brief historical

¹ Paris: Armand Colin & Cie., 5 rue de Mézières. Pp., 509.

remarks have been supplied. The discussions of the book are ample, the developments easy and natural, and not marred by a strained effort for rigor and conciseness. The practical sides of arithmetic, notably methods of approximation and abridged procedures of computation, are emphasised; but mere mechanical expertness is never inculcated at the expense of reason and theory, which are always placed in the foreground. Great attention has been paid to the examples which form the logical complement of the text, and are in themselves an essential and integral part of the work. In fine, the work contains a vast amount of general and detailed material which can scarcely be found in any other book on the subject in English.

* * *

The joint committee appointed some years ago by the most prominent of the American universities and colleges, for adopting a standard and uniform system of English requirements for admission to college, marked the beginning of an exceedingly important educational reform in the United States. The extension of the same idea to the remaining systems of requirements, although far more difficult of execution, will be a great step toward raising the standard of American education. In the case of English, the students of all academies and high schools throughout the United States now know in advance what will be required of them for admission to any college of high rank in the United States, and can consequently make their work conform to this end, without loss of time, money, or effort. Many publishers have taken advantage of the new system to issue in convenient form small editions of the English classics whose reading forms part of the requirements mentioned, but in general style and good typographical make-up, the editions of The Macmillan Company are superior to any that we have seen. The latest issues are Macaulay's essay on Milton, edited and annotated by Charles Wallace French, principal of the Hyde Park High School, Chicago, and Tennyson's *Princess*, edited by Wilson Farrand, of Newark, N. J. Macaulay's *Addison*, George Eliot's *Silas Marner*, Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*, Shakespeare's *Macbeth* and *Merchant of Venice*, with various other of the required volumes, have also been published. The books are small 16mos, bound in neat, flexible covers, and cost only 25 cents each. Their sphere of usefulness should not be limited entirely to the school-room.

* * *

We remarked many months ago upon the plan of M. Henri Joly to publish a series of Biographies of the Saints, and noticed his introductory work on the *Psychology of Saints*. The idea of M. Joly was not exactly that which would have suggested itself to the ultra-psychological critic. His treatment would not accord with the possible treatment of M. Ribot. The ideal he sets is to reconstruct in vivid and faithful historical outlines both the personality and the epoch of his various subjects, and thus to depict reality rather as it appeared to the contemporaries of the saints than as it would appear to psychological analysis proper. It is the work of the loving admirer rather than of the heartless critic. We glean from the titles and reputations of the collaborators that the series is intended for devout believers; nevertheless the ideal is far above that which has usually shaped the character of such works. The series has been successful; the initial volume by M. Joly on the *Psychology of the Saints* is now in its fourth edition; the *Biography of Saint Vincent de Paul*, by the distinguished academician, the Duc de Broglie, is also in its fourth edition; that of *Saint Augustine of Canterbury* is in its third edition; that of Saint Louis, Saint Jerome, and two others are in their second edi-

tion. We have now to announce the publication of two new volumes,—that of *Saint Ignace de Loyola*, by M. Joly, and that of *Saint Etienne*, the apostolic king of Hungary, by E. Horn. M. Joly has made use of recently discovered material in his work, which has throughout many high qualities; and it may be said of both volumes that they are very interesting reading. The publisher is Victor Lecoffre, Paris, rue Bonaparte 90. The price of each volume is only 2 francs bound, 3 francs.

* * *

Longmans, Green & Co have just issued a monumental product of typography in the form of the new *Metaphysic of Experience* of Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, a distinguished English thinker, Honorary LL. D. of Edinburgh University, Honorary Fellow of Oxford University, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and Past-President of the Aristotelian Society. The work, which appears in four volumes of nearly 500 pages each, is a thoroughgoing review and examination of the philosophical field, and embodies the results of a life-time of thought and patient industry. We intend to give the work a critical examination in a forthcoming number of *The Monist*.

* * *

We have to acknowledge the receipt of bound copies of Volumes VII and VIII of *The Critical Review of Theological and Philosophical Literature*, edited by Prof. S. S. F. Salmond, and published by T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh (imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York). *The Critical Review* resembles in some respects the French *Annales* and the German *Jahrbücher*; it does not contain independent articles, but is made up simply of analyses, critical reviews, and notices of theological literature, and also of philosophy in so far as it forms a part of theological study. These reviews are all by well-known authorities, and maintain a high standard. The clergyman and the theological scholar could scarcely find a better record of the English, German, and French publications in their field. The price of each volume is \$2.00 net.

* * *

Henry Holt & Co., of New York, are the publishers of a new text-book upon *The Science of Finance* for the use of colleges and universities. The author is Prof. Henry Carter Adams, of the University of Michigan, and the subtitle of the book, which more clearly defines its purpose, reads: "An Investigation of Public Expenditures and Public Revenues." The choice of the topics and the manner of discussion have been determined by a desire on the part of Professor Adams to "contribute something to the development of a financial system that shall satisfy the peculiar requirements of Federal and local government in the United States." He begins with a discussion of fundamental principles, a consideration of the nature of public wants, and a classification of the means to be employed for realising the aim which his science sets. The work is divided into two parts entitled respectively, *Public Expenditures* and *Public Revenues*. In the first part, "The Theory of Public Expenditures," "Budgets and Budgetary Legislation" are considered; and in the second part the subjects "Public Domains and Public Industries," "Taxation," and "Public Credit" are treated. The work is large, containing nearly 600 pages, and in style and general structure is as well adapted for independent reading as for university instruction.

* * *

The Macmillan Company have published a little work entitled *Economics*, by Dr. Edward Thomas Devine, general secretary of the Charity Organisation So-

ciety of the City of New York, and sometime fellow in the University of Pennsylvania. As to the point of view of the work, it will be sufficient to state that it is the production of a pupil of Prof. Simon N. Patten, of the University of Pennsylvania. The work is simple and in part almost primer-like in its method of presentation, and will be found by all to be clear reading. It is a work which the uninitiated reader can peruse with facility and profit. It contains seventeen chapters treating of the economic man, the economic environment, the making and consumption of goods, value, distribution, money, the organisation of credit and industry, the disposition of the social surplus, etc. (Pp. 404. Price, \$1.00.)

The same company has also recently issued a timely little book on *The Control of the Tropics*, by Benjamin Kidd, the well-known author of that very successful work, *Social Evolution*. According to Mr. Kidd's view, "the two leading sections of the English-speaking world, and particularly the American people, are, in their relations to the tropical regions of the earth, passing through a period of development which, in the result, is likely to profoundly influence the history of the world in the twentieth century." Mr. Kidd believes in the future ascendancy of the two great English-speaking nations, and thinks that their method of dealing with the tropical problem is the only one which is destined to succeed. "The prevailing idea of a colony among the Continental Powers of Europe is the one which has been abandoned for a century throughout the English-speaking world—the idea that it is an estate to be worked for the exclusive profit of the Power whose possession it is. The prevailing idea of a colony in England is that which governs the relations of England to Canada and Australia, where England is dealing practically with equals in these great modern States, in which all the forces resident in our civilisation are operative." The publicist and the student of international politics will find helpful data and suggestive ideas in Mr. Kidd's little book. (New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 101. Price, 75 cents.)

A more important and enduring work is *The Rise and Growth of American Politics*, being a sketch of constitutional development, by Henry James Ford. (New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. 409. Price, \$1.50.) The author informs us that it is the purpose of the work to tell the story of our politics so as to explain their nature and interpret their characteristics. He has omitted the consideration of questions of public policy and of party issues, which are referred to only in so far as they have affected the formation of political structure. It has been his object to give rather an explanation of causes than a narrative of events; nevertheless, the work presents a view of our political history from colonial times to the present day. Inasmuch as our politics are an offshoot from English politics, "the growth of the variety is studied with regard to the characteristics of the stock." The work is divided into four parts: "Origins of American Politics" are treated in Part I.; "Political Development" is treated in Part II.; "The Organs of Government" are dealt with in Part III.; and "The Tendencies and Prospects of American Politics" are considered in Part IV. The work is pleasantly written, and affords an accurate insight into the present status of American politics, and into the system of the government under which we live. Its perusal by thinking citizens would go a great way toward removing the prejudices which hamper individual political thought and action.



D'ALEMBERT.

(1717-1783.)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.

BY PROFESSOR L. LÉVY-BRUHL.

VOLTAIRE was, indeed, in his tendencies, both confessed and secret, in his likes and his dislikes, in his good qualities and his defects, "the representative man of French philosophy in the eighteenth century." We have therefore been obliged to give a somewhat detailed account of his doctrines, in which we find the average of the philosophical ideas professed by most of his contemporaries. Around him was arrayed an army of "philosophers," full of zeal but undisciplined, and sometimes unruly, whose best lieutenants were the most independent. In spite, however, of the differences in their natures, tempers, aptitudes and talents, the public feeling was not mistaken in grouping them all together under one name, from La Mettrie to Condorcet, from Condillac to Abbé Raynal. Sometimes unthinkingly, but in most cases quite consciously, they worked together on a common task. Most of them used every exertion in combating the Roman Catholic Church, and in a general way Christianity itself. They rejected its conception of the universe and of man, which appeared to them false and superstitious; they condemned the social order which the Catholic hierarchy contributed to maintain, and which they thought unjust and oppressive. Against this double tyranny all weapons were lawful. They would preserve nothing of this religion except its moral teaching, and even this they reduced to its essential elements, and held it to be human rather than specifically Christian.

In the constructive part of their work likewise, in spite of inevitable divergencies, they are quite akin to one another. Eager to lose no time in putting something in the place of that which they

thought they had destroyed, they set to work with great haste, and their want of experience appears so constantly as to be almost monotonous. There is a continual recurrence of the same paradoxes, accepted without discussion, and of the same dubious formulæ looked upon as axioms; their common stock consisted of a limited number of theories, often superficial and rudimentary, concern-



VOLTAIRE.

From a painting by Latour in 1736. Engraved by Balechou.

ing psychology, morals, politics and history, and of certain ideas and views which were often both profound and fruitful—building-stones, as it were, intended to fit into an edifice which they were as yet unable to build. For the *Encyclopædia* which they thought of as destined to be this edifice, represents a work-yard rather than a building. It has no unity, save in the spirit which animates it,

and in the perseverance of Diderot, who, in spite of obstacles and at the cost of untold trouble and sacrifice, finally brought it to completion.

* * *

La Mettrie, by the date of his works, somewhat precedes the main body of the philosophical army. He died in 1751, four years



VOLTAIRE IN HIS LIBRARY.

before Montesquieu, and before Diderot, D'Alembert and Rousseau had produced their masterpieces. Being a disciple of Boerhaave, who sought to explain the phenomena of life by the mechanism of physical and chemical phenomena, being also acquainted, though somewhat superficially, with the doctrines of Descartes and Locke, he composed, with elements derived from widely different sources, a system which he thought scientifically proven. It was a

kind of materialism, based on the idea which often reappeared in the course of the century, that the diversity in the orders of phenomena is due to the more or less complex organisation of matter. As this organisation is not the same in animals as in plants, nor (in certain points) in man as in animals, the functions which exist in plants, animals, and in man, must also be different: there is no need whatever of a special principle to explain certain of these functions rather than others. In opposition to spiritualistic dualism, which sets an abyss between the substance of the soul and that of the body, La Mettrie advanced, in his *Histoire Naturelle de l'Âme*, the ancient peripatetic and scholastic conception, which makes of the soul the form of the body. Like some Aristotelians of the Renaissance, he slipped his own materialism into this theory. He openly expounded it in the *Homme-Machine*. While he praised Descartes for saying that an animal is a machine, he reproached him for not having dared to say the same of man. Not that La Mettrie denied the existence of feeling or thought in animals or in man: such a paradox would seem to him absurd. He means that feeling, thought, consciousness, are all produced by the machine; the whole soul is explained by it, depends upon it, and, in consequence, disappears when it gets out of order, or is taken apart. As a physician, he quotes in support of his theory definite facts borrowed from mental physiology and pathology, and he declares that he will accept as his judges none but scientific men, acquainted with anatomy and with the philosophy of the body.

La Mettrie's reputation in the eighteenth century was very bad. In our days some have tried to rehabilitate him. No doubt a philosopher may have been a declared materialist and atheist, have written insipid defences of physical voluptuousness, and have died from eating too freely of patties, and yet may none the less have been a sincere man and have honestly sought after truth. No doubt also La Mettrie more than once served as a scapegoat for the philosophers who followed him and perhaps from time to time imitated him. The nearer they came to him the more fiercely they expressed their indignation against his abominable doctrines; for he, being dead, had nothing to fear either from the police or the Parliament. His good name may have suffered from this manoeuvre. Yet, if we examine his works closely, we shall conclude that he has not been seriously wronged. He does not sufficiently distinguish between what is proved and what is merely asserted; he has no absorbing concern for close reasoning and exact expression,

and his language is often rash in proportion to the looseness of his demonstrations. Let us grant that he introduced French materialism in the eighteenth century, but let us acknowledge at the same time that he too often presented it under an aggressive and unacceptable form.



FRONTISPIECE TO THE "ENCYCLOPÆDIA."

In 1751 appeared the *Discours Préliminaire* of the *Encyclopædia*. Diderot had acted wisely in asking D'Alembert to write it, and in contenting himself with drawing up the prospectus of his

great enterprise. He had already been at odds with the authorities, and had spent several months in Vincennes on account of his *Lettre sur les Aveugles*, in a word, he was looked upon as a suspicious character. D'Alembert, a great mathematician, renowned for his *Traité de Dynamique*, and a member of the Academy of Science, was just the man to present the *Encyclopædia* to the public, and his name insured it against the ill-will of the enemies of philosophy.

This discourse was much admired, but we now find it rather difficult to understand this admiration. Though we do not refuse our homage to the dignity of its tone and the elevation of its thought, we are rather disappointed as we read it. This is owing to several causes. Ideas which were new in those days have now become familiar and commonplace. Several important points in D'Alembert's philosophy do not appear in the *Discours*, or are merely hinted at. Others, on the contrary, are developed which do not express his real thought; but he believed this concession to be indispensable in order to gain acceptance for the rest. "In the accursed country in which we write," he said to Voltaire, "such phrases as these are notarial style, and serve only as passports for the truths that we wish to establish. Moreover, nobody is deceived by them. . . . Time will teach men to distinguish what we have thought from what we have said." D'Alembert never would deviate from this prudent course. Accordingly we see in the works offered to the public a D'Alembert whose attitude is irreproachable and whose irony is hidden under the forms of respect. But the letters to Voltaire and to Frederic the Great show us a quite different sort of man, eager for the fray, and as much incensed against parliaments, Jesuits, Jansenists, priests in general, and religion as the most determined "philosopher."

Being a fervent admirer of Bacon, D'Alembert borrowed from him his classification of sciences, with a few alterations which he himself explains. To tell the truth, the *Discours Préliminaire* contains not one but three classifications of human knowledge, from three different points of view. D'Alembert first examines "the origin and development of our ideas and sciences from the philosophical or metaphysical (i. e., psychological) point of view." Like a true disciple of Locke and Condillac, he divides all our knowledge into direct ideas and ideas derived from reflexion. Our direct knowledge is only that which has come to us through our senses: in other words, to our sensations alone do we owe our ideas. The classification here consists, therefore, in tracing our

complex ideas back to simple ones, that is, to those derived from sensation.

The "encyclopædic order of sciences," which comes next, is a logical order. It must not be confused with the order which the human mind has actually followed in the production of the sciences. In all likelihood man, spurred on by his bodily wants, must first have set out to meet the most urgent need, and then, as he met with difficulties, have tried another way, then have retraced his steps, etc. If so, the sciences which we look upon as containing the principles of all others, and which must come first in the encyclopædic order, were not the first to be invented. Moreover, in the historical order of the progress of the human mind, the various sciences can be viewed only in succession, one after another, whereas the encyclopædic order consists in embracing all sciences at one glance, as if from a height one should perceive at one's feet a maze of interweaving paths. Or, again, this encyclopædic order may be compared to a map of the world, on which we see at one glance the whole surface of the globe. And just as, in preparing such a map, we may choose among various systems of projection, so we may also conceive the encyclopædic order in several different ways. None of these ways is necessarily to be adopted to the exclusion of all others, and if D'Alembert chose that of Bacon it was because, without being more defective than the others, it has the advantage of suggesting with tolerable accuracy the genealogy of human knowledge.

Lastly, a third order considered by D'Alembert is that according to which our sciences have been historically developed since the Renaissance. It differs from the order which the human mind would follow if left to its own lights. In this order, then, the sciences of erudition came first, owing to the prestige of antiquity, which after long ages of barbarism and ignorance was rising again fair and luminous before the delighted eyes of men. Thus D'Alembert had a clear perception of the psychological genesis of our knowledge, of the logical order of the sciences, and of their historical succession. Could not these three orders have been combined to form a higher one? Comte later on attempted such a combination; but D'Alembert contented himself with a rapid criticism of each of the sciences, and a summary appreciation of the great minds who had created or developed them.

And, first of all, in the already formidable mass of our knowledge, how few branches deserve the name of sciences! History, according to D'Alembert, is in no wise entitled to it. It is only of

practical interest. Why should we not, for instance, cull from it the best catechism of morals that could be given to children, by collecting into one book the really memorable deeds and words? It would be particularly useful to philosophers and to the "unfortunate class" of princes to teach them to know the men with whom they live from what they learn of men who lived in former times. Metaphysics should be strictly limited to what is treated of in *Locke's Essay*. Nearly all the other questions it proposes to solve are either beyond solution or idle. It is the food of rash or ill-balanced minds—in one word, a vain and contentious science. D'Alembert is not allured, like Voltaire, by the hypothesis which attributes to matter, under certain conditions, the power to think. To him it appears uncalled for and dangerous. If it inclines towards materialism, we fall back into a metaphysical doctrine no more clearly proven than any other. Is it not better for us to confess that we do not know at all what substance, soul, and matter, are? Likewise, as regards the existence and nature of God, scepticism is the only reasonable attitude of mind. And we should be compelled to say the same of the existence of the outer world and of man's liberty, did not instinct here supplement the deficiency of reason; whether the outer world exists or not, we have such a strong inclination to believe in it that everything appears to us as if it existed; and, in the same way, everything appears to us as if we were free.

Even in the natural sciences, how limited did man's knowledge appear. Physiology had hardly yet begun to exist. D'Alembert speaks of medicine as a man who has measured all its risks; in his eyes it is a purely empirical science. The physician who builds systems and clings to a theory is most dangerous; that one is least to be feared who has seen many patients and has learned to make an accurate diagnosis and not to dose at random. Physics is more advanced and its conquests are lasting. Here we stand on firmer ground, but progress is slow and the human mind has to guard against itself. D'Alembert insists upon the prudent advice already given by Bacon: we should distrust even the most probable explanations, so long as they have not been tested by experience, and, if possible, by calculation.

Sciences in the highest sense of the word, D'Alembert called those he had been studying all his lifetime, and to which he owed the best of his glory—the mathematical sciences, which he divides into pure mathematics, mixed mathematics, and physico-mathematical sciences. Certitude, properly so called, which is

founded upon principles necessarily true and self-evident, does not belong equally or in the same way to all these branches of mathematics. Those which rest on physical principles, that is, on experimental truths or on physical hypotheses, have, so to speak, only an experimental or hypothetical certitude.

One might infer from this that D'Alembert looks upon pure mathematics, in opposition to physico-mathematical sciences, as being really *a priori* and independent of experience : but how could he have harmonised such a conception with the principle borrowed from Locke, according to which all our knowledge comes, either directly or indirectly, from experience? D'Alembert did not fall into this contradiction. He avoided it by means of a theory of mathematics which was consistent with his sensationalistic principles, and much clearer than the ones to which Hume and Condillac resorted. Mathematics, in his opinion, belongs to natural philosophy. "The science of dimensions in general is the remotest term to which the contemplation of the properties of matter may lead us." Experience shows us individual beings and particular phenomena, the sun, the moon, rain, and wind. By means of successive abstractions and of more and more comprehensive generalisations, we separate the qualities common to all these phenomena and beings, till at last we reach the fundamental properties of all bodies : impenetrability, extension, and size. We cannot further subdivide our perceptions, and we find at this point a subject for sciences which, in virtue of the simplicity of this subject, may be made deductive. Thus, in geometry, we strip matter of nearly all its material qualities, and consider, so to speak, only its ghost. "Thus," says D'Alembert in a language that foreshadows Stuart Mill, "it is merely by a process of abstraction that the geometrician considers lines as having no breadth, and surfaces as having no thickness. The truths he demonstrates about the properties of all are *purely hypothetical* truths. But they are none the less useful, considering the consequences that result from them." This empirical theory of mathematics, which stands in such direct opposition to that of Plato and Descartes, has made its appearance again in our century, and is anything but abandoned at the present day. Even such men as Helmholtz, though reared under the influence of Kant, have deemed it indispensable to accept the statement that geometry contains elements derived from experience.

As the certainty of mathematics rests on the evidence of ideas so closely related that the mind perceives the connexion between

them at a glance, so the certainty of morals rests on the "heart's evidence" which rules us as imperiously. D'Alembert's theory of morals is almost entirely identical with Voltaire's. The only original feature about it is the personal accent that D'Alembert gives it, especially in his letters. To him sympathy for the hapless, indignation against the "monstrous inequality of fortunes" are not mere commonplaces, hackneyed expressions of a trite sentimentality, an homage paid to the reigning fashion. They are the words of a man who has seen the poor, who has lived among them, who has witnessed their sufferings, and to whom misery is a living reality, not a theme for literary amplification. D'Alembert goes so far as to ask himself whether, when driven to despair, and reduced without fault of his own to the verge of starvation, a man is morally bound to respect the surplus that another has beyond his needs.

In dignity of life and independence of character, as well as in genius, D'Alembert was among the glories of the party of philosophers. He more than once dared to contradict Voltaire. His friendship with Frederick never cost any sacrifice of his pride, and he fell out with Catherine of Russia because she rather haughtily rejected his intercession on behalf of some Frenchmen who had been taken prisoners in Poland. His two great passions were for mathematics and against "priests"; and it is characteristic of the times that the latter should have contributed no less than the former to constitute him a "philosopher."

* * *

Diderot was as adventurous, expansive and lyrical as D'Alembert was prudent, reserved and methodical. But his disorder is rich in ideas. Diderot was one of the most extraordinary mind-stirring writers that the world has ever seen. The brightness and charm of his conversation seem to have been prodigious. He was called "the philosopher." It must indeed be admitted that if we always meant by this word a man whose methodical and persevering meditation does not rest satisfied till it has found out a first principle from which it can deduce the whole world of reality, Diderot would occupy but a low place among philosophers. Not that he was incapable of reducing his ideas to a system; but the starting-point of his attempts at such a synthesis was variable, depending on a chance encounter, conversation or reading. Before his reason went deep into things, his imagination had to be stirred. But on the other hand he was without a rival in rising from an apparently insignificant point to general ruling principles, and in dis-

covering from that vantage ground many roads, some of which led him to new points of view ; his curiosity was indefatigable, his reflexion sometimes profound and always suggestive.

Unfortunately, though all this be sufficient to exercise a considerable influence upon contemporaries, it may easily fail to produce many durable works. All Diderot's writings wear an air of improvisation, due to his ready and sudden enthusiasm, and to the facility with which he could put together *extempore* a vast structure of ideas. It can therefore hardly be said that the *Encyclopædia*, by compelling him to scatter his labors for twenty years upon an infinite and varied task, prevented him from bringing forth the great masterpiece which his intelligence, if concentrated, might have produced. It was rather because Diderot felt no strong desire to concentrate himself thus that he poured into the *Encyclopædia* and into a multitude of pamphlets his wonderful gifts for quick assimilation and uninterrupted, but fragmentary, production.

Diderot was at first a deist, after the manner of Voltaire, and, like him, under the influence of the English, particularly of Locke and Shaftesbury. He then thought, as did Voltaire, that modern physics had dealt materialism and scepticism a fatal blow. "The discovery of germs, in itself, has dispelled one of the strongest objections of atheism." But this style of philosophy soon ceased to satisfy him, and he gradually inclined to what he himself called the most attractive form of materialism : that which attributes to organic molecules desires, aversions, feeling, and thought,—to end at last in a sort of pantheistic naturalism.

Several paths led Diderot to this goal. First of all, he perceived that the irreducible dualism of soul and body was generally upheld for religious quite as much as for philosophical reasons ; and this alone was sufficient to drive him away from it. Then, in his *Lettres sur les Aveugles* and *Sur les Sourds Muets*, he insists upon the relative character of our metaphysical conceptions. For a blind man, what becomes of the proof of the existence of God based upon final causes? Diderot attempted, as Condillac did afterwards, to work out the psychological development of sensationalism. All our knowledge comes from the senses ; how does it come from them? What do we owe to each of our senses? Can we analyse their data, and afterward from them reconstruct the whole? Cheselden's experiment and Molyneux's problem were known ; Diderot wished to go beyond these, to carry this kind of "metaphysical anatomy" still farther, and to take in pieces, so to speak, the senses of man. He imagined the "conventional mute,"

and the conclusions that he drew from his psychological analysis alarmed many a Christian.

But Diderot's pantheistic tendencies seem to have been chiefly determined by the discoveries made about this time in natural science. These he followed with passionate interest, and his imagination soon swept him on to bold hypotheses concerning life and thought. "We are," he says, "on the verge of a great revolution in science." In mathematics such men as Bernoulli, Euler, D'Alembert, Lagrange, have "set the pillars of Hercules." Nobody will go further. The natural sciences, on the other hand, have only just been born; and already the little that is known about them entirely changes our view of the world. For instance, to a mathematician studying abstract mechanics, a body may undoubtedly, by convention, be looked upon as inert; but if we examine the facts, the inertia of bodies is a "fearful error," contrary to all sound principles of physics and chemistry. In itself, whether we consider its particles or its mass, a body is full of activity and strength. The distinction between inorganic and living matter is therefore superficial, and strictly speaking even false; for do we not plainly see that the same matter is alternately living and not living, according as it is assimilated or eliminated by a plant or an animal? Nature makes flesh with marble, and marble with flesh. Therefore, is it not very rash to assert that sensibility is incompatible with matter, since we do not know the essence of anything whatever, either of matter or of sensibility? But, it is said, sensibility is a simple quality, one and indivisible, and incompatible with a divisible subject. "Metaphysico-theological gibberish," answers Diderot. Experience shows that life is everywhere; who knows but feeling may be everywhere too?

One of the most serious objections raised against such a doctrine rests on the stability and permanence of living species, which seem to set an insurmountable barrier between man and other animals, between any two living species, and, above all, between the realm of life and that of inorganic matter. Diderot was aware of this difficulty. He answered it by asserting the natural evolution of all the species that ever appeared on the globe. It does not follow because of the present state of the earth and consequently of the living species and of the inanimate bodies which are to be found thereon, that this state has always been similar in the past, or is to remain similar in the future. What we mistake for the history of nature is only the history of an instant of time. Just as in the animal or vegetable kingdom an individual begins to exist,

grows, matures, decays, and disappears, may it not be the same with an entire species? Who knows what races of animals have preceded us? And who knows what races of animals will succeed ours? Let us then waive the apparently unanswerable question of the origin of life. If you are puzzled by the question of the egg and the owl, it is because you suppose animals to have been originally what they are now. What folly! We do not know what they have been any more than we know what they are to be. To Diderot's eager, universal, and insatiable scientific curiosity was joined a conception of science itself which might already be termed "positivism." We know little; let us be contented with what we can know. Our means of gaining knowledge reach as far as our real needs do, and where these means are denied us, knowledge is probably not very necessary for us. I might as well feel seriously grieved at not having four eyes, four feet, and two wings. We must accept the fact that we are as we are, and not aspire to a science that would be beyond our comprehension. If men were wise, they would at last give their attention to investigations that would promise to promote their comfort, and no longer deign to answer questions which are idle because they are unanswerable. For a similar reason, they would cease to aim at a greater degree of precision in science than practical considerations demand. In a word, "utility is the measure of everything." Utility will a few centuries hence set limits to experimental physics, as it is on the point of doing with regard to geometry. "I will allow centuries to this study (physics), because its sphere of utility is infinitely wider than that of any other abstract science, and because it is unquestionably the basis of our real knowledge."

The same fervent love of humanity which animates and limits Diderot's idea of science, is also to be found in his polemics against the Christian religion. Of course his language varied according to circumstances. When he did not intend to publish he gave free rein to his bold tongue. In this way he wrote the *Supplément au Voyage de Bon Gainville, Le Neveu de Rameau* (his masterpiece), the *Entretien avec la Marchale de * * ** In private letters, he sometimes vents his rage in invectives against that religion, "the most absurd and atrocious in its dogmas, the most unintelligible, metaphysical and intricate, and consequently the most liable to divisions, schisms and heresies, the most fatal to public peace and to sovereigns, the most insipid, the most gloomy, the most Gothic, the most puerile, the most unsociable in its morals, the most intolerant of all." In the *Encyclopædia* he makes a show of respect.

Yet significant sallies will sometimes escape him: "The Hebrews knew what Christians term the true God; as if there were any false one!"

His ethics, extremely lax as regards the union of the sexes, is unfortunately influenced by the lachrymose sentimentality of the times. The moment that virtue is mentioned Diderot gets excited. Tears come into his eyes, his heart throbs, he gasps, he must embrace his friends, and they must share his transports. This overflow of feeling seriously impairs the precision of his ideas. Diderot taught his daughter that every virtue has two rewards: the pleasure of doing good, and that of winning the good will of others; and every vice has two punishments: one in our inmost hearts, the other in the feeling of aversion which we never fail to excite in others. He wished her to have no prejudices, but to have morals and principles "common to all centuries and nations." Here we recognise ideas dear to Voltaire. Like him also, Diderot considered that justice was rooted in the very nature of man, and not, in spite of Locke, variable according to times and places. "The maxims engraved, so to speak, on the tables of mankind are as ancient as man and preceded his laws for which they ought to furnish the guiding principles." But Diderot, in accord here with Rousseau, added that nature has not created us wicked, and that it is bad education, bad examples, and bad legislation that deprave us.

The originality of Diderot must not therefore be sought in his ethics; it lies elsewhere, in the mass of ideas set in motion by this indefatigable mind, a real precursor on many points of the present century, which has justly shown a predilection for him. He anticipates the progress of the natural sciences and the change they were to bring to the general conception of the universe, and consequently to the whole life of mankind. He was among the first to recognise the social importance of the mechanic arts, by giving them the place they were entitled to in the *Encyclopædia*. He raised in public esteem the men who practise these arts, and thus did for the workman what the physiocrats were at the same time doing for the husbandman. At the same time his *Salons* were making the beginnings of art criticism, and teaching his contemporaries how to look at pictures and statues. On dramatic art and the art of the comedian he brought forward many ingenious and profound ideas,—and finally, he revealed in many articles of the *Encyclopædia*, a searching knowledge of the history of philosophy, then neglected and almost unknown in France.

Goethe, who greatly admired him, said that his was "the most Germanic of French heads." Indeed very few French philosophers have had as keen a sense of the great pulse of universal life and of the creative power of nature, or as sound and penetrating an insight into manifold reality. He occupies a special place, which we must almost despair of defining in a satisfactory manner. We can neither set forth his philosophical thoughts without exhibiting their shortcomings, nor yet point out these drawbacks without running the risk of being unjust to this vast, powerful, and unrestrained genius.

* * *

Compared with such men as D'Alembert and Diderot, Helvetius is not the most original of the "philosophers," yet his book *De l'Esprit* created a wonderful sensation, both in France and abroad. This success was partly due, at least in France, to the personality of the author, who was a great financier and a kind, generous, hospitable and friendly man, who approached very near to the most esteemed type of man of the eighteenth century: the man of feeling who is virtuous and made happy by his virtue. The success was undoubtedly also due in part to a most captivating style; easy to read, composed with a manifest concern for the favor of women, and weaving in short stories and anecdotes, *De l'Esprit* did not repel even the most indolent reader. Lastly, its success was due to the apparent boldness of the paradoxes which however were nothing but the fashionable opinions carried to their logical conclusions. The strange thing was that the success of Helvetius lasted for a long time, and at the end of the century it was still thought worth while to refute him.

Apart from the current doctrine of sensationalism for which Helvetius was evidently indebted to Condillac or to some other contemporary writer, his two main paradoxes are the following: (1) That personal interest or the pursuit of happiness is the only principle, whether confessed or not, of human actions; (2) that education can do everything. The first paradox was not new. Many a moralist, not to mention La Rochefoucauld, had already shown the infinite cunning of self-love, and concluded that men, even in the actions that seem most disinterested actions, are always more or less hypocritical. But Helvetius gives his argument a quite different turn. There is no pessimism or bitterness about him; he is full of kindness. "It was not the love of paradoxes," he writes, "that led me to my conclusion, but solely a desire for men's happiness." And he flatters himself that his doctrine may

contribute to it. Indeed, if it be once granted that man never seeks anything but his own interest, let law-givers so contrive that the general interest shall always agree with private interests, and all men will be good and happy. Everything, therefore, depends upon the laws. Wherever private interest is identified with public interest, virtue in each individual becomes the necessary effect of



HELVETIUS. (1715-1771.)

self-love and personal interest. "All the vices of a nation almost invariably originate in some defects of its legislation."

Diderot justly observed that this omnipotence attributed to the laws repeats in an exaggerated form the conception of Montesquieu who saw an inseparable connexion between morals and the system of government, and thus attributed to political laws an influence not always confirmed by experience. Furthermore, with

Montesquieu, the forms of government depend, in their turn, upon climate and a multitude of conditions, whereas Helvetius expressly opposes Montesquieu's theory of climates. He maintains that the action of the law-giver is supreme everywhere, and that no obstacles are insuperable if this action be properly directed. If it be objected that the pursuit of personal interest is rather a narrow basis to sustain the whole edifice of human society, he answers that, as all things come from experience, the feeling which was afterwards to be called altruism is no exception to the rule. The *moral instinct*, the moral sense, the natural capacity for beneficence and benevolence, appealed to by the English, are not to be admitted. "The vaunted system of the morally beautiful is really nothing but the system of innate ideas, demolished by Locke, and brought forward again under a somewhat different form." No individual is born good, no individual is born wicked. Both goodness and wickedness are accidents, being the result of good or bad laws.

Thence logically follows the second paradox, according to which education alone creates differences among men. Since nothing is innate or hereditary, every human soul is at first a blank page, and all souls are identical at birth. Inequality among minds is therefore due to the various circumstances in which men have been placed, to the passions aroused by these circumstances, to the power of attention that these passions produce, in short, to a thousand causes, but above all to education. Pedagogy is to individuals what political science is to nations. Error is an evil which, like vice, may be avoided. To insure the happiness of mankind, it will only be necessary to bring the art of education to perfection. Education will make enlightened men and even "men of genius as numerous as they have hitherto been scarce." The enormity of the paradox did not prevent its making an impression upon the public. It had at least the merit of calling attention to the then quite new science of pedagogy, and of preparing the public to welcome Rousseau's *Emile*. Besides, the influence of Rousseau was already quite perceptible in Helvetius. "Everything is acquired" is indeed, according to Locke's conception, the negation of innate ideas; but it is also, according to Rousseau's conception, the assertion that the errors, sufferings and crimes of men are their own work, and that it is for the educator and the law-giver to cure them.

* * *

Le Système de la Nature, by Baron D'Holbach, which appeared in 1770, is a less superficial and more vigorous work than the writ-

ings of Helvetius. Being a confessed materialist, D'Holbach defines man as a material being organised so as to feel, think and be modified in certain ways peculiar to himself, that is, to the particular combinations of substances of which he is composed. The intellectual faculties may be reduced to changes produced by motion in the brain. The word "spirit" has no meaning. The savages admit the existence of "spirits" to explain effects for which they cannot account, and which seem to them marvellous. Such an idea of spirit is preserved only by ignorance and sloth. It is more useful to divines, but most harmful to the progress of society, which keeps pace with science. The immortality of the soul is a religious dogma which never was of any use except to priests, and is not even a check upon the passions if they are at all violent, as experience sufficiently proves. And as necessary laws govern all natural phenomena, intellectual and moral phenomena included, freedom is quite out of the question.

So far this materialism had nothing remarkable about it unless it be its perfect frankness. But on the question of the existence of God, D'Holbach subjected deism and theism to a searching criticism, obviously directed against Voltaire's natural religion, and worthy of some notice. People make a wrong use of physics in behalf of metaphysics, says D'Holbach, and the study of nature should have nothing to do with moral or theological interests lest a new chance of errors be added to all those we already have to guard against. But even if we overlook this point, the argument based on final causes does not prove what it is thought to prove. First of all, the idea of order is relative to human canons of propriety, and if we leave these out of account, disorder is in itself no less natural and normal than order, nor illness than health; all phenomena being produced by virtue of the same laws. Then "to be surprised that the heart, the brain, the arteries, etc., of an animal should work as they do, or that a tree should bear fruit, is to be surprised that an animal or a tree should exist." What we call finality is but the total sum of the conditions required for the existence of every being. When these conditions are found combined, the living being subsists; if they cease to be so, it disappears; and this very simple proposition, which is true as regards individuals, is no less so as regards species and even suns. There is nothing in this which compels us to have recourse to a Providence, the author and maintainer of the world's order.

The divine personality, upheld by theists, is untenable. Newton, the vast genius who divined Nature and its laws, is only a

child when he leaves the domain of physics; and his theology shows that he had remained in bondage to the prejudices of his childhood. What is that God, lord and sovereign of all things, who rules the universe, but an anthropomorphic conception, which was only a reminiscence of Newton's Christian education? And what is Voltaire's retributive and vengeful God, but a reminiscence of precisely the same kind?

The God of deists is useless, that of theists is full of contradictions. If we nevertheless accept him, we have no right to reject anything in the name of reason, and we are inconsistent if we refuse to go further and to submit to religious dogma. Theism is liable to as many heresies and schisms as religion, and is, from a logical point of view, even more untenable. So there will always be but a step "from theism to superstition." The least derangement in the machine, a slight ailment, some unforeseen affliction, are sufficient to disturb the humors, and nothing more is required. Natural religion is only a variety of the other kind of religion, and speedily comes back to the original type. It is fear, and ignorance of causes, that first suggested to man the idea of his gods. He made them rude and fierce, then civilised, like himself; and nothing but science can cause this instinctive theology to disappear.

The appearance of this book, in which the author (though under an assumed name) so boldly carried his principles to their utmost logical conclusions, created great commotion among the "philosophers." Though they did not all feel indignant, they nearly all thought it advisable to simulate indignation. Voltaire strongly protested, and this time he was sincere. Diderot, who was suspected of having had a hand in the work, kept very quiet. D'Alembert confessed that the *Système de la Nature* was a "terrible book." Frederick II., very much shocked, wrote a refutation of it. He clearly perceived the revolutionary ideas lurking in it, and became out of humor with the Encyclopædists, who were friends and intimates of Baron D'Holbach. As for Rousseau, he had already broken with them long before, and had not waited for this book before opening the battle against materialism and atheism, which he "held in abhorrence."

Nevertheless, Rousseau had contributed to the *Encyclopædia*, in the first years of its publication; Condillac, Turgot, Quesnay had likewise written articles for it, and, unfortunately, other men besides, who were unworthy of such neighbors. In spite of Diderot's efforts there are strange incongruities in the *Encyclopædia*, and we easily understand Voltaire's frequent indignation at the

vapid or high-flown nonsense which Diderot was compelled to insert. D'Alembert, who ceased to be associated with him in publishing the *Encyclopædia* in 1757, though he went on contributing to it, often pleads extenuating circumstances in his Letters to Voltaire. It was he who, in his *Discours Préliminaire*, gave perhaps the best characterisation of this undertaking in which the philosophical spirit of the age found its expression: "The present century," he said, "which thinks itself destined to alter laws of all kinds and to secure justice . . ."

The philosophers proceeded to "alter the laws" with an eagerness, a confidence in their own reason and in their paradoxes, and a power of self-delusion that were extraordinary. The government they controlled existed only in imagination, and there was no check of experience to bring them to a halt in time. The work which they did too hastily now seems to us rather poor and out of proportion to their claims; but it does not follow that this work was not necessary, or that they were wrong in undertaking it. On the contrary, their impulse on the whole was generous, and for this reason, in spite of all their failings, it proved irresistible and carried away the very men who ought to have been its natural adversaries. Hatred of falsehood, superstition, oppression, confidence in the progress of reason and science, belief in the power of education and law to overcome ignorance, error and misery, which are the sources of all our misfortunes, and lastly warm sympathy for all that is human were shed abroad from this focus to the ends of the civilised world. Events followed which left an indelible mark upon history. And though a clear-sighted reaction showed the weaknesses, inconsistencies and lapses of this philosophy, it may well be believed that its virtue is not yet quite exhausted, and that by laying its foundations deeper it may yet rise again with new strength.

THE CROSS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

BY THE EDITOR.

INTRODUCTORY.

CRoss means to us any form in which one line, stick, or beam, passes through or over another. The word is an Anglicised



THE SIMPLE CROSS.¹



THE X CROSS.¹

form of the Latin *crux*, which means any wooden pole or combination of poles erected for the execution of criminals. It is prob-

¹ Reproduced from Lipsius, *De Cruce*.

ably derived from the root "çram," which in Sanscrit means "to cause pain" or "to torture;"¹ and the term *crux* actually retained the significance of any instrument of capital punishment in the form of a lingering and painful death almost to the time of Constantine, when Christianity became the state religion of Rome. Then two intersecting lines, either a horizontal on top of a vertical line (T *crux commissa*), or a vertical passing through a horizontal

line (+ or † *crux immissa*), or two lines standing on end (X *crux decussata*) were adopted under the name of cross as the symbol of the new faith.

The *crux commissa* (T) is also called the Tau cross, because it resembles the Greek letter T, called *tau*. The equilateral *crux immissa* (+) is commonly known by the name "Greek cross," while the other high form standing on a prolonged foot (†) is frequently called the Latin cross because it was officially adopted by the Roman Church as the symbol of Christianity. The popular name of the *crux decussata* is St. Andrew's cross, because St. Andrew is supposed to have been crucified on the X cross.

Seneca speaks of the great variety of the forms of the cross and the various ways in which criminals were crucified.²

The cross, certainly, did not always have the transverse beam,

and was frequently a simple pole, wherefore it has also been called "rood," a word that signifies a rod without a transverse beam.

¹ The derivation from crun-c, as connected with the German *krumm*, proposed by Corssen upheld by Zestermann in his two programmes of Leipsic, 1867 and 1868, and again proposed by Friedrich (*Bonner Th. Litbl.*, 1875, No. 17 ff.), or a connexion with the root of the English words *crook*, as proposed in some English dictionaries, e. g. Chambers's, are highly improbable, not to say, impossible.

² Reproduced from Lipsius, *De Cruce*.

³ Consol. ad. Marc. 20. Video istic cruces non unius quidem generis sed aliter ab aliis fabricatae, etc.



THE MOST COMMON FORM OF THE
ROMAN CROSS.²

Cicero¹ dwells on the cruelty and ignominy of this penalty, which was reserved for the vilest crimes and to which slaves and highway robbers alone were subjected. Livy, whose idea of a cross is apparently that of a stake, calls the cross "arbor infelix," and Horace mentions the big timber nails (*clavos trabales*) and plugs (*cuneos*) employed for crucifixion.²

Pliny (*Hist. Nat.*, 28) alludes to the strange superstition, natural at the time and common all over the Roman empire, that the ropes or nails employed for crucifixion were regarded as possessed of magic power.

It will facilitate a comprehension of the history of the cross, if we distinguish between the cross as an instrument of capital punishment and as the figure of two intersecting lines. That the former gradually assumed the shape of the latter is an interesting and instructive fact, which will find its natural explanation when we consider that a simple religious symbol was needed for Christianity, and the figure of two intersecting lines recommended itself for this purpose on account of the universality of its use, the variety of its interpretations, and, finally, the religious awe accorded to it for its mystic potencies by almost every primitive nation on earth.

CRUCIFIXION AS A SACRIFICE.

The nature of punishments depends greatly upon climatic conditions, and the death penalty of the cross is of an unequivocally southern origin. It is an exposure to the heat of the sun. In fact, the word *ἠλιάξεν*, "to expose to the sun," is a synonym of the term "to hang up on the tree," or "to crucify."³

Death by exposure to the sun was intended among the Israelites as a sacrifice to Yahveh. We read in Numbers xxv. 3-5 and 9:

"And Israel joined himself unto Baal-peor: and the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel. And the Lord said unto Moses, Take all the heads of the people, and hang them up before the Lord against the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel. And Moses said unto the judges of Israel, Slay ye every one his men that were joined unto Baal-peor.

"And those that died in the plague were twenty and four thousand."

The most common death penalty of the Israelites is by stoning. Death by exposure to the sun always partakes of the nature of a sacrifice. We read in 2 Sam. xxi. 1-9:

"Then there was a famine in the days of David three years, year after year; and David enquired of the Lord. And the Lord answered, It is for Saul, and for

¹ Cicero. *Terr.* v. 21.

² Hor., *l.*, 35.

³ The term *ἠλιάξεν* is the word used in the Septuagint in 2 Samuel, chapter xxi., verses 1-6 and 9.

his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites. And the king called the Gibeonites, and said unto them; (now the Gibeonites were not of the children of Israel, but of the remnant of the Amorites; and the children of Israel had sworn unto them: and Saul sought to slay them in his zeal to the children of Israel and Judah). Wherefore David said unto the Gibeonites, What shall I do for you? and wherewith shall I make the atonement, that ye may bless the inheritance of the Lord? And the Gibeonites said unto him, We will have no silver nor gold of Saul, nor of his house; neither for us shalt thou kill any man in Israel. And he said, What ye shall say, that will I do for you. And they answered the king, The man that consumed us, and that devised gainst us that we should be destroyed from remaining in any of the coasts of Israel, Let seven men of his sons be delivered unto us, and we will hang them up unto the Lord [i. e., Yahveh] in Gibeah of Saul, whom the Lord did choose. And the king said, I will give them.¹

"And he delivered them into the hands of the Gibeonites, and they hanged them in the hill before the Lord [Yahveh]: and they fell all seven together, and were put to death in the days of harvest, in the first days, in the beginning of barley harvest."

The Gibeonites were worshippers of Yahveh as much as the Israelites, and yet they deemed it necessary to atone the wrath of God by human sacrifice. Without entering into the details of the story whether or not David intended to destroy thereby the house of his predecessor on the throne, we have the fact that the event took place in the name of Yahveh in response to an inquiry of Yahveh's oracle and according to the Yahvistic faith. It proves that the ideas of hanging up human victims to the Lord as an atonement were essential features of the religion of those days. But the Bible would not be a truthful record of the religious evolution of Israel if it did not preserve some evidence of this ancient and most significant custom, which was all but common among all savage nations.

It is a remarkable fact and by no means without significance that the oldest crucifixions recorded in the history of other nations, too, are not penalties but sacrifices offered to the sun-god, and these bloody offerings which seem to be interchangeable with holocausts were supposed to be the surest and most reliable methods of making prayer effective, of attaining one's wish, or of atoning the wrath of a god, especially if the victim was the son of the man who tried to gain the assistance of the deity.

Stockbauer, a Roman Catholic author,² calls attention to an event mentioned by Justinus which is of interest in this connexion.

¹The clause ^{לְיָהוָה} ^{בְּחֵיבָה} translated in the English Bible, "whom the Lord did choose," would more correctly be translated "for the satisfaction of Yahveh." The author apparently does not mean to remind the reader in this connexion that "Saul was once the choice of Yahveh," but on the contrary, that a sacrifice of seven men of the house of the rejected King would appease the wrath of Yahveh. The verb ^{בְּחֵיבָה} means "delectari" or "to be pleased with."

²*Kunstgesch. d. Kr.*, p. 3.

The Carthaginian general Maleus had lost a battle about 600 B. C. in Sicily, and was on this account banished. Unwilling to submit, he returned home with his army and besieged his native city; but before he deemed it advisable to take the walls by storm, he had his son Catalo crucified in sight of the beleaguered fortifications, whereupon he attacked and conquered Carthage.

Notice here that the crucifixion of a son, an innocent victim, is supposed to be a reliable method of gaining the assistance of Baal!

The outstretched arms appear to have become a significant attitude of the sun-god. A votive stone, discovered in Numidia, North Africa, in the year 1813, shows the sun-god with outstretched arms holding a twig in each hand, with the inscription: "To Lord Baal, the Eternal Solar King, who has listened to the prayers of Hicembal," etc.¹

Holocausts or burnt offerings in which the victim was burned entirely are another ancient sacrifice to the sun-god. The Baal cult mentioned in the Old Testament required of its devotees to make their children pass through the fire.

Holocausts, too, were made for sacrifices, and the superstition prevailed that if a man offered his own son, his prayer would surely be granted. We read, for instance, in 2 Kings, iii. 26-27:

"And when the king of Moab saw that the battle was too sore for him, he took with him seven hundred men that drew swords, to break through even unto the king of Edom: but they could not.

"Then he took his eldest son that should have reigned in his stead, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall. And there came a great indignation over² Israel: and they departed from him, and returned to their own land."

The Israelites are apparently convinced that it would be useless now to continue the war, for Baal must now grant the prayer of the King of Moab. They are indignant because they have been deprived of the satisfaction of making their victory complete.

The Greek author Manetho informs us that the Egyptian king Amaris stopped a solar sacrifice of three human beings and ordered that it be replaced by a holocaust of three wax figures.

The early Christians were conscious of the similarity of their own interpretation of the death of Christ and the solar sacrifices of previous centuries. In his answer to Celsius, Origen calls Christ a holocaust of Love, and Christianity has always been regarded

¹ *Domino Baali Solario requeaterno qui exundivit precer Hicembalis, etc.* The inscription is published in Ghillany's *Menschenopfer der Hebräer*, p. 531.

² The English version reads "there was great indignation against Israel." Luther translates more properly: "Da ward Israel sehr zornig."

as a final fulfilment of the ancient belief that a human sacrifice is needed for the atonement of the wrath of God.

THE PRE-CHRISTIAN CROSS IN THE OLD WORLD.

We are so accustomed to regard the cross as the symbol of Christianity that we are apt to discredit the belief that the cross is the most common religious symbol of non-Christian, and especially of pre-Christian religions. But the fact is nevertheless well established, and can easily be proved.

ASSYRIA.

On the monuments of Assyria and Egypt crosses of various description are found, among which the equilateral forms abound, (thus \times \oplus \otimes). Assyrian kings wear equilateral crosses together with other amulets on their breast, and their horses are decked



ASSYRIAN KING IN BATTLE.¹

with them. We are probably right in interpreting it as a symbol of the sun and royal dignity. Sometimes the solar wheel (\oplus or \otimes) is used as an ornament for the ear, and we see the winged figure of a god placed within the four-spoked sun wheel.²

Upon a stele of Khorsabad an eagle-headed man holds in his right hand a ring, in his left a tau-cross (τ).³


Ancient crosses of the most modern description (thus \oplus , not unlike European decorations given by kings to men whom they desire to honor) are found among the bas-reliefs of Assyrian monuments, one of them depicting a royal reception scene. The cross

¹ Reproduced from Layard's *Monuments of Nineveh*.

² Layard, *Nineveh*. Figs. 79, a, 6, 11-59.

³ Botta, *Monuments de Ninive*. II., pl. 158. Layard, Fig. 23. Reihm, Fig. B, p. 114. Quoted by Zückler, p. 12.


stands in the sky together with sun and moon, forming with these two divine symbols a trinity of remarkable significance.



A COURT RECEPTION IN ASSYRIA.¹

[Note the cross, the sun, and the moon in the sky. Observe also the crossed hands of those who approach the king.]

The Assyrian thunderbolt which is seen in the hands of Marduk, the God of Lightning, exhibits the form of three crossing rods, almost like a star (thus ✕), and anticipating by a strange co-



PROCESSION OF THE GODS. Marduk (or Merodach) holds in his left hand the fagot-shaped thunderbolt. (After Layard.)

incidence the Christian symbol of the initials I and X, in the sense of Jesus Christ (✝), which is frequently found in the catacombs.

¹ Reproduced from Layard's *Monuments of Nineveh*.

A more complicated form of the cross, with flower-like excrescences and ending in a divided disk (⌘), is found in the hands of the goddess Ishtar, but its significance is still an unsolved problem.

The cross standing on a sphere (⌘), exactly the same as the



ISHTAR.¹



PART OF THE SEAL OF AN
EGYPTIAN KING FOUND
IN ASSYRIA.¹

emblem of royal power in Christian lands, appears on an ancient cartouche discovered in Assyria, which served an Egyptian king as a seal.

EGYPT.

Concerning the four-armed cross in Egypt, we quote from Alviella's book on the *Migration of Symbols*, p. 15, the following interesting remark:

"On the Famous Damietta stone the Greek words Πτολεμαῖος Σωτήρ, "Ptolemy the Saviour," are rendered by the demotic characters forming the equivalent of Πτολεμαῖος, followed by the sign †; from which the author concludes that the term Saviour being rendered by a cross, this sign was with the Egyptians, an allusion to the future coming of the Redeemer. Unhappily for this ingenious interpretation, M. de Harlez, who has taken the trouble to refute M. Ansault's article, points out to him that in demotic the sign † is the simplest form of a hieroglyph representing a hammer, or a boring tool, and is usually employed to express the idea of grinding, avenging, and by amplification, "the Grinder," "the Avenger," a not uncommon epithet of Horus, and some other gods."

"The tau-cross," (i. e., T) says Zoeckler,² "has been found in Egypt upon the breast of a mummy preserved in the British museum, and is in several instances represented as growing out of

¹ Reproduced from Layard's *Monuments*.

² *Kreuz Christi*, p. 9.

the heart of a man" (thus \downarrow). Other Egyptian symbols that resemble the Christian cross are such characters as $\alpha\pi$ (\dagger or \ddagger), $\omega\pi$ (\ddagger), the determinative sign of towns (thus \oplus). In addition, there is the cross with four transverse bars (\boxplus) which serves as a symbol of the Nile-measure, a staff with four cross-beams called *Νειλομέτριον* or *Νειλοσκοπέιον*. This Nile-measure was regarded with religious awe, and the four bars were interpreted to mean the fourfoldness of the world and of the gods, and the four stages of the soul-migration.¹

In Egypt as well as in Assyria we meet with a peculiar combination of the tau cross with a ring (thus $\dagger \circ$ or \circ), now commonly called *crux ansata* or handle-cross. Its form dates back to the most ancient times and is interpreted by the Egyptians as the key of life. The origin of the symbol can, as is the case with all pre-historic signs, not be determined with any degree of certainty. Some give it a phallic significance in which the upper or oval part \circ represents the female, and the tau-like T or lower part the male principle. Others surmise that it is the tau-cross upon which the solar disk rests. It is an attribute of Osiris and Isis and other gods of Egypt, as well as of the Assyrian goddess Ishtar. The key of life is more common with an enlarged circle outside of Egypt, where it becomes the emblem of Aphrodite or Venus \circ and is as such called the mirror of Venus. This sign is still retained in the symbolism of the science of to-day as an abbreviation which in our calendar means "the planet of Venus" and "Friday," i. e., the day of Venus, and in our botanical text-books "female," as opposed to the sign of Mars $\♂$ as male.

THE CROSS OF THE ISRAELITES.

There is a distinction between *tau* and *tav*; the former is the name of the Greek T and its figure is three-armed (T), and the latter is the name of the Hebrew *T*^h, now written τ , which in its oldest form is a four-armed or Greek cross ($+$); but both are called crosses in the literature of early Christianity.

The Hebrew *tav*-cross may have been freely used as a sign, perhaps for marking cattle, and otherwise, but in addition, appears to have been equivalent to an oath when the signer attached it to a protocol or contract in the presence of a judge. Thus Job says (in xxxi. 35, a passage that is greatly obscured in our English Bible by a poor translation):

¹ See H. Brugsch, *Hieroglyphische Grammatik*, Leipsic, 1872. Concerning the Nile-measure see also Carriero, *Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Kulturentwicklung*, I., p. 199.

"Lo, there is my mark [viz., my *tav* (+), serving as my signature or sigil]! The Almighty may reply and my adversary should write down his charge."

The meaning of these words is that Job has pleaded his case and has signed the document in a legal form with his cross, which act is equivalent to making a statement upon oath in court. He calls upon God to be his witness and wants now his accuser to make his charges which he is ready to refute. Another significant passage occurs in Ezekiel ix. 4-6, where we read:

"And the Lord said unto him, Go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a [tav-]mark upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry for all the abominations that be done in the midst thereof. And to the others he said in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the city, and smite; let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity: Slay utterly old and young, both maids, and little children, and women: but come not near any man upon whom is the [tav-]mark; and begin at my sanctuary. Then they began at the ancient men which were before the house."

We must incidentally notice that this *tav*-mark of two intersecting lines (or, as we now would say, "cross") is never identi-



ASTAROTH WITH THE CROSS. Sidonian coins.¹

fied in the ancient Hebrew literature with the martyr instrument for crucifixion, which in Hebrew is simply called אֵץ (pronounce 'ayts), a tree. The Israelites never thought of identifying both, and only in Christian times the *tav*-sign of Ezekiel could be interpreted as a prophecy of Christ. The passage proves, however, the prevalence of the belief in the salutary effect of the *tav*-mark and contributed not a little finally to settle the problem of the form of the Christian cross in favor of the figure of two intersecting lines.

PHŒNICIA.

The high cross with a prolonged lower limb (thus †), is the symbol of Astarte in the ancient religion of the Phœnician sun-worship. Ancient coins of the city of Sidon show the goddess standing on the prow of a ship with this high cross in her arms. Considering the rite of a sacrificial crucifixion in the Baal cult of the

¹ Reproduced from Calmet No. 6, Plates CXL and XLV.

Phœnicians and Carthaginians, which is well established, we may here be confronted with an ancient identification of the intersecting lines with a pagan emblem of an atonement for sin.



MAUSOLEUM OF A GRAND LAMA IN TIBET.

INDIA AND TIBET.


The sacred symbol of all the religions of India is an equilateral cross whose ends are turned all in the same direction at right angles, thus 卐 or 卐. It is called the Swastika or Buddhist cross,

but antedates the age of Buddha and can be traced to prehistoric times. It is called by Buddhists the wheel of the law and the broken lines are supposed to indicate the motion of the spokes.

We only mention, without entering into details, the use of the cross by the side of the swastika in Tibet and China, because they have probably been imported by Buddhists and Nestorians.¹ But there are good reasons to believe that crosses were used in pre-Christian and even in pre-Buddhistic times. Bishop Faurie, a Roman missionary and a Frenchman, observes (as quoted by Zoeckler, p. 20) that some tribes of Kui-Tchen, a province of Southern China, offer sacrifices to big crosses erected at the entrance of their villages. The people of this region of China, the bishop says, wear crosses of various colors on their garments and mark the dead on their foreheads with crosses of ashes. They call the cross "the great arch ancestor, saviour, and protector," which is apparently not due to Buddhist influence. Bishop Faurie jumps at the conclusion of a mysterious Christian tradition, which, however, we need scarcely add, is very doubtful.

GREECE.

The cross is frequently found in Greece, where it appears to have served mere ornamental purposes, for it abounds on pottery



THE CROSS AND THE SWASTIKA ON GREEK POTTERY. (Cypriotic ware of the Geometric Period.)²

during the so-called geometric period. The swastika (卐), which may have migrated to Greece from India, is also quite common and received, from the similarity of its four arms to the Greek letter gamma (Γ), the name *gammadion*, or *crux gammata*. The gammadion appears on the pottery of Troy, on old coins, and on the breast of Apollo, the God of the Sun.

The swastika in all probability is a symbol of the sun. The original form (which most likely was not limited to four rays, but had sometimes only three, sometimes five or more) may have been undulating lines (thus 卐 卐 卐), forms which are still preserved on

¹ We reproduce on the preceding page the picture of a mausoleum from Huc's *Travels in Tartary, Tibet, and China*. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.) The crosses on the miters which decorate monuments of this kind in Tibet are very conspicuous.

² *American Jour. of Arch.*, 1897, I. 3, p. 258.

various ancient monuments. When cut in wood by primitive artists, they may easily have assumed a cornered shape (thus 卐). That the idea of motion is connected with the swastika appears from the Buddhist interpretation of it as a wheel and from the feet into which Greek artists changed the gammadion, especially in its tri-cornered form.



APOLLO WITH THE SWASTIKA. (From a vase in the Historical Art Museum in Vienna.)¹

ROME.

Zoeckler² states that the pre-Christian use of the four-armed cross in ancient Roman monuments has been established by de Rossi, Edmond le Blant, and Marini, who discovered the use of crosses of this form (卐) in unequivocally pagan tombstones at the beginning and the end of the names. Zoeckler mentions several instances of the cross indicating the beginning and the end of names on coins as well as sigils, and calls attention to the method of


¹ Title page of D'Alviella's *Migration of Symbols*.

² *Das Kreuz Christi*, p. 397.



PETROGLYPHS IN KRI ISLAND, OCEANIA.

writing names crosswise, as did, for instance, the brick manufacturer Sempronius Heron, who made bricks for the barracks of the twenty-second legion.



Half a century before the Christian era a man working in the mint for Julius Cæsar wrote his name in the form of a cross; and Garrucci³ declares that it indicates the Julian star (* *Julium sidus*) which is frequently depicted as a mere cross (+).

THE TEUTONS.

The tau-cross (T) was an important religious symbol among the Teutons, who called it the Hammer of Thor, representing the thunderbolt of the God of Lightning. Thor was the first-born son of Odhîn, the All-father, being, as a hero and a saviour, the favorite God of the Saxons as well as the Norse.

CROSSES IN THE OCEANIC ISLANDS.

In the religion of the inhabitants of the Kei islands the ghosts of the dead play an important part. There are a number of ghost caves, and the petroglyphs on overhanging rocks are the methods by which the natives remain in communion with their ancestors. Popular legend ascribes the greatest age to the petroglyphs *a-t* in the accompanying illustration. Most of them (*a-h*, also *q* and *p*) are masks and are probably intended to picture the ghosts. Figure *l* is apparently a ship. The hairy circles have either the same significance or may be solar disks. Other pictures are spirit hands (*u*, *v*, and *r*); but of special interest are two groups of three crosses (*s* and *t*) which might be an awkward reproduction of Golgotha if the theory of Christian influence were admissible. The greatest probability is that the pictures are intended to represent ghosts carrying three crosses, one on their head and one on each shoulder, or in each arm.⁴

¹ Camurrini *Iscrizioni di vasi fitilli*, p. 18, No. 33, and p. 58, No. 361.

² P. F. means *primigenia fidelis*.

³ *Revue Archéologique* 1866, I., p. 90.

⁴ For further details see *Tenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, '88-89, p. 167-168.

THE GENERAL IDEAS OF INFANTS AND DEAF-MUTES.¹

BY PROF. TH. RIBOT.

WE are concerned with children who have not yet learned to speak, and with such alone. In contradistinction to animals, and to deaf-mutes when left to themselves, infancy represents a transitory state of which no upper limit can be fixed, seeing that speech appears progressively. The child forms his baby-vocabulary little by little, and at first imposes it upon others, until such time as he is made to learn the language of his country. We may provisionally neglect this period of transition, studying only the dumb, or monosyllabic and gesture phase.

The problem proposed at the end of the seventeenth century (perhaps before), and dividing the philosophers into two camps, was whether the human individual starts with general terms, or with particulars. At a later time, the question was proposed for the human race as a whole, in reference to the origin of language.

Locke maintained the thesis of the particular: "The ideas that children form of the persons with whom they converse resemble the persons themselves, and can only be particular."

So, too, Condillac, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, and the majority of those who represent the so-called sensationalist school.

The thesis of the general was upheld by authors of no less authority, commencing with Leibnitz:

"Children and those who are ill-acquainted with the language they desire to speak, or the matter whereof they discourse, make use of general terms, such as *thing, animal, plant*, in lieu of the proper terms which are wanting to them; and it is certain that all proper or individual names were originally appellative or general."²

¹ Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.

² *Nouveaux Essais*, Book III., Chapter I.

The problem cannot be accepted under this form by contemporary psychology. It is equivocal. Its capital error is in applying to the embryonic state of intelligence and of language, formulæ that are appropriate to adult life only—to the growing mind, categories valid for the formed intellect alone. A reference to the physiology of the human embryo will render this more intelligible. Has this embryo, up to three months, a nose or mouth? Is it male or female? etc. Students of the development of intra-uterine life in its first phases are very cautious in propounding these and similar questions in such a manner; they do not admit of definite answers. That which is in the state of development and of incessant becoming, can only be compared remotely with that which is fixed and developed.

The sole permissible formula is this: Intelligence progresses from the indefinite to the definite. If "indefinite" is taken as synonymous with general, it may be said that the particular does not appear at the outset; but neither does the general in any exact sense: the vague would be more appropriate. In other words, no sooner has the intellect progressed beyond the moment of perception and of its immediate reproduction in memory, than the generic image makes its appearance, i. e., a state intermediate between the particular and the general, participating in the nature of the one and of the other—a confused simplification.

Recent works on the psychology of infancy abound in examples of these abstractions and inferior generalisations, which appear very early.¹ A few examples will suffice.

Preyer's child (aged thirty-one weeks) interested itself exclusively in bottles, water-jugs, and other transparent vases with white contents; it had thus seized upon a characteristic mark of one thing that was important to it, to-wit—milk. At a later period it designated these by the syllable *móm*. Taine records an analogous case of a child to whom *mm* and *um*, and then *nim* at first signified the pleasure of seeing its pap, and subsequently everything eatable. We are assisting at the genesis of the sign; the crude sound attached to a group of objects becomes at a later period the sign of those objects, and later still an instrument of substitution. Sigismund showed his son, aged less than one year, and incapable of pronouncing a single word, a stuffed grouse, saying "bird." The child immediately looked across to the other side of the room where there was a stuffed owl. Another child having listened first

¹ Cf. Taine, *L'Intelligence*, Vol. I., Book I., Chapter II., Part 2, Note 1. (Preyer, *Die Seele des Kindes*, Chapter XVI.)

with its right ear, then with its left, to the ticking of a watch, stretched out its arm gleefully towards the clock on the chimney-piece (auditory, not vocal, generic image).

Without multiplying examples known to every one, which give peremptory proof of the existence of abstraction (partial dissociation), and of generalisation, prior to speech, let us rather consider the heterogeneous nature of these generic images, the result of their mode of formation. They are in fact constructed arbitrarily,—as it were by accident, depending partly on the apprehension of gross resemblances, partly, and chiefly, on subjective causes, emotional dispositions, practical interests. More rarely they are based upon essential qualities.

John Stuart Mill affirms that the majority of animals divide everything into two categories: that which is, and that which is not, edible. Whatever we may think of this assertion, we should probably feel much astonishment if we could penetrate and comprehend certain animal generalisations. In the case of children we can do more than assume. Preyer's son employed the interjection *ass* (which he had forged or imitated) first for his wooden horse, mounted on wheels, and covered with hair; next for everything that could be displaced or that moved (carts, animals, his sister, etc.), and that had hair. Taine's little girl (twelve months), who had frequently been shown a copy of an infant Jesus, from Luini, and had been told at the same time, "That is the baby," would in another room, on hearing any one ask her, "Where is the baby?" turn to any of the pictures or engravings, no matter what they were. *Baby* signified to her some general thing: something which she found in common in all these pictures, engravings of landscapes, and figures, i. e., if I do not mistake, some variegated object in a shining frame. Darwin communicated the following observation on one of his grandsons to Romanes:

"The child, who was just beginning to speak, called a duck 'quack,' and, by special association, it also called water 'quack.' By an appreciation of the resemblance of qualities, it next extended the term 'quack' to denote all birds and insects on the one hand, and all fluid substances on the other. Lastly, by a still more delicate appreciation of resemblance, the child eventually called all coins 'quack,' because on the back of a French sou it had once seen the representation of an eagle."¹

In this case, to which we shall return later, there was a singular mixture of intellectual operations: creation of a word by ono-

¹ Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 283.

matopœia (resemblance) and finally an unbridled extension of analogy.

Such observations might be multiplied. They would only confirm this remark: the generic image varies in one case and another, because the condensation of resemblances of which it is constituted depends often upon a momentary impression, upon most unexpected conditions.

The development of *numeration* in the child takes us to some extent out of the pre-linguistic period; but it is advisable to consider it at this point. In the first place we have to distinguish between what is learnt and what is comprehended. The child may recite a series of numerical words that have been taught to him: but so long as he fails to apply each term of the series correctly to a number of corresponding objects, he does not understand it. For the rest, this comprehension is only acquired slowly and at a somewhat late period.

"The only distinction which the child makes at first is between the simple object and plurality. At eighteen months, he distinguishes between one, two, and several. At the age of three, or a little earlier, he knows one, two, and four (2×2). It is not until later that he counts a regular series; one, two, three, four. At this point he is arrested for some time. Hence the Brahmans teach their pupils of the first class to count up to four only; they leave it to the second class to count up to twenty. In European children of average intelligence, the age of six to seven years is required before they can count to ten, and about ten years to count to one hundred. The child can doubtless repeat before this age a numeration which it has been taught, but this is not what constitutes knowledge of numbers; we are speaking of determining number by objects."¹ B. Pérez states that his personal observations have not furnished any indication contradictory to the assertions of Houzeau. An intelligent child of two and a half was able to count up to nineteen, but had no clear idea of the duration of time represented by three days; it had to be translated as follows: "not to-day but to-morrow, and another to-morrow."²

This brings us back to the question, discussed in the last *Open Court*, of the numeration claimed for animals. Preyer tells us of one of his children that "it was impossible to take away one of his ninepins without its being discovered by the child, while at eighteen months he knew quite well whether one of his ten animals was missing or not." Yet this fact is no proof that he was able to count

¹ B. Pérez, *op. cit.*, 219.

² Houzeau, *op. cit.*, II., 202.

up to nine or ten. To represent to oneself several objects, and to be aware that one of them is absent, and not perceived—is a different thing from the capacity of counting them numerically. If the shelves of a library contain several works that are well known to me, I can see that one is missing without knowing anything about the total number of books upon the shelves. I have a juxtaposition of images (visual or tactile), in which a gap is produced.

For the rest, much light is thrown on this question by Binet's ingenious experiments. Their principal result may be summarised as follows.¹ A little girl of four does not know how to read or count; she has simply learnt a few figures and applies them exactly to one, two, or three objects; above this she gives chance names, say six or twelve, indifferently to four objects. If a group of fifteen counters, and another group of eighteen, of the same size, are thrown down on the table, without arranging them in heaps, she is quick to recognise the most numerous group. The two groups are then modified, adding now to the right, now to the left, but so that the ratio fourteen to eighteen is constant. In six attempts the reply is invariably exact. With the ratio seventeen-eighteen, the reply is correct eight times, wrong once. If, however, the groups are found with counters of unequal diameter, everything is altered. Some (green) measure two and one-half centimetres, others (white) measure four centimetres. Eighteen green counters are put on one side, fourteen white counters on the other. The child then makes a constant error, and takes the latter group to be the more numerous, and the group of fourteen may even be reduced to ten without altering her judgment. It is not until nine that the group of eighteen counters appear the more numerous.

This fact can only be explained by supposing that the child appreciates by *space*, and not by number, by a perception of continuous and not by discontinuous size—a supposition which agrees with other experiments by the same author to the effect that, in the comparison of lines, children can appreciate differences of length. At this intellectual stage, numeration is accordingly very weak, and restricted to the narrowest limits. As soon as these are exceeded, the distribution between minus and plus rests, not upon any real numeration, but upon a difference of mass, felt in consciousness.

In children, *reasoning* prior to speech is, as with animals, practical, but well adapted to its ends. No child, if carefully watched,

¹ Cf. *Revue Philosophique*, July, 1890.

will fail to give proof of it. At seventeen months, Preyer's child, which could not speak a word, finding that it was unable to reach a plaything placed above its reach in a cupboard, looked about to the right and left, found a small travelling trunk, took it, climbed up, and possessed itself of the desired object. If this act be attributed to imitation (although Preyer does not say this), it must be granted that it is in imitation of a particular kind,—in no way comparable with a servile copy, with repetition pure and simple,—and that it contains an element of invention.

In analysing this fact and its numerous analogues, we became aware of the fundamental identity of these simple inferences with those which constitute speculative reasoning: they are of the same character. Take, for instance, a scientific definition, such as that of Boole, which seems at first sight little adapted to this connexion. "Reasoning is the elimination of the middle term in a system that has two terms." Notwithstanding its theoretical aspect, this is rigorously applicable to the cases with which we are occupied. Thus, in the mind of Preyer's child, there is a first term (desire for the plaything), a last term (possession); the remainder is the method, scaffolding, a mean term to be eliminated. The intellectual process in both instances, practical and speculative, is identical; it is a mediate operation, which develops by a series of acts in animals and children, by a series of concepts and words in the adult.

DEAF-MUTES.

In studying intellectual development prior to speech, the group of deaf-mutes is sufficiently distinct from those which we have been considering. Animals do not communicate all their secrets, and leave much to be conjectured. Children reveal only a transitory state, a moment in the total evolution. Deaf-mutes (those at least with whom we are dealing) are adults, comparable as such to other men, like them, save in the absence of speech and of what results from it. They have reached a stable mental state. Moreover, those who are instructed at a late period, who learn a language of analytical signs, i. e., who speak with their fingers, or emit the sounds which they read upon the lips of others, are able to disclose their anterior mental state. It is possible to compare the same man with himself, before and after the acquisition of an instrument of analysis. Subjective and objective psychology combine to enlighten us.

The intellectual level of such persons is very low (we shall re-

turn to this): still their inferiority has been exaggerated, especially in the last century, by virtue of the axiom, it is impossible to think without words. Discussion of this antique aphorism is unnecessary; in its rigorous form it finds hardly any advocates of note.¹ Since thought is synonymous with comparing, abstracting, generalising, judging, reasoning, i. e., with transcending in any way the purely sensorial and affective life, the true question is not, Do we think without words? but, To what extent can we think without words? Otherwise expressed, we have to fix the upper limit of the logic of images, which evidently reaches its apogee in adult deaf-mutes. Further, even in this last case, thought without language does not attain its full development. The deaf-mute who is left without special education, and who lives with men who have the use of speech, is in a less favorable situation than if he forms a society with his equals. Gérando, and others after him, remarked that deaf-mutes in their native state communicate easily with one another. He enumerates a long series of ideas, which they express in their mimicry, and gestures, and many of these expressions are identical in all countries.

"Children of about seven years old who have not yet been educated, make use of an astonishing number of gestures and very rapid signs in communicating with each other. *They understand each other naturally with great facility.* No one teaches them the initial signs, which are, in great part, unaltered imitative movements."

The study of this spontaneous, natural language is the sole process by which we can penetrate to their psychology, and deter-

¹ Max Müller, however, is an exception. He has not made the smallest concession on this point in any of his works, including the last (*Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.). He even maintains that a society of deaf mutes would hardly rise above the intellectual level of a chimpanzee. "A man born dumb, notwithstanding his great cerebral mass and his inheritance of strong intellectual instincts, would be capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang or a chimpanzee, if he were confined to the society of dumb associates" (p. 92). This thesis was attacked by thirteen critics, including Romanes, Galton, the Duke of Argyle, etc., but Max Müller meets them all and replies to them without flinching. It must be confessed that the arguments invoked by his correspondents are very unequal in merit. Some are convincing, others not. The Duke of Argyle says happily that "words are necessary to the progress of thought, but not at all to the act of thinking." Ebbs (p. 13, appendix) shows that Max Müller has unduly limited the question by excluding all processes anterior to the formation of concepts; we think in images; the transition from one form to another is imperceptible, and the faculty of abstraction does not appear suddenly along with the signs. On the other hand, we cannot admit as evidence the facts invoked by other correspondents, e. g., chess-players who combine and calculate solely by the aid of visual images; answers to letters, conceived in the first place as a general plan before they are developed in words, etc. It is forgotten that the persons capable of these operations have had long practice in verbal analysis, thereby attaining a high intellectual level. So, in the physical order, the practical gymnast, even when not executing any particular feat, possesses a suppleness and agility of body, due to exercise, which translates itself into all his movements.

mine their mode of thought. Like all other languages, it comprises a vocabulary and a syntax. The vocabulary consists in gestures which designate objects, qualities, acts; these correspond to our substantives and verbs. The syntax consists in the successive order of these gestures and their regular arrangement; it translates the movement of thought and the effort towards analysis.

I. VOCABULARY—Gérando collected about a hundred and fifty signs, created by deaf-mutes living in isolation or with their fellows.¹ A few of these may be cited as examples:

Child—Infantile gesture, of taking the breast, or being carried, or rocking in the cradle.

Ox—Imitation of the horns, or the heavy tread, or the jaws chewing the cud.

Dog—Movement of the head in barking.

Horse—Movements of the ears, or two figures riding horseback on another, etc.

Bird—Imitation of the beak with two fingers of the left hand, while the other feeds it; or simulation of flight.

Bread—Signs of being hungry, of cutting, and of carrying to the mouth.

Water—Exhibition of saliva, imitation of a rower, or of a man pumping; accompanied always by the sign of drinking.

Letter (missive)—Gestures of writing and of sealing, or of unsealing and reading.

Monkeys, cocks, various trades (carpenter, shoemaker, etc.) all designated by imitative gestures. For sleep, sickness, health, etc., they employ an appropriate gesture.

For interrogation: expression of two contradictory propositions, and undecided glance towards the person addressed. This is rather a case of syntax than of vocabulary; but a few signs may be further indicated for some notions more abstract than the preceding.

Large—Raise the hand and look up.

Small—Contrary gestures.

Bad—Simulate tasting, and make grimace.

Number—Indicate with the help of the fingers; *high numbers*, rapid opening of the hand several times in succession.

¹ *De l'Education des sourds-muets*, 2 vol., 1827. Notwithstanding its somewhat remote date, the book has lost none of its interest in this particular. It must also be remembered that institutions for deaf-mutes are far more numerous now than at the beginning of the century, and that the children are placed in them much earlier. Formerly they were abandoned to themselves or instructed very late; in proportion to their age, they presented better material for the study of their development.

Buy—Gesture of counting money, of giving with one hand, and taking with the other.

Lose—Pretend to drop an object, and hunt for it in vain.

Forget—Pass the hand quickly across the forehead with a shrug of the shoulders.

Love—Hold the hand on the heart (universal gesture).

Hate—Same gesture with sign of negation.

Past—Throw the hand over the shoulder several times in succession.

Future—Indicate a distant object with the hand, repeated imitation of lying down in bed and getting up again.

It does not need much reflexion to see that all these signs are *abstractions* as well as imitations. Among the different characters of an object, the deaf-mute chooses one that he imitates by a gesture, and which represents the total object. Herein he proceeds exactly like the man who speaks. The difference is that he fixes the abstract by an attitude of the body instead of by a word. The primitive Aryan who denominated the horse, the sun, the moon, etc., the rapid one, the shining one, the measurer (of months), did not act otherwise; for him also, a chosen characteristic represents the total object. There is a fundamental identity in the two cases; thus justifying what was said above: abstraction is a *necessary* operation of the mind, at least in man; he must abstract, because he must simplify.

The inferiority of these imitative signs consists in their being often vague, with a tendency to the opposite sense; moreover, since they are never detached completely from the object or the act which they figure, and cannot attain to the independence of the word, they are but very imperfect instruments of substitution.

II. SYNTAX—The mere fact of the existence of a syntax in the language of the deaf-mutes proves that they possess a commencement of analysis, i. e., that thought does not remain in the rudimentary state. This point has been carefully studied by different authors: Scott, Taylor, Romanes,¹ who assign to it the following characteristics:

1. It is a syntax of position. There are no "parts of speech," i. e., terms having a fixed linguistic function: substantive, adjective, verb, etc. The terms (gestures) borrow their grammatical value from the place which they occupy in the series, and the relations between the terms are not expressed.

2. It is a fundamental principle that the signs are disposed in

¹Taylor, *Early History of Mankind*, p. 80. Romanes *Mental Evolution in Man*, Chapter VI

the order of their relative importance, everything superfluous being omitted.

3. The subject is placed before the attribute, the object (complement) before the action, and, most frequently, the modified part before the modifying.

Some examples will serve for the better comprehension of the ordinary procedure of this syntax. To explain the proposition: After running, I went to sleep, the order of gesture would be: to run, me, finished, to sleep.—My father gave me an apple: apple, father, me, give.—The active state is distinguished from the passive by its position: I struck Thomas with a stick; me, Thomas, strike, stick. The Abbé Sicard, on asking a deaf-mute, Who created God? obtained the answer: God created nothing. Though he had no doubt as to the meaning of this inversion, he asked the control question, Who makes shoes? Answer, shoes makes cobbler.

The dry, bare character of this syntax is evident: the terms are juxtaposed without relation; it expresses the strictest necessity only; it is the replica of a sterile, indistinct mode of thought.

Since we are endeavoring by its aid to fix an intellectual level, it is not without interest to compare it with a syntax that is frequent among the weak in intellect. "These do not decline or conjugate; they employ a vague substantive, the infinitive alone, or the past participle. They leave out articles, conjunctions, auxiliary verbs, reject prepositions, employ nouns instead of pronouns. They call themselves "father," "mother," "Charles," and refer to other people by indeterminate substantives, such as man, woman, sister, doctor, etc. They invert the regular order of substantives and adjectives."¹ Although this is a case of mental regression, hence not rigorously comparable with a mind that is sane but little developed, the mental resemblance between the two syntaxes, and especially the absence of all expression of relations, deserves to be signalised, because it cannot be the result of a fortuitous coincidence. It is the work of intellectual inferiority and of relative discontinuity of thought.

There is little to say about *numeration* in deaf-mutes. When untrained, they can count up to ten with the help of their fingers, like many primitive people. Moreover (according to Sicard and Gérando), they make use of notches upon a piece of wood or some other visible mark.

To conclude, their mental feebleness, known since the days of

¹ Kussmaul, *Die Störungen der Sprache*, Chapter xxx.

antiquity by Aristotle, by the Roman law which dispossessed them of part of their civil rights, later on by many philosophers who refused even to concede them memory, arises from their inaptitude to transcend the inferior forms of abstraction and kindred operations. In regard to the events of ordinary life, in the domain of the concrete (admitting, as is not always done, that there are individual varieties, some being intelligent, and others stupid), deaf-mutes are sufficiently apt to seize and to comprehend the practical connexion between complex things.¹ But the world of higher concepts, moral, religious, cosmological, is closed to them. Observations to this effect are abundant, though here again—as must be insisted on—they reveal great individual differences.

Thus, a deaf-mute whose friends had tried to inculcate in him a few religious notions, believed before he came under instruction that the Bible was a book that had been printed in heaven by workmen of Herculean strength. This was the sole interpretation he gave to the gestures of his parents, who endeavored to make him understand that the Bible contains a revelation, coming from an all-powerful God who is in heaven.² Another who was taken regularly to church on Sunday, and exhibited exemplary piety, only recognised in this ceremony an act of obedience to the clergy. There are many similar cases on record. Others on the contrary, seek to inquire into, and to penetrate, the nature of things. W. James³ has published the autobiography of two deaf-mutes who became professors, one at the asylum of Washington, the other in California.

The principal interest attaching to the first is the spontaneous appearance of the moral sense. After stealing small sums of money from the till of a merchant, he accidentally took a gold coin. Although ignorant of its value, he was seized with scruples, feeling "that it was not for a poor man like him, and that he had stolen *too much*." He got rid of it as best he could, and never began again.

The other biography—from which we make a few brief ex-

¹ Cf. as proof, the story related by Kussmaul (*op. cit.*, VII.): A young deaf-mute was arrested by the police of Prague as a vagabond. He was placed in an institution and questioned by suitable methods, when he made known that his father had a mill with a house and surroundings which he described exactly; that his mother and sister were dead, and his father had remarried; that his step-mother had ill-treated him, and that he had planned an escape which had succeeded. He indicated the direction of the mill to the east of Prague. Inquiries were made, and all these statements were verified.

² Romanes, *Mental Evolution*, etc., p. 150.

³ W. James, *Psychology*, I., 266, for the second observation; *Philosophical Review*, I., No. 6, p. 613 et seq. for the first.

tracts—may be taken as the type of an intelligent and curious deaf-mute. He was not placed in an institution until he was eleven years old. During his childhood he accompanied his father on long expeditions, and his curiosity was aroused as to the origin of things: of animals and vegetables, of the earth, the sun, the moon, the stars (at eight or nine years). He began to understand (from five years) how children were descended from parents, and how animals were propagated. This may have been the origin of the question he put to himself: whence came the first man, first animal, first plant, etc. He supposed at first that primæval man was born from the trunk of a tree, then rejected this hypothesis as absurd, then sought in various directions without finding. He respected the sun and moon, believed that they went under the earth in the West, and traversed a long tunnel to reappear in the East, etc. One day, on hearing violent peals of thunder, he interrogated his brother, who pointed to the sky, and simulated the zigzag of the lightning with his finger; when he concluded for the existence of a celestial giant whose voice was thunder. Puerile as they may be, are these cosmogonic, theological conceptions inferior to those of the aborigines of Oceanica and of the savage regions of South America, who, nevertheless, have a vocal idiom, a rudimentary language?

To sum up. That which dominates among the better gifted, is the creative imagination: it is the culminating point of their intellectual development. Their primitive curiosity does not seem inferior to that of average humanity; but since they cannot get beyond representation by images they lack an instrument of intellectual progress.

THE MORAL EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.

BY THE EDITOR.

IMAGINATION AND LOVE OF TRUTH.

LOVE of knowledge is a good thing, but love of truth is more important than anything else, and should be impressed upon a child's mind as early as possible ; but we must not be blind to the fact that the conception of truth can scarcely develop before the fourth or fifth year. Although the idea is very simple to an adult, it is, in its full significance, quite complex,—indeed, too complex to be appreciated in all its importance by children.

The first condition for developing the love of truth is never to let the punishment of a small criminal follow his confession of a trespass. For fear is the main, and in serious cases, the only, incentive to telling lies,—lies in the sense of wilful misstatements of facts, of deceptions, made for the purpose of gaining advantages or escaping unpleasant results.

We ought to know that sometimes a child tells untruths which are not lies. Children have a vivid imagination, and they are apt to invent facts. A certain small boy who was suspected of having broken a dish denied the fact, while his little brother, who could not have done the deed, positively assured his parents that he had broken the dish. He told an untruth simply because he imagined how he might have broken it. The case was interesting to him, and in his vivid imagination he depicted all the details, and told with great complacency a long story describing how the accident had happened.

To many children the dreams of their imagination at once become as real as the reminiscences of actual events, and in our fervor of impressing upon children a love of truth, we must not be too quick to condemn a little sinner before we positively know that he tells not a mere untruth but an actual lie invented for the purpose of shirking his responsibility.

Love of truth ought to be closely connected with self-esteem, and what is commonly called the sense of honor. There ought to be no worse opprobrium than the defamation of being a liar.

When years ago I was a scientific instructor at the Royal Corps of Cadets at Dresden, I adopted the principle, whenever any disturbance of a recitation occurred, of simply asking the question, "Who did it?" On the first occasion, of course, there was no response, whereupon I spoke contemptuously of the spirit of the whole class, in which there was some one too cowardly to stand up frankly and acknowledge the mischief which he had committed. I argued that all the members of the class were responsible for the *corps d'esprit*; and that so long as such cowardice was condoned and encouraged, I could have no respect for the class. When this happened for the first time, the charge of cowardice stung the evil doer, but he did not rise to confess, although the whole class grew more and more indignant and urged him to do so. The duty of the class, I continued, is so to influence its members that none of them shall shirk the responsibility and fail to acknowledge whatever he has done. In a society that tolerates suspicious characters one must be on one's guard; and so a teacher cannot treat a class in which some refuse to confess the truth frankly and openly, as young friends, but as inferiors, comparable to inmates of a penitentiary who are always under the suspicion of wrong-doing. The result was that somebody rose to expose the delinquent; but I refused to listen to the denunciations, and stigmatised, at the same time, in strong terms, the practice of playing the informer, saying that I did not care to know who did it, but hoped that the guilty one would have honor enough to tell the truth, if it were for no other motive than to avert suspicion from an innocent comrade. The malefactor appeared after the recitation and denounced himself privately, but here again I refused to listen to the confession, and told him the proper thing would be to stand up before the whole class and publicly acknowledge his guilt. What he had done before the whole class, he must confess to before the whole class. Without any further suggestion, at the next recitation the malefactor jumped up, and in a few clear words made the confession required.

An occurrence of this kind took place once only in every new class and never again. The class understood the principle, and whenever anything out of the way happened, whenever there was a noise which was difficult to trace, or whenever a disturbance of any kind took place, the cause of which could not be discovered,

the question, "Who did it?" was always followed by a prompt surrender of the delinquent. He knew, of course, that he would not be punished, nor was it ever necessary, because the confession ended the joke, if there was any joke in it, for its repetition had become impossible.

When I was a child attending school, the investigation of criminal cases was a favorite pastime for several of my teachers. I remember that many of our lessons were idled away by cross-examinations. The professor played the judge in court, and every one of the boys deemed it his duty to mislead him. It was almost impossible to learn the truth, for the *corps d'esprit* of our classes preserved the conviction that belying the teacher was the proper thing to do, and any one who had told the truth plainly, either in self-confession or in denunciation of others would have been regarded as an abject fellow who, without self-respect, bowed his neck under the yoke of our common oppressors. During my experience as a teacher at the Royal Corps of Cadets, I was never obliged to undertake any investigation, and I may add, I never had reason to doubt the word of the boys. Many of them are now officers in the German army, or may do duty in the very institution at which they were educated, and I hope they have learned to treat soldiers and cadets in the same spirit.

WORLDLY PRUDENCE.

While love of truth must become part of the foundation of a child's mind, we should not one-sidedly press the importance of truth to the utter neglect of discretion. Common prudence teaches that we have to tell the truth at the right moment and in the right way. Love of truth should not be identified with bluntness. We are by no means requested to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to everybody. We should tell the truth above all considerations where it is our duty to do so, and that depends upon circumstances.

The physician who shocks a sick man by bluntly telling him, "Your disease is fatal," may be guilty of a criminal offence in so far as he hastens the dissolution of his patient. He must be on his guard and break the truth in an appropriate way, as the occasion requires. Due reserve is not lying, and bluntness is not love of truth. We must consider the consequences of our words, and choose such expressions as will bring about the result at which we truthfully aim. We must tell the truth with discretion.

The main thing is to tell the truth to ourselves. The old evening prayer has a very good feature in its review of the day's work, and its self-criticism should, at any rate, be kept up. Whenever a child has done anything wrong, let him consider it in a quiet mood when he retires for the night, and drive home to him the lesson that, the severer he is with himself, the more apt he will be to make a success in life. Most failures in life are direct results of vanity, which prevents us from seeing our own faults. Truthfulness to ourselves must be the basis of our truthfulness to others; as Shakespeare says:

" This above all : to thine own self be true,
And it must follow as the night the day
Thou canst not then be false to any man."

As to cleverness and discretion, I know no better way to cultivate them than by reading with the children Æsop's Fables and even Reynard the Fox. The former have the advantage of being short, and most of them need no explanation as to the lesson involved. The moral of the latter, however, is almost dangerous, as it seems to teach that cunning is the most valuable equipment in life, and that the clever liar will win in the end. But I am not willing to reject the story on such easy terms, for many of the situations and many of the delineations of characters are too realistic and intrinsically true not to teach a useful lesson. A few words of explanation will prevent children from drawing the wrong moral from the story. First we must call their attention to the fact that all the creatures so ingeniously duped by the fox are caught by their own faults—Bruin, the bear, by his love of honey; Tibert, the cat, by his proclivity for mousing; Bellin, the ram, by his ambition to appear as a clever councillor; Kyward, the hare, by his stupidity, which in a certain sense is a vice too, and which our children must be taught to overcome as a matter of duty. It is true that Reynard is the personification of cunning, but Isegrim the wolf, his enemy, has all the faults of the fox with the sole exception that he is physically his superior, and is, in addition, voracious, improvident, slovenly, and villainous. And with what a humor are all the other characters described! Grimbart, the badger, the uncritical admirer of Reynard; Baldwin, the Ass, the learned clerk; the she-ape, Ruckinaw, an intriguing chambermaid. Noble, the lion, is a very short-sighted sovereign who becomes a mere puppet, a plaything, and, without knowing it himself, is used by Reynard as a tool. For all that, the fox remains a rascal who constantly runs the risk of ending on the gallows.

With some such hints, a reading of this ancient animal epic will be very instructive, especially if after its perusal the children are told that the tale reflects the age in which it was written—an age in which true goodness was rare and the importance of a genuine love of truth was not yet appreciated. Civilisation was then so low that cleverness, even in the low form of cunning, was uncommon, and whenever found it was appreciated as a rare gift from heaven. It takes quite a clever man to tell a lie with approximate consistency, and the *Odyssey*, written in an analogous period of culture in the Greek nation, expatiates with great satisfaction upon the virtue of lying and the mendacious genius of its versatile and inventive hero, whose usual epithet, *πολύμητις*, sounds like a translation of *Regin-hard*.¹

There can be no doubt that the animal fables, including the story of Reynard the Fox, are among the best methods, if not the very best, to teach in a playful way the first elements of worldly wisdom. The fact that *Æsop's Fables* can be traced back to India, that fables are mentioned in the Old Testament and in the history of Rome as early as the sixth century B. C.; further, that similar poetical productions of an independent growth have been discovered in the tales of Uncle Remus among the negroes of the United States, and in the animal stories of the natives of America, Africa, and Oceanica, is sufficient evidence not only of the fact that they must be a very ancient and venerable heirloom of ancestral wisdom, but also of their popularity and usefulness as a means of instruction.

Carlyle speaks of the animal fable as "a true world's book which through centuries was everywhere at home, the spirit of which diffused itself into all languages and all minds, . . . the universal household possession and secular Bible."

SQUARE DEALING.

There is an innate desire among people to get something for nothing, or to gain by a reduction of prices. On this principle those merchants base their business who announce that they are enabled by bankruptcy or otherwise to sell under the manufacturing price. While I do not deny that this is sometimes possible, there is no question that some of the goods bought in this way possess much less value than the reduced price represents. The man

¹ *Reynard* means "strong in council" (*regin* = wisdom, advice, council; and *hard* = strong, firm). The second part of Greek *πολύμητις* is derived from the same root as *μητιάειν*, "to deliberate," "to consider," "to devise"; and thus the entire word means "he of many devises."

who buys goods at an exorbitant price loses money, but he owns the goods. He got what he wanted. But he who buys poor goods at a reduced price loses both, money and goods, for he gave away the former, and the latter are without value and will either be useless or will not serve the purpose for which they were bought.

The fact that cheap goods are "made to sell" is admirably set forth in Dr. John Wolcott's humorous poem *The Razor Seller*, which I quote :

A fellow in a market-town,
Most musical, cried razors up and down,
And offered twelve for eighteen pence ;
Which certainly seemed wondrous cheap,
And, for the money, quite a heap,
As every man would buy, with cash and sense.

A country bumpkin the great offer heard,—
Poor Hodge, who suffered by a broad black beard,
That seemed a shoe-brush stuck beneath his nose :
With cheerfulness the eighteen pence he paid,
And proudly to himself in whispers said,
" This rascal stole the razors, I suppose.

" No matter if the fellow *be* a knave,
Provided that the razors *shave* ;
It certainly will be a monstrous prize."
So home the clown, with his good fortune, went,
Smiling, in heart and soul content,
And quickly soaped himself to ears and eyes.

Being well lathered from a dish or tub,
Hodge now began with grinning pain to grub,
Just like a hedger cutting furze ;
'Twas a vile razor !—then the rest he tried,—
All were impostors. " Ah ! " Hodge sighed,
" I wish my eighteen pence within my purse."

In vain to chase his beard, and bring the graces,
He cut, and dug, and winced, and stamped, and swore ;
Brought blood, and danced, blasphemed, and made wry faces,
And cursed each razor's body o'er and o'er :

His muzzle formed of *opposition* stuff,
Firm as a Foxite, would not lose its ruff ;
So kept it,—laughing at the steel and suds.
Hodge, in a passion, stretched his angry jaws,
Vowing the direst vengeance with clenched claws,
On the vile cheat that sold the goods.
" Razors ! a mean, confounded dog,
Not fit to scrape a hog ! "

Hodge sought the fellow,—found him,—and begun :
 " P'rhaps, Master Razor-rogue, to you 't is fun,
 That people flay themselves out of their lives,
 You rascal ! for an hour have I been grubbing,
 Giving my crying whiskers here a scrubbing,
 With razors just like oyster knives.
 Sirrah ! I tell you you 're a knave,
 To cry up razors that can't shave ! "

" Friend," quoth the razor man, " I'm not a knave,
 As for the razors you have bought,
 Upon my soul, I never thought
 That they would *shave*."
 " Not think they'd *shave* ! " quoth Hodge, with wondering eyes,
 And voice not much unlike an Indian yell ;
 " What were they made for, then, you dog ? " he cries.
 " *Made*," quoth the fellow with a smile,—"*to sell*."

It is sad, but nevertheless true, that most people who are cheated in life are deceived by their own desire to deceive. There is, for instance, a trick among gamblers, which among the uninitiated rarely fails. The gambler who plays puts down three cards and requests those present to bet on one of them. While putting down the cards, there is a disturbance somewhere behind the gambler, and he indignantly turns round, requesting the people to be quiet, and this moment of his apparent inattention is utilised by a bystander who lifts up one of the cards, shows it to some others, and puts it down again. It is done quickly enough not to be noticeable to the gambler. But woe to him who imagines that on the strength of this deception he can risk his money on the exposed card. For, when the card is turned up it proves to be different from the one he has seen. The man who lifts up and shows the card belongs to the gang, and before he puts it down again he replaces it by another one. There are, however, plenty of people who, if they but have a chance to deceive their fellow-men, venture to do so, and thus they are gulled by their own evil desires and have no reason to complain about it.

The bait which will catch the unwary with the greatest ease is flattery. Vain people are most easily inveigled and defrauded by praise, or by propositions that appeal to a sense of their own importance, or fame, or ability. The fable of the fox and the crow repeats itself more frequently than any other allegorical story, and it is worth while to have our children learn it by heart so that they will remember the lesson.

Let us teach children at an early age and as soon as they can

comprehend it, not by moralising, but by practical instances such as they observe in their surroundings, that the employment of tricks never pays; and that they should look with suspicion on every one who invites them to gain by the loss of others or by deception. To gain by cheating others is difficult; and therefore, as a mere matter of prudence, it should not be practised. In fact, one must become a professional trickster, or gambler, in order to succeed in the profession of cheating. A bird that is caught tightens the noose by its own movements. So a country clown, when victimised by a gang of tricksters, himself closes as a rule the snare into which he falls.

SYMPATHY WITH ANIMALS.

It is well to impress children at an early age with the truth that animals are as much sentient creatures as we are. It is not necessary to make children sentimental or to avoid telling them that animals are used for meat; but they should not witness such scenes as the slaughter of chickens, or pigs, or other creatures. Our Western civilisation is in many respects, and, indeed, in its most important features, superior to all other civilisations, but it is inferior to Hindu habits, in so far as it has no proper sympathy with animal life. I read, for instance, in an otherwise good book, the title of which is *The American Boy's Handy-Book*, on page 386, the following passage:

"Mr. Fred Holder, the celebrated naturalist and writer of boys' books on natural history, is responsible for 'the goose fisherman,' which is nothing more nor less than a live goose, with a line and spoon-hook attached to one leg. Mr. or Mrs. Goose is driven into the water and forced to swim, which, owing to the nature of the bird, is not a difficult or disagreeable task.

"As the bird swims, using its feet as paddles to propel itself, the spoon at the head of the line is jerked along in a most interesting manner to the fish, and if there are any pickerel, with their voracious appetites to spur them on, they cannot often restrain themselves, but needs must seize what, to them, appears to be a fat, shiny, young fish, but which they learn to their sorrow to be a hard metal snare.

"Then the fun begins. The goose feels something tugging at its leg, and becomes excited. The unfortunate fish plunges about, only to drive the cruel barbs deeper into its cartilaginous mouth, and make escape impossible.

"Finding, as it supposes, a hidden enemy in the water, the bird seeks refuge on the shore, where its master gleefully unbooks the fish, and starts the bird on another trip."

What a barbarous game! Can there be any better mode of teaching boys cruelty? And what will be the result of an education in which the distress of a goose is thought to be exciting fun? The game is not so cruel as many other sports, but it is certainly

calculated to harden a boy's heart to the sufferings of helpless animals. Hunting and fishing are good out-door exercises, but they can be tolerated only on the condition that the mind shall not dwell on the havoc which is caused in animal life. The sole inducement to hunting and fishing ought to consist in the exercise it affords, and perhaps also in the difficulties which the pursuit of the game offers.

I, for one, cannot understand how a man can shoot at a deer that does not run away but confidently and boldly faces the hunter. That hunting and fishing are sports is a mark of barbarism. They ought to be simply a business, engaged in on account of the necessity of killing a certain number of animals either for food, or because of the danger of their becoming a plague to the country, as is the case with the rabbits in California, which have to be killed, not for food, but because they destroy the harvest, and on account of their rapid increase making it a question whether they or man shall inhabit the country.

A disinclination to regard hunting as a noble sport may appear sentimental ; but I am happy to say that a man who, if he lacked any virtue, lacked in sentimentality, cherished the same opinion. Frederick the Great, who as a warrior and general is unexcelled in the history of mankind, had a great contempt for hunting, and declared that there was as little enjoyment in killing deer as there was in a butcher's killing calves. But Frederick was an exception on the throne, for hunting has always been, and is still, a royal sport, and the slaughter of game is by many sovereigns looked upon as a most important event in their lives.

The only hunting worthy of man is the lion or tiger hunt, which is heroic and means salvation of life by the destruction of those creatures that are destructive to it. But most of the hunting that is actually done is little better than mere slaughter, the worst sport being coursing, for which the animals are first caught and are then let loose for the purpose of being hunted to death.

MISCELLANEOUS.

HUMAN DOCUMENTS FROM THE EARLY CENTURIES.

The discovery of the *Logia Iesou* at Oxyrhynchus in 1897 aroused world-wide interest in the archæological explorations being conducted in Egypt. But the *Logia* were by no means the only manuscripts found at that time and place. The Egypt Exploration Fund, under whose auspices this work was being done by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt, has just published under their editorship a whole volume, containing more than a hundred and fifty ancient texts found at that time.

Among these is a single page of the Gospel of Matthew, which is older than any other MS. of the New Testament now known. Although only a few verses of the first chapter its text tends to prove the correctness of the conclusions of Westcott and Hort, and to show the incorrectness of the accepted text. Some other theological texts of no special value were also discovered, but the most interesting "find" was a lost poem by Sappho. Professor Blass has restored the somewhat mutilated text, which is translated thus :

" Sweet Nereids, grant to me
That home unscathed my brother may return,
And every end for which his soul shall yearn
Accomplished see !


" And thou, immortal Queen,
Blot out the past, that thus his friends may know
Joy, shame his foes,—nay rather, let no foe
By us be seen !

" And may he have the will
To me, his sister, some regard to show,
To assuage the pain he brought, whose cruel blow
My soul did kill,

" Yea, mine, for that ill name
Whose biting edge, to shun the festal throng
Compelling, ceased awhile ; yet back ere long
To goad us came."

Fragments of a treatise on metre by Aristoxenus of two lost comedies, of a chronological work, elegiacs, and epigrams, together with fragments of Thucydides, Homer, Plato, Demosthenes, and other extant authors have also been brought to light.

But none of these is so interesting as the large number of private and public documents which were found, filled as they are with so much of the "Eternally Human" that they cannot fail to appeal to us. An account of the trial of an em-



THE LOST ODE OF SAPPHO.

issary from Oxyrhynchus before the emperor in Rome is so dramatic in its effect as to prove itself the relation of an eye-witness. The scene is laid in the famous gardens of Lucullus, where the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his council are seated in judgment.

"As he (the emperor) was saying this, Appianus turned around, and, seeing Heliodorus, said, 'Heliodorus, when I am being led off to execution, do you not speak?' Heliodorus: 'And to whom can I speak, when I have no one to listen to me? Onward, my son, to death; it is a glory for you to die for your beloved country. Be not distressed. . . .' The Emperor recalled Appianus and said, 'Now do you know whom you are addressing?' Appianus: 'I know very well: I, Appianus, am addressing a tyrant.' The Emperor: 'No, a king.' Appianus: 'Say not so! the deified Antoninus, your father, deserved imperial power. Listen; in the first place he was a lover of wisdom; secondly, he was no lover of gain; thirdly, he was a lover of virtue. You have the opposite qualities to these; you are a tyrant, a hater of virtue, and a boor.' Cæsar ordered him to be led away. Appianus, as he was being led off, said, 'Grant me this one favor, lord Cæsar.' The Emperor: 'What?' Appianus: 'Order that I may wear the insignia of my nobility on the way.' The Emperor: 'Take them.' Appianus took up his band, placed it on his head, and put his white shoes on his feet, and cried out in the midst of Rome, 'Run hither, Romans, and behold one led off to death who is a gymnasiarch and envoy of the Alexandrians.' The veteran (who was accompanying Appianus) ran and told his lord, saying, 'Lord, while you are sitting in judgment, the Romans are murmuring.' The Emperor: 'At what?' The consul: 'At the execution of the Alexandrian.' The Emperor: 'Let him be sent for.' When Appianus entered he said, 'Who has recalled me when I was now saluting my second death, and those who have died before me—Theon, Isidorus, and Lampon? Was it the senate or you, the arch-pirate?' The Emperor: 'We, too, are accustomed to bring to their senses those who are mad or beside themselves. You speak only so long as I allow you to speak.' Appianus: 'I swear by your prosperity I am neither mad nor beside myself, but I appeal on behalf of my nobility and of my rights.' The Emperor: 'How so?' Appianus: 'Because I am a noble and a gymnasiarch.' The Emperor: 'Do you, then, mean that we are ignoble?' Appianus: 'As to that, I do not know, but I appeal on behalf of my nobility and my rights.' The Emperor: 'Do you not now know that we are noble?' Appianus: 'On this point, if you really are ignorant, I will instruct you. In the first place, Cæsar saved Cleopatra's life when he conquered her kingdom, and, some say, . . .'"

Another interesting minute of court proceedings shedding light upon the life of the year 49 in Egypt is this account of a law-suit for the possession of a child. "From the minutes of Tiberius Claudius Pasion, strategus (judge of the nome or district). The ninth year of Tiberius Claudius Cæsar Augustus Germanicus Imperator, Pharmouthi 3. In court, Pesouris *versus* Saraeus. Aristocles, advocate for Pesouris, said: 'Pesouris, my client, in the seventh year of our sovereign Tiberius Claudius Cæsar, picked up from the gutter a boy foundling, named Heracles. He put it in the defendant's charge. This nurse was there for the son of Pesouris. She received her wages for the first year when they became due, she also received them for the second year. In proof of my assertions there are the documents in which she acknowledges receipt. The foundling was being starved, and Pesouris took it away. Thereupon Saraeus, waiting her opportunity, made an incursion into my client's house and carried off the foundling. She now justifies its.

removal on the ground that it was free-born. I have here firstly, the contract with the nurse; I have also, secondly, the receipt of the wages. I demand their recognition.' Saraeus: 'I weaned my own child, and the foundling belonging to these people was placed in my charge. I received from them my full wages of eight staters. Then the foundling died, and I was left with the money. They now wish to take away my own child.' Theon: 'We have the papers relating to the foundling.' The strategus: 'Since from its features the child appears to be that of Saraeus, if she and her husband will make a written declaration that the foundling entrusted to her by Pesouris died, I give judgment in accordance with the decision of our lord the praefect, that she have her own child on paying back the money she has received.'"

The custom of manumitting slaves for a monetary consideration is reflected in this letter of the year 86. "Chaeremon to the agoranomus, greeting. Grant freedom to Euphrosyne, a slave, aged about thirty-five years, born in her owner's house of the slave Demetrous. She is being set at liberty under . . . by ransom by her mistress Aloine, daughter of Komon, son of Dionysius of Oxyrhynchus, under the wardship of Komon, the son of Aloine's deceased brother Dioscorus. The price paid is ten drachmae of coined silver and ten talents, three thousand drachmae of copper. Farewell."

A letter touching upon a shortage in the accounts of an official is a fresh reminder of the constancy in human traits. "Good men went wrong," or, rather, rogues were found out then as now. "Aurelius Apolinarius, strategus of the Oxyrhynchite nome, to his dear friend Apion, ex-strategus of the Antaeopolite nome, greeting. Dioscorus, strategus of the Antaeopolite nome, has sent me a despatch which has been delayed until Epeiph 13 of the past third year, explaining that Potamon, also called Sarapion, the collector of the nome, among the receipts of the revenue of the third year when you were in office, received towards the completion of the survey of the dykes and canals in the second year the sum of three thousand one hundred and eighty-seven drachmae, three obols, which he did not pay over to the revenue office within the appointed time. Dioscorus now wishes me to ask that this should be refunded, and to credit it to the nome. In order, therefore, that you may be acquainted with these facts and lose no time in repaying the money in accordance with this letter . . ."

A report of a robbery in which the victim seems to have his doubts as to the efforts made by the police to catch the thieves, is suggestive of the idea that Tammany methods are pretty ancient. ". . . they broke down a door that led into the public street and had been blocked up with bricks, probably using a log of wood as a battering-ram. They then entered the house and contented themselves with taking from what was stored there ten artabae of barley, which they carried off by the same way. We guessed that this was removed piecemeal by the said door from the marks of a rope dragged in that direction, and pointed out this fact to the chief of the police of the village and to the other officials. I am therefore obliged to put in this petition, and beg you to order that the chief of the police and the other officials be brought before you, and to make due inquiry about this robbery, so that I may be able to recover the barley."

A declaration by an egg-seller is rather quaint reading: "To Flavius Thenyrras, logistes of the Oxyrhynchite nome, from Aurelius Nilus, son of Didymus, of the illustrious and most illustrious city of Oxyrhynchus, an egg-seller by trade. I hereby agree on the august, divine oath by our lords the Emperor and the Cæsars to offer my eggs in the market-place publicly, for sale and for the supply of the

said city, every day without intermission, and I acknowledge that it shall be unlawful for me in the future to sell secretly or in any house. If I am detected so doing (I shall be liable to the penalty for breaking the oath)."

Some of the Greek and Latin documents deal with the every-day life of the people in the most concrete fashion. Here, for instance, is the monthly meat bill of a cook, affording more than a glimpse at the bill of fare of the second century. "Cook's account. Thoth 4th, 24th year, 4 pounds of meat, 2 trotters, 1 tongue, 1 smout. 6th, half a head with the tongue. 11th, 2 pounds of meat, 1 tongue, 2 kidneys. 12th, 1 pound of meat, 1 breast. 14th, 2 pounds of meat, 1 breast. 16th, 3 pounds of meat. 17th, 2 pounds of meat, 1 tongue. 18th, 1 tongue. 21st, 1 paunch. 22nd, 1 paunch, 2 kidneys. 23rd, 2 pounds of meat, 1 paunch, 2 trotters. 26th, 1 tongue. 30th, 1 breast. And before this, on Mesore 18th, 2 pounds of meat, 1 paunch, 2 kidneys. 21st, 1 breast. 23rd, 1 half a head with the tongue 2 kidneys. 24th, 2 pounds, 2 trotters. 25th, for Tryphon 2 pounds, 1 ear, 1 trotter, 2 kidneys. 29th, 2 pounds, 2 trotters, 1 tongue. 2nd intercalary day, 1 tongue. 3rd, 1 breast."

The formal invitations of the second and third century were so much like those issued to-day that, with the names and dates changed, they might be copied and used as models of elegance in any social circle. This invitation to dinner, for instance: "Chaeremon requests your company at dinner at the table of the lord Serapis in the Serapeum to-morrow, the 15th, at 9 o'clock."

A less formal letter of invitation to a festival was also found: "Greeting, my dear Serenia, from Petosiris. Be sure, dear, to come up on the 20th for the birthday festival of the god, and let me know whether you are coming by boat or by donkey, in order that we may send for you accordingly. Take care not to forget. I pray for your continued health."

A letter of consolation written in the second century is no less interesting; "Irene to Taonnophris and Philo, good cheer! I was as much grieved and shed as many tears over Eumoeus as I shed for Didymas, and I did everything that was fitting, and so did all my friends, Epaphroditus and Thermoutbion and Philion and Apollonius and Plantas. But still there is nothing one can do in the face of such trouble. So I leave you to comfort yourselves. Good-bye. Athyr!"

There were pawn-shops in those days to which some of the ladies had recourse when in need, and they were compelled to pay the usurious interest of four per cent. per month. Here is a letter from one of the victims: "Now please redeem my property from Serapion. It is pledged for two minae. I have paid interest up to Epeiph, at the rate of a stater per mina. There is a casket of incense-wood, and another of onyx, a tunic, a white veil with a real purple border, a handkerchief, a tunic with a Laconian stripe, a garment of purple linen, two armlets, a necklace, a coverlet, a figure of Aphrodite, a cup, a big tin flask, and a wine-jar. From Onetor get the two bracelets. They have been pledged since Tybi of last year for eight . . . at the rate of a stater per mina. If the cash is insufficient owing to the carelessness of Theagenis, if, I say, it is insufficient, sell the bracelets to make up the money. Many salutations to Aia and Eutychia and Alexandra. Xanthilla salutes Aia and all her friends. I pray for your health."

Most natural of all this epistolary literature is an ill-spelled and ungrammatical letter written by a spoiled boy to his father: "Theon to his father Theon, greeting. It was a fine thing of you not to take me with you to the city! If you won't take me to Alexandria with you I won't write you a letter or speak to you or say good-bye to you; and if you go to Alexandria I won't take your hand or ever

greet you again. That is what will happen if you won't take me. Mother said to Archelaus, 'It quite upsets him to be left behind.' It was good of you to send me presents . . . on the 12th, the day you sailed. Send me a lyre, I implore you. If you don't I won't eat, I won't drink; there now."

I wonder if he got the lyre.

CLIFTON HARBY LEVY.

THE GOESCHEN SERIES OF POPULAR CLASSICS, AND LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC TEXT-BOOKS.

There was undoubtedly a strong admixture of ethics and philanthropy in the economical reflexions that stirred the heart of Herr G. J. Göschen, the well-known Leipsic publisher, when he conceived the project of publishing his cheap series of *Literary Classics* and *Literary and Scientific Manuals*. But whatever the motive, the World-Spirit moved to good purpose in him. The series is marvelously cheap, costing but 80 pfennigs apiece (20 cents) for volumes some of which run to 300 pages, and all of which are bound in flexible linen covers. It embraces the most varied subjects—histories of literatures, grammars of the most important languages, annotated editions of the German classics of all periods, dictionaries, histories of art, and manuals of all the sciences. The books are not reprints, but independent works by competent authorities—with illustrations, figures, etc.—and all of pocket-size. The plenitude of material is such that we can mention in this review the mathematical text-books only. A few of the literary manuals will be noticed later. "*Wir können es nicht mit einem Trichter eingiessen,*" as the medieval professor of philosophy petulantly said to his students at the end of a four-years' course on Aristotle.

* * *

The miniature mathematical library of the Göschen series consists of some ten volumes, which are shortly to be increased by several more. The mathematical editor under whose direction these works have been written is Prof. Hermann Schubert, of Hamburg, well known to the readers of *The Open Court* and *The Monist*. Professor Schubert is himself the author of three of the books of the series—all of them models of conciseness, yet exceedingly rich in contents for their size, and of very high didactic value. They are (1) his *Arithmetic and Algebra*, (2) his *Collection of Examples in Arithmetic and Algebra*; and (3) his *Tables of Four-Place Logarithms*. The value of his first book lies in its systematic and logical development of the principles; it embraces nearly all of what is called with us higher arithmetic (excluding the commercial parts), and elementary algebra; it would form an excellent skeleton-course in the hands of elementary instructors. The *Examples* are a companion-book to the *Arithmetic and Algebra*. The *Four-place Logarithms* are unique in several respects: they are printed in two colors red and black; both for the natural numbers and for trigonometric functions, anti-tables are given, dispensing with interpolation, and making it as easy to find the anti-logarithms as the logarithms; tables of physical and mathematical constants have also been added. This book could be used in great part by students quite ignorant of German.

The next volume in order is that of Dr. Benedikt Sporer, on *Niedere Analysis*, and is devoted to such subjects as continued fractions, indeterminate analysis, the theory of combinations and probabilities, series, interpolation, and the elementary theory of equations. The volume has 173 pages, and contains much material

that cannot be found in the common run of text-books on "advanced algebra." It serves as a sort of introduction to the succeeding volumes on *Higher Analysis*.

The first of these is the *Differential Calculus* of Dr. Friedrich Junker (192 pp., 63 figures). This volume contains a brief introductory chapter to the Calculus, which is a sort of *résumé* of the relevant developments of the preceding volumes; a second chapter on differences, differentials, and derivatives of the first order; a third on derivatives and differentials of higher orders; a fourth on the determination of the limiting values of singular forms; a fifth on the convergence and divergence of series; a sixth on the development of functions by exponential series; a seventh on the maxima and minima of functions; an eighth on the applications of analysis to geometry; and a final brief chapter on the application of the differential calculus to mechanics. The treatment, while traditional, is enlivened by many practical and modern points of view.

A volume complementary to the preceding works on analysis is a valuable and extremely convenient *Collection of Mathematical Formulæ* by Prof. O. Th. Bürklen (pp. 129, figures 18). This little book, which is in its second edition, gives in a compact form the most important and the most useful of the formulæ of arithmetic, algebra, and algebraical analysis, including finite and infinite series and the theory of equations, the most important propositions of plain and solid geometry, plain and spherical trigonometry, geodesy, analytical geometry, and the differential and integral calculus. There is a brief bibliography of the best hand-books of the various subjects here summarised, and a table of useful numerical values.

The geometrical part of the series is made up of some four volumes, the first being the *Plane Geometry* of Dr. G. Mahler, professor of mathematics in the Gymnasium of Ulm. The figures of the book, which is now in its second edition, are printed in two colors, black and red, the construction-lines being in red. The treatment is almost entirely modern, and not marred by a vicious straining for artificial rigor. The principle of symmetry has been made use of; the useful arithmetical applications of the principles of geometry have not been neglected; historical matter has been inserted here and there, and a brief but good collection of exercises given. Not the most unimportant feature of the book is the third chapter, on the systematic treatment of geometrical problems. The best modern text-books of geometry do not leave the pupil in the dark when solving geometrical problems, but put in his hands rational methods of attack that give to his labors rather the character of research than that of erratic and haphazard groping.

The volume on *Plane Analytical Geometry* is by Dr. Max Simon, of Strasburg contains 203 pages, and has 45 cuts. For actual amount of useful matter, this little book surpasses many treatises on analytical geometry having twice or three times its bulk. The same author has supplied the treatise on the *Analytical Geometry of Space* (200 pp., 28 cuts).

The volume on *Projective Geometry* is by Dr. Karl Doehlemann, of Munich, (162 pp., 57 figures, some of which are in two colors). Dr. Doehlemann has given a brief bibliography of the subject, and supplied an index. His booklet is particularly to be noted, as the study of projective geometry is rarely cultivated outside of technical and professional schools.

We have finally to mention the excellent little manual of Kurt Geisler, on *Mathematical Geography* (pp. 183). The matter contained in this little volume would form an excellent supplement to the subjects ordinarily treated in American text-books on physical geography, and properly forms an integrant branch of this

last subject. It encroaches on the domains of astronomy and physics, and had better be studied in connexion with the text-books of these sciences.

Both the publishers and authors are to be highly complimented on the general character of the series, and it can only be wished that its circulation will ultimately justify them in their undertaking. It is so cheap that almost any one can afford to purchase all the books in his department, and, so far as we have examined them, they will be found in every case to be modern productions, incorporating the best knowledge of the age.¹

T. J. McC.

NOTES.

The readers of *The Open Court* will remember the correspondence published some time ago from the Rev. Peter Rijnhart, Christian missionary among the robber tribes near the border of Tibet. A dispatch, which has recently gone the rounds of the daily papers, announced his assassination and the flight of Mrs. Rijnhart to more civilised parts of China. The Rev. Chas. T. Paul, pastor of the Church of Christ, Toronto, Canada, an intimate friend of Mr. Rijnhart, writes, in reply to an inquiry, as follows:

"Up to the present I do not feel at all compelled to believe that he was killed. The dispatches say he left his wife to visit a camp at an hour's distance, but never returned. His wife then fled to Ta-chien-lu, being pursued by brigands, and believing of course that her husband had been murdered.

"I have received a telegram and two letters from Mrs. Rijnhart's sister, Dr. Jennie Carson, of Chatham, Ont., in which I am informed that no such news of any kind has come to Mrs. Rijnhart's home. I think, too, that some message would have come to me if things were as bad as stated in the dispatches.

"Strange to say, this morning's mail brings me a letter from Fort Wayne Ind., stating that Mrs. Rijnhart's friends in that city have heard direct from her. She writes from Ta-chien-lu, China, under date of December 1. She believes her husband dead and is now on her way to America. I am making up a purse of money to bring her from Shanghai to Canada. My Fort Wayne correspondent adds:

"Mr. Rijnhart may be alive; he may have been taken prisoner and escaped in another direction, and we may hear from him again when he reaches some civilised place; we cannot believe he is dead."

"My last news from Mr. Rijnhart was dated in May, 1898. He was just then leaving on a long journey to the interior. He expected to cross the Kuenlun Mountains and make his way gradually toward the capital. He had ample supplies for a year and a considerable company of men. Among other purposes of the journey was that of doing medical mission work and distributing New Testaments *en route*.

"Mr. Rijnhart is good as gold, simple in faith, and heroic in deed."

¹Intending purchasers should address the G. J. Göschen'sche Verlagsbandlung, Leipsic, Germany, or some local foreign book-seller.



JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.

(1712-1778.)

Frontispiece to the April, 1899, Open Court.

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JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.

(1712-1778.)

BY PROFESSOR L. LÉVY-BRUHL.

ROUSSEAU'S personality exhibits so much complexity and yet at the same time so much unity that it is no easy thing to study in him the philosopher apart from the man of letters. His philosophical tenets are the very soul of his talent as a writer. They are not merely the result of his mind's reflexions upon the great problems, but rather of his heart's inmost tendencies. Rousseau the philosopher is Rousseau's entire self. Yet this very fact gives to his philosophical doctrine, if we try to examine it separately, a certain character of unity. His solutions of the essential questions are in harmony with one another, and it is not impossible to discover the general principles from which all the rest springs.

The chief philosophical problem, according to Rousseau, is the moral problem from the two-fold point of view of the individual and of society. He feels but little curiosity for theoretical questions, properly so called. Though a subtle and sometimes rigorous dialectician, it never occurs to him to reflect upon logic. Exact sciences have but little interest for him. The strong liking for botany which he manifested in his later years came from an æsthetic, and, in a certain sense, religious feeling.

On the other hand, everything relating to man's conduct and destiny moved him deeply. He was led to philosophical reflexion by the discomfort, suffering, and often indignation bred in him either by his intercourse with other men, or by the sight of men's intercourse with one another. Morals, institutions, and beliefs all hurt him, and appeared to him false, and different from what

they should be. Whence comes it that the immense majority of men are sunk in poverty, in order to maintain in luxury the few who in their turn suffer from having no rule of life and nothing more to desire? Whence comes it that the weak and the powerful are equally dependent upon one another, and equally unhappy? Why do we find, lurking beneath the apparent refinement and mildness of manners, the cold rage of envy, base covetousness, desperate pursuit of personal interest, indifference to public good, hardness of heart, and cruelty? Why does the development of arts and sciences, notwithstanding the excellence of a few individuals, seem to have made mankind worse and more miserable still? And, lastly, why is hypocrisy universal, making it possible for Rousseau to appear original merely because he said what was as clear as daylight to everybody? In short, to reduce all these questions to two essential ones: is it necessary that man and society should be what they are? If we can conceive the possibility of their being otherwise, by what means can man be brought back to truth, virtue, and happiness?

To the first of these two questions there is a very simple answer, supplied by Christian theology. Man fell through sin. His nature is corrupt, and it is not a surprising thing that what springs from such a nature should be corrupt also. Rousseau did not content himself with this appeal to mystery. Had he done so, he might have been a more orthodox Christian, but his effect upon his contemporaries would have been far less great, and he might have had none whatever. How could the theological solution be proposed again to minds feverishly longing for enfranchisement, and impatient to apply reason to the treatment of those subjects which theology had kept to itself for so many centuries? And then, had he borrowed his argument from the doctrine of the fall of man, what could he have said on morals that had not been well said already by Nicole and Malebranche? Instead of simply taking human perversity as a fact, Rousseau, by a stroke of genius, set himself to the study of its genesis. Instead of supposing it to be innate, he sought to discover how it was acquired. "All you can see is man in the hands of the Devil," he writes to the Archbishop of Paris; "but I see how he came there. The cause of evil, according to you, is man's corrupt nature; but this corruption is itself an evil, and what ought to have been done was to seek its cause. We both agree that man was created good, but *you* say he is wicked because he has been wicked, while *I* demonstrate how he came to be wicked. In short, according to Rousseau, the

dogma of original sin is not so much a solution as a statement of the problem. He attempted to supply a real solution and to offer an explanation instead of a dogma.

The undertaking was a bold one, and characteristic of the age which asserted that in man "everything is acquired," and which, in its desire to set the individual man wholly free from all sense of solidarity with his fellows, except in so far as he himself freely accepted it, endeavored with Condillac and Helvetius to belittle and even to deny the influence of heredity. In the same way, Rousseau attacked the formidable problem of the origin of evil in the human soul, still unsolved save in religious metaphysics, without stopping to ask himself whether it was not beyond the reach of his reason. That reason set the problem, was for him sufficient ground for believing that reason was capable of solving it. Though Rousseau was an adversary of the philosophers and out of patience with their misuse of reason, it did not occur to him, any more than to them, to submit reason itself to criticism and to measure its power.

* * *

The search for the genesis of moral and social evil implies that man was once innocent and good. If we thus admit a "contradiction" (a word Rousseau was wont to use with the meaning of "opposition") between man's primitive nature and our social order, we shall see that it is sufficient to explain all the vices of men and the evils of society.

But it is no light task to discern what is original and what is artificial in the present nature of man. How can we know his "primitive state, which exists no longer, may never have existed, will probably never exist again, but of which, however, we must have some precise notions in order to judge rightly of our present state?" We see that Rousseau does not for a moment claim for his researches the character of historical investigations. He makes no pretension to anthropological science. He does not even seek to discover what primitive man may actually have been. The genesis he undertakes to seek is an analytical one, like those attempted in psychology by Diderot, Condillac, and Buffon, to which the public had given a very favorable reception. Just as Condillac, in tracing our knowledge back to its first elements, did not have recourse to direct observation, but, by a sort of ideal analysis, eliminated imaginatively all the senses save one, in order to establish the special data of that one, after which he brought back the other senses one by one, so Rousseau proceeds, as he himself says, by

means of "hypothetical and conditional" reasoning. He first considers the nature of man as he now is, and determines all that may be explained by the influence of social intercourse, of surroundings, education, etc. Then, suppressing all that is thus explained, he infers that what remains must have been the original nature of man.

Those who objected that Rousseau's "man in a state of nature" had never existed, failed therefore very egregiously to understand him. It is as if one should object that Condillac's animated statue never existed. Rousseau's method is quite a psychological one. It was "by meditating upon the first and simplest operations of the soul" that he endeavored to deduce the feelings and ideas of the natural man. Nature, whose voice cannot be completely hushed, was to tell him, by means of an inward feeling, whether his hypotheses were acceptable. He had in her a means, if not of verification, at least of control.

* * *

In order to separate at once from man's present nature all that the successive generations have acquired in the course of the centuries, Rousseau supposes the original man to have lived alone. Even the family did not yet exist: it was a first revolution that brought about the establishment of families, and the distinctions between them. Originally man did not live in society any more than wolves and monkeys do; he occasionally joined his fellow-creatures, but usually kept aloof from them. He was an animal, inferior in certain respects to some but upon the whole superior to all others. His body was robust, and mainly unacquainted with other ills than wounds and old age. The innumerable diseases to which civilised man is a prey were unknown to men in a state of nature; moreover, as the sway of natural selection was undisputed among them, every weak and deficient individual, not being able to get beyond childhood, was eliminated at the outset. As regards his mind, his first state, in common with all animals, must have been that of simple perception and feeling to will and to be unwilling, to desire and to fear,—these must have been the first and almost the only operations of his soul. He felt no curiosity, and his mind stagnated indefinitely. As he wandered through the forests, without industry and without speech, neither at war with his kind nor bound by any ties to them, having no need of his fellow-creatures and at the same time no desire to harm them, he had only so much feeling and enlightenment as belongs to such a state; there could be no education and no progress. The species

was already old, and man remained still a child. His only passion was the love of his own person (not self-love which supposes a distinction between personal interest and the interest of others, that is, of society). He had a natural inclination to pity, when he beheld one of his fellow-beings in distress.

But this harmless animal, apparently so nearly like the others, had that within him which could create between him and them an almost boundless difference. He was "perfectible." He possessed the potentiality of reason, and of everything that comes in its train: language, civil society, morality, and progress. The difficulty is to understand how the solitary man became sociable, and what started that extraordinary evolution, of which modern societies are the outgrowth. Rousseau confesses that the transition puzzles him; he has recourse to "the spur of necessity," to the presence of want, occasioned apparently by the increase of population. How did man begin to think? "The more we meditate upon this subject, the greater the distance between pure sensations and the most simple form of knowledge" appears. And how are we to explain the origin of language? Rousseau thinks the problem insoluble; he does not know which was the more indispensable prerequisite for the creation of the other, a society already in operation or a language already invented.

Having reached this point, the author sketches a sort of hypothetical pre-history, in which man, having once left the state of nature behind him, is constantly led on to new inventions by new wants. His intelligence and sensibility developed, the family is constituted, and groups of families are formed; common tradition, knowledge, and beliefs are established. Finally, when the last traces of the state of nature are obliterated, the idea of property appears. This idea, dependent as it is upon many other previous ideas, which could have arisen only one after another, was not formed all at once in the human mind: many improvements had to be made and much industry and enlightenment to be acquired before it could occur to men.

Property implies the organisation of civil society, of penal justice, and the legal recognition of inequality. Henceforth there must be rich men and poor men; and, by a prodigious piece of dexterity, those who have possessions have managed to get their wealth insured and protected by those who have none. Soon there will be powerful men and weak men, and in the end masters and slaves. Inequality thus reaches its last stage. In the state of nature men were all equal, save for a few physical differences, since

they all led the same peaceful and solitary life. In the present state some are starving while others are wallowing in superfluous wealth, and all become crafty, jealous, and wicked.

But, one might object, was it not by virtue of his very nature that man developed his reason, and gradually formed the family, property, and civil society? If the social man existed as a germ or potentiality within the original man, is it fair to oppose them to each other? Rousseau forestalled the objection. Such an evolution, he says, was not inevitable. It might possibly not have taken place. Nature had but meagerly endowed men for sociability. She had very little share in all that they did to make fast its bonds. She had made him rather for solitude. Perfectibility, social virtues, and all other potentialities which the natural man had received could never have developed of themselves; they needed the chance conjunction of several causes which might never have occurred; man would then have remained forever in his primitive condition. But when once this evolution had begun, and, above all, when once society had been established, every step taken brought man farther from his original type.

Thus the long toil of civilisation, which gave us arts, sciences, and industry, also brought upon us diseases, misery, sufferings of all kinds, and especially vices. Society is an assemblage of artificial men, preyed upon by factitious, though only too real, passions, for which in the primitive state there was no occasion. Therefore, if man's nature is now corrupted, we must not infer therefrom that it has always been so. This corruption is his own work, and the ransom to be paid for his release from savagery.

Thus did Rousseau solve the first problem he had set himself, and trace the genesis of social evil. Where are we to seek a remedy for it? This remedy, if it exists, can be found only in a system of education that would rehabilitate man depraved by the morals and institutions of to-day. But such a system of education implies a whole system of philosophy, for it presupposes a thorough knowledge of man's nature, of the laws of his mental development, of his private and public intercourse with his fellow-creatures, of his place in nature, of his future destiny, and lastly, of the first cause of all things. This philosophy Rousseau was to undertake, and the idea of "nature" as opposed to everything fictitious or conventional, was to be the clue that he followed in his researches.

* * *

Knowing what was the state of nature, which man has left forever, knowing what his present social state is, and what it ought to

be, what education ought man to receive? What is he to be taught, and how?

As a principle, education should be national and public. There lies the essential cause of the "superhuman grandeur" of Sparta. There are opened the ways unknown to the moderns, by which the ancients brought men to such fortitude and patriotic zeal as are unexampled among ourselves, but the germs of which are in the hearts of all men. To train citizens is not the work of a day, and in order to have men good citizens, they must be taught when children, and accustomed from their earliest years to regard themselves only as members of the State, and to consider their own existence, so to speak, as part of that of the State. Evidently this can be obtained only by public education entirely directed to this object. Public education is, therefore, one of the fundamental maxims of popular and right government.

But as nothing is more unlike Sparta than the States of the eighteenth century, our ambition shall not be to train citizens, and we shall turn from the question of public control. We must limit our task, which even then will be difficult enough, to preventing the social man from being entirely artificial. "Conformity with nature" is the motto of Rousseau's pedagogy. In accordance with this principle, he advises mothers to suckle their children themselves; in devotion to the same principle he waits, before speaking of religion to his pupil, till the latter is able to understand the twofold revelation of conscience and of the universe. The good teacher is he who assumes no other function than to present matters in such a way that the lessons of experience may be clear, striking, and calculated to produce a durable impression upon the child's mind. He leaves it to nature to educate by degrees the child's senses, understanding, and conscience; he sometimes encourages nature, but never forestalls her. Thus the child escapes the many prejudices insidiously instilled into his mind by the customary methods of education, which are afterwards so difficult to eradicate.

Thus, *Émile* shall not be a man made by man; he shall be one made by Nature. This does not involve making him a savage, or confining him in the depths of the forests; but, though absorbed in the vortex of society, we ask only that he be not led away by man's passions or opinions; that he see with his own eyes, feel with his own heart, be governed by no authority save his own reason. *To be one's self*: nothing is more rare, difficult, and even impossible, unless one has been prepared for it from child-

hood. As soon as he is born, man is wrapped in swaddling clothes; when dead, he is sewed up in a shroud; all his life long, he is pinioned by laws, manners, and customs, decorum, and professional obligations. Nobody ever suffered more than did Rousseau from social tyranny and hypocrisy; nor did any cry of revolt ever echo so far and so long as the cry he uttered against them.

Does this mean that he dreams of bringing man back to his primitive state? Certainly not, for there is a wide difference "between the natural man living in a state of nature, and the natural man living in a state of society." The latter must adapt himself to his situation. He is a "savage intended for life in towns." He must therefore receive a systematic education, and be instructed in all accomplishments. Mingling with other men, he must learn to live not like them, but with them. Our race does not like to be half finished. In the present state of things, a man left to himself among other men would be the most distorted of all. Whence it follows that in a well regulated republic, the State owes to every man not only the possibility of living by his own work, but also such education as will make of him a free man and a good citizen.

No philosopher, and, more broadly speaking, no writer for a century past, has had an influence comparable to that of Rousseau. But the very strength and durability of this influence, which is still deeply felt in our times, has often prevented him from being studied and judged with impartiality. He has enthusiastic admirers and intense opponents, and both sides have maintained legends often very far from true. Thus many people still believe that to Rousseau must in an especial manner be ascribed the responsibility for the excesses committed during the Revolution, and that the worst terrorists were inspired chiefly by his doctrines. But the responsibility of Rousseau in this connexion is neither greater nor less than that of other philosophers of the eighteenth century, and he even contributed, as Auguste Comte clearly perceived, to bring on the religious reaction which combated these very philosophers. The error may have arisen from the fact that other French philosophers, from motives of policy, met the temporal power with deference and with flattery, whereas Rousseau, being a Genevese citizen, boasted of his republican feelings. But for all that he is not a revolutionary spirit. On the contrary, he counselled political moderation and prudence. Even the unhappy Poles who were on the point of perishing he exhorted not to lay their hands rashly upon their national constitution, and he predicts most profound misfortunes for the French if they try to change the institutions

under which they have lived for so many centuries. Though the inequalities of fortune are monstrous, though "the demon of property pollutes whatever it touches," yet Rousseau does not mean to lay hands on vested rights, and it is in the future only that he perceives means of opposing the ever-increasing social inequality.

But, having said this much, we must acknowledge that Rousseau's philosophy was big with consequences. The opposition between what is natural and what is artificial, which is its leading idea, was apt to lead minds in love with logic and justice a very great way if applied to every aspect of human life. This opposition was, of course, not discovered by Rousseau; it had been known ever since there had been moralists; and especially since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the "good savage" and "nature" had been quite in fashion. Rousseau's achievement lies in making of this opposition the principle of a whole moral and social doctrine, and of finding therein a means of distinguishing between what is and what ought to be, by declaring nature to be good, and evil to have sprung from human conventions. Therefore, if the evils under which we labor are of social origin, the finding of remedies depends upon us. For this it is sufficient to "see with our eyes, to feel with our hearts, and to judge with our reason"; to free ourselves from traditional preconceptions and prejudices. We shall then plan for man, not a chimerical return to an impracticable state of nature, but a social organisation more in conformity with order and justice.

The very foundation principles of the present state of society are thus called into question. The lawfulness of individual property, the excessive inequality of fortunes, the sovereignty of the people, the reciprocal rights and duties of the individual and the State, the relation between the Church and political powers, are so many problems proposed by Rousseau in such a way that it became thenceforth impossible not to take an interest in them. He thought the solutions more simple and easy than they really are: witness the "civil religion" he wished to establish in the name of the State, which was often so entirely misunderstood. But the thought that led him to ask these questions was after all just, and many of his ideas were original and suggestive. In spite of his connexion with the "philosophers," he really follows none of them; how many others, friends and adversaries, have followed him!

THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH.¹

BY TH. RIBOT.

ALTHOUGH many linguists resolutely abstain from considering the origin of speech (which is certainly, like all other genetic problems, beyond the grasp of psychology), the question is so intimately allied with that of the evolution of articulate language, allied again in itself with the progressive development of abstraction and of generalisation, that we shall give a brief summary of the principal hypotheses relating to this subject, while limiting ourselves to the most recent.

I.

Launching forth then into this region of conjecture—do we, in the first place, find among some animals signs and means of communication which for them are the equivalents of language? In considering this point it matters little whether or no we accept the evolutionary thesis. It must not be forgotten, in fact, that the problem of the origin of speech is only a particular case of the origin of language in general: speech being but one species among several others of the *facultas signatrix*, which can only be manifested in the lower animals in its humblest form.

There can be no doubt that pain, joy, love, impatience, and other emotional states, are translated by proper signs, easy to determine. Our problem, however, is different; we are concerned with signs of the *intellectual*, not of the affective, life. In other words, can certain animals transmit a warning, or an order, to their fellows? Can they muster them for a co-operative act, and make themselves intelligible? Although the interpretation is necessarily open to the suspicion of anthropomorphism, it is difficult not to recognise a sort of language in certain acts of animal life. Is it, *a priori*, probable that animals, which form stable and well-organised

¹ Translated by Frances A. Welby.

societies, should be bereft of all means of intercommunication and comprehension?

With regard to ants, we learn from such observers as Kirby and Spence, Huber, Franklin, that they employ a system of signs. To elucidate this point, Lubbock undertook a series of patient experiments, certain of which may be quoted.¹ He pinned down a dead fly so that no ant could carry it off. The first that came made vain attempts to remove it. It then went to an ant-hill and brought seven others to the rescue, but hurried imprudently in front of them. "Seemingly only half awake," they lost the track and wandered alone for twenty minutes. The first returned to the nest and brought back eight, who, so soon as they were left behind by the guide, turned back again. During this time the band of seven (or at least some of them) had discovered the fly, which they tore in pieces and carried off to the nest. The experiment was several times repeated, with different species, and always with the same result. Lubbock concluded that ants were able to communicate their discoveries, but without indicating locality. In another experiment he placed three glasses at a distance of thirty inches from a nest of ants. One of the glasses contained two or three larvæ, the second three hundred to six hundred, the third none at all. He connected the nest with the glasses by means of three parallel tapes, and placed one ant in the glass with many larvæ and another ant in that with two or three. Each of them took a larva and carried it to the nest, returning for another, and so on. After each journey he put another larva into the glass with only two or three larvæ, to replace that which had been removed, and every stranger brought was imprisoned until the end of the experiment. Were the number of visits to all three glasses the same? And if not, which of the two glasses containing larvæ received the greater number of visitors? A difference in number would seem to be conclusive as proving a power of communication. The result was that during forty-seven and a half hours two hundred and fifty-seven friends were brought by the ants having access to the glass containing numerous larvæ, while during an interval of fifty-three hours there were only eighty strange visitors to the glass containing two or three larvæ; there were no visits to the glass containing none. Communication for bees as for ants, appears to be made by rubbing the antennæ. If the queen is carried off in a hive, some of the bees are sure to discover it before long. They become greatly agitated, and run about the hive frantically, touch-

¹ *Ants, Bees, and Wasps*, VII.—Romanes, *Animal Intelligence*, IV.

ing any companions they meet with their crossed antennæ, and thus spreading the news through the whole community. The bee-hunters in America discover them by choosing a clearing where they catch a few wandering bees, which are then gorged with honey and suffered to fly when replete. These bees return with a numerous escort. The same process is repeated with the new comers, and by observing the direction which they follow at their departure, the nest is discovered.

As regards the higher animals (notwithstanding the exaggerations of G. Leroy—who asserts that when they hunt together, wait for one another, find each other again, and give mutual aid, “these operations would be impossible without conventions that could only be communicated in detail by means of an articulate language [sic]”) the truth is that we know singularly little about them. It is certain that, in addition to sounds that translate their emotions, many species have other means of communication. According to Romanes¹ the most intelligent dogs have the faculty of communicating with one another by tones of barking, or by a gesture, such simple ideas as “follow me.” This gesture is invariably the same; being a contact of heads with a motion between a rub and a butt, and always resulting in a definite but never complex course of action. In a troop of reindeer the leader makes one sign for the halt, another for the march forward, hitting the laggards one after another with his horns. Monkeys are known to produce various sounds (the gibbon compasses a complete octave), and several species will meet and hold a kind of conversation. Unfortunately, notwithstanding recent researches, we have only vague and doubtful data in regard to monkey language.

We know finally, that certain birds are able to articulate, and possess all the material conditions of speech, the faculty being indeed by no means uncommon. Parrots do even more; there is no doubt that they can apply words, parts of sentences, and airs, to persons, things, or definite events, without varying the application, which is always the same.² Association by contiguity sufficiently explains this fact; but, granting that they do not as a rule make a right intellectual use of articulate sounds, they seem in certain instances to attach to them the value of a *sign*. Romanes actually observed a more extraordinary case, implying generalisation, with apposition of a sound. In the first instance, one of his par-

¹ *Animal Intelligence*, XVI., p. 445.

² The most interesting of the many observations on this subject are those of Dr. Wilkes, F. R. S., published in the *Journal of Mental Science*, July, 1879.

rots imitated the barking of a terrier which lived in the house. Later on, this barking became a denotative sound, the proper name of the dog; for the bird barked as soon as it saw the terrier. Finally, at a still later stage, it got into the habit of barking when any dog, known or unknown, came into the house; but ceased to bark at the terrier. While distinguishing individuals it therefore perceived their resemblance. "The parrot's name for an individual dog became extended into a generic name for all dogs."¹

In short, the language of animals—so far as we know it—exhibits a very rudimentary development, by no means proportionate to that of the logic of images, and highly inferior to that of analytical gesture. It throws no light, notwithstanding all that has been said, upon the problem of the origin of speech.

In respect to this subject, which has excited human curiosity for centuries without satiation, there appear to me (when we have eliminated old or abandoned hypotheses) to be only two theories which have any solidity: the one presupposes instinct; the other a slow evolution.

I. It must be remarked that if the partisans of the first theory seem at the outset to have frankly admitted innate disposition (the fundamental characteristic of instinct), it is more difficult to distinguish between some of the later writers and the evolutionists.

Thus it has been said: speech is a necessary product in which neither reflexion nor will participate, and which is derived from a secret instinct in man (Heyse). Renan sustained a similar thesis. For Max Müller, "man is born speaking, as he is born thinking"; speech marks the transition from (concrete) intuitions to ideas; it is a fact in the development of the mind; it is created with no distinct consciousness of means and end. For Steinthal, on the contrary, "language is neither an invention nor an innate product; man creates it himself, but it is not begotten of the reflecting mind." Through all these formulæ, and others somewhat tinged with mysticism, we can discover but one point of fact, analogous to that which states that it is in the nature of the bee to form its comb, of the spider to weave its web. The last word of the enigma is unconscious activity, and whether directly, or by evasions, this school must return to innate faculties.

A somewhat recent theory—that of L. Noiré,²—is distinct from the foregoing. In these, speech is the direct (although, it is true, unconscious) expression of intelligence; for Noiré, on the other

¹ *Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 173.

² *Der Ursprung der Sprache* (1877). Fr. Müller maintained a similar view.

hand, it is the outcome of will. "Language is the result of *association*, of community of feeling, of a sympathetic activity which, at the outset, was accompanied by sounds . . . ; it is the child of *will* and not of sensation." Speech is derived from community of action, from the collaboration of primitive men, from the common use of their activities. When our muscles are in action, we feel it a relief to utter sounds. The men who work together, the peasants who dig or thresh the grain, sailors rowing, soldiers marching, emit more or less vibrant articulations, sounds, exclamations, humming, songs, etc. These sounds present the requisite characters of the constitution of articulate language; they are common to all; they are intelligible, being associated by all with the same acts. Action, according to Noiré, is the primitive element in all language. Human labor is the content of primitive roots; to cut, knock, dig, hollow, weave, row, etc. Although Max Müller adhered almost unreservedly to this hypothesis, it has, like all others, encountered much criticism which we need not dwell on. Is it probable, it has been asked, that the first names should have been for acts only, not for objects? How explain the synonyms and homonyms so frequent in primitive language? etc.

II. The hypothesis of a progressive evolution of speech, while dating from antiquity, has only taken a consistent form in our own days, under the influence of transformist doctrines. The work of anthropologists and of linguists, above all of the former, it finds support in the study of inferior idioms and of the comparative method. Its fundamental thesis is that articulate language is the result of a long elaboration, lasting for centuries, in which we may with some probability reconstitute the stages. While its authors are not in complete agreement it may be said that, generally speaking, they admit three periods: the cry, vocalisation, articulation.

The cry is the primordial fact, the pure animal language, a simple vocal aspiration, without articulation. It is either reflex, expressing needs and emotions, or, at a stage higher, intentional (to call, warn, menace, etc.). It has been said that the speechlessness of animals is due to the imperfection of their auditory (?) organs and want of organic correspondence between their acoustic images and the muscular movements that produce sound: but the cause of this aphasia must also, and above all, be referred to their weak cerebral development; this applies also to primitive man. "What function could words have fulfilled when the anthropoid of the Neanderthal or the Naulette roamed, naked and solitary,

from ditch to ditch, through the thick atmosphere, over marshy soil, stone in hand, seeking edible plants or berries, or the trail of females as savage as himself?"¹ It is intelligence that creates its instruments, as well speech as all the rest.

Vocalisation (emission of vowels only) does not in itself contain the essential elements of speech. Many animals practise it; our vowels, long or short, even our diphthongs, can readily be recognised in the voice of different species (dog, cat, horse, birds in large numbers, etc.). In the child, it succeeds the period of the simple cry; and since it is admitted that the development of the individual hints at that of the race; that, moreover, many primitive languages or rudimentary idioms (as such, near the time of their origin) are very rich in vowels,—it has been concluded that there existed a longer or shorter period intermediate between those of the cry and of articulation (this thesis has close affinities with the theory of Darwin, Spencer, etc., which has been rejected by other evolutionists); that speech is derived from song, intellectual language from emotional language; in other words, that man could sing before he could speak. Various facts are alleged in support of this theory: (1) In monosyllabic languages, which are generally held to be the most ancient, the accent plays a cardinal rôle; the same syllable, according to the tone which accompanies it, takes on the most widely different meanings. Such is the case of the Chinese. In Siamese, *hã* = to seek; *hâ* = plague; *hà* = five. (2) Other languages in which intonation is of less importance, are nevertheless in close relation with song, and by reason of their vocabulary and of the grammatical construction, modulation is necessary for giving a complete sense to the words and phrases. (3) Even in our own languages, which are completely dissociated from song, the voice is not even in tone; it can be greatly modified according to circumstances. Helmholtz showed that for such banal phrases as "I have been for a walk," "Have you been for a walk?" the voice drops a quarter-tone for the affirmation, and rises a fifth for the interrogation. H. Spencer called attention to several facts of the same order, all commonplace. (4) The impassioned language of emotion resembles song: the voice returns to its original form; "it tends," according to Darwin, "to assume a musical character, in virtue of the principle of association."

Whatever may be the force of this reasoning, conclusive for some, doubtful for others, the conditions necessary to the existence of speech arose with articulation only, consonants being its firmest

¹ A. Lefèvre, *Les races et les langues* (Bibliothèque scientifique internationale), pp. 5-6.

element. The origin of speech has been much disputed. Romanes invokes natural selection: "The first articulation probably consisted in nothing further than a semiotic breaking of vocal tones, in a manner resembling that which still occurs in the so-called 'chattering' of monkeys,—the natural language for the expression of their mental states."¹ It should, however, be noted that the question, under this form, has merely a physiological interest. The voice is as natural to man as are the movements of his limbs; between simple voice and articulate voice there is but the same distance as between the irregular movements of the limbs of the newly born, and such well-co-ordinated movements as walking. Articulation is merely one of the forms of expression: it is so little *human* that it is met with, as we have seen, among many of the lower animals. The true *psychological* problem lies elsewhere: in the employment of articulate sounds as *objective signs*, and the attaching of these to objects with which they are related by no natural tie.

Geiger in his *Ursprung der Sprache* (1878) brought forward a hypothesis which has been sustained by other authors. It may be summed up as follows: words are an intimation of the movements of the mouth. The predominant sense in man is that of sight; man is pre-eminently visual. Prior to the acquisition of speech, he communicated with his fellows by the aid of gestures, and movements of the mouth and face; he appealed to their eyes. Their facial "grimaces," fulfilled and elucidated by gestures, became signs for others; they fixed their attention on them. When articulate sounds came into being, these lent themselves to a more or less conventional language by reason of their acquired importance. For support of this hypothesis, we are referred to the case of non-educated deaf-mutes. These invent articulate sounds (which of course they cannot hear), and use them to designate certain things. While many of these words appear to be an arbitrary creation (e. g., *ga*=one, *ricke*=I will not, etc.), others result from the imitation by their mouth of the movements perceived on the mouth of others. Such are *mumm*=to eat; *chipp*=to drink; *be-yr*=barking of a dog, etc.² Why should primitive man have done less than the deaf-mute, when he not only saw the movements but heard the sounds to boot?

To conclude with a subject in which individual hypotheses abound, and which for us is only of indirect interest, we may sum-

¹ *Loc. cit.*, 372.

² Heinicke, *Beobachtungen über Stumme*, 75, 137.

marise the sketch given recently enough (1888) by one of the principal partisans of the evolutionary theory :

“Starting from the highly intelligent and social species of anthropoid ape as pictured by Darwin, we can imagine that this animal was accustomed to use its voice freely for the expression of its emotions, uttering of danger-signals, and singing. Possibly enough also it may have been sufficiently intelligent to use a few imitative sounds ; and certainly sooner or later the receptual life of this social animal must have advanced far enough to have become comparable with that of an infant at about two years of age. That is to say, this animal, although not yet having begun to use articulate signs, must have advanced far enough in the conventional use of natural signs (or signs with a natural origin in tone and gesture, whether spontaneous only or intentionally imitative) to have admitted of a tolerably free exchange of receptual ideas, such as would be concerned in animal wants, and even, perhaps, in the simplest forms of co-operative action. Next, I think it probable that the advance of receptual intelligence which would have been occasioned by this advance in sign-making, would in turn have led to a further development of the latter,—the two thus acting and reacting on each other until the language of tone and gesture became gradually raised to the level of imperfect pantomime, as in children before they begin to use words. At this stage, however, or even before it, I think very probably vowel-sounds must have been employed in tone-language, if not also a few of the consonants. Eventually the action and reaction of receptual intelligence and conventional sign-making must have ended in so far developing the former as to have admitted of the breaking up (or articulation) of vocal sounds, as the only direction in which any further improvement of vocal sign-making was possible. I think it not improbable that this important stage in the development of speech was greatly assisted by the already existing habit of articulating musical notes, supposing our progenitors to have resembled the gibbons or the chimpanzees in this respect. But long after this first rude beginning of articulate speech, the language of tone and gesture would have continued as much the most important machinery of communication. Even if we were able to strike in again upon the history thousands of years later, we should find that pantomime had been superseded by speech. I believe it was an inconceivably long time before this faculty of articulate sign-making had developed sufficiently far to begin to starve out the more primitive and natural systems ; and I believe that, even after this starving-out

process did begin, another inconceivable lapse of time must have been required for such progress to have eventually transformed *Homo alalus* into *Homo sapiens*." ¹

Among all these hypotheses we may choose or not choose; and while we have dwelt briefly on this debated problem, whose literature is copious, we may yet have said too much on what is mere conjecture.

One certain fact remains, that—notwithstanding the theory by which speech is likened to an instinct breaking forth spontaneously in man—it was at its origin so weak, so inadequate and poor, that it perforce leaned upon the language of gesture to become intelligible. Specimens of this mixed language are still surviving among inferior races that have nothing in common between them, inhabiting regions of the earth with no common resemblances.

In some cases speech coexists with the language of action (Tasmanians, Greenlanders, savage tribes of Brazil, Grebos of Western Africa, etc.). Gesture is here indispensable for giving precision to the vocal sounds; it may even modify the sense. Thus, in one of these idioms, *ni ne* signifies "I do it," or "You do it, according to the gesture of the speaker. The Bushman vocabulary is so incomplete and has to be reinforced by so many mimic signs, that it cannot be understood in the dark. In order to converse at night, the tribe is obliged to gather round the fire.

In other cases, speech coexists with inarticulate sounds (Fuegians, Hottentots, certain tribes of North America) which travellers have compared, respectively, to clinking and clapping. These sounds have been classified according to the physiological process by which they are produced, into four (or even six) species: dental, palatal, cerebral, lateral; it is impossible to translate them by an articulated equivalent. "Their clappings survive," says Sayce, "as though to show us how man, when deprived of speech, can fix and transmit his thought by certain sounds." Among the Gallas the orator haranguing the assembly, marks the punctuation of his discourse by cracking a leather thong. The blow, according to its force, indicates a comma, semi-colon, or stop; a violent blow makes an exclamation. ²

It was advisable to recall these mixed states in which articulate language had not yet left its primitive vein. They are transitional forms between pure pantomime and the moment when speech conquered its complete independence. Having considered the origin of speech, we shall next study its development.

¹ Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Man*, pp. 377-379.

² For data, consult especially Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, V.; Sayce, *Principles of Comparative Philology*, I., § 17.

PARENTHOOD.

BY THE EDITOR.

FROEBEL'S motto, "Come, let us live for our children," should be adopted as a maxim by all parents. Parents that cannot make up their mind to live for their children have no business to have children. Children are not dolls; they should not become toys for our amusement and diversion; children are pledges; the possession of children implies duties, and the fulfilment of these duties demands not only a painstaking labor and watchfulness, but also much discretion and wisdom.

The obligation of educating children exercises a most beneficial influence upon parents, and the proposition to discuss "the education of parents by their children"¹ is not as paradoxical as it seems. We may say that no one, neither man nor woman, has grown to mental and moral maturity until he or she has been confronted with this noblest of all duties, the care of bringing up children. Carus Sterne² says:

"Every child requites much of the love bestowed upon it by the parents, by making them better and more perfect beings than they were before its advent into the family. In fact, the highest polish, the finishing touches of education, are given people neither by home, school, nor church, but by their own children. Should they be so unfortunate as not to have any, they will experience difficulties in replacing this lacking factor in the education of their affections."

Frequently sexual love is spoken of as the factor that exercises a civilising influence upon man; but Carus Sterne, "at the peril of exposing himself to heresy in poetical matters," declares that on the contrary it engenders cruelty, produces destructiveness and

¹This is the title of an article by Carus Sterne, which appeared in *The Open Court*, Vol. I. Nos. 22-23.

²Carus Sterne is the *nom de plume* of Dr. Ernst Krause, of Berlin, a well-known German author of scientific and popular-scientific works, his most celebrated work being *Werden und Vergehen*. He is counted among the foremost evolutionists of Germany, and did not fail from the very beginning to emphasise the moral significance of the doctrine of evolution.

brings about beneficent results only when resulting in a firm union, demanding reciprocal surrender and self-sacrifice. The religious aspirations of mankind develop from the relation between parents and children. Says the same author :

" Out of parental and filial love there develops, even in immature minds, a universal love for humanity. The infant becomes the Saviour—the earthly father becomes the prototype of the all-wise, all-bountiful Father in heaven."

Protestants as a rule object to Mariolatry as pagan. They are aware of the pagan features of a literal belief and are therefore disgusted with their Roman Catholic brethren. But belief in the divinity of motherhood contains no less truth than the belief in the divinity of fatherhood. Protestants, as a rule, believe in the latter, and are therefore not aware of the Protestant paganism that results from a sensual and grossly literal interpretation of the belief in God the Father. The family relation is not dual, but trinitarian. It is not parent and child, but father, mother, and child.

Carus Sterne, too, touches upon this point, saying :

" The early endeavor to elevate the mother into the realm of the divine is a deeply-felt and psychologically well justified factor in the development of Christian dogma. It was thus that the mother with the infant on her lap was made the chief picture at the shrines. The "Holy Family," so typically portrayed by Raphael, wins all hearts, even at this day, in Protestant countries, for it justly makes the nursery the sanctuary which produces and constantly feeds the pure flame of love of man and of God."

The possession of children is a blessing, and the joy that parents may derive from them is immeasurable. It would nevertheless be a grave mistake to think that such happiness can be had simply through the procreation of progeny and by indulging, simian fashion, in a love of one's own offspring. The bliss of parenthood has to be bought with many cares, with sacrifices, and with far-seeing forethought.

It is a common observation that the character of people changes for good the moment they become parents. The average man is thoughtless and perhaps even frivolous, but as soon as the duties of parenthood approach him, he begins to reflect and becomes considerate. Now he weighs his words and takes life more seriously. Many who never before gave a thought to the problems of religion, because they are lukewarm and do not care to have a settled opinion, pause for the first time in their lives and ask themselves whether they had better teach belief in God or unbelief. The moral views of people assume a decidedly more definite form when they think of their children, and our behavior is influenced

by the idea that we set with our habits an example to our youngsters.

What a wonderful plan it is of nature to split up the evolution of mankind whose life in its entirety forms one uninterrupted line of progress, into innumerable sections of individual lives. We could very well imagine a different arrangement. The individual and the race might coincide, and we should then have the growth and evolution of one immortal personality, in the place of an immortal race broken up into a progressive succession of mortal individuals. There would be no death in the dispensation of the unlimited life of such a race-individual; nor would there be any birth, and mankind would not need starting life over again with every new baby; there would be no need of education; no need of love. But where would the interest in life remain, if this mankind-individual lived through centuries and millenniums without being obliged to continue its existence through begetting and educating children.

Life would be unpalatable if it were not broken up into limited pieces and constantly started over again. An immortal mankind-individual would feel like Goethe's Mephistopheles, who says to Faust:

"Trust me, who for millenniums, year by year,
The same tough cud must masticate and test:
No mortal from the cradle to the bier
Can ever this unsavory stuff digest.
Trust one of us to whom this life is known;
The whole can be endured by God alone."

The mutuality of life is the condition of our moral ideals which naturally have a tendency to break through the narrow range of exclusively individual interests; it points beyond the sphere of individual life without annihilating the importance of the individual. It makes the individual the representative of superindividual aspirations which, through the inherited parental affections, have become sufficiently deep-seated as to well up spontaneously whenever needed, sometimes even in criminal characters, in spite of themselves. Egotism and altruism are both useful and beneficent instincts. They balance each other, and where either is missing the other will run to seed and do great harm.

Our ethics, our religion, nay, our whole interest in life, is simply an expression of the natural constitution of mankind, viz., of the system of mutuality.

It may be wrong to say that without the mutuality of life there would be no ethics at all, because another arrangement would sim-

ply imply other rules of conduct than those which we now call moral. In other worlds of a different constitution, with other interrelations, there would be other needs, and consequently its creatures would aspire after other ideals. It is difficult to say what might be; but this much is sure, that our moral and religious conceptions are a product of the conditions which have shaped our lives. However much religious truths have been represented as a contradiction to nature, they are nature in its highest efflorescence; and wherever for a time, through gross sensualism and childish immaturity, by a literal conception of parables and an unspiritual pagan interpretation of the nature of dogmas, mankind has drifted into a hostility to nature, religion lost its true significance, but showed always, even in the darkest ages, a tendency to return to a purer, more elevating, and more natural morality.

It is mutuality that gives zest to life and makes it worth living. The interest that keeps us in the world and attaches us to existence is like the vault of a massive structure, where stones keep one another up by inclining toward and pressing upon one another. Mutuality holds up the lofty arch as firmly and as solidly as the interrelation that obtains among the various members of human society naturally produces and sustains ethics; and the most important, because fundamental, mutuality of human life is the relation between parents and children. It is apparent that mankind would never have developed true humanity, had it never witnessed a mother's love. The sublimest and noblest sentiments would be still unknown, had not generation after generation been trained in the school of parental care and self-sacrifice. Men have learned the most valuable lessons of life by living for their children.

AMERICANISM AND EXPANSION.

BY THE EDITOR.

AMERICANISM is the principle of liberty, and expansion is growth. The United States have entered upon a new period in their development by acquiring new territory, some of which is situated in the distant Eastern Seas; and we hear again, as on similar occasions in the past, from a great number of the people, the vigorous protest that expansion as such is opposed to Americanism. Expansion reaches out into new fields as a tree in growing spreads over into an adjoining garden; and the question arises, Have we a right to acquire territory without the previous consent of the people who at present inhabit the territory into which, through the accident of historical occurrences, our power now extends? The present situation is by no means the first one of the kind, but it is new in so far as the territories do not directly touch our present boundaries, and part of them belong to another continent over 8,000 miles away.

The United States began their history as thirteen small colonies, and their progress has been one of constant expansion. The Colonies dared to resist the oppressions of the English government on the principle that taxation requires the consent of the governed; they established themselves as states, and laid down the maxims of their policy in the Constitution. There were from the beginning two parties, the Whigs, who were in power through having just succeeded in liberating the country and giving it independence, and the Federalists, who insisted upon a union of the states and a strong federal government. The Whigs are the men who shaped the principles of the new country, jealously guarding the liberty of the people, the independence of the states, and the self-government of every township; their maxim found the tersest and best formulation in Lincoln's words, "A government of the

people, by the people, and for the people." The Whigs are, as it were, the negative side of the evolution of our country, stating the difference between the government of the United States and the systems of the Old World, and declaring what our country should not be.

The Federalists were suspected by the Whigs of being royalists, and were frequently, even in and before the days of Washington, treated in party debates as traitors to democratic principles. The first great leader of the Federalists was Hamilton, who gave expression to his more vigorous policy in *The Federalist*, a paper that was discontinued with the controversies which called it into existence.

The Federalists were very weak at the time when peace was made with England, and played then a very minor part in our politics; but they gained in importance when the Whig principles proved utterly unequal to conducting the business of the new republic.

The general interest in the common affairs of the United States was so weak that only with considerable difficulty could a quorum of the members of Congress be obtained to ratify the treaty of peace with England.

In 1785, Algiers declared war against the United States, and Congress recommended the building of five forty-gun ships of war; but Congress had only power to recommend, and since the Whigs saw danger in the growth of a strong government, the ships were not built, and the Algerians continued to prey with impunity upon American commerce. At the same time, England treated the new republic with such disrespect that she neglected even to send a minister to Washington, and as our historians briefly state, "The Federal Government was despised abroad and disobeyed at home."

It was dire necessity that compelled the people of the United States to listen to the representations of the Federalists; and under the strain of circumstances, by a loose construction of the Articles of Confederation, the United States Government rose in power, and assumed the leadership of the new republic.

It is needless to enter into a recapitulation of the history of our country, to tell the old story over again of how the Whigs adopted the name "Republicans," and later on became known as "the Democratic party," while the Federalists are at the present day represented by the Republicans. Further, we must bear in mind that, on the principles of the Whigs, the Southern States were perfectly justified in breaking away from the Union, and es-

tablishing a confederacy of their own ; and it is a matter of historical experience that liberty is always suppressed in the name of liberty, and slavery rests upon the maxim that everybody has the right to suppress his brother man, if only he has the power to do so. Nominally the South stood up for liberty, and the North for union, but practically the South insisted upon the right of slaveholding, while the North represented the ascendancy of free labor. Their difference was a difference of principle which has been decided by the sword. The cause of the real freedom of the North, in the face of the sham freedom of the South, remained victorious, and thus the confederacy of the United States changed into a union ; and now only the name United States became legitimate.

The idea prevailed among the founders of our nation that a weak government is the best guarantee for the liberty of the people, and on such grounds the Whig party and their heirs have always endeavored to prevent the increase of federal power ; and yet the noble principles of democracy have always been used as a shield for the boldest boodling and maladministration. All good citizens of the United States agree that while our federal government is upon the whole well conducted, and may be considered as the best republic on earth, the municipal administration of our great cities leaves much to be desired, and the problem presents itself, How shall we, with the least disturbance of democratic principles, change the methods of city government which at present are subject to just criticism ?

While it is true that American principles stand for liberty, we must not imagine in fond self-illusion that we have as yet discovered the proper method of realising the right use of liberty. So far, all progress and growth of the United States have been made in spite of the strict constructionists of the United States Constitution. A loose construction was adopted as a matter of necessity. The fact is that the United States are of a natural growth, and growth cares little for rules or regulations invented by theorists to prevent further expansion. The building up of our institutions has been guided by the principle of liberty, which upon the whole has been realised, but which if carried to extremes would simply have stopped the wheels of the machinery of our government.

The irony of fate, which is so often visible in history, placed the Anti-Federalists, led by Thomas Jefferson, in power, when, for the first time in the history of the United States, an independent action on the part of the government was required. James Monroe had been sent to France in 1803 as an official ambassador of the

United States, but when he reached Paris the political situation had been suddenly changed, and an unexpected opportunity for expansion offered itself which had to be acted upon at once. France was preparing for a renewed war with Great Britain, and offered to the United States for \$15,000,000 that large tract of territory then called Louisiana, covering the whole Mississippi Valley and extending northward to Canada. The war being imminent, the bargain had to be concluded at once or abandoned for good, and Mr. James Monroe transcended his instructions and accepted the offer. The president, who had been elected on Whig principles, did not hesitate to endorse Mr. Monroe's action, although it was fundamentally and directly opposed to his interpretation of the Constitution. He believed that it was in the interests of the liberty of the country to have a weak government, and that the Constitution gave the federal government no power to purchase foreign territory and make it a part of the Union; but he excused his conduct on the ground that "he acted like a guardian who makes an unauthorised purchase for the benefit of his ward, trusting that the latter will afterwards ratify it." He probably had the good intention of having the transaction ratified by the people of the United States, which, however, was never done. The only ratification consisted in the general acquiescence in it, but the inhabitants of "Louisiana" were never asked for their consent to being incorporated into the United States; nor have their wishes ever been considered; if they had been consulted at the time, there can be no doubt that the French population, at least a great part of it, would have voted as vigorously against it as the present Anglo-American and Anglicised inhabitants would vote for it. The fact is that whatever importance general principles may have, and I do not deny their great importance, the development of nations cannot be limited nor pre-determined by maxims, nor be confined within narrow limits; it is of a natural growth; and if there exist laws or institutions that hamper it or prevent the definite settlement of political issues, they will be shattered to pieces with the same power with which roots break the rock into which they descend.

The advantage of the Constitution of the United States consists in this, that it is, upon the whole, sufficiently elastic to allow expansion and to admit new interpretations under new conditions.

The question now arises whether under the present circumstances expansion is or is not in agreement with Americanism. Is it necessary to follow the maxims of the old Whig party who

wanted every American farmer to remain behind his plow, and not to bother himself with the people in the next township? Are we really so isolated that each community should be concerned only with its own affairs, and that all of them should not grow into a higher unity of state and national union? The spirit of the principles of the Whigs has always remained dominant in the evolution of the United States; but as soon as we would apply them in the sense of the strict constitutionists, whenever they would lead the country to wreck and ruin, they have been tempered by the ideals of the Federalists, who have always done good service in building up the institutions of this country, and giving it a strong and sometimes a very good government.

The truth is that a strong government is by no means dangerous to the liberties of the people, but on the contrary it is the best guarantee of them provided the general Whig sentiment of liberty prevails throughout the country. A strong government which respects Whig principles will never be in need of stooping to *comp d'états*, or assuring the continuance of its power by crooked means. It will unflinchingly stand for the right, and enforce justice. A weak government, however, as experience shows all over the world and at all times, does not shrink from using any means to remain in power,—a fact which is sufficiently proved in the republics and tyrannies of ancient Greece, in the autocratic countries of Turkey and Russia, and in the South American republics. The weakness of a government, as is proved by undeniable facts of history, is always a menace to the liberty of the people, while a government that is strong can afford to allow the people their full liberties, provided they do not infringe upon the liberties of their fellow-beings.

We have discussed the problem of the acquisition of Cuba in a former article,¹ and have proposed as a policy of the United States to make our new acquisitions, especially Cuba, confederate republics of the United States. The Cubans should enjoy perfect liberty at home; they should elect their own magistrates, and attend to the policing of the country by men of their own choice, of their own language, their own nationality, according to principles which they deem best. But while in their own affairs they should be as free as any State of the Union, the defenses of the island should not be left to the accidents of their home politics, but should remain in the strong hands of the forces which represent the insoluble alliance of our Union with Cuba, at the head of which is the

¹ In the November number of *The Open Court*.

President of the United States. Cubans should be freely admitted to the army and navy, in proportion to the number of their population; but there ought to be no danger of a rupture in times of war, which would endanger the United States and the Nicaragua Canal, so important to the trade of the United States.

The idea that the business of the United States is at home, and that the Illinois farmer has no interest beyond the territory which he plows, is a grave mistake. The world is one great organism, and if we want to stand up for our principles in contrast to European principles, we must not forget that for the defense of our own country and our ideals, we must be in possession of those points of strategic importance which shall enable us to weather a political crisis in the eventual evolution of the history of the world. There is no need of subjugating the Cubans or the Filipinos; we need not interfere with their home politics; we should give them, as a matter of course, as much liberty as they can stand; but it would be a crime to give up the positions of strategic importance which we have gained, and which may in the future prove the salvation of our institutions in their struggle with European institutions. If we love Americanism, if we believe in the principles of liberty, we should not only not be opposed to expansion, but enthusiastically hail it. There is no reason to oppose it, and we may safely follow the example of the great Whig leader, Jefferson, when against his own principles he absorbed into the United States the Valley of the Mississippi, without either the consent of its population or even of the United States.

The present crisis is an occasion in which we can prove whether or not our American principles are good for anything; if they cannot be applied to Cuba or the Philippines, we may be sure that they are not justified in the United States. True, it is not so easy to transplant them forthwith to peoples who are not yet accustomed to the bracing air of liberty; and the probability is that mistakes will be made before the desired end is attained. But it is wrong to censure our government for permitting the United States to carry the spirit of Americanism to other nations merely because they are not yet ripe for it.

The truth is that our present expansion is not a new departure, but a repetition of antecedents which in all national matters are exactly the same. To begin from the very beginning, did the Pilgrims ever ask the Indians for their permission to settle at Plymouth Rock? It appears that they went there because they were exiled from Europe and had to seek a new home, and perhaps

they had the same right to the country as the Indians. It appears that the earth is open everywhere, and those people who are strongest take possession of the earth. According to the old view, those people who are the strongest conquer their fellow-beings by force of arms; but, according to the principles of a more highly developed humanity, those are the strongest who build their institutions upon the consent of the governed. It is therefore a matter of course that wherever the American flag is to be raised we shall endeavor to gain the consent of the governed. Should we within a reasonable time be unable to gain the confidence and good will of the inhabitants of the newly acquired territories, we should give them up, either abandoning them to themselves or to some other power who will be better able to administer their public affairs.

The policy of imperialism is a mistake, but for all that expansion is justified.

Because we believe that the safest foundation of any government is the consent of the governed, and that it is the duty of every government to allow full sway to the liberty of its citizens, it would be a very mistaken policy if for that reason our government would disarm and cease to protect itself against the armed governments of other nations. The new ideal of liberty as expressed in Americanism does not abolish the duty of looking out for our defenses, and of being ready to defend our principles in case they are attacked.

And what should we do with the Philippines if the policy of expansion be wrong? All Americans agree that it would be unfair to return them to Spain. Shall we then leave them to themselves, and allow them to adjust their own affairs according to their own pleasure? There can be no doubt that the result would be an internecine war which would be more bloody than the present struggle between the United States and Aguinaldo's forces. And in reply to those who have made themselves the advocates of the Filipinos, especially of Aguinaldo, we have to say that his ambition for Philippine independence would probably mean the suppression on the one hand of the white colonists, and on the other hand of the mountain tribes of the interior. That Aguinaldo's government would be just to other nationalities who are inhabitants of the islands cannot be expected, and the result would after all not be the independence of the Filipinos, but the interference of European governments on behalf of their colonists. As soon as we withdrew, leaving the Filipinos and the German colonists to their fate, Germany or some other power would acquire a perfectly

just title to interference. The result would be that the Philippines would fall into the hands of another power, and we should have no right to complain, if we had turned from them in Pharisaic self-righteousness.

We should renounce expansion only if we believe that the American principles are for home consumption only, and are not applicable to other nations.

The expansion of the United States has not come by our own choice, but through the development of historical events; it has been forced upon us, and as the situation is at present, we must deeply regret that Aguinaldo has ventured upon a war with the United States. But there can be no doubt that it is the duty of the United States to re-establish order in the conquered territory, unless the Americans as a nation have lost faith in their competency to accomplish the task.

It is possible that the United States government has made some mistakes while assuming control of the Philippines; but we abstain from criticising its measures because it is all but impossible to judge of proceedings which have taken place at such a distance. At any rate, we must insist upon the justifiability of expansion and go even so far as to say that should the nation as such oppose it, it would amount to a self-condemnation and imply that Americanism, or rather the spirit of liberty that pervades our institutions, has no right to exist except within the narrow limits of the United States of America.

Our policy toward the Filipinos implies more difficulties than have been anticipated, and a protracted war is unavoidable. But in spite of their hostile attitude we should not lose sight of the hope to give them the liberty for which they are fighting now and allow them to constitute themselves as a Filipino Republic.

We might divide the country according to the nature of the population into various states with constitutions adapted to the conditions of the people. The city of Manilla might form a free city after the pattern of the Hanse towns; the Mohammedans might enjoy the privilege to live in accord with their traditions; the Filipinos and mountain tribes might choose a government that would suit them best; yet all of them, independent in local affairs, would be subject to the authority of the United States who would interfere only when the laws or administrations of the various people would seriously collide with the principles of humanness as established in civilised countries.

The easiest way of governing people, be they colonists or a


conquered race, is by giving them local self-government. The more independent they feel the more satisfied they will be. The most convenient way of maintaining order is by allowing them to do their own policing, by men of their own kind. This consideration alone should induce us to hand the responsibilities of administration in all local affairs over to men of the people's own choice.

The easiest, the cheapest, the most practical, method of governing Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands will be to give them as much independence as possible. We cannot (at least not at present) make of the Filipinos citizens of the United States, but we can make of all the conquered territories federal republics which stand under the protectorate of the United States.

THE CROSS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE religious use of the cross (i. e., the figure of two intersecting lines) was discovered among the Indians of Central America to the great astonishment of the Roman priests who ac-



T-CROSSES ON AN ALTAR TABLET OF A TEMPLE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.¹

companied the Spanish conquerors ; and the deep significance the cross must have had among them appears from the two splendid "Temples of the Cross" among the ruins of Chiapas, Yucatan.²

¹ The author expresses his deep obligation to the Bureau of American Ethnology, the Chicago Public Library, and the Field Columbian Museum, for the kind assistance rendered him in his investigations, especially in procuring illustrations.

² From Kingsborough's *Antiquities of Mexico*, Part III.

³ See W. H. Holmes, *Archaeological Studies Among the Ancient Cities of Mexico*, Field Columbian Museum. Publication No. 16. (Anthr. Ser. I., i.)

The inhabitants of that country were sun worshippers, and the cross may with them (as it still does with many of the Indians of



THE ALTAR TABLET OF THE TEMPLE OF THE CROSS NEAR PALANQUE.¹ (See p. 236 ff.)

he U. S.) have meant the world, or, properly speaking, the earth, with its four directions—North, South, East, and West; or the sun


¹ From Kingsborough's *Antiquities of Mexico*, Part, III.

with its rays; or a tree as the symbol of vegetation; or the fecundating rain penetrating the earth; or the combination of two principles positive and negative, male and female, etc., into one.

Prescott, in his *History of Mexico*, on mentioning the crosses frequently found in Yucatan, says: "It is a curious fact that the cross was consecrated as the object of religious worship, both in the New World and in religions of the Old, where the light of Christianity had never come."

Count Goblet d'Alviella sums up the situation in these words:

"When the Spaniards took possession of Central America, they found in the native temples real crosses, which were regarded as the symbol, sometimes of a



NECKLACES WITH PENDANTS, FOUND IN THE SCULPTURES OF MEXICO AND YUCATAN.¹

divinity at once terrible and beneficent—Tlaloc, sometimes of a civilising hero, white and bearded—Quetzacoalt, stated by tradition to have come from the East. They concluded from this that the cross had reached the Toltecs through Christian missions of which all trace was lost; and, as legend must always fix upon a name, they gave the honor to St. Thomas, the legendary apostle of all the Indies. Although this proposition has again found defenders in recent congresses of Americanists, it may be regarded as irrevocably condemned. It has been ascertained beyond all possibility of future doubt that the cross of pre-Columbian America is a kind of compass card, that it represents the four quarters whence comes the rain, or rather the four main winds which bring rain, and that it thus became the symbol of the god Tlaloc, the dispenser of the celestial waters, and, lastly, of the mythical personage known by the name of Quetzacoalt."

J. G. Müller, in his *History of the Religions of the American Aborigines* (on page 496) informs us that on the Island of Cozumel,

¹ *Migration of Symbols*, pp. 12-13.

² *A. R.*, 80-81, plate XLV, facing p. 256.

the god of rain was worshipped under the symbol of a cross. He says:¹

"One is accustomed to looking upon the cross as an exclusively Christian symbol, and wherever the cross is found the suspicion arises that there must have been some later Christian influence. This was the general opinion of the older Spanish historians, who regarded the crosses found in America as so many witnesses which prove that the Apostle St. Thomas had here preached the Gospel. . . . On account of the simplicity of the shape of the cross, we must not be surprised that it is found also among the ancient peoples of the Western Hemisphere as a symbol of nature. The Indians, Egyptians, Assyrians, and Phenicians used it. It appears on the head of the Ephesian goddess.² An explanation of the meaning of this natural symbol is, on account of its very simplicity, difficult, because it admits many possibilities. The attempts heretofore made to regard the cross as the key of the Nile, as a Phallus, as the sign of the four seasons, may be combined in the one idea of the fertilising power of nature. It is for this reason that the cross appears in combination with the solar gods and the Ephesian goddess; and thus the symbol would also be appropriate for the rain god of the tropical countries, whom it represents, according to the testimony of the natives.

"Among the Chinese, too, rain denotes fertilisation, and the Greek myth of the golden rain of Zeus, which coming from the clouds falls into the lap of Danaë, can have no other significance. It appears, therefore, that wherever we meet an aboriginal worship of the cross in Central America, we are probably confronted with the idea of the fertilising rain which crosses the soil of the motherly earth."

"Stone crosses are not only worshipped in Cozumel and Chiapa, but also over the whole of Yucatan.³

"Sigüenza speaks of an Indian cross which was discovered in the cave Mixteca Baja. In addition, ancient crosses were discovered under the ruins of the Island of Zaputero, in Lake Nicaragua, but they were of a different form, representing a kind of head-dress.⁴ Further, old crosses of white marble were discovered on the Island of St. Ulloa⁵ in the Pacific, and wooden crosses were worshipped in the State of Oaxaca,⁶ and near Guatulco, or Aguatalco,⁷ and in the country of the Zapotecas. In North America, we can trace the existence of the cross as far as Florida.⁸ In South America, too, crosses are not infrequently mentioned.⁹ Also, in the eastern parts of Asia, and on the islands of the Pacific, cross-worship prevails; further, in eastern India, on the Nadak Islands, and on the islands of the Mulgrave-Archipelago, etc."

¹ For the sake of making the passage more readable, we relegate the ponderous quotations to footnotes.

² See Lipsius, *De cruce* I., 8. Baumgarten, *Gesch.*, v. A. (1752) I., p. 203. Creuzer, *Symbolik*, I., p. 332 ff. II. p. 176. Augusti Chr. Arch. III., p. 599.

³ Cf. Cogolludo, II., ch. 12. Gomara, *Hist. gen.* (1554) p. 68, 70. Picard, 165. Clavigo, I., 353. Prescott, I., 180. Squier, *Nicar.*, 493. The same is true of Mixtecas and Querétaro in Northern Mexico, according to Clavigo (I., 353) and Boturini.

⁴ See Squier, *Nicaragua*, pp. 492 and 309.

⁵ Juan Diaz in Ternaux Comp. X., 45.

⁶ Mühlendorff, I., 254.

⁷ Hazart, 285.

⁸ Irving, *Conq. Florida*, II., 206 and 219. Also, Cibola, Castaneda in Ternaux Comp. IX., 165.

⁹ Gomara, III., 32. Antonio Ruiz, *Conquista Espiritual del Paraguay*, §§ 23, 25. Lafiteau, I., 425-450. Hazart, 284. Baumgarten, II., 219. I., 197. Müller, *Gesch. d. n. Urr.*, §§ 85, 75. Garcilasso, II., 3.

Prof. J. G. Müller goes too far in explaining all these crosses as symbols of the rain god. The probability is that many of them are symbols of the sun, and others of the earth. Some slanting crosses signify death.

Among the ruins of Copán a strangely ornamented cross has been discovered which is here reproduced after the drawing of Heinrich Meye. Dr. Julius Schmidt describes it as follows :¹



A MAYA CROSS OR VOTIVE TABLET AT COPÁN.²

"It is undoubtedly a votive tablet, representing the worshipper making his offering to the Cross, the Maya divinity of the rain which awakens vegetation to new life. The form of the cross is a very curious one, not, however, destitute of a certain symmetry. The corresponding portions are not arranged in the way customary with us, either in horizontal or vertical correspondence, but diagonally, as is indicated by the letters inserted in the drawing. But there is no identity of the corresponding parts; it is merely a general similarity. The inner edges of the

¹ Schmidt and Meye's, *Stone Sculptures of Copán and Quirigua*. London: Asher & Co.

² The tablet stands in a court of the ruins at the foot of the eastern pyramid.

rims are trimmed with beads (could they be rain-drops?), the outer edges with tooth-shaped projections. The figure sits with its legs crossed beneath it, and holds out in the palm of its right hand an object of uncertain nature placed on a shallow vessel, whose indefinite form escapes identification. The face turned in profile shows a large, almost square eye, a large ear adorned with a ring; the rest of the face suggests a crab as the model. Upon the breast is hung from the neck by a string of beads a medallion in the shape of a face, which has the features merely indicated, and is set in beads and a halo of rays. It is probably of the same sort as an object found by Colonel Galindo in the vault H, carved in a green-colored stone, intended to be strung on a cord as shown by two perforations. From the sleeve-cuffs on the figure's wrists we judge that the body is to be understood as clad. The ornamental free end of the girdle hangs down over the feet.

Dr. Julius Smith is a good authority on the significance of Central American monuments and his interpretation of this cross as the Rain-god who awakens vegetation to new life may be accepted as probable; yet I can find no suggestion of a crab in the figure, and am inclined to regard its head as that of a cock. The face at any rate has a bird's bill, and is crowned with a cock's comb.

The beads (with one exception where the artist's copy may be at fault) are here as well as the beads of the necklace of the solar face which is nodding over the head of the Mexican High Priest (reproduced further down on page 242) always five in number.

The figure that appears on the cross cannot, in our opinion, be "the worshipper making his offering," but is the deity worshipped.


The indigenous races of America are deeply religious; they are misguided and superstitious but devout to a fault, for they do not shrink from the ultimate consequences that result from the faith that is in them. We reproduce from the monuments of Guatemala two slabs representing scenes of worship that express a great intensity of religious devotion. The attitude of the priests is very expressive; the prayer rises up in the shape of a graceful curve, and the gifts of the deity are made visible in symbols the significance of which is still a secret. (See p. 230.)

Judging from the halo-like disc of the tablet on the left hand, which is twelve feet long and three feet high, the deity represents some celestial body. According to Dr. Habel it is the goddess of the moon. The worshipping priest has a skull in his right hand, and on the altar before him lies a decapitated human head. An equilateral cross appears both on a pendant hanging from a disc on the breast of the deity and on the altar cover. (See *A. R.*, 88-89, pp. 614-615.)



GUATEMALA MONUMENTS. (R. A., 88-89, pp. 614 and 647.)

The monument on the right-hand side shows a man imploring an unknown deity, probably (as suggested by branches and flowers)



THE FIGHT OF THE SOLAR DEITY WITH THE TIGER DEVIL.¹ (See p. 232.)



FIGHT BETWEEN BEL MERODACH AND TIAMAT.

From an ancient Assyrian bas-relief, now in the British Museum. After Budge.

the god of resurrected vegetation. The Latin cross above the head of the deity, as well as the little cross hanging down under

¹From an ancient Mexican manuscript-painting, preserved in the Library of the Institute at Bologna. Reproduced from the colored fac-simile of Kingsborough's Mexican Antiquities, Vol. II, plate ii.

the right hand of the god, may not be without significance. The priest holds a skull in his left hand, indicating the human sacrifices with which the god's favor had to be procured. (See *A. R.*, 88-89, p. 647.)

Kingsborough, in his *Mexican Antiquities*, publishes a number of ancient documents which show the religious importance of the cross among the tribes of Central America. An interesting picture of an ancient manuscript, the original of which is preserved in the library of the Institute at Bologna,¹ shows a deity, apparently a sun god, whose emblem or coat of arms is an equilateral cross on a round shield, driving away an evil demon with claws and tail. The god and the monster have the same attitude that can be observed in the Assyrian bas-relief of the fight between the god Merodach



ZEUS CONQUERING TYPHOEUS.

Picture of an antique water pitcher. (Baumeister, *Denkm. d. class. Alt.*, p. 2135)


and Tiamat. The Devil, in the Mexican manuscript a tiger demon, in the Assyrian bas-relief a lion-shaped beast, has claws and a tail, and retires at the threatening approach of the god, who boldly attacks him with a thunderbolt; and mark that in both cases the attitudes of the combatants are similar, and that also the fingers of the right hand are wrongly placed in their relation to the thumb in the same way as they ought to appear on the left hand!

The idea that the sun-god struggles with the demon of darkness is almost universal. Thus Ahura Mazda smites Ahriman the fiend, and Zeus conquers Typhoeus.

Judging from the style of architecture and sculpture, we may say that the tribes who built these temples had reached a civilisa-

¹ Kingsborough. *M. A.* Vol. II., plate 11.

tion resembling in many respects that of the early Carthaginians who offered human sacrifices on crosses to the sun. There is a striking similarity between the architectural styles of ancient Mex-



THE SOLAR DISC OF THE EGYPTIANS.



THE CROSS IN THE SOLAR DISC ON AN ANCIENT MONUMENT OF CENTRAL AMERICA.¹

ico and of Egypt and Assyria ; and we cannot doubt that the winged discs with tail feathers represent the sun on the monuments of the Old World as well as of the New.

We reproduce winged solar discs from the monuments of

¹*Monuments of New Spain*, by M. Dupaix. From original drawings executed by order of the King of Spain. Part II., Vol. IV.

Egypt, of Assyria, and of Persia, in addition to the winged disc of Mexico. The cross that appears in the last one mentioned is an exact counterpart to an Assyrian cross which we reproduced from the Layard's *Monuments* in the last number of *The Open Court* (p. 155). If the Hebrews had been artists we might easily have enriched our collection by a winged solar disc of Jerusalem, for the



THE SOLAR DISC OF THE ASSYRIANS.

Jews shared with their neighbors the same conception of Zebaoth, the Lord of the starry host, as being "the sun of righteousness with healing in his wings."¹

While the Egyptian and the Assyrian civilisation exhibits bold strength and tenacity, the Mexican is distinguished by artistic




AHURA MAZDA, THE LORD OMNISCIENT.

The God of the Persians whose visible symbol is the sun.

taste, which is still noticeable in their descendants even to-day. We need but look at the altar tablet called the *beau-relief* and compare the freedom of its treatment to works of Egyptian or Assyrian art, to recognise the artistic superiority of the Mexican in spite of his many other shortcomings. There are many Raphaels slum-


¹ See Malachi IV, 2.

THE ALTAR TABLET OF THE BEAU RELIEF.¹

¹ Reproduced from W. H. Holmes, *ibid.*, plate XX, facing p. 190.

bering in the undeveloped potencies of these tribes, and we may expect great things of them in sculpture and painting, if the spread of Western civilisation will give them a good training and an acquaintance with the artistic ideals of our age.

The most interesting cross of the American Indians has been discovered in a temple near Palenque, called the Temple of the Cross No. 1. The site is covered with temples which exhibit unequivocal traces of an indigenous sun-worship. The Temple of the



THE TEMPLE OF THE BEAU RELIEF, NEAR PALENQUE.¹


a, Vestibule showing entrance to sanctuary bordered by glyphic inscriptions. *b*, Sanctuary showing the Beau Relief and entrance to basement stair. *c*, Basement chamber at foot of stair north extension. *d*, East extension of basement chamber. *e*, *f*, Slope of mountain side. *g*, Line indicating portion of front of building destroyed.

Beau Relief, so called by archæologists of to-day, contains the most beautiful piece of sculptural art of the aboriginal Indians, the so-called tablet of the Beau-Relief, representing a picture of a god. Two other temples are called "the Temples of the Cross." One of

¹ Reproduced from William H. Holmes. Field Col. Museum Publ. 16, p. 189.

them contained as an altar-piece the famous stone tablet of the cross, which shows on an elevated platform a much ornamented Latin cross on which a bird is perched. A priest on the right-hand side offers a child as a sacrifice; another person to the left may be the chief or a prominent official of some kind.¹ (See p. 225.)

The temple of the cross No. 2 contains a similar altar-piece, the centre of which is filled out by a cross. It stands upon two crouching figures, and is surmounted by a terror-inspiring face



THE TEMPLE OF THE CROSS No. 1, SEEN FROM THE TEMPLE OF THE SUN.
NEAR PALENQUE.²

behind which two rods are placed crosswise. The sacrificing priests on either side of the cross bear a close resemblance to the corresponding figures of the altar-piece in the Temple of the Cross No. 1.


We have no tradition or definite information concerning the cross in the temples of the cross near Palenque, and can surmise its significance only by comparing it to similar productions of Central America.

¹ Most of the monuments have been destroyed or have suffered greatly. The tablet of the cross is broken, one piece being preserved in Washington, the other in Mexico.

² Reproduced from W. H. Holmes, *ibid.*, p. 199.

Similar crosses have been discovered in various ancient monuments of Mexico, and we cannot doubt that every particular feature of it possesses a definite significance.

The Tejérváry Codex (Dresden) contains the illustration of a huge Maltese cross with broad fields and smaller beams inserted between them after the fashion of St. Andrew's cross. In the centre stands a blood-stained deity and every one of the four fields



THE CROSS OF THE TEJÉRVÁRY MANUSCRIPT.¹

contains human figures standing on both sides of a T-formed cross, on the top of which a bird is perched.² Except for the T-form of the four tree-crosses in the fields of the Maltese cross, the scene is the same as on the altar tablet of Palenque. But then, T-crosses are almost as frequent as four-armed crosses on the old monu-

¹ The colors are on the top, red; on the right-hand side, green; at the bottom, blue; on the left-hand side, yellow. The illustration has been reproduced from Kingsborough's *Mexican Antiquities*, Vol. III, plate 44.

² Müller, l. c., p. 498. Cf. Klemm, *Kulturgesch.*, V., 142-143.

ments of America. Professor Müller explains the bird perched on the cross as "a symbol of the sky, which is the home whence the rain god descends."

The cross of the Tejeváy Codex remained a puzzle to archæologists until it was compared by Prof. Cyrus Thomas to a number of similar Mexican documents, especially the *Tableau des Bacab*



CALENDAR WHEEL FROM DURAN.¹

of the Codex Cortesianus and the Borgian Codex, as well as calendar tables of the Codex Peresianus and the calendar wheel of Duran. The Bacab tableau resembles the cross of the Tejeváy Codex in its general arrangement, except that there is only one T cross which stands in the central field in the place of the blood-

¹A. R. 81-82, fig. 8, p. 45.

stained deity, and the bird is missing. The calendar wheel exhibits the cross formation and is like a swastika whose extremities are rounded off into the shape of a tire. A picture of the sun in the centre proves that the tau cross and the blood-stained deity of the tableau represent the sun god Herrera.¹ Mr. Cyrus Thomas explains the calendar wheel as follows :

"They divided the year into four signs, being four figures, the one of a house, another of a rabbit, the third of a cane, the fourth of a flint, and by them they reckoned the year as it passed on, saying, such a thing happened at so many houses or at so many flints of such a wheel or rotation, because their life being as it were an age, contained four periods of years consisting of thirteen, so that the whole made up fifty-two years. They painted a sun in the middle from which issued four lines or branches in a cross to the circumference of the wheel, and they turned so that they divided it into four parts, and the circumference and each of them moved with its branch of the same color, which were four, *Green, Blue, Red, and Yellow*; and each of these parts had thirteen subdivisions with the sign of a house, a rabbit, a cane, or a flint."²

According to Mr. W. H. Holmes all these crosses resembling the Palenque cross, which abound in the ancient Mexican pictographic manuscripts are tree-crosses. The branches of these cross-shaped trees terminate in clusters of symbolic fruit, and the arms of the cross are loaded down with symbols which, although highly conventionalised, have not yet entirely lost their vegetable character. The bird perched on its top seems to be the most important feature of the group, and to it, or the deity which it represents, the sacrifice is offered.

We are inclined to regard the bird as a humming bird and the altar of the cross as dedicated to Huitzilopochtli, the god of the sky and of war. Nor is the name of the god of any importance for our purpose; for the worship of almost all Mexican gods demanded human sacrifices of infants as well as adults.

Here are some characteristic instances :

The humming bird is called by the Aztecs "Huitzilin," which means "sun-hair, or sun-ray," and Huitzilopochtli means "humming bird to the left."³ The humming bird, being the most ethereal creature among the fowls of the air, is the symbol of the sun god and the national deity of the Aztecs, like the Hindu Shiva. He wears a collar of human faces, human hearts, and torn human bodies,⁴ and human sacrifices characterise his cult.

¹ *Hist. Amer. Dic.*, II., B. 10, ch. 3 Transl. Vol. III., pp. 221-222.

² A. R. 81-82, p. 44.

³ Torquemada Acosta, V., 9.

⁴ Diaz, II., 82. Clavig. I., 418. Müller, 597.

An ancient bas-relief preserved by Kingsborough in his *Antiquities of Mexico* shows the picture of a Mexican high priest in full pontifical robes, with medicine bag and staff, his girdle decorated with human faces. The rich ornaments on his head appear to be feathers decked with sunflowers or daisies. A mysterious head with a pipe in its mouth is attached to the priestly mitre on a projecting (probably forklike) stick. It must have nodded in a most theatrical manner with every motion of the priest, and we regard it as a representation of the face of the sun. On the top of the staff the head of a humming-bird emerges from other strange emblems. Further below the typical representation of the solar disc appears and the lower end is decorated with an X cross. We need not hesitate to say that the figure is a high priest of Huitzilopochtli.

The devout attitude of the two persons representing the congregation is quite in keeping with the religious spirit of the American races.¹

The explanation of the altar of the cross of Palenque as being dedicated to Huitzilopochtli has its difficulties, but they do not seem to be of weight. Tlaloc, the god of the water (or Tlaloc-teuctli), was associated with Huitzilopochtli as his ally and friend, and we know that he was worshipped in the City of Mexico in a temple that was situated by the side of the temple of Huitzilopochtli. He received human sacrifices in the form of little children that were bought for the purpose.² He is invoked whenever rain is needed and prisoners, dressed like the god, are offered him as a sacrifice.


The bloody sacrifices of ancient Mexico are of special interest because they preserve features of a past period in the history of religion embodying an idea which in a spiritualised form reappears in Christianity. The victim that is to be sacrificed is identified with the god himself to whom the sacrifice is made, and his body is afterwards eaten by the worshippers for the sake of partaking of his divinity. Professor Müller describes the rite of the annual sacrifice of the merchants of ancient Mexico to Quetzalcohuatl, the god of property, whose worship bears many important resemblances to the cult of Huitzilopochtli,³ as follows :

“Forty days before the festival, the merchants used to buy a slave that was without defect; he was bathed in a lake called the Lake of the Gods, then attired as the god Quetzalcohuatl, whom he had to impersonate for forty days. Dur-

¹ The two persons, being a man and a woman, the bas-relief may represent the solemnisation of a marriage.

² Müller, l. c., p. 501.

³ Müller, l. c., p. 591.



A MEXICAN HIGH PRIEST OF THE SUN GOD.¹

From Kingsborough's *Antiquities of Mexico*, Part III.

ing this season, he enjoyed the same reverence which was due to the god himself; he was placed upon an elevated seat, decorated with flowers, nourished with the most exquisite food. But, at the same time, especially during the night, he was carefully guarded to prevent his escape. When during processions through the city he sang and danced, the women and children came out from the houses to salute him and bring him gifts. In this way he lived until nine days before the festival; then two old priests approached him with reverent devotion and told him solemnly, 'Lord, know that in nine days thy dancing and thy singing will cease, for thou must die.' If he remained joyful, and continued dancing and singing, it was deemed a good omen; if not, a bad one. In the latter case, the priests decocted a potion of blood and cocoa for the purpose of taking from him the recollection of their words. When he had taken the potion, they hoped that he would regain his former joyfulness. On the day of the festival, he received even greater honors than ever before; music was played for him and incense burned. At last, at the hour of midnight, he was sacrificed. His heart was cut out from his body, lifted up to the moon, and thrown before the image of the god. Then the body was thrown down over the steps of the altar, and served to the merchants, especially the slave-traders, as a sacrificial meal. This festival and sacrifice took place annually; but in certain cycles in the divine year Teoxihuitl it was celebrated with an array of unusual festivity."

The highest god of the Mexicans was Tezcatlipoca, the shining mirror, and (according to Wuttke) another personification of the sun. He was the national god of the Tlalotlacs, but his cult was introduced among the Aztecs, who worshipped him as the brother of Huitzilopochtli and of Tlaloc. The three gods resemble one another almost enough to make them indistinguishable. Tezcatlipoca's festivals fall in May, when the first rain dispels the annual drought, in October, the best season of Central America, and in December on the death day of his brother Huitzilopochtli. We meet here the same pious cannibalism as in the cult of the other great Mexican deities. Prof. T. G. Müller says:

"The main sacrifice of Tezcatlipoca was the youngest and most beautiful prisoner of war or slave, whose duty it was to represent the god in his youthfulness. He was worshipped the whole year as a god. Twenty days before the festival he was married to four beautiful girls, and five days before the festival the most opulent feast was given him. On the day of the ceremony, he accompanied the image of the god which headed the procession, and was then sacrificed in a temple especially built for the purpose, with all due reverence, about a mile outside of the city, beyond the lake. The heart cut out from his breast was presented to the image, and then to the sun; but the body was not, as is the case with other sacrifices, thrown down over the steps of the temple, but carried down by the priests. Noblemen and priests received the arms and legs of the sacrifice as a sacrificial meal. The youths devoted to his worship performed a dance to the god, and the virgins offered honey cakes called 'holy flesh,' which was destined as a prize to the victors in the races which took place on the temple stairs."—p. 617.

This, as well as the human sacrifices of Huitzilopochtli, is ob-

viously an invocation to some life-spending deity to return after the drought of the hot season. As the vegetation dries under the parching influence of the sun, so the god must die, but is resurrected in his former vigor.

The fact is remarkable that the worship of the cross among the Mexicans is closely connected with human sacrifices, and this seems to connect the cross worship of Central America with the cult of the sun god in the old world.

Human sacrifice and religious cannibalism was by no means



A STONE TABLET FOUND IN THE VICINITY OF SANTA LUCIA, GUATEMALA.

Representing a dead head with outstretched tongue and carrying the emblems of crossed bones on the forehead. We may assume that it served as a sepulchral monument. (See p. 246.)

limited to the Mexicans of America, but can be traced in the rituals of various people all over the world, a fact which is good evidence in favor of the antiquity of the underlying belief which leads to the slaughter of some god-incarnation. Mr. J. G. Frazer, in his curious book *The Golden Bough*, has collected rich material on the subject. The most important instance is a custom of the Babylonians, cited by Berosus, who tells that "during the five days of the festival called the *Sacæa*, a prisoner condemned to death was dressed in the king's robes, seated on the king's throne, allowed to eat, drink, and order whatever he chose, and even per-

mitted to sleep with the king's concubines. But at the end of five days he was stripped of his royal insignia, scourged and crucified."

This Babylonian rite is apparently, as Mr. Fraser suggests, a further evolution of a more ancient custom that is still practised among the savage tribes of Africa, according to which the king, who is believed to be the incarnation of the deity, usually of the sun or heaven, is sacrificed in his best years and before his physical powers can give out. Mr. Frazer says :

" We must not forget that the king is slain in his character of a god, his death and resurrection, as the only means of perpetuating the divine life unimpaired, being deemed necessary for the salvation of his people and the world."



THE X CROSS OF THE GOD OF DEATH.¹ (See p. 246.)

With the advance of civilisation the old custom was modified Mr. Frazer says :

" When the time drew near for the king to be put to death, he abdicated for a few days, during which a temporary king reigned and suffered in his stead. At first the temporary king may have been an innocent person, possibly a member of the king's own family ; but with the growth of civilisation, the sacrifice of an innocent person would be revolting to the public sentiment, and accordingly a condemned criminal would be invested with the brief and fatal sovereignty."

All these savage notions reappear in a purified form in Christianity, and incidental features, such as the previous recognition as god and king, the hosannas and flowers offered during a solemn procession, the buying of the victim that has to suffer death, add strength to the more essential similarities. We deem it specially significant, although the fact may be after all incidental,

¹ Reproduced from the Annual Reports of Bureau of Ethnology.

that the cross worship is almost always closely connected with human sacrifices offered to the god of the sun, be he Baal or Huitzilopochtli.

* * *

We conclude this sketch on the cross in Central America with a mention of an instance in which the *crux decussata*, or St. Andrew's cross (X), symbolises two dead bones, and is the attribute of the deity of death. Prof. J. G. Müller (l. c., p. 98) says :

"Pauguk, the god of death, is armed with a club or bow and arrows, and is pictured without flesh and blood, covered only with a thin skin. He is a hunter of men, and his appearance is a sure sign of the approach of death. Whenever any one dies suddenly or unexpectedly it is said that he met the eye of Pauguk. Warriors, reaching out for the prize of victory, frequently grasp his cold and bony hand." (Conf. Schoolcraft, *Wigwam*, 215 ff. Alg. ver. II., 226-241.)

MISCELLANEOUS.

ST. PAUL AND THE THEATRE HAT.

Nations among which the Christian religion has been introduced so as to practically exclude all other forms of religion are called Christian nations. That does not imply that all members of such a nation profess faith in Jesus Christ. In our own country but a minority of the inhabitants belong to Christian churches. Still, Christianity is, so to speak, the only religion which exercises and has exercised for centuries a visible and tangible influence upon our people and their ancestors. Our manners and morals, public as well as private, have consequently become thoroughly imbued with Christianity. There may be some who are ignorant of this fact and inclined to deny it. It is, however, easily proved, especially as far as our manners and customs are concerned.

That our manners and customs are influenced by Christianity, even where it should least be expected, can be demonstrated with the greatest facility. The "theatre hat," for instance, which of late has been so often discussed and generally condemned, at least by the stronger sex, is an old Christian apostolic institution. That is the more surprising, since church and theatre are by numerous persons thought to be utterly opposed to each other. But, a closer examination of the first part of chapter xi. of the First Epistle to the Corinthians will make it perfectly clear that no less an authority than the Apostle Paul is responsible for the "theatre hat."

In that passage the Apostle commands the male members of the congregation at Corinth to be uncovered during divine services, while he urges the women to cover their heads. The Apostle does, indeed, not expressly use the term "divine services." He says that the men should be bare-headed when praying and prophesying, and that the women should wear their head-dress when doing the same. His words to that effect are found in verses 4 and 5: "Every man praying and prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoreth his head. But every woman that prayeth and prophesieth with her head uncovered dishonoreth her head. For that is even all one as if she were shaven." Praying and prophesying formed, as is generally known, the two principal elements of the public, religious services of the Christians at the time of the Apostle Paul, just as they do at present. It is, therefore, not to be doubted that the Apostle's commandment refers to the head-dress of the Christians at Corinth when they were attending church.

The precept of the Apostle, as far as woman is concerned, centers in verse 10, which in our English translation reads: "The woman ought to have power on her head." This rendering is incorrect, inasmuch as it omits the indefinite article be-

fore the word power. It should be: "The woman ought to have a power on her head." The corresponding Greek word must mean something worn by women on their heads; and our English Bible has added on the margin the note: "That is a covering, in sign that she is under the power of her husband." Whether that be the real meaning of the strange Greek word, I am unable to state. The word signifies either in its abstract sense, power, or, in its concrete sense, officers that exercise power. Neither meaning suits our passage. If it could be shown that it also meant protection, and a thing that protects, it would be quite acceptable. It is, however, possible that the word found at present in our passage has been inserted by an old copier, instead of the original word meaning head-dress (for instance, *ἐπικρατῖδας*), or that it was the popular name of a certain kind of head-gear worn by women at that time. One thing is absolutely sure, and is nowhere denied, it must be the name of something in the line of veils, hoods, or bonnets, used by women to cover their heads.

The Apostle enjoins his command concerning the head-dress of men and women among the early Christians at Corinth with so much force and earnestness that it is but natural to assume that they have obeyed him. Besides, as he did not preach another religion at Corinth than at other places, he must have given the same command wherever he succeeded in founding congregations. The Apostle Paul being the founder of the Christian Church among the Gentiles, among all nations not of Jewish descent, is also the father of our churches, because our ancestors were Gentiles, not Jews. For this reason it is to be taken for granted that the direct influence of the Apostle must appear in many things even among us; and it cannot be wondered at that such precepts of his as that of covered and uncovered heads, are still religiously observed in all Christian churches. Up to this present day men take off their hats as soon as they enter church, while women do not think of removing them. This latter custom, far from being the outgrowth of female vanity and the desire to publicly display their good or bad taste in selecting fashionable head-gear, has been introduced by the Apostle Paul, and proves how conservative the gentler sex is in matters of religion.

But the Apostle's influence in this respect is by no means confined to the churches; it rules supreme even at such places of worldly pleasure as the theatre and the concert-hall. Every one knows that the theatre of the ancient Greeks was a religious institution; theatrical performances with them were religious services of the highest importance. A similar connexion exists between the Christian Church and the modern theatre. The migration of the Teutonic tribes swept away Greek and Roman culture from the confines of Western Europe. The Church alone preserved the germs of that old and venerable civilisation, and cultivated as well as imparted them to the people which acknowledged its spiritual rule. Thus it happened that during the Middle Ages the Christian Church became the mother of all modern arts and sciences. Modern music, poetry, sculpture, painting, architecture, etc., served their apprenticeship as handmaids of religion. Christmas plays were the beginnings of modern drama and opera. Those plays were given at the usual places of public worship and were regarded as public religious services of even a higher order than the ordinary services. The necessary consequence was that men removed their hats and women did not on such occasions, just as at the regular services.

When, by and by, the theatre became emancipated from the control of the Church, that custom had become so firmly established that it was a matter of course for women not to be seen in public places unless with covered heads. The origin

of that custom had long been forgotten; nobody cared to learn its real meaning; everybody was convinced that it was the only proper thing for decent women to do; and women themselves would have been ready to fight for what they believed to be their privilege. And this position our women can hardly be said to have abandoned. That is, in short, the historical evolution of the "theatre hat"; and I hope to have been successful in proving that the Apostle Paul is its father, in so far at least as he induced all Gentile Christians to conform with an old, religious observance of the Greeks and Romans.

Among the Jews, both sexes, men as well as women, had to cover their heads while praying, a custom still observed in all orthodox synagogues. Among the Greeks and Romans, however, men prayed with bare heads, but women had to be veiled. Juvenal, for instance, tells us, Sat. VI., 390-392, of a certain Roman lady (quaedam de numero Lamiarum ac nominis Aeli):

Stetit ante aram, nec turpe putavit,
Pro cithara velare caput, dictataque verba
Pertulit, ut mos est, et aperta palluit agna.

(She stood before the altar, nor did think it disgraceful to veil her head in favor of a cithara, and completed the prescribed words religiously, and watched closely, as the lamb was opened.) Paul, who was very careful not to introduce Judaism among his Gentile disciples, accepted and sanctioned, also in this respect, the old established heathen custom.

Many people will, as I believe, find it somewhat queer that the Apostle should have occupied himself seriously with such a question, and especially that he should have made so great a distinction between man and woman. The more carefully will we have to consider his reasons. These, as furnished by himself, are three in number. The Apostle, in the first place, states that it is not "comely that a woman should pray unto God uncovered." According to him, such a woman should also be "shorn or shaven." The long hair given her indicates that she must cover her head while attending church. The second reason consists in woman's natural inferiority. The Apostle says: "The man is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man." Such inferiority demands an outward token, and, in order to furnish that, the Apostle decreed that women should keep their heads covered at church. The third reason is found in verse 10: "The woman ought to have a power on her head because of the angels." The expression "because of the angels" has to be explained more fully.

It refers to an old Jewish myth or superstition which, as is shown by our present passage, was shared by the Apostle Paul. In the first verses of Genesis vi. the following remarks occur: "It came to pass when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and daughters were born unto them, that the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and they took them wives of all which they chose." "There were giants in the earth in those days, and also after that when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old men of renown." "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." We further are informed that this experience induced God to destroy the inhabitants of the earth by the great flood. On these short and unconnected remarks, in later times, the story of the fallen angels was built up. Angels became enamored of mortal women, begot

the giants, and introduced all kinds of wickedness and evil among the dwellers of the earth. God was finally compelled to punish those angels by imprisoning them in a deep, dark hole in the desert of Dudael, and the mortal sinners by drowning them in the deluge. This story is handed down to us in the first part of the Book of Enoch, an apocryphal writing which originated in Palestine about one hundred and twenty-five years before the Christian era, and which was very popular both among the Jews as also afterwards among the early Christians. It is impossible to cite the whole story of the fallen angels. A few sentences, however, will enable us to form a sufficiently clear idea of its character.

In chapter vi. we read: "It happened, after the children of men had multiplied in those days, that fair and beautiful daughters were born to them. And the angels, the sons of the heavens, saw them and lusted after them, and said unto each other, 'Come, let us choose wives among the children of men and beget children.' And Semjaza, the first of them, said unto them, 'I fear lest ye may not want to accomplish that deed, and then I alone shall have to suffer punishment for that great sin.'" The next chapter continues: "And they took them wives, and each selected one for himself, and they began to go in unto them, and mixed with them, and taught them witchcraft and incantations, and informed them how to cut roots and different kinds of wood. But they became pregnant and brought forth mighty giants whose length was three thousand cubits."

The Apostle evidently believed that women, by covering their heads when appearing before God, would avoid the danger of tempting the angels, some two hundred of whom had fallen easy victims to womanly loveliness and beauty in olden times, and had thereby brought fearful ruin and destruction upon themselves and upon all the inhabitants of the earth. He was afraid such an awful thing might occur a second time, and, therefore, thought it but prudent to warn all Christian women not to show their bare heads when in presence of God and His angels.

The first of the apostle's reasons is a mere question of taste in regard to which there has taken place a very decided change. We are not at all shocked when we behold a woman with bare head; nor do we consider it as unbecoming when a woman, be it from choice or necessity, wears her hair short, or is, as the Apostle would express it, shorn. Neither does the second reason impress us as strong and convincing. The Apostle rests his decision upon the report of the creation of man in Genesis ii., where we are told that the first woman was formed out of a rib of the man, and was created for the purpose of finding a help meet for him. But there are at present not very many people who implicitly believe in that tradition. Modern science has formulated other theories concerning the origin of man, and modern public opinion does certainly not countenance the idea that man is a superior being as compared with woman. Man and woman are certainly different from each other in more than one respect; but, for all that, they are without doubt of exactly the same rank and dignity, and nobody is more strongly convinced of this truth than woman herself. If they were asked in earnest whether they considered themselves as beings occupying a lower position than man, and whether they felt themselves in duty bound to publicly confess their inferiority by wearing such a badge as the Apostle has prescribed for them, they would rise of one accord to indignantly protest against such an outrageous insult.

The third reason is even weaker than the first two. Many Christian poets and thinkers, for instance Milton, have become interested in the old myth of the fallen angels, but they invented their own explanation, and would never have believed in

the report of the Book of Enoch, notwithstanding the fact that its truth has never been doubted among the early Christians, and that it was even accepted by Paul and other Apostles. We are absolutely unable to imagine that angels could be tempted by womanly grace and beauty; and we can cite in confirmation of such a doubt the following words of Jesus Christ himself: "In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven."

We have, therefore, to admit that the Apostle Paul absolutely fails to support his commandment with convincing reasons. It is, according to our way of feeling and thinking, as little uncomely for women to remove their hats at church or at other public places, as it is for men. We cannot believe that the virtue of angels may in any way be affected and tempted by women. And, least of all, may women be ordered to wear a badge of inferiority, because they are not inferior to men.

The apostle very likely had, although he entirely fails to mention it, still another reason which would have to be accepted as valid, as far, at least, as his own contemporaries were concerned. His precept was undoubtedly called forth by an attempt of Christian women at Corinth to demonstrate that they were man's equals by discarding their customary head-dress at the meetings of the congregation. That would have been, if successful, not only an injudicious but also a very dangerous move. Those rumors, circulating among pagans that the Christians were practicing all kinds of animal sin at their meetings, would thereby have been confirmed. For prostitutes alone appeared in public, clothed in a toga and bareheaded, while decent matrons always wore the stola which included a covering for the head.

The result of this investigation is that we to-day disagree from the Apostle Paul on a question considered by himself as important enough, but which is and remains after all not a question of faith and ethics, but simply of temporary expediency and fashion, which, as such, does not stand in any connexion with religion. We might draw the conclusion that modern women ought to abolish the old custom introduced by the Apostle, and thereby demonstrate that they have the same rights as are enjoyed by men. Such a course would at once become necessary when it ever should be claimed that women must not uncover their heads because they are not man's equals. But, since only few know anything about the origin and the real meaning of the custom, we may even imagine that women wear their head-dress at public places where men have to uncover because chivalrous men have granted them such a privilege. Nevertheless, considerations of Christian charity should induce Christian women to willingly renounce such a privilege wherever other people suffer from it. True womanhood as well as true manhood does not consist in covered or uncovered heads, but in perfect charity, the laws of which are exactly the same for both sexes. In Christ there is neither man nor woman.

St. Paul's Church, Belleville, Ill.

WM. WEBER.

COUNT TERACHIMA ON THE RELATIONS OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES.

[The following remarks were made by Count Terachima, of Japan, a graduate of Pennsylvania University, who is now taking postgraduate studies in law at the University of Paris. Count Terachima replied to the sentiment, "The Foreign Students of the American Universities," at the Washington's Birthday banquet in

Paris, given under the auspices of the American University Dinner Club. The toast was proposed by the chairman, Consul-General Gowdy.

PARIS, March 10, 1899.

THEODORE STANTON.]

Mr. Toastmaster and Ladies and Gentlemen:—It gives me a double pleasure to-night to find myself, on this brilliant occasion, with you, gentlemen from the American universities and colleges and their honorable and distinguished guests. In the first place, because this is my first attendance at the University Club dinner to celebrate one of the greatest men in human history, the father of your country. Secondly, because I find here a fitting place to state that not only myself but Japan owes much to the United States, and to express again, as I have already done many a time, the words of sincere gratitude to you, gentlemen, who represent the best political, social and intellectual elements of your country.

Further, that I have been called upon to respond to the toast "Japan" adds still more to my pleasure, for as a Japanese who made the United States his second home, living there some number of years, and who received his liberal education at the University of Pennsylvania, I always love to speak to my American fellow-graduates of that marvellous change and development which has taken place in Japan since the first treaty of commercial intercourse was concluded between us and your Commodore Perry in 1854.

I shall venture to say a word or two in response to your call, trying to give a very brief outline of the state of things, as they exist at present, in Japan and in the Far East.

We hear much of China lately as to the advisability of opening up the Celestial Empire to the commerce of the world. But only think a moment; it is but little more than forty years ago that we, the same Japanese who are now the pioneers of Western progress and civilisation, were refusing to allow the foreigners to come into the country for any purpose whatever. We wanted to be left alone, undisturbed in the deep slumber which had lasted centuries. Our foreign policy up to that time, if there was any, was hostile to the rest of the world except a few cases of clandestine commerce with Portuguese and Spanish adventurers and also with the Chinese, Koreans and the other Asiatic people. In principle, therefore, the country had its entrances strictly closed to strangers, and there was no place for the "open door" doctrine. It was only after the memorable visit of Commodore Perry that we came to the conclusion to enter into peaceful intercourse with the Americans and subsequently with the Europeans. Gentlemen, thus the great influence of the nineteenth century civilisation has penetrated into the heart of the country where the system of feudalism had reached its highest perfection and where the sole principle of diplomacy was "isolation." Then and there we became the earnest partisans of the open door policy in the countries of the Far East, and are endeavoring to promote the realisation of the highest ideals of modern civilisation. We waged the war against China in which we sacrificed much of our best blood in order to uphold the disputed right of Korean independence and sovereignty, in much the same way as in the last great war the United States acted with Spain. And, now, as the representative and the most powerful native state in the Orient, Japan has a new and difficult task to perform, namely—to maintain peace and to guarantee the security of international commerce in that far-away portion of the world! To accomplish this very responsible but important mission, we welcome the co-operation of all true partisans of peace and humanity. This is what the leaders of the Land of the Rising Sun are striving to achieve.

Allow me to add a few words about the Japanese graduates of the American institutions. I know I am not saying too much when I tell you that they are more or less prominent in the sphere of work they have chosen—in politics, diplomacy, science, religion, and jurisprudence. As an example I may present you the name of His Excellency Mr. Kourino, the present Japanese minister in France, who is a graduate of the Harvard Law School and whom we esteem as one of the ablest and most accomplished diplomats we have the good fortune to call ours. They all endeavor to bring the Japanese Empire to the high position in the family of nations which destiny has designed for her.

In Japan you will be sure to find friends warm enough to give you very welcome reception and earnest enough to afford you sympathetic support in any lofty work the United States may undertake in the interest of universal peace and for the promotion of human welfare.

May the bonds of friendship existing between your country and mine become in future stronger and stronger, and may they add much to the realisation of higher principles than those of egoism and of oppression.

S. TERACHIMA.

AMERICANISM IN THE ROMAN CHURCH.

The Pope's encyclical has created a stir in America. The Italian party, as we may call those who are in favor of continuing the present conditions of the Roman Church, which practically is governed by Italians, claim that His Holiness has condemned Americanism, a movement which tends to broaden the Church and adapt it to the spirit of the times: and the general tone of the encyclical tends to support their view. But Archbishop Ireland, the leader of progressive thought among the American Roman Catholics, can find in it no trace of condemnation of his own position. The fact is that the Pope makes general statements only, which are mere hints and not definite decisions. There is no doubt, however, that he censures Father Hecker and his followers for their lack of appreciation of the purely ascetic saintliness of the saints, which does not find expression in helpful work; but otherwise no names are mentioned, and thus Archbishop Ireland is left at liberty to interpret the words in the sense in which he reads them. The Pope, he says, censures only certain excrescences of Americanism, but not Americanism itself.

In America we understand by Americanism love of freedom, self-reliance, and the consciousness of responsibility.

Father McGlynn showed the spirit of Americanism when he braved the curse of excommunication, a feat of heroism for a believer in Rome's authority which Protestants cannot properly appreciate, because they have ceased to fear the thunder of Rome that for centuries has been showered upon them without any visible effect.

Whether the followers of Father Hecker are imbued with Americanism remains to be seen. In response to the censure which has been passed on the doctrines of their venerable founder, they have at once cabled their unreserved allegiance to Rome and sent a letter of submission, the publication of which is left to the discretion of the Pope. Submission to church authority, and, above all other things, to Rome, is a virtue according to the Roman view, but the reward will be that those who submit will be regarded as good subjects of Rome. Whenever a man is strong enough to assert his independence he will be respected as a man with backbone. The weak must not expect the leniency which Father McGlynn

received, who, after his apostacy, was honored with a personal and most cordial interview with His Holiness. Backbone always enforces consideration, and he who bows his neck under the yoke must carry it. He who insists on his rights, and stands up for them without fear of ban and interdict, must be reckoned with even in the fold of the Roman Church. American Catholics are looked upon with a certain suspicion among the partisans of reactionary policy in Europe, but they are after all more respected than their submissive European co-religionists.

We may be allowed to express briefly our views on the subject.

We recognise in the Roman Catholic Church a most powerful institution which serves the spiritual needs of large masses of people who without the discipline of their priests would be without a guide in life. Every man has the religion he deserves; and the religion which a man deserves is in most cases the religion which he needs. The sensual man needs a sensual religion that drives home to him truths in concrete allegories which he could not understand in a direct statement; he must literally believe in the flames of hell in order to see harm in wrong-doing and to understand that the curse of sin is real and inevitable. The Roman Catholic Church is adapted to large masses of mankind. According to the opinion of outsiders the methods of the Church are gross; but they are effective. They have originated through an accommodation to the needs of gross minds, while the sentiments of the more cultured are satisfied by the subtler sensuality of art.

The organisation of the Church is perfect, but its politics are far from the high ideal which it claims to fulfil.

The Church is Roman, but not catholic; it is an Italian institution, not a church universal. This is apparent even in external and trivial things. The great mass of cardinals are Italians; in addition there are a few of other European nationalities, French, German, Slav, Spanish, but only one American cardinal.

The very name "Roman Catholic" is a contradiction in terms. Rome is a city in Italy with a glorious though bloody history; it is not a city through which the life of to-day pulses; it belongs more to the past than to the present time; but at any rate, it is one particular spot on earth. "Catholic" means that which appertains to the whole world, to the entire earth wherever it is inhabited. Thus "Roman Catholic" is a "particular universal"; and it is obvious that a church which is Roman cannot be catholic, and one that is catholic cannot be exclusively Roman.

Catholicism is a good thing, for catholic doctrine is exactly the thing we want. Let us have truth that is universal and principles that are applicable everywhere. We need not despair of finding them, for truth universal is no impossibility; in fact, we possess it in "science." Thus there is only one religion in the world that is truly catholic,—the Religion of Science. All other religions are catholic in the measure in which they accept truth universal.

The aspiration after catholicity is always wholesome, even when it is not realised. The Roman Catholic Church is practically a Roman church; yet there are men in it who tolerate its Romanism for the sake of its ideal of catholicity.

"Roman" might mean the Catholic Church as it is in Rome; but in that case we ought to have German, French, American, etc., Catholic churches as well. This is the position of the Anglican Church.

Further, "Roman" might mean that the Catholic Church has its centre in Rome, which should be regarded as a matter of accident, and the seat of the popes might as well be Avignon or New York or Chicago. If this view were accepted, the representatives of the Church should see to it that other nationalities should be rep-

resented in the Church government according to their importance; but the policy of Rome has always been to admit to its internal affairs as few outsiders as possible; and they have so far almost succeeded in paralysing American influence. It appears that they can no longer keep it out without a struggle; hence the disturbance which is caused by the American movement in the Roman Church.

We cannot help sympathising with the American movement in the Roman Church; it is still weak in Europe and met by most powerful opponents, but we hope that the time will come in which it will be recognised by the highest church authorities as legitimate in its aspirations.

The Roman Catholic Church needs a regeneration, and Americanism is the leaven in the dough which will prove a vitalising element of great value. Sad would be the day on which the Church officially rejected Americanism as un-Catholic, for it would doom the Church to stagnancy.

Americanism in the Roman Catholic Church is a sign of spring; it proves that some life is still left in the old tree. So long as Americanism remains a factor in the politics of the Church, there is hope that she may keep up with the progress of Protestant countries. In the interest of the many millions who blindly follow the authority of Rome, we are anxious for the success of the good cause of wider freedom and higher spirituality.

F. C.

APRIL MONIST.

The April *Monist* is more popular than the general run of its predecessors and with one or two exceptions the subjects treated are of quite general interest. The opening article is by Prof. G. Sergi, on "The Primitive Inhabitants of Europe." It sets forth in an intelligible manner the criteria which the well-known ethnologist has established for distinguishing the various types of human races. Prof. Sergi's theory is that the race in Europe which followed the Neanderthal type was Eurafican and came from Africa; the Asiatic, or Indo-European, civilisation followed. As the criterion for distinguishing race, Professor Sergi has substituted the *form* of the skull for the more transitory features which have been adopted by other anthropologists.

William Romaine Paterson, a well-known English novelist, has contributed an article on "The Irony of Jesus," in which the intellectual and critical attitude of Jesus is emphasised. The new voluminous work of Shadworth H. Hodgson, "The Metaphysic of Experience," finds a full and competent *résumé* in an essay entitled "Actual Experience," by Dr. Edmund Montgomery.

In an illustrated paper on "Yahveh and Manitou," Dr. Paul Carus traces the analogies which exist between the character of the ancient Yahveh, or Jehovah, as described in the records of the Old Testament, and the God-conception of the North American Indians. The ancient God of Israel was a God of the desert, and as his people were brought into contact with civilisation the burden of all prophecy was to the effect that his ancient religion and rites were being abandoned for the gods of a false culture. The constant refrain is a return to the old conditions, and this, trait for trait, has been the development of the religion of the North American Indian, since the advent of the white man.

"The Contemporary Philosophical Movement in France" has been treated by Prof. L. Lévy-Bruhl, who is now writing a series of articles on French Philosophy for *The Open Court*. There is at present great activity in philosophical circles in France, and the survey of Professor Lévy-Bruhl will give information which can scarcely be found elsewhere. M. Lucien Arréat has contributed his usual criticisms

of the latest French philosophical books; while the book reviews cover an unusually wide sphere of interest, including theology, the history of religion, philosophy epistemology, mathematics, physics, biology, anthropology, and so forth. (Chicago The Open Court Publishing Co. Price, 50 cents.)


The work which Dr. Félix Le Dantec published a couple of years ago on a *New Theory of Life* was very favorably received by the thinking world, and his new book on *Individual Evolution and Heredity*¹ displays the same characteristics of careful research and moderate speculation which marked his initial work. M. Le Dantec, while not a materialist, has a decided bias to looking at the phenomena of life from the point of view of physics and chemistry, or at least he believes that the scientific description of life in its ultimate form will be stated in terms of physical and chemical laws. He believes that he has established by his studies the fact that it is impossible to find between living bodies and inert bodies, so called, any other difference than the presence or absence of the property known as assimilation, and is apparently of the opinion that no other property can be made the basis of biological research. From this foundation the research must proceed deductively, and will exclude the errors based on teleology and anthropomorphism. He seeks a high scientific ideal. His work has all the semblance of mathematical rigor. The treatment, though concise, is highly suggestive, giving evidence of profound study which has not excluded important American contributions to the subject.

* * *

Dr. A. Binet and Dr. V. Henri, of Paris, who have shown themselves indefatigable in the production of experimental researches in psychology and in the publication of journals and works relating to their department, embarked last year on a new literary enterprise which has taken the form of a library of pedagogy and psychology. The first book of the series is on *Intellectual Fatigue*,² a series of experimental researches on the general feeling of lassitude and on the general physiological alterations which follow mental exertion. The first part is devoted to the influence of intellectual labor on the action of the heart, on the capillary circulation, on the pressure of the blood, on the temperature of the body, on the production of heat, muscular force, and the changes of nutrition. The second part is devoted to a consideration of the methods of studying such effects and to a discussion of the influence of intermittent periods of rest upon intellectual labor. The experiments have been conducted partly in the laboratory and partly in the school-room. The book is very complete in its description of instruments, methods of registration, and interpretation of results. Upon the whole, it is rather a physiology of intellectual work, and it can hardly be said that the results justify any definite conclusion as to the real problem involved, which is the determining of the duration and arrangement of the working hours of schools. But the methods for further work and the directions in which this work is to be done have been indicated by the authors. The old pedagogy, which they characterise as pure verbiage, has been supplanted by a new pedagogy which is based upon observation and experiment. To have furnished some of the instruments by which these observations and experiments can be conducted has been the purpose of the authors; the rest remains to be done.

¹*Evolution Individuelle et Hérité: Théorie de la Variation Quantitative.* By Félix Le Dantec. Paris: Félix Alcan, 108 Boulevard Saint-Germain. Pp., 308. Price, 6 francs.

²*La Fatigue Intellectuelle.* By A. Binet and V. Henri. 90 figures and 3 plates. Paris: Schleicher Frères, 15 rue des Saints-Pères. 1898. Pp., 338.



ÉTIENNE BONNOT DE CONDILLAC.
(1715-1780)

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Frontispiece to The Open Court.

THE EVOLUTION OF SPEECH.¹

BY PROF. TH. RIBOT.

IN passing from the origin of speech² to the study of its development, we enter upon firmer ground. Although this development has not occurred uniformly in every race, and the linguists—who are here our guides—do not always agree in fixing its phases, it is nevertheless the surest indication of the march of the human mind in its self-analysis in passing from extreme confusion to deliberate differentiation; while the materials are sufficiently abundant to admit of an objective study of intellectual psychogenesis, based upon language.

This attempt has nothing in common with the "general or philosophical grammar" of the beginning of this century. The Idealogues who founded this had the pretension, while taking language as their basis, to analyse the fundamental categories of intelligence: substance, quality, action, relation. A laudable enterprise, but one which, by reason of the method employed, could only be abortive. Knowing only the classical or modern languages, the products of a long civilisation, they had no suspicion of the embryonic phases; accordingly, they made a theoretical construction, the work of logicians rather than of psychologists. Any positive genetic investigation was inaccessible to them; they were lacking in material, and in instruments. If by a comparison borrowed from geology, the adult languages are assimilated to the Quaternary layer; the Tertiary, Secondary, and Primary strata will correspond with certain idioms of less and less complexity which themselves contain the fossils of psychology. These lower forms—the semi-organised or savage languages which are a hundred times more numerous than the civilised languages—are now familiar to us; hence there is an immense field for research and

¹ Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.

² See the April *Open Court*.

comparison. This retrogression to the primitive leads to a point that several linguists have designated by a term borrowed from biology: it is the protoplasmic state "without functions of grammatical categories" (Hermann Paul). How is it that speech issued from this undifferentiated state, and constituted little by little its organs and functions? This question is interesting to the linguist on certain sides, to the psychologist on others. For us it consists in seeking how the human mind, through long groping, conquered and perfected its instrument of analysis.

I. At the outset of this evolution, which we are to follow step by step, we find the hypothesis of a primitive period, the so-called *roots*, and it is worth our while to pause over this a little. Roots—whatever may be our opinion as to their origin—are in effect general terms. But in what sense?

Chinese consists of 500 monosyllables which, thanks to varieties of intonation, sufficed for the construction of the spoken language; Hebrew, according to Renan, has about 500 roots; for Sanskrit there is no agreement. According to a bold hypothesis of Max Müller, it is reducible to 121, perhaps less, and "these few seeds have produced the enormous intellectual vegetation that has covered the soil of India from the most distant antiquity to the present day.¹ Whatever their number may be, the question for us reduces itself into knowing their primitive intellectual content, their psychological value. Here we are confronted by two very different theses. For one camp, roots are a reality; for the other, they are the simple residuum of analysis.

"Roots are the phonetic types produced by a force inherent in the human mind; they were created by nature," etc., etc. Thus speaks Max Müller. Whitney, who is rarely of the same mind, says, notwithstanding, that all the Indo-European languages are descended from one primitive, monosyllabic language, "that our ancestors talked with one another in simple syllables indicative of ideas of prime importance, but wanting all designation of their relations."

In the other camp it is sustained that roots are the result of learned analysis, but that there is nothing to prove that they really existed (Sayce); that they are reconstructed by comparison and generalisation; that, e. g., in the Aryan languages, roots bear much the same relation to Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin words as Platonic ideas to the objects of the real world" (Bréal). It has been calculated that the number of articulate sounds which the

¹ This list may be found in *The Science of Thought*, p. 306.

human voice is capable of producing amounts to three hundred and eighty-five. These sounds, for physiological reasons, constitute a fundamental theme in the various words created by man. Later on, linguists in comparing the vocables used in different languages, established the frequent recurrence of certain sounds common to several words. These have been isolated, but we must not see in them aught besides *extracts*. Moreover, "the first stammerings of man have nothing in common with phonetic types so arrested in form and abstract in signification, as *dhâ*, to place, *vid*, to see, *man*, to think, and other analogous words."

To sum up. In the first thesis roots come into existence, *ub initio*; words are derived from them by reduplication, flexions, affixes, suffixes, etc.; there is the trunk upon which a whole swarm of languages has proliferated.

In the second thesis, words come first; then the common element, disengaged by analysis, but which never really existed in the pure and primitive condition.

Whether the one opinion or the other be adopted, I see no conclusion to be drawn from it save that the first terms designated qualities or manners of being, varying with the race. The first thesis seems the more apt in revealing to us the primitive forms of abstraction and generalisation. If it be selected, despite its fragility, one finds in the list of roots (even when most reduced) an extraordinary mixture of terms applied to the most disparate things (e. g., tears, break, measure, milk, to choose, to clean, to vomit, cold, to fear, etc.). To assert with Max Müller (from whom I borrow the preceding terms) that "there are the one hundred and twenty-one original concepts, the primitive intellectual baggage of the Aryan family" is to employ an unfortunate formula, for nothing could less resemble concepts than the contents of this list. If the second thesis be adopted, the root then being nothing but "the exposed kernel of a family of words," "a phonogram," analogous to composite photographs, formed like these by a condensation of the similarities between several terms, then clearly primitive abstraction and generalisation must be sought in words, and not in roots.¹

¹ How were primitive terms (roots or words) formed? A much-debated and still unsolved question. Man had at his disposal one primary element, the interjection. By all accounts this remained sterile, unfertile; it did not give birth to words; it remained in articulate language as a mark of its emotional origin. A second proceeding was that of imitation with the aid of sound onomatopœia. From antiquity to the present time, it has been regarded as the parent, *par excellence*. This was accepted by Renan, Whitney, Taylor, H. Paul, etc.; rejected by M. Müller Bréal, P. Regnaud, etc. No one disputes the formation of many words by onomatopœia, but those who question its value as a universal process say that "if in certain sounds of our idioms

II. Leaving this question which, from its relation to that of the origin of speech, shares in the same obscurity, we have further to ask if the primitive terms (whatever nature be attributed to them) were, properly speaking, words or phrases? Did man initially give utterance to simple denominations, or to affirmations and negations? On this point all linguists seem to be in agreement. "Speech must express a judgment." In other words it is always a phrase. "Language is based on the phrase, not on the single word: we do not think by means of words, but by means of phrases."¹

This phrase may be a single word,—or composite, formed by confusion of words as in the so-called agglutinative, polysynthetic, holophrastic languages,—or two words, subject and attribute; or three distinct words, subject, attribute, and copula; but beneath all these forms the fundamental function is unalterably to affirm or deny.

The same remark has been made of children. "We must," says Preyer, "reject the general notion that children first employ substantives, and afterwards verbs. My son, at the age of twenty-three months first used an adjective to express a judgment, the first which he enunciated in his maternal tongue; he said *heiss* (hot) for 'the milk is too warm.' Later on, the proposition was made in two words: *heim-mimi*, 'I want to go home and drink some milk' (*heim*=home, *mimi*=milk). Taine and some others have cited several observations of the same order.

According to some authors, all language that has reached complete development has perforce passed through the three successive periods of monosyllabism, polysyntheticism, and analysis; so that the idioms that remain monosyllabic or agglutinative would correspond to an arrest in development. To others, this is a hypothesis, only, to be rejected. However this may be (and it is not a question that we need to examine), it seems rash to assert, with Sayce, "that the division of the phrase into two parts, sub-

we seem to hear an imitation of the sounds of nature, we must recollect that the same noises are represented by quite different sounds in other languages, which are also held by those who utter them to be onomatopœia. Thus it would be more just to say that we hear the sounds of nature through the words to which our ear has been accustomed from infancy" (Breal). I have observed that those who study the spontaneous formation of language in children, claim for them little onomatopœism. On the other hand, a word created by undoubted onomatopœia is sometimes by means of association, or of strange analogies, transferred successively to so many objects that all trace of the transformations of meaning may be lost, and the imitative origin actually denied. Such was Darwin's case, before cited, where the onomatopœia of the duck finally served to designate all liquids, all that flies, all pieces of money. If the successive extensions of the term had not been observed, who could have recovered its origin?

¹ Sayce, *loc. cit.*, IV., §§ 3-5.

ject and predicate, is a pure accident, and that if Aristotle had been Mexican (the Aztec language was polysynthetic), his system of logic would have assumed a totally different form." The appearance and evolution of analytical language is not pure accident, but the result of mental development. It is impossible to pass from synthesis to analysis without dividing, separating, and arraying the isolated parts in a certain order. The logic of a Mexican Aristotle might have differed from our own in its form; but it could not have constituted itself without fracture of its linguistic mould, without setting up a division, at least in theory, between the elements of the discourse. The unconscious activity by which certain idioms made towards analysis, and passed from the period of envelopment to that of development, imposed upon them a successive order. Polysynthetic languages have been likened to the performance of children who want to say everything at once, their ideas all surge up together and form a conglomeration.¹ Evidently this method must be given up, or we must renounce all serious progress in analysis.

To sum up the psychological value of the phrase, independently of its multiple forms, we may conclude by the following remarks of Max Müller :

"We imagine that language is impossible without sentences, and that sentences are impossible without the copula. This view is both right and wrong. If we mean by sentence an utterance consisting of several words, and a subject, and a predicate, and a copula, it is wrong. . . . When the sentence consists only of subject and predicate, we may say that a copula is understood, but the truth is that at first it was not expressed, it was not required to be expressed; in primitive languages it was simply impossible to express it. To be able to say *vir est bonus*, instead of *vir bonus*, is one of the latest achievements of human speech."²

* * *

The evolution of speech, starting from the protoplasmic state without organs or functions, and acquiring them little by little, proceeding progressively from indefinite to definite, from fluid to fixed state, can only be sketched in free outline. But the successive points of this differentiation, which creates grammatical forms, and

¹ There is in Iroquois a word that signifies, "I demand money from those who have come to buy garments from me." Esquimaux is equally rich in terms of this sort. Yet we must recognise that these immense composite words, themselves formed from abbreviated and fused words virtually imply the beginning of decomposition.

² *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*, ed. 1891, p. 196.

parts of discourse, are under an objective form the history of the development of intelligence, inasmuch as it abstracts, generalises, analyses, and tends towards an ever-growing precision. The completely developed languages—and we are speaking only of such—bear throughout the print of the unconscious labor that has fashioned them for centuries: they are a petrified psychology.

We must return to the roots or primitive terms, whatever may be their nature. Two distinct categories are generally admitted: pronominal or demonstrative roots, verbal or predicative roots.

The first form a small group that properly indicate rather the relative position of the speaker, than any concrete quality. They are equivalent to here, there, this, that, etc. They are few in number, and very simple in their phonetic relations: a vowel or vowel followed by a consonant. Many linguists refuse to admit them as roots, and think they have dropped from the second class by attenuation of meaning.¹ Possibly they are a survival of gesture language.

The second (verbal or predicative) is the only class that interests us. They have swarmed in abundance. They indicate qualities or actions; that is the important point. The first words denominated attributes or modes of being; they were adjectives, at least in the measure in which a fixed and rigid terminology can be applied to states in process of forming. Primitive man was everywhere struck with the qualities of things, *ergo* words were all originally appellative. They expressed one of the numerous characteristics of each object; they translated a spontaneous and natural *abstraction*: another proof of the precocious and indispensable nature of this operation. From its earliest developments intelligence has tended to simplify, to substitute the part for the whole. The unconscious choice of one attribute among many others depends on various causes; doubtless on its predominance, but above all on the interest it has for man. "A people," remarks Renan, "have usually many words for what most interests them." Thus, in Hebrew, we find 25 synonyms for the observance of the law; 14 for faith in God; 11 for rain, etc. In Arabic, the lion has 500 names, the serpent 200, money more than 80; the camel has 5,744, the sword 1,000 as befits a warrior race. The Lapp whose language is so poor, has more than 30 words to designate the reindeer, an animal indispensable to his life.² These so-called syno-

¹ Whitney, *The Life and Growth of Language*, Chap. X. Sayce, *op. cit.*, VI., 28, rejects them absolutely.

² Renan, *Histoire générale des langues sémitiques*, pp. 128 and 363.

nyms each denominate a particular aspect of things; they witness to the abundance of primitive abstractions.

This apparent wealth soon becomes an embarrassment and an encumbrance. Instead of 100 distinct terms, one generic substantive, plus one or two epithets, would suffice. But the *substantive* was not born of the deliberate desire to obviate this inconvenience. It is a specialisation, a limitation of the primitive meaning. Little by little the adjective lost its qualificative value, to become the name of one of the objects qualified. Thus in Sanskrit *dēva* (shining) finally signified the god; *sourya* (the dazzling) became the sun; *akva* (rapid) the name of a horse, etc. This metamorphosis of adjective into substantive by a specialisation of the general sense occurs even in our actual languages; as, e. g., when we say in French *un brilliant* (diamond); *le volant* (of a machine); *un bon* (of bread, counting-house, bank, etc.). What is only an accident now was originally a constant process. Thus the substantive was derived from the primitive adjective; or rather, within the primitive organism, adjective-substantive, a division has been produced, and two grammatical functions constituted.

Many other remarks could be made on the determination of the substantive by inflexions, declensions, the mark of the gender (masculine, feminine, neuter); I shall confine myself to what concerns *number*, since we are proposing to consider numeration under all its aspects. Nothing appears more natural and clear-cut than the distinction between one and several; as soon as we exceed pure unity, the mother of numbers, plurality appears to us to be homogeneous in all its degrees. It has not been so from the beginning. This is proved by the existence of the dual in an enormous number of languages: Aryan, Semitic, Turanian, Hot-tentot, Australian, etc. One, two, were counted with precision; the rest was vague. According to Sayce, the word "three" in Aryan language at first signified "what goes beyond." It has been supposed that the dual was at first applied to the paired parts of the body: the eyes, the arms, the legs. Intellectual progress caused it to fall into disuse.

At the close of the period of first formation which we have been considering, the sentence was only a defaced organism reproduced by one of the following forms: (1) that; (2) that shining; (3) that sun, that shining.¹ The verb is still absent.

With it we enter on the period of secondary formation. It was long held to be an indisputable dogma that the *verb* is the word

¹ P. Regnaud, *Origine et philosophie du langage*, p. 317.

par excellence (*verbum*), the necessary and exclusive instrument of an affirmation. Yet there are many inferior idioms which dispense with it, and express affirmation by crude, roundabout processes, with no precision,—most frequently by a juxtaposition: snow white—the snow is white; drink me wine—I drink (or shall drink) wine, etc. Plenty of examples can be found in special works.

In fact, the Indo-European verb is, by origin, an adjective (or substantive) modified by a pronoun; *Bharami*—carrier-me, I carry. It is to be regretted that we cannot follow the details of this marvellous construction,—the result of unconscious and collective labor that has made of the verb a supple instrument, suited for all expressions, by the invention of moods, voices, and tenses. We may note that, as regards tenses, the distinction between the three parts of duration (which seems to us so simple) appears to have been established very slowly. Doubtless it can be asserted that it existed, actually, in the mind of primitive man, but that the imperfection of his verbal instrument failed in translating it. However this may be, it is a moot point whether the verb, at the outset, expressed past or present. It seems at first to have translated a vague conception of duration, of continuity in action; it was at first “durative,” a past which still continues, a past-present. The adjective notion contained in the verb, indefinitely as to time, only became precise by little and little. The distinction between the moments of duration did not occur by the same process in all languages, and in some, highly developed, otherwise like the Semitic languages, it remained very imperfect.¹

The main point was to show how the adjective-substantive, modified by the adjunction of pronominal elements, constituted another linguistic organ, and losing its original mark little by little, became the verb with its multiple functions. The qualificatory character fundamental to it makes of it an instrument proper to express all degrees of abstraction and generalisation from the highest to the lowest, to run up the scale of lower, medium, and higher abstractions. Ex., to drink, eat, sleep, strike;—higher, to love, pray, instruct, etc.; higher still, to act, exist, etc. The supreme degree of abstraction, i. e., the moment at which the verb is most empty of all concrete sense, is found in the auxiliaries of the modern analytical languages. These, says Max Müller, occupy the same place among the verbs, as abstract nouns among the substantives. They date from a later epoch, and all had originally a more

¹ On this point, consult especially Sayce, *op. cit.*, II., § 9, and P. Regnaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-299.

material and more expressive character. Our auxiliary verbs had to traverse a long series of vicissitudes, before they reached the desiccated, lifeless form that makes them so appropriate to the demands of our abstract prose. *Habere*, which is now employed in all Roman languages to express simply a past time, at first signified "to hold fast," "to retain."

The author continues, retracing the history of several other auxiliary verbs. Among them all there is one that merits particular mention on account of its divagations: this is the verb *être*, verb *par excellence*, verb substantive, unique; direct or understood expression of the existence that is everywhere present. The monopoly of affirmation, and even the privilege of an immaterial origin have been attributed to it.¹ In the first place, it is not met with under any form in certain languages which supplement its absence by divers processes. In the second, it is far from being primitive; it is derived, according to the idioms, from multiple and sufficiently discordant elements: to breathe, live, grow (Max Müller); to breathe, grow, remain, stand upright (*stare*) (Whitney).

Hitherto we have examined only the stable, solid parts of speech. There remain such as are purely transitive, translating a movement of thought, expressive of *relation*. Before we study these under their linguistic form, it is indispensable to take up the standpoint of pure psychology, and to know in the first place what is the nature of a relation. This can the less be avoided inasmuch as the question has scarcely been treated of, save by logicians, or after their fashion, and many very complete treatises of psychology do not bestow on it a single word.²

"A relation," says Herbert Spencer, "is a state of consciousness which unites two other states of consciousness." Although a relation is not always a link in the rigorous sense, this definition has the great advantage of stating it as a reality, as a state that exists by itself, not a zero, a naught of consciousness. It possesses intrinsic characters: (1) It is indecomposable. There are in consciousness greater and less states; the greater (e. g., a perception)

¹ The word *être* is irreducible, indecomposable, primitive, and wholly intellectual. I know no language in which the French word *être* is expressed by a corresponding word representing a sensible idea. Hence it is not true that all the roots of the language are in last resort signs of sensory ideas." (V. Cousin, *Histoire de la phil. au XIII. siècle*, 1841, II., p. 274.

² For the psychology of relation consult Herbert Spencer, *Psychology*, I., p. 65, II., pp. 360 et seq.; James, *Psychology*, I., pp. 203 et seq. The latter gives the history of the subject, which is very brief, and remarks that the idealogues form an honorable exception to the general abstention. Thus Destutt de Tracy established a distinction between feelings of *sensation* and feelings of *relation*.

are composite, hence accessible to analysis; they occupy an appreciable and measurable time. The lesser (relation) are naturally beyond analysis; rapid as lightning, they appear to be outside time. (2) It is dependent. Remove the two terms with which it is intercalated, and the relation vanishes; but it must be noted that the terms themselves presuppose relations; for, according to Spencer's just remark, "There are neither states of consciousness without relations, nor relations without states of consciousness." In fact: to feel or think a relation, is to feel or think a change.

But this psychical state may be studied otherwise than by internal observation, and the subsequent interpretation. It lends itself to an *objective* study, because it is incarnated in certain words. When I say, red *and* green, red *or* green, there are in either case, not two, but *three* states of consciousness; the sole difference is in the intermediate state which corresponds with an inclusion or an exclusion. So, too, all our prepositions and conjunctions (*for, by, if, but, because*) envelop a mental state, however attenuated. The study of languages us that the expression of relations is produced in two ways, forming, as it were, two chronological layers.

The most ancient is that of the cases or declensions: a highly complex mechanism, varying in marked degree with the idioms, and consisting in appositions, suffixes, or modifications of the principal theme.

But these relations have only acquired their proper linguistic organ, specialised for this function, by means of prepositions and conjunctions. They are wanting in many languages; gesture being then substituted for them. The principal parts of the discourse are solitary, juxtaposed without links after the manner of the phrases used by children. Others, somewhat less poor, have only two conjunctions: *and, but*. In short, the terms on which devolved the expression of relations are of late formation, as it were, organs *de luxe*. In the analytical languages, prepositions and conjunctions are nouns or pronouns diverted from their primitive acception, which have acquired a value expressive of transition, condition, subordination, co-ordination, and the rest. The psychological notion common to the greater number, if not to all, is that of a movement. "All relations expressed by prepositions can be referred to repose, and to movement in space and time, i. e., to those with which the locative, accusative (movement of approximation) and ablative (movement of departure) correspond in declension."¹ It may be admitted that this consciousness of movement, of change,

¹ Regnaud. *op. cit.*, pp. 304 et seq.

which is no more, fundamentally, than the sense of different directions of thought, belongs less to the category of clear notions than to that of subconscious states, of tendencies, of actions, which explains why the terms of relation are wholly wanting, or rare, and only conquered their autonomy at a late period.

With these, the progressive work of differentiation is accomplished. Discourse has now its materials and its cement; it is capable of complex phrases wherein all is referred and subordinated to a principal state, contrary to those ruder essays which could only attain to simple phrases, denuded of connective apparatus.

We have rapidly sketched this labor of organo-genesis, by which language has passed from the amorphous state to the progressive constitution of specialised terms and grammatical functions: an evolution wholly comparable with that which, in living bodies, starts from the fecundated ovule, to attain by division of labor among the higher species to a fixed adjustment of organs and functions. "Languages are natural organisms, which, without being independent of human volition, are born, grow, age, and die, according to determined laws." (Schleicher.) They are in a state of continuous renovation, of acquisition, and of loss. In civilised languages, this incessant metamorphosis is partially checked by enforced instruction, by tradition, and respect for the great literary works. In savage idioms where these coercive measures are lacking, the transformation at times occurs with such rapidity that they become unrecognisable at the end of a few generations.

Spoken language, as a psycho-physiological mechanism, is regulated in its evolution by physiological and psychological laws.

Among the former (with which we are not concerned), the principal is the law of phonetic alteration, consisting in the displacement of an articulation in a determined direction. It is dependent on the vocal organ; thus, after the Germanic invasion, the Latin which this people spoke fell again under the power of physiological influences which modified it profoundly.

Among the latter, the principal is the law of analogy, the great artisan in the extension of languages. It is a law of economy, the basis of which is generalisation, the faculty of seizing on real or supposed resemblances. The word remains invariable, but the mind gives it different applications: it is a mask covering in turn several faces. It suffices to open a dictionary to see how ingenious and perilous is this unconscious labor. Such a word has only a few lines; it has no brilliant record. Such another fills pages;

first we see it in its primitive sense; then—from analogy to analogy—from accident to accident—it departs from it more and more, and ends by having quite a contrary meaning.¹ Hence it has been said that “the object of a true etymology is to discover the laws that have regulated the evolution of thought.” Among primitive people, the process that entails such deviations from the primitive sense, is sometimes of striking absurdity; or at least appears to us as such by reason of the strange analogies that serve the extension of the word. Thus: certain Australian tribes gave the names of mussels (*muyum*), to books because they open and close like shellfish; and many other no less singular facts could be cited. Much more might be said as to the rôle of analogy, but we must adhere to our subject.

In conclusion: it is to be regretted that linguistic psychology attracts so few people, and that many recent treatises on psychology, excellent on all other points, do not devote a single line to language. Yet this study, especially if comparative, from the lowest to the most subtle, would throw at least as much light on the mechanism of the intelligence as other highly accredited processes. Physiological psychology is pursued with ardor, on the right supposition that if the facts of biology, normal and morbid, are studied by the naturalists and the doctors, they may be so also by the psychologists, after their mode. So too for languages; comparative philology has its aim, psychology another proper to it. It is impossible to believe that any one, armed with sufficient linguistic instruction, who consecrates himself to this task, will expend his labor in vain.

¹ It is superfluous to give examples of such a well-known fact. See Darmesteter, *The Life of Words*.

MOHAMMEDANISM AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONS.

BY THE REV. W. P. REEVE.

THAT Mohammedanism offers peculiar difficulties to the efforts of Christian missions, those most interested in the active work of evangelisation make no attempt to deny. While its political power continues unarrested in the slow and certain process of decay, no successful attack has yet been made in the name of Jesus Christ upon its spiritual dominion. Not only does it maintain its influence over its original conquests, but it continues to put forth amazing powers of expansion. Its adherents to-day can hardly be estimated at less than two hundred million souls.¹ In India and Burmah, in China, in Australasia, it is rapidly advancing, and authorities are agreed that the negro races of Central Africa are destined soon to reinforce its strength. Mohammedanism stands to-day, as it long has stood, one of the most formidable problems of missionary enterprise. And yet, although a clear apprehension of the question obviously constitutes the first step for its final solution, it remains a problem little understood. With the view, therefore, of ascertaining what peculiar difficulties Mohammedanism presents to Christianity, and the basis of these difficulties in the religion itself, I propose to examine, first of all, the religion, and then briefly to notice the ethical and political system in which it logically results.

I.

Though the essence of Mohammedan belief is contained in the famous proposition which constitutes the test of conversion: "There is only one God, and Mohammed is the Prophet of God," the contents of the faith may be conveniently considered under the following divisions: (1) The idea of God. (2) Mohammed and

¹ *Statesman's Year Book.*

the Prophets. (3) The Koran. (4) Predestination. (5) Eschatology.

1. The source of the difficulties which Mohammedanism presents to Christianity unquestionably lies in the nature of its theology. If it be assumed that the diffusion of Christianity is conditioned to a large extent by the previous formation of receptivity for it, an examination of the Mohammedan conception of God at once reveals what formidable obstacles are presented to missionary enterprise.

Without entering into any discussion of Mohammed's religious development, it is enough to state that he early displayed a desire for a higher and more consistent belief than the polytheism of Arabia. After years of spiritual unrest, he reached at length the great conception of the Unity of God. In the words of the Koran : "God is one God, the eternal God ; He begetteth not ; neither is He begotten ; and there is not any one like unto Him."¹ In this rigid monotheism God is conceived as an absolute, transcendent Will. Although He is invested in name with the highest ethical attributes, it is apparent that He is conceived under physical categories. He is a great, self-centred Ego, desiring existence solely for His own advantage. Since the Highest Goodness must by the law of its being go out in relations of love to others, He is not a truly ethical nature, He is not a personal God. The pure transcendence of the idea of God at once rules out all possibility of vital relationship between God and the world. To the Mohammedan mind the problem of how a transcendent Deity can be at the same time immanent, never occurs. The results of this theology are apparent in every department of Mohammedan life. As this investigation proceeds, they will one by one come out. Before entering upon this detailed development, however, it will be advisable to state the characteristics of the Christian conception.

There are essential points of difference. In contrast with the Mohammedan idea of God as an irresistible, transcendent Might, who addresses humanity only through the medium of Law, Christianity presents as its very essence the doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood. In the Christian system God is conceived as personal, and therefore as entering into relations of love with men. The Old Testament doctrine of the Divine Holiness is developed in Christian thought into the doctrine of the Divine Personality. The problem of transcendence and immanence is for Christianity an ab-

¹ Sura. CXII. This idea of the Unity of God must have resulted from some conception of the Divine character.

solutely necessary problem. The solution is found in the Incarnation, and the doctrine of the Incarnation results in and is bound up with the doctrine of the Trinity. The divine life enters with all its redemptive energies into the life of man, and its complete revelation is forever sealed in the person of Jesus Christ.

In the attempt to reconstruct the Mohammedan idea of God, the missionary declares the Divine Sonship of Christ. The essence of his message is, that he who has seen the Son has seen the Father, and that he who has faith in the Son shall be justified and made at one with the Father. But in preaching this Gospel he is met at once with a peculiar difficulty. Since the Mohammedan idea of a purely transcendent God affords no basis for an Incarnation, there is the danger, to which experience bears ample witness, that this doctrine will be misunderstood and denied. No pious Mussulman considers the question open. As to the merits of Jesus he has a verdict from the Infallible Prophet, and that verdict rejects altogether the doctrine of His Sonship with God. Upon what grounds is this judgment based? Why did Mohammed reject Christianity?

Surprise is often expressed at the rise of an independent monotheistic faith six centuries subsequent to the foundation of the Christian Church. If Christianity in its purity had reached Arabia, it may well be questioned whether history would have known Mohammedanism. Unfortunately, however, as Mohammed saw it, the original spirituality of the faith lay obscured beneath a fungus growth of superstition. Far from affecting Arabian heathenism, it rather itself exhibited a thinly disguised idolatry. Vows were openly paid to relics and images. A long train of martyrs, saints, and angels interrupted the communion of the human spirit with its God. From Judaism the great iconoclast derived much of his system, but Christianity he saw only as a warning and a failure. His conception of God was formed independently of Christian thought. And the views concerning fundamental Christian doctrines which he has transmitted to his followers are the results of the test which he applied to those doctrines in his great premise of God as a transcendent Will.

Mohammed took up the history of Christ and set the stamp of his authority on a Christology which is the despair of modern missions. Of the Canonical Gospels¹ he apparently knew little or noth-

¹ Stanley's *Eastern Church*, p. 263. The only passages of the N. T. suggested in the Koran are those referring to the Paraclete in St. John and the account of the birth of the Baptist in St. Luke. See also Sir William Muir's *Mohammed*, Vol. II., pp. 313 and 278.

ing. Taken as his ideas were from the traditions based on the Apocryphal Gospels, he had poor guides in the attempt to measure the proportions of that great figure. In Christ, however, he acknowledged the highest merit. Next to himself, He was the greatest of the Prophets.¹ He had the power of performing miracles.² He was taken up into the immediate Presence of God.³ The miraculous nature of his birth is repeatedly affirmed,⁴ and the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin is all but accepted.⁵ But on the premises of his theology which admitted of no real communion between God and the world, and which is opposed in its essence to the doctrine of a Divine Spirit indwelling in humanity, the ascription to Christ of Divine Sonship appeared to Mohammed nothing less than a blasphemous insult to the uniqueness and unity of God. He refused to believe that Christ claimed it Himself, and he was led to understand it, as Islam understands it still, in the sense of physical paternity. On this point the Koran is explicit: "Those who dare to say Jesus, the son of Mary, is the son of God, are infidels."⁶ And again: "They say the Merciful hath gotten offspring; now have ye done a monstrous thing; almost might the very heavens rend thereat and the earth rend asunder, and the mountains fall down in fragments, that they ascribe a son to the Merciful, when it becometh not the Merciful to beget a son. Verily there is nobody in the heavens nor in the earth that shall approach the Merciful but as a servant."⁷ Such is the attitude of Mohammed and Mohammedanism on the Incarnation. Herein is presented to Christianity a peculiar difficulty; for it is obvious that from no religion except an abstract monotheism could such a difficulty be advanced.

It is significant also that Mohammed denies the Crucifixion. To his theology it could have no relation and it is out of harmony with the position which he assigns to Christ as his own greatest forerunner. We have in this an illustration of the peculiar opposition with which Islam meets Christianity at so many points. In addressing Mohammedanism the conditions are very different from those which attend the preaching of the Gospel to a people who know nothing of Christ. In the latter case no settled presuppositions weaken the force of the message. However great the other

¹ Sura II., 254.

² *Ibid.*, III., 40.

³ *Ibid.*, XIX., 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III., 30.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III., 30.

⁶ *Ibid.*, V., 19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, XIX. Mohammed held that some one else who deserved such a death, even Judas himself, was substituted for Christ on the cross. Christ was taken up into heaven, and at the last day will accuse the Jews because they rejected him as a Prophet, and the Christians because they received him as God. *Ibid.*, III., 49. IV., 156.

difficulties, at any rate the real doctrine of Christ has not been anticipated by a false one, nor receptivity for the whole truth deadened by the prior acceptance of a half-truth. Mohammed, however, passed judgment on the Christian revelation. Islam has a Christ of its own. And because of the very recognition He receives as Man and Prophet, missionaries find it all the more difficult to obtain for Him recognition as God and Redeemer.

The doctrine of the Trinity is the theological bulwark of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ. In view of the Mohammedan attitude on the Incarnation, a presentation to Islam of the Trinitarian concept of God is absolutely necessary. History, moreover, forces the discussion. The echoes of the Athanasian struggle penetrated to Arabia, and Mohammed came in contact with Christianity at a time when the standing of a Christian was determined by his attitude on the Trinity. He has accordingly pronounced upon it, and the Mohammedan world is by no means unaware that such a doctrine is characteristic of Christianity. Everything in the relations between Christianity and Islam points to another Trinitarian controversy.

As it attracted the attention of Mohammed, the doctrine of the Trinity had undoubtedly degenerated into tritheism. The sect of the Collyridians, which became notorious in Arabia, openly adored the Virgin, and the Trinity as it was presented to Mohammed consisted of God, Christ, Mary. Under any circumstances the difficulty will be so to explain the doctrine that it may not be mistaken for tritheism. To every Mohammedan the words of the Koran are likely to recur: "They surely are infidels who say that God is the third of three; for there is no God but one God." "Say not three; forbear; it will be better for thee. God is only one God."¹ After the example of Mohammed, his followers are jealous of the great canon of the unity of God. How to present the doctrine of the Trinity so as to give no foundation for the view that it threatens the divine unity, is the problem which confronts Christianity.

Here, then, is a situation of peculiar difficulty. To the adherents of a religious system which involves in its thought of God neither an Incarnation nor a trinity, is to be preached a religion which is bound up with both. When the attempt is made to reconstruct the thought of God peculiar to the former, it is absolutely necessary for the missionaries of the latter to preach both the Incarnation and the Trinity. And yet the difficulty is that with the

¹*Ibid.*, V., 77. IV., 6.

adherents of the former both these doctrines are in danger of being rejected for the express reason that they are inconsistent with its conception of God.

It is not, however, by any abstract analysis that the full significance of this Mohammedan idea of God for the present discussion can be understood. In order to estimate the fanaticism it inspired, and the true measure of that hostility towards Christianity in which it resulted, it is necessary briefly to consider its history.

Mohammedanism in its very origin was a protest. Bursting forth as the culmination of religious forces which had long been preparing Arabia for monotheism, it came as a revolt from all that threatened or denied the Divine Unity. It was the impassioned assertion to a world, which knew not or had forgotten God, of the Divine Existence and Omnipotence, of the reality of man's dependence, and the necessity of his submission.¹ No existing system displayed the truth. The religions of the world were corrupt and abominable. Idolater and Magian, Jew² and Christian, each in his way denied or insulted the unapproachable majesty of Allah. The time of vindication had arrived. God, through Mohammed, had decisively spoken. And the nations must be brought by those who heard to a speedy recognition of the one true faith.

Not only does the fundamental religious duty of submission to God take the form of devotion in extending his kingdom upon earth,—it distinctly justifies the use of force for religious ends. The Christian revelation of the Divine Love must secure its converts by the agency of spiritual influence. Its only triumphs must be moral triumphs. The Mohammedan faith, on the contrary, knows nothing of true personality. The Supreme Spirit does not condescend to enter into the life of humanity, and through a spiritual process win humanity to Himself. God is rather conceived as the type of an Eastern despot. Refusal to do him homage is rebellion, and rebellion must be suppressed by the sword. Such was the theory which Mohammed, after the Hegira, urged both by precept and example. It was a theory thoroughly congenial to the military temper of the Saracens. It inspired and appropriated to the cause of religion a tremendous secular force. But it is unnecessary to claim for it anything of conscious adaptation. Instead of marking

¹ Maurice, *Religions of the World*, p. 23. An admirable discussion of this point. The terms "Islam" and "Moslem" are both derived from a root meaning "submission to" and "faith in God."

² Mohammed accused the Jews of worshipping Ezra. *Ibid.*, IX., 30.

a decline in the Prophet's moral enthusiasm, it springs spontaneously from the character of his theology. As the result of that theology the Church and State are one, and the use of force in the cause of religion becomes a sacred duty. God demands a Holy War. "Fight on, therefore, till there is no temptation to idolatry and the religion becomes God's alone."¹

From these circumstances there resulted a mood of fanaticism, the most intense and sustained in the history of religion. That fanaticism, unfortunately for the missions of to-day, was early directed against Christianity. I have already given the grounds upon which Mohammed rejected the Christian religion. Upon those grounds the conquest of Christendom became the settled policy of Islam. In Syria and Egypt, in Africa and Spain the Mohammedan arms were successful. Moslem historians relate of the Caliph Omar that, during the ten years of his reign, 1,036 towns were captured, 4,000 Christian churches destroyed, and 4,000 mosques erected in their stead. In the Middle Ages the Christian crusades deepened the sense of hostility. And when, finally, the Ottoman Turks rose to predominance in the Mohammedan world, they vigorously took up the policy of universal domination, captured Constantinople, and menaced for two hundred years the safety of Europe.

As the result, therefore, of the historical situation in which the Mohammedan idea of God took form, it encouraged the feeling of superiority, stimulated and justified aggression, and brought with it to the Islam of to-day a deep sense of enmity towards the Christian faith. Christian missionaries stand face to face with the most discouraging of all difficulties, that of a relentless opposition to their efforts, based on history, and kept alive by religious zeal. Nor is there satisfactory evidence that this spirit is on the wane. In 1857 it instigated the Indian mutiny. In 1884 it inflamed the Soudan. It is seen to-day in the Armenian massacres. In independent Mohammedan states it is a crime for a Moslem to become a Christian. In Morocco the Government has ordered the missionaries to withdraw. In Algeria, owing to popular tumult, the French discourage all missionary effort.² The most extensive work in the Mohammedan field is that of the Church Missionary Society, and to the spirit of fanaticism the last report bears painful witness. One convert in Persia is imprisoned; another beaten by a mob; several have actually been murdered.³ Even in India Missionaries

¹ *Ibid.*, VIII., 40.

² *Methodist Review*, July, 1896.

³ Church Missionary Society Report, pp. 116, 119.

are threatened and subjected to violence ;¹ converts are persecuted and their lives attempted.²

2. A further examination of this religious system reveals a still greater difficulty. In presenting the doctrine of the person of Christ, missionaries find confronting them the doctrine of Mohammed's supernatural call, and the whole power of his influence on the Moslem world.

Though the founder of a religion, Mohammed occupies in it no such position as that of Christ in Christianity. Not only is He the founder, Christ is also a constituent element and the central fact of His faith. Among the religions of the world Christianity stands distinct as pre-eminently the religion of redemption. Its characteristic feature is the union of the divine and human in the person of Christ, the Redeemer and Perfecter of humanity. When compared with Christ, Mohammed discharges no strictly religious function, just as, when compared with Christianity, Mohammedanism is not strictly a religion. But from the relative point of view, the function which he does discharge is just as important for such a religion as Mohammedanism, as that of Christ is for such a religion as Christianity. The Mohammedan idea of God, indeed, postulates the prophetic office. To an Incarnation it is opposed. But God, though transcendent, does not remain altogether aloof from the life of man. He requires obedience and worship, and His will is declared by his prophets. While of these Mohammed recognises no less than 124,000, he singles out for special distinction the five great names of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ, who successively mark the five periods into which, as his philosophy conceives, all previous history falls.³ To these five periods correspond five revelations, each of which, though adequate for its age, is superseded in the succeeding era. Nor does the world receive the full revelation, until he himself comes forward, with the commission of God, to speak the final word, and establish the absolute religion. As revelation reaches its height in him, it therefore closes with him. He is the last and the greatest of the prophets. He is in fact The Prophet. In the great dogma which constitutes the Mohammedan confession of faith, his position is defined with emphatic precision: "There is only one God, and Mohammed is The Prophet of God." He has united himself in popular imagination with the name of God Himself, and founded his influence on the vitality of a religious principle.

Mohammedanism, therefore, is based on the authority of Mo-

¹ *Ibid.*, 170, 181.

² *Ibid.*, 185, 207.

³ Sale's Koran. The Preliminary Discourse, p. 99.

ammed. While that authority stands, the religion will stand. Upon his word all questions, religious and moral, depend for an answer. In every controversy a reference to that word is the one and only procedure. Beyond the limits therein set down the human spirit cannot advance. The search for truth resolves itself into the function of interpretation. It is not by an appeal to reason that such a system can be shaken, because it is not by such an appeal that it is defended. Its apologetic is that of a great scholastic philosophy, which substantially accepts as its premises the positions already assumed by an ecclesiastical power. The task of Christianity would be simpler if Islam did not so rigidly exclude the idea of the efficacy of the human reason as a medium for the testing of truth. The very fact that the adherents of an alien faith are willing to submit their claims to rational consideration, is itself an indication of intellectual receptivity, and therefore a condition favorable to the extension of the Christian religion. But the premises of Mohammedan controversialists are always dogmatically assumed. From the doctrine of a transcendent God the conception of authority logically results. Where the ideas of a distant Deity and a finished revelation prevail, the past inevitably enslaves the present, and the human mind, dominated by the dogma of infallibility, and fixed in the contemplation of the faith once for all delivered, loses the incentive and the means of progress.

From his authoritative position as the mediator of an absolute revelation, three other lines of influence proceed which converge to support the ascendancy of the Prophet.

(1) The belief is held that on the Day of Judgment he will act as Intercessor on behalf of the faithful.¹

(2) Attention is fixed upon him as the highest type of moral excellence. His example, as embodied in the Hadis, or Sacred Traditions, is held to be absolutely binding in the conduct of life. The study of these traditions is a distinct science, and their administration a regular profession.

(3) In current legend the historical Mohammed has been idealised into a being endowed with supernatural attributes. This mythical Prophet has been formed on the model of Jesus Christ. The doctrine of Pre-existence takes the form of the theory of the "Light of Mohammed" which was with God before Creation. Like the birth of Christ, his birth was announced from above. He was subjected to a Satanic temptation. He was able to solve enigmas put to trouble him. Unclean spirits obeyed him and he had

¹ T. P. Hughes. *Notes on Mohammedanism*, p. 260.

the power of performing miracles. His death was accompanied by portents, and he rose again from the dead. Of the difficulty which springs from this tendency, Dr. S. W. Koelle, long a missionary to Islam, remarks: "It is mainly this unnaturally magnified, this un-historical and fictitious Mohammed, who sways the hearts of the Moslems and keeps them from recognising in Jesus Christ the true Saviour of man."¹

The very abstractness of the Mohammedan idea of God tends to concentrate the imagination of the faithful upon the figure and history of Mohammed. It must be acknowledged that in this sense Islam is a personal religion. Personal it can never be in the sense of bringing man into living communion with God. But personal it is, since it was founded by a person, and since the mind of its adherents is fixed upon him. The theory of Mohammed's imposture is no longer tenable. He made, however, high claims, which, if Christianity is to prevail, must be discredited. And yet, behind what fortifications those claims lie entrenched!

3. The pretensions and doctrines of the infallible Prophet are definitely embodied in an infallible book. The missionary who defends the claims of Christ with the Christian Bible, is met by the disciple of Mohammed with the Koran. Shortly after the Prophet's death his utterances were collected by Abu Bekr, his successor, into a single volume. Othman, the third Caliph, revised this edition, ordered the destruction of all existing copies, and sent out the Koran to the faithful with the great advantage of a uniform text.

The Mohammedan theory of inspiration goes beyond those extreme positions still held concerning the Scriptures by conservative Christians. The Koran was not only verbally inspired; it existed from all eternity. To Mohammed its various lines or Suras were revealed in ecstasy, or dictated by the angel Gabriel. Against the New Testament, Mussulman theologians claim that it does not contain the original Gospels, but merely the *Hadis* or traditions of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Any such conception as that of personal inspiration is of course foreign to the thought of Islam. To question the so-called divinity or "uncreated nature" of the Koran is the height of blasphemy.

The doctrine of the divinity of the Koran is supported by its literary beauty. Its poetic quality delights the Eastern imagination. Since no translation can reproduce that quality, those unacquainted with the original have often advanced unfavorable opin-

¹ S. W. Koelle. *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*. London. 1889. P. 245.

ions.¹ But where Arabic culture prevails the verdict is unanimous. As to the merits of the style even Mohammed's enemies agree with his friends, and may fairly be said to have confirmed his boast: "If men and genii were assembled together that they might produce a book like the Koran, they must fail." And again, in support of his prophetic claim:² "If ye be in doubt as to our revelation to our servant then produce a Sura like unto it, and summon your witnesses."³

In Judaism, after the exile, the growing transcendence of the idea of God coincided with the formation of the Canon, and it is certain that the canonised text of the Koran is the result of the concept of God, to which it bears witness. Of this theology and the whole system of Islam, the sacred book is the bulwark. Its precepts are thoroughly disseminated throughout all classes of Mussulman society. In that society it constitutes the norm of thought and action. And its possession of absolute authority, inseparably associated with the power of Mohammed, lies directly in the path of Christianity.

Nothing could more clearly prove how these influences have fixed the character of Islam than the famous episode of the Matozilites. In their history the difficulties of Christianity in its conflict with Mohammedanism are in a manner foreshadowed. Under the influence of Greek philosophy they arose in Persia during the eighth century. Their true distinction lay in the effort to develop the ethical aspects of the conception of God. But it was the intellectual modifications which this involved that gave them prominence. Their efforts bring out in striking relief the essential unity of the rational spirit and the ethical will. Aiming to moralise the idea of God, they inevitably vindicate the rights of reason. Styled by themselves "defenders of God's unity and righteousness," they are named by others "the freethinkers of Islam." Though it is important to notice that they rejected the doctrine of predestination, the most significant of all their positions, as suggesting what chiefly retarded intellectual and moral advance, was their attitude concerning the Koran. They rejected the doctrine of its eternal existence, declaring that it had been "created" and was therefore liable to error. For a time they were supported by the more liberal Caliphs, but they eventually succumbed to the invincible orthodoxy of Islam. Their teaching, indeed, was out of harmony with its genius. "Not in the God of the Matozilites, whose essence was righteousness, but in that of orthodoxy, the

¹R. B. Smith. *Lectures on Mohammedanism*, p. 151. ²Sura, XVII., 90. ³Sura, II., 21.

Almighty God, bound to no law but His own arbitrary will, did the great multitude recognise their Allah and the Allah of Mohammed. Unfortunately they were not mistaken."¹

4. The idea of the freedom of the human will depends upon the conception of a personal God. God's Love conditions His Omnipotence, and that love demands the free response of moral beings. As to God, the emphasis in Islam is altogether upon the fact of Supremacy; as to man, upon the duty of Submission. That life of spiritual communion which demands the fact of freedom is altogether foreign to its thought. We have, as a result, the doctrine of God's Absolute Decree and Predestination both of good and evil. Whatever has or shall come to pass in this world, whether good or bad, proceeds entirely from the Divine Will, and is irrevocably fixed and recorded in the "preserved tablet."²

There are two directions in which this belief operates against the progress of Christian missions. One is characteristic of that revived and militant Mohammedanism which recalls in its missionary activity the early victories of the faith. The other is a mark of those countries and classes in which Islam has run its course and produced its normal effect. Instead of the positive opposition which springs from enthusiasm, they present the inert resistance of that moral paralysis which results from fatalism.

(1) In its impression on strongly religious natures the doctrine of predestination intensifies the idea of the Greatness of Allah, and renders those who hold it fiercely and irrationally opposed to the advances of other systems. Particularly is this the case with the great reforming sect of the Wahabis, a body of zealots who reproduce the mood of the primitive Mohammedans, and constitute the true spiritual force of modern Islam. They advocate a return to the simplicity of the original Mohammedan Church, and above all to its determination to spread the Truth by the sword.³ The conviction that everything has been ordained makes them indifferent to consequences, and, as the history of India proves, they are ready to take any risk in their hatred of Christianity. They have immense influence in Bengal, where through their efforts Mohammedanism has at length become the dominant religion.⁴ And that influence is employed with telling effect to the prejudice of the Christian religion.

¹ Kuenen. *National and Universal Religions*, p. 52.

² Sura, LXXXV., 22.

³ Sir William Hunter. *Our Indian Mussulmans*, pp. 50, 58, 60, and 64.

⁴ The last Indian census (1891) proves this. In a population of 40,000,000 they outnumber the Hindus by 1,500,000.

(2) From the dualism which ultimately results where God is conceived as the author both of good and of evil, the Mohammedan mind has struggled in vain to escape. During the period of first enthusiasm that dualism remains implicit, as it did with the Saracens, and as it does with the Wahabis. But in the course of normal life it is bound to emerge. The pressure of physical evil soon brings the problem home, and the descendants of those who counted it the highest happiness to die for the cause of God find themselves—

Impotent pieces of the game He plays
Upon this checker-board of nights and days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays;
And one by one back in the closet lays.¹

Man looks in, to himself, and beyond, to the world, and seeks in vain to reconcile his environment and his will. There is a power in the universe making for evil, and against that power it is hopeless to strive. The consequent fatalism develops in two extremes, each the logical complement of the other, and each unfavorable to the advance of Christianity—immorality on the one hand, and monasticism on the other.²

5. An elaborate and decisive eschatology crowns the Mohammedan system. In support of his religion the Prophet enlisted the aspiration for immortality, and set forth a view of the future state peculiarly adapted both by hope and fear to strengthen the hold of his faith on the Oriental imagination. For this reason the doctrine is related to the present discussion. Because it assists Islam, it is a difficulty for Christianity, and therefore demands consideration.

Mohammed's eschatology is in thorough harmony with his idea of God. Where God enters into no relations with men in this world, no basis is afforded for a consummation of relations in the next. A theology which forbids true ethical life in time and space knows nothing of spiritual growth or perfected union with God in the life beyond the grave. The conception of Heaven is static and sensuous. The conception of Hell, with one arbitrary exception, is static also. The Day of Judgment makes the cardinal division between Believers and Infidels. Those of the former who have obeyed the Law pass at once over the Bridge of Sirat³ into the

¹ The verse of Omar Khayyam is a suggestive commentary on Mohammedan theology.

² There are thirty-two leading orders of Dervishes, all rigidly ascetic. (Hughes's *Mohammedanism*, p. 237.)

³ Sale's *Preliminary Discourse*, p. 120.

bliss of Heaven; those who have not fall into the purgatorial fire of the first circle of Hell. Their faith, however, and the Prophet's intercession will ultimately procure for them admission into paradise. No Believer, whatever may be his sins, will be condemned to eternal damnation. From this fate, on the other hand, no Infidel can possibly escape. The intensity of the torture will accord with the magnitude of the aberration, and in connexion with the efforts of Christian missions it is important to observe that conversion to an alien religion marks the climax of human turpitude. For Apostates, for those "who have become Unbelievers after they have embraced Islam"¹ is reserved the supreme agony of Hawia, or the Bottomless Pit.

The Mussulman is persuaded to steadfast allegiance, not only by the threat of torments to be suffered, but also by the promise of pleasures to be enjoyed. If he continues faithful, all the delights of a carnal paradise will be his forever, and a divine dispensation will avert the disaster of satiety. The descriptions of Mohammed are conceived in a vein of true Eastern imagery, and exercise the greatest influence over the sentiment of the people.

The power of these beliefs is not to be destroyed by preaching, as against them, the eschatology of Christianity. That eschatology is a corollary from the conception of a personal God. And it is the doctrine of a personal God and His manifestation in Jesus Christ that must primarily be proclaimed to Islam. Against the acceptance of this doctrine Mohammedan eschatology directly and indirectly operates, and therefore deserves the brief notice it has here received.

Besides the doctrinal positions above examined, Mohammed instituted a system of practical religion which controls the daily lives of his followers and militates through the mechanical force of custom against the formation of receptivity for Christianity. The five "pillars" of practice are: (1) The Recital of the Creed. (2) The Five Daily Prayers. (3) The Legal Alms. (4) The Fast of the month Ramazan. (5) The Pilgrimage to Mecca.

Concluding at this point the investigation of Mohammedanism in its purely religious aspect, there yet remains briefly to be considered the bearing of its ethical and political developments upon the problem of Christian missions. The difficulties already brought out are directly due to the religion. Those about to be suggested are its indirect results.

¹ Sura, IX.

II.

True morality must always rest, not on the submission of humanity to an Omnipotent Will, but on the relation of humanity to a Personal God. True morality, therefore, Islam has not, and on its premises can never have. Its ethic is necessarily legalistic and external. Mohammed set forth what he conceived to be the will of God in a definite code, and compliance with its regulations is the highest reach of Moslem virtue. To this entire conception Christianity is of course opposed. In particular, however, there are three positions which occasion difficulty to Christian missions: (1) Mohammed's legislation as to slavery. (2) As to the use of liquor. (3) As to the position of women.

1. By regulating, Mohammed recognised the institution of slavery. As to the treatment of slaves he made several salutary reforms, and undoubtedly his system marks a relative advance. But he implanted no ethical principle which could result in enfranchisement. The slavery of Islam is bound up with the Law of Sale, the Law of Marriage, and the Law of Inheritance. And Christianity, which in its essence makes for freedom, is on that ground resisted by all the power of a vested interest.

2. Nothing is more characteristic of Mohammed's legislation than his prohibition of the use of liquor. Drunkenness is the one vice really feared in tropical countries and generally condemned as a breach of divine law.¹ The Mussulman moralist, in that spirit of adaptation which so deeply influenced his policy, appropriated this dominant idea, and forbade the use of wine. He sowed no seed which would result in temperance or abstinence, and Christianity, though it sows this spiritual seed and creates the character that makes in all things for moderation, is condemned and opposed because, as to the use of wine, it declares no absolute veto.

3. In regard, finally, to the position of women, it must be conceded that Mohammed remedied grave abuses. He gave women rights of property. He placed restrictions on polygamy. He regulated divorce. Here again, however, the fatal defect of his theology appears in his ethic. It does not ground the principle of individuality. It does not stimulate progress. Woman remains in Islam to-day just where Mohammed left her. And, after all, he

¹ In the South Sea Islands there is a curious illustration of this sentiment; one of the most common "taboos" is that on liquor. The Mormon Church is increasing there owing, for one reason, to its veto on drink. See Stevenson's interesting discussion in *The South Seas*, Chapter IV.

made large concessions to lust. He fixed the number of wives at four; but he set no limit to the property of masters in their female slaves. As in the prohibition of wine his moral law satisfied the prevailing idea, so here it gratifies the prevailing passion, of the tropics. In opposing the advance of the Christian religion, with its high ideal of womanhood and its spiritual conception of marriage, Islam is reinforced by the strength of a natural appetite to which its own ethic allows immoderate satisfaction.

III.

On the political side, Islam has not essentially advanced beyond the stage of tribalism. All law is divine. Church and State are identical, and the result of their union is the peculiar institution of the Caliphate. The Sultan of Turkey is the Caliph of Islam, whose duty it is to enforce all the provisions of Sacred Law. For a Moslem to become a Christian is not only a sin; it is also a crime. And within the jurisdiction of the Caliph, now *de facto* confined to Turkey, that crime can be punished with death. It is true, indeed, that, on certain terms, Christianity has always been tolerated in Mohammedan states. The Prophet expressly enacted that conquered Christians who refused to embrace Islam should be allowed, nevertheless, on the payment of a tax, to reside in the dominions of the Caliph. But this toleration was never intended to imply that a Mohammedan subject could become a Christian convert. For diplomatic reasons the Sultan has from time to time modified the law. That these concessions were only apparent came out in 1875, when, in reply to the complaints of missionaries, it was declared through the British representative that "the right of making proselytes from the religion of the state neither had been nor was intended to be granted by the Turkish Government."¹ In confirmation of this, Dr. Koelle, an eminent missionary already referred to, reports to his society that "no church or special building intended for public Christian service for Turks would have any chance of being authorised by government. Any government in Turkey which would carry out the principles of religious liberty faithfully, openly, and fully, would be accused by every conscientious Moslem of infidelity to their religion and of treachery to their state."² Missionary effort in Turkey is accordingly confined to the Oriental Christians. In its political manifestation the Mohammedan religion is unalterably opposed to the advance of Christianity.

¹ Diplomatic Correspondence, 1875.

² Report to the Christian Missionary Society.


In accordance with the plan originally suggested, I have attempted to point out the difficulties which Mohammedanism presents to Christianity. In this investigation it has been my aim to show how these difficulties logically result from the fundamental antagonism between the idea of God in the one religion, as Absolute Will, and the idea of God in the other, as Absolute Personality. Rejecting the possibility of a living relation between Deity and humanity, the Mohammedan conception develops the doctrine of a completed revelation, places the world under the dominion of law, and renders equally impossible both the progress of thought and the growth of a truly moral order. Not only, therefore, does it summarily deny the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity, characteristic of the Christian theology, but, in its reliance on dogma in matters of belief and on legalism in matters of life, it displays tendencies the very opposite of those which are required to win acceptance for Christianity.

From this examination, however, made, as it necessarily has been, from the standpoint of Christianity, the absolute religion, it would be erroneous to conclude, either that the Mohammedan system has not even relative merit, or that the fixed character of that system presents to Christianity an insoluble problem. In many countries Mohammedanism proved, and in many it proves to-day, a relative benefit. It freed Arabia from idolatry and Persia from Zoroastrianism. It releases the Hindu from caste, and raises the negro above fetishism. This benefit, however, is no more than relative. Neither in its theology nor in its morality, can it seriously be argued that Islam is a universal religion. Impervious though it appear to be, when its course is run it will be disintegrated. And Christianity, adjusted to races whose needs Mohammedanism can no longer supply, will take its place.

THE CROSS AMONG THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE significance of the cross among the North Americans has received much attention from the various investigators of the Bureau of Ethnology and the Smithsonian Institution, and we are



RATTLESNAKE ROCK, MOJAVE DESERT, CALIFORNIA.



Containing one Latin (\dagger), one Greek (†), one treble (卐), and one disc (\oplus) cross.

led to the conclusion that here as in Mexico the cross was one of the commonest religious symbols. To be sure, we must be careful not to accept crosses as genuinely Indian unless they are of undoubted pre-Christian origin. Says Mr. William H. Holmes:¹

"From the time of La Salle down to the extinction of the savage in the middle Mississippi province, the cross was kept constantly before him [the Indian], and its presence may thus be accounted for in such remains as post-date the advent of the whites. Year after year articles of European manufacture are being discovered in the most unexpected places, and we shall find it impossible to assign any single

¹ Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, 1880, p. 269.

example of these crosses to a prehistoric period, with the assurance that our statements will not some day be challenged. It is certainly unfortunate that the Amer-



PETROGLYPHS IN SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA.¹
[With wheel stars and wheel crosses.]


ican origin of any work of art resembling European forms must rest forever under a cloud of suspicion. As long as a doubt exists in regard to the origin of a relic, it

¹ *A. R.*, 88-89, figs. 32 and 33, pp. 70 and 71.

PETROGLYPHS AT OAKLEY SPRING, ARIZONA.¹

[It is impossible to give an incontrovertible explanation of the various discrosses, some of which stand and others slant.

The cross on the heart which occurs several times will at once remind us of the Egyptian symbol of the same appearance. It is probably a coincidence without any significance, for it is used to represent a cross-bearing mask. Cf. *A. R.*, 88-89, pp. 505-506.]


PETROGLYPHS NEAR SAN MARCOS PASS, CALIFORNIA.²

¹ *A. R.*, 88-89, fig. 437, p. 329.

² *A. R.*, 88-89, p. 63.

is useless to employ it in a discussion where important deductions are to be made. At the same time it should not be forgotten that the cross was undoubtedly used as a symbol by the prehistoric nations of the South, and consequently that it was probably also known in the North. A great majority of the relics associated with it in ancient mounds and burial-places are undoubtedly aboriginal."

While we must be very careful not to build theories on its significance, there can be no doubt about the prevalence of the




BRAZILIAN PETROGLYPHS.¹

One figure is in its upper part similar to the Egyptian key of life.

Indian cross all over the continent. Most of the rock-inscriptions, the petroglyphs so called, contain crosses of all sizes and shapes, some of which are solar symbols (e. g., those of Oakley Springs, Arizona), others are meant to be stars (e. g., the crosses of the



NICARAGUA CROSSES (ISLAND OF CEIBA)
REPRESENTING RAIN.²



MAYA SYMBOL WITH CROSSES,
SIGNIFYING WOOD.³

Eskimo), or clouds, or symbols of rain; still others represent animals, such as alligators, or birds in flight, or men with outstretched arms.

Mr. Holmes has collected a great number of representations of the cross without being able to come to a definite conclusion or explanation. He says:

¹A. R., 88-89, fig. 1113, p. 692. ²A. R., 88-89, fig. 1234, p. 730. ³A. R., 88-89, fig. 1233, p. 729.

"In all the examples given it is a simple and symmetrical cross, which might be duplicated a thousand times in the religious art of any country. A study of the designs associated with the cross in these gorgets is instructive, but does not lead



SPIDER-GORGET FROM A STONE GRAVE IN ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ILLINOIS.¹

to any definite result. In one case the cross is inscribed upon the back of a great spider; in another it is surrounded by a rectangular framework of lines, looped at the corners, and guarded by four mysterious birds, while in others it is without attendant characters; but the workmanship is purely aboriginal."

Concerning the cross on the back of the spider, Mr. Holmes says (A. R., 80-81, pp. 287-8):


"It has been suggested that it may have been derived from the well-defined cross found upon the backs of some species of the genus *Atta*, but there appears to be good reason for believing otherwise. The cross here shown has a very highly conventionalised character, quite out of keeping with the realistic drawing of the insect, and, what is still more decisive, it is identical with forms found upon many other objects. The conclusion is that the cross here, as elsewhere, has a symbolic character."



PETROGLYPHS IN NAJOWE VALLEY, CALIFORNIA.²



THE CROSS OF THE SUN.³



CROSSES OF THE ESKIMO.

Mr. Garrick Mallery says in the tenth annual report, 1888-89, p. 724:

"The 'Greek' (i. e., the equilateral) cross represents to the Dakota the four winds, which issue from the four caverns in which the souls of men existed before their incarnation in the human body. All 'medicine men,' i. e., conjurers and magicians, recollect their previous dreamy life in those places and the instructions then received from the gods, demons, and sages. They recollect and describe their pre-existent life, but only dream and speculate as to the future life beyond the grave.

¹A. R., 80-81, Plate LXI, facing p. 288.
²A. R., 88-89, fig. 1123, p. 696.

³A. R., 88-89, fig. 28, p. 67.
⁴A. R., 88-89, fig. 1228, p. 727.

“ The top of the cross is the cold all-conquering giant, the North-wind, most powerful of all. It is worn on the body nearest the head, the seat of intelligence



SPIDER-GORGET FROM MOUNDS IN ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ILLINOIS.¹

and conquering devices. The left arm covers the heart; it is the East-wind, coming from the seat of life and love. The foot is the melting burning South-wind, in-




SPIDER-GORGET FROM A MOUND IN MISSOURI.

dicating, as it is worn, the seat of fiery passion. The right arm is the gentle West wind, blowing from the spirit-land, covering the lungs, from which the breath at

¹ *A. R.*, 80-81, Plate LXI, facing p. 288.


last goes out, gently, but into unknown night. The centre of the cross is the earth and man, moved by the conflicting influences of the gods and winds.

" Among the Ojibwa of northern Minnesota the cross is one of the sacred symbols of the society of the Midê or shamans, and has special reference to the fourth degree. A neophyte who has been advanced to the third initiation or degree, is instructed in ritualistic chants purporting to relate the struggle between Mi'nabô'zho, the mediator between the Ojibwa and Ki'tshi Ma'nidô, and the malevolent Bear spirit, which contest occurred when Mi'nabô'zho entered the fourth degree structure at the time when the first Indian was inducted therein for initiation.



THE EQUILATERAL CROSS
OF THE DAKOTA.

" The structure as erected at this day is built in the form of an oblong square having openings or doors at the four cardinal points. At these openings Mi'nabô'zho appeared and shot into the inclosure charmed arrows, to expel the horde of demons occupying the sacred place; and the Bear spirit was the last to yield to his superior powers. The openings being opposite to one an-



THE CROSS IN THE MEDICINE LODGE.

other, north and south and east and west, suggested to Mi'nabô'zho the cross, which is now erected whenever a third degree Midê receives this last and highest honor.



THE CHRISTIAN LABARUM.




AN AMERICAN LABARUM.

" The cross is made of saplings, the upright pole reaching the height of four to six feet, the transverse arms being somewhat shorter, each being of the same length as that part of the pole between the arms and the top. The upper parts are painted white, or besmeared with white clay, over which are spread small spots of red, the

latter suggesting the sacred shell, or *mégis*, the symbol of the order. The lower arm or pole is squared, the surface toward the east being painted white, to denote the




NECKLACE.



SOME OF THE ROCK SCULPTURES DISCOVERED IN OWENS VALLEY, SOUTH OF BENTON, CALIFORNIA.¹

REPRESENTING A MEDICINE MAN.

source of light and warmth. The face on the south is green, denoting the source of the thunder bird who brings the rains and causes the appearance of vegetation; the surface toward the west is covered with vermilion and relates to the land of the



SIGNS OF THE SUN AND OF STARS.² (Oakley Springs, Arizona; and other places.)
 setting sun, the abode of the dead. The north is painted black, as that faces the direction from which come affliction, cold, and hunger."

¹ *A. R.*, 88-89, fig. 1230, p. 728.

² *A. R.*, 88-89, scattered on pp. 694-697.

The Maltese cross (✠) is a symbol of virginity among the Moki, and is worn in the hair by the maidens of the tribe, but its shape is frequently conventionalised into a simple cross.

Among the Kiate'xamut, an Innuït tribe, the medicine man wears on his head a cross which represents the demon that is under his control.



SHELL-GORGET OF THE MISSISSIPPI MOUND-BUILDERS.¹


That the Indian prayer-stick bears a certain resemblance to the cross is immaterial, but may be mentioned as a strange coincidence.

The characters scratched on the prayer-stick are the picture writing which continued in use long after the arrival of the whites, and of which interesting instances are quoted in the "Jesuit Rela-

¹*A. R.*, 80-81, Plate LVIII, facing p. 282. Similar designs of four birds' heads with a sun and a cross in the centre are frequently found in North America. For other specimens and further comments see William H. Holmes's essay, *Art in Shell of the Ancient Americans*, *A. R.*, 80-81, pp. 179-305.

tions of 1646" of the Algonquins of the St. Lawrence river and by Charles Wiener in his *Péron et Bolive* (1880).


Crosses of various descriptions, painted on buckskin, are used as phylacteries. We reproduce two of them. The zigzag lines of the one represent snakes, and the cross formed by them was called by the owner "the black wind." The significance of the other cross has not been determined. Both pieces of buckskin contained a number of mysterious things which were tightly wrapped and deemed to be of great efficacy.



PHYLACTERIES DRAWN ON BUCKSKIN

The most interesting crosses, the arms of which are painted in different colors, are found on medicine sashes and shirts. The Ethnological Bureau possesses several fine specimens, and we reproduce here as an interesting example the design of an Apache mantle of invisibility, of which Mr. Mallery says:

"It is a cloak or mantle made from the skin of a deer, and covered with various mystic paintings. It was made and used by the Apaches as a mantle of invisibility, that is, a charmed covering for spies which would enable them to pass with impunity through the country, and even through the camp of their enemies. The fetishistic power depends upon the devices drawn." (*A. R.*, 1888-1889, p. 503.)



PHYLACTERY.

Another magic mantle is described as follows:



APACHE MANTLE OF INVISIBILITY.¹

¹ From *A. R.*, 88-89, Plate XXXIII, facing p. 504.

"A similar but not identical pictographic fetish or charm is described and illustrated by Capt. Bourke as obtained from a Chicarahua Apache, which told when his ponies were lost, and which brought rain. The symbols show, inter alia, the rain cloud, and the serpent lightning, the raindrops and the cross of the winds of the four cardinal points." (*Ibid.*)



APACHE MEDICINE SASH.¹

The cross which appears in the Apache medicine sash, reproduced from Mr. Bourke's essay on "Medicine Shirts and Sashes" (*A. R.*, 1887-1888, p. 593), consists of four demons standing in the four quarters of the world. Between them four amulets can be seen, a hoddentin bag containing sacred flour (1), a crab (2), and two other things. From this central place, which I deem to be the home of the winds, streaks of lightning, called Tzi-Daltai (3), issue on either side in the form of zigzag lines, ending in heads reminding one somewhat of a pinchbug. The saw-like streaks may represent thunder.²



CROSS ON A COPPER PLATE FOUND IN AN OHIO MOUND.³

Two Apache medicine-shirts are most beautifully reproduced in colors by the Bureau of Ethnology in their *Annual Report*, 1887-1888 (Plates VII. and VIII.). The centre of the one shows a Maltese cross whose arms are blue, green, red, and yellow; the other exhibits among many curious designs in a most prominent position a bluish, equilateral cross mounted on a ball divided into four quadrants which are black, red, blue, and yellow. Thus the whole figure presents the appearance of the cross-bearing globe

¹ *A. R.*, 87-88, fig. 448, p. 593.

² I am unable to explain the curved lines at (5) and the two little crosses, one of which is marked (6).

³ *A. R.*, 88-89, fig. 1226, p. 725.

such as is used by European monarchs as an emblem of royal power.



THE STORY OF CHRIST IN PERUVIAN PICTOGRAPHY BEFORE THE INVENTION OF WRITING.¹

Mr. Bourke says of the medicine-shirts:

"The symbolism is different for each one, but may be generalised as typical of the sun, moon, stars, rainbow, lightning, snake, clouds, rain, hail, tarantula, centipede, snake, and some one or more of the 'kan' or gods."



CROSSES ON DICE (used for playing dice).

Considering the many things a cross stands for, we must expect to find it in the pictographic writing of the American Indians; and a glance at a sample of an old Peruvian manuscript found at

¹ *A. R.*, 88-89, p. 672. The same method of writing prevailed in North America.

Sicasica in the valley of Pancactambo, given by Wiener, amply justifies this assumption.

Pictography prevailed also among the North American Indians before the invention of writing in letters, and the first accounts of the story of Christ were written by the natives in this manner.

"Connected with this topic is the following account in the *Jesuit Relations of 1646*, p. 31, relative to the Montagnais and other Algonquins of the St. Lawrence river, near the Saguenay: 'They confess themselves with admirable frankness; some of them carry small sticks to remind them of their sins; others write after their manner, on small pieces of bark.'"




SICASICA MANUSCRIPT. PICTURE WRITING OF AMERICAN INDIANS.¹

The cross is a symbol of varying significance, and we must be on our guard before we identify its usage in diverse parts of the world and even on the same continent. One instance will be sufficient to show how easy it is to make a mistake and how ridiculous and preposterous a substitution of our own views and associations for the notions of other people may become. Mr. Garrick Mallery gives the following explanation of the significance of the Latin cross among the Dakota Indians:

"The same disposition of straight lines which is called the Latin cross was and is used by the Dakota to picture or signify both in pictograph and gesture sign, the mosquito-hawk, more generally called dragon-fly. The Susbeca or mosquito-

¹ *A. R.*, 88-89, p. 672. The designs are red and blue.

hawk is a supernatural being. He is gifted with speech. He warns men of danger. He approaches the ear of the man moving carelessly or unconcernedly through the deep grass of the meadow or marsh—approaches his ear silently and at right angles, and says to him, now alarmed, 'Tci-'-'tci-'-'tci!'—which is an interjection equivalent to 'Look out!' 'You are surely going to destruction!' 'Look out!' 'Tci-'-'tci-'-'tci!'



THE DRAGON FLY
CROSSES OF THE
DAKOTA.¹

"Now the mosquito-hawk is easily knocked down and caught and has a temptingly small neck. But woe to the man or woman or child who with the cruelty commonly practiced on all living things by Indians of all ages and states, dares to wring off his head. Whoever shall do this, before the winter comes shall be beheaded by the detested Ojibwa. It is true, for long ago a reckless young warrior feeling annoyed or insulted by the infernal 'Tci-'-'tci-'-'tci!' so unceremoniously uttered in explosive breaths near his ear, tried it, and his headless trunk was found ere he escaped from the swamp.

"The cross has its proper significance in this use not only in representing quite faithfully the shape of the insect but also the angle of his approach.

"One reason for the adoption of the dragon-fly as a mysterious and supernatural being, is on account of its sudden appearance in large numbers. When in the still of the evening, before the shades of darkness come, there is heard from the meadow a hum as of the sound of crickets or frogs, but indistinct and prolonged; on the morrow the Susbecca will be hovering over it; it is the sound of their coming, but whence no man kens."




ANCIENT BEAD BRACELET OF PERU.² [The Maltese crosses represent birds.]

Mr. Mallery prefaces this explanation of the cross as the symbol of the mosquito-hawk with these remarks:


"The use of this symbol antedates the discovery of America, and is carried far back in tradition and myth. When a missionary first asked a Dakota the name of this figure, which he drew for him in the sand, wishing to use the information in his translation of Bible and Creed, the Dakota promptly replied Sus-be-ca

¹A. R., 88-89, p. 725.



²A. R. 80-81, plate XLV, facing p. 256.









Solar Cross.



An American Swastika.



Prayer-sticks.



Symbol of the Whirlwind

CROSSES FOUND IN THE MOUNDS AND ANCIENT GRAVES IN THE DISTRICT OF THE MOUND-BUILDERS.¹

¹A. R., 80-81, Plate LIII., facing p. 272. Of these crosses 8 are engraved on shell-gorgets, 1 is cut in stone, 3 are painted on pottery, and 4 are executed in copper. The last one, in the right hand corner at the bottom, is a symbol of the whirlwind (cf. A. R., 88-89, p. 605).

and retraced the figure saying 'That is a Sus-be-ca.' It was therefore promptly transferred to Scripture and Creed, where it still reads 'He was nailed to the Sus-beca,' etc. 'God forbid that I should glory save in the Susbeca of our Lord Jesus Christ.' To the good missionary this was plain and satisfactory; for the Dakota had demonstrated by tracing it in the sand that Susbeca was the name of the figure called in English, 'cross.' But when the Dakota read his new Bible or Creed, he must have been puzzled or confused to find, 'He was nailed to a mosquito-hawk,' or, 'God forbid that I should glory save in the mosquito-hawk of our Lord Jesus Christ.'"

While it is quite true that we have no positive evidence to prove the pre-Christian workmanship of the many crosses discovered among the North American Indians, there is no good reason to doubt the indigenous and ancient character of the various cross-forms themselves in the sense in which they are still in use. For the medicine man of the Indian is very conservative, probably even more conservative than the priesthood of any other nation. Says Mr. Bourke: "Never desirous of winning proselytes to his own ideas, he [the medicine man] has held on to those ideas with a tenacity never suspected until purposely investigated."

We may say, in fine, that the cross among the Indians of North America had several meanings of a deeply mystical significance, prominent among which is the idea that it represents the four quarters of the world; yet this thought is not geographical but religious, indicating in the medicine lodge as well as in symbols and in nature at large the divine presence of a spiritual helpfulness and special protection to those who employ the proper methods of conjuration.

croachments of absolutism upon popular rights," but also "to describe the long-continued struggle of the many to throw off the yoke of the few, to emphasise the corrupting influence of the union between Church and State, to illustrate once more the blighting effects of superstition, ignorance, blind obedience, unjust laws confiscation under the disguise of unequal taxes, and the systematic plunder, year by year, of the weaker classes by the stronger." With inquiry, much just indignation and naive ethics have been mingled. The academic historian and the case-hardened political scientist will find much to censure in the form which the history of France has taken in Mr. Watson's hands; but the unsophisticated reader who wishes to acquire a vivid picture of one of the most interesting stories of modern times will find the work a fascinating one. The author has thrown his whole heart into his task, and has not minced his words in the expression of his opinions. With a due measure of criticism, the book can be enjoyed.

NATURE-STUDY AND CHILDREN'S READERS.

Frances L. Strong, of the St. Paul Teachers' Training School, has embodied her practical experience as an instructress of children in a little series of volumes entitled, *All the Year Round: A Nature Reader*. The series is published by Ginn & Co., of Boston, and is divided into three parts: Autumn, Winter, and Spring. (Price, 30 cents each.) As the method of combining all the work of the primary curriculum with the work of reading is not as widely known as it should be by primary teachers in the schools of the small towns and cities, nor by parents, it is much to be wished that books of this character should be brought to the notice of the general public. "Nature Work," as it is called, has been greatly developed in the schools of the large cities, and all who wish to acquire familiarity with its principles can satisfy their desire in these books. The system is far from being an iron-clad one, and can be adapted by every person to the requirements of his special case, and to his special experience. The plan of instruction involves the gathering of the materials for each lesson by the teacher and the pupils. The material is then studied by means of the so-called "morning talk," which deals with some natural object that accords with the season. Each child examines a specimen of the plant or animal, new words are introduced, and the affinities of the different natural objects skilfully developed. The observation lesson is followed by a drawing lesson in which the child is required to reproduce with his pencil what he sees. Work in free-hand cutting and clay-modeling is an accompaniment. A spelling lesson and the reading proper then follow. The object of the series is not so much to furnish new reading matter as to "stimulate the thought, enlarge the vocabulary, and open the eyes of the children to the wonders of the world around them." The Autumn volume begins with the study of the familiar autumn plants with which our fields abound, and concludes with reflexions on insects, spiders, and the rodents. Instructions are given as to the preparations for the Winter work, which embraces studies of lime-stone, quartz, ocean life, coal, evergreens, and bits of anthropology. This section appropriately concludes with some work on evaporation. The volume on Spring deals with like appropriate scientific topics. The lessons are conversational, and quite varied in their interest, and much good poetry from current sources has been interwoven in the text; the classical poetry, however, has been little exploited, probably from its difficulty.

A similar but more elementary volume is *Nature's By-Ways, or Natural Science for Primary Pupils*, by Nellie Walton Ford, published by The Morse

Company, New York and Boston, and with illustrations from the great artists by Gertrude Morse. The type is clear and good, and many will find it more useful than the preceding volumes as a beginner's reader.

AN EXEMPLARY COURSE IN ELEMENTARY MATHEMATICS.

Two volumes of the excellent course in elementary mathematics published under the direction of M. Darboux, the distinguished mathematician and dean of the Faculty of Sciences at Paris, have already been mentioned in *The Open Court*. They were the *Arithmetic* of Jules Tannery and the *Plane Geometry* of Jacques Hadamard. Three other important volumes have been published in the series, and are of just the type with which mathematical instructors in America should become acquainted. They are the *Algebra* and *Plane Trigonometry* of M. C. Bourlet, and the *Cosmography* of M. M. Tisserand and H. Andoyer.

M. Bourlet's *Algebra* (548 pages, price 7 fr. 50c.) is very complete for an elementary work. The treatment of negative numbers and of the commutative, associative and distributive properties of operations is quite detailed. Functions of a single variable are discussed, and the graphical representation of the variation of a function explained. Some few notions of analytical geometry have been introduced, and the theory of derivatives, usually deferred to the calculus, is touched upon. The methods employed are such as admit of subsequent extension in mathematics, and assure economy of presentation in all later developments.

The same author has written the treatise on *Plane Trigonometry* (322 pages, price 6 fr.). The book begins with an exposition of the notions of vectors, equipollency, and so forth. An appendix for special students treats of the trigonometrical representation of imaginary quantities, the formula of Moivre, the roots of imaginary quantities, binomial equations, and cubic equations.

The *Cosmography* of M. M. Tisserand and H. Andoyer (370 pages, price 6 fr.) is virtually a text-book of astronomy. The book is concisely written, and is devoted to the science of the subject as contrasted with its fictions. The most recent investigations have been recorded. There are twelve excellent plates from photographs of the heavens. The history of astronomy and some special technical points of difficulty are treated in an appendix.

Two important volumes in the same series, a *Solid Geometry* by M. Hadamard and a text-book of *Mechanics* by M. Koenigs, are announced as in the press. Inasmuch as the system of mathematical instruction in France is now more completely and rationally organised than that of any other country, the methods of these text-books are deserving of the closest attention. The publishers are Armand Colin & Co., 5 rue de Mézières, Paris.

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BOOK NOTICES.

GRUNDPRINZIPIEN FÜR LÖSUNG DER SOCIALEN FRAGE. Verfasst in drei Gesprächs-abenden von G. Krause. Published by the author. New York.

The author of this book is obviously a serious man who burns with the desire to redeem suffering mankind from the evils of the present system of social wrongs. He has passed through many sore disappointments without losing courage to carry on a propaganda for the principles and methods by which he proposes to solve the difficult problem. He submitted the MS. of his book to C. H. Boppe, editor of the *Friedenker*, to Maximilian Grossman, former principal of the Workingmen's

School of New York City, Prof. Ernst Haeckel of Jena, and Baroness Bertha von Suttner, author of *Ground Arms*; Col. M. von Egidy was also approached. All of them replied kindly but coolly, indicating that the MS. contained nothing new, and would scarcely find a publisher; some said that it was not worth publishing. The national executive of the Socialist Labor party of New York at first accepted the book for publication, but soon withdrew their promise, because they could not in-dorse the author's view and would only tolerate it as a private opinion. Herr Krause censures all these parties severally according to their answers, and handles them without gloves.

We must recognise that Herr Krause grows warm and eloquent when he speaks of "the true human progress that will benefit all" (p. 31), and he proposes as the sole means of progress a propaganda (*Agitationsweise*) of radical self-culture. He denounces the principle of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" which characterises the social democratic agitation (p. 29), and demands a pure morality and a spirit of self-sacrifice. Since the realisation of this ideal is impossible under the present social system of the god Mammon, he proposes to form a new organisation for the introduction of a new system on a new basis of human solidarity. Clubs are to be founded in which each member shall contribute an assessment of about 12 per cent. of their income for the various purposes of the organisation. There shall be regular meetings of the members; popular libraries, public lectures, free discussions, physical instruments for self instruction, etc., and if possible an exclusion of all spiritous drinks. At any rate alcoholism and other vices shall not be suffered (p. 41). The main benefit to members would consist in subsidies if for some reason or other they should become destitute; but above all, every one would upon his conscience be under the obligation of a faithful self-education.

The author's intentions are good, but we fear that he will meet with disappointments only. Many of his ideals are being realised through other methods and by people who are not Socialists; but his special plan can, in our opinion, not be carried out; but supposing he would be fortunate enough to start an organisation such as he sees in his prophetic vision, he would soon find out how difficult it is to run it. Even if the assessment of 12 per cent. were not too high, the members would by no means be assured that the officers of the club would administer the common funds with integrity and honesty. The anarchical system of individual responsibility such as prevails now will probably, in spite of its many drawbacks, prove more acceptable to the masses of mankind

P. C.

WOMAN IN THE ANCIENT HEBREW CULT. By *Ismar J. Peritz*, A. M. Ph. D. (Harv.). Professor of Semitic Languages and Archæology, Syracuse University. Reprinted from *Journal of Biblical Literature* (1898, Part II.), published by the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

Woman's position in the ancient Hebrew cult has always been supposed to be inferior to that of man, a view which was used as an argument for barring the admission of women to the highest legislative council of the Methodist Episcopal Church at the General Conference. Dr. Peritz, however, after a careful investigation of the Biblical records, arrives at a result that will be unexpected in many circles, and is yet based upon good evidence. He says "that the Semites in general, and the Hebrews in particular, and the latter, especially in the earlier periods of their history, exhibit no tendency to discriminate between man and woman so far as regards participation in religious practices, but that woman participates in all the essentials of the cult, both as worshipper and official; and that only in later

time, with the progress in the development of the cult itself, a tendency appears not so much, however, to exclude woman from the cult, as rather to make man prominent in it." The essay is written in a thoroughly scholarly manner and the arguments carry conviction.

DER SCHÄDEL DES SECUNDUS ARBITER. Die Geschichte eines Seelenwanderers von F. P. Kentel. Chicago: 1898.

This neat little book of 91 pages is a psychological novel describing the weird story of an educated but erratic man who believes he has discovered the skull of one of his prior incarnations. Mr. Secundus Strobel, a gentleman of means and too much leisure, devotes his life to the odd task of disentangling the secrets of his former life, and thus the romance of his imagination is woven into the history of the disease of his mind that leads him to the asylum. P. C.

Students of Catholic philosophy will welcome the appearance of a little metaphysical treatise on *The Notion of Time*,¹ which has been written by Désiré Nys, professor in the Catholic University of Louvain. The treatment is based on the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The importance of the subject will be admitted by every one. In our opinion, the study of modern psychological investigations on this subject is preferable to the study of the works of Saint Thomas, great philosopher though he was. Nevertheless, the work has value as a contribution to the history of philosophy, and its author has not omitted to touch upon some of the views of recent philosophers.

The January and February issues of the elegant *Bibelot* series, "a reprint of poetry and prose for book lovers, chosen in part from scarce editions and sources not generally known," are *Gertha's Lover's*, a tale by William Morris (Part I), and *Lyrics from Paul Verlaine*, the absinthe poet of France, who died in Paris in 1896 in abject poverty. The English translations of Verlaine are by various hands,—in one case the French original is given. "Friend and foe alike," says the editor, "have vied in stripping him of every vestige of reputation; one thing only his bitterest traducer could not choose but admit,—the exquisite poetry of such verse as *Chanson d'automne*, the *Avant que tu ne t'en ailles*, and *Il pleure dans mon cœur*." Each issue of the *Bibelot* series costs 5 cents. (Thomas B Mosher, 45 Exchange street, Portland, Me.)

Two attractive volumes have recently been added to the series of *Biographies of Saints* published by Victor Lecoffre, rue Bonaparte 90, Paris. One of them is devoted to *Saint Henry*, the Emperor of Germany, under whom the temporal and spiritual powers were consolidated. This little volume is written by Henry Lesêtre, who has acquired a reputation for researches in mediæval religious history. The second volume is on *Saint Dominic*, and has been written by Jean Guiraud. Saint Dominic, who was a Spaniard and lived between 1170 and 1221, was the founder of the order of Dominicans and an active participant in the crusade against the Albigenses. The volumes are cheap (75 cents, bound), and are written in French from the Roman Catholic point of view.

The Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for the year ending 1896 has just been published. The bulk of the contents is devoted to archæology and

¹ *La Notion de Temps d'après les principes de Saint Thomas D'Aquin*. By Désiré Nys, Professeur à l'Université catholique de Louvain. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1 rue des Flamands. 1898. Pp., 232. Price, 2 fr. 50 c.

anthropology. The first of the larger contributions is a very elaborate monograph on *Historical Art*, by Thomas Wilson, Curator of Prehistorical Archæology in the United States National Museum. His paper "is a contribution to the history of art, rather than to the science of art, and is intended as a record of the actual manifestation of art in the various epochs of human culture in pre-historic times." The memoir covers over 300 large pages, and is very richly illustrated. The second original contribution of the volume is a long essay by Stewart Culin, of the Museum of Archæology of the University of Pennsylvania, on *Chess and Playing Cards* being a catalogue of games and implements for divination exhibited by the National Museum at the International Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1895. There is much of strange interest in the contribution, which is also profusely illustrated. The third paper is a description of the exhibit of Biblical Antiquities at the Atlanta Exposition, by Dr. Adler and Dr. Casanowicz. The fourth is on the *Lamp of the Esquimaux*, by Dr. Hough, of the National Museum.

Dr. William Benjamin Smith, professor of mathematics in Tulane University, has published the first volume of his work on the *Infinitesimal Calculus* (Macmillan, pp. 352, \$3.25). It deals with the more elementary parts of the subject, *Real Variables*, reserving the difficult parts, and especially the general theory of functions, for a second and a third volume. The book will not appeal to the average reader of *The Open Court*, but to the student it has much to recommend itself—large print, clear and distinct figures, salient sub divisions, a common-sense arrangement, good collections of familiar exercises, and, best of all, a practical appreciation of the real needs of instruction. The language is concise, though not elegant, and with a leaning to Teutonicisms and technicalities.

The same house has also just issued a large work (336 pp.) by Prof. J. Harkness, of Bryn Mawr, and Prof. F. Morley, of Haverford, entitled *Introduction to the Theory of Analytic Functions*, which is an entirely new book and not indentifiable with their well-known *Treatise* in any way. The theory of functions occupies a central position in modern analysis, and has innumerable points of contact with other branches. Yet there is no text-book in English giving an elementary account of its fundamental concepts. It is this need the work in question supplies to those who have already entered on the higher mathematics. (Macmillan, \$3.00). Both volumes are handsome specimens of typography.

A paper-covered edition of Dr. Paul Carus's *Buddhism and Its Christian Critics* has just been issued in the Religion of Science Library, at the reduced price of fifty cents (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago). The book is one which will be particularly interesting to students of comparative religion, and to Christian missionaries, to whom mainly it is addressed. There are six chapters, entitled as follows: The Origin of Buddhism, The Philosophy of Buddhism, The Psychological Problem. The Basic Concepts of Buddhism, Buddhism and Christianity, and Christian Critics of Buddhism. There are also a few illustrations.

A new revised and enlarged edition of the same author's *Ethical Problem* has also just been issued. It contains, beside the original three lectures, the entire controversy that was elicited by the work when it first appeared, together with Dr. Carus's replies to prominent thinkers holding different views on the subject. This list includes Mr. William M. Salter, lecturer of the Chicago Ethical Society, Prof. Friedrich Jodl, of the University of Vienna, Prof. H. Hoeffding, of the University of Copenhagen, Prof. L. M. Billia, of Turin, Italy, the late Dr. Robert Lewins, of

the British Army, Mr. F. M. Holland, and Mr. John Maddock. The most important questions of ethics, such as the nature of conscience, the distinction between moral law and moral rules, the ultimate basis of morality, the relation of pleasure and pain to moral motives, and so forth, are fully discussed in the work. The bulk of the volume has been considerably swollen, and contains now 351 pages (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. Cloth, \$1.25).

Dr. Douglas Houghton Campbell, professor of botany in the Leland Stanford University, of California, has collected the course of lectures which he delivered last year into a volume entitled: *The Evolution of Plants* (New York: The Macmillan Company. Pages, 319. Price, \$1.25). The lectures aim to present in an untechnical manner the most striking facts bearing upon the evolution of plant forms. So far as the author's knowledge reaches, no popular work, not addressed to botanical students alone, and giving a connected account of the development of the plant kingdom from an evolutionary standpoint, exists in the English language. And this deficiency in our scientific literature it was that moved him to publish the present work. He claims no originality for the matter presented, beyond its arrangement, and has availed himself freely of the material accumulated by botanists during the past fifty years. Sixty drawings have been prepared for the elucidation of the text.

NOTES.

Dr. W. L. Hailmann, the late superintendent of Indian schools (under Cleveland), writes concerning the article on the "Indian Question," written by Mr. A. H. Heinemann for the December *Open Court*, that "it is the most instructive, true to the core, and will do much to clear the atmosphere," adding, "I do not, however, think it quite severe enough on the political corruption which poisons every phase of the work," and "on the lack of conscience displayed" on "the part of secretaries of the interior, senators, representatives, and local party bosses. But all the statements made by Mr. Heinemann are good and true and thorough."

We learned with deep regret of the death, some months ago, of Hermann Boppe, the editor of the *Freidenker*, of Milwaukee, Wis. He was an honest man and stood up bravely for his convictions. As an iconoclast he had not his equal; but his language was moderate, and he never pandered to sensationalism. He condemned religion in any form and preferred the discarding of traditional ideas to the method of purifying them, as pursued by *The Open Court*. His political radicalism found its ideal in the institutions of Switzerland, and he advocated reforms such as the abolition of the presidency, etc. His field of work was limited to the Germans, especially the liberal element, which is represented by the *Turnverein*. Among the Turners he had his friends, although even here he frequently met with resistance, for he never tried to be popular and would have held to his views even though he had wrecked the *Freidenker* and all his literary enterprises. The cause of his death was overwork, for he was indefatigable, and the means at his disposal were not sufficient to engage effective editorial assistance. His best helpmate was his wife, a German-American lady, a native of Milwaukee, of scholarly education and high accomplishments.

We differed from Mr. Boppe's views on many points, and were repeatedly engaged in controversies, but they never disturbed our personal relations, which remained friendly to the very last.

P. C.



CONDORCET.

(1743-1794.)

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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PAGANISM IN THE ROMAN CHURCH.¹

BY TH. TREDE,

Pastor of the Evangelical Church at Naples.

IN silent desolation, surrounded by swamps and malaria, there rises in the plain of Pæstum the famous temple of Poseidon, the best preserved of all the extant Hellenic temples. "A tale of the ages olden,"—thus it impressed us as we saw it not long ago in the light of the evening sun. "The sun rules"—such is the expression in modern Greece for the sinking king of day, a popular expression understood only by one whose eye has seen the color-marvels of evening in the southland, which, proceeding from the throne of that monarch, deck as by magic sea and land, mountain and valley, earth and sky with a chromatic splendor that no artist can imitate—yonder the shimmering sea, the purple-surg-ing, sacred salt-tide of Homer; here proud mountains veiled in tender violet; between them the soundless plain once famous for its rose-gardens, and in the plain that temple, transfigured by the roseate, odorous haze; above us the sky, as blue as when blooming life filled these fields now desolate for centuries, as smiling as when, twenty-four hundred years ago, Hellenic faith erected the temple—thus we saw that majestic construction, and then left that region, bearing with us deep and imperishable impressions.

The temple at Pæstum is an eloquent surviving witness of struggles of world-wide significance, such as earth has not seen before or since, we mean the two centuries of conflict beginning with Constantine, in which, as is commonly said, paganism succumbed to victorious Christianity. Two hundred years! A long time, so long that we cannot possibly assume that from the start Christian-

¹ Translated by Prof. W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

ity was facing in paganism a weak, half-dead opponent. It must be that this opponent possessed great vitality if it was only after two hundred years that he could be declared conquered by a church which was supported by the most powerful of allies, the State.

We speak of a two hundred years' conflict between Christianity and paganism. Is the expression correct? Was then this struggle a purely spiritual struggle, and did the victory consist in a conquest of the spirit of paganism by the spirit of Christianity? And was there an inner victory won, which resulted in the disappearance of the outward evidences of pagan life, as, for instance, the temples? We speak of a "fall," an "overthrow" of Hellenic-Roman paganism. Does this mean that those two hundred years destroyed the moral and religious tendencies of paganism so that mankind was transformed, first inwardly and then, as a consequence of this, outwardly?

In the temple of Pæstum we see a lifeless relic of paganism; the present article will show forth some of its living relics.

With Constantine, the first so-called "Christian" emperor, the power of the State was turned against paganism. While the pagan Roman emperors had endeavored to annihilate Christianity by annihilating the individual Christians, the Christian Roman emperors resorted to another method for accomplishing their ends. In order to exterminate paganism they directed their attack against pagan worship, which was the means, according to the Roman point of view, of preserving for all mankind the favor of the guardian gods. The government attempted to abolish this by violence in order thus to deprive paganism of the means of self-manifestation, the very condition of existence. As a matter of course acts of violence could not abolish the religious spirit and tendency of paganism, and the fact that two hundred years were required for a by no means complete outward Christianisation shows how little virtue there was in the violent measures of government.

Measures against the pagan Roman worship could not fail to strike the temples at the very first. The closing, evacuation or destruction of the temples, as well as their use for the construction of churches and other purposes, began under Constantine and his sons, but did not assume considerable headway until the end of the century of Constantine (the 4th), under Emperor Theodosius. The Church hailed him as a second Joash, of whom the Old Testament says: "And all the people of the land went to the house of Baal and brake it down; his altars and images brake they in pieces

thoroughly." (2 Kings, xi. 18.) At this time the Church began to call out the hosts of her monks for the destruction of the temples, and among the bishops there were not a few who flattered themselves that they possessed the spirit, the power and the calling of Elijah. Such a one was, for instance, Theophilus, bishop of Alexandria, who thoroughly destroyed the world-famed temple of Serapis at that place and also destroyed the unapproachable, mysterious, miraculous image of the great Serapis. The Church was filled with rejoicings, for she believed that the fall of this temple was a glorious victory for Christianity. For the vanished Serapis the Church offered compensation in "king" Christ, and the heathen who were converted by such deeds now expected all that they had formerly hoped and obtained from Serapis from Christ, who assumed the guardianship of the Nile-gauge which had formerly stood in the temple of Serapis. Such was the dispensation of the Church. For the honor of Christ and the pursuit of their own salvation bands of monks, fanatical or instigated by fanatics, undertook in those days regular crusades against the temples, and in Canopus (Egypt), for instance, razed to the ground all the temples, although they made compensation by providing for the construction of Christian sanctuaries and furnishing them with relics of the saints in the place of the expelled gods, in whom the whole Church of that time recognised real powers, called "dæmons," which according to the notions of that time were subdued by the magic spell of the Church. Such a crusade was undertaken in Syria by the trooper-bishop Marcellus, attended by gladiators, soldiers, and monks, and in Gaul Bishop Martin, elevated from the camp to be a Church official, could not repress his warlike ardor and directed it against temples and "dæmons." No wonder that the Frankish rulers chose this bishop for their patron saint and took with them on their crusades as a palladium that guarded and guaranteed victory the mitre of Saint Martin. The clergy, who had charge of this palladium at home and on the way, received from the "cappa" (hat, or mitre) referred to the name "cappelani," and the receptacle which contained the palladium was called "cappella" (hat-box). This "cappa," then, served the same purpose for the Christian Frankish princes as for Æneas that palladium which he took with him from Troy (*Æneid*, I., 378), or as that famous "ancile" (shield) which was regarded in Rome as a direct gift of heaven, or as that famous image of Mary in Constantinople, which at the beginning of the fifth century was dedicated to public worship by Pulcheria, sister of the Emperor Theodosius II., and in critical times was

fastened as a protection to that portion of the wall which was most exposed to hostile attacks. Constantine had the very same expectation of the cross, *caeleste signum Dei*, when he substituted it for the pagan emblems that had been worshipped as divine.

While in the Orient the temples were quite thoroughly cleaned away, in the Occident, and especially in Italy, they received very different treatment. We are told of no scenes of vandalism, nor of trooper-bishops and crusades against the temples of Italy. Monasticism did not appear there until later, and this absence of fanatic mobs of monks preserved the temples from the fate that befell them in the Orient. In Italy in the course of the two centuries beginning with Constantine only a small portion of the temples were violently destroyed; on the contrary they were evacuated, closed, deprived of their revenues and consequently of their administration; many, after their pillars had been taken away for Christian purposes, fell into ruins, many were transformed into churches, many survived these two centuries to meet later one of the fates just mentioned or to be destroyed by earthquakes. Many temples, chiefly in Sicily, have defied the ravages of time until the present day. It is true, the number of theatres preserved is much greater, a fact that is easily explained. For when the temples had long been desolate in Italy the pagan theatre still flourished, together with beast-baiting and gladiatorial combats, which for instance did not cease in Rome until the beginning of the fifth century.¹ The temples in Naples disappeared almost utterly, but only gradually in the succeeding centuries, likewise in Tarentum (Taranto) and in Palermo. The effects of an earthquake may be seen in the temple ruins of Girgenti and Selinus in Sicily, and in Calabria more than a hundred years ago a fearful earthquake destroyed many remains of temples. It is remarkable that in two places the Greek word for temple, *Naos*, has been preserved. Capo di Nao is the name to-day among the Calabrian people for that promontory on the Gulf of Tarentum where still a single column marks the place of the temple of Hera. Near the modern Monteleone the same word calls attention to the site of a temple.

This extensive sparing of the temples in Italy fifteen hundred years ago proves on the one hand that the Christian emperors did not and could not carry out all that they decreed, and on the other hand that the people were free from Christian fanaticism. It would have been an easy matter to destroy all the temples of Italy

¹The spectacle of beast-baiting was permitted as late as the sixth century, and that by the Christian emperor Justinian. Even the clergy participated at such spectacles.

in the course of fifty years, yet what could have been accomplished in a short space of time was not completed in two hundred years. When the Normans took possession of Sicily in the eleventh century they found there numerous Mohammedan sanctuaries erected by the Arabian conquerors. In Palermo there were several hundred temples and mosques. All these were destroyed in no time at all by the order of the Norman leaders; the same in Bari and elsewhere. There is not a trace of such structures left.

Now because ruins of temples were once very common things in Southern Italy it has come about in later centuries that the people in many cases regarded the ruins of secular edifices as remains of temples. Many a time the writer has strayed along the deserted strand of Baiæ with its many ruins, praised by Horace as the most charming corner of the earth, and always heard the people there demonstrate the ruins of the baths to be the temples of every possible Roman divinity. On the slope of Posilipo, near Naples, stands the solitary ruin of a Roman bathing villa, known to-day in the popular language as the "Castle of the Ghosts." In this title we hear an echo of the ancient belief in "dæmons" which was preserved even by the Christians for centuries, and the stronghold of the belief in the mysterious magic of the pagan Roman world is shown by other ruins on Mount Posilipo where to this day a piece of ruined wall is entitled "the School of Virgil," that is, the place where Virgil, who was regarded as a magician, taught his magic arts. In modern Sulmona, the birth-place of Ovid, popular songs speak of him to this day as a magician.

For the judgment of past and present it is important to know the connexion between the oldest churches of Southern Italy and the pagan temples.

Nearly all the oldest church structures originated in one of the three following ways: either they made use of all sorts of temple materials, and especially pillars, or they were built upon the same foundation which once bore a temple, or the temples were transformed into Christian churches. That is, pagan materials served to make the new Christian structure. This sort of church buildings may serve as a simile to characterise the spiritual reconstruction of those centuries. The Church of that time built a new spiritual structure, but of pagan materials.

In S. Clemente, on the road between Naples and Salerno, lies one of the least known and at the same time most remarkable churches of Christendom, notable because it has come down to our time almost unaltered, although it belongs without question to the

fifth century. It is a baptistery, and therefore round and provided with a variety of antique pillars. Pillars from what was once the temple of Apollo are seen in the church of S. Restituta in Naples, pillars from the temple of Poseidon in the pilasters of the cathedral in the same place. There are antique pillars in the old church of S. Costanzo on the island of Capri, which marks the place down by the sea where the ancient village of Capri stood, destroyed later by the Saracens. These are but a few of the instances from the oldest period of Southern Italian church structures. When later the Lombards settled here and had princely residences in Salerno, Capua, and Benevento, they too used antique columns in their church edifices. It was some five hundred years before the supply of columns was exhausted. Toward the last Pæstum became a rich source of supply. Thence the Norman duke Robert Guiscard brought the ancient columns for his cathedral at Salerno on which he inscribed himself "dux," "rex," and "imperator," as may be read to-day. The atrium of this cathedral still shows the stolen columns of the proud Norman. From Pæstum also the rich merchants of the once mighty Amalfi procured a supply of columns for their cathedral. Twenty splendid granite columns, which adorn the cathedral of Gerace are of Hellenic origin, taken from the ruins of ancient Locri. The Norman duke Roger, who once resided in Melito (Calabria), procured columns from the ruins of Hipponion near the modern Monteleone.

It is worth noting that the erection of such columns in churches, especially in the oldest times, was done in a very unsystematic way. They took what they found—and accordingly we see even yet pillars of very different kinds standing side by side. And a similar method was pursued by the Church of those centuries in its spiritual edifice.

Just as they gathered up columns, so they did other pagan objects which could be used in the churches for various purposes. In the cathedral at Naples we see a splendid basalt basin with beautiful reliefs showing the worship of Bacchus, snatched from some temple. It serves as a baptismal font! In the cathedral at Terracina is seen an ancient granite tub, in the cathedral at Amalfi an antique vase, in the cathedral at Syracuse a very pagan and secular mixing-vessel. It is known that in many churches in Rome there are marble episcopal chairs which once stood in the bath-rooms of the public baths of Diocletian. Rome, indeed, gave a widely followed example in the gathering up of pagan material for ecclesiastical purposes. By this statement we mean not merely

bath chairs, and so forth, but we are thinking also of material for the spiritual edifice of the Church.

Numerous antique sarcophagi with their pagan reliefs constitute an odd adornment of the older churches of Southern Italy. They are found, for instance in Salerno, Capua, Amalfi, Cava (in the monastery of S. Trinita), Palermo, and in Naples and Girgenti. It is a strange sight when the eye is surprised in a Christian church by Hellenic-Roman inscriptions and finds dancing bacchantes where they should not be expected. The sarcophagus in Girgenti is famous, with its relief representing the legend of Hippolytus. When we come to examine the spiritual structure of the Church more closely we shall be still more surprised by mythological features of a different sort than by those on the sarcophagi mentioned.

Little is preserved of the chief adornment of the temples, the statues of the gods, for while in Italy no sweat was wasted over deliberate and violent destruction of the temples, during these two centuries of conflict the images of the gods were for the most part destroyed, and what is found in the museums, as at Naples, is but a remnant. For in that city images of the gods were so numerous that the proverb ran: "You are more likely to meet a god than a man in Naples." Only one of all the extant statues of the gods in Southern Italy has escaped the lot of imprisonment in a museum. It is a mutilated Ariadne which stands beside a fountain in the vicinity of Monteleone, where it is worshipped unto this day under the name of Santa Venere, just as Poseidon was worshipped in the temple at Pæstum, the divinity being identified with the statue. "Saint Venus" is appealed to by women under certain circumstances down to this day. And the harbor at that place is named after her: Porto Santa Venere.

The temples from which the statues of the gods had disappeared, when once they were changed into churches, or when new churches were built on their foundations, were straightway occupied by the ancient paganism under the guise of Christianity. The pagan rhetor Libanius, who in that period of conflict presented to the Roman emperor a defence of the endangered temples, was right: "They may close the temples against the gods, but not the hearts of men." Some instances will illustrate this.

The oldest church that was built within the walls of Naples in the sixth century (there were some churches built without the walls previous to this), stood upon the ruins of a temple of Artemis, and was dedicated to the Madonna. The latter took the place of

the former and assumed all of her former functions. In the ancient campanile of this church, built of brick, one may still see all manner of fragments of that temple. To this day in that church women ask of the Madonna precisely what was once asked of Artemis in the same place. On the slope of Posilipo, near Naples, there stands solitary on the shore a church of the Madonna on the spot where once sea-faring men could see a temple of Venus Eupleua, that is, the divinity who protected harbors and navigation. To the present hour in the eyes of the fishermen the Madonna performs the same offices as did once Dame Venus, and gifts are brought to her altar as of old, and vows performed before her image as once they were before that of Venus Eupleua. There was in Naples a temple of Antinous, the well-known favorite of the Emperor Hadrian, who placed him among the gods, after the youth had incurred death for his sake. On the place of this temple has stood from early times the church of St. John the Baptist, who also incurred death for the sake of his Master. John the Baptist, then, in the simplest and most natural fashion, displaced Antinous and assumed in the eyes of the so-called Christians the same office that Antinous had filled. In Terracina the church of S. Cesareo stands upon a temple of Augustus; in Messina St. Gregory displaced Jupiter in the same manner, and in Girgenti Zeus was likewise obliged to flee before S. Gerlando; and when Saint Benedict came to Monte Cassino in the sixth century, S. Martino, that warlike saint, chased away Apollo, who, as we all know, had pierced with his dart the serpent Python. On the highest point in modern Pozzuoli stands the cathedral of Saint Proculus on the foundation of a splendid temple of Augustus which the Apostle Paul saw when he landed there. One who travels along the magnificent mountain road toward Sorrento and enters the divinely favored plain at Meta, covered with fragrant orange groves, will find in Meta a famous church of the Madonna which offers the same miraculous cures that were once sought on the same spot in a temple of Minerva Medica. From the fifth century there has existed in a cave on the majestic promontory of Monte Gargano in Apulia the ancient sanctuary of St. Michael, who expelled from the place in the fifth century the oracular dæmons of Kalchas. We shall later hear more of this famous shrine. At Marsala (in Sicily) a church of S. Giovanni was built above the cave and magic spring of a sibyl, and there the saint still dispenses oracles, that is, has displaced the sibyl. On the summit of Monte Vergine near Naples once stood a sanctuary of the *Magna Mater* (Cybele), and when S. Guiglielmo

built his cells there as a hermit he found the remains of the sanctuary, which had been a pilgrim shrine of the pagans down to the days of the last emperors. Upon the ruins was erected a church of the Madonna which was soon equipped with a famous miraculous image (*imago prodigiosa*), and thus once more a "magna mater" reigns there, who is so highly esteemed that this shrine attracts more than fifty thousand pilgrims every year at Pentecost. In the sixth century a pagan asked the monk Isidor what difference there was between the magna mater Cybele and the Madonna.

One of the best examples is furnished us in the Madonna del Capo (of the Promontory). On the towering Licinian promontory near Croton on the Gulf of Tarentum stood formerly the temple of Hera Lucina, the religious centre for all the Hellenic colonies of that coast, a shrine of solemn pilgrimage to which came every year a brilliant-hued procession, just as in Athens to the Parthenon. Forty-eight marble columns enclosed this sanctuary, which stood in the midst of a murmuring fir grove and guarded immense treasures, which, however, even a Hannibal spared, fearing the wrath of the divinity. When this temple came into Roman possession it retained its popularity, the only change being that the name of the goddess was changed to Juno Lucina. Then Christianity entered the country, and in the fifth century the bishop of Croton changed that temple into a church. Again only a slight change was made, for the divinity whose image was displayed there was now called Mary, but in her function and influence she was all that Juno had been. Afterwards as before processions went up thither, afterwards as before vows were performed, afterwards as before women appealed in the most important concerns of life to Mary-Juno-Hera. Pythagoras, who developed his chief activity in Croton, induced the women there to lay their ornaments on the altar of Hera. In later times many Christian virgins did the same before they renounced the world and entered the cloister. That temple of the Madonna was left solitary when the Saracens devastated the coast, the sacred image was taken to Croton, but the temple itself remained in good preservation for a long time. Finally it was destroyed by a bishop of Croton, who constructed a palace for himself out of the material. This man bore the name Lucifero and lived about the year 1520. To-day it may be said of the temple:

"Only one lofty column
Tells of its vanished splendor."

Finally an example from Sicily. On Mount Eryx in the north part of the island, illumined by sunshine or veiled in clouds, there overlooked the sacred salt tide the temple-sanctuary of Aphrodite, famous throughout antiquity among both Greeks and Romans. The temple has disappeared, but on the same height, called Monte S. Giugliano, the graciously smiling, loving Madonna is worshipped. Aphrodite kept there her sacred doves, and to this hour doves are to be seen fluttering about the mountain and the sacred spot, for no priestly conjuration has been able to remove this relic of paganism. A strange testimony this!

In this rechristening of the old gods also an example was set the church by eternal Rome, this episcopal capital which had been Christianised outwardly at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. Pagan mothers there were in the habit of taking their sick children to the sanctuary of Romulus and imploring aid of him who had been suckled by the she-wolf on that spot. The church did not want the Christianised mothers to be deprived of any comfort, and accordingly erected a Christian sanctuary there and established in it St. Theodorus, to whom mothers appealed just as before they had done to Romulus. This transformation took place in the fourth century, and the church referred to, a round structure of brick, partly ancient material, still stands. Two centuries later eternal Rome crowned the work of rechristening by transforming the Pantheon, the temple dedicated to all the gods, into a church sacred to all the martyrs, after taking into it whole wagon-loads of holy bones.

Even in the fourth century many a man of deeper insight complained of the merely nominal Christianity of the masses who were floating with the current. These were the voices of prophets in the wilderness. There is a mournful sound in the judgment of Augustine upon his time: "Jesus is seldom sought for his own sake." It is a painful saying when Chrysostom compares the church of his time with a woman who has retained only the empty chests in which her wealth had been. While even such superior minds were by no means able to escape entirely the spell of paganism, others floated along with this tide that was submerging the church without being aware that they were dominated by paganism. We mean to include all those churchmen of the two centuries of conflict who assigned to the saints and martyrs the very same function which, according to the doctrines of the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists, belonged to heroes, dæmons, and guardian spirits. Without difficulty the outwardly Christianised pagan masses found again in the

church what they had just surrendered. The Spartans had apotheosised their Lycurgus, the Hellenes Hercules and other heroes, the Romans their emperors (including Constantine), Hadrian had deified his Antinous. The Church did the same with its martyr-heroes. The Church said: "Juno Lucina is a false divinity; Mary is the true intercessor between men and the Most High." This was the "lenitas," the mild method, of the Church, which often made pagans Christians by the wholesale but gave to Christianity a pagan form and accordingly reared a spiritual edifice that corresponded with the Church edifices of those centuries of conflict. In both pagan material was used. The protection of pagan deities which had been secured by pagan religious ceremonies made way for Christian ceremonies which ensured the guardian care of Christian divinities. The fact remained, only the name was changed.

For the better understanding of the above it must be remembered how deeply rooted in the heart of a Hellenic-Roman pagan was the need of reaching with faith and hope those deities of a lower grade, which, as intercessory divinities, were nearer to man, and furthermore what support the Hellenic-Roman religious faith had received in this direction from the philosophical doctrines of the second century. Then we must consider in this connexion the well-known fact that during the first Christian centuries new divinities and new forms of worship were constantly being introduced from the Orient and willingly received. So the Hellenic-Roman pagan world was accustomed to hear of new and powerful aiding and atoning divinities, and the yearning human heart turned with especial readiness to those divinities and forms of worship which promised atonement. Why, men asked, should they not give a trial to Christianity which blazed, a propitious planet, above the so-called Christian emperors, which promised to the longing human heart the true aiding and atoning divinities, substituted a brilliant ceremonial for the splendor of pagan worship, and received all possible aid favor and encouragement from the great ones of the age? Moreover the charitable institutions of all sorts within the Church and its membership constituted an especial attraction for the people of the poorer classes. As early as 325 A. D., indeed, complaint was made by the Council of Nicæa of the defective preparation of the catechumens. Finally I call attention to the fact that the Hellenic-Roman pagan world never hesitated to modify newly introduced divinities or to recognise in them their own heathen deities. When, for instance, the worship of Mithras, the

Persian god of light, was introduced, traces of which may still be seen in a cave on the island of Capri, the religious Roman merely saw in Mithras his own pagan deity Sol (the sun). The Phœnician Astarte was modified by the Hellenes into Aphrodite, and she in turn became among the Romans Venus. Tacitus was able to see in the Germanic gods those of his native Rome. Thus we see the reason why it was so easy for the outwardly Christianised pagans to feel at home on the Christian Olympus with its saints and its Mary, especially as the nature of the religion suffered no change. It was afterwards as before a matter of ceremonial, that is, the essence of certain performances which were believed to have an inherently magical effect. Christianity was regarded as the new dispensation, and the Christianised pagan merely exchanged one dispensation for another.

Just as the pagan divinities, with Christian names, leaving the deserted temples entered the churches, so the Hellenic-Roman religious ceremonial followed them. The construction of the Christian ceremonial during these two centuries of conflict is a parallel to the construction of the churches by means of pagan materials.

We meet in the churches the spell of the holy water, we see to-day the clouds of incense, the flowers on the altars, the candles before the images, the votive offerings or "vota," relics of all sorts, pictures and statues, the latter in such growing avalanches on Neapolitan territory that the modern churches revive the truth of that old proverb mentioned above: "In Naples one is more likely to meet a god than a man." All these things are portions of the Hellenic-Roman ceremonial, introduced during those two hundred years of so-called conflict.

At the entrance of pagan temples stood a vessel of holy water with which to sprinkle oneself, and magic spells added strength to the holy water as to-day; the aspergillum (holy water sprinkler) was very familiar to the pagans, and sprinkling men and inanimate objects with holy water was a universal pagan custom. While Justin Martyr in the second century condemned the holy water as an invention of the devil, opinion had changed by the end of the fourth century. The erudite Jerome tells, with the pagan-Christian belief in miracles common to his time, that the race-horses of a Christian, sprinkled with holy water, won over the horses of a heathen. "Thus the pagan god was conquered by Christ." (Jerome, *op. 4*, p. 80.) That Christian baptism took the place of pagan ceremonies of atonement in the eyes of Emperor Constantine and his contemporaries, and likewise in the eyes of Emperor Theodosius,

is clear from the fact that baptism was transferred to the close of life.¹

Clouds of incense and the glitter of candles were prominent features in the pagan temples. Aphrodite escapes to Paphos and views with joy the place where rises her temple and where glow a hundred altars with the burning incense from Sheba and fragrant with fresh wreaths (Virgil, *Aeneid* I., 415). Jeremiah (xliv. 17) condemned the Jews who burned incense to the queen of heaven; Emperor Theodosius forbade pagan burnt offerings. The prohibited incense, rechristened with a Christian name, entered the churches, and with it lights, whether in costly lamps or in the glimmer of tapers. Of perpetual lamps (*vigil ignis*) we are told by Virgil, *Aeneid* IV., 200 :

"And altars placed a hundred : vigil fires
He hallowed there, the eternal guards of heaven."

The temples were filled with votive gifts, just such as we find to-day in all the churches of the South, in some of them in great quantities. In *Æschylus's* tragedy of "The Seven Against Thebes" women hasten full of anxiety into the temples, and we hear some of them exclaim before the images of the gods: "Now it is time, ye holy ones of this temple, that we appeal to your images as we embrace them." They call out to Poseidon, then to Apollo, to Hera, and so on: "Remember the temples, remember the sacrifices, remember the rich gifts, remember the votive offerings, and hasten!" Any one acquainted with modern Naples might think *Æschylus* was our contemporary and had intended in the above passage to depict the present thought regarding votive offerings. Of the *donaria* (votive gifts), which often consisted of representations of beneficial occurrences, the Roman poet *Tibullus* says (*Eleg.*, I., 3): "O goddess, that thou canst give aid is shown by the number of paintings that deck thy temple." Had *Tibullus* seen the contemporary churches of Southern Italy? The Roman satirist *Juvenal*, a contemporary of *Hadrian*, says that the goddess *Isis* furnished a living to the painters of votive pictures. Did the poet mean perhaps the *Madonna* at Naples?

Relics, too, the pagans had, but not quite so plentifully as the Christians. The bones of *Theseus* rested in Athens, whither they had been solemnly brought, and where they were regarded as pledges of his protection. The house of *Romulus*, the stones vomited forth by *Saturn*, a chip of the ship *Argo*, and so forth, were regarded as very sacred relics.

¹ Atoning ceremonials of magic power were numerous in the pagan world.

According to Plutarch the pagan king Numa objected to the images of the gods in the temples, but later the worship of images in the temples assumed great dimensions and moved from the temples into the churches. Emperor Theodosius forbade the heathen worship of images, but it was rechristened, and to-day goes far beyond the limits observed by paganism, and is protected by absolutism. The images, as in ancient life, are identified with the "santi" whom they are intended to represent, and the number of these increases with incredible speed. When the Arabs took possession of the city of Selinunt (Modione) in Sicily they found so many statues of saints that they called the city Rahl el Asnam, "village of idols." Closely connected with the worship of images is the cultivation of processions, which to-day are as much like the corresponding performances of Hellenic-Roman worship as one twin the other, as like as the Christian legends of miracles are to the pagan. The legends of the pagans laid aside the Roman toga, clothed themselves in the Christian cassock, and became thus eligible to church membership. Finally the Church took under her patronage the festivals connected with the Church service, hoping that a saint placed in the centre of these festivals so popular with the common people would transform them into something sacred. But she was disappointed, or, more correctly, she lost all sense of the distinction between pagan and Christian festivals. We may be witnesses of Christian festivals later which would serve as examples of Pagan orgies. In ancient life the priests were managers of the festivals. The Christian priests of Southern Italy perform this office to the present day, and understand the business as well as did their pagan predecessors.

The Church spoke of victory and triumph when she saw the temples deserted, the gods banished, and herself raised to the throne, like Joseph who rose from chains and a dungeon to royal distinction. The victory of the Church was in fact her defeat, which became complete when sacrifices were admitted to the church buildings. Sacrifices were the heart and centre of the Hellenic-Roman worship, and were forbidden by the Christian emperors again and again for two hundred years, and finally on penalty of death. In the sacrifice of the mass that central feature of ancient worship found its way from the temples into the new churches, and along with it the class of sacrificing priests, to whom descended the function, the office and the wealth of the pagan priests who had been dismissed. The Christian priest, tonsured after the fashion of the pagan Isis-worship, beside him the

altar-attendant, just as he may be seen in a Pompeiian fresco,—the Christian priest offering the mass-sacrifice for the living and the dead, that was the complete defeat of the Church at the moment when she was dreaming of victory.

The Hellenic-Roman temples served not only the rites of religion; many of them had other incidental objects. When the churches were offered as compensation for the deserted temples it was expected that this compensation should be complete, for the force of custom is great, especially in the South. It is well known that the right of asylum was transferred to the churches. Temples were also storehouses for public and private treasures, and nearly every temple had an especial treasure-chamber. Millions in treasure were concealed for instance in the above-mentioned temples of Hera Lucina, Aphrodite Erycina, and in many others. The temple on the island of Delos, as is known, contained the public treasure of Athens. Private citizens often deposited great sums, and the supervisors of the temples, that is, the priests, not infrequently acted as bankers, carrying on financial operations with such capital. For centuries, in Naples, for instance, many monasteries with fine churches attached, and certain richly endowed charitable institutions were the only public banks, which understood not only financiering but bankruptcy as well. The pious bank that was connected with the foundling asylum and had millions in deposits from private persons ended in the previous century with a crash. Any one who wishes to see what a treasury really is should ask to be shown the treasure-chapel of S. Gennaro in the cathedral at Naples, where there are millions in precious stones. The church of S. Maria Nuova in Naples once had such a wealth of gifts that had been presented to a certain miraculous image that it was possible to pay for a complete reconstruction of the church from the sale of them. The proceeds were 120,000 lire. Furthermore the temples guarded public and private documents, records of all sorts, sometimes even the lists of citizens, so that the priests acted as archivists. In this direction, too, the church furnished a substitute, in the shape of the monasteries. Of old the positions with the widest outlook had been chosen for temples, and the monasteries followed this example: these sacred places became the repositories of all important public and private documents within their districts. We find such treasures, for example, in the monastery of Monte Cassino, in the monastery Trinita della Cava; one of the most important historical archives in the world is the government archive in Naples, now in the chambers of the monastery

of S. Severino. The greater part of its treasures consists of records which were deposited in monasteries. Every monastery was a Delphi in the eyes of its neighborhood.

Many temples served also as museums for the monuments of the great dead. In the Parthenon at Athens the sons of Themistocles set up a statue of their father; the statues of the heroes of Attica were to be seen at Delphi; the porches of many temples were filled with statues of victors; in the temples erected in honor of the emperors were seen their statues; even Cleopatra stood in a Roman temple. The force of ancient custom causes the churches, equally numerous in modern times, to be used in the same way. The church of S. Domenico in Naples, with its worthy and its worthless monuments, is the temple of fame of the Neapolitan aristocracy. S. Domenico in Palermo serves the same purpose. The church of S. Croce in Florence is a national temple of fame; St. Peter's in Rome, the papal. "And marble figures stand and gaze at me."

The power of custom in southern lands was cited above in explanation. The writer, who has lived uninterruptedly for more than ten years in that region, is constrained to call the power of custom, as he has observed it, astounding when he marshals before his mind's eye all the small and great things that have been preserved of ancient life and have become a part of the manners and customs of popular life, while the people themselves take not the slightest account of this origin. In this sketch we can cite only a few examples, and will refer to but a few things which show how ancient life has been preserved to the present day in even trifles. The donkeys which carry vegetables to the city are equipped with the "bissaccium" which comes from the ancient Roman times; the two-wheeled Roman carriage, the "cisium" is perpetuated in the popular "corricolo," which we see standing by the hundred in the very places where rose the ancient gates of Naples and where such carriages had had their stand for centuries. Ancient statues of horses show the forelock tied up neatly, a custom which may be observed in thousands of instances in the Campagna. Look at the bottles and jugs for wine and oil found at Pompeii, the shape of the loaves of bread; regard the recreations of large and small; note the tambourine ("tympanon") used in the popular dances; consider the beds of the South with their dreadful height and their two little and more dreadful pillows,—everywhere we find ancient Roman life preserved in such trifles. But in popular life there are details which are still older and show the specific Hellenic influence. The

numerous money-changers under the open sky, the cook-shops on the street and the kettles of boiled lentils, the door-knockers in the older quarters, the fondness for garlic, the number of hair-dressers, the custom that men make the daily purchases for the house, all features of Neapolitan daily life, are derived from Greek life. Even those intestine-vendors mentioned by Aristophanes are still to be found in Naples, offering their unappetising wares to-day in this once Hellenic city as formerly they did on the streets of Athens. Pits as receptacles for oil, such as are to-day found in Apulia, for instance, were known to the Hellenes; the modern shepherds in the Sila forest with their shawms remind us of the shepherds of Theocritus; and as of old in the cities of Greece rhapsodes recited publicly the tales of Homer's heroes, so Naples preserves her "cantastorie," i. e., her story-tellers, who entertain the listening crowd with the heroes of Tasso and Ariosto. In the popular theatre certain figures of the ancient theatre are preserved, and rural wine-stands are painted on the door-posts just as one may see them to-day preserved in one case in Pompeii.

If from these few instances we see the striking power of conservative custom in unimportant things, the same power is to be reckoned with the more surely in considering the highest and most important sphere of ancient life, religion. Here of all places the power of custom caused the old and traditional to be preserved.

In closing let us once more cast a glance upon temples and churches. The number of the latter in the South is great, but the number of temples also was always equal to the demand. One who knows the history of the two centuries before Constantine is aware to what an extent Hellenic-Roman piety devoted itself to the construction of temples and pious endowments of every sort, vows, dreams, divine revelations as well as the hope of favor and profit, being the chief motives. In innumerable instances we find the same motives in church endowments. Vows of the city and vows of princes created the principal churches in Naples, for instance, and probably every church of the South is in some respect an evidence of that pagan desire for reward which descended to the Christian Church, of "righteousness of works." The famous treasure-chapel of St. Januarius in Naples originated in a vow of the city, given in the time of a severe pestilence. By this performance they won the favor of the "santo" referred to, and expected from him an equivalent. If for S. Gennaro we substitute an ancient divinity, we have the religious life of paganism.

While we find the ancient pagan motives active in the con-

struction and decoration of churches, yet a church is a very different thing from a temple. Let us compare a modern church with the temple of Pæstum. The pagan temple stood in the midst of a sacred territory, far from the tumult of secular life, often in the midst of sacred groves, and the presence of the divinity was felt in the solemn silence. The churches of the South, on the contrary, stand in the midst of the rush of the street, shut in by secular buildings, often disturbed by mad noises, as though it were intended to deprive the worshippers of the last remnant of inspiration, of sense of the nearness of God. The temple of Pæstum shows a direct, simple and majestic dignity and a solemn sobriety. The churches of Southern Italy? The older ones all have been modernised, i. e., supplied with the empty ornaments of senseless decoration; the later ones have all the same tendency. The temple at Pæstum had a single statue of a divinity, which occupied the "cella," and only one altar, just in front of the temple, and the eyes of those gathered about the altar turned from it to the solemn and silent interior of the temple. The churches of Southern Italy are filled almost without exception with glass tabernacles in which stand gaily decked or beribboned and bekerchiefed madonnas, creations of mere handicraft which never would have been endured in a pagan temple. Inside, the churches show the disturbing features of the many side-altars and other things which were unknown in the temples. On the anniversaries of the patron saints and Madonnas one might compare the churches with royal receptions; at the same time they are concert-halls, opera-houses, where one hears opera-airs and merry dance-music. In Lent they become college lecture-rooms, where the Lenten preachers, generally advertised as famous, "distinguished orators," begin their addresses with "Signori," (Gentlemen). Sometimes one is reminded of a theatre, for applause with clapping of the hands is not unheard of. Fifteen hundred years ago the display oratory which had spread itself before that time in the forum and in the halls of the rhetors, entered the Church. It is still to be found in the churches of Southern Italy, and a saint or a Madonna has to endure not one, but seven, oratorical displays (panegyrics). A Greek temple was never disturbed by panegyrics.

Finally, the churches are mercantile establishments, having, like these, their signs, displayed in some cases constantly, in others only occasionally: "Perpetual, complete, daily absolution for living and dead." Such signs were not seen about Roman and Greek temples.

INTERMEDIATE FORMS OF ABSTRACTION.¹

BY TH. RIBOT.

HAVING thus acquainted ourselves in the two previous *Open Courts* with the factor of speech, which as an instrument of abstraction becomes steadily more and more important, we can take up the subject of abstraction from the point at which we left it. In passing from the absence to the presence of the word, from the lower to the intermediate forms of abstraction, we must again insist on our principal aim: viz., to prove that abstraction and generalisation are functions of the completely evolved mind. They exist in embryo in perception, and in the image, and at their extreme limit involve suppression of all concrete representation. This conclusion will hardly be contradicted. The difficulty is to follow the evolution step by step, stage after stage, and to note the difference by *objective marks*.

For intermediate abstraction, this operation is very simple. It implies the use of words; it has passed the level of prelinguistic abstraction and generalisation. We may go farther, and—always *with the aid of words*—establish two classes within the total category of mean abstraction:

1. The lower forms, bordering on generic images, whose objective mark is the feeble participation of the word: it can indeed be altogether foregone, and is only in the least degree an instrument of substitution.

2. The higher forms, approximating to the class of pure concepts, and having as their objective mark the fact that words are indispensable, since these have now become an instrument of substitution, though still accompanied by some sensory representation.

¹ *Mémoires*. Ed. by Frances A. Welby.

The legitimacy of this division can be justified only by a detailed comparison of the two classes.

I.

Before giving examples that determine the nature and intellectual trend of the lower forms, a theoretical question presents itself which cannot be eluded, albeit any profound discussion of it belongs to the theory of cognition rather than to psychology. It is as follows: Is the difference between generic images and the lowest concepts, one of nature or of degree? This question has sometimes been propounded in a less general and more concrete form. Is there any radical difference, any impassable gulf between animal intelligence¹ in its higher, and human intelligence in its lower aspects? Some authors give an absolute negation, others admit community of nature, and of transitional forms.

I shall first reject as inadmissible the argument that identifies abstraction with the use of words. Taine seems at times to admit this: "We think," he says, "the abstract characters of things by means of the abstract names that are our abstract ideas, and the formation of our ideas is no more than the formation of names which are substitutes."² Clearly if abstraction is impossible without words, this operation could only begin with speech. All that was said in previous articles proves the inanity of such an assertion.

Let us, in order to discuss the question profitably, sum up the principal characteristics of generic images on the one hand, of inferior concepts on the other.

Generic images are: (1) simple and of the practical order; (2) the result of often-repeated experiences; (3) extracts from very salient resemblances; (4) a condensation into a visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory representation. They are the fruit of *passive* assimilation.

The inferior concepts most akin to them, which we are studying in the present instance, are in character: (1) less simple; (2) less frequently repeated in experience; (3) they assume as material, similarities mingled with sufficiently numerous differences; (4) they are fixed by a word. They are the fruit of *active* assimilation.

It may be said that the two classes, when thus opposed to each

¹ Intelligence is taken here in its restricted sense, as the synonym of abstracting, generalising, judging, reasoning. and

² *De l'intelligence*, Vol. I., Bk. IV., Chap. 1, p. 254, first edition.

other, present but minimal differences, save for the addition of words. For the moment, indeed, the word is only an instrument handled by a bad workman, who ignores its efficacy and highest significance, as will be proved below. But were it otherwise, and were the delimitation between the two classes in no way fluctuating, the thesis of a progressive evolution must needs be given up, unless it be admitted to begin only with the appearance of speech.¹

Romanes describes the passage from the generic image to the concept as follows :

“Water-fowl adopt a somewhat different mode of alighting upon land, or even upon ice, from that which they adopt when alighting upon water; and those kinds which dive from a height (such as terns and gannets) never do so upon land or ice. These facts prove that these animals have one receipt answering to a solid substance, and another answering to a fluid. Similarly, a man will not dive from a height over hard ground, or over ice, nor will he jump into water in the same way as he jumps upon land. In other words, like the water-fowl, he has two distinct receipts, one of which answers to solid ground, the other to an unresisting fluid. But unlike the water-fowl, he is able to bestow upon each of these receipts a name, and thus to raise them both to the level of concepts. So far as the practical purposes of locomotion are concerned, it is, of course, immaterial whether or not he thus raises his receipts into concepts; but, as we have seen, for many other purposes it is of the highest importance that he is able to do this. Now, in order to do it, he must be able to set his receipt before his own mind as an object of his own thought: before he can bestow upon these generic ideas the names of “solid” and “fluid,” he must have cognised them as ideas. Prior to this act of cognition, these ideas differed in no respect from the receipts of a water-fowl; neither for the requirements of his locomotion is it needful that they should: therefore, in so far as these requirements are concerned, the man makes no call upon his higher faculties of ideation. But, in virtue of this act of cognition whereby he assigns a name to an idea known as such, he has created for himself—and for purposes other than locomotion—a priceless possession; he has formed a concept.”²

In point of fact, the transition is not so simple. Romanes omits the intermediate stages: for with fluid and liquid we pene-

¹ *De l'intelligence*, I., Bk. IV., Chap. 1, p. 254, first edition.

² *Mental Evolution in Man*, pp. 74 and 75.

trate into a more elevated order of concepts than those immediately bordering on the generic image. What he well brings out is that the bare introduction of words does not explain everything. It must not be forgotten that if the higher development of the intelligence depends upon the higher development of speech, this last is conditioned, not simply by the faculty of articulation, which exists among many animals, but by anterior cerebral conditions that have to be sought out.

For these, we must return to the distinction loosely established above, between passive and active assimilation. We know that the fundamental mechanism of cognition may be reduced to two antagonistic processes, association and dissociation, assimilation and dissimilation; to combine, to separate; in brief, analysis and synthesis.¹ In the formation of the generic image, as we have seen, assimilation plays the principal part; the mind works only upon similarities. In proportion as we recede from this point, we have the contrary; the mind works more and more upon differences; the primitive and essential operation is a dissociation; the fusion of similarities only appears later. The further back we go, the more analysis preponderates, because we are pursuing resemblances more and more hidden by differences. Coarser minds do not rise above palpable similarities. The peasant who hears a dialect or patois closely akin to his own understands nothing of it; it is another language to him; whereas even a mediocre linguist immediately perceives the identity of words that differ only in accent.

We may represent the differences between generic images and these general notions that most nearly approximate to them, by the following symbol:

I. <i>A B C d e</i> <i>A B C e f</i> <i>A B C g h</i> , etc.	II. <i>A b c d e</i> <i>x y z A f</i> <i>g A h k m</i> , etc.
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where each line corresponds to an object, and each letter to one of the principal characters of the object. Table I is that of the generic image. A part, *A B C*, is constantly repeated in each experience; moreover, it is in relief, as indicated by the capitals; the elimination of differences is almost passive,—self-caused; they are forgotten.

Table II is that of a fairly simple general notion. Here *A* has to be disengaged from all the objects in which it is included. It

¹ As Paulhan remarks, "L'abstraction et les idées abstraites" (*Revue Philosophique*, Jan., 1889, p. 26 et seq.), these two processes are initially linked one with the other, so that we find analytical syntheses, and synthetical analyses.

still has a salient character, indicated by capitals, and recurring in each object; but as it is merged in the differences, as it represents but a poor fraction of the total event, it is not disengaged spontaneously; it exacts a preliminary labor of dissociation and elimination.

Thus understood, the difference between the two processes consists only in the faculty of greater or less dissociation, and we are in no way authorised in assuming a difference of nature.

But the question may be propounded in a different manner,—more precise and more embarrassing. I formulate it thus: the generic image is never, the concept is always a judgment. We know that for logicians (formerly at any rate) the concept is the simple and primitive element; next comes the judgment, uniting two or several concepts; then ratiocination, combining two or several judgments. For the psychologist, on the contrary, affirmation is the fundamental act; the concept is the *result* of judgments (explicit or implicit), of similarities with exclusion of differences. If in addition to this we recall what was said above: that speech commences with phrases only, that in its simplest form it is the word-phrase; then the debated question may be thus transformed: Is there, between the generic image and judgment in the lower forms, a break in continuity, or a passage by slow transformation?

For the partisans of the first theory, the appearance of judgment is a "passage of the Rubicon" (Max Müller). It is as impossible to deny this as to affirm it positively and indisputably. Romanes, who makes a stand against the "passage of the Rubicon," admits the following stages in the development of signs, taken as indicative of the development of intelligence itself.

1. The indicative sign; gesture or pronominal root; a dog barking for a door to be opened, etc.

2. The denotative sign which is affixed to particular objects, qualities, or actions; for example, the parrot which on seeing a person utters the name of the person, or some word which it has associated with him, and which for the animal has become the distinctive mark of the person.

3. The connotative or attributive sign, which, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to an entire class of objects having a common quality; for instance, the child which applies the word *star* to everything that shines.

4. The denominative sign; or the intentional employment of the sign as such, with a full appreciation of its value; for example, the word *star* in its meaning to the astronomer.

5. The predicative sign, or a proposition formed by the apposition of two denominative signs.¹

This hierarchical order, while in some measure open to criticism, indicates at least schematically the progressive passage from the concrete to the higher abstractions, and may therefore be accepted.

It is clear that the two first stages scarcely pass beyond the concrete.

To the third, Romanes attaches capital importance: judgment begins with it. It may, however, be asked if affirmation really exists at this stage. For my own part I am inclined to admit it as included in the generic image in its highest degree (for here too there are degrees), under the form *not of a proposition, but of an action*. The hunting dog assuredly possesses generic images of man and of different kinds of game, under the visual and more especially the olfactory form. When it starts off on the scent of its master, of a hare, or of a partridge, this is surely a judgment of a certain kind, an affirmation, the least doubtful of all, seeing that it is an act. The absence of verbal expression and of logical information in no way alters the fundamental nature of the mental state. We have already spoken in a previous *Open Court of practical judgments and ratiocinations*; it is needless to reiterate.

The transition from the third to the fourth stage is even more important. It is here that the true concept appears; this point attained, an almost unlimited progress is possible. Now the true cause of the true concept is reflexion. This formula appears to us the simplest, the briefest, the most clear, and the most exact. There is the possibility of concepts where there is the possibility in the mind of detaching a single character (or several), extracted from among many others, of setting it up as an independent entity, of raising it into a *known* object, i. e., determined in its relations with ourselves, and with other things. Example: to form the general idea of a vertebrate. But this fundamental act—reflexion—is not without antecedents, it does not spring forth as a new apparition. It is the highest degree of attention, i. e., of a mental attitude that we encounter very low down in the animal scale.

Discontinuity of evolution, in the passage from lower to higher, is thus far from being established. Doubtless this, like all other questions of genesis, leaves much to hypothesis, and can only be decided on probabilities: yet these do not appear to favor a rupture in continuity, and opposition of nature.

¹ *Op. cit.*, VIII., 158-165.

In sum—to confine ourselves to what is least contestable: given the cerebral and psychological conditions for speech (not for articulate language alone), and application of words to qualities and attributes raised little by little into independent entities,—and the decisive step has been taken. Such is intellectual progress, and we may remark in passing that the process which creates the true concept, leads fatally by the same issue to faith in idols, in the entities realised.

Without for the moment pausing at this last point, let us under a more positive form, and strictly on the lines of experimental psychology, examine the nature of the lower forms of intermediate abstraction, determining it by examples. At the same time we shall fix the intellectual level that corresponds to the moment of transition between generic images (animal form), and the higher abstracts which have still to be studied in detail. The best method is to take as a type such human races as have remained in the savage or half-civilised state: these are more instructive than childhood, because they represent fixed and permanent conditions. We can draw on two principal sources: their languages, and their systems of enumeration. Their religious beliefs might also be studied with the same results, but this would take too long, and would moreover be less definite.¹

1. *The languages*, considered under their most general characteristics, reveal a notable impotence for transcending the simplest resemblances, an incurable incapacity for extended generalisations; they hardly rise above the concrete. Words play a very indistinct part; they are the most incomplete substitute—hardly more than a mark, a sign, like gestures—differing from the latter only in the future they carry within them. The study of the ascending progress of generalisations is in effect the study of the successive phases of the emancipation of speech up to the time when it becomes preponderant and dominating. At the actual stage, which might be termed *concrete abstract*, it is not yet emancipated; it is a minor, under tutelage:

Let us take in turn substantives, adjectives, and verbs.

The indigenes of Hawaii, says Max Müller (*Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, II., p. 19), have but one word,

¹ We have touched on this subject incidentally in *La psychologie des sentiments* (Part II., IX, § 2, pp. 305 et seq.). Many tribes do not get beyond polydemonism, peopling the universe with innumerable genii; this is the reign of the concrete. A certain progress is marked by subordinating the genius of each tree to the god of the forest, the different genii of a river to the god of the river, etc. At a degree higher, the intellect constitutes a single god for water, one for fire, one for the earth, etc. Thus there come to be genii of individual, specific, and generic origin.

“aloba,” to express love, friendship, esteem, gratitude, benevolence, etc.; on the other hand, words to express variations in the direction of the force of the wind are very numerous, proving once more how at its origin abstraction or dissociation is governed by practical causes. In savage languages there are terms to express not merely each species of dog, but their age, the color of their hair, good or bad qualities, etc. So, too, for the horse; there are special words to designate its varieties, and all its movements; to indicate if it is mounted, not mounted, frightened, running away, and the like. The North American Indians have special words for the black oak, the white oak, and the red oak, but none for the oak in general,—still less for tree in general. The indigenes of Brazil can point out the different parts of the body, but not the body as a whole (Lubbock). Among several tribes of Oceania, a special word is employed for the tail of a dog, another for the sheep's tail, and so on, but they have no designation for tail in general. Again, there is no common term for the cow, but there are distinct words for red, white, or brown cows (Sayce).

There are, however, cases of very clear progress in generalisation; the significance of a word extends itself; from specific it becomes generic. This metamorphosis exists *in vivo* among the Finns and Laplanders. The former have a name for the smallest stream, and none for river; originally again there was a term for each finger, none for finger in general; but latterly the term used for thumb alone has come to designate the fingers collectively. Among the second race, certain tribes who had a special denomination for each kind of bay, have now adopted one that serves for all kinds (Max Müller).

The same holds good of the poverty of the adjective, the abstract term proper. The case of the Tasmanians has often been quoted, how they could only express qualities by concrete representations: hard=like a stone; long=legs; round=like a ball, like the moon, etc. (Lubbock). A less familiar case, termed by linguists “concretism,” is met with even in certain more developed idioms, like a survival of the time when the mind was unable to detach itself from the concrete, or to forego a complete and detailed qualification. Instead of saying ten merchants, five hens, the idiom is merchants ten men, hens five birds, and so on for similar cases.

The verb is able to express all degrees of abstraction and of generalisation as well as the adjective and substantive. At this period, it exactly repeats the type (as described above) of the sub-

stantive with its burdensome multiplicity,—for want of a generalisation simple enough, according to our judgment. The North American Indians have special words for saying: to wash one's face, another person's face, the linen, utensils, etc.: in all, thirty words, but none for washing in general. So, too, for eating bread, fruits, meat, etc., striking with the hand, foot, axe, etc., for cutting wood, meat, or any other objects: for all these there are special terms, but none for saying simply, to eat, to knock, to cut (Sayce, Hovelacque). On the other hand, here is a case of transition, analogous to that of the Lapps and Finlanders. Certain tribes in Brazil have a few verbs of general, simple significance: eat, drink, dance, see, etc., even love, thank, etc. (Lubbock).

We need not multiply examples; these will suffice to throw into relief the extreme impotence in generalising, so soon as the mind loses its hold on the concrete. We might also recall the difficulty so often experienced by missionaries. They find it almost impossible, even by creating new words, or by changing the meaning of others, to translate the sacred books into these idioms, from their paucity of concrete terms.

2. *The numeration*, taking its development as a whole, appears to sub-divide into three principal periods: concrete numeration, as studied above, in animals and children; concrete-abstract numeration, with which we are now occupied; purely abstract numeration, which we shall examine later, as translated into organised arithmetic.

We have seen that speech at its origin was so humble as to need gesture to complete and to elucidate it. During its concrete-abstract period, numeration is in an analogous position. At first its extension is very limited: it progresses slowly and painfully from unity. Further, it can operate only when sustained by the concrete; it must have a material accompaniment. Counting is accomplished by the enunciation of words, with the aid of enumerated objects, as perceived at the same time, or with that of the fingers: which, let it be remarked, is the first essay in substitution. There is simultaneously concrete or digital, and verbal numeration.¹

We know that many Australian and South American tribes can count verbally to two only; some say two-one = three; two-two = four; others by the same process arrive at six (two-three = five, three-three = six): everything else is "much." For the most part

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I., gives abundant data on this question. Chap. VII. is entirely devoted to it.

they count without words, with the aid of fingers or of articulation; even when they employ words, the two numerations—digital and verbal—are performed simultaneously.¹

This manner of counting is in first degree concrete; the concrete-abstract form is only there in embryo. A great advance, made early enough in many tribes, consisted in counting by five, taking the hand (five fingers) as a new unit, superior to the simple unit. Then: one hand = 5; two hands or half a man = 10; two hands, one foot = 15; two hands, two feet, or a man = 20. Such is the evident origin of the quinary, decimal, and vigesimal numerations. Sometimes fingers, as instruments of numeration, have been replaced by objects of a typical number. Ex.: 1 = moon or sun; 2 = the eyes or legs, etc.

However varied these processes (of which only a few have been mentioned) in different races and periods, they are fundamentally identical to the psychologist. They may be reduced to this; numeration is performed more particularly with the aids of sensible perceptions; words are but an insignificant accompaniment, a superfluity—existing only as a proliferation—of so little utility that they are for the most part neglected.

Though it is less often spoken of, we may remark that the measure of continuous quantity passed through the same concrete-abstract phase; and here it appeared at a somewhat early stage, owing to practical and social wants. Hence we find at the outset the foot, the finger, the thumb (inch = Fr. *pouce*), the palestra (four fingers' length), span, cubit (arm's reach = *coudde*), fathom, etc., the stadium (distance a good runner could cover without stopping).² The concrete character of all these measures is obvi-

¹ In the account of his travels among the Damaras (*Tropical South Africa*, p. 133) Galton says: "In practice, whatever they may possess in their language, they certainly use no numeral greater than three. When they wish to express four, they take to their fingers, which are to them as formidable instruments of calculation as a sliding-rule is to our English schoolboy. They puzzle very much after five, because no spare hand remains to grasp and secure the fingers that are required for 'units,'—yet they seldom lose oxen: the way in which they discover the loss of one, is not by the number of the herd being diminished, but by the absence of a face they know." [This tallies with what we have already said as to so-called numeration in animals and children.] "When bartering is going on, each sheep must be paid for separately. Thus suppose two sticks of tobacco to be the rate of exchange for one sheep, it would sorely puzzle a Damara to take two sheep and give him four sticks. I have done so and seen a man first put two of the sticks apart and take a sight over them at one of the sheep he was about to sell. Having satisfied himself that one was honestly paid for, and finding to his surprise that exactly two sticks remained in hand to settle the account for the other sheep, he would be afflicted with doubts; the transaction seemed to come out too pat to be correct, and he would refer back to the first couple of sticks, and then his mind got hazy and confused, and wandered from one sheep to the other, and he broke off the transaction until two sticks were put into his hand and one sheep driven away, and then the other two sticks given him and the second sheep driven away." Galton relates many other similar facts which he had himself witnessed.

² And the barley-corn of English measure.—*Tr.*

ous. Again, there are survivals in certain current locutions, such as a day's journey. More than this; they have a human character, their standard and starting-point being, at least at the outset, certain parts of the body, or a determined sum of muscular movements. Little by little they lost their original significance, progressing through centuries towards our metrical system—the type of a scientific, deliberate, rationally abstract system, as far as possible liberated from anthropomorphism.

The reader will probably obtain a more definite idea of the nature of these lower forms by recapitulating the examples cited, than from any long dissertation. Is their intellectual level very superior to that of the generic image? This question is doubtful. At times the only distinction between them is the presence of the word: at the present stage it makes but a poor figure,—yet with all its modesty, it augurs a new world wherein it is to be of prime importance.

PEACE ON EARTH A PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY.

A SUGGESTION TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PEACE COM-
MISSION.

BY THE EDITOR.

MEN of good will have at sundry times, both in and out of season, preached peace on earth to mankind. The Gospel story selects this theme as the cradle-song for the child in the manger; and yet war has continued to the very present day, and if there is any abating of its power it is apparently due to the increase of its destructiveness, diminishing only in the ratio as it becomes more formidable. On the one hand, Moltke, the greatest strategist of modern times, regarded even a victorious war as a misfortune; on the other hand, Christ, the prince of peace, emphatically declared that he had come to bring not peace but a sword, and considering the constitution of the universe it would be difficult to refute the proposition that war is part of God's dispensation. Is it not, then, a fond illusion to convene an international conference and discuss disarmament, the abolition of war, and the arbitration of conflicts, by an international tribunal, and the establishment of peace on earth?

The advocates of peace on earth are, as a rule, zealous men who mean well but lack in proper comprehension. They are men of sentiment unfamiliar with real life, attempting the impossible. They imagine that the great national governments would voluntarily surrender their power—an act which would be neither wise nor right. If the average peace-advocates could have their way for a time, they would soon find out that their system would not work.

But while we must recognise that sentiment alone is an insufficient guide in life, we need not give up our ideals. The ideal of

peace on earth is not quite unfeasible ; on the contrary, the evolution of humanity is naturally tending toward it. We must only bear in mind that the abatement of war does not mean the abolition of struggle. A higher civilisation, therefore, must be brought about by substituting for barbarous methods of fighting, the civilised weapons of argument and demonstration. Struggling is a duty, as Professor Jhering has pointed out in his work *Der Kampf ums Recht*. Even the peaceful settlement of lawsuits remains a combat, and right is right only when it can be maintained ; for, after all, right is ultimately based upon might.

While it is true that struggle is part of the world-order, we should not be blind to the truth that the methods of struggle have been changed by the progress of civilisation. The old barbarous methods of the club have given way to gun and canon, and resistance in the face of an overwhelming superiority has become useless, so that to-day in civilised countries controversies between powerful institutions are decided not by arms but according to law through the verdict of a judge. The fact, however, is that while the court-room exhibits no direct display of warlike force, the power of the government and the collective will (*der Gesamtwille*) of the community stands behind the judge. The decisions of our courts are given by Right not by Might ; yet Right in this case has become Might, and the question is only whether or not it is possible to create among nations the same condition that has been established among individuals.

This question, I am confident, may be answered in the affirmative. The tendency of evolution is toward the substitution of the more spiritual for the more material and cruder methods ; and while Might must forever remain the basis on which alone all adjustments will be made, Right is actually acquiring more and more influence over the minds of the people, so as gradually to reverse the equation Might is Right into its opposite, Right becomes Might.

For the first time in the history of civilisation, representatives of almost all civilised governments are now assembled to discuss the feasibility of establishing peace on earth, and the question is, Will they be able to accomplish anything ? The Czar of Russia has proposed disarmament, but the Russian government is at the same time enormously increasing the number of its battle-ships, and the Emperor of Germany frankly declares that peace can be maintained solely by sufficient war preparations ; and the old proverb holds good still : "*Si vis pacem para bellum.*"

Nevertheless the peace-conference is a symptom of progress,

and we may fairly hope that some good will come of it, for we may rest assured that the commissioners are wise enough to see what can and what cannot be accomplished. Yet there is danger on the one hand that the practical diplomat, the *Realpolitiker*, will have no faith in the ideal of peace on earth, and the idealist, the *Schwärmer*, will attempt the impossible and thereby delay the realisation of that which is possible.

We must bear in mind that struggle is the law of life and cannot be abolished, and power exists as a result of previous successful struggles, peaceful as well as warlike. Power is the essence of life, and we cannot expect any one, let alone any government, to renounce power. The idea of disarmament should, therefore, not be entertained at all; for discussion of the subject cannot lead to any result. In times when there is danger of war, it would not only be inadvisable but morally wrong, indeed criminal, for a government to disarm and expose its citizens to the humiliation of defeat; and since the world is a large battlefield, it is the duty of every government even in times of peace to be prepared for the emergencies of war. Because our government, as a rule, has done too little for the defence of the country, there is no reason to expect that other nations should do likewise. We are extremely lucky that we have not suffered for our neglect. If we had been a little less prepared during our disagreement with Spain we should have been confronted with great disasters, but if we had been a little better prepared, Spain would have been more amenable to our requests, and we might have bought the freedom of Cuba and Porto Rico without any sacrifice of human lives, for less money than the war cost us.

Disarmament is unfeasible, and a court possessing the authority to decide international disputes would play a very ludicrous part among the powers of the world, for we cannot expect that the strong nations would voluntarily submit to its decisions. They would uphold the court only so long as it suited them, and the institution that should bring peace on earth would most certainly suffer the worst injury possible—ridicule.

The only practical way of bringing mankind nearer to the cherished ideal of peace on earth would be by the establishment of an international tribunal, consisting of five or ten or perhaps fifteen commissioners, men of high standing, noted for their unequivocal love of justice and breadth of comprehension, whose duty should be, not to decide litigations of international politics, but simply to give, when called upon, an opinion from a purely moral stand-

point. If the members of such an international commission, after a careful investigation of the situation, should come to a substantial agreement on a question which threatens to be a *casus belli* they would necessarily influence the opinion of all the sober and fair-minded people in the countries involved and might thus contribute not a little to calm down the war-fever before actual hostilities began. Their verdict should not be a decision nor should they be regarded as judges. They should not be a court of arbitration. Their authority should be that of an advisory council. They should not be vested with the power to enforce their views, but should simply act the part of honest friends. They should be good patriots who love their country, and love it so well as to hate to see its honor tarnished by wrongdoing. They should be men who represent the conscience of their country, and thus when combined in an exchange of thought would represent the conscience of civilised mankind. The less political power they had, the weightier their opinion would be, and certainly no power on earth would be powerful enough to disregard their propositions or to treat them with indifference. The mere existence of such a tribunal—a kind of international conscience—could not fail to exercise a beneficial influence on politics, and would help to lift diplomacy to a higher realm, where integrity and justice would be the standard by which ultimately all transactions should be measured.

PLATO AND THE CROSS.

BY THE EDITOR.

CHристиANITY, the religion of the cross, although founded upon the scriptures of the Hebrews, developed upon the classical soil of ancient Greece and other provinces of the Roman Empire. In order to understand the character of the new religion that spread with wonderful rapidity over the big cities of Egypt,



THE CROSS ON GREEK STANDARDS.

Syria, Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy, we must be familiar with the dominant ideas that began to take hold of the masses of the people; and back of them, behind the highest culture of the age, lay the philosophy of Plato.

Plato will come to be recognised more and more as the fore runner of Christianity, as its prophet and as he who made the paths for it level and straight. His philosophy of the soul, his conception of God, his notions of Heaven and Hell, his theory of ideas (of which the Logos, as his disciples, the Neo-Platonists, concluded from Platonic premises, is the comprehensive unity)

foreshadow in metaphysical terms the doctrines of Christianity, the latter being in many respects simply a popular and religious expression of the abstract thoughts of Plato's philosophy. What has Plato to say of the cross?

The cross (σκόλαψ or σταυρός) as the wooden instrument of the most cruel and degrading execution, is to Plato not yet identified with the figure of two intersecting lines, be it erect + or standing on edge X. The latter, the figure of two intersecting lines, is to him a symbol of deep significance, being the form of the soul, while the former, the instrument of a disgraceful death, is the extremity of suffering.

Plato mentions the X-cross in his story of the creation, where he tries to reconcile the astronomical and religious convictions, the result of which are theories which prepare the way for mysticism and the doctrines of the Kabala.

In *Timaeus* (34-36) we read that God created the universe as a God, an animated cosmos, and he made him spherical without organs, feet or hands, for the God had no need of them. Plato continues:

"The movement suited to his spherical form was assigned to him, being of all the seven movements that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence."

And "in the centre he created the soul, which is diffused throughout the body, making the body also its exterior environment."

"God did not make the soul after the body, although we are speaking of them in this order. . . . He made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be its ruler and mistress."


"And God made the soul out of the following elements and on this wise: Out of the indivisible and unchangeable, and also out of that which is divisible and has to do with material bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of essence, partaking of the nature of the same and of the other, and this compound he placed accordingly in a mean between the indivisible, and the divisible and material. He took the three elements of the Same, the Other, and the Essence, and mingled them into one form, compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the Other into the Same."

The proportions in which the three elements "Sameness, Otherness, and Essence" are mingled may be omitted here. Plato continues:

"This entire compound he divided lengthways into two parts, which he joined to one another at the centre like the letter X, and bent them into a circular form connecting them with themselves and each other at the point opposite to their original meeting-point; and, comprehending them in a uniform revolution upon the same axis, he made the one the outer and the other the inner circle. Now the motion of the outer circle he called the motion of the same, and the motion of the inner circle the motion of the other or diverse. The motion of the same he carried round by the side to the right, and the motion of the diverse diagonally to the left.

And he gave dominion to the motion of the same and like, for that he left single and undivided ; but the inner motion he divided in six places and made seven unequal circles having their intervals in ratios of two and three, three of each, and bade the orbits proceed in a direction opposite to one another ; and three [Sun, Mercury, Venus] he made to move with equal swiftness, and the remaining four [Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter] to move with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another, but in due proportion."

Plato's doctrine of the two axes that cross each other in the shape of a \times must be understood in a mathematical, not a me-



PROSERPINE CARRYING TWO CROSS-TORCHES.

Theseus and Pirithous venturing down to Hades for the purpose of rescuing Proserpine, the daughter of Ceres, are made prisoners and bound by an Eriny. Theseus is at last rescued by Hercules. Pluto holds in his hand a scepter on the top of which sits the dismal owl as an *avis funebris*.

(From an Etruscan Vase. Baumeister, *Denkmäler des class. Altertums*.)

chanical, sense ; for if they were solid axes they could not turn in the way described by Plato. His idea of the soul of the universe as being in the shape of the letter X, which is a cross on edge, is perhaps primarily due to the sacredness which ancient religious traditions attached to this symbol, but the thought took root in his mind and found its justification in geometrical and astronomical considerations.

In order to appreciate the importance of Plato's thought of the X, the cross on edge, we must bear in mind that his conception of



HADES, SHOWING PROSERPINE WITH THE CROSS TORCH, AND TRIPTOLEMUS AND RHADAMANTHUS WITH CROSS-RIBBONS.

(Greatly reduced from *Mon. Inst.*, VIII., 9.)

Picture of a vase found at Altamura, representing a period in which the fear of Hell had become greatly subdued and the belief in its terrors is offset by the legend of a return from the realm of the dead and the conquest of death.

[The upper center shows Pluto and Proserpine, the rulers of the Nether World, in their palace, the former with scepter and Cantharus, or sacred cup, the latter holding the cross-torch and a dish filled with fruits and flowers. Cantharus means both scarabæus-beetle, the Egyptian symbol of immortality, and the drinking vessel used in the mysteries, which probably derives its name from some unknown connexion with the scarabæus. Underneath we see Hercules taming the three-headed Cerberus in the moment of crossing the Acheron, which originates (see Homer, *Odyssey*, X, 513) in the conflux of Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon. Hermes points out the road leading back to the upper world. The Danaïdes with the water vessels on the right bear their punishment with placidity, while Sisyphus on the left seems to be more severely taxed. Dire Necessity (*Ἀνάγκη*) holds the whip in her right hand, but her left extends to the sufferer a laurel branch. (The branch is missing in many similar pictures. It is apparently not an apple branch, which was a symbol of Nemesis, as some archæologists suggest.)

The upper scene on the right shows the ancestor of Hercules and Hippodamia, Pelops, in a Phrygian cap, conversing with Myrtilus who promises to remove the nail from a wheel of Æno-maus's waggon in the race for Hippodamia, his bride, by which trick he remains victorious. Underneath are the judges of the dead, Triptolemus, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus, the latter in the attitude of pleading a case with great zeal.

The upper scene on the left represents Megæra and her sons, the Heraclides, innocent victims of a cruel fate in life, who are here comforted. Below this group we see Orpheus with lyre in hand, approaching the palace to ask Proserpine for the release of Eurydice. The Erinyes, or avenging demons (called *HOINAI*) in the picture have lost their terrible appearance and suffer the singer to pass by unmolested.]

this God as the universe as a deity, as "the first-born of all creatures" and the created type of all other gods and beings, comes

close to the Christian conception of God the Son, in whom God the Father revealed himself. God the Father is eternity in its absolute significance; but God, the first-born and archetype of all existence is the revelation of eternity in time. Plato explains this thought as follows :

"When the father and creator saw the being that it moved and lived, and that it became the ideal image of the eternal gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the paradigm still more like the original; and as this was eternal, he sought to make the universe eternal, so far as might be. Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time.¹ For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say that he 'was,' he 'is,' he 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to him, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be, older or younger, nor is subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause. These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Moreover, when we say that what has become *is* become and what becomes *is* becoming, and that what will become *is* about to become and that the non-existent *is* non-existent,—all these are inaccurate modes of expression."




CRUCIFIXION ON A
SIMPLE POLE.

The slanting cross is a religious symbol in ancient Greece, the significance of which seems lost. We find the judges of courts and priests, as pictured on vases, dressed with ribbons crossing over their breast, and the cross-torch plays an important part in the Eleusinian mysteries as a symbol of resurrection, but we have no means now of finding out the reason or the peculiar use of this strange utensil. Proserpine, the wife of Hades and goddess of rejuvenated nature, holds it in her hands.

¹We understand Plato to say, that God is eternal in the sense of being above time, but the second God, the universe is eternal in the sense of infinite duration in time.

While the figure of two intersecting lines is a symbol of deep significance to Plato, the emblem of the God incarnate in the universe, he looks upon crucifixion, or death by impalement, as the utmost extreme of disgrace and suffering, and in speaking of the realisation of the ideal of justice which is to him the harmonised totality of all virtues in their perfection, he declares that the perfectly just man must be just, merely for the love of justice, and not on account of worldly blessings that might accrue from its practice. Therefore the perfectly just man will be tried, will suffer all kinds of ills on account of his justice and finally be crucified, yet with all that he will rather be than appear just. Plato says :




IMPALEMENT.

From Assyrian monuments. (After Layard.)

"They will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged raked, bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be crucified."

Plato apparently follows older traditions, for he quotes Æschylus in this connexion, contrasting the truly just man with the unjust man who in his injustice is so perfect as to acquire cunningly "the greatest reputation for justice." Plato says :

"And at his side (at the side of this perfectly unjust man) let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity who wishes, as Æschylus says, *to be and not to seem good.*"



PROMETHEUS TIED BY ZEUS TO THE STAKE (OR CROSS) AND EXPOSED TO THE EAGLE; RESCUED BY HERCULES.

(A vase found at Chiusi, now in Berlin. Baumeister, *D. d. cl. A.*, p. 1410.)

Æschylus, the great tragedian, has dramatised the myth of Prometheus, the forethinker who takes compassion upon poor, miserable mankind, by bringing them the fire from heaven and teaching them its various uses. For punishment Prometheus is

crucified on Caucasus and exposed to the ravenous eagle of Zeus who daily feasts on the immortal Titan, until Hercules comes and shoots the eagle, whereupon Prometheus is taken from the cross.

The deep significance of this legend, illustrating the sufferings of the aspiring man who sacrifices his life for the progress of the race and improvement of the wretched has been well understood by both pagans and Christians, but the most remarkable fact is that all the old mythological illustrations of Prometheus the sufferer show him tied to the staurus, or cross, and Æschylus uses the word "to attach to the rood," *ἀνασλοπιζω*, which is a synonym of the New Testament term "to crucify" (*σταυρεῖν*).

Later authors and artists modify the tradition by having Prometheus, the Titan, chained to Mount Caucasus itself.



PROMETHEUS CRUCIFIED ON A ROCK AND DELIVERED BY HERCULES.
In the background the mountain-god Caucasus.

Plato, no doubt, had seen the Prometheus of Æschylus performed on the stage, he had read the tragedy and pondered it in his heart. In this way, most likely, in connexion with his experiences of the course of events in daily life, he elaborated his highest ideal of moral perfection as the man who is crucified for justice's sake.

A consideration of death by crucifixion as the ancient rite of a sacrifice to the sun-god may have played a part, too, in the formation of the Prometheus myth; but if it did, it is no longer mentioned by Plato.¹ There are, however, other legends, as for instance the Andromeda myth, which represent sacrificial death by exposure to the sun, the victim being tied to a tree or chained on a rock.

¹ We remind our readers in this connexion of the previous article "Crucifixion as a Sacrifice" on pp. 151-154 of the *March Open Court*.

The influence of Plato's ideal of the just man as the crucified one was not lost, but it did not exercise upon the early Christians so direct an influence as we might expect. The early Christians we must remember did not belong to the cultured classes of society,



THE SACRIFICE OF ANDROMEDA.¹

Picture of an ancient Amphora in Naples. (From Baumeister, *D. d. cl. A.*, p. 1291.) The victim is here, probably for artistic reasons, represented as being tied to two trees.

but recruited themselves from the ranks of fishermen, artisans, of the poor in general, and even of slaves. Few of them were familiar with Plato, and the thoughts of Plato reached them only

¹ Trendelenburg has discovered a passage commenting on this or a similar picture in Achilles Tatius, and explains it as follows: Andromeda, adorned as the bride of death with girdle, crown, and veil, is tied to two poles. Above her Cupid stands engaged with women in the preparation of a wedding. Andromeda's old nurse hands her a twig. Behind and above the nurse are guards with Phrygian caps and arms. On the left, Cassiopeia, Andromeda's mother, who exhibits the vanity, of which the legend accuses her, is seated, in conversation with her servants. Underneath Perseus fights the monster, which scene is witnessed by three Nereids, one riding on a sea-horse, one on a dolphin, and the third resembling the typical figure of Scylla.

through the medium of the Neo-Platonist Philo, but it reached them after all.

Plato's prophecy of the sufferings of the just man is alluded to in the documents of early Christianity only once; viz., in the Acts of Apollonius where this Christian martyr pleads his case in these words:

"One of the Greek philosophers said: The just man shall be tortured, he shall be spat upon, and last of all he shall be crucified. Just as the Athenians passed an unjust sentence of death, and charged him falsely, because they yielded to the mob, so also our Saviour was at last sentenced to death by the lawless."

Plato's philosophy paved the way in Greece for a religion which exhibits the ideal of a morally perfect man, the incarnation of the Logos, who by a disgraceful death on the cross, proves that he would rather be, than merely seem, good.

The two ideas of the cross (1) as the instrument of torture as an emblem of the ignominious death of the perfectly righteous man, and (2) as the intersecting lines denoting the symbol of God incarnate, are both contained in Plato, but they are separate and unconnected like two streams which in the course of time are destined to mingle their waters.

MISCELLANEOUS.

INTERNATIONAL GOOD-WILL.

The theory that sentiment plays no part in diplomacy is quite true of the old school, which is exclusively a diplomacy of monarchies, but is very wrong where we have to deal with the international relations of republics. Public sentiment influences the international relations of France to a considerable degree. The hatred of the Germans, the friendship of the Russians, jealousy of the commercial superiority of the English, are popular notions to which French diplomats have to adapt themselves in public speeches and their general political attitude.

Whether the more prominent rôle of sentiment in diplomacy is an advantage or not, diplomats will do well not to overlook it, and to consider it as an important factor whenever they have to deal with republics. It no doubt weakens the policy of the government which is thus limited by national preferences and prejudices; it hampers their movements and prevents them from committing the country to sudden changes. The government of Russia can swing around from a friendly to most hostile attitude within an hour; the United States cannot. This condition is in some respects a disadvantage, as it renders changes that are sudden all but impossible; they could occur only under very extraordinary conditions, and so the diplomacy of republics tends upon the whole toward conservatism and stability.

Since the Spanish-American war there has been a remarkable change in the sentiments that dominate the public opinion of the United States. The United States, up to this period, had had no enemy in diplomacy except her old mother country, England, and it was strange to see how these two powerful nations, so much akin, could be so antagonistic in sentiment; but the main reason was that the United States had never waged any serious war except with her mother country, and so the war-spirit of our youngsters found nourishment only in imaginary fighting with English soldiers. While we must not be blind to the fact that there are important differences between English and American civilisation, we may fairly grant that they are trivial as compared with the civilisations of other countries. Our country is in its political institutions, its general conception of life, and political and social ethics, nearer in spirit to England than to any other country. The animosity that sometimes obtains between the two countries has appeared more like the quarrels between two brothers who in due time will have to make up under circumstances where their common ideals might be attacked or endangered. The English have always been suspected in the United States of looking upon the world as their property, and they in their turn seem to be irritated that there is a continent in this world where men of their own kin and speech dare to

tell them to keep their hands off. The English are wont to look upon Americans as deteriorated Englishmen, while Americans prefer to regard their nationality as a more highly evolved Anglo-Saxondom, broadened by the best features of other nationalities.

All the differences between England and the United States were ventilated in this country during the crisis concerning the Monroe Doctrine, which was brought on under Cleveland's administration, through the differences between England and Venezuela. At that time the excitement ran so high that war seemed imminent, and the people of the United States apparently did not shrink from standing up for the Monroe Doctrine with armed hand. England then graciously waived her claims in favor of an unreserved recognition of the principles of the so-called Monroe Doctrine, and the turbulent waters were soon quieted.

The Spanish war changed the situation thoroughly. England was the first nation to declare a friendly neutrality,—an act which was the more appreciated by our people as it was accompanied by a spontaneous expression of sympathy that came not only from aristocratic leaders but was backed by the assent of the large masses of the commoners of England. For the first time in the history of the two countries a genuine friendship was established and produced a sentiment of solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic which will not soon wear away. The hatchet has been buried, old grudges have been forgotten, inveterate suspicions have been laid aside, and mutual respect and good will have been established.

This approach of the two nations is of great importance, and cannot be over-estimated in the history of civilisation. It may become the basis of a broader friendship which will promote the harmony among the various civilised nations of the world.

It is strange, however, that simultaneously a difference has sprung up in quarters where it could least be expected,—between the United States and Germany.

The relations between Germany and the United States have always and without any exception been excellent, for not only are more than one-third of our people of German descent and about eight million inhabitants of German birth, but also some of the most important institutions in the field of education and university training have been adopted from Germany and adapted to our special conditions. Most of our best scientists have studied at German universities, and have imported the spirit of German science into this country. They look up to German scientists and poets with an admiration and a veneration that could not be surpassed in the Fatherland itself. Thus, Germany rightly may be regarded as the second mother country of the United States, and war between Germany and the United States has always been considered as a sheer impossibility.

It is unnecessary now to review the causes which have led to the estrangement between the two nations; it started in Manila and was intensified in Samoa. The spirit of ill will was fostered on both sides by those extravagant patriots who have no other means of stimulating the love of their own country than by preaching hatred of other countries, and produce a bitter feeling which can never do any good, but will spread a feeling of ill will that will be the cause of many troubles.

At the present date, we are happy to say the estrangement seems to pass off. The governments of both nations show a sincere wish to re-establish the good relations that have always been existent before; and we have all reasons to believe that they will succeed.

The incidents in Manila belong to the past, and the expressions of a military spirit which naturally originate in the heads of soldiers who are combative by na-

ture, fighting being the main duty of life, have caused ripples only which will quickly pass away¹; and it is fortunate that the German ambassador, Baron von Holleben as well as the United States minister, Andrew White, are animated with the desire to re-establish the *entente cordiale* between the two nations.

Mass-meetings of German citizens in this country have been held of late for the purpose of assuring the German government that the Germans of this country have not yet forgotten that they are Germans. We are sorry to say, however, that the leaders of this movement have made one grave mistake, viz., that of expressing their German-American patriotism by an unnecessary and uncalled-for show of hatred of England. While it is quite true that the Anglo-Saxon friendship should not be an alliance in a political sense, which would commit America to the policy of Great Britain, we should rejoice that a good understanding between Great Britain and America has been established, and should not unreasoningly denounce these sentiments as a mistake and a national blunder. The German-American mass-meetings would have served a better purpose if they had insisted on a triple alliance of the three Teutonic nations,—the Germans, the English, and the Americans. We must not forget that Germany is the home of all Anglo-Saxons, and we wish heartily that the Germans of Germany would remember their kinship with Great Britain and the United States. These three nations are kin in spirit and civilisation, as they are kin in blood, and it ought to be the diplomatic ideal of their governments to pursue a policy of good-will, and to establish among the people of Teutonic blood a sentiment of brotherly friendship.²

The United States is a cosmopolitan nation, and the ideal of our diplomacy must be to remain on good terms with all the nations of the world. Should the necessity come that we must go to war, let it be *for a cause but never against any nation*. At the present time it is our earnest desire to re-establish the good relations with Spain. Our right to regulate the conditions on the islands in American waters has been recognised, and the cause of all ill feeling against Spain has been removed. Further, we wish that unnecessary irritation and mutual spitefulness between our own and other nationalities, above all the Germans and the English, should cease on all sides, and that a policy of lasting good-will and international friendliness be recognised as the common ideal of the diplomacy of all nations.

P. C.

THE FILIPINO QUESTION.

It has been fashionable of late to hold mass-meetings in almost all large cities, either to support or vigorously to denounce the present administration on account of its expansion policy. We are not opposed to expansion, as was indicated in a former article on the subject, so long as expansion comes as a natural result of growth and through duties which historical events force upon us. We are opposed, however, to an expansion by the suppression of the rights of others; it would be an act of injustice on the part of the United States to pursue a policy either of conquest or of imperialism. Accordingly, there is no sense in denouncing the expan-

¹ The publication of a letter written by a German naval officer, and also the speech of the captain of the Raleigh, are on the same footing, and only prove that soldiers are not diplomats. The importance of such evidences of a military patriotism should not be exaggerated in diplomatic circles.

² Authors and newspaper writers on both sides of the Atlantic have sinned much. The worst I have seen is a most venomous article written by a German university professor; and a German diplomat used to say that the Yankees are anti-German, but that the German-Americans are even more so. He meant perhaps anti-imperialistic.

sion policy of the United States; there could arise a cause for censure only if we can prove that our administration pursues a policy of injustice toward other nations; but it seems to me that the situation is at present not yet sufficiently clear to allow of the formation of a final judgment.

The affairs in Cuba have undoubtedly been handled with great discretion, and seem to have reached a consummation which is much better than could be hoped for.

The case seems different in Luzon. Aguinaldo's forces are resisting the authority of our government with armed hand, and the probability suggests itself that either our administration or its representatives have committed some mistakes. Taking all in all, we must confess, however, that it is very difficult to say how these mistakes, if they were committed, might have been avoided, for it is certain that the policy of those who censure the administration most vigorously on the ground that we should have left the Filipinos to themselves could not have led to the insurance of a condition of peace and liberty in those islands, but would have served simply to complicate the situation.

Our war with Aguinaldo is lamentable, but it was probably unavoidable; for granting even that the representatives of our government committed mistakes in not respecting the pretensions of the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, we cannot exonerate Aguinaldo either; for his claims were exaggerated, and it would have been a grievous mistake on the part of the United States to recognise in him the legitimate representative of the Filipinos. Aguinaldo is not a Gomez, and whatever his ability may be as a dictator and general, he has not proved himself to be an organiser of a republic such as would insure the liberties of the European residents of Manila, as well as of the native Filipinos. His methods of government, so far as we can judge by probabilities and precedents, do not recommend themselves.

The present situation is a new departure and presents many new problems involving our executive government in unforeseen difficulties. Under similar conditions other nations have made mistakes, and as it is but human to err, we may expect that we shall not be found entirely faultless. We must therefore not lose patience if we hear reports of occurrences which indicate that now and then some of our representatives or citizens did not act up to the standard of our ideals.

In the face of the fact that Aguinaldo, with all those who have taken up arms against the United States, draw their main strength from the moral backing which they receive from the anti-expansionists of the United States, we deem it a patriotic duty not to join in the hue and cry of those who unreasonably condemn our administration. Our administration could neither tolerate the presence of armed hordes in the new provinces, nor recognise the legality of a dictatorship upheld by military force. We cherish the confidence that our administration means to do what is right; that it will ultimately endeavor to establish home rule in all those territories which have been ceded to our government; that it will allow them the utmost range of liberty which the people of these districts can stand; and that if mistakes have been committed the grievances caused thereby will in time be duly redressed.

P. C.

HENRY CLARKE WARREN.

Henry Clarke Warren, a Páli scholar of highest standing, the author of *Buddhism in Translations*, and a man of a rarely noble character, passed away in the beginning of the present year, and we have delayed the announcement of his death

only because we waited for a well-authenticated statement of the main facts of his life, the data of which we now offer to our readers on the authority of his teacher, co laborer, and friend, Prof. C. R. Lanman of Harvard University.

"Henry Clarke Warren was born in Boston, November 18, 1854, son of the late Samuel Dennis and of Susan Clarke Warren. He was the second of four brothers, all graduates of Harvard. In his early childhood a fall from a gig produced an injury which resulted in spinal ailment and in lifelong physical disability and suffering. Thus shut out, before ever experiencing them, from many of the possibilities that make life so attractive to childhood, youth, and young manhood, he bravely set himself to make the utmost of what remained to him. His broadness of mind soon showed itself in a catholicity of interest very unusual for one of his years. The natural trend of his mind toward speculative questions appeared clearly in his scientific investigations of Buddhism. With all this went an eager curiosity about the visible world around him. We can easily believe that he would have attained to high distinction in natural science, so good was his native gift of observation and of well-balanced reflexion upon what he saw. He used his microscope with great satisfaction in botanical study. At Baltimore he worked with enthusiasm in the chemical laboratory. The department, however, in which he has made a name for himself is Oriental Philosophy, and in particular Buddhism, conceived, not as a simple body of ethical teaching, but as an elaborate system of doctrine.

"His first essay in print was an admirable version of a Buddhist story in the *Providence Journal* of October 27, 1884. An interesting paper on "Superstitious Customs Connected with Sneezing" soon followed in the *Journal* of the American Oriental Society. Later appeared results of his studies in the *Transactions* of the International Congress of Orientalists at London, and in the *Journal* of the Páli Text Society of London. These, however, were but chips from the keel he had laid for a craft of ambitious dimension and noble design.

"In 1896 appeared his *Buddhism in Translations*, published by the University as volume iii. of the Harvard Oriental Series. It is an octavo of 540 pages, made up of about 130 passages from the Páli scriptures. These selections, done into English prose and verse, are chosen with such broad and learned circumspection that they make a systematically complete presentation of their difficult subject. The work is divided into five chapters. Of these, the first gives the picturesque Buddha legend, and the fifth treats of the monastic order; while the other three are concerned with the fundamental conceptions of Buddhism, to-wit, "sentient existence, Karma and rebirth, and meditation and Nirvána." Mr. Warren's interest centred in the philosophical chapters; the first and last were for him rather a concession to popular interest, an addition intended to "float" the rest. Much has recently been written about Buddhism upon the basis of secondary or even less immediate sources. Mr. Warren's material is drawn straight from the fountain-head. It is this fact that gives his book an abiding importance and value. And it was a genuine and legitimate satisfaction to him to read the judgments passed on his work by eminent Orientalists—of England, France, the Netherlands, India, and Ceylon—welcoming him, as it were, to a well-earned place among their ranks.

"One of the most pleasing features of his later years was his intercourse with the venerable Subhuti, a Buddhist elder, of Waskaduwa in Ceylon. This distinguished monk, whose learning, modesty, and kindness had endeared him years ago to Childers, Fausböll, and Rhys Davids, was no less ready with words of encouragement for Mr. Warren, and with deeds of substantial service, notably the pro-

curing of copies of manuscript. The King of Siam recently celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession to the throne by publishing in thirty-nine volumes a memorial edition of the Buddhist scriptures or Tipitaka (a most commendable method of celebrating! Sovereigns of far more enlightened lands have preferred sky-rockets). Copies were sent, exclusively as gifts, to the principal libraries of Europe and America, Harvard among them. Mr. Warren had sent to His Majesty a magnificently bound set of the Harvard Oriental Series; and it was matter of honest pride and pleasure to him to receive from the king in return a beautiful copy of this Tipitaka. It is certain to be a satisfaction to the king and some of the high authorities at Bangkok when they learn how diligently Mr. Warren used the royal gift.

"Long before the issue of his *Buddhism*, Mr. Warren was well advanced in his study of Buddhaghosa's 'Way of Purity.' To publish a masterly edition of this work was the ambition of his life as a scholar. He did not live to see of the travail of his soul; but, as in the case of Whitney, of Child, and of Lane, it is believed that naught of his labor of love will be lost. A word about Buddhaghosa and his work, and about Warren's plan and his progress towards its achievement.

"Buddhaghosa (about 400 A. D.) was a famous divine, who had been brought up in all the wisdom of the Brahmans, and who, after his conversion to Buddhism became an exceedingly prolific writer. He may, in some sort, be styled the St Augustine of Buddhism. His 'Way of Purity,' or 'Visuddhi-magga,' is an encyclopædia *raisonnée* of Buddhist doctrine. It is, as Childers says, 'a truly great work, written in terse and lucid language, and showing a marvelous grasp of the subject.' Warren's plan was to publish a scholarly edition of the Pâli text of this work, with full but well-sifted critical apparatus, a complete English translation, an index of names, and other useful appendices. Buddhaghosa makes constant citations from his predecessors, quite after the manner of the Christian church fathers. And in order further to enhance the usefulness of his edition, Mr. Warren had undertaken to trace back all these quotations to their sources."¹ The Pâli text Mr. Warren had practically constituted from beginning to end. Much labor is still to be put upon the *apparatus criticus*. Of the English translation about one-third has been made, and about one-half of the quotations have been identified.

Mr. Warren's interests in the furtherance of science are perpetuated in his will. He has left to Harvard College his house and garden grounds on Quincy street, a legacy of \$15,000 for the continued publication of the Harvard Oriental Series, \$10,000 for the Dental School, and the like amount for the Museum of Archæology. These gifts are manifestations of the spirit that prompted them; for his (says Professor Lanman) was the *metta*, that friendliness or good will, which plays such a rôle among the virtues of Gotama Buddha; his was patient and cheerful courage under adversity; his were high intellectual endowments, directed by a character unselfish, and lofty, and pure; his was a profoundly religious nature. For these things, while we mourn his loss, let us remember him and be glad.

MANILAL N. DVIVEDI.

The brother of Manilal Nabhubai Dvivedi, Professor of Sanscrit, Nadiad Gujarat, Bombay Presidency, India, informs us of the death of this prominent Hindu scholar and philosopher. Dvivedi was well acquainted with Western thought, yet his heart was rooted in the philosophy of his own people. His master was S'ankara,

¹ Extracted from the *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, Vol. 7, No. 27.

the greatest representative of Brahman philosophy. The trend of Mr. Dvivedi's thought was monistic, and we deem him one of the best, perhaps the best, interpreter of Brahman thought. One of his first books, which earned for him a name in the philosophical world, was *Monism or Advaitism? An Introduction to the Advaita-Philosophy in the Light of Modern Speculation*. Other books of his are the *Rāja-Yoga*, the *Tarka-Kaumudī*, a compendium of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy (a book which earned the praise of such scholars as Prof. W. D. Whitney and Dr. G. Bühler), the *Yoga-Sūtras*, the *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, the *Samādhi-Sātaka*, and *Sydvūda-Manjari*. His *Imitation of S'ankara*, which like his other books contains the Sanscrit as well as the English translation, is a collection of utterances of his master, so systematised as to make the study of Sanscrit philosophy comparatively easy, even to the uninitiated. We reviewed the book at considerable length in *The Monist*, Vol. VI., No. 3, and have discussed the Atman theory in *The Open Court* under the title "Brahmanism and Buddhism, or the Religion of Postulates and the Religion of Facts." (Vol. X., p. 4851.)

We had some correspondence with the late Professor Dvivedi on the contrast between Buddhism and S'ankara's conception of the self. Professor Dvivedi was anxious to reconcile both systems, and it may be that he succeeded in settling the problem to his own satisfaction. We ceased to hear from him when disease overtook him, and regret now to learn of his death. India has lost in him one of her best sons, and a man whose life was helpful in leading the Hindus toward a higher condition of existence by showing them how they could preserve their own and yet adopt all the good of Western civilisation.

P. C.

A FURTHER NOTE ON THE BUDDHIST NATIVITY SUTTA.

Since writing my note in the November number, I have made further researches into the sources of this document. I have found large portions of it in other parts of the Pāli canon, and am convinced that it is one of the most fundamental narratives, on a footing with the Book of the Great Decease. Thus, the statement that the mothers of Bodhisats always die a week after the Nativity is in the Udāna (V. 2). The splendors and earthquakes at Buddha's descent from heaven and birth in the world, are in the Anguttara-Nikāya (IV. 127) and partly also in the Sanskrit Divyāvadāna, p. 204. But, above all, nearly the entire Nativity Sutta (Majjhima 123) translated by me last August, is embedded in the Dīgha-Nikāya (Mahāpādāna-Sutta, No. 14), where it is told of a former Buddha, Vipassī. I made my translation in March, 1897, and my increasing knowledge of Pāli leads me to correct the second paragraph, which should run thus:

"Wonderful, O brother! marvellous, O brother! is the occult power and magical might of the Tathāgata: when, for example, he has knowledge of bygone Buddhas who have gone into Nirvāna, have broken down obstacles and avenues, exhausted their transmigrations and passed beyond all pain; and the Tathāgata perceives: 'Such were the families of the Blessed Ones, such were the names of the Blessed Ones; their clans were so-and-so; such were their moral codes, such their doctrines, their wisdom, their dwellings, and their manner of release.'"

The Nativity Suttas (including the one in the Sutta-Nipāta) lie behind the Laṭi Vistara and other early poems and commentaries. They probably constituted one of the ancient Nine Divisions of the canon, called *Marvels*. Together with the First Sermon, the Chain of Causation, the Confessional, the Antinomies of the

Schools, and the Book of the Great Decease, they rank among those prime documents of the religion around which all recensions rally.

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS.

A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE.

Mr. Edwin Herbert Lewis has rendered a distinct service to the cause of education in the compilation of his admirable *Introduction to the Study of Literature, for the Use of Secondary and Graded Schools*. (New York: The Macmillan Co. Pages, 410. Price, \$1.00.) His guiding principle has been "That literature ought to serve as a prime agency in the education of the emotions, and indirectly, of the will. . . . If the study of English during the adolescent age is merely formal, the student loses one of the best influences that the school can ever give him." In saying this, the author would not underestimate the ethical or commercial value of formal training in composition; he would still insist upon Spartan severity with regard to everything that affects the outward forms of writing and speech; but the attaining of the desired end by Spartan methods, which end is the arousing of an unconstrained love for noble literature, is almost a hopeless undertaking; and "Gradgrind and enemy of Gradgrind he must be within the same hour."

In the selection of literature for reading in secondary schools the second principle has been that the natural interests of the student, and not the chronological order, should be consulted. To discover what these natural interests are, the experience of school-boys of various ages who have been allowed to browse in good libraries has been consulted, and as the result partly of such experimenting, as interpreted and supplemented by the author's own judgment, observation, and theory, the present volume has been offered "as a tentative body of lyrics, ballads, and short stories." The material has been drawn mostly from nineteenth century authors. The works are grouped by subjects, and bear such titles as "The Nobility of Animals," containing selections from such authors as Browning and Scott; "The Heroism of War," containing selections from Tennyson, Sir Francis Hastings Doyle, Kipling, Gerald Massey, Stevenson, Eggleston, Whittier, and Emerson; "The Heroism of Peace," with selections from Walt Whitman, Longfellow, Kingsley, Lowell, A. Conan Doyle, and Tennyson; "The Athlete," with selections from Byron, Lefroy, Blackmore, Blackie, Poe, Franklin, and Jeffries; "The Adventurer," represented by pieces from Longfellow, Tennyson, and Stanley; "The Hearth," with selections from Kingsley, the Bible, Matthew Arnold, and Landor. "The Morning Landscape," "the Gentleman," "Wit and Humor," and "The Far Goal," complete the list of titles. An introduction is prefixed to each chapter, with the aim of pointing out the thread of meaning common to all the pieces. The reading of Homer, Cooper, and Shakespeare is recommended at certain stages, and the poems which should be read aloud, and which are especially good for learning by heart, are indicated. A chronological table of British and American authors has been appended to the volume.

BOOK REVIEWS.

LIFE, DEATH, AND IMMORTALITY. With Kindred Essays. By *William M. Bryant*, M. A., LL. D., Instructor in Psychology and Ethics, St. Louis Normal and High School. New York: The Baker & Taylor Co. 1898. Pages, vi, 442. Price, \$1.75.

The common theme for the essays comprised in this volume is the religious

aspect of human nature, but its chief topic is that which is referred to in the leading title of the book,—man's immortality. The author puts the question thus: "Whether in respect of man's essential nature as a thinking unit, death can ever be more than transition from one to another grade of life,—whether so complex a living unit as man can ever wholly die?" The key to the solution of the problem is found in the fact that the human mind can conceive of an infinite Mind, and can also conceive of itself as progressively unfolding its own powers to infinity. From this fact and from certain admissions made by Mr. Spencer, the author infers that man's "ancestry" necessarily includes as its first indispensable term the great First Cause itself, that is, man as mind can descend only from that which is Mind, "the absolutely spontaneous, self-moved, all inclusive *One* beyond which there is no reality whatever." He argues further that as there can be but one type of mind then the individual unit, which constitutes the extreme term of integration in the total process of Evolution, must be possessed of the same typical nature as the perfect Mind itself. Here we have, says Mr. Bryant, the answer to the question, "whether death can mean utter dissolution for man as a thinking unit." For, "the identity in nature of all minds must mean that each thinking unit is in its typical nature infinite. The degree of its present realisation may be ever so slight yet because it belongs to the same type as every other mind and therefore to the same type as the perfect Mind, it may rightfully claim for itself the full import of its infinite ideal nature." This necessarily implies immortality, seeing that as man can realise the full import of his infinite nature only by progressive finite stages of development, infinite duration will be required for its complete realisation. Assuming life to be a constructive process, then for man whose nature is infinite in its possibilities, "life must signify nothing less and nothing else than an infinitely extended constructive process,—a process of self-development, the full import of which is nothing less than this: that it constitutes the constructive realisation in his own personality of the divine nature common to all thinking units." But may not man by persistent self-contradiction accomplish his own utter extinction? This is the inversion of the process of life, and the author concludes, after a consideration of the question, that the individual is "an indestructible unit whose central characteristic is: *Power to choose his own course of action*,—the only restriction upon this power being that from his very nature the individual cannot so far misuse it as to bring about its utter destruction, so far as to effect the individual's own utter annihilation." But the divine may become the demonic, and man may choose the never-ending death of self-perversion, death being regarded as merely the phase of transition from one to another degree of life. By Christianity the infinite nature of man was explicitly announced, instead of being implied in other creeds, and the author remarks that, in lieu of saying that Christ brought life and immortality to light, "it might be more precisely descriptive of the fact to say, that Christ brought life *as* immortality to light, in the sense that he was the first to show that life in its highest significance, life in its intellectual and moral phase, already involves the indestructibility, the immortality of such living unit."

We have dwelt so long on the central theme of Mr. Bryant's work that we cannot follow him in his comparison of Buddhism and Christianity, and of Christianity and Mohammedanism, nor in his treatment of miracles and Christian Ethics, except so far as to state that in his view Christian doctrine involves the highest conceivable ethical principle,—that "which demands the ceaseless self-unfolding of man as Mind, and hence of man as the divine son, into ever richer degrees of realised likeness with God as the one divine Father,—the one eternally perfect

Mind." The work concludes with a chapter on Eternity, which gives an account of the development of the author's religious views, and is of special value as being a record of actual mental experience.

C. S. WAKE.

IN TUNE WITH THE INFINITE, OR FULNESS OF PEACE, POWER, AND PLENTY. By *Ralph Waldo Trine*, author of "What All the World's a-Seeking." New York: 46 East Fourteenth Street, Thomas T. Crowell & Company. Boston: 100 Purchase Street. 1898. Pages, 222. Price, \$1.25.

The thesis which the author of this work proposes to establish is that every man possesses within himself the cause of whatever enters into his life. He regards thoughts as forces, which can be connected with whatever "order of thought of the universe" a man chooses, and so place himself exactly in those conditions he most desires. The mind is not only continually building from within, but is constantly attracting from without on both the seen and the unseen side of life, influences and conditions most akin to its own prevailing state. The author in treating of the effects of the various mental states and conditions upon the physical body attempts to show how and why fear, worry, anger and other emotions have a poisoning and destructive effect on the body, while the opposite emotions have a life-engendering, body-building influence. He supposes a knowledge of the higher laws can be used by any one to bring and hold himself continually in a state of abounding health and strength, and to set in operation subtle, silent forces that will in time entirely rebuild the body, so that healthy conditions will replace those of disease. This is said to apply also to the affairs of every-day life, which are thought to depend for their successful issue or failure on the action of the higher forces of man's nature. The author affirms, moreover, that everything is first worked out in the unseen before it is manifested in the seen, in the ideal before it is realised in the real, and in the spiritual before it is exhibited in the material. Hence the realm of the unseen is that of cause, and the realm of the seen is that of effect. Everything is governed by law and therefore what has been done by any one, prophet, seer, sage, or saviour, may be done by all men. The practical conclusion of the work is, that to come into the full realisation of one's own awakened interior powers, is to be able to condition one's life in exact accord with what we would have it. The point of view of the book is mystical and one to which we cannot assent.

Ω.

Persons desirous of obtaining in brief compass an adequate idea of the past history and future prospects of Cuba, may consult with profit a little book by Frederic M. Noa, entitled: *The Pearl of the Antilles* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pages, 84. Price, 75 cents).

We have received a prospectus of the *Encyclopædia of the History and Mental Evolution of the Jewish Race*, which is to appear in twelve quarto volumes, with about 2000 illustrations. (New York, Funk & Wagnalls.) The specimen pages are very promising, and the enterprise is supported by the best scholars of to-day.

Dr. Arthur Pfungst, well known as an author, especially as a poet and translator of Oriental subjects, has translated T. W. Rhys Davids's *Buddhism* into German, which he has done from the seventeenth English edition. The book, published by Reclam, is a marvel of German cheapness, costing 40 pfennigs, which

equals 10 cents of our money. Prof. Rhys Davids's book is well known as a standard work, and the present edition will contribute not a little to make the doctrines of the Shâkyamuni better known in Germany.

Dr. Th. Achelis, a prominent anthropologist of Germany, who some years ago contributed to *The Open Court* an article on "Animal Worship," has written in German a sketch of *Ethics*, in which he explains the growth, development, and significance of ethics from the standpoint of an anthropologist and an evolutionist. It has appeared in the *Sammlung Götschen*, which will insure it a wide circulation. Dr. Achelis discusses in the first part of the book the history of the ethical systems, first of classical antiquity, secondly, of the Middle Ages, thirdly, of modern times. The second part of the work is devoted to a consideration of the factors of morality, language, mythology and religion, social life, law and art. The last part is devoted to the principles, or rather the conditions, of morality, viz., first, the will, secondly, the moral motives, and thirdly, the moral norms and ideals. The work concludes with the idea that ethics is the development and gradual fulfilment of humanity, that is, of the most ideal human norms. (G. J. Götschen, Leipsic. Price, 20 cents.)

NOTES.

The writer of the article "Peace on Earth, a Problem of Practical Diplomacy," wishes to add by way of a note that he knows himself to be in substantial agreement with the Hon. C. C. Bonney of Chicago, a jurist whose thorough knowledge of the law is widely recognised by the legal profession and who otherwise has won eternal fame as the inaugurator of the World's Congresses and the Parliament of Religions. Ten years ago, Mr. Bonney, as the Chairman of the Committee on Toasts and Responses for the Banquet given by the Bar Association of Chicago to the American Bar Association, offered as a toast for the banquet that

"The establishment of a permanent International Court of Arbitration, to declare the law of nations, and the right of such cases as the parties might submit to it, either for advice or for decision, would powerfully promote the substitution of arbitration for war, and worthily crown the great achievements of the nineteenth century."

The writer takes exception to the expression "to declare the law of nations" and also to the very name "court of arbitration." If a standing commission were established to whom questions of right and wrong in international complications would be submitted, care should be taken to avoid even the semblance of representing it as a court which has the authority of arbitration. But a personal interview with the Hon. Mr. Bonney has assured the author that he practically means the same thing as proposed in the present article.

Mr. Bonney's toast received cordial responses from Thomas M. Cooley, Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, Alphonse Rivier, Emile De Laveleye, G. Rolin Jaquemyns, August Von Blumerincq, and the Hon. William E. Gladstone, all of whom expressed their appreciation of the gravity of the problem and the desirability of a solution.

Mr. Bonney argues his case as follows :

"It is almost incredible that the wager of battle as a mode of determining controversies between English subjects was not actually abolished till 1819, though it had fallen into disuse in the midst of tribunals in which evidence and argument took the place of battle-axe and lance, but as late as 1818 Lord Ellenborough declared that the general law of the land was then in favor of the trial by battle, when properly demanded.

" Yet the progress of the world since that day has been so wonderful that it should not seem an extravagant prediction that the twentieth century will enjoy the felicity of celebrating the general substitution of arbitration for war, . . .

" War may, indeed, as Lord Coleridge says, remain in the future, as it has sometimes been in the past, a dire necessity. Cases may, indeed, continue to arise in which persistent wrong must be met with armed retaliation; but having successfully made Sovereign Justice the final arbiter of controversy among the powerful States of the American Union, the genius of human government can neither retrace its steps nor stay its grand advance, but must still go forward till it has made Sovereign Justice the crowning glory of international law, and the supreme safeguard of international intercourse. A simple treaty of leading powers, creating the tribunal recommended in the toast and providing for its proceedings and support, would, indeed, mark the beginning of a new era of peace and progress.

" The supreme achievement of civilisation is the substitution of arguments for arms—of an unarmed judge for a military commander—of the voice of justice for the edict of force; and this is true as well of nations as of men. Alike for both in the swift-coming years will the paths of law and duty prove to be the highways of prosperity and power."

The application of the scientific spirit to matters of religion in both philosophical and historical questions is fast spreading through our universities. It is carried out in the Summer-School of Theology at Cambridge, Mass., which will meet on July 5th, and the general favor with which its lectures have been received is a hopeful sign of the times

The Countess de S. Canavarro, who founded a Buddhist convent in Ceylon already described in *The Open Court*, has gone to India, and is at present working in behalf of Buddhism in Buddha Gayâ, the place where the Buddha Gayâ temple stands as a memorial of the spot in which the ascetic Gautama attained to enlightenment.

The Countess is active in organising the Maha-Bodhi Society of Buddha Gayâ, which serves as a centre of all the Maha-Bodhi societies in Buddhist countries, and publishes the *Maha-Bodhi Journal*. She proposes to erect a small temple of modest architecture, in ancient style, which shall contain a Buddha statue, that in its way will be unique. She proposes to have it carried out, not in the traditional style, but according to modern taste. It will be done in Parian marble, carved by an American artist, in the United States of America.

The article on "Paganism in the Roman Church," which appears in the present number of *The Open Court*, is the first chapter of a large work by the Rev. Mr. Trede, entitled *Das Heidenthum in der römischen Kirche, Bilder aus dem religiösen und sittlichen Leben Süditaliens*, published in four parts by Friedrich Andreas Perthes, of Gotha. Pastor Trede has spent many years in Southern Italy, and gathered for his book a vast amount of interesting material relating to the popular religion, folklore, and religious antiquities of this historic country.

Some of the cuts in Dr. Carus's article on "Plato and the Cross" in the present number are from *The Open Court* of November, 1898. They were there used to illustrate the Greek idea of salvation, and not with special reference to the history of the cross. They have been reprinted for the convenience of the readers.



MIXE IDOL—MIXISTLAN.

This idol was used on the altar of a Christian Church of native Mexicans for nearly four hundred years, as the image of a saint, and was only lately removed at the command of the Archbishop of Antequera, the Rt. Rev. Eulogio Gillow, who now retains the original in his possession. Photographed with the permission of his Grace the Archbishop. See Prof. Frederick Starr's article in the present *Open Court*.

Frontispiece to the July, 1899, Open Court.

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
SURVIVALS OF PAGANISM IN MEXICO.

BY FREDERICK STARR.

EVERY ONE who seriously studies the pure Indians of Mexico must be impressed with the frequent and curious survivals of pagan belief and practice found among them. It would be easy to present examples: we give but one. The Mixes are among the most conservative of Mexican Indians. Their towns are situated in a magnificent mountain district: most of them are perched upon the very summit of lofty ridges. The roads of the district, unlike those of the Mixteca or the Zapotecan serrano, do not zigzag but go straight to the summit and straight down the other side. Governmentally the Mixe towns belong to two districts,—Villa Alta and Yautepec. Among those of Villa Alta, Mixistlan and Tamasalapa are notably conservative. In all the Mixe towns the native language is commonly used, and in some Spanish is but little understood. The Mixes of Mixistlan are said to have practised cannibalism within half a century. All the Mixes are nominally Christian, and religious works were translated and printed in their language in the early half of the eighteenth century. Pagan practices are, however, still common among them. Several years ago the Archbishop of Antequera, Rt. Rev. Eulogio Gillow, collected a considerable mass of data regarding these, and published them in his book *Apuntes historicos*. In that work we find the story of the idol of which a picture is here presented: the photograph was made from the original now in the possession of His Grace. We translate:

“Señor Don Pedro Ortiz, resident Cura of the parish of Yalalag and charged with the parishes of Caxonos and Chicacastepec, who had gone to the pueblo of Santa Maria Mixistlan, a dependency of Chicacastepec, in order to visit the people of that

"pueblo, as was his duty, went at once to the church to inspect its
 "condition: standing before the high altar, he was surprised and
 "disgusted at seeing an idol, standing to the right of the crucifix,
 "while a sculpture of the Holy Mother of God stood at its other
 "side. He bitterly reproached those who accompanied him, se-
 "verely charging them with acts of idolatry, doubtless practised
 "in the Lord's house. When he then asked them questions rela-



OTOMI MAN.

Old-fashioned male costume, native make.

"tive to the idol, they made no reply. He ordered them to carry
 "it at once to the curacy. Perceiving that he was not obeyed, he
 "took it in his own arms and carried it thither. Seeing that many
 "villagers came to the house and viewed the idol with profound
 "sadness and equal tenderness, he covered it with clothes to con-
 "ceal it. Among those who came to the curacy was an aged man
 "of the town, who drew near to the idol with great emotion, gazed

“at it with the most intense sorrow and—before the Cura could
 “prevent—kissed it, almost weeping, and hurried away. Observ-
 “ing that the curacy was becoming a pagan shrine, the Cura
 “judged it necessary to conceal the idol in the way already men-
 “tioned.

“To avoid disagreeable occurrences in the town, fearing that



OTOMI MOTHER AND SON.

Location of tribe west of Mexico City: fine valley; agricultural.

“he might be hindered in removing the idol and having some fear
 “lest he might himself suffer violence on the part of the natives,
 “on the very night of the occurrence above described, he or-
 “dered a trusty servant to carry the idol, carefully covered, with
 “great secrecy to Yalalag. The next day many came to the house
 “to scrutinise everything cautiously; the object of their scrutiny

“was evident. While they arranged the luggage which the priest
 “was to carry with him to Yalalag, they carefully examined every
 “package, wondering at not finding what they so eagerly sought.
 “After some days passed, the chief men of Mixistlan came to the
 “Cura and begged him earnestly for his idol, offering him what-
 “ever he wished for its surrender. He then blamed them to their



FAMILY GROUP OF OTOMIS.

Mother spins as she walks. Note mode of carrying baby. Homespun dress.

“faces for their acts of idolatry and other abominations, but he
 “could not convince them. A little later they came again upon the
 “same errand, complaining that heaven denied them rain and that
 “disease was decimating them, for having permitted the removal
 “of the saint from the pueblo. Again he harangued them but no-
 “ticed that his remarks made no impression. They continued to

“send delegates to beg back their idol. He diligently sought to
 “secure data regarding the idol in question, but could learn noth-



OTUMI MAN. Native garment of coarse Ixtli fiber cloth.

“ing more. He only learned that the people of Mixistlan véné-
 “rated it with ardor, burning candles before it and giving it other




TRIQUI WOMEN—CHICAHUASTLA. Location : high mountains, north-west of Oaxaca. Note native dress ; also feet, toes, legs, etc.

“offerings. Evidence of the candle-burning was left on the knees
“of the idol, which were somewhat blackened.”

EDITORIAL REMARKS ON PROFESSOR STARR'S ARTICLE.

The importance of anthropology is increasing at a rapid rate, and it is the result of natural conditions that the United States of America is the center of in-



ZAPOTEC TOWN. Santiago Guevea, not far from Tehuantepec, but high up in the mountains.

terest of this new science. We still have the Indian with us, and, as Major Powell pointed out of late, the Indian is rather increasing than decreasing. The various types are in very different conditions: some take kindly to Western civilisation, and others oppose it with might and main. While Christian missionaries exercise

a powerful influence upon them, a number of young anthropological emissaries have induced them to divulge their secret thoughts, and give us the key to their strange practices, rituals, and customs.

There are a great number of prominent anthropologists in Europe, such as Ratzel, Ranke, Müller, Topinard, Sergi, Tyler, etc., but none of them can afford to neglect the information drawn from America.

Major J. W. Powell, with his staff of well-trained assistants, has laid a basis for American anthropology in a truly scientific manner, in the magnificent series of the publications of the American Bureau of Ethnology. It is on account of this work



ZAPOTEC WOMAN—TEHUANTEPEC.

Note the fine physique. Women are *the* leaders in this tribe, which is the finest and best Mexico. Juarez, the great president, was a Zapotec. They are much mixed with Mixtecs. Diaz has Mixtec blood. Both tribes are progressive and industrious.

that the University of Heidelberg conferred upon him the highest academic honor at their command, that is, the dignity of *doctor philosophiæ honoris causa*.

The magnificence with which the reports of the American Bureau are published is apt to conceal the systematic and scientific spirit in which they have been made, and may actually in some cases, where the books are only superficially in-



SCENE IN JUAVE TOWN—SAN MATRO

The Juaves are seaside fishers; little known; pure type; and interesting. There are only four towns; location near Tehuantepec.

spected, prove a hindrance to the appreciation of their intrinsic value; but the work remains, and will be more appreciated the more the Indian passes away. Now is the last moment to do this work of saving genuine and direct reports of this interesting phase of a past civilisation; and if it were neglected now, it would be impossible to make good the loss of direct and authentic reports.

The University of Chicago is perhaps the first American institution which has created a special chair of anthropology, the incumbent of which is Prof. Frederick Starr. He appears specially adapted for this kind of work, for he loves the Indian and sees even in a savage more marks of civilisation than the average civilised man




ZAPOTEC WOMAN—TEHUANTEPEC.

is able to detect. It is natural, therefore, that Professor Starr loves to contradict the usual opinions, not only concerning Indians and savages in general, but also on other subjects. Whatever may be the topic of conversation, Professor Starr will be on the side of those who protest. While he discovers the vestiges of a finer and higher type in the uncivilised, he at the same time points out the vestiges of barbarism in our own half-civilised conditions. And thus it is natural that he has sometimes antagonised those who do not appreciate his temper, and fail to take into consideration his characteristic personal equation.



DRYING FISH—JUAVE TOWN.

It will be interesting to our readers to furnish them with a sample of the work which Professor Starr has done for anthropology, in a number of pictures repre-




JUAVE GIRL.



senting Mexican types, villages, and landscapes, photographed by him during his recent trip through Central America.¹

¹ On a former trip Professor Starr had taken photographs of pictures representing the history



BRIDGE OF VINES—IXCUINTEPEC.

Professor Starr's work in Mexico on his last two excursions has been to establish the physical types of the aborigines. There are in the State of Oaxaca alone fifteen languages spoken to-day. This suggests that there is a rich field for the anthropologist.

The work of the Professor was threefold: Making measurements, taking photographs, and making plaster casts. In the two years, he studied twelve tribes in the States of Mexico, Haxcala, Puebla, Michoacan, and Oaxaca, taking thirteen or fourteen measures on each person. In each village he aimed to measure 100 men and 25 women; in all, he measured more than 1150 men and 300 women. He made 700 negatives of types, life, groups, houses, villages, and scenery, and made 50 casts in plaster from living subjects. Most of this work was done in mountainous districts remote from railroads, mostly with suspicious and superstitious natives. On his last trip alone he rode 1000 miles on horseback, while his plaster, plates, etc., had to be carried principally on human backs.

The tribes which Professor Starr visited are: in the State of Mexico, the Otomis; in Michoacan, the Tarascans; in Haxcala, the Haxcaltecs; in Puebla, the Aztecs; in Oaxaca, the Mixtecs, *Triquis*, Zapotecs (Mitla), Zapotecs (Tehuantepec), *Mixes*, *Juaves*, *Chontals*, *Cuicatecs*, and *Chinantecs*.¹

Professor Starr proposes to publish the results of his labors in Mexico in the shape of an album and in pamphlets. The pamphlets will be published partly by the University of Chicago and partly by other institutions, such as the Davenport Academy of Science. Some will appear as articles in anthropological publications. Professor Starr has consented to our publishing in the present number of *The Open Court* a most interesting and instructive experience of his in the types of the religious life of the Mexicans. The Mexican Indians are Christians in name, but it will be noticed that Christianity is often only superadded to their previous paganism, and it will take a long time before their ancient Indian creed has been obliterated by a more rational and purer religion. The fact that an Indian idol was worshipped in a Christian church throws much light on the development of the human mind, and on the law of persistence which was so well set forth by Rev. Th. Trede in the last number of *The Open Court*. How much Protestant Christianity is saturated with the spirit of Teuton paganism, its proud combativeness and the ethics of struggle, we have seen in a former article.² The case is quite analogous in Asia where the spread of Buddhism consisted in an assimilation of the indigenous religions of Taoism in China and Shintoism in Japan.

The illustrations of this article will give some idea of the Album which Professor Starr intends to publish, being reduced to about half the original size.³ They explain themselves and stand in no need of further comments. We may add only that the faces bespeak a peculiar intelligence and good nature, and we may expect that future centuries will develop from these artistically inclined children of our continent a noble race with features of their own, and that they may make contributions to civilisation in lines in which the European races are lacking. P. C.

of the Spanish conquest of Mexico under Cortez, painted by native contemporaneous artists, the chronologers of the Spanish allies. The most interesting of them were published in the December number of *The Open Court* for 1898.

¹ Those italicised are almost unknown in science.

² *The Open Court*, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 177, "The Religion of Our Ancestors."

³ The Album will be 11 x 14 inches, groups 8 x 10 inches, and portraits 5 x 7 inches, and pains will be taken to bring out all the beauties of these pictures, which were taken by an expert photographer who accompanied Professor Starr's little party on its expedition through Mexico. Mr. Synnberg, of Chicago, a photographer of artistic tastes and accomplishments, has been engaged to reproduce 141 plates on heavy plate paper, and these will be accompanied by a descriptive text.

TIMEO DANAOS.

BY WILLIAM VOCKE.

AS a constant reader of *The Open Court* I have read with interest your article on international goodwill published in its last number and fully agree with your views as to the important part public sentiment plays in the diplomatic relations of republican countries. Your remarks on the improvement in the relations between our country and England, as well as your references to the inestimable benefits our people have derived from their contact with the Germans, are also highly appreciated, but I beg to differ with you, when you say that the recent "estrangement between the United States and Germany started in Manila," meaning, as you doubtless do, that it was due alone to the misunderstanding between Admiral Dewey and the German admiral von Dietrichs; and since this leads you to say further on, that "mass-meetings of German citizens in this country have been held of late for the purpose of assuring the German government that the Germans of this country have not yet forgotten that they are Germans," and still further, that the leaders of this movement "have expressed their German-American patriotism by an unnecessary and uncalled-for show of hatred for England," I deem it my duty, in view of the great importance, as well as the justice of the movement which you so seriously deprecate, to call your attention to a few facts, in order to show that your assertions are not entirely well founded.

Did the misunderstanding between the United States and Germany start in Manila? The difficulties there between the two admirals occurred in the summer of 1898. More than a year before that time the columns of many of the most widely circulated dailies in this country were constantly flooded with base falsehoods about the German people and their government. At the time the Germans secured by peaceable negotiations with the Chinese govern-

ment possession of a Chinese harbor for the protection of their extensive trade interests in the East these papers made most violent daily outcries against them, charging them with the wicked intention of seeking to establish barbarous trade restrictions against other nations, calling upon our government to interfere and in conjunction with England to prevent the cession of the harbor, stigmatising the men at the head of the German government as a band of buccaneers, highwaymen, and pirates, and showing their ill will in many other similar ways. Scarcely had our war with Spain broken out, when this evil disposition found vent in a systematic course of vilification such as has never been witnessed in the press of any country.

Let me call your attention to only a few of the many falsehoods which were circulated here and were made the subject of editorial comments, in which they were treated as historic truths, long before Admiral von Dietrichs set sail for the Philippine islands. Right at the beginning our people were gravely assured that both, the government and the people of Germany, were bitterly hostile towards us and that the former was engaged in getting up a combination of the continental powers to interfere in favor of Spain.

This lie nailed, we were told that but for the friendly attitude and the mailed hand of England these powers, with Germany in the lead, would have interfered, and that hence we owed England an immeasurable debt of gratitude. The German Emperor was reported to have said he "would never permit the Yankees to seize Cuba," and our Ambassador at Berlin, it was claimed, had been slighted at Court. Although both these statements were shown by the German ruler and Mr. White to have been base fictions, they were nevertheless given repeated publication as undisputed facts. Scarcely had Admiral Dewey's victory become fully known, when it was seriously asserted that "grasping Germany" was casting covetous glances at the Philippines and was threatening to interfere with our conquests which "liberal and unselfish England" was generously offering to help us prevent. This fabrication turned up again every now and then throughout the war to scare the timid and had gained such credence that one of the learned professors of the University of Chicago, in a lecture before his class delivered last winter, told his young hearers in all earnestness, that von Dietrichs would have attacked our navy under Admiral Dewey had not the British fleet prevented it.

A few apparently well-directed shots at our fleet from a battery in a Cuban port gave rise to the falsehood that the battery

was manned with German gunners furnished by the German military authorities, who were also said to have sent gunners to Cadiz to serve the forts at that place. Prince Bismarck, our people were told, had said that the war was the result of persistent provocations on our part and had indulged in other most unfriendly remarks about our government. Certain utterances from the lips of Lord Wolseley, the commander of the English army, and other English soldiers concerning the untried character of our raw volunteers, were treated as most friendly criticism, similar expressions, however, from German military authorities, intended in no more unfriendly a spirit, were set up to show deep hostility. The German Consul at Manila was falsely said to have tried to interfere with our blockade long before von Dietrichs was there, and as to the great gun manufacturer Krupp it was asserted that he had shipped a large number of cannon to Spain to be used in her fortified places and to have smuggled them through the German and French custom houses as kitchen furniture. The sympathies of the German people for Spain were reported to be so intense as to have prompted them to make collections throughout the empire which in a very short time had aggregated the enormous sum of twenty-three million marks. This story, as well as several of the others here mentioned, were cabled by the Berlin agent of the Associated Press and therefore passed through almost all the American dailies, and although the *New Yorker Staats Zeitung* and other German papers in the country promptly called attention to the enormity of the falsehood, the Associated Press never saw fit to have its agent explain and refute it.

But the most of these vile stories, of which I have only enumerated a few, came from British sources and were clearly intended to poison the minds of our people against the Germans. In fact, for a long time it had the appearance as if all the mendacious scribblers in the whole British kingdom, moved by one common impulse, had been gathered together for the sole purpose of bringing about a positive and lasting estrangement between this country and Germany. We were at war with a foreign power, and in the excitement of the hour, so natural under such circumstances, groundless suspicions were easily aroused. The studied and persistent attempts to place the fatherland in a false light before the American people, coupled, as they oftentimes were, with comments so abusive and scurrilous that they could not have been worse had we been in an open state of war with Germany, had therefore a far-reaching and most pernicious effect. The vile falsehoods, taken

as facts, were the subject of exciting discussion in private and in public, here as elsewhere; politicians and statesmen agitated them in the halls of Congress; semi-official organs spoke of the strong probability of an early war with Germany, and even men in high official positions, having imbibed the poison and ignorant of the true facts, gave expression to most angry and violent remarks amid loud threats of war.

The misunderstanding between the admirals, which in all probability amounted to nothing more than little tilts to which under ordinary conditions but little, if any, attention would have been paid, was in the excited condition of the public mind, brought about by the vicious slanders which had been circulated here so long, treated as a most aggravating aggression on the part of the German government, and otherwise enormously magnified. I beg to say, therefore, that the estrangement between the two nations did not "start in Manila and was intensified in Samoa," as you have it, but that it had started long before as the result of vile intrigues employed in the interest of another foreign power, and was intensified in Manila to such an extent that an American admiral in Samoa, in alliance with the commander of a British man-of-war, dared to do gross violence to a harmless people by firing shot and shell into their peaceful hamlets, in order to prevent the installation of their duly elected king, because the Germans favored him and the English opposed him, and further, because the American Chief-Justice of the island (at the bidding of the London Missionary Society, as we are now reliably advised) had seen fit to decide that the king was inelligible. Can it be doubted that if in this sad business the rôles of the representatives of the English and the German government had been reversed, the American Chief-Justice as well as the admiral, right or wrong, would nevertheless have been on the side of the British?

Alarmed at the serious danger which threatened the peace of two hitherto friendly nations, whose good relations should be sacredly guarded first of all by the German-American citizens, the editors of the German papers in Chicago called the first of the mass-meetings to which you refer. Two of the speakers at that meeting were born on this soil and never were Germans, one of them was a staunch fighter for liberty in 1848 and he, as well as another, American citizens for more than forty years, while the remaining two have belonged to this country over thirty years. Recognising, as they all did, that public sentiment in this country shapes the policy of our government, they were prompted by no

other motive but to appeal to reason, to warn the people not to heed the shameless slanders which for nearly two years had disgraced the columns of our press, and thus to prevent foreign intrigue from bringing about an open rupture between our country and the fatherland. You will see, therefore, when all the facts are duly considered, that the first and most important of all the meetings was not called by the leaders "to show the German government that they still are Germans," but that their course was patriotic and just, because it had for its sole object the peace and good will of two great and kindred nations.

Your statement that the leaders of the movement "have expressed their German-American patriotism by an unnecessary and uncalled for show of hatred for England," neither applies to the Chicago meeting, unless it is assumed that a proper characterisation of the shameless conduct of English venders of news on American soil, and the rejection of the arrogant assumption of the Anglo-maniacs that we are an Anglo-Saxon people and have derived all the blessings of our civilisation from England, constitutes such a show.

The men in charge of the meeting, as well as the entire audience, still believe in the wisdom of the counsels of the father of our country relative to entangling alliances with foreign powers, and since our country, in her invincible strength, does not stand in need of an alliance, the meeting expressed itself accordingly. For this reason it is also impossible for the speakers to agree with you when you say that "the mass-meetings would have served a better purpose if they had insisted on a triple-alliance of the three Teutonic nations, the Germans, the English, and the Americans."

I admit that the spirit on the other side during our war was not what it should have been, and I deplore this as deeply as you do. But the press in Germany could not in the very nature of things have been half so violent as ours was, nor could public sentiment there exercise such powerful influence upon the action of the government as it does here. Nevertheless, I recognise it also to be a high mission of our German-American citizens to teach the Germans in the fatherland to respect and honor our American people, to brush away misunderstandings there and to seek to restore and preserve for all times the former esteem and cordial relations between the two nations.

I trust you will appreciate why I explain the character of the German-American movement and the causes that led to it at such length. Had I found your utterances almost anywhere else I would

hardly have noticed them, but you as I hail from the fatherland, and your views relating to subjects affecting Germany are widely respected. I have no reason to assume that you would devote your powerful pen to anything which in your judgment is not eminently just, and hence I take it for granted that some of the facts which have contributed to shape the movement which you condemn have escaped your notice, which is my apology for calling your attention to them.

FOR A RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP.

BY THE EDITOR.

BEFORE I use the word "lie" when confronted with an undeniable untruth, I think twice; for it is difficult to prove the conscious intention that constitutes a lie as distinguished from a simple untruth. But before I would fasten the word liar upon a whole nation, be it the mass of the people or their government, I would think thrice. The fact is that during the last two years a great number of untruths, very regrettable untruths, have been told in the German as well as in the American newspapers, and the result has been an estrangement between these two nations, which (together with England) are called upon to work out in harmonious and peaceful competition the ideal of humanity, the Parliament of the World, the United States of the two Hemispheres.

I shall not attempt now to investigate the source of these untruths; nor is it necessary, for untruths originate spontaneously from dearth of sensations, from desire for gain, (now in the interests of the bulls, now in the interest of the bears,) or from secret grudges of a private nature; but they originate anyway, and find a most easy entrance in our, the American, press, which is most careless and most irresponsible in divulging anything that may attract attention and increase circulation. I fail to see that the various untruths and unfriendly utterances in our own, the American, press and in the fatherland were English inventions, and Mr. Vocke has failed to prove it. There is not even a probability of their being English inventions, for the English press contained less venomous articles on these mooted questions than either the German or the American press.

The principle observed in the publication of news is different

here from what it is in Europe. Our papers publish anything and everything, truths as well as rumors of truths, and actual lies, while European papers are more restricted in this direction and can be called to account. This makes a great difference. The American press is irresponsible, we may say unbridled, and we know it. Think of the vile accusations to which our Presidents are exposed before and sometimes even after election! We are at present not concerned with the question whether or not our press is badly managed, but with the fact that when untruths appear in American papers they cannot be of much consequence, because they exercise a temporary influence only.

Now, let us for argument's sake assume that the untruths in the American press were due to British intrigue, what shall we say of the untruths and unfriendly bickerings of the German press in Germany? Shall we believe they too were inspired by British intrigue?¹

It is a pity that all these incidents and misunderstandings occurred, for otherwise the Philippines (which are, as has been frequently predicted, a white elephant on our hands) might be German by this time. The majority of our people scarcely wanted to keep the islands; but as matters are now, we must keep them and make the best of it; and it is not impossible that our new duties may in the long run widen our range of experience and exercise a wholesome and educational influence upon our people. But if the German navy had not appeared in full force at Manila, the United States might have been glad to leave Spain free to sell the islands to the highest bidder, and we might have saved twenty million

¹ While I do not hesitate to blame American papers for spreading untruths which tended to aggravate the situation, I cannot acquit the very best German newspapers and magazines of the same charge. The climax was capped in an article by Herr Stoerk, professor of political economy at the University of Greifswald, which appeared in *Die deutsche Revue*. His attacks on America are mean and based on gross ignorance. According to the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, the greatest German statesman cherished a great dislike for "the Yankees," whom he characterized as "anti-German," and he is reported to have added, "The German-Americans are just as bad if not worse." The Germans of the fatherland are as a rule sadly mixed up about American conditions, and, having learned through the German-American press something about the corruption of our local politics, think that everything in this country is as rotten as the average conscience of aldermen, "boodlers," and political "bosses." The American victories in the Spanish-American war were therefore unexpected surprises. When, judging from straws in the wind, I felt that America began to be misjudged in Germany, I wrote an article, which, however, was rejected by *Die deutsche Rundschau*, on the plea that they had published similar articles (!) and were fully informed on American conditions (!). In the meantime one of the contributors of the *Rundschau* spoke of the unchivalrous policy of the Yankees. When Professor Evans of Munich wrote me that the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* would publish the article, the war was practically over my predictions were more than fulfilled, and the article would have needed a revision. But at any rate, it was too late to speak, for the mischief had been done, and there was little use in trying to mend it.

dollars and further war expenses. Then Germany would have the responsibility of keeping order, which weighs now heavily on us, while we should not have lost the advantages of trade, which (as England has found out) are after all the main thing.

Mind, I am not an Anglomaniac. I do not tolerate that foolish imitation of English style (simply because it is English) which is quite fashionable in certain circles. Nor am I blind to all the little national vanities and comical features of the English character which expose John Bull to the humorous comments of other nations, but I desire to be just, and I find not only no evidence of English intrigues in the divulcation of these latest untruths, but on the contrary I am becoming more and more convinced that the English have had nothing to do with them—most assuredly not the English nation, neither the people at large nor the government.

And I regretted all the more the policy of fastening a lie on England, as for the first time in our national history cordial relations have been established between our own people, the United States of America, and the people of England.

We Americans as a nation are the product of the entire European civilisation. All the various peoples of the old world have contributed to the make-up of this country in proportion to their own importance, and I do not hesitate to say that two nationalities stand foremost as parent-nations of ours; the one is Great Britain, the other is Germany. Let us not forget what we owe to either one of them. To Germany we owe the best impulses of our scientific and educational aspirations, the spiritual, intellectual, and philosophical character of our nation; to Great Britain we owe our political institutions. The influence of German thought and German method on this country cannot be underrated, and a dear old friend of mine, a German university professor, wrote me not long ago when groaning under the oppression of a temporary reaction that overshadowed the fatherland as with a black cloud: "I will not lose hope. Should it come to the worst, the spirit of German thought will be resurrected on the other side of the Atlantic unhampered and with wider outlooks."

I was born in Germany and I have good reasons to be proud of it. I believe in the power of German thought, and my own family has produced several men who rank very high in the history of German science; but at the same time I always believed in freedom and in the wholesomeness of freedom. I believe that the spirit of American institutions is good. There is of course a good scope for improvement in all branches of our political life, espe-

cially in local city governments, but for all that the principle of freedom is right. Mistakes are made by paternal governments as well as by the administrators of free nations; mistakes will always be made; let a free people enjoy the benefit of making mistakes. Such is the school of life. That is the way of educating the people and teaching them the right use of liberty. I believed in freedom while still living in Germany and was drawn to this country by the congeniality of its institutions. I am wont to say, that I am a native American born in Germany, and I venture to say that this is true of the great majority of German-Americans. They love Germany, but they love at the same time the bracing air of American freedom and of the free institutions of this country. It is universally recognised that Germans make the best American citizens, and the reason is that even before they come hither, they are in sympathy with the free institutions of this country.

Many of our best German-American citizens are refugees from their old home for the very reason that they fought against the German authorities, sword in hand, for the establishment of free institutions. Their American patriotism is of the same type as the patriotism of the colonists, who for the sake of freedom did not shrink from taking up arms against their own mother country.

And this is the reason why American patriotism is more intense than any other patriotism. It is not merely the natural attachment to the place where one happens to have been born, but it is a love of freedom, of cosmopolitan ideals, and of the humanitarian breadth to which the fathers of our nation have pledged the further development of the United States of North America.

A cosmopolitan attitude toward other peoples is an important feature of our national ideals. Our policy therefore must be peaceful except when we are attacked, or when our independence or honor is endangered.

As to the German-Americans, to whom I myself belong, I deem it as a matter of course that it is in our interest to preserve the good *entente* between the two nations to which we are related, to the one by birth, to the other by adoption. But our German brothers in the fatherland must also learn to appreciate the spirit of this country and not to think lightly of our love of American ideals. Their worth will finally be justified in spite of the unavoidable accompaniment of nuisances and prurient excrescences of freedom. And at the same time let us bear in mind that England must be the third nation to whom our cordial friendship should be

extended. In fact, England has extended her hand of friendship to us first and she did so in an outburst of popular sympathy which cannot be suspected of any sinister motives and was then and at once officially endorsed by the English government. Let us not without very grave and sufficient reasons run England down or stir popular indignation against it. In the present case the offence cannot be charged to the country even if it could be proved that English reporters were found guilty of having invented the mooted falsehoods. England is very near to us, as it is also to Germany, kin in blood, kin in language, and cherishing similar, perhaps the same, ideals of the further commercial and industrial development of mankind.

We can learn many good things from England, for she is the country that has produced the prototype of liberal institutions all over the world, for our country not less than for Germany.

There is one point where there seems to be a disagreement between Mr. Vocke's and my own political views, but the difference may be due to the different usage of the word "alliance." He is opposed to the triple-alliance of the three Teutonic nations, the Germans, the English, and the Americans, which I have advocated, and I have quoted by way of explanation what I understand alliances of such a nature to be. When the Anglo-Saxon Alliance was the topic of the day, I said in *The Open Court*, Vol. XII., No. 9, p. 375 :

"The Anglo-Saxon alliance is not a diplomatic treaty; nor should it be. It is the recognition of a deep-seated sympathy between two powerful nations, kin in blood, the same in language, similar in institutions, and cherishing peaceful ideals of civilisation. It is not in opposition to other nations, but simply indicates that the United States and Great Britain have become conscious of a solidarity of interests and would regard a war that unfortunately might break out between them as a civil war, deplorable under all conditions. The Anglo-Saxon alliance finally tends toward the establishment of a parliament of the world."

This kind of alliance, this recognition of a deep-seated sympathy, should not remain limited to England and the United States, but should be extended to other nations, above all to Germany, the second mother-country of the United States. There need be no fear of entanglements, but there ought to be the establishment of mutual confidence and good-will. I am aware that alliances of this kind cannot be made by the governments, but must grow from acts of international friendship, and the first step towards it consists in pointing out the desirability of such a relation. Mr. Vocke will probably not dissent from me on this ground, when he

bears in mind the significance which I would give to the word "alliance."

In conclusion I must express to Mr. William Vocke not only my thanks for giving a detailed exposition of his views to our readers, but also my satisfaction at our agreement on the main point in question, that it is "the high mission of our German-American citizens . . . to preserve for all times the former esteem and cordial relations between the two nations."



A SERMON OR DISCOURSE OF MARTIN LUTHER¹

THAT CHILDREN BE KEPT AT SCHOOL.²

AFTER the introductory epistle to Spengler, and a genial preface to his fellow-preachers whose zeal in the same cause he would inspire, Luther begins :

Beloved Friends :—Because I see that the common man is indifferent to the maintenance of schools, and wholly withholds his children from instruction; and gives himself solely to food and belly-care, and besides will not or cannot consider what an abominable, un-Christian thing he purposes in this, and what a great, murderous damage he is doing in all the world for the Devil's service, I have determined to put out this admonition to you, if perchance there still be a few people who believe yet in any measure that there is a God in heaven and a hell ready for unbelievers (for all the world acts as if there were neither a God in heaven nor a devil in hell), and who will heed this admonition, and so I shall tell you what use and harm there is in this matter.

* * *

Civil authority is a glorious, divine institution and a fine gift of God, who indeed founded and instituted it and wishes it maintained, as being by all means indispensable; and were it not, no man could stand before another, but one must needs devour the other as do the unreasoning beasts. Hence, just as the preach-

¹ Translated by W. H. Carruth.

² On this subject Luther had already published in 1524 his Address to the Councillors of all German Cities, that they should establish Christian schools; as well as remarks on the subject in the address *An den Adel*, and elsewhere. In the *Kirchenordnung* (parish organisation) for Leisnig, Wittenberg and other places, he always made provision for free schools, for girls as well as boys. The present pamphlet, dedicated to Lazarus Spengler, syndic of Nuremberg, differs from the address to the councillors in appealing to the parents and guardians. It contains the substance of sermons addressed "more than once" to the Wittenbergers, and finished perhaps at Coburg, in 1530.

er's office and honor is to make of sinners naught but saints, of devils' children children of God, so it is the work and honor of the civil authorities to make human beings of wild beasts, and to uphold men so that they may not become beasts. The authorities defend every one's body, so that not every comer may throttle it; they guard every man's wife, so that not every comer may take and abuse her; they guard everybody's child, daughter and son, so that no one may steal them away; they protect everybody's house and home so that no one may break in and do violence; they preserve for everybody his fields, cattle, and goods, so that no one may attack, steal, rob, and harm them.

There is naught of such protection among beasts, and would be none among men were there no civil authority, but men would become for sure mere wild beasts. Thinkest thou not, if birds and beasts could speak, they would say: "O dear men, ye are not men but very gods beside us. How safely ye sit, live and hold all things, while we have nothing safe one from another a single hour, neither life, nor house, nor food. Woe to your ingratitude, that ye see not what a glorious life our Lord God has given you above us beasts!"

Now then, because this is certain, that civil government is a divine creation and ordinance, and besides a necessary office and institution for us men in this life, . . . it is easy to reckon that God did not order and found it that it should go down, but he wishes it maintained. Now who will maintain it if not we men to whom God commended it and who in truth need it? Wild beasts will not do it, nor wood and stone. But what sort of men can uphold it? Forsooth, not only those who would rule with the fist, as many now dream. For where the fist alone tries to rule, the end for sure is savagery, so that whoever overweighs the other may bag him; as indeed we have examples enough before our eyes of what good the fist can do without wisdom or reason. . . .

Accordingly, since our government in German lands must and does follow Roman imperial law, which is thus the wisdom and reason of our government, given of God, it follows that said government cannot be upheld, but must go down, if the said law is not maintained. Well, who shall maintain it? Fist and armor cannot do it; heads and books must do it; it must be taught and remembered what the law and wisdom of our temporal realm is. Although it is fine when an emperor, prince, or lord is himself by nature so wise and prudent that he can hit the right by heart as Duke Frederick (the Wise) of Saxony, and Fabian von Feilitz

could (and I have experienced ; the living I will not name), yet since such birds are rare, and the example bad on account of the others who are not so gifted by nature, therefore it is better in the long run in ruling to keep the common book-law ; it has thus more authority and respect, and needs no miracle or exception.

Now the jurists and scholars are the people in this world who uphold this law, and thereby the civil empire ; and just as in Christ's kingdom a pious theologian and upright preacher is called God's angel, a redeemer, prophet, priest, tutor, and teacher, so in the temporal realm one might call a pious jurist and faithful scholar the emperor's prophet, priest, angel, and redeemer. On the other hand, as a heretic or false preacher in Christ's kingdom is a devil, thief, murderer, and blasphemer, so is a false and unfaithful jurist in the emperor's house or realm a thief and knave, a traitor, scoundrel, and devil of all the realm.

But when I speak of jurists I mean not only the doctors of law but the whole trade : chancellors, clerks, judges, advocates, notaries, and whatever has to do with the law of the state, and even the great jacks which are called councillors at court, for they too practise the work of law, or the office of jurist. And as the word councillor, or man of reason (Rath) is not far from the word treason (Verrath), so are many of these councillors at court not far from the latter, and at times give their masters reasons such that no treason could betray them as surely.

Now thou seest of what use a pious lawyer or jurist may be ; yea, who will or can tell it all ? For God's work and ordinances bring ever so many and great fruits that they are neither to be told nor comprehended. Firstly, he upholds and helps forward with his book, through divine ordinance, the whole civil government, emperor, princes, lords, cities, land, and people, as above said ; for such must all be upheld by wisdom and law. And who will sufficiently praise this work alone ? Thence hast thou a guard and shield for thy life and limb against neighbors, foes, murderers, and thereafter protection and peace for wife, daughter, son, hearth, home, servants, money, goods, fields and whatever is there ; for all this is shrined in the law, walled and well hedged. What all this means no man could ever in any books write out, for who will say how unspeakable a blessing is peace ? how much it both gives and saves in a year ?

Such great works may thy son do, and become such a useful person if thou hold him to it and have him learn, and thou thyself mayest become a sharer in them and thus lay out thy money so

preciously. Shall it not be to thee a gentle joy and a great honor when thou seest thy son an angel in the kingdom and an apostle of the emperor, and besides a corner-and-foundation-stone of temporal peace on earth? And know for certain that God himself holds these things thus, and that it is even so. For although by such works one is not made acceptable or saved in the eyes of God, yet this is a joyous comfort that such works please God so well, and still more where such a man is a believer and in the kingdom of Christ; for thereby we thank him for his benefits and offer the fairest thank offering, the loftiest service of praise.

Yea, thou must needs be a rude, ungrateful clod, and fit to be driven of men among beasts, if, seeing that thy son might become a man who might help the emperor uphold realm, sword, and crown, and the prince rule his land, aid and counsel cities and lands, help so many men protect life, wife, children, goods, and honor,—if, knowing this, thou wouldst not risk on it enough that he might learn and come to it: Tell me, what of these things do all the convents and monasteries. I would take the work of one faithful and pious jurist and notary for the holiness of all the priests, monks, and nuns alive, where they are at their best. And if such great and good works move thee not, yet should God's honor and approval alone move thee, since thou knowest that thou thereby dost thank God so gloriously and do Him so great a service, as has been said.

It is, indeed, a shameful contempt of God that we do not grant such glorious, divine works to our children, but rather thrust them into the service of greed and the belly alone, and let them learn nothing but seeking food, like a swine, ever rooting with its nose in the mire, instead of rearing them for such a worthy work and station. Surely either we are out of our wits or we do not really love our children.

Now if thou hast a child that is fit to learn, and canst hold him to it, but dost not, and goest thy way and askest not what shall become of the civil kingdom, its law and peace, thou doest all in thy might against civil authority, like the Turk, yea, like the Devil himself. For thou withdrawest from the kingdom, principality, land, and city, a saviour, comfort, corner-stone, helper, and rescuer, and on thy account the emperor loses sword and crown, the land loses protection and peace, and thou art the man by whose fault, as far as in thee is, no man may hold secure his life, wife, child, house, home and goods; but thou dost offer them all freely in the shambles, and givest cause that all men become mere beasts,

and one at last eat the other. All this thou dost surely do, especially when thou dost knowingly keep thy son from such a helpful station for the belly's sake.

Now art thou not a fine, useful man in the world? who dost use daily the empire and its peace, and in return for thanks dost rob it of thy son, and thrust him into greed, and strive with all energy to the end that there may be no one who shall help uphold empire, law, and peace, but that all shall go down together, whereas thou thyself hast and holdest life and limb, goods, and honor, through such government.

I will say nothing here of what a fine delight it is that a man be learned, though he never have an office, so that he may read all sorts of things at home by himself, talk and mingle with learned people, travel and do business in strange lands. For such delights move, perchance, few people. But since once for all thou seekest Mammon and food so sharply, look hither how many and great goods God hath founded on schools and scholars, that thou mayest not despise learning and knowledge because of poverty. Behold, emperors and kings must have chancellors and clerks, councillors, jurists, and scholars; no prince but must have chancellors, jurists, councillors, scholars, and clerks; so, too, all counts, lords, cities, and castles, must have syndics, town clerks, and other scholars; there is no nobleman but must have a clerk. And if I may speak of common scholars, where are the miners and merchants and traders? Reçkon up how many kings there are, princes, counts, lords, cities, and villages. Where will they find learned people three years hence, when already the want is beginning here and there? I hold in truth kings must become jurists, princes must become chancellors, counts and lords must become clerks, burgomasters become town clerks.

If indeed we do not take hold of this matter betimes we must become Tartars and Turks, and an unlearned common-school teacher or vagrant student become doctor and councillor at court. Therefore I hold that there has never been a better time than now to study, not alone because knowledge is so abundant and so cheap, but that great wealth and honor must follow, and those who study at this time will be precious people such that for one scholar two princes and three cities will contend; for thou hast but to look above thee or about thee to find that numberless offices will wait upon scholars ere yet ten years are past, and yet there be few that are trained for the same.

And not alone is such great reward set by God for such schools

and scholars; it is besides an honorable and divine reward; for it is earned by a divine and honorable office with many noble, good and useful works which please God and are called his service. The greedy-gut, on the contrary, acquires his property with contemptible and aggressive works, (even if they are not godless and sinful works,) and can have no joyous conscience about it, nor can he say that it is the service of God. Now I had liefer earn ten gulden at a work that might claim to be God's service than a thousand gulden at a work that was not God's service but only my own use and profit.

And beyond such honorable earnings they have also honor. For chancellors, city clerks, jurists, and the people that serve in these offices must sit near the head of the table and help counsel and rule, as said above; and they are indeed the lords of earth, though they be not so in person or through birth and position. For Daniel says he was obliged to do the king's work. And it is true, a chancellor must do imperial, royal or princely works or business; a city clerk must do the work of council and city, and all this with God and with honor whereto God gives blessing, fortune, and prosperity.

And what is an emperor, king, or prince, when they are not at war, but ruling with the law, save mere clerks or jurists, if one speaks with an eye to the work? For they have to do with the law, which is a juristic and clerky work. And who rules land and people when there is peace and not war? Is it the mounted men and the generals? I think, indeed, it is the pen. What, meantime, is the greedy-gut doing with his mammon, who comes to no such honors, and at the same time smutches himself with his filthy lucre?

Thus the Emperor Justinian himself declares: "It behooves imperial majesty not simply to be decked with arms, but to be armed with laws." See there how strangely this emperor reverses his words, calling laws his harness and weapons, and weapons he calls his ornaments and decorations; would even make his clerks cuirassiers and warriors. And, forsooth, it is well said; for laws are indeed the right harness and weapons which uphold and guard land and people, yea the empire and civil government, as is above sufficiently told, that wisdom is better than power. And pious jurists are indeed the real cuirassiers who defend emperor and princes. And many such sayings could be cited from the poets and histories, but it grows too long. Solomon himself mentions that a poor man by his wisdom saved a city against a mighty king.

Not that by this I would have warriors, troopers and what pertains to battle belittled, despised, or abolished; they too, if they are obedient, help with the fist guard peace and all else; every one has his honor from God, as well as his office and his work.

But I must praise my own trade a bit because my neighbors have turned out so ill, and it is in danger of being despised; just as St. Paul continually praises his office, so that some think he does it too much and is conceited. He who would praise and honor the fist and warriors will find enough for which they are to be praised; so I myself have done (I believe) in other pamphlets honestly and heartily. For the jurists and clerklings please me not who praise themselves in such wise as to despise and ridicule other stations as though they were the only people, and no one else in the world were fit for aught, as the shavelings (priests) have done hitherto and the whole papacy. One should praise as high as ever one can all stations and works of God, and despise no one for the sake of another.

Again, there are certain dirt-diggers¹ who have a conceit that the name of clerk, or writer, is scarcely worthy to be named or heard by them. Well, pay no heed to that, but think thus: The good fellows must have some sort of pastime and pleasure. So leave them the pleasure; but remain thou none the less a writer before God and the world; if they dig long thou shalt see after all that they honor the quill most highly, for they place it on hat and helmet, as though they would confess by this act that the quill is the topmost thing in the world, without which they are not prepared for battle, nor can march along in peace, still less dig so securely; for they too must use the peace which the emperor's preachers and teachers (the jurists) teach and uphold. Therefore thou seest that they place our tool, the quill, at the top, as is fitting, while their tool, the sword, they gird about their loins: there indeed it hangs fair and fit for their work; on the head it would not be becoming,—there the quill, or plume, must float.

* * *

Some, indeed, think that the writer's is a slight and easy office, but to ride in armor and endure heat, frost, dust, thirst, and other discomfort,—that is labor. Yea, that is the common old daily song, that no one sees where the shoe pinches another; every one feels only his own discomfort, and envies the other's easy time. True it is, it would be hard for me to ride in armor; but then, I would like

¹ *Scharhansen*, trooper-jacks, but playing on *scharren*, to dig.

to see the trooper who could sit still with me a whole day and look into a book, even though he had not to pay heed, compose, think, or read. Ask a chancery-clerk, a preacher, or an orator what sort of work writing and speaking is; ask a schoolmaster what sort of work teaching and rearing of boys is.

Light is the quill, 'tis true, and no tool in all the trades easier to obtain than that of a writer, for it needs but a goose's wing, which are to be had anywhere in plenty for nothing; but yet there must go with it and do the work the best portion (the head), and the noblest member (the tongue), and the highest function (speech), that are in the human body, whereas in other offices either the fist, the foot, the back, or such members alone do the work, while the man can think, sing merrily, and jest freely, none of which a writer can do. Three fingers do it, they say of a writer, but the whole body and soul must take part.

I have heard it told of the dear and admirable Emperor Maximilian, when the great jacks murmured at his using so many clerks on embassies and otherwise, that he said: "How shall I manage? They will not let themselves be used, so I have to use clerks." And again he said: "Knights I can make, but doctors I cannot make." And I have heard of a fine nobleman who said: "I will have my son study; it is no great art to swing two legs over a horse and become a trooper; that he will learn soon, and will be well-mannered and well-spoken also."

Again I say, I wish to say this not out of contempt for the trooper's station, nor any other station, but as against the irresponsible dirt-diggers who despise all learning and knowledge, and have no other thought than that they wear armor and swing two legs across a horse, although they seldom have to do it, and to offset this have comfort, pleasure, joy, honor, and reward the whole year. It is indeed true, as they say, knowledge is easy to carry, and armor hard to carry; but on the other hand, bearing armor is soon learnt, but knowledge is not soon learnt, and not easy to use and apply.

They say, and it is the truth, the pope too was a pupil; therefore despise me not the fellows who say *Panem propter Deum* (bread, for God's sake!) before the doors and sing the bread-song; thou hearest, as the one hundred and thirteenth Psalm says, great princes and lords sing. I too was once such a crumb-steed (starveling), and received bread before the houses, especially at Eisenach, my dear city. Although afterwards my dear father kept me with all love and fidelity in the university at Erfurt, and by his sour

sweat and labor helped me to the point where I am, yet I have been a crumb-steed, and, in accordance with this psalm, have come so far by the aid of the pen that I would not now trade with the Turkish emperor, to have his possessions and be without my learning. Yea, I would not take for it the goods of the world many times heaped up; and yet I would not have come to this if I had not gotten into school and the writer's trade.

Therefore let thy son study with good heart, though he should go about for bread the while, and thou shalt give our Lord God a fine piece of wood, out of which he can carve thee a lord. The fact remains that thy son and mine, that is, common people's children, will have to rule the world, both in spiritual and temporal stations, as this psalm says. For the rich greedy-guts cannot and will not do it; they are mammon's hermits and monks, and must attend it day and night. And the born princes and lords are not equal to it alone, and especially are they wholly unable to understand the spiritual office. Therefore government of both sorts on earth must remain with the poor, middle-class common people, and their children.

And pay no heed if the common greedy-gut despises knowledge so mightily and says: Ha! if my son can write his mother tongue, read and reckon, he knows enough, I will put him with a merchant. They shall soon become so tame that they would gladly dig a scholar out of the earth ten yards deep with their fingers. For the merchant shall not be a merchant long if preaching and law fail. This I know forsooth: we theologians and jurists must remain, or we shall all go down together—that will not fail. When the theologians cease then God's word ceases, and there remain only heathen, yea, mere devils. When the jurists cease then law ceases together with peace, and there remains only plunder, murder, license, and force, yea, mere wild beasts. But what the merchant will earn and gain when peace ceases, his ledger will tell him when the time comes; and how much use all his goods will be when preaching fails, his conscience perchance shall say.

Here I ought to tell how many scholars we must have in medicine and other free arts; of which two points one might write a great book and preach on them half a year. Where should preachers and jurists and physicians come from if there were no grammar and other rhetorical studies? From this source they must needs all flow. But it grows too long and too large for me. I say this in brief: A diligent, pious schoolmaster, or magister, or whatever he is, who faithfully trains and teaches boys, can never be rewarded

fittingly, and is not paid with any amount of money,—as even the heathen Aristotle says. But as yet the work is so shamefully despised among us as though it were nothing at all. And yet we claim to be Christians!

And I, if I could resign the preacher's office and other things, or had to, would prefer no office to being a schoolmaster or teacher of boys. For I know that this work, next to the preacher's office, is the most useful, the greatest and the best, and really do not know yet which of the two is best. For it is hard to make old dogs obedient and old rogues pious, whereat the preacher's office labors, and must labor much in vain. But young trees one can bend and train better, although some break in the doing of it. Beloved, count it to be one of the highest virtues on earth to train faithfully the children of other people, which so very few, yea almost no one, does for his own.

THE HIGHER FORMS OF ABSTRACTION— THEIR NATURE.¹

BY PROF. TH. RIBOT.

IT is unnecessary to enter in detail into the researches of the last thirty years as to the seat and the nature of images. Yet since these have been the point of departure of the following inquiry, the results may be briefly summarised.

It is generally admitted that the image occupies the same seat as the percept of which it is a weak and incomplete residuum, i. e., in order to produce itself in consciousness it demands the putting into activity of certain definite portions of the cerebral centres. The energy of the representative faculty does not merely vary from individual to individual in a general manner: there are particular forms of imagination, constituted by the very marked predominance of a certain group of representations, visual, auditory, muscular, olfactory, gustatory.

Normal observations, and still more pathological researches, have thus determined certain types. We may also (though this is mere hypothesis and difficult to verify) admit a "mixed" or "indifferent" type, in which the different species of sensations are represented by corresponding images of equal clearness and vigor, without marked predominance of any one group, whilst still maintaining their relative importance: e. g., it is clear that in man the visual and olfactory images cannot be equivalent in absolute importance. Excluding this indifferent type, we have three principal "pure" types: visual, auditory, muscular or motor, signifying a tendency to represent things in terms borrowed from vision, from sound, or from movement. If we push the investigation further, we find that these types again imply variations or subtypes. Thus there may be a lively faculty for representation of complex visual

¹ Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.

forms (faces, landscapes, monuments) along with a weak sense for graphic signs (printed or written words) and so on.

The numerous works devoted to this subject, and too well known to be insisted on here, lead us to this conclusion: that there is no general faculty of imagination. This is a vague term which designates very different individual variations: these last alone have any psychological reality, and are alone important in cognising the mechanism of the intellect.

May it not be the same for the faculty of conception? May not the word "general idea" or "concept" be in its kind the equivalent of the word image, namely a vague formula,—its psychological reality lying in types or variations as yet undetermined? I am exposing for ideas, the problem that has already been set forth for images, while recognising its much greater obscurity. The psycho-physiological conditions of the existence of concepts are practically unknown: this is a *terra incognita* wherein the new psychology has hardly adventured itself, and where it would indeed have been chimerical to tread before the preliminary study of the image.

* * *

The question I have set myself to elucidate is very modest, very limited and circumscribed, representing only part of the problem indicated above. It may, however, teach us something of the ultimate nature of concepts. It is as follows:

When we think, hear, or read a general term, what arises as sign in consciousness, *directly and without reflexion?*

I have purposely italicised these words in order to emphasise my principal aim, which was to discover the *instantaneous* operations (conscious or unconscious) that occur in such a case, in persons whose habits of mind are widely different. I endeavored as much as possible to eliminate reflexion and to seize the mental state. With time and effort, minds that are least apt in abstraction will arrive at a more or less successful translation of general terms, or at the substitution for them of some mangled and halting definition. I set myself as far as possible to suppress this secondary phase of the mental process, and to arrest it at the first, in order to determine what the word evokes immediately and in what degree this differs with the individual.

In order to make the answers more exactly comparable, I interrogated only the adults of both sexes, excluding all children. It was indispensable to my investigation that it should comprise people of very different degrees of culture, habits of mind, and profes-

sion. The principal classes were mathematicians, physicists, doctors, scientists, philosophers, painters, musicians, architects, men of the world, women, novelists, poets, artisans. The last class made such confused replies that I must regard their data as worthless. Too much is left for individual interpretation. The total number of persons interrogated amounted to one hundred and three.

The method was invariably the same. We said to the subject: "I am going to pronounce certain words; will you tell me directly, without reflexion, whether this word calls up anything or nothing in your mind? If anything, what is suggested to you?" The reply was noted down at once; if delayed beyond five to seven seconds, it was held to be null, or doubtful. In the case of naïve subjects, I employed certain preliminaries: before pronouncing abstract words, concrete terms (designating a monument, or person) such as would evoke a simple image, were heard; then the impulse being given, I proceeded to the enumeration of general terms.

The words which served as material for the inquiry were fourteen in number, proceeding from the concrete to the highest abstractions. They were enunciated in an indifferent order and were as follows: *dog, animal, color, form, justice, goodness, virtue, law,¹ number, force, time, relation, cause, infinity.*

The inquiry was invariably oral, never in writing, the greatest care being taken to prevent the person from knowing the end in view, unless afterwards: which led in certain cases to interesting explanations. The very nature of my method prevented me from extending it as widely as I could have wished. I could not, as was done in England, distribute printed questions among the public, because it was necessary to note the spontaneous answer immediately before it was corrected by later reflexion. Moreover, I needed unsophisticated subjects, ignorant of my purpose, and therefore eliminated all whom I suspected of being even indirectly acquainted with it.

The majority were interrogated on the fourteen terms cited above, others on a few only: so that the total number of responses was over nine hundred. It would be beside the mark to publish them here. They are nothing more than data which have to be interpreted. Three principal or pure types appear to stand out

¹ The word "law" was purposely chosen for its ambiguity; physical laws, moral or social laws. The immense majority of answers were in the juristic sense. Ex., Code, Law of the Twelve Tables, a judge, woman with scales, etc.

from them, besides the failures or mixed cases. These may be termed the *concrete* type, the *visual typographic* type, and the *auditory* type. Each of these corresponds with a particular mode of representing the general idea. We will examine them separately.

I. CONCRETE TYPE.—Here the abstract word nearly always evokes an image, vague or precise; usually visual, sometimes muscular. It is not a simple sign, it does not represent the total substitution, it is not dry, and finally reduced. It is immediately and spontaneously transformed into a concrete. In fact the persons of this type think only in images. Words are for them no more than a kind of vehicle, a social instrument of mutual comprehension. When a sequence of general or abstract terms passes through their minds, what really passes is a succession of concretes, save for the very abstract words which "evoke nothing." This is an answer I have often received, and which, in virtue of its importance, will be considered in another article.

The concrete type appears to be the most widely distributed; it obtains almost to exclusion among women, artists, and all who have not the habit of scientific abstraction. I have selected a few examples from among the many observations belonging to this type.

A painter.—*Cause*: nothing. *Relation*: relations of terms; recital, written report. *Law*: judges in red robes. *Number*: vague. *Color*: contrast between green of plant, and red of drapery. *Form*: a round block, a woman's shoulder. *Sound*: a murmur. *Dog*: ears of a dog running. *Animal*: vague collection, as in certain Dutch pictures. *Force*: hits out with his fists. *Goodness*: his young mother, seen vaguely. *Time*: Saturn with his scythe. *Infinity*: a black hole.

A woman.—*Cause*: I had been the cause of her son's success. *Law*: the government is bad. *Color*: sees an impressionist picture by her son. *Form*: names a beautiful person. *Goodness and Virtue*: names two people who each have this quality. *Force*: sees men fighting. *Relation*: social relations between husband and wife. *Justice*: sees an audience-hall and judges. *Dog*: sees a dog that bit one of her parents. *Infinity*: nothing. *Time*: a metronome.

These two interrogatories are complete. I might proceed by another method: that of taking each general term (law, cause, number, etc.) and quoting all the answers received, among which many would be identical. Such an enumeration would be long and superfluous: we cannot, however, neglect a few of the particulars. For the word *cause*, several persons (women, artists, people in so-

ciety) replied "*cause célèbre*," "*procès célèbre*," for the most part mentioning one only, and that some recent trial. At first this reply annoyed me, and appeared to be useless for my inquiry. Later, on the other hand, I felt it to be instructive, because it characterises better than any description the type which I have denoted as concrete, and the particular turn of this kind of mind, in which the abstract sense does not present itself, at any rate at the beginning.

I may also note two answers given me immediately by a celebrated painter:—*Number*: I see many brilliant points. *Law*: I see parallel lines. (Is this the unconscious idea of levelling by the law?)

The terms *goodness* and *virtue* suggested answers which are easily summarised: they fall into two categories. (1) Nothing; this answer does not belong to the concrete type; (2) a definite person, who was always named and who thus becomes the incarnation, the concrete representation.

Nearly all the images evoked belong to the visual sense; the word *force*, however, most frequently called up pure muscular images, or the same accompanied by a vague visual representation. Example—Seeing somebody lifting a weight; I vaguely see something pulling; a weight suspended by a ring; a string drawing on a nail; pressure of my fist in a fluid; the Marshal of Saxony breaking an *écu* of six pounds, etc.

I have been describing the ordinary and principal form of the concrete type. It consists in the immediate and spontaneous substitution of a particular case (fact or individual) for the general term. In certain observations a slightly different *variation* may be detected; I have encountered it among several historians and learned men. In the ordinary type, the whole (general) is thought by means of the part (concrete); in the variation, the thinking is by analogy, and the mechanism seems to be reduced to pure association. A few examples will explain the distinction. The replies in duplicate were given by different persons. *Number*: the "Language of Calculation," Pythagoras. *Cause*: Hume's theory of causality; Kant's theory. *Law*: the "Tables of Malaga," Montesquieu's definition. *Color*: the chemistry of the spectrum. *Justice*: Littré's definition. *Animal*: the *περὶ ψυχῆς* of Aristotle. *Time*: a vague metaphysical theory. *Relation*: discussion of Ampère and Tracy on this subject. *Infinity*: books on mathematics. *Color*: treatises of photography, etc.

It might be objected that there is a certain association in ordinary cases as in these; but the distinction will readily be per-

ceived. The former proceed from that which contains, to the content—from the class to the fact: they think the whole by means of the part; there is an internal association. The latter form associations beside and from without. Apparently these do not reach to the concrete, they stop half way; for a complete generality they substitute a semi-generality. Further than this, my data are neither sufficiently numerous, nor clear enough, for the point to be insisted on.

2. VISUAL TYPOGRAPHIC TYPE.—Nothing is easier to define. In its pure form it consists in seeing printed words and nothing more; in three cases words were seen *written*. Among some the vision of the printed words was accompanied by a concrete image as in the first type, but only for semi-concrete concepts (dog, animal, color); but for the higher abstracts (time, cause, infinity, etc.) the typographical vision alone exists.¹ This mode of representation is widely distributed among those who have read much; but there are many exceptions.

No doubt many of my readers will discover from self-observation that they belong to this type. I have further noticed that all who have this mode of representation regard it as normal, and necessary, in any one who knows how to read. This is a fallacy. I do not possess it myself in the faintest degree, and have met many others who resemble me.

Thus I was little prepared to discover this type; and had even reached my thirtieth observation without suspecting it, when I encountered such a clear case as to put me on the track. I was interrogating a well-known physiologist. To every word except *Law* and *Form*, he replied "I see them in printed characters" and was able to describe these accurately.

Even the words *dog*,² *animal*, *color*, were unaccompanied by any image. He volunteered further information which may be reduced to the statement, "I see everything typographically." The same holds good for concrete objects. If he hears the names of his intimate friends whom he meets every day, he sees the names printed; it is only by an effort of thought that he sees the image. The word "water" appears to him as if printed, and he has no vision of a liquid. If he thinks of carbonic acid, or nitrogen, he sees indifferently either the words printed or the symbols CO_2 , N . He does

¹ For the word *infinity*, those who fall under this type see the printed word, or the mathematical sign ∞ .

² It should be noted that he lived among these animals and experimented with them almost daily.

not see the complex formulæ of organic chemistry, but the words only.

Surprised (from the reasons above indicated) at this observation—of the sincerity and precision of which there could be no doubt—I continued my investigation, and discovered this mode of thinking in general terms to be sufficiently common. Several cases indeed were as pure and as detailed as the one just cited. Thenceforward I adopted the habit of invariably asking at the close of my interrogatory, "Did you see the words printed?"

Several people remarked that they had read a great deal, and corrected many proofs, and that this would account for their belonging to the typographical visual type. The influence of habit is certainly enormous, but is no adequate explanation here, since there are many exceptions. I have myself read and corrected many proofs, but no word ever appeared in my consciousness as printed, unless after considerable effort, and then vaguely. Hence this mode must be due in great part to natural disposition.

Among the compositors questioned I found: (1) That they saw my fourteen words printed in some special type, which they occasionally specified; (2) they had a concomitant image for semi-concrete terms; (3) for abstract terms no image accompanied the typographical vision. Here we have the superposition of two types: the one natural, and of primitive formation (concrete type), the other acquired, and of secondary formation (typographical visual type).

In short,—in many minds the existence of the concept is associated with a clear vision of the printed word and nothing beyond it.

3. AUDITORY TYPE.—In its pure form this seems to be rare. It consists in having in mind nothing but signs (auditory images) unaccompanied either by the vision of printed words or by concrete images. Possibly it may preponderate among orators and preachers; of this I have no documentary evidence. Musicians do not appear to belong to this type.

One very clear and complete case of the kind I have, however, encountered. This was a polyglot physician known as the author of several works, who for many years had lived among books and manuscripts. He has no trace of typographical vision, but all words "sound in his ear." He can neither read nor compose without articulating; as the interest of his book or work grows upon him he speaks aloud—"He must hear himself." In his dreams there are few or no visual images; he hears his voice and that of

his interlocutors: "His dreams are auditory." None of my words, even when semi-concrete, evoked visual images.

In most cases the auditory type is not clear. For very general terms the heard word alone exists, but in proportion as the concrete is approached, the sound is accompanied by an image; thus returning upon our former type.

It is worth while to note that the term *flatus vocis* "*nomina*," first employed in the Middle Ages and which has since become the formula of Nominalism, seems by its nature to indicate that it was originally invented by persons who belonged to the auditory type, and I may even hazard an hypothesis. The typographical visual type did not exist (printing not being invented); it is true that a substitute might have existed in the *graphic* visual type (reading of manuscripts). But considering that in the Middle Ages instruction was essentially oral, that learning came rather through listening than by reading, that the oratorical jousts and arguments were daily and interminable, it is undeniable that the conditions of developing the auditory type were highly favorable here.

I need hardly say that the three types described above are rarely met with in the pure and complete form. As a rule a mixed type prevails: a concrete image for certain words, and typographical vision, or auditory images, for others. To sum up: all cases seem to be capable of reduction to the following: (1) The word heard; beyond this, *nil* (we shall subsequently have to examine this "nothing"); (2) typographical vision alone; (3) the same, accompanied by a concrete image; (4) the word heard, accompanied invariably by a concrete image.

4. Prior to the commencement of this inquiry I felt much hesitation on one point: should one in questioning use general *words* or general *propositions*? I decided in favor of words because these are brief, simple, isolated, and undisguised, and have the advantage of being understood directly, while they in no way suggest to the subject what line he is to follow.

I still however felt scruples in the matter. Was not the investigation as conducted on these lines a little artificial? In point of fact, general terms most frequently occur as members of a phrase, co-operating with others, and connected with them by certain relations. I therefore recommenced my inquiry, using the same method, but replacing words by phrases. The general propositions employed are purposely trite, to avoid contradiction, and to ascertain the immediate mental state. They were as follows:

Cause invariably precedes effect.—Infinity has several mean-

ings.—Is Space infinite?—Has Time any limits?—Law is a necessary relation.—I need not enlarge upon the results: they are *precisely the same* as for words. In every case, and for each person, there is one predominating word which absorbs all the content of the phrase, and is a substitute for it. On this the instantaneous mental operation is concentrated.

If of the concrete type, the subject sees images. In the second phrase, e. g., everything converges on the word *infinity*. Replies: Sensation of obscurity and depth, vague luminous circles, a sort of cupola, a never-receding horizon, etc. If a typographic visualist, the printed sentence is seen less clearly than the simple words: "in minute characters; no capitals"; some persons glimpse it rapidly: others see only "the principal word printed."

For the pure auditory type, the answer is always very simple. "I hear the sentence, I see absolutely nothing."

The new method therefore simply confirms the previous observations, with no variations. This identity of result seems to me to militate against a distinction admitted by many authors. In the classical treatises a distinction is made between "necessary ideas" and "necessary truths" (I use their terms uncritically), i. e., general concepts and general propositions. Example: cause, principle of causality. In my opinion there is merely a difference of form between the two positions, the one psychological, the other logical. A concept is a judgment in a state of envelopment, or of result. The proposition is a word in the state of development. The difference is not material, but formal; it is the passage from synthesis to analysis.

I thought that after an interval of two years it might be interesting to repeat the same inquiry on the same people; but the results were not encouraging in this direction. Some, remembering the previous investigation, declared that "they felt themselves influenced beforehand." Others, who had a more vague recollection (perhaps because they did not understand the object of the inquiry) gave answers analogous to their former replies. In short, notwithstanding the lapse of time, and change of circumstances, each seemed to be consistent with his former self.

I must admit that in the preceding research the psychological nature of the concepts was studied under a particular aspect. This objection was made at the London Psychological Congress¹ by the

¹ The results of the investigation were published, partly in the *Revue Philosophique*, October 1891, partly at the International Congress of Psychology, second session, London, 1892 (*International Congress of Experimental Psychology*. London: Williams & Norgate, pp. 20, et seq.).

President, Professor Sidgwick, whose remarks may be summarised as follows :

First, Professor Sidgwick believes that the act of suddenly calling attention to a word, in a person not accustomed to introspective observation, evokes a response which does not exactly correspond to the state ordinarily aroused by such words. In his own particular case he has found that the images evoked (usually visual) were extremely feeble, but that when he dwelt upon them they were enlivened. Secondly, the images vary a great deal according to the terms employed; for example, when he is occupied with mathematical and logical trains of thought, he sees only the printed words. If he is engaged upon the subject of political economy, the general terms sometimes have for their concomitants extremely fantastic images: like *value*, for instance, which is accompanied by the indistinct and fragmentary image of a man placing something upon the pan of a balance. Thirdly, when for such words as *infinity*, *relation*, etc., the subject answers *nothing*, the only conclusion justified is that the subject is incapable of describing the confused elements which exist in his consciousness. Fourthly, Professor Sidgwick's own experience points to the conclusion that my types may succeed each other in the same person.

On this last point—the co-existence of several modes of conception in the same person—I am quite in agreement with Professor Sidgwick, and my own data, drawn up from personal observations, would provide me with sufficient evidence. At the same time the object of my investigation was not to determine the manner in which each individual conceives, but the forms under which men as a whole think of concepts. Nor did I profess to follow the work of the mind when it resolves its general ideas into concretes, when it makes coin out of its bank-notes, but only to seize the subjacent labor that accompanies the current and facile use of general terms, in speaking, listening, reading or writing. No doubt it would be advisable to treat the subject in another manner by studying—no longer the momentary state that corresponds with the presence of the concept in consciousness—but the stable organised turn of mind due to a long habit of dealing with concepts. To this end it would be desirable more especially to question mathematicians and metaphysicians. My data are neither numerous nor clear enough to permit of my hazarding any dictum on this subject. Some mathematicians have told me that they *invariably* require a figured representation, a construction, and that even when these are considered as purely fictitious their support is indispen-

sable to the train of reasoning. *Contra* those who think geometrically, there are others who think algebraically, eliminating all configuration, or construction, and proceeding by simple analysis with the aid of signs : which (with the necessary corrections and descriptions) would bring the first under the concrete, and the second under the audito-motor type. Among metaphysicians the typographical visual type seems largely to predominate. One (who is well known) belongs to the pure auditory type. All this, however, is inadequate ; the investigation would have to be followed out, by and upon others.

A young Russian doctor, M. Adam Wizel, who was interested in the subject, put the same questions (following the method indicated above) to persons in the hypnotic state. Admitting the unconscious mental activities to preponderate in this state he asked whether by this procedure it would not be possible to penetrate farther into the unknown substrate of consciousness. His experiments were undertaken at the Salpêtrière, in Charcot's, clinique, upon six women—hysterics of the first order. The subjects were first put into a state of somnambulism, then after a preliminary explanation were questioned, as above. After getting the answers Wizel ordered the subjects to forget all that had happened, and then woke them. He now began again in the waking state, asking the same questions, so that he was able to compare the answers given successively in the two cases. They are nearly always clearer and more explicit during somnambulism than during the waking state, as may be judged by the following example (taken from the third observation) :

QUESTIONS.	SOMNAMBULISM.	WAKING STATE.
Dog :	A big grey animal	Nothing
Form :	A red cardboard head	Nothing
Law :	A tribunal	Nothing
Justice :	A magistrate	State of justice
Number :	Figure 12 in white	The number of a note (?)
Color :	Green	Blue

Where the replies are concrete in the two cases I note a tolerable analogy between them. M. Wizel (who eliminated all doubtful cases, and any accompanied by crises) never encountered the typographical visual type, nor the pure auditory type, in his experiments. His six hysterics belong to the concrete type, with the predominance of *visual* images—much more rarely of motor images, provoked by the word "force." The answer "nothing" is very frequent ; less so, however, during somnambulism than during the waking state.

MISCELLANEOUS.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

MYTH, RITUAL, AND RELIGION. By *Andrew Lang*. London: Longmans, Green, & Company. 1899. Vol. I., pages, xxxix, 339. Vol. II., pages, vii, 380.

Mr. Andrew Lang's *Myth, Ritual, and Religion* is so widely known and has been received with such favor abroad, that one wonders the book should have been "long out of print." There are few works on comparative mythology that exhibit the same sound common sense and insight into human motives, or present in so attractive a form the vast accretions of scientific research that have gathered about the history of religions. The work remains after its revision substantially as it stood in its original form, the gist of the book being stated in the following lines from the preface of its first edition: "'While the attempt is made to show that 'the wilder features of myth survive from, or were borrowed from, or were imitated from the ideas of people in the savage condition of thought, the existence—even among savages—of comparatively pure, if inarticulate, religious beliefs is insisted on throughout.'"

The problem of comparative mythology, Mr. Lang finds to be the reconciliation of the irrational with the rational elements in myths, the elimination of the *chronique scandaleuse* of the gods, etc., the explanation of what Max Müller calls the "silly, senseless, and savage element,"—the element that has made mythology the puzzle which men have so long found it. He reviews the past systems of mythological interpretation, and finds the germs of the modern anthropological theory in the hypotheses of Eusebius, De Brosses, and especially of Fontenelle, the significance of whose essays on the *Origin of Fables* has recently been insisted upon by Prof. L. Lévy-Bruhl in *The Open Court* of December, 1898. Mr. Lang himself belongs to the anthropological school, but his theory diverges slightly from the theories of its best known exponents. He asks: "Is there a stage of human society and of the human intellect in which facts that appear to us to be monstrous and irrational—facts corresponding to the wilder incidents of myth—are accepted as ordinary occurrences of everyday life?" He finds such a stage in the region of romantic invention, as for example in the stories of the Arabs, and claims by analogy "that everything in the civilised mythologies which we regard as irrational seems only part of the accepted and natural order of things to contemporary savages, and in the past seemed equally rational and natural to savages concerning whom we have historical information." His theory is, therefore, "that the savage and senseless element in mythology is, for the most part, a legacy from the fancy of ances-

tors of the civilised races who were once in an intellectual state not higher, but probably lower, than that of Australians, Bushmen, Red Indians, the lower races of South America, and other worse than barbaric peoples." And this line of thought Mr. Lang follows in nineteen chapters, throughout all the mazes of ancient, modern, and savage mythology.

The same incongruities and absurdities which challenged in the pagan mythology the scorn and opposition of the early Christian zealots, and which in savage myths aroused the curiosity or aversion of the anthropologist or missionary, exist in a greater or less degree in the popular conceptions of current religious beliefs. "It is no wonder that pious and reflective men have, in so many ages and in so many ways, tried to account to themselves for their possession of beliefs closely connected with religion which yet seemed ruinous to religion and morality." The study of such works as Mr. Lang's will do much to clear up the problems that engage the minds of all thinking religious men.

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The Ballad of Reading Gaol by C. J. C.¹ (the prison number of Oscar Wilde during his term of imprisonment) is a poem dedicated to the memory of a fellow prisoner, "sometime trooper of the Royal Horse Guards" who was hanged for murder.

- "He did not wear his scarlet coat
For blood and wine are red,
And blood and wine were on his hands
When they found him with the dead,
The poor dead woman whom he loved,
And murdered in her bed.
- "He walked amongst the Trial Men
In a suit of shabby gray ;
A cricket cap was on his head,
And his step seemed light and gay ;
But I never saw a man who looked
So wistfully at the day.
- "I never saw a man who looked
With such a wistful eye
Upon that little tent of blue
Which prisoners call the sky,
And at every drifting cloud that went
With sails of silver by.
- "I walked, with other souls in pain,
Within another ring,
And was wondering if the man had done
A great or little thing,
When a voice behind me whispered low,
'That fellow's got to swing.'"
- "And I and all the souls in pain,
Who tramped the other ring,
Forgot if we ourselves had done

¹ Published by Benj. R. Tucker, New York.

A great or little thing,
 And watched with gaze of dull amaze
 The man who had to swing."

The poem is impressive because real. It pictures the horror which a prisoner feels at capital punishment and suggests at the same time the idea that our penitentiary system is not a cure for crime.

" I know not whether Laws be right,
 Or whether Laws be wrong ;
 All that we know who lie in gaol
 Is that the wall is strong ;
 And that each day is like a year,
 A year whose days are long.

" The vilest deeds like poison weeds
 Bloom well in prison-air :
 It is only what is good in Man
 That wastes and withers there :
 Pale Anguish keeps the heavy gate,
 And the Warder is Despair.

" For they starve the little frightened child
 Till it weeps both night and day :
 And they scourge the weak, and flog the fool,
 And gibe the old and gray,
 And some grow mad, and all grow bad,
 And none a word may say."

A new edition of Prof. Hermann Schubert's *Mathematische Mussestunden*—a collection of mathematical recreations and games of patience—has been announced by Göschen, of Leipsic. The first edition of the book was published in 1898 only. The book in its general character resembles the well-known works of Lucas and W. W. Rouse Ball; but the author has subjected all the problems to fresh analysis and has interwoven with his expositions much critical comment. Magic squares are exhaustively treated, and the discussion of the "Fifteen Puzzle" is very full. The first edition of the book contained but 286 pages; in the edition which is to appear the author intends to incorporate the originals of some of the English essays which appeared in his *Mathematical Recreations* published by The Open Court Publishing Company.

Professor Schubert also published in 1895 a brochure entitled *Zwölf Geduldspiele*, which covers much the same ground, but in a different form. (Same publishers.)

Students of the national problems now engaging public attention will find a varied discussion of the "Foreign Policy of the United States" in the May supplement of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. The discussion was conducted by some of the leading political scientists of the country and included many addresses, among which was one by Carl Schurz.

We have received three additional volumes in the series of the *Biography of the Saints*, published by Victor Lecoffre, of Paris, rue Bonaparte 90. They are :

Sainte Mathilde, by L. Eugène Hallberg, of the University of Toulouse; *Saint Ambroise*, by the Duc de Broglie, of the French Academy, perhaps the most distinguished contributor to the series; and *Saint Basile*, by Paul Allard, whose *History of Persecutions* is well known. The price of these volumes is two francs each.

The same publisher has also issued a work which is likely to be found an attractive volume by Catholics who can read French. It is the second edition of M. l'Abbé Pierre Batiffol's *Six Leçons sur les Évangiles*,—a course of lectures on the early history of the Church, delivered at the Catholic Institute of Paris, in February and March, 1897. The lectures were addressed to young people. The author has given evidence of some breadth of view in his treatment, and in the bibliography which he appends to his work he gives reference to some of the most prominent of modern inquirers into the early history of the Church, not excluding Protestants and heretics.

Dr. Jean du Buy who is instructor in the Amity Bible Workers' School, in New York City, has compiled and arranged systematically a collection of the ethical teachings of Jesus, without reference to theological doctrines. The book is a handy one, and gives the gist of Jesus's doctrine. The structure and mode of exposition are the author's, but the language either literally or imitatively is that of the New Testament. (Boston: James West.)

A Primer of the Bible by W. H. Bennett, M. A., (Henry Holt & Co., New York) aims "to sketch, in the light of recent criticism, the history of the Bible; "the composition of the books—as far as possible in chronological order; their "relations to one another, and to the history of Israel, of Judaism, and of the "Church; and the process by which they were chosen, collected, and set apart as "Sacred Scriptures." The book contains 228 pages and consists of two parts, one devoted to the Old and one to the New Testament.

Readers of the early numbers of *The Open Court* will remember the graceful sonnets which appeared there from time to time from the pen of Miss Mary Morgan (Gowan Lea), a Canadian poetess who is now sojourning abroad. Miss Morgan has recently published a very pretty little edition of her rondeaux, sonnets, and translations. The publishers are Hass & Co., 2 Langham Place, London.

The two latest issues of T. B. Mosher's elegant *Bibelot* series are: (1) *Songs in Absence and Other Poems*, by Arthur Hugh Clough, and (2) *Demeter and Persephone; Three Translations*, by Walter Pater. (Price, 5 cents each.)

Dr. Pierre Janet, professor of philosophy in the Lycée Condorcet and director of the Laboratory of Psychology of the Clinique of Salpêtrière, is very well known for his researches in morbid psychology, and his recent great work *Névroses et idées fixes*, which consists of experimental studies in the disorders of the will, attention, and memory, and of researches on the emotions, obsessions and their treatment, will be received with favor by physicians and psychologists. The studies are voluminous, covering nearly 500 large pages, and have been conducted with all the necessary technical accompaniment of the modern psychological and clinical laboratory. (Paris: Alcan. 1898. 12 francs.)

Another work has just been published, on psycho-pathology, entitled *L'Insta-*

bilité mentale, by Prof. G. L. Duprat, who is of the opinion that it is the business of philosophy to determine whether psychology has not equal rights with biology in the treatment of psycho-pathological phenomena; and he has accordingly presented the study of a type of this affection known as mental instability which is widespread but has been but little investigated. For the physician mental instability is but a wavering state on the borderland of disease and health, while for M. Duprat it is a primitive psychological fact which can engender disorders of sensibility and mentality, instead of being engendered by them. (Paris: Alcan. 1899. 5 francs.)

Dr. Eugène Bernard-Leroy, of the University of Paris, has given us a unique study in his work *L'illusion de fausse reconnaissance*, designed as a contribution to the investigation of the psychological conditions of the recognition of memories. The subject of this book is a familiar one to every person in whose mind the recollection has been aroused of events with which he seems to be entirely familiar but which are absolutely new to him. The subject, owing to its difficulties, has been very insufficiently treated, and Dr. Bernard-Leroy's book is the first which has been exclusively devoted to it. (Paris: Alcan. 1898.)

From the well-known Library of Contemporary Philosophy we have three new volumes. The first is *L'éducation des sentiments*, by Prof. P. Félix Thomas, and will be of value to educationists. The subjects treated are such as the rôle of pleasure and pain in education, personal inclinations, needs, appetites, fear, anger, curiosity, self-love, sympathy, pity, emulation, friendship, love of country, love of play, love of the good and the beautiful, lies, religious sentiments, etc. (Paris: Alcan. 1899. 5 francs.) The second is an essay on objective psychology, entitled *L'ignorance et l'irréflexion*, by L. Gérard-Varet. The book was presented by the author as a thesis for obtaining the doctorate in the University of Paris, and is said to have given rise to a spirited discussion. The main object of the author's inquiry is to discover the structure and character of that common spontaneous form of mentality in which reflexion plays no part, and in which thought properly so called is neither the need nor the rule. (Paris: Alcan. 5 francs.) The third book is a metaphysical treatise on esthetics, by Dr. Jean Pérès. Its title is *L'art et le réel*. (Paris: Alcan. 1898. 3.75 francs.)

It remains for us to notice *Les trois dialectiques*, by Prof. J. J. Gourd, of the University of Geneva, which is a reprint of an article which appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, one of the ablest philosophical periodicals of the day. By the three dialectics Professor Gourd understands (1) the theoretical dialectic, (2) the practical dialectic, and (3) the religious dialectic; which three phrases are a metaphysical translation of the familiar terms "science," "morals," and "religion."



MAINE DE BIRAN.

FRENCH PSYCHOLOGIST.

(1766-1824.)

From a Physionotrace Engraving by Quenedey, Paris, 1811.
Courtesy of M. Naville, of Geneva.

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THE GOSPEL ON THE PARISIAN STAGE.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

ABOUT thirty years ago there was a revival in Paris of the mediæval "Mystery." The "Deluge" in one theatre competed with "Paradise" in another, and there was a third, whose exact title I forget, though I remember Abraham kneeling before a luminous trinitarian triangle in the sky, and the descent of ballet angels who danced around him. In "Paradise" Abingdon gained much praise by the refinement of her Eve, and there was an accomplished Satan who, borrowing an item from Pandora's box, began his temptation of the first new woman by offering her a hand-mirror. Those spectacles had no religious purpose, and yet they did not admit of the comic and grotesque features found attractive in holiday times, and so the playwrights have since repaired, as in England, to the Old Testaments of pre-Christian religions, as represented in fairy tales. But of late there has been a revival of the Miracle Play, which it is now usual to call the Passion Play, and as it adheres to sacred seasons, beginning with Christmas time and ending with Easter, it may be supposed to appeal to pious sentiments. I was rather startled one day early in the year to see the walls about Montparnasse placarded with the name "Jesus." It announced a performance for the benefit of some charity (apparently Catholic), in a horticultural hall. It represented (1) The Nativity, (2) The Crucifixion, (3) The Resurrection. Another Passion Play, composed by Edmond Harancourt, was accompanied by Bach's music. At the *Nouveau Théâtre* I witnessed *La Passion*, of which the musical composer, Henri Giuletti, has also arranged the words, which follow the New Testament pretty closely. I was struck by the contrast between the conventionalism of Giuletti's

text and that arranged by the priests at Oberammergau. The great impression produced by the latter, which I have repeatedly witnessed, is largely due to the purely human motives emphasised. The opposition to Jesus originates in his attack on the merchants who have secured from the municipality licenses to sell at the temple articles needed for individual offerings. They bring their complaint to the Council where a momentous discussion takes place, in which Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea counsel moderation. At Oberammergau the miracles of Jesus are omitted. But at the *Nouveau Théâtre* the scenic display was by no means servile to the scriptures. For instance in the scene of the Resurrection Christ is seen in the air just above his sepulchre, a crowd of his followers are present, and are ranged on either side, the centre of the stage being reserved for the Mother, who kneels alone, her arms stretched out as if on a cross, adoring her son. In the scene of the Supper the movements were unpleasantly automatic, but perhaps I am not able to judge this tableau from a merely artistic standpoint. Just as I was thinking how much more striking it would be if those ladies who probably paid for the supper (Luke viii. 3) were at the table,—just then was heard from behind the scene a woman's voice, very sweet and touching, singing of the greatness and compassionateness of incarnate love. From time to time this thrilling voice broke out again, with pathos or with triumph, and formal masculinity, its functional hardness, was relieved. Jesus seemed to be surrounded by the faces of the women who "ministered to him of their substance," and who never "forsook him and fled," as his disciples did.

But it was clear to me that the audience, mainly well-to-do people, were not really moved by the representation of the Passion. There was no sign of emotion. A history can only acquire super-human conventionalisation by parting with its human accents. Is it not a merely perfunctory sorrow this, of mourning over the few minutes' pain by which a man once passed to the throne of the universe? The French priests who drape their churches on Good Friday, and portray so vehemently the sufferings of Jesus, have generally shown indifference if not satisfaction at the four-and-a-half years' agony of another Jew entombed on Devil's Island. What were the momentary sufferings of Jesus as he passed to Paradise compared with the sufferings of Dreyfus?

It has for some time been a problem with cultured Christians, eloquent divines, artists, how to portray a Jesus not too far, yet not too near,—not beyond human sympathies, not within the sphere

of ordinary human sufferings. The most important artistic attempt of this kind has been made by the young French dramatist, Edmond Rostand, whose play *Cyrano de Bergerac* has placed him at the head of all living playwrights. This is the second year in which his religious drama has come amid the Fairs,—“Ham Fair,” “Bread and Spice Fair,”—and the merry festivities which have long preoccupied Easter time, and breathed some divinely human sentiment into the sacred season. His play is entitled *La Samaritaine: Évangile en trois tableaux*.

This play was, I believe, the first serious work of Rostand, and it bears some marks of youth. For example: it is one of the most striking things about the narrative of the Samaritan woman (John iv.) that Jesus does not utter or even hint the slightest reproach to her for having had five husbands, and for then living with one not her husband. In this play Jesus does utter a reproach, and even suggests that all of her “marriages” were sinful. Although it was necessary for the plot of the play that this Samaritan woman should have been of that character, it would have been more artistic to preserve the calm words of Jesus as reported, and let the reproaches come from the woman herself when her conscience is awakened. The necessity just alluded to arises from the fact that the legend of Mary Magdalene’s having been a courtesan, not supported by anything in the Bible, has gradually become the cherished romance of Christendom, and a dramatist could have little hope of charming an audience without introducing any “woman with a past.” Such is Photine, the luminous name here given the Samaritan woman. Saint Mary Magdalene is a Venus baptised and penitent; Photine is a Magdalene turned prophetess. No character could be more perfectly adapted to the genius of Sarah Bernhardt, who surpasses herself in it. A critic in *L’Orchestra* pronounces Bremont “an ideal Christ,” but that depends on the individual ideal. Having one of my own I have never found it realised either here or at Oberammergau: the actors are afraid to venture an any spontaneity, and interpret Jesus as an automaton. Bremont was no doubt ideal for those who regard Jesus as one going through certain prearranged functions, without any human or personal freedom at all. Only two of the other figures are conventionalised: Peter has the usual fierce look, and John the feminine, though in the New Testament John is the fierce one, who wished to call down fire on the Samaritans, and whose intolerance Jesus twice had to rebuke. However the acting generally was almost faultless, and no learning or outlay was spared to give the large

number of performers rich and correct costumes, and to make every tableau a work of art unusual even in the Sarah Bernhardt Theatre.

A group of leading Samaritans gathered around Jacob's well,—their city Sychar in the distance,—converse in troubled and resentful tones concerning the insults they receive from the Jews, and some propose a resort to arms. This is opposed by young Azriel, who is taunted with being the sixth lover of Photine, the Samaritan beauty. When the Samaritans have gone Jesus appears with his disciples, who fall to denouncing the Samaritans, which elicits from him the parable of the good Samaritan. He then sends them into Sychar to buy food, and while he is alone, waiting, Photine's voice is heard,—though she is not yet seen. She is singing snatches from the Song of Solomon, beginning with "Take us the foxes, the little foxes that spoil the vines." The verses are not given consecutively as in the Bible, but daintily selected, and slightly modified. It is not so much singing as a high recitative, which, accompanied by perfect violins, is thrilling. Then she appears on a path among the trees, the amphora on her shoulder, beautifully and simply draped, and approaches the well, still singing. She does not notice Jesus at all, but having let down her amphora, raised it, gazed into the water as a mirror, and placed it on her shoulder, turns to leave. "Such," says Jesus to himself, "is poor humanity, which grazes happiness and passes it!" She is about to disappear, when he calls "Woman!" Photine turns and looks at him with an insolent air, and he says, "I thirst; for the rays of the sun are intense; will you give me some water?" Photine answers wrathfully, describing the hatred and contempt heaped by his people on hers, and telling him ironically that the water though so limpid is from a Samaritan well, consequently impure. Though his disgust may be diminished by thirst not a drop shall he have.

When Jesus has revealed himself, and Photine, amazed at his knowledge of her life, approaches him as a prophet, she speaks of the controversy between Jews and Samaritans about the sanctity of their respective mountains, and adds that "We, the simple ones, are only troubled between these rival mountains. We ascend neither the one nor the other, but remain below in the vale between them; and the vale has flowers that make us forget God." In reply to this Jesus utters his sublime universalism. "The hour cometh, it is come, simple heart, when neither in Gerizim nor in Jerusalem shall men worship the Father," etc. The dramatist has

had the critical insight to omit the spurious fling at the Samaritans (John iv. 22), which contradicts all the catholicity of the utterance. I was also struck by the fact that though this dramatised Jesus is a Messiah he is portrayed as sufficiently human to do a little acting, for when Photine offers him water he says, "I have not thirsted except for thy rescue." This thirst was not caused by the sun's heat.

Photine has poured out all her heart to him, how she had thirsted for beauty, for the satisfaction of heart and life, and found each fountain delusive, her spirit still famished. "Thy words touch me less than the tears in thy eyes," says Jesus. "She says, my words are without value, my eyes without charms." He answers, "To me the most beautiful eyes are eyes filled with tears." Then reclining at his feet she listens, and he enters on his instructions, her refrain being "I listen." So ends the first tableau.

We are next in the Samaritan city, Sychar, the street a bazaar alive with merry crowds in bright colors, who give the disciples an unpleasant reception, and charge them double for food. Peter remarks that the good Samaritans are only in parables, and they go off.

Young Azriel, her lover, knocks at Photine's door and learns that she is still at Jacob's well. Some women observe the handsome youth and talk together angrily of Photine. Life is all honey to that free-lover, they say; while honest women knit and bake bread, her lover is comparing her to a lily of the valley. They are informed to their delight that the authorities mean to banish Photine. Just then the disturbing beauty enters the city gate. Her lover rushes to meet her, and is amazed to find her without her cruse, her veil gone, her face excited.

In her first ecstasy on finding her prophet, Photine had burst out with one of the love songs she had sung on approaching the well—"In thy breath all perfumes, in thy words all honeys, in thy clear eyes all skies, etc.,"—but arrested herself, "Great God, what have I done! the same, O sacrilege, the same song for Him that served me for—" Before she says Azriel Jesus reassures her: "I am always a little in all words of love." The amorous songs were the only hymns Photine knew, and the devoutest psalm could hardly indicate so well how wholly her heart had gone to her prophet. Azriel, who now meets her, will hear no more such songs. She gently untwines his arms. "I come to restore what I have served only to make thee forget. The great hopes thou hast cast away, I bring them back."

Then she cries, "People!" And now Photine has to encounter every variety of obstacle which new ideas have to surmount in every age and region. Of the marvel of his telling her how many husbands she had had but little is made. One can for a franc witness in Paris much more astonishing divinations than that concerning a woman whose many marriages must have made her notorious in all her region. (William de Torre is astounding all savants by announcing at a distance any name and address you select in the Paris Directory while you are holding the book close to your eyes, and shouting aloud a sentence you have written and folded away in a bit of paper.) The burden of Photine in Sychar is the choice anthology of all the teachings and parables of Jesus. There where she reclined at his feet beside Jacob's well we are to suppose that after the curtain fell he rehearsed to her all that he had uttered to disciples or crowds. We now behold an inspired prophetess uttering again the most beautiful teachings and parables, and summoning the city to repair with her to the Messiah of their long hopes and visions. Her ecstasy electrifies them: The tradesmen try to silence her; she is drawing attention away from their bazaars. The priest is alarmed; she is calling the people to new doctrines. The priest moves the woman by saying to Photine, "How could the great pure soul of a Christ converse with such an one as you? Go and perfume your door, and sit at the threshold, and prepare for the evening the crafts of your eye." "You treat me only as I deserve," answers Photine, and kneeling in the market-place she cries, "I confess my life and smite my breast, and I desire to entreat forgiveness of all." Then the previously resentful women come to her side. Followed by a crowd she passes to other streets and we hear her voice, fainter, nearer, until when she again appears she is surrounded with a multitude prepared to follow her.

The chief priest and the merchants then raise the cry of sedition, and send for the Roman guard. They come, and Photine is arrested, her hands tied; but a centurion appears, and after hearing what the excitement is about orders Photine's release. "It is all about that handsome carpenter with the blonde head. He will never trouble the world."

Some then begin to oppose because the Roman is inclined to befriend Jesus, but Photine explains that the new movement is related to matters far above the empires of the world. A general curiosity among the religiously indifferent, and a deeper feeling among others, incline them to Photine, and the conquest is com-

pleted when a priest says, "Well, I will go too! This man may found a new cult, and make me Chief Priest." The humor is too deep for laughter.

In the third and final tableau we are again at Jacob's well, on the edge of which Jesus is still seated. He appears as if in reverie, while his disciples seated or lying on the ground at a little distance are with difficulty appeasing their hunger with the wretched viands which the Samaritans had picked out to sell them. To their ill humor has been added the scandal of finding Jesus conversing with a woman whose reputation they seem to know. "I would not dare to blame him," says Peter, "but sometimes, it must be confessed, he is of singular imprudence." Presently Jesus makes a remark on what one says, and they lower their voices; at length they are silent but Jesus answers an unspoken thought of Peter. Then they become very thirsty. The water in the well is inaccessible, but Photine has left her pitcher full of water. They declare they will perish rather than taste the accursed water drawn by a Samaritan woman in a Samaritan pitcher, but presently John tastes this water and calls out with surprise and delight. Nathaniel, Andrew, James, follow, and declare that it is nectar. The sweetness of all sweet things is in it, and when all have been refreshed they ask Jesus what the woman left in her cruse when she departed. He tells them that she left there her pride, her sins, her frivolity, but that the sweet savour is "what I found among the faults of a life which they are coming to forget at my feet."

Jesus already hears them coming,—those Samaritans whom his disciples have just been execrating. Presently the others hear, we all hear, at first faint in the distance a sound as of lutes and timbrels, chants of psalmody. All Sychar has followed Photine: they bring flowers and garlands, and when the crowd has met his look there is an eager pressing forward, a stretching forth of hands in homage. The flowers are strewn before him, but after the flowers are the woes of the world. To the blind he says "See!", to the lame "Walk!" to the dumb "Speak," and for the drunkard, for the courtisans, he has words of forgiveness. The priest is scandalised. "Can he be Christ who invites the courtisan and the drunkard to follow him?" For once the anger of Jesus is kindled and he says to the priest, "I will answer you, accursed man!" But just then he hears Peter say, "Take away these children!" The children had been singing a childish round, and Jesus calls them to him, strokes their hair, and asks them to sing him their song. They sing, "When we piped for you merry airs you have

not danced, when we piped sad airs you have not wept." Turning to the priest Jesus says, "Their little song furnishes my answer to you." The priest who rejected the Baptist, severe and ascetic, as a madman, now rejected the eating, drinking, smiling, quickly pardoning Jesus as a Sybarite!

This little outbreak of mingled anger and humor against the priest gave Bremont a little more freedom; his tenderness to the children, his gentleness to the courtesans,—one of whom had hidden,—brought forward by Photine, was very fine. But the acting of Sarah Bernhardt in all this was really great. I have often recognised little mannerisms in her, but now they had all vanished: her simplicity, humility, self-forgetfulness, her thinking only of the others—the poor, the little ones, the sufferers,—that they should be healed, cheered, were exquisite suggestions of her new birth. Gazing on the new Photine her lover radiant cries, "I know then what to make of my life." When finally these people gather around Jesus to entreat him to remain with them, offering their abodes, their all—the courtesans, their jewels laid aside—kneeling before him,—there becomes visible that which for ages has moved the heart of mankind. The applause was not such as hands or voices could give; it was given in breathless stillness, bent heads, and flowing tears.

Had *La Samaritaine* been written in unrhymed Greek in the second century it would now be in the New Testament, and what sermons would be preached from sentences quoted from Christ! "Heaven is where all love." "All loves are beautiful save love of self." While listening to the charming play I was not at all surprised at the occasional posings of Jesus, as where he pretends that the hot sun has made him thirsty. It is all legitimate in a drama. And I remember when once witnessing a play of "The Nativity" that the posings and elaborate intonings of carols and prophetic hymns by Mary and others were all in place behind footlights. The "asides" and attitudinising of Jesus before the resurrection of Lazarus, his affectation of vehement grief, after telling his disciples secretly he was glad Lazarus was dead that he might display his power, etc., led Renan to suspect that Jesus and Lazarus and the sisters had got up a little deception; but it is much better explained if we suppose it all a pious drama made up out of the parable of Dives and Lazarus and performed in rural districts (in the second century) where the people had been accustomed to the sacred Greek plays. It is the belief of many learned men that the Oberammergau play succeeded a sacred pagan play

in the same village. There is little doubt that many of the apocryphal gospels are relics of pious performances by which alone the humble masses could be impressed, when there was as yet no printing and little painting, and it is not improbable that various narratives in the New Testament, among them the resurrection of Jesus, were to some extent shaped by dramatic exigencies, and are now as unfairly accepted, or criticised, as literal history as it would be to so treat the dramatic representations of Robespierre and Napoleon now drawing crowds in Paris and London. All of this may be justly pronounced theoretical, but it appears to me more probable than the alternative hypothesis of mere fraud in the composition of certain marvellous narratives which criticism is finding unhistorical and mythical. Of course this would not affect the fact of such dramas being founded on vague popular beliefs, but only account for the definiteness and completeness of their historic shapes in the New Testament. It would also explain the fact that the tremendous miracles are not alluded to by any historian of that era,—not even Josephus. In all dramas there is an element of supernaturalism, though in the modern world it is in the guise of improbability. At least there are few novelists, romancers, or playwrights able to frame a plot which does not at some vital point rest on an improbability. The Greek stage was a nursery of mythology. How is it that we find the Gospels written in or on the eve of the second century so full of Christ's miracles whereas not one is alluded to in the first century writings,—the Epistles? Possibly for the same reason that we find in Rostand's *La Samaritaine* some wonders ("thought-transference") not in the Bible, but well adapted to certain alleged phenomena of our own time. As legends of præternatural events now grow, so grew they of old, and so it appears they will grow until the intellectual soil is too highly cultivated for their nourishment.

MAINE DE BIRAN.

(1766-1824.)

BY PROF. L. LÉVY-BRUHL.

MAINE DE BIRAN was said by Cousin to have been the first of French metaphysicians since Malebranche. This is true, especially, if we understand by a metaphysician, as they did in the eighteenth century, a thinker who studies the origin of our knowledge, and the genesis of our ideas. Yet this original and deep philosopher was but little known to his contemporaries. Maine de Biran, though he wrote much, published but little during his lifetime, and what he gave to the world was not sufficient to make his thought fully understood. It was Cousin, who, in 1834, and afterwards in 1841, edited part of the manuscripts left by Maine de Biran. Since then other unpublished works have been edited, chiefly by M. Naville. If we have not yet the whole of Maine de Biran's writings, we possess enough to feel assured that no essential part of his doctrine now escapes us.

Maine de Biran never taught. Being a life-guardsman to Louis the Sixteenth in 1789, and later sub-prefect, and councillor of State, if he was also a philosopher it was in virtue of a strong natural aptitude and inclination. A sort of instinct irresistibly impelled him to make a study of himself. His health being delicate, he was watchful of the slightest changes in his physical condition and in his consciousness due to surrounding circumstances, and was consequently predisposed to introspection. "When one has little vitality," he writes, "or but a faint conscious sense of vitality, one is more inclined to observe internal phenomena. This is why I became so early in life a psychologist." He heard the springs of the machine creaking, and he felt his thought straining or slackening with them.

His taste for psychology first found food in Condillac, and then

in the Ideologists. He became acquainted with Cabanis, and was afterwards his friend; and though later he thought that he had advanced beyond his doctrine, he never completely rejected it. But he also read the Genevese Charles Bonnet, and it was probably by him that he was led to study the philosophy of Leibnitz, and to seek a psychological interpretation of it that would be in harmony with his own tendencies. It was at this time that he wrote his *Mémoire sur l'Habitude* (1805), an original and thoughtful work, which, under a form that suggests Condillac, already manifests



VICTOR COUSIN (1792-1867).

many of his own personal and independent views. In the next period he reached the clearest expression of his thought and expounded what he looked upon as his most important theory, to wit, the theory of effort, or of the first fact of consciousness. In this he was seconded by his friend Ampère, the celebrated physicist, whose philosophical work is inseparable from his own. He often enunciated his ideas at philosophical meetings held at his house in Paris. Royer-Collard was wont to be present, and also "young Professor Cousin," who comprehended the thought of

Maine de Biran marvellously well. In later years, when ill, and anxious to find a "firm and steady prop," Maine de Biran inclined towards a mystical and religious kind of philosophy; and he had yielded himself fully to it before the end of his life.

Condillac's psychology had separated, so to speak, consciousness from organism. Convinced that "we never get out of ourselves," he thought himself thus justified in studying only what reflection and analysis can reach and decompose within ourselves. Now this is an abstraction which Maine de Biran constantly finds to be contradicted by his personal experience. Our humor changes, our attention flags, our self-confidence disappears or returns without our knowing how; is it not because a multitude of dim sensations are produced within us, of which we are made aware only by their effects? Thus experimental psychology can as yet describe only the smallest portion of the soul's phenomena. This science begins with clear apperception, and with the distinction between the "self" and its modifications. But how many things take place in the soul before, during, and after the first consciousness of the self, which will never come within the range of our knowledge! These things Maine de Biran calls pure impressions, or simple impressions; they constitute the "affective life." They correspond to Leibnitz's dim and insensible perceptions; or, perhaps more exactly, to Cabanis's "sensibility." "These impersonal sensations, which I shall term pure affections, may be considered as the most immediate results of functions that underlie a general organic life . . . a state previous even to the birth of a conscious and thinking subject." This was a fruitful thought, which experimental psychology has turned to excellent account in our days. This science admits as a principle, as Maine de Biran did, that "simple impressions may constitute an absolute sort of existence, *sui generis*, apart from any distinct personality or consciousness of self. M. Pierre Ganet, for instance, has returned to this hypothesis in order to explain many surprising cases of hysterical anesthesia and amnesia, of twofold personality, etc.

This part of ourselves which escapes our knowledge also escapes our power. The affective life is independent of our will, though our will depends upon it. It is a purely passive basis of our complex being, from which the Ego can never be separated, and which becomes tense or slack or altered without our being able to interfere, at any rate directly; a sum of organic dispositions we are the less able to modify since they are the very source of our powers and volitions. They result from our temperament, and

what we call character is but the physiognomy of temperament—a striking phrase, for which we are indebted to Bichat, the physiologist, and which Maine de Biran made his own by exploring it thoroughly.

At about the same epoch Schopenhauer in Germany was saying the same thing; and though he was in nowise acquainted with the works of Maine de Biran, there is in this more than a mere fortuitous coincidence. Between Schopenhauer's psychology and that of Maine de Biran there lie hidden, under obvious differences, deep analogies. If little attention has hitherto been paid in France to this fact, it is because of a predisposition to see in Maine de Biran one of the founders of contemporary spiritualism,—and he is therefore associated with Cousin rather than with Bichat or Cabanis.

But this interpretation, while not false, is certainly incomplete, and not in harmony with history. Maine de Biran owes nothing to Cousin, and was, especially in his two earlier periods, imbued with the doctrines of Bichat and of the "immortal author of the *Rapports du Physique et du Moral*." Now this was no less true of Schopenhauer. True, in Schopenhauer the ideas borrowed from Bichat and Cabanis were mingled with other elements taken from Kant, Plato, and Buddhist metaphysics, whereas Maine de Biran contented himself with investigating certain problems propounded by the eighteenth century. Yet both these men alike oppose to the conscious personality of the Ego the dim unconscious background which enfolds it, sways it, and even directs it, and predetermines, unknown to ourselves, our thoughts and actions, our intelligence and character. Only afterwards do their doctrines diverge.

Affective life constitutes in us what Maine de Biran calls "animality." Above it, but linked to it, appears "humanity," i. e., consciousness reflecting on itself and master of itself, personality, or the Ego. This latter begins to exist by itself only when exercising free activity or determined effort. Thus—and Maine de Biran likes to remind us that he is here taking up the thought of Leibnitz—the idea that the human person has of itself is originally the idea of an active force. The Ego is first of all activity and liberty. In other words, the Ego is the soul, insomuch as it perceives its own existence, but this it perceives only when its activity meets (within the body) with a resistance which it endeavors to overcome.

If this observation is correct, the whole structure of Condillacism falls to pieces. Sensation is no longer the first fact of con-

sciousness, the principle of all the soul's life. The very term "sensation" is abstract and ambiguous, because Condillac did not carry the analysis far enough. For, if sensation be conceived as simply passive, then it is only an "affective impression," and the Ego does not yet appear: sensation may take place without consciousness being aware of it. Does sensation imply a motor reaction, conscious and deliberate? Then it resolves itself into a passive and an active element. The latter is intentional effort. In it, and not in any received impression, must we seek the special origin of our active faculties, the pivotal point of existence and the foundation of all the simple ideas we may acquire concerning ourselves and our intellectual activity.

Yet Maine de Biran does not think that the soul appears to itself just as it really is. "I was at first rather inclined," he says, "to mistake the inmost feeling of our individuality, or what I called the Ego, for the very core of the substance of the soul. But Kant has taught me better. We feel our own individuality; but the real substance of our soul we feel no more than any other substance." No doubt the Ego that perceives and judges is the same that is perceived and judged; but this being which is perceived and judged has still an inmost core of substance inaccessible to apperception. It may be endowed, as Malebranche thought, with a multitude of properties or attributes which are unknown or do not come within the range of our inward sense. This inward sense may indeed assure us that *we* are thinking; and on this point Descartes's "I think, therefore I am," is irrefutable. But the most subtle analysis of this inward sense cannot possibly throw the slightest light upon our knowledge of ourselves, "as an object, outside of thought." To believe that, by means of analysis based on purely internal experience, we can at length arrive at the notion of a substantial Ego, is to mistake the psychological fact of what is within us, that is, ourselves in the actual exercise of thought, for the metaphysical notion of the substance which is supposed to remain the same beyond and beneath thought.

Maine de Biran here agrees with Kant, as he says. In Kant, however, the theory of the Ego's knowledge of itself has for its basis the whole of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and more especially the theory of sensible and intellectual knowledge. Maine de Biran, on the contrary, starts from the analysis of the first fact of consciousness, and on that analysis he afterwards attempts to found a theory of the understanding and reason. In opposition to the doctrine of categories, which is quite *à priori* in Kant, he endeavors to

maintain a psychological genesis of the general principles of thought. Thus, because the Ego perceives itself as a cause, Maine de Biran finds therein "the pattern and model of every idea of power, force, and cause." Unity, simplicity, existence, etc., are ideas which the Ego obtains by means of an abstraction wrought upon itself, and which in a way isolates its own attributes. If we find these attributes again in objects, it is because they have been, so to speak, projected by the Ego. In one word, reason is thus held to be the spontaneous result of a sort of self-analysis of consciousness.

But this is rather a sketch than a regular theory, and Maine de Biran was suspicious of everything that might carry him beyond the firm ground of experience. The science he seeks to establish starts from a fact and must lead only to facts and to the laws which they obey. The absolute, as Maine de Biran does not hesitate to confess, is beyond its grasp. How, he says himself, could all things fail to be relative in our eyes, since the very existence of the Ego, the individual personality which is the basis of the thinking being, is relative? The thing called Ego being a compound, or the result of the union and relation between two substances, can conceive or feel nothing but as a compound or relation. The very idea of substance seems suspicious to Maine de Biran. The Ego does not find it within itself, for it apprehends itself as a cause, not as a substance. This idea must, therefore, originate without our knowing it, in the representation of exterior things, space and matter. It was this idea that caused the philosophy of Descartes to tend in the direction of pantheism. It is the secret enemy of personality and liberty; it tends to mingle together in an obscure metaphysical unity the Ego-person in which everything has its beginning, and the God-person in which all things end.

Though an original and deep psychologist, Maine de Biran was a timid metaphysician. No doubt the study of the Ego induced him to think of it as a "hyperorganic" force, while the inward sense assured him of his liberty; but he was fully aware that there are problems, and most essential ones, to which his doctrine gives no direct answer, the moral problem, for instance. Therefore he wished to complete his psychology by a reasoned adherence to a general system of philosophy in accordance with his inmost tendencies. In his second period he felt himself won over to Stoicism, which is, in his eyes, a moral philosophy based upon the dignity of the human personality and upon the energy of active effort. But Stoicism expects too much from man's will; and although

Christianity, in its turn, makes man too weak and helpless, it was to Christianity that Maine de Biran turned in the latter years of his life for the "prop" of which he felt the need. He then wrote his *Nouveaux Essais d'Anthropologie*, which distinguish in man three lives, one above the other, as it were: sensitive life, which is in us that of the animal; human life, that is, the life of action and the struggle of the thinking principle against the instinctive and animal principle; and lastly, divine life, in which animalism is conquered and the struggle ceases because love has united man to the supreme source of all beings and all good. And thus, in a sort of quietism, ended this philosophy which had begun as a continuation of Condillac and Cabanis.

A REVELATOR OF SCIENCE.

BY F. L. OSWALD.

PHILOSOPHERS have long thought it probable that the "monarchical protectorate of art and literature" has been overrated and that the free arena of republican competition is as propitious to the true interests of science, as to the promotion of industrial development.

Progress, as distinct from motion, is, indeed, incompatible with the lack of liberty, though the liberal Condorcet goes so far as to pronounce the "thought-protecting influence of Imperialism a compensation for the character steeling turmoil of democratic institutions."

The truth seems to be that the Chinese wall of paternal monarchies may shelter arts and the literature of conservatism, but that progressive science is favored by the open fields of freedom. A dogmatist, rehearsing his tenets, like a parrot turning a wire-wheel, may bless the absence of competition; but strong-winged birds rather dispense with cage-food. The eagles of thought rarely appreciate the advantages of a storm-proof bastile, and Louis Büchner, the pioneer of mental emancipation, was given no chance to rejoice in the protective peace of Imperialism. The barriers of prescriptive dogmas bruised his wings again and again, and whenever he contrived to escape their restraint, a swarm of black rooks tracked his flight and forced him to waste his time in the squabbles of self-defence.

The characteristics of the fearless investigator asserted themselves in his very school years. "Little Loo Büchner solved mathematical problems by a sort of intuition," says Professor Habermann of the Darmstadt college, "and could apply the gift of his graceful style to three different languages, but was kept in hot water by his penchant for asking indiscreet questions."

"What made the mediæval nations so much meaner and sillier than their pagan ancestors?"

"How is it that animals can take care of their health so much better than learned men?"

"Is it a duty to believe things that cannot be proven?"

No reply?—What's the use of science if its teachers will not answer questions? thought Master Louis.

One scholastic sage "considered him too forward (*aberwitzig*) to let him take his place at the head of his class;" still, when he graduated in his eighteenth year, they granted him a certificate with a rather liberal endorsement: "The holder of this has distinguished himself by thorough literary, philosophical and poetic studies, and shows remarkable ability in all his compositions."

The curriculum of a German "Gymnasium," or preparatory college, is about nine-tenths language drill; but young Büchner hankered after a different sort of knowledge, and devoted a year to the study of natural science,—especially chemistry, physiology and zoölogical literature. The young truth-seeker clung to the belief that animals can teach us many forgotten facts, "being nearer to the heart of Nature, and to the source of life protecting instincts." In 1843 he went to the University of Giessen. The new high school had attracted many foreigners by the fame of Justus Liebig, the Copernicus of Chemistry, and Büchner divided his time between philosophy and modern language studies. His moral ideal, at that time, seems to have been a system of natural philosophy with an ethical by-purpose, but Büchner Senior, a shrewd old burgher, with social theories of his own, had witnessed the success of moonshine metaphysicians and the neglect of philosophical sun-priests, and persuaded his son to turn his attention to medicine.

The young philosopher compromised the difficulty by enlarging the scope of his studies. His prodigious memory enabled him to brave a risk which Benjamin Franklin avoided by exemption from the *par-force* training of a routine college, and he could enter the field of free inquiry with a mind uncrippled by the deadweight of scholastic ballast.

Instead of staggering along the beaten road of the anxious office-seeker, he found time for exploration trips into by-trails and wayside thickets, and every now and then ascended a hilltop to verify his landmarks on the horizon of the future. Soon after the winter of 1846 his initials: "F. L. B." begin to appear under various magazine articles, as entertainingly digressive as Richard Burton's Letters from Ultima Thule. Incidentally, and often as

on the suggestion of a mere chance for banter, he throws out hints that kindled the fires of international controversies or sowed the seeds of fruitful scientific theories. Thus, in an essay on "Moral Freaks" he remarks that "the mental influences of heredity may awaken echoes from the experience of pre-human, as well as of pre-historic, ancestors, and that the dread of darkness, for instance, is perhaps an after-effect of the midnight panics of treetop-dwellers, treated to frequent surprise-parties of giant cats."—"which cats," he adds, "perhaps furnished the prototype of Old Scratch and the night-prowling Lamias." A geological dissertation tempts him to a "Fable for Teleologists,"—the zealots of the "Design in Everything" School.

"In the foothills of the southern Alps," he says, "granite blocks have tumbled into gravel, which, in the course of ages has hardened all around into a solid conglomerate, and one can imagine the elders of the Piedmont frogs pointing out the closeness of the fit as an indisputable proof of an intelligent *demiurgus*. 'See how every protuberance of the rock corresponds with an indenture in the outline of its wisely-prepared receptacle, and vice versa,' they will argue, 'examine it on all sides,' the sagacious adaptation is perfect, all around. Here and there it might be a work of chance, but in its totality the arrangement should not, it cannot, be ascribed to accident

"Evidences of unitary cosmic laws" (*die Einheit der ewigen Gesetze*) he says, "abound, but the opposition to arguments of probability has no limits whatever. On the borders of the Arctic Circle the summer sun often merely dips below the horizon, to reappear a little farther east; and I have often wondered if the natives can be persuaded to recognise the identity of the setting and rising orb. 'How can you prove that there are not two different suns, mounting guard by turns?' they will probably ask. We see crab-apples turn into pippins and steppe-ponies into race-horses; we can trace the ascent of roses from thorn-blossoms; we cannot doubt that the most civilised nations of the present world have sprung from brutal barbarians, but the connecting link between those barbarians and their still lowlier fellow-creatures is gone and till its remains have been recovered to the last fragment of bone-splinters our conservative friends will defy us to prove the continuity of the development."

Two years after Büchner's arrival in Giessen, a storm-wave of political party-strife swept over western Europe, and a number of patriotic students founded the progressive association known as the

"Allemania Bund," with a club for the promotion of sociological studies and political reform. To the literary propaganda of those societies young Büchner contributed several pamphlets that foreshadow our best latter-day protests against the meddle-mania of paternal governments.

"Apron-string policy" (*die Gängelband-Politik*) says the keen-sighted young patriot, "is always liable to two great objections: It obstructs the natural path of progress and is apt to foster the growth of mischievous monopolies. And what is almost worse, in their eagerness to regulate the food, drink, dress, holiday amusements and metaphysical opinions of their subjects, our rulers often neglect duties pertinent to the legitimate purpose of government, viz., the prevention of trespass upon natural rights. Their own system sets a baneful example by meddling with private rights and ignoring public nuisances. The same political moralists who force hardworking wage-earners to support drunkards and loafers, permit the owner of a glue-factory to poison the atmosphere of a populous city with pestilential vapors."

Some of these Circulars were published without Büchner's signature, but the trenchant style of the young Darmstadter had by that time become too well known to escape identification, and the regents of the university twice sent him a *dehortatorium*, or admonition to desist. Handle the theory of coal-ferns in any way you please, but don't get tangled in the beards of our aldermen.

Büchner had friends at court, too, and might have risked the consequences of a third warning; but his relatives were getting uneasy, and a family council decided to send him to Strassburg, under the pretext of giving him a chance to attend a course of French lectures.

In 1848 Louis Büchner received his medical diploma, and it required the influence of all his friends and the triumphant results of a public examination to carry his testimonials across the cliff of the theme he had ventured to select for his inaugural address, the *thesis*, namely, that "a personal soul is inconceivable without a material substratum."

The new M. D. then retired to his native city, where his rooms on the Reis-Market speedily became the headquarters of all local reform-clubs. His pen, too, was in constant request, and even his practical father could not help feeling proud of his prestige, and amidst the premonitions of an impending storm consoled himself with the reflection that his son had outgrown the necessity of de-

pendence on government patronage, and in stress of circumstances would be abundantly able to get along in France or North America.

Still, when the storm did burst, with all the fury of a savage political reaction, the significance of the alternative was brought home to the young patriot with unexpected force, and he decided to seek counsel in solitude and communion with the spirit of Nature. From Wuerzburg, Bavaria, where he had taken refuge in the house of a friend, he went to the highlands of the Austrian Alps, and after a week's struggle with conflicting passions, came to the conclusion that duty required him to stick to his post, and in hopes of better times to come, purchase peace at the price of temporary silence.

His fame as a leader of mental emancipation, however, continued to rise, and in 1854 he published the work which Claude Bernhard described as a "Catechism of secular science, a Magna Charta of our constitutional rights as thinkers and rationalists."

In Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands, "Matter and Force" created a sensation exceeding that produced in England by the novel theories of Darwin's "Descent." It formulates principles which former writers had hardly ventured to imply in diffident conjectures. Its publication marks a new era in the history of cosmology, and its theories not only indicate the advanced standpoints of physical science, but outline the road of progress for centuries in advance. It is the record of a philosophical revelation.

Three editions of *Kraft und Stoff* were published in 1855, four in 1856, and several excellent translations insured the cosmopolitan fame of the work; but for the social interests of the author he might as well have circulated a treatise on the scientific application of dynamite bombs. Scores of reactionary journals shrieked out their alarm; opposition pamphlets fluttered in flocks, and before the end of the year all the hirelings of conservatism were up in arms against the daring deviator from conventional lines of thought. A government cage-bird had ventured to leave his prison, and the hue and cry became so deafening that the lovers of peace advised the defendant to seek refuge in exile, till public attention had been diverted by other topics,—perhaps by the electric flashes of the war-cloud which about that time began to gather around the Crimean seaports.

Büchner tried the effect of banter to silence some of the most obstreperous alarmists, but the many-voiced owl-swarm would not down, and the German Huxley was actually forced to cancel the arrangements for a permanent engagement at the University of

Tuebingen, where he had been recording the proceedings of a meeting of German naturalists.

He had bought posthumous fame at the expense of his temporal interests. The menace of a heresy trial finally died down to the growls of bigots, but Büchner's name remained on the official blacklist. The precarious tolerance of his government was understood to imply the condition of abstinence from dogmatic controversies. In other words, his metaphysical organs of speech were now gagged as effectually as his sword-arm of political reform had been shackled in 1848, and henceforth the great thinker limited his publications to topics of physical science. His "Physiological Sketches" appeared in 1861; "Nature and Science" in 1862; "Conferences on Darwinism" in 1869; "Man in the Past, Present and Future" in 1870; "Light and Life" in 1882. These works open out new vistas of thought in a surprising number of different directions, and like the predictions of astronomical discoveries and Humboldt's forecasts of mineralogical treasure-troves, prove that the gift of augury is an attribute of all earnest thinkers.

In 1883 Crown-prince Frederick, the victor of Wörth and champion of all liberal reforms, visited Büchner in Frankfort-on-the-Main, and when his untimely death blighted the hopes of his nation, the old patriot mourned as the philosopher Libanius had mourned for the loss of the Divus Julian.

"It was the hand of Nemesis," he says, "the stroke of Fate that waits upon every excess of good fortune. Once more, since the days of Trajan and the Antonines, philosophy, philanthropy and heroism were wedded to supreme opportunities for national redemption,—the prospect was too bright to escape the doom of a total eclipse. Is it always thus? There may be only apparent exceptions, for Marcus Aurelius perhaps paid his debt to fate in the anguish of his family-sorrows, and Frederick the Great in the purgatory of the Seven Years' War."

Time soon justified his misgivings. The reflux-tide of national exaltation set in. As in France, after the collapse of the Napoleonic Olympus, the immortals had to pine in exile; the gazettes that had heralded a hundred victories were now forced to record an endless series of lese-majesty trials. Like Bismarck, Büchner had to seek solace in the recollections of the past. Flunkey orators of national jubilees found it expedient to avoid his name. It became fashionable to sneer at the theories of the German Aristotle. Graduates with an appetite for rapid promotion endeavored to circulate refutations of "Matter and Force."

The old philosopher smiled ; but became more reticent from year to year, and at last retired to the hermitage of his little Darmstadt garden cottage,—“where my green lawn,” he writes to the editor of *Dageraad*, “is all the better for the absence of crowds, and where occasional visitors are not distressed by the clanking of my shackles.”

The silence of that retreat was perhaps more propitious to the place of a wounded soul than the storm and stress of a great commonwealth, but it might be questioned if in a land of freedom its balm would have been needed. Our restless republicans might have found no time to sit at the feet of the Grand Master of Science, but they could not have failed to recognise the value of his labors, and, moreover, would have broken his fetters, as surely as they would break the skull of Grand Inquisitor Pobodonotscheff.

THE CROSS OF GOLGOTHA.

BY THE EDITOR.

CRUCIFIXION was comparatively rare among the Greeks, but it was frequently practised in the Orient, and also by the Romans after they came into contact with Carthage.

The Israelites knew in their law several methods of capital punishment, which were: stoning,¹ burning to death,² strangling,³ slaying by the sword,⁴ and "hanging on the wood."⁵ The latter was more dreaded by the Jews than any other death on account of the curse which was attached to it in Deuteronomy (xxi. 20-23), where we read:

"If a man have committed a sin worthy of death, and he be to be put to death, and thou hang him on a tree: his body shall not remain all night upon the tree but thou shalt in any wise bury him that day; for he that is hanged is accursed of God; that thy land be not defiled, which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance."

The Israelites were surrounded by nations which worshipped solar deities and practised the cruel rites connected therewith. They were still, as we learned in a former article, under the awe of crucifixion as a religious rite, in which guilty persons and also innocent victims were offered to God for an atonement or for the fulfilment of a desire. It is but natural that for this very reason the lawgivers of Israel placed a special check upon that kind of capital punishment which was still practised as a human sacrifice by their neighbors; and it was but natural that that which was a sacred offering to a pagan deity became accursed before Yahveh. Crucifixion was not abolished but limited, that the land be not defiled. It is this passage that has proved the most objectionable

¹ Deut. xxi. 21. Lev. xx. 2, 27.

² Gen. xiii. 15. Lev. xx. 14, and xxi. 9.

³ Ex. xxi. 14-17. It is assumed that "putting to death" means strangulation.

⁴ Deut. xiii. 15.

⁵ Deut. xxi. 22-23. Translated in Christian versions "hanging on the tree."

stumbling-block with orthodox Jews of all times to the acceptance of Jesus the Crucified as the Messiah.

Criminals were frequently hung up on a cross (i. e., they were exposed on a tree or a pole after their death as a *post mortem* disgrace), and the passage in Deuteronomy (xxi. 22-23) is sometimes interpreted in this sense, which, if true, would have limited in Palestine the exposure of the dead body to a few hours or at most one day.

As to the form of the cross of Christ we have no definite information whatever. The cross is called in the New Testament *σταυρός* (i. e., rood, stake, or pole) and *ξύλον* (i. e., wood).¹ The latter is apparently a Hebraism, being a literal translation of *צלב*.

THE SHAPE OF CHRIST'S CROSS.

Judging from the report that a short hyssop stalk² was sufficient to reach up a sponge filled with vinegar to the crucified Jesus, the cross of Calvary cannot have been high. The soldiers, it appears, broke the legs of the two thieves and pierced the side of Jesus with a spear while their bodies were still hanging on the cross.

Christ was crucified by the Romans and according to Roman fashion, but the Roman mode of crucifixion varied and was apparently left to the executioner's pleasure who devised all kinds of horrible tortures for his victims. Sometimes criminals were simply tied upon a dry tree or a pole; sometimes they were placed across a sharpened stake (*σκόλαψ*)³, which would gradually pierce and tear the vital organs of the body; sometimes the delinquent was seated on a pointed pole which then from below was forced into the body; sometimes the condemned were hung up with extended arms, sometimes with their heads downwards. If natural trees were used, the branches offered good points of attachment, and the hangman selected with preference a bifurcated trunk which constitutes the Y-shaped cross. Whenever such a tree was not at hand, a transom or cross-beam (called *patibulum*) was nailed to a pole. This yielded a figure of which we commonly think when Christians of later generations speak of a cross.

Thus we have the following forms of the cross: 

Christian artists of later centuries have upon the whole adopted the Latin form of the cross, but not to the exclusion of the others,

¹ For instance, Acts v. 30. John xix. 29.

² See also 1 Cor. i. 23. Gal. v. 11, vi. 12.

³ This was an Assyrian mode of execution. See Layard, *Nin.*, p. 379, and Fig. 58. Compare Bonomi, *Nin.*, p. 276, and Fig. 162.

almost all of which are represented in various illustrations of the crucifixion.

Before crucifixion the delinquent was stripped of all his clothes which became the property of his executioners. The loin-cloth which for reasons of propriety always appears in Christian crucifixes, has no foundation in history, and it is not probable that the rude Roman soldier ever made an exception to the rule. The legend that Mary, the mother of Christ, used her veil as a loin-cloth is of a late origin.



THE TAU CROSS IN MARTIN SCHÖN'S PICTURE "CHRIST ON THE ROAD TO CALVARY." XV. Century. (After L. Veuillot.)

The transom of the cross (*patibulum*) and sometimes the whole cross, had to be carried by the delinquent himself to the place of execution.¹ In addition a tablet was hung round his neck on which the crime was written for which he was condemned. This tablet was nailed to the cross over the head of the sentenced person.

The cross with *patibulum* and tablet renders the figure of a vertical pole crossed by two smaller horizontal lines, thus †.

Christian illustrations represent Christ as bearing the whole cross, while the two rogues carry only their cross-beams. The idea that lies at the bottom of this conception seems to be that Christ's

¹ Plautus: "Patibulum ferat per urbem deinde affigatur cruci."

sentence had been spoken on the same morning and no preparation for his execution had been made. The tablet with the inscription of the crime for which the condemned was executed is specially mentioned in the Gospels, and Pilate, not without a touch of irony toward the Jewish authorities that clamored for the execution of the Galilean prophet, wrote on it in three languages: "Jesus the Nazaree, King of the Jews."

As it is difficult to keep a body in position on a cross, the delinquent was seated, as on a saddle, upon a projecting cleat called in Latin *sedile*, which, however, was not intended for an alleviation of his suffering, but simply as a convenience for the executioners.

Illustrations of the cross with tablet and cleat are sometimes made in the Russian Church thus †.

Justinus Martyr, who is apparently well informed about the details of crucifixions, mentions the seating cleat (*sedile* or *πήγμα*) on which Jesus was placed, like one sitting on horseback, and he compares it to a projecting horn.¹


Irenæus, when speaking of the mystic value of the number five, having mentioned the five-lettered words saviour (*σωτήρ*), father (*πατήρ*), love (*ἀγάπη*), etc., says (*Adv. her.*, II., 24, 4):

"The very form of the cross, too, has five extremities, two in length, two in breadth, and one in the middle on which the person is placed who is fixed by nails."

Tertullian (*Ad nat.*, I., 12), when defending the Christians against the accusation that they were worshippers of the cross, says:

"An entire cross is attributed to us; viz., with its transverse beam (*antenna*) and with that projecting seat."²

The seating-cleat is indicated in ancient symbols,⁴ but the thought of it has been dropped entirely by later Christian writers and also by artists, obviously for æsthetical reasons, and has been supplanted (although not before the seventh century) by a foot-



THE CROSS OF CALVARY ACCORDING TO STOCKBAUER.²

¹ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ πηγνύμενον ὡς κέρασ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐξέχον ἔστιν, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐποχοῦνται οἰστανούμενοι.

² *Kunstgeschichte des Kreuzes*, p. 37. Confer Gretses *De Cruce*, lib. I., c. 3.

³ Sed nobis tota crux imputatur, cum antenna scilicet et cum illo sedilis excessu.—The word *antenna* originally means a sail-yard.


⁴ Münter, *Sinnbilder und Kunstvorstellungen der alten Christen*, Vol. II., illustration 28. Reproduced from Bosio, p. 411.

rest (*suppedaneum lignum, ὑποπόδιον*), which, however, has no justification in history or archæology.¹

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF THE CROSS.

Christianity is the religion of the cross and Paul is the preacher of the Gospel of the cross.

Paul is thoroughly historical, and his Epistles (with few exceptions) are accepted by the most scrupulous and infidel critics as genuine. Even the Acts of Paul and Thekla, formerly regarded as spurious, turns out to be, at least in its original form, one of the earliest Christian books, containing correct local coloring and a great deal of reliable contemporary information.



THE CROSS WITH THE
CLEAT AS THE TREE OF
LIFE BETWEEN ADAM
AND EVE.

The history of this interesting document and its later additions which placed it under the suspicion of critics is quite instructive.² The accretions are evidences of a gradual growth of the eagerness to tell stories of miracles in glorification of martyrs. The more Christianity spread the more did it reach the masses of the people, and thus the influence of the uncultured increases in proportion to its external success.

The author of the Acts of Paul and Thekla describes the personality of Paul in these words :

"A man of middle size, and his hair was scanty, and his legs were a little crooked, his knees were projecting (*or far apart*); and he had large eyes, and his eyebrows met, and his nose was somewhat long; and he was full of grace and mercy; at one time he seemed like a man at another he seemed like an angel."

When Paul, then the Pharisee Saul and a persecutor of Christians, witnessed the heroism of Stephen, when he heard him say, "Behold, I see the heavens open and the Son of God standing on the right side of God," when he saw him die unflinchingly, he began dimly to feel the significance of a martyr's death. Though Stephen died as a criminal, he ended his life happily and with a prayer for his persecutors on his lips. No doubt that he died with the assurance of inheriting the bliss of the world to come. Being of a delicate constitution, the pangs of conscience which naturally

¹ See Stockbauer, *Kunstgeschichte*, pp. 37-39; and Dr. O. Zöckler, *Das Kreuz Christi*, pp. 437-439.

² For further details as to the genuineness of the Acts of Paul and Thekla, see Conybeare's *Monuments of Early Christianity*, pp. 49-60.

rose in Saul and which he suppressed for a while, made themselves felt in spite of himself and he succumbed at last to a severe attack of epilepsy while travelling on the road to Damascus. Seeing a flash of light, he fell to the ground and heard a voice speaking in Hebrew, "Saul! Saul! Why persecutest thou me? It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks!" When he asked who it was, the voice continued, "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest."¹

This event is the turning-point in Saul's life. Henceforth Saul, who later on called himself Paul, became a Christian, who gloried in the cross of Christ.

The story is psychologically so probable that with all the documentary evidence of Paul's Epistles,² we have good reason to accept it in all of its main features as historical, and need not be concerned about the contradictions that have been pointed out in the details of the reports of the event.

Paul's experiences in prosecuting the Christians taught him the lesson of Golgotha, and keen as he was to comprehend truths by contrasts, he recognised at once a transcendent glory in the ignominy of the cross. The present world is "perishable;" it is a life of "the body of death." But "the perishable" implies "the imperishable," and the present life a life to come. If we die with Christ on the cross we shall be resurrected with him.

The resurrection of Jesus is to him a fact, for the vision on the road to Damascus is taken as the real Jesus, and while from the standpoint of a modern alienist the identification of both in the sense in which Paul understood it cannot be conceded, we would not hesitate to say that there is a truth at the bottom of Paul's belief. When a man dies his soul is not annihilated; it continues as a living factor in the minds of the people. His words and the example of his deeds live on, and the deeds of a man constitute a living presence among the people whom he impressed, which is his spiritual self.

It happens that a dead enemy may be more powerful than he ever was during his life. Brutus was victorious in battle and yet he committed suicide in despair of success because he was haunted by the ghost of Cæsar. Cæsar was not dead to his murderer. The hangman can slay the bodies of innovators, but not their ideals: he cannot dispatch their souls. Spirit cannot be quenched. A cause will thrive with the greater power the more its representatives are made martyrs. Thus we would not hesitate in

¹ Acts ix. 3; xxii. 6; xxvi. 13, 14.

² 1 Cor. xv. 9; Gal. i. 13; Phil. iii. 6; 1 Tim. i. 13.

this sense to say that it was the soul of Jesus that spoke to Paul on the road to Damascus.

On the strength of his vision on the road to Damascus, Paul regarded himself as an apostle and prides himself on having received the Gospel from Christ directly. For, says he :

" I neither received it (the Gospel) of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Christ."

When Christ died the death of a criminal the little Nazarene congregation was overwhelmed with fear and grief at the sad fate of their leader. The belief that he was still alive, that he had been seen in various places in Jerusalem and in Galilee, did not take away the curse pronounced on him that hung on the tree.¹ It was the Pharisee of Tarsus who saw the blessing of the curse and the power of salvation in him who bears the punishment of sin.

If the Pharisee Saul had been a child of our century, he would at once have proceeded to Jerusalem to learn as much as possible about Jesus of Nazareth from the Apostles who had seen him face to face and were familiar with his doctrines. Saul does nothing of the kind ; on the contrary, he avoids contact with the Apostles and retires into Arabia ; and not until he had become clear himself about his conception of the Gospel did he go up to Jerusalem. Yet even then he limited his exchange of thought to the very pillars of the Church, Peter and James, the Lord's brother. St. Paul says :

" For ye have heard of my conversion in time past in the Jews' religion, how that beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God, and wasted it :

" And profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers.

" But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace,

" To reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the heathen ; immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood :

" Neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me : but I went into Arabia, and returned again unto Damascus.

" Then after three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days.

" But other of the apostles saw I none, save James the Lord's brother."

The difference of doctrine was considerable, for St. Paul regarded the communism of the Nazarenes and their strict observance of the law as unessential ; nevertheless Peter found no objection to the new Apostle so long as he promised not to create a disturbance in his own little flock. The Apostles at Jerusalem recognised the success of St. Paul in the prosperous towns of the

¹ Deut. xxi. 23.

Gentiles, whose sympathy appeared in the very substantial form of pecuniary contributions, which were quite welcome to the impoverished communistic society at Jerusalem. St. Paul says:

"When James, Cephas, and John, who seemed to be pillars, perceived the grace that was given unto me, they gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship; that we should go unto the heathen, and they unto the circumcision.

"Only they would that we should remember the poor."

While Jewish Christianity proved unacceptable to the world, the Gentile Church spread and increased; and it was Paul's gospel of the cross that conquered the world for Christ. Paul says:

"But God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world."

The power of the Gospel of the cross consists in the recognition of the truth that this world is a world of suffering, and that only by sacrifice for a higher purpose than self can man attain peace and solace. Many details of Paul's doctrines, his gnostic notions of the spiritual body and the arrangements as to the bodily resurrection, his prophecy of the coming of the day of the Lord during his own lifetime, and the transfiguration of the bodies of those who will be left, were at the time of great importance but faded from sight at the non-fulfilment of the prediction, leaving in the foreground and even increasing the great burden of his message of the Christ, crucified and therefore glorified.

It is noteworthy that Paul says nothing whatever concerning the form of the cross of Christ, whether it must be regarded as a simple pole, or as two intersecting beams, as a T, or as being of any other shape. The shape of the cross is indifferent. To Paul the cross means the ignominious and painful death of Christ by




THE TAU CROSS ON THE TRINITY DOLLAR.¹

¹ The original, which is preserved in the Museum of the Royal Mint at Berlin, is cast in silver; some of the figures being soldered on and the details having been finished with the chisel. Its size is more than four times the size of our illustration. The inscription reads "*Propter scelus populi mei percussus eum esaias LIII.*" It was made in 1544 on the order of Maurice, Duke of Saxony, by Hans Reinhard (See O. Henne am Rhyn *Kultur Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, p. 112).


which he set us an example ; and this conception of the cross has dominated the whole history of the Church, although there was no one of his successors who was his equal in spiritual comprehension and earnestness. On the contrary, there is a constant falling off, which finally resulted in the crudest idolatry and the revival of pagan superstitions.

THE EARLY CHRISTIANS.

St. Paul's conception of the cross is spiritual ; it is the significance of Christ's death and nothing besides, but the Church-fathers descant upon the occult meaning of all kinds of forms of crosses, the simple pole, the tree, the wood, the three-armed cross as a Y



THE Y CROSS.¹



THE T CROSS IN A PICTURE OF
THE TRINITY.²

and as a T, the four-armed cross (equilateral as well as with a prolonged foot), the slanting cross, and finally the five-armed cross, which is done frequently in one and the same sentence, as though the cross of Christ might have possessed all these shapes at once. The Church-fathers at any rate rejected no analogy that could possibly be found in nature and tried all methods that could in any way indicate the mysterious powers of the cross.

The cross as the raw wood of a tree is called the tree of life and becomes thus related to the ancient idea of a world-tree, which

¹From D'Agincourt, plate CI. Fresco in the chapel of St. Silvestro near the church of the Quattro Incoronati at Rome. Painted probably in 1348. See *The History of our Lord*, by Mrs. Jameson and Lady Eastlake, p. 175.

²Popularly known as the Italian Trinity and frequently painted in this style between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries. See *The History of our Lord*, by Mrs. Jameson and Lady Eastlake, p. 351.


plays an important part in various mythologies, especially as the Teutonic Ygdrasil and the Chaldean cosmic tree, an echo of which still vibrates through the words of the prophet Ezekiel.¹

One thing is sure, that from the traditions transmitted by the Church-fathers there is no way of settling the question of what shape Christ's cross might have been. The first centuries seem upon the whole to favor the T cross, while since the age of Constantine the four-armed cross begins to be more and more accepted. While the Greek Church adopted the erect equilateral cross (+), the Latin Church finally accepted the high standing four-armed cross (†) as the symbol of the Christian faith.



CHALDEAN TREE OF LIFE.

Professor Zöckler, summing up all that can be said in favor of the theory that Christ's cross had the shape of a T, says:



THE PASSION OF CHRIST ON THE CROSS AS A TREE WITH BRANCHES.
Mediæval Bible Illustration.

"In favor of the three-armed form of the cross is the typical cabalistic explanation of the number-value of the letter 'T,' which is 300 among the Church-

¹ In Chapter xxxi. the prophet compares the Assyrian to the world-tree, which is described in mythological terms so as to leave no doubt that he follows Assyriological prototypes.

fathers. Barnabas (*Epistles*, IX) mentions the number of the servants of Abraham as being three hundred and eighteen, and expresses them by the letters I. H. T. I=10 II=8, and T=300. Barnabas says that the number 318 (= *ιηϛ* or *Ιηϛωϛ*, T)



CURTAIN OF AN EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF EGYPT. (Restored by Swoboda.)¹

is a prophecy on the cross of Jesus. In a similar sense, Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.*, VI., 4-11), Ambrosias (*Defide Ad Grat.*, I., 3), St. Augustine (*Serm.*, 108

¹ Reproduced from Franz Xaver Kraus, *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 532.

De Temp.), Paulinas (*Epistles*, XXIV., 23) repeat the same explanation, and also allude to the three hundred warriors of Gideon, the conqueror of the Midianites as well as to the three hundred years of the saving ark of Noah (Genesis, vi. 15). Finally, Tertullian (*Adv. Marc.*, III., 22), Origen (*Hom. in Ezech.*, IX., 4).

The Egyptian cross, the so-called key of life, served the Christians of Egypt for a long time as the symbol of Christianity, and was used for a long time promiscuously with other forms of the cross, among which the equilateral Greek cross seems to have been most conspicuous. Some Egyptian representations of the crucifixion indicate the transition from the pagan to the Christian interpretation of this ancient symbol, the handle of the key of life being changed into the head of Christ while the transom bears his outstretched arms. The execution of these pictures is very crude but (as Kraus says, *l. l.* p. 537) highly interesting to the historian of Christian iconography. They illustrate the rule that ancient symbols are preserved even when radical changes set and become adapted by acquiring a new meaning.

The Egyptian key of life has also been carried to Italy probably through the influence of Egyptian Christians. We find it for instance on a ciborium-column in S. Petronilla (discovered in 1875) in a bas-relief representing the martyrdom of St. Achilleus. Here the form of the Egyptian cross is so changed as to give to the handle the appearance of a wreath, suggesting the interpretation of a crown of life which will be the reward of the Christian martyrs who take the cross of their master upon themselves.

Whether or not the Egyptian key of life plays a part in the formation of the Chrisma, the monogram of Christ (✠) which in some of its oldest forms frequently exhibits the shape of a standing cross (thus †), remains an open question which we hope to discuss in a special article.



THE EGYPTIAN CROSS ON THE MARTYRDOM OF ST. ACHILLEUS.¹ CIBORIUM COLUMN IN S. PETRONILLA (Fourth Century)

¹ Fr. X. Kraus. *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 198.

In spite of the frequent references of Church-fathers to the tau-form, the four-armed cross became more and more the typical symbol of Christianity, partly because people began to believe that this was the shape of Christ's cross, partly because the four-armed



THE CRUCIFIXION ACCORDING
TO THE EARLY CHRIS-
TIAN OF EGYPT.¹



THE EGYPTIAN KEY OF LIFE CHANGES
INTO A CHRISTIAN CROSS.¹

cross was more pleasing to the eye and appeared more complete partly perhaps because it was more cosmopolitan, being more frequently met with in nature and admitted of more interpretations.

¹ Forrer, *Die frühchristlichen Aethüner von Achmim-Panopolis*.

ITALIAN ANARCHISM.

BY PROF. G. M. FIAMINGO.

WE might search in vain perhaps for a better definition of anarchism than that just given by a little girl twelve years old. She is the child of one of the men taken a few weeks ago at Alexandria in Egypt, as an accomplice in the plot prepared against the German Emperor's life. Asked by a person who did not know the facts, what her father was doing abroad, the little girl replied:

"He is working for Anarchy."

"But do you know, little one, what Anarchy means?"

"O yes, it means hating God, the Government and the rich!" It is obvious to a philosophic student of life that the anarchism defined in such terms by its own apostles must be regarded as a purely pathological phenomenon, in lieu of being treated as a simple strange ideal or as a paradoxical social organism. Anarchism rebels against each and every form of authority. Now ere anarchism was heard of there already existed in Italy another social institution which has this same character, and that was brigandage. Carefully scrutinised to their fundamentals, anarchism and brigandage are both the violent expression of certain individual passions, of inherent social tendencies: anarchism, be it clearly understood, as it manifests itself in Italy, where it rarely, almost never, assumes the character of scientific anarchism that can boast in other lands distinguished adherents such as Prince Krapotkin and Elisée Reclus. In Italy anarchists are almost wholly to be sought among the most ill-informed of the populace. They are guided by the spirit animating the proverb that has long been very popular in Southern Italy and which runs: "I would rather be a bull for two years than an ox for a hundred!" In this popular saying we behold in brief a condensation of the philosophy of life that results in brigandage or anarchy as the case may be, or as the

social fashion runs. There was a time, until quite recently, when this brigandage, traditional and almost historic in Italy, presented certain features that could be invested with a cloak of heroism and romance, and brought into existence certain types that assumed in the popular mind, epic and legendary characters, such as the noted chieftains Tiburzi, Fioravanti, Menichino etc., who were almost mourned when captured or killed. By an easy transition, as the spiritual heirs of this movement, anarchy took birth, and under the burning sun of the South were hatched, as by magic, such creatures as Caserio, Angiolillo, Acciarito, Luccheni and others. Such anarchists would some thirty years ago have been dubbed brigands, and in lieu of over-running Europe in search of sovereigns to kill, would have retired into the thick tangles of the woods that crown the mountains of the Basilicata or the Romagna, organising a band of ruffians whom they would lead on to attack and plunder the postal diligence or even some helpless hamlet.

In short, in anarchism, as it exists in Italy, we are face to face with an interesting social phenomenon, that enables us to study the effects of the nineteenth century civilisation upon a secular Italian institution, for as such brigandage must be regarded. The result is a transmutation into anarchism. The outlaw, proud, and of boundless audacity, fiercely individualist, unyielding, and consenting to no matter what form of government except his own, found some pretext, no matter what—a vendetta to carry out, an unhappy love affair, a pretended persecution—in order to betake himself to the woods; and amid the hills, this voluntary exile from society established his reign. No one better than these Italian brigands has reduced to their utmost limits of absurdity, certain modern individualistic doctrines, perversions of the doctrines of Frederick Nietzsche. Now contemporary Italian anarchism is equally unconscious. Almost instinctively, by an imperious excessive expansion of their own individuality, the followers of anarchism have become the ignorant apostles of a misconceived version of the German philosopher's theories.

For their apostolatry cannot be called intelligent, since Caserio, Angiolillo, Lega, Acciarito, Luccheni, and all the rest of these notorious assassins, are absolutely deficient in education, and barely able to read and write their native tongue. Further, until a few weeks ago, not a single one of Nietzsche's works had been translated into Italian, and even educated readers took their views of him at second, third, and fourth hand, resulting in strange misconstructions of his meanings. Yet, so much are the ideas of na-

tions intertwined and mutually affected in these latter days of quick communication and rapid spread of news, that even the most ill-educated and abject are affected by the spirit of the times to such a degree that it is possible that a violent revolutionary movement should unconsciously be formed in Italy, making a species of dis-respectable vanguard to an intelligent movement in favour of unrestricted individuality. Its adherents are much more excessive in their doctrines than those who in France are called the "*libertaires*," for the Italian individualists look to Max Stirner and Nietzsche as their popes, both of which thinkers,—and this fact cannot be too much insisted upon,—they neither know at first hand nor grasp in their real significance. The leading and much gifted contemporary Italian novelist, Gabriele d'Annunzio, has made himself the mouthpiece of theories à la Nietzsche, but a Nietzsche again so ill understood that D'Annunzio's works might take rank as a perverted caricature of the German philosopher's views.

In D'Annunzio's footsteps follow a long line of romance writers and literary men who ape his style and repeat his crude, ill-digested social views. A more serious personality, a real thinker, is the greatest living Italian poet Giusuè Carducci. He too is an individualist, and one of so pronounced a type that he almost leaves the German Nietzsche behind, and since Carducci is Nietzsche's contemporary in age, he is therefore no follower, but has evolved his own individualism out of his inner consciousness. Carducci's influence too, has been far-reaching over the whole younger generation of students and readers, making them all preachers of the gospel of individualism, a task in which they have been further aided by the Italian sociologists and economists.

It is in this wise that the garden of Europe endeavors to heal the truly deep and terrible evils that have been inflicted upon it by an excessive leaning toward the perverse German philosophic theories of Karl Marx and his followers, i. e., by the method of reverting to another German thinker who stands at the opposite pole of their first leader. Francesco Ferrara, a leading spirit among living Italian political economists, the recognised worthy peer of Frederick Bastiat, as early as 1870 charged Italian University professors with Germanising and corrupting Italian youth. And in very truth, thanks to the philosophic and economic theories of government dear to Prince Bismarck, Italy has plunged herself into a bottomless pit of State-socialism, which has ruined the peninsula and is the real cause of its present sufferings. The functions assumed by the State and the local public institutions to the det-

riment of liberty and individuality, have been constantly increasing, until in this year of 1898 the public expenses of the peninsula amount to twenty-four hundred million (2,400,000,000) francs while the most trustworthy Italian political economists, such as Signor Bodio, the Director General of the office of State Statistics, Professor Pantaleone, Signor Stringher, calculate the average public riches produced annually in Italy at no more than five milliards (5,000,000,000) of francs. Thus the exigencies of the Government in Italy absorb every year the half of that which is produced by its 32,000,000 inhabitants.

In no European country are the ideas of Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lasalle so much to the fore as in Italy, nowhere have their socialistic programmes been so much put into practice. And now, just as the theorists had foreseen, the socialistic and social organisation gives as its immediate result the most violent anarchistic reaction. The most intelligent section of Italian youth has become the standard bearer of the most uncompromising individualist theories, and has adopted as its gospel Frederick Nietzsche's "*Also sprach Zarathustra*" though it can rarely read this book in its original tongue and has to approach it by a French translation. And the cause for this must be sought in nothing more nor less than an instinctive need to react against that State socialism that out of Germany has invaded Italy devastating its length and breadth. As a recoil from this terrible State socialism, that suffocates all individual liberty of action, just as by excessive taxation it has sterilized every economic activity, Gabriele d'Annunzio writes his novels and Giosué Carducci makes his verses, and those men who have intelligence and know how to write or speak imitate their example. But neither Caserio nor Angiolillo nor Lega nor Luccheni knows how to write or speak, so instead, by means of a stiletto or a pistol, they give violent and often unconscious expression to the popular protest against the cruel ills under which Italy groans.

It must not however be inferred for a moment that there exists a moral solidarity between those who write books calculated to react against the corrupt and vexing State-socialism that obtains in modern Italy and those who think they can remedy the evil by committing execrable political crimes more to be deplored even than those ills they hope to heal. Yet it is nevertheless true that the causes that induce these two methods of expression are absolutely identical, causes that have made Frederick Nietzsche to be regarded as an almost popular philosopher in latter day Italy and that have

brought about for the fair peninsula, a sad supremacy in anarchist crime.

Nevertheless, anarchist criminality, like the Nietzschean philosophy, is the last and *fin de siècle* manifestation of phenomena that are not new in Italy, for the mal-government of this land is of long standing. An accurate record of the political crimes committed in Europe in this century places their figure at about one-hundred and fifty in number. Of these purely political crimes more than a third go to the account of Italy alone. Now it is manifest that so many assassins are not born in Italy for the same reason that causes the olive and the orange to flourish on its soil. Italy has had so many assassins because already in 1860 there existed a Government which Mr. Gladstone classified as standing below the Turkish in infamy and justly stigmatised as the "negation of God." In those days, for such as had criminal tendencies, there was not lacking the occasion to become a political criminal, while the intelligent and cultured classes professed liberal doctrines, or formed themselves into Republican or Federalist factions.

All social movements in Italy instantly transform themselves into political factions, into protests and oppositions to the Government, which for centuries had been tyrannous. The aim of the movement in favor of national unity was the suppression of little states. It is noteworthy that the socialism of Karl Marx never found followers in Italy; while ever since 1860 the socialistic revolutionary views of Michel Bakounin spread the length and breadth of the peninsula, and this no doubt, because these doctrines enjoined the overthrow of the new *régime* which had instantly proved that it was of as tyrannous a complexion as that which it had superseded. To throw off the yoke of governmental omnipotence and individual slavery is equally the goal steered for by all the other Italian political parties, be they republican, democratic, federalist or what not.

Hence the anarchism personified by beings like Caserio or Luccheni represents that which forty years ago was simply called political crime, that is, it is the exaggerated expression of a large section of society who hold very opposed political and social views but are all agreed in severely condemning the action of the Italian Government that opposes every form of individual liberty and paralyses all the activity of the country by forcing everything under a bureaucracy. Political as well as anarchistic crimes are not possible in an essentially liberal government like that of England. In Italy, on the other hand, they are the spontaneous and necessary

product of the reactionary and tyrannical *régime* that pertains in the peninsula. If the saying of Adolphe Quetelet be paradoxical that it is society which puts the knife into the assassin's hand, it is surely not going beyond limits to incriminate the Italian Government as the fomenter of anarchist crime.

Indeed it would be hard to find in Italy a single person who does not hate and despise in words the action of the Government. Taxes have reached such an excessive limit, and are exacted in such a vexatious way, that they almost assume the character of theft. Justice is a myth. Magistrates can be bought and sold with the greatest facility and for a low price. Public security is null and the most treacherous crimes can be committed in the very centres of the largest cities. All governmental action is shamelessly corrupt and partial. Hence the populace detests their rulers and their actions as profoundly as does the *bourgeoisie* and if the present governmental *régime* is not upset, it is due solely and only to the force of social inertia, which is great and traditional in Italy. Now the hatred of the Italian populace against its tyrannous government is increased whenever it is able to draw comparisons. It is not an accidental fact that Caserio, Angiolillo, Lega, Luccheni and the rest have been wandering through Europe for a while, residing, above all in the free Swiss Republic, since they could not return to Italy. Indeed, the Italian laws concerning anarchy are so severe that it might almost be asserted that no Italian anarchist can be found in the peninsula. The Code punishes anarchy by means of the so-called *domicilio coatto* (forced residence) that is by relegating all persons known to hold these views to rocks in the Ionian Sea or to a penitentiary at Assab in Africa, where the malarious climate takes care that the capital punishment clause, erased since some years from the Italian Statute Book, shall nevertheless come into speedy action.

Now the sole aim of the International Anarchist Conference to which Italy has invited all the Powers has been to restore to Italy its anarchists, scattered over the whole of Europe. Thus in Italy at the end of the nineteenth century there have been rehabilitated those ideas of collective responsibility in crime such as are still held by the Bushmen and the Kaffirs. Solely because Lega, Luccheni and the rest commit horrible crimes, for which they are punished with death, or life-long imprisonment, their punishment is extended to hundreds of persons who up to that moment had given no proof of being animated by murderous desires. And even an assassin in Italy has the benefit of a legal trial. For those condemned to *domicilio*

coatto on the other hand, there is lacking even the semblance of judicial equanimity. The police in every town draws up a list of these presumed to be anarchists and sends this list to the central committee for the *domicilio coatto*. The individual thus incriminated has no possible means of exculpating himself against this secret denunciation, and one fine day, when he least expects it, he receives a visit from the *carabinière* who will arrest him and send him off to die on some distant shore. This method is closely related to that of the Inquisition of infamous memory. There is only one difficulty that stands in its way and that is the extraordinarily large number of persons whom they could strike. Thus, for example, a secret report presented by a Governmental Inspector of Schools in the province of Trapani in Sicily, affirmed that in the Lyceum of that city, out of eight professors, four were anarchists and of the thirty-two students at least twenty held the same views. Now if the persons in that Lyceum who held subversive views were to be sent to *domicilio coatto* it would have been needful to close the establishment. And this is only an example of many similar cases.

It is thus that Italy hopes to drag into the most deplorable political reaction all those Powers whom it has invited to its anarchist conference. It is needful to note this fact. The blind and misonicist reaction that to day directs the course of the Italian Government, does not spring from the murderous deed committed by Luccheni on the Empress of Austria, but rather from the revolutionary acts that saddened Italy in the May days of 1898. These revolutionary deeds, above all at Milan, were a serious attempt at overthrowing the actual political order. The populace, famishing, and groaning under the most burdensome and excessive tariff on foreign cereals that exists in all Europe, made a heroic and courageous attempt to shake of their burdens. This cost the lives of two hundred and fifty people and achieved nothing. In that revolution the anarchists practically did not appear. The great mass of the uprising was composed of socialists, republicans and democrats, or simple liberals, all men thoroughly discontented with the present state of things and all animated by the same hatred of the Italian Government, which they regard as the root of their economic misery. The chief leaders of these disorders were all condemned to hard labor for terms varying from twelve to fifteen years, though in some cases it was scarcely possible to establish the precise nature of the responsibility the men had incurred. Indeed the military tribunals themselves had to recognise the lack of a pre-conceived plot.

Since all these persons attempted the life of the Italian Government and rebelled against constituted authority, in the eyes of the Government they were all anarchists. It is to purge the land of this sect, who are its uncompromising enemies, that it has convened the Roman International Conference. And not the land of Italy only but the neighboring lands, whither Italian political culprits fly for refuge and whence they carry on their political propaganda.

It was to please a friendly nation that England gave its adhesion, in the first instance, to this idea, but on mature consideration and with a better understanding of the facts England has not participated. In any case, every clear-sighted politician knows that no practical result can spring from such a conference. Nor is the proposal to legislate internationally against anarchy new, but one that has already failed in several instances. The first project saw the light and then passed into the darkness of State archives at the initiative of Count Benst, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Austria-Hungary. Since thirty years the prospectus slumbers among the portfolios of the various Embassies and Ministers. Then followed a similar project elaborated by the Spanish Government, and after a Russian attempt at the same thing, the work of Gortschakoff. Even Prince Bismarck's proposition met with the same scant favor, elaborated after the great attempt made at Niederwald to blow up the German Emperor and the Princes.

The main difficulty in averting anarchistic attempts springs from the fact that anarchists, besides committing crime, also commit suicide and it is almost impossible to prevent suicide. The men who committed the recent murders, so fresh in all memories, the slayer of Carnot, the Austrian Empress and Castelar did their deeds for causes not dissimilar from those which animated Emanuel Jobard who stabbed a poor lady sitting next him in a theatre. Emanuel Jobard, interrogated concerning the reasons that pushed him to this crime, stated that he wished to die, but being a good Catholic he felt that he could not commit suicide, hence he had killed the first person that came in his way, certain that he would be condemned and killed in his turn, and yet should find time to repent and make his peace with God before appearing at the Throne. In the same way Caserio, Lega, Luccheni have taken strange roads whereby to become suicides. For each of these men did his deed under conditions that made detection certain and escape absolutely impossible. Nor did they attempt to fly. Angiolillo murdered Castelar in a public bathing establishment at San Juan, and his deed done,

stood by to see the result. Caserio struck the President of the French Republic in the most crowded street of Lyons. With the sole exception of the plot hatched against the life of the German Emperor in Alexandria, all the other anarchistic attempts committed by Italians, were the work of isolated individuals.

These anarchists who feel impelled to political crime are perfectly lucid as to what they are doing and the certain consequences of their actions. They are fatalists, led by a principle which they express thus; "Ideas must be watered with blood." From their point of view their own death is absolutely required in order to help on the progress of anarchistic theories; that is, liberty, and the general social welfare imposes on them a mission that costs their life. Nor do they quail or falter in the face of this necessity, acting just like the early martyrs to the Christian faith, who suffered torture and death, looking for their crown of glory in Heaven in return for their fidelity to their creed on Earth. The fact is patent that the Italian anarchists of to day, at least in their youth, made excessive professions of religious devotion and showed a leaning to mysticism. Both Caserio and Angiolillo, as boys, served the mass in their parish churches. But growing up in a sceptical age and environment, their souls, which were made to animate the fanatic apostles of a Divine Law, turned away, by a reversion, from all religious sentiment, and took from the social *milieu* in which they found themselves, an ideal, which they substituted for the God of the elder faith. For love of humanity, these mystic beings of unbalanced intellect became enamoured of the thought that to them was confided a murderous mission. Science has demonstrated that the anarchist assassins are nearly all affected with epilepsy, and beings who would not steal a pin nor break a single law, impulsively do the most atrocious deeds that cause the world to shudder with horror. In nearly every case tried, witnesses have testified to the kind-heartedness of the accused.

It is therefore obvious that we are dealing with persons who have been led into crime by the force, overwhelming in the case of their weakened brains, of that hypnotic suggestion which lies concealed in the social ideas they have accepted. And so sure are they of themselves, so tranquil in their conscience, that they do not even quail when led upon the scaffold, nor suffer from that *delirium tremens* which affects all ordinary criminals when they find themselves face to face with certain death. In short, they are all heroes and martyrs in their own eyes. They have a confused idea concerning the great social and economic evils that afflict their land, and,

impotent to comprehend the mechanism of social order and of a number of most intricate causes that determine the adversity of a land, these men impersonate the ills they deplore in one or several individuals. To their unbalanced brains, filled with a belief that a Messianic mission has fallen on their shoulders, the thought of killing a human being, who to them personifies all the social evils, becomes an act devoid of any criminal character, and they carry it into effect with the calmest conscience. It is no personal interest that has impelled them to the deed. They only aim after the happiness of society as the early martyrs aimed after the happiness of the world. And just the same causes which gave to the East so vast a concourse of saints and martyrs, and now-a-days of brigands, that is to say, the hot climate which makes the people easily prone to enthusiasms, and fervid illusions, these same causes, augmented to-day by the general economic and social ill-being with which fair Italy is afflicted, give to the land in this century's end the sad primacy in the production of criminal anarchists.

DEATH AND RESURRECTION.¹

BY THE EDITOR.

LESSING proved, in his ingenious booklet, *How the Ancients Represented Death*, that the Greek artists did not represent death as a skeleton, but as the brother of sleep, the picture being that of a genius with an inverted torch. In the meantime skeletons have been discovered among the relics of ancient art; but Lessing's contention has for that reason not been refuted. On the contrary,



GREEK SKELETON DANCE. SILVER CUP FOUND AT BOSCOREALE.

it found thereby further corroboration, for the skeleton is not intended to represent death.

It is well known that in Egypt the figure of a mummy was passed around on festive occasions, with the words, "eat and drink and be merry, for soon you will be like this." The mummy represented to them the transiency of life, and far from inciting the revelers to ponder over the problem of death, it was interpreted in

¹ This article is in the nature of a supplement to the series of articles on "Death in Religious Art" which appeared in *The Open Court*, Vol. XI., No. 12, and Vol. XII., Nos. 1 and 2.

the sense of Omar Khayyam as a lesson to enjoy life, and to drain the cup of pleasure to the lees.

The skeleton among the Greeks had the same significance as the Egyptian mummy at carousals. Far from making men serious, it was intended to dispel all gloomy thoughts. This interpretation appears most plainly in the silver cup found at Boscoreale among other silverware, the pieces of which show a simple and pure taste, but may belong to a later age of classical antiquity.

The skeletons represented on this cup are not genii of death, but represent certain sages and poets who have now passed away, and whose present condition would admonish the merry revelers to pluck the rose while it is in bloom, and to enjoy life while it lasts. It is a classical analogue to the Christian Death Dances; in fact, it is a death-dance; but how different is the tendency in the two cases!


There can be no doubt concerning the interpretation of the figures, since the names are inscribed over the skeletons, who represent the philosophers Epicurus and Zeno, and the poets Anacreon, Sophocles, Moschus, Euripides, and Menander.

Very strange performances are the death-dances of the Tibetan mystery-plays, one of which is performed on the last three days of the year and is called "the ceremony of the sacrificial body of the dead year." The effigy of a man made out of dough as life-like as possible and having inside a distinct heart and all the entrails filled with a red fluid, is placed by four cemetery ghouls in sight of the numerous spectators in the center of the yard, and at once bands of skeleton-ghosts rush upon the corpse to attack it. This is the time to display the necromantic power of Lamaism over the evil spirits. Monks and lamas come forth and go through a series of ceremonies, the magic effect of which keeps the fiends away. But a more formidable devil with great horns and possessed of superior powers makes his appearance and takes the field. Whereupon a saint or an incarnation of Buddha himself comes to the rescue, sprays flour on the enemy, makes mystic signs and utters incantations. The skeleton-ghosts and the big fiend grovel before him and implore mercy. He graciously yields to their supplications and allows them to partake of a sacramental meal. While they kneel before him he gives to each one of them a little flour to eat and a drink out of a vessel of holy water.

This concludes the day's performance.

The corpse, however, is not destined to be preserved. On the next day the fight is renewed, and after a cannonade with blessed

mustard-seed and other exorcisms, an awful demon appears whose title is "the holy king of religion." He wears the head of a bull, a dagger in the right and the effigy of a human heart in the left



TIBETAN SKELETON-DANCE.¹

hand. This strange figure seems to represent the main deity of the ancient Tibetans, when they were still in the habit of offering human sacrifices, not in effigy but in reality. The demon god has

¹ Reproduced from E. F. Knight's *Where Three Empires Meet*. London, 1893.

been converted by Buddha and become a protector of Buddhism. He is now satisfied with human sacrifices in effigy, and the man made of dough, being supposed to be an enemy of Tibet, is surrendered to him. He dances round the figure of the man on the ground, stabs him, binds his feet in a snare, and at last cuts off his limbs, slits open his breast, takes out his bleeding heart, lungs, and other intestines. At this moment a horde of monsters falls upon the remnants of the dismembered dough-man and scatters them in all directions. The pieces are collected again in a silver basin and the Holy King of Religion, eating a morsel, throws them up in the air. This is the signal for the *finale*: the pieces are caught and fought for by the demons, and at last the crowd of spectators joins the general scramble for pieces of dough, representing human flesh, which they either eat or treasure up as talismans.

Similar ceremonies are executed by different sects in different ways, but all of them indicate survivals of practices which antedate the institutions of Buddhism.



KING DEATH. GNOSTIC STONE.²

Another interesting relic of skeleton-representation is preserved by Gori¹ in a crude inscription which no longer belongs to classical antiquity but dates from the first Christian centuries. It is scratched on a magnet stone, and represents Death as a skeleton,

according to some such conception as is represented in the Gospel of Nicodemus, where Death in communion with Satan is said to have power over the world, as the great monarch to whom everything that lives is subject. The picture shows Death riding on a chariot drawn by lions; at least this is the interpretation which Bishop Münter³ gives of the strangely-shaped and ill-drawn animals, which gallop over another skeleton while a third skeleton to the right contemplates the scene.

The illustration is accompanied by unintelligible inscriptions similar in character to the Ephesian letters so frequently found on Abraxas gems. The probability is that this strange device, which unequivocally belongs to the period of Gnostic thought, was used as an emblem by some secret religious society, and represented an

¹ *Gemmae Astriferae*, II., p. 248.


² After Münter's reproduction (I., 86) from Gori's *Gemmae Astriferae*, II., p. 248.

³ *Sinnbilder und Kunstvorstellungen*, p. 110.

idea that was communicated to the members in "mysteries." The absence of any Christian emblem would lead us to conclude that it is pagan-Gnostic.

Death as a rule is not represented in the Christian catacombs, except perhaps by palms and wreaths, or allegories of rest. Boldetti¹ found in the cemetery of Calixtus and Praetextatus a crudely-wrought slab representing a wagon, the tongue of which is carved in the shape of a cross, and is turned backward, as a sign of its no longer being used. The driver and horses are not seen, but the whip appears by the side of the wagon. The inscription is mutilated beyond recognition, but the name of the man buried, Agilius, is legible.

While death itself is not represented by the early Christians, the thought of death was not foreign to them; and the main thing on which their interest is concentrated is the hope of resurrection.



DEATH AS THE END OF A JOURNEY.
Tombstone in the cemetery of Calixtus and Praetextatus.¹

The idea of immortality among the early Christians was not a preservation of the soul, but a resurrection of the body; and this is one reason why they preferred burial to cremation. Prudentius says (*Cathemerinon Hymn*):

"There will soon come a time when genial warmth shall revisit these bones, and the soul will resume its former tabernacle, animated with living blood. The inert corpses, long since corrupted in the tomb, shall be borne through the ether [*auras*], in company with the souls. For this reason is such care bestowed upon the sepulchre: so h honor paid to the motionless limbs—such luxury displayed in funerals. We spread the linen cloth of spotless white—myrrh and frankincense embalm the body. What do these excavated rocks signify? What these fair monuments? What, but that the object intrusted to them is sleeping, and not dead. . . . But now death itself is blessed, since through its pangs a path is thrown open to the just, a way from sorrow to the stars. . . . We will adorn the hidden bones with violets and many a bough; and on the epitaph and the cold stones we will sprinkle liquid odours." (*The Church in the Catacombs*, by C. Maitland, pp. 45-46.)

¹ *Osservazioni*, p. 349.

² Reproduced from Münter after Boldetti, p. 349.

The immortality of the soul, such as it was taught by Plato, whose Socrates scorned to identify himself with the corpse that would form his bodily remains, would not have satisfied these simple-minded people, and so the doctrine was officially adopted by the Church and incorporated into the Apostolic Confession of Faith, where it reads: "I believe in a resurrection of the flesh." The fear of death therefore is repelled by the thought of resurrection, which is interpreted literally and in a materialistic sense, and thus we find a great number of bas reliefs and pictures directly or indirectly representing the idea of a reawakening to life.

The Christians of later centuries clung tenaciously to the belief in resurrection from the grave, the reanimation of the dust, the revival of the body—or howsoever the doctrine was expressed; only of late this crude and materialistic conception begins to give way to a more spiritual belief in the immortality of the soul. The most favorite German funeral hymn begins with the words:¹

"Auferstehn, ja auferstehn
Sollst du mein Staub nach kurzer Ruh."

The hymns of the English-speaking world give expression to the same hope. American Christians sing:

"Thus shall they guard my sleeping dust
And as the Saviour rose
The grave again shall yield her trust
And end my deep repose."

Robert Pollok, a Scottish religious poet of great fervor and a faithful believer in Calvinism,² describes in detail how every atom of the body will be raised on the day of judgment. He says:

"The doors of death were opened, and in the dark
And loathsome vault and silent charnel-house

¹ This song is probably kept alive through its beautiful tune. It is a sign of the times that one of the verses of *Jesus meine Zuversicht*, which emphasizes bodily resurrection, has recently been dropped from the *Württembergische Gesangbuch*. The verse reads:

"Dann wird eben diese Haut
Mich umgeben wie ich gläube.
Gott wird werden angeschaut.
Dann von mir in diesem Leibe
Und in diesem Fleisch werd ich
Jesum sehen ewiglich."

It is obvious that the ideas of the resuscitation of "this skin of ours, these eyes, this body this flesh" have become objectionable to the ever increasing intelligent portion of Christianity.

² Robert Pollok was born at Moorhouse, Renfrewshire, Scotland, in 1798, and died at Southampton, Sept. 17, 1827. His chief work was *The Course of Time*, a poem which has passed through many editions, and is still a favorite in serious households in Scotland. The poem treats of the spiritual life and destiny of man. It was published March, 1827, and at once became popular. It is written in blank verse in ten books, in the poetic diction of the eighteenth century, but with abundance of enthusiasm, impassioned elevation of feeling, and copious force of words and images. See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol., XIX., p. 403.

Moving were heard the mould'ring bones that sought
 Their proper place. Instinctive every soul
 Flew to its clayey part: from grass-grown mold
 The nameless spirit took its ashes up. . . .
 Wherever slept one grain of human dust—
 Essential organ of a human soul,
 Wherever tossed—obedient to the call
 Of God's omnipotence, it hurried on
 To meet its fellow-particles, revived,
 Rebuilt, in union indestructible.
 No atom of his spoils remained to death.¹

A new and higher conception of life appears when the immortality of the soul is insisted upon without reference to a revival of the dust. Still mythological but less offensive are the lines

"There is no death in heaven;
 But when the Christian dies,
 The angels wait his parted soul
 And waft it to the skies."

Theodore Parker boldly cuts himself loose from the traditional belief in the resurrection of the flesh and objects to the immortality of "risen dust," saying:

"In the creed of many churches it is still written, 'I believe in the resurrection of the flesh.' Many doubted this in early times, but the Council of Nice declared all men accursed who dared to doubt it. . . . This doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh seems to me impossible and absurd. . . . When the stiffened *body* goes down into the tomb, . . . I feel that there is no death for the *man*. That clod which yonder dust shall cover is not my brother. The dust goes to its place, the man to his. It is then that I feel my immortality. I look thro' the grave into Heaven. I ask no miracle, no proof, no reasoning. I ask no risen dust to teach me immortality. I am conscious of eternal life."¹

As to the early Christians, we shall easily pardon the crudeness of their conception of immortality when we consider the crudeness of their philosophical knowledge and general education. To them religion was still a kind of magic. Thus Jesus is in the most ancient pictures of Christian art commonly represented after the fashion of a magician, wand in hand, to indicate his power of working miracles. The belief in miracles simply served in those times, as it does to-day, to feed the yearning for a resurrection of the dead. If miracles are possible, why cannot a corpse be resurrected to life? No doubt, in the bas-reliefs on sarcophagi where Jesus is represented as multiplying the loaves and fishes, the artist thought of

¹ Quoted from an unpublished book, *Faiths of Famous Men*, by the Rev. John K. Kilbourn Philadelphia, Pa.

him in the sense in which Christ is regarded in the Fourth Gospel, as being the bread of life. Further Christ is represented as Orpheus with the lyre that moved the heart of the pitiless king of death ; as Jonas who was hidden in the interior of the whale ; and especially as the master over life and death, which power he proved in the resurrection of Lazarus.

The crudeness of the old conception of immortality need not blind us to the germs of truth which are contained in it. We no longer believe in a reawakening to life of the corpse, but we know that there is a preservation of the soul.

Our life is in our thoughts, our sentiments, and in our endeavors, and they are spiritual, not material. The material particles which do the work while we think are discarded in the process as waste-products, and are replaced by new material of the same kind. Our thoughts are preserved as memory by a *preservation of form*. The form remains in the metabolism of our physical system and preserves the continuity of our spiritual life. In the same way as the waste products of the process of thinking are not our thoughts, the corpses of the dead are the remains of those who have consummated their lives, not the men themselves, not their aspirations, their thoughts, their deeds. The body dies and is doomed to disintegration ; but the significance of a man, his life-work, his soul, the new formations which he has called into being, are not annihilated in death ; they remain a living factor with the living and a real presence the bliss of which continues in its individual and personal significance according to the worth of each individual soul.

* * *

May I be allowed to add a suggestion :

Our funerals still show traces of the old belief in the resurrection of the body and are not yet free from the superstition of corpse-worship. The dead are often addressed by funeral orators as though they were the men themselves who have passed from us. The grave is called their resting-place and is visited and decked with flowers in honor of the deceased. The very ritual suggests these thoughts ; and the reverence with which we naturally deal with human remains naturally corroborates a materialistic conception of immortality. We should replace the funeral ceremony by a memorial festival. The funeral should be arranged in the simplest possible manner, not with a showy parade of flowers and music, but let it simply be a disposing of the remains, perhaps in the presence of a few witnesses, but not as the last official occasion at which the

sympathy of friends should be revealed. This, now so prominent a feature of funerals, should be reserved for a memorial which might be celebrated on the first birthday of the deceased after his death, or on memorial day, or on some other appropriate occasion, and it should not be a day of wailing over the deceased's death, but a day of thanks for his life and the good he has accomplished, in a word, not a lugubrious day of lamentation, but a memorial day, a thanksgiving, a harvest festival. If there are tears, let them be tears of gladness in remembrance of the blessings which the survivors enjoyed while he lived among them and which in part they still enjoy after his bodily form has been taken away.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE PHILIPPINE IMBROGLIO.

We are quite inclined to believe that serious mistakes were committed in the Philippine Islands when the sovereignty of Spain passed to the United States. The Filipinos were somehow unnecessarily offended, and did not at once receive a sufficient assurance of the intentions of our government to grant them the independence to which they were entitled. President McKinley might very well have received the messenger of Aguinaldo at Washington without acknowledging thereby the existence of a Filipino Republic. But while we acknowledge that mistakes were made by the representatives of our country, we cannot say that the Filipinos are blameless, and that it would be the patriotic duty of American citizens to support their cause and hamper our government in re-establishing peace in the Islands. The claims of Aguinaldo could not be granted, for that would have involved a suppression of the colonists and other peaceful inhabitants of Luzon to the arbitrary dictatorship of one man.

Our government has certainly tried to come to terms with the Filipinos allowing them a perfectly free home government, but Aguinaldo proved uncompromising and has refused the fairest propositions. Under the present circumstances, there is no choice for the United States but to continue the struggle until under peaceful conditions such a Filipino Republic can be established, as would not interfere with the independence of the white colonists.

Our government is bitterly criticised by a number of well-intentioned liberty-loving men but few of them consider that if the claims of Aguinaldo and his followers had been granted, we should have been guilty of neglecting the rights of others who are entitled to our protection. It is not impossible, that if the management of our affairs had been left to the loudest critics and defenders of peaceful methods, the imbroglio would be worse than it is now. American sympathisers with the cause of the Filipinos, as a rule, consider only the rights of the Aguinaldo party who are ready to defend their claims with gun in hand, and do not consider the rights of the non-combatants whose interests should not be neglected.

While the present warfare is lamentable, the more so as it is to a great extent based upon misunderstandings of the intentions of the American government, and while we should like to see the establishment of a Filipino Republic, we cannot countenance the methods of propagandism which a great number of prominent American citizens make in behalf of Aguinaldo. It seems to us that William Lloyd Garrison misinterprets the situation when he addresses Aguinaldo with these words:

"Thou hast unmasked a nation falsely clad
 In altruistic garb, revealed a land
 Blind to distinctions between good and bad,
 And smiting Liberty with ruthless hand."

The accusation is neither fair nor just, and can only be uttered by one who has no idea of the difficulty of the situation.

We repeat that our government made mistakes in the very beginning; but there is no justification for going to the extreme of slandering President McKinley by saying:

"Whether as tool or tyrant History's pen
 Upon the nation's scroll of lasting shame
 Shall pillory in letters black thy name,
 Time can alone adjudge."

It is the duty of our nation to establish order in the Philippines, and to give the Filipinos full liberty of home government, retaining for the United States government nothing except perhaps the possession of Cavite together with other strategic points of the harbor of Manila, and the recognition of a protectorate. Yet the latter should be drawn up in the form of an alliance, as an older brother would treat a younger brother, with rights similar to those the territories of the United States possessed, and nothing should be contained in the treaty which might savor of imperialism or indicate the conception that the Filipino republic is subject to the United States.

The best plan may prove to be a division of the territory of the Philippines into various states with different constitutions according to local requirements, ethnological as well as religious. The Mussulmans, the various mountain tribes, the Filipinos, the European colonists of the city of Manila, the Chinese colonists, etc., are too disparate elements to enter as homogeneous ingredients into the plan of a comprehensive Philippine Republic. But the various districts might be independent and might form a loose confederacy under the presidency of the United States; and a federal supreme court should be instituted as a court of last appeal in all affairs, civil litigations and criminal proceedings. It would be the duty of the latter so to construe the laws of the different states that they would not lead to collisions and would be interpreted in the spirit of modern civilisation and humaneness.

N.P.C.

BOOK-REVIEWS.

EIN DEUTSCHER BUDDHIST. Oberpräsidialrat Theodor Schultze. By *Dr. Arthur Pfungst*. Stuttgart: Fromman's Verlag (E. Hauff). 1899. Pages, 51.

This pamphlet is the memorial of a prominent German official and author of considerable influence, who not only played an important part in German history, especially with reference to the fate of the Duchies of Schleswig Holstein, but was also widely known in certain circles as a man deeply interested in the religious problem, with a strong inclination toward Buddhism.

Theodor Schultze was born in Oldenburg, Holstein, June 22nd, 1824, and died at Potsdam, April 6th, 1898. Educated at Lübeck, he studied jurisprudence at the Universities of Kiel and Berlin, and entered the Danish service of his native country in Holstein. When Holstein was occupied by the Prussians in 1864, he was retained by the conquerors for his special work, but he saw fit first to be released from his oath by the king of Denmark. This request being granted, he returned

to Holstein to resume his work, but the Prussian authorities discharged him. Schultze sought and found service in the Duchy of Oldenburg, and succeeded in pressing the succession-rights of the Duke of Oldenburg to the duchy of Holstein. The question was settled by the payment of a million dollars indemnity by Prussia to the duke of Oldenburg. Now his services were again sought by Prussia and he was appointed in 1866 as a member of the government of Kiel. On account of his executive ability, Bismarck called him to Berlin, but Schultze declined the honor because he saw danger in being too closely allied with Bismarck who (as Schultze declared) did not encourage independence and manhood among his co-workers. After having advanced to the high position of *Oberpräsidentrat*, he retired from active service in 1888, and devoted himself to religious problems. In 1898 he began to suffer from a cancer in the throat which soon made swallowing impossible. The patient refused artificial nourishment and thus actually died from lack of food after a fortnight's starvation. He attended to his daily routine work to the very end of his life, and although unable to eat attended even the common meals until the third day before his death. In accordance with his request there was no announcement of the funeral, no presence of a clergyman, no marking of his grave by a monument or tombstone, and no mourning dress among his friends and relatives.

Schultze remained unmarried, and led a very retired life. His career as a writer began only three years before he retired from public life, and after he had passed his sixtieth year. His first work was a translation of the *Dhammapada* in verse, which brings the spirit of this canonical book home to the reader much better than prose translations.

Two other books of his entitled, "The Christianity of Christ and the Religion of Life" and "The Rolling Wheel of Life, and the Firm Condition of Rest," are now published as one work under the title "Vedanta and Buddhism" as "ferments for the future regeneration of the religious consciousness of Europe." Schultze believed that the dry bones of Christian churchlife in Germany could receive new life impulses by a study of the Eastern religions.

Schultze accepts Pfeiderer's view that Christ, finding it impossible to realise his aim of founding a religion of life by energetic efforts, came to the conclusion that he could attain his aim through suffering, which induced him to submit to his innocent death on the cross. Schultze accepted the original Christianity as the religion of love, but repudiated the later development of dogmatism, and declared that we ought not to speak of the triumph of Christianity over the Greek or Roman paganism, but of that of the Greco-Roman paganism over Christianity. In comparing Buddhism with Christianity, he says:

"It is remarkable that while we send missionaries to India, our scholars study Brahmanism and Buddhism, not for the purpose of refuting them, but for profiting through a knowledge of them."

In a controversy which is the last literary production of Schultze, he said:

"Although I never thought of being a Buddhist missionary, I must own that if according to my opinion Christianity and Buddhism are compared impartially as factors of human culture, and questioned according to their real value for mankind, one must give the preference to Buddhism; and I hope that this view will be recognised more and more in Christian countries whose inhabitants are, after all, only nominally Christians."

Professor von Schroeder made a reply to Schultze, and insisted on giving the preference to Christianity. Schroeder said: "Buddhism is the grandest attempt of mankind to attain civilisation by one's own power; Christianity, however, is the

religion of the revealed love of God, which gives us salvation and a life of eternal bliss as a gift In Christianity, everything depends upon the person of Christ in Buddhism, upon the right doctrine The lack of Buddhism is that it is without God, without the service of God, and without prayers." In fact, Schroeder adds that Buddhism is not a religion at all, for "what is religion but a belief in a higher spiritual being (or beings) who live in a sphere above man?"

Schultze wrote that Buddhism does not so much deny the existence of gods but denies man's dependence upon them. It is not so much godless as free of gods.

In addition to the above-mentioned works, Schultze translated Ashvagosha's *Buddha-Charita* into German verses, and also John Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* from the English.

No one could have been more competent to write the memorial of Theodor Schultze than Dr. Arthur Pfungst of Frankfort, a poet of some repute who not only sympathised with his religious views but was one of the few men with whom Schultze remained in constant correspondence to the end of his life.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHRISTIANITY AND BUDDHISM. By Dawsonne M. Strong, C. B. London: Watts & Co. 1899. Pages, xv, 128. Price, 2s. 6d.

Any publication having a purpose akin to this work by Gen. D. M. Strong is to be welcomed, for through such efforts the misunderstandings between Christianity and Buddhism will gradually be reduced to a minimum, and the conception of a universal religion of humanity, now apparently Utopean, may one day be actually realised on earth.

All religious biases originate in the false conviction on the part of each religion that it alone is in the possession of the truth. This arrogant and intolerant spirit sometimes urges its devotees to do great and good deeds, but as a rule, and particularly in the intellectual field, it does more evil than good. The misunderstanding between Christianity and Buddhism, the two greatest religious systems of the world, each of which, while proclaiming the doctrine of universal love, despises the other as false, heretical, atheistic (in the sense of being immoral), is chiefly due to just this mental prepossession and false religious conviction. But there is another cause which tends to create misconceptions. I refer to the difference of terminology. Symbol is the key to things spiritual, and since we mortal beings are not capable of communing with one another as pure spirits, we must make use of symbols or words, which, however, being subject to differences, may in spite of their helpfulness become at once the source of serious misunderstandings.

Now, Buddhistic terminology is so different from that of Christianity that all superficial students of it invariably fail to grasp its significance, and, not being conscious of their lack of knowledge, they are only too willing to ascribe their misconceptions to the religion itself. One of the gravest misinterpretations thus formed is the Anâtman theory of the Hînayâna system, which corresponds to the Cûnyatâ doctrine of the Mahâyâna. Dr. Carus in his *Buddhism and Its Christian Critics* has endeavored to make this point clear for Christian readers, and General Strong in his present work shows no hesitation in joining him. In connexion with this point let me say a few words about the Cûnyatâ theory of the Mahâyâna.

"Cûnya" means void, empty, lack of characteristics, etc., but let us see how it is used by Buddhists. Açvaghosa, forerunner of the Mahâyâna philosophy, divides his system into two departments, that which treats of Suchness (= Bhûta-tathatâ), and that which treats of Birth-and-Death (= Saṃsâra); and Suchness is stated by him as devoid of or transcending all forms of individuation, namely as

Cūnya. (See his Mahāyānaçraddhotpāda-çāstra.) Nāgārjuna, from whose marvellous genius the Mahāyāna Buddhism received its finishing touches discriminates two kinds of truth in his Mādhyamikaçāstra, practical truth (= samvrtisatya) and pure truth (= paramārtha). The practical truth is a naïve realism, while the pure truth is unconditioned, absolute, infinite, in another word, çūnya.

Next, let us examine what the Vijñānavādin, otherwise called Yogacaryā, says about çūnya. According to the Vijñānamātrati-siddhi çāstra by the famous Vasubandhu, there are three kinds of world conceptions: (1) that which is founded on imagination (= parikalpita-lakṣaṇa); (2) that which sees the relativity of existence (= paratantra-lakṣaṇa); and (3) that which conceives the real reality (= pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa. And this real reality is practically neither more nor less than Açvaghosa's Suchness and Nāgārjuna's Pure Truth, for Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa is defined as the middle path between existence and non-existence, while the Cūnya is recognised both by Açvaghosa and Nāgārjuna to be a name provisionally given to the Truth which transcending relativity and conditionality is out of the sphere of verbal description.

Now suppose that they used the term çūnya in the sense of nothingness, having in view a nihilistic conception of the world: how could we then reconcile this term with such words as Suchness, Pure Truth, or the Middle Path, all of which convey a positive sense? It seems to me that those who ignore what is really meant by Cūnya and who almost wilfully denounce the Mahāyāna philosophy as a nihilism or a system which recommends one to sit down and idly contemplate the nothingness of existence, are simply declaring their utter ignorance of one of the greatest intellectual movements that ever appeared in our Manuśyaloka. Let those who are broad-minded and keen-sighted make an honest inquiry into the truth of the matter.

To return to our book, General Strong considers that there are three prominent features in Christianity and Buddhism,—the metaphysical, the ethical, and the biographical. The latter two having been exhaustively contrasted in connexion with these systems, he says, he has confined himself to a consideration of the first point. The book consists of an introduction, five chapters, and an appendix. The first chapter treats of Jesus and Gotama; the second of God and Cosmos; the third of Soul, Self, Individuality, and Karma; the fourth of Heaven and Nirvāna, which he agrees with Dr. Carus in considering to be synonymous with enlightenment; the fifth is the concluding chapter, in which the author proclaims the fundamental identity of the two greatest religions in the world, adding a hymn taken from the Samyutta-nikāya. In the Appendix we have his versification of some of the Buddhist legends.

The book abounds with quotations from many important Buddhist works compiled or written by Western scholars, and all these materials are happily disposed of. Those who have read Dr. Carus's *Buddhism and Its Christian Critics* will be glad to find a companion-work in Gen. D. M. Strong's present contribution to Buddhist literature.

T. SUZUKI.

SOURCE-BOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY. Edited for Schools and Readers by *Albert Bushnell Hart, Ph. D.* With practical introductions. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1899. Pages, xlvi+408. Price, 60 cents.

*This little book is an attempt to do for the study of American history what the photographer does for the study of art,—to collect a brief series of illustrations which, without including a hundredth part of the whole field, may give examples

of the things most important to know." It is designed, not to supplant the text-book, but to accompany it. Its author hopes that the brief records which constitute it "may awaken interest in the books from which they came and in the men who wrote them; that a clearer idea of what our ancestors did and thought and suffered may be had from their own writings; that the book may serve as a part of the material necessary for topical study; and, above all, that it may throw a human interest about the necessarily compact and factful statements of text-books."

The work consists of brief selections from the authors and the books of all periods of American history, including even the Spanish War. The following are some of the titles of the chapters: (1) Discoveries; (2) Conditions of Settlement; (3) First Era of Colonisation; (4) Second Era of Colonisation; (5) Colonial Life in the Seventeenth Century; (6) Rivals for Empire; (7) Colonial Life in the Eighteenth Century; (8) Colonial Government; (9) The Revolution; (10) The Confederation and the Constitution. etc., etc. Typical selections are, for example: extracts from the letters of Christopher Columbus; from the history of Captain John Smith; from the history of John Winthrop; from Cotton Mather's records of the witch-trials of New England; from Besse's records of the persecution and execution of the Quakers in New England; from the ordinances of New Amsterdam; from the memoirs of Tonti; from the letters of Washington; from the papers of Franklin; from the Boston town records; from the papers of the presidents; from the newspapers and the public proceedings generally; and in more recent times from the principal poems and the political writings of our great authors; from the magazines; and so forth, and so forth.

Some very typical fac-simile illustrations have been incorporated in the book, with a view of suggesting to young people the kind of manuscripts and other materials which historians are obliged to study. The frontispiece is a reproduction of a part of the original Mayflower Compact, 1620. There are also reproductions of specimens of Continental paper currency, 1776; of Charles Carroll's letter on fugitive slaves, 1826; and lastly, extracts from the final Proclamation of Emancipation, by Abraham Lincoln. Practical introductions have been added: (1) on the use of sources in history-study, by the author, giving bibliographies and a list of reprints of old documents available for schools; (2) on the sources in secondary schools, and by Dr. R. G. Huling, of the Cambridge, English High School; (3) on the sources in normal schools, by Prof. Emma Ridley, who has drawn up a long list of subjects for topical study from sources.

Dr. Hart's book is a valuable addition to the historical literature of the school-room, and cannot fail to give to the students of our high schools and academies some idea of the scientific methods which are now employed the world over in writing history.

The field of Year-Books seems to be a province pre-eminently French. As there is no department in America or England in which there is not a *Review of Reviews* (the latest that has come to our notice being *The Psychic Digest; or, the Esoteric Review of Reviews*), so in France the mania for epitomising has found embodiment in the establishment of a dozen or so *Années*, there being a philosophical *Année*, a biological, a psychological, a political, a scientific, a literary, and several other *Années*. The latest is *L'année de l'église*, which is the year-book of the Catholic Church and has been compiled by M. Ch. Égremont (Paris: Victor Lecoffre). It is a handy volume, and will for the statistics which it contains be of value to publicists and theological writers. It is more than a chronology; it is a

running comment upon all the significant events which have taken place within the Catholic Church for the year 1898; the compiler having sought to emphasise the idea and moral import of each of these events, rather than to give their details. A section is devoted to each of the countries of the world, one to the Holy See, and one to missions. The acts of the Sacred College and the Encyclicals of the Pope are discussed, as are also such subjects as pilgrimages, Leo XIII. and the social question, the relations of the Holy See with the various powers, etc. It will be interesting both to the friends and the enemies of the church to learn that Cardinal Gibbons puts the number of conversions to the Catholic Church in the United States at 30,000 annually. The number of Catholics in the United States in 1898 was 9,500,000, and the number of churches nearly 8000. We hope that the second volume of the *Année* will have an index.

The readers of *The Open Court* are perfectly familiar with the career, and partially also with the religious and philosophical views, of Victor Charbonnel. (See *The Open Court* for May 1898). The best-known of the books of Victor Charbonnel is his *La volonté de vivre* which tells how he passed from Catholicism to "the religion of the ideal," the free Christianity of Channing and Tolstoi. The book caused no little stir in France, and has now been translated into English under the title of *The Victory of the Will* by Emily Whitney, daughter of the late Professor Whitney of Yale College, and has been published in attractive form by Little, Brown & Co., of Boston. We may characterise M. Charbonnel's views by one or two brief quotations. "We have only to close the sanctuary of our soul," he says, "and accustom our eyes to its shades, in order to see splendors shine forth, to hear voices that inspire and counsel." It is the gospel of introspection, "the assertion of the spiritual man over temporal conditions," the cultivation of character and of right conduct in life by a constant exercise of the will. Life should be a "continuous effort of will." "Let us be at every moment masters of ourselves." It is an eloquent book, rather rhapsodical in parts, and with a slight tendency to mysticism. The translation of the book has been well done, and an introduction has been supplied by Lilian Whiting. Miss Whiting is quite unrestrained in her admiration of the author, has called M. Charbonnel "the Emerson and Mæterlinck of France," and predicts that his book will arouse the same enthusiasm in America as it did in his own country. The enthusiasm which is accorded to the book, however, may perhaps be qualified by the spiritualistic, telepathic, and otherwise ghostly interpretations which Miss Whiting has placed upon the utterances of M. Charbonnel; the burden of her entire message being that the spiritual truths which the author has enunciated are finding their substantiation (and even a thin material substratum) in the discoveries of contemporary science. But her review of these discoveries will hardly be accepted by scientists. Miss Whiting has said many beautiful things, but the "unseen world" makes too many demands on her science, and the beauty which is the characteristic of truth is wanting to it.

The Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for 1897 contains the usual large number of original scientific memoirs, digests of scientific progress in the various sciences, and reprints of important scientific researches. We mention the following articles as important: (1) The Aspects of American Astronomy, by Simon Newcomb; (2) The Evolution of Satellites, by G. H. Darwin; (3) Electrical Advance in the Past Ten Years, by Elihu Thomson; (4) The X-Rays, by W. C. Röntgen; (5) Cathode Rays, by J. J. Thomson; (6) Story of Experiments in

Mechanical Flight, by S. P. Langley; (7) On Soaring Flight, by E. C. Huffaker; (8) The Revival of Alchemy, by H. C. Bolton; (9) Diamonds, by William Crookes; (10) The Discovery of New Elements Within the Last Twenty-Five Years, by Clemens Winkler; (11) An Undiscovered Gas, by William Ramsey; (12) Fluorine by Henri Moissan; (13) The Age of the Earth as an Abode Fitted for Life, by Lord Kelvin; (14) Crater Lake, Oregon, by J. S. Diller; (15) Recent Progress in Physiology, by Michael Foster; (16) The Law Which Underlies Protective Coloration, by Abbott H. Thayer; (17) Recent Research in Egypt, by W. M. Flinders-Petrie. The illustrations of these articles are also good, and students will find in the Reports a rich store of material for investigation and reference.

Dr. Alfred Espinas, of the University of Paris, the author of the well-known work *Animal Societies*, has published within the last two years a very readable book on the *Origin of Technology*.¹ Properly speaking, it is a study in sociology, but it may also well be ranked as a philosophical work. "The philosophy of knowledge," he says, "has had its historians; it will therefore not be out of place, to attempt to write the history of the philosophy of action." His point of view is that one general law dominates the development of technology: a theory of facts is not possible until the facts have been in existence for a certain period of time; we constantly see the philosophy of action following upon the development of industries and of the practical arts. The development of philosophical technology is traced in the history of religions, especially in that of Greece. In fact, general technology goes hand in hand with theology and ethics. There is a valuable chapter upon tools and machines, which follows the theory of organic projection enunciated by Kapp, that the tool or instrument forms a unit with the operator; it is the continuation the projection without, of an organ. The operator uses it as he would some prolonged member, without hardly ever thinking of its structure or of inquiring how its different parts are adapting themselves to their work. The labor produced by its assistance may still be regarded as natural. But the machine stands upon a higher plane, involving the reasoned realisation of some unique aim. It is largely the result of reflection, and the adaptation of its articulated parts is perfect.

Two of the most recent issues of the Library of Contemporary Philosophy, published by Alcan, Paris, are: (1) *La timidité*, by Dr. L. Dugas, who has sought to distinguish timidity from fear, and has given a psychological analysis of its conditions and an ethical discussion of its rôle in character and society; (2) *Les fondements de l'éthique*, by Prof. E. De Roberty, of the New University of Brussels which is the third essay of his series on "Morals Considered as Elementary Sociology," which was announced some years ago. Dr. De Roberty's writings have been mentioned several times in *The Monist*, to which we refer readers who would know something of their contents. He is the author of many books, and is pursuing every philosophical question zealously.

NOTES.

The Clark University, of Worcester, Mass., in celebrating the tenth anniversary of its existence last month, wisely followed the precedent which was set by Princeton some years ago at its sesquicentennial celebration by making the main feature of the program an exhibition of scholarship rather than one of pageantry.

¹ *Les Origines de la technologie*. By Alfred Espinas. Paris: Félix Alcan, 108 Boulevard Saint Germain, 1897. Pages, 295. Price, 5 francs.


There was a series of lectures delivered at the university by distinguished representatives of science from each of the leading countries of Europe. Émile Picard, Professor of Mathematics at the University of Paris, gave three lectures on subjects connected with his specialty; Ludwig Boltzmann, Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Vienna, delivered four lectures on the principles and fundamental equations of mechanics; Angelo Mosso, Professor of Physiology at the University of Turin, lectured on Conscious Processes and Bodily Exercise; Santiago Ramon y Cajal, Professor of Histology at the University of Madrid, spoke of his latest investigations on the texture of the human cerebral cortex, giving practical demonstrations; and August Forel, late Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Zürich, and director of the Burghölzli Asylum, lectured on hypnotism and the habits of ants. Professors Picard and Cajal spoke in French, and Professors Boltzmann, Mosso and Forel in German. The courses were free.

The significance of such courses in strengthening the bonds of international scholarship and educational good-will cannot be overestimated, and our universities are to be congratulated on the wise and systematic policy which they are pursuing in this direction.

While going to press, the news reaches us of the demise of Col. Robert G. Ingersoll, the great agnostic—a powerful orator, and a man who had the highest courage of his conviction. He passed away in peace, without pain, without agony, without even a groan or a sigh. There is no need of our praising the virtues of the Colonel for he is well known throughout the country and has in his career been constantly before the public. His family life was exceedingly happy and perhaps the most beautiful lines he wrote, and those which expressed his religious views in positive terms, were dedicated to his grandchild; the whole having been published in elegant form with pictures of grandfather and grandchild.

Our readers know that *The Open Court's* attitude toward religion is different from that of the Colonel. We have repeatedly discussed our differences in the most amicable way both at Dobbs Ferry, N. Y., and at Mr. E. C. Hegeler's residence, La Salle, Ill. Colonel Ingersoll was quite ready to accept the *Religion of Science* as his own and actually said so in public when at the request of the Rev. Mr. Rusk he addressed an orthodox Christian congregation in Chicago; but he could not be induced to change his aggressive tactics for a more constructive method. It was not his field, and he was too much of a fighter to show a conciliatory spirit.

The soul of his father was re-incarnated in him, only turned in the opposite direction. The champion of the church militant, direct and unreserved in his faith, had become an uncompromising iconoclast; but the character remained the same. And when we consider the work which he has accomplished, we think that religious people ought to be grateful to him; for to a great extent we owe to him the disappearance of much narrowness and thoughtlessness in our churches, and his merit for the purification of religion cannot be doubted even by his bitterest enemies.



THE FEELING OF DEPENDENCE.

By SASHA SCHNEIDER.

[See the article "Is Religion a Feeling of Dependence?"]

Frontispiece to *The Open Court* for September, 1899.

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A BASIS FOR REFORM.

BY THE HON. C. C. BONNEY.

ONE of the great shortcomings of our nation is due to a lack of system both in the administration of the government and the construction of the laws. What we need for our high offices and in our legislature is not only a greater number of honest men, but also men trained in the philosophy of law and familiar at least with the principles of statecraft.

In a free country, government must be the supreme business of the people. It is amazing to see that in American public life the public service goes limping on a beggar's dole, while the great private institutions command the highest order of talent by paying what it is worth. The error of a false notion of public economy ought to be rooted out of the public mind.

When the governments of the United States and the several States of this Union shall begin to regard government as the great business of a free people, and to consider how transcendently greater are the interests of even a small city—not to say a large city, or a State—than the largest and most gigantic of private enterprises can be; when we shall secure for public service the best talent of the country and when it will be deemed an honor and a distinction to hold positions of public trust the same that are now doled out as spoils to the bosses of the victorious party; then, and not till then, we shall have reason to be proud of our national life and may expect that all the several reforms that are needed in the various branches of government and the dispensation of the laws will make speedy headway.

But we demand that government employees should have a better financial outlook, be it in higher salaries, or in having life-

positions, or in the assurance of pensions, for the sole purpose of raising the standard of civil service. We have never had in this country any *standard* of the civil service, legislative, executive, or diplomatic. We have standards of judicial and legal procedure. We have standards of army and naval service. We have the naval academy and a military school, in which are trained, continually, young men drawn from the congressional districts of this great nation. I desire to call attention to this great omission.

To make the system of government complete there should stand also, side by side with the naval and military academies, a Civil Service Academy, in which the arts of statesmanship and diplomacy should be taught, to fix a certain standard of excellence for the American people, and to hold up this standard before those who seek preferment in public life, to show the nature and extent of the qualifications which they should try to acquire.

It is not that none but those who graduate in the military or naval academies succeed in obtaining honor in those professions, nor would it be so in civil life, in case the school which I advocate should be established; but the influence of such an example could not, in my judgment, be over-rated.

In connexion with the proposition of creating a school for civil, legislative, executive, and diplomatic service, let me touch upon another problem of great importance.

In the founding of our government we obliterated the hereditary governing class, but substituted nothing in its stead. Whatever be the faults of hereditary aristocracies they serve in the Old World the purpose of giving steadiness to the government, of preserving the historical connexion, of heeding the experiences of the past, and acting in times of need as high-priests of patriotism.

Amid the trials of that early day there was a spontaneous response to the demands of the country which resulted in the admirable early legislation which is still the delight of every student of the law; but as the country advanced in its growth, and its interests were developed, we forgot that we had made no substitute for the hereditary governing class of other countries, and that, from its nature, the patriotic charity of voluntary and self-denying service must be temporary. Although we recognise in all private callings the necessity for study and experience and practice—nay, in one of the great departments of our government we recognise the necessity of long study and experience to fill the judicial bench,—still, when we come to the no less difficult and important matter of legis-

lation, we take it for granted that all men are endowed by nature with the high genius required for the framing of statute law.

Not only is this the case, that the governments, state and national, have never, up to this hour, made any provision for professional and skilled labor in the matter of statute making, but we have committed another folly to which public attention should be called. Because in the mother country there is a House of Lords, and because in the Congress of the United States there is a Senate to represent the equal rights of the states, therefore it seems to have been assumed that there must necessarily be a Senate and House of Representatives in the State Legislatures, and yet both of those bodies are characterised by the same principles of organisation and office. This should not be so. Evidently there has always been a feeling latent in the public mind, as well as in professional judgment, that there should be two legislative houses for some purpose, but that purpose has not been clearly discerned, or, if discerned, it has not been clearly defined.

What, then, can be suggested in this behalf? It is this: in contributing the results of experience, in acting on a matter of public policy, the judgment and suggestion of the blacksmith, the farmer, the merchant, the banker, are just as much entitled to respect as those of the highest scholar or professional man. As to the mere matter of discussing public policy, and deciding whether a measure of a particular kind is required, an assembly of men drawn fresh from the people, and representing every class in the community, and every interest in the state, is the proper body to determine such questions, and they ought, in my judgment, to be determined, as has sometimes happened in this country, and not infrequently in the mother country, not on the details of a statute, but upon a simple resolution of inquiry whether or not the proposed legislation ought to be enacted in the State.

Then, above this body of popular representatives should sit the Senate, to take the measures which the popular judgment has approved, and embody them in the clear and exact provisions of a well-known statute. Statute-making is not only strictly professional work, it is the very highest order of such work.

The drawing of a well-constructed bill requires great accomplishments, and the endowments which belong only to highly-gifted minds, and yet that is a summer-day pastime compared with the difficult task of framing a wise and well-constructed bill for enactment into a law by the legislature. The statute-maker must look into the future, and endeavor to perceive the various contin-

gencies and difficulties which may arise. Hence I suggest that we will find the best skilled body for the delicate work of statute-making, and an effective prevention of defective and slipshod legislation, in a slight reconstruction of the Senate, in our various state legislatures, by making them consist only of experienced professional men, assimilated in tenure and compensation to the judiciary.

THE CHRIST OF PAUL.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE Queen of Sheba certainly deserved her exaltation as the Hebrew Athena, and the homage paid to her by Jesus, for journeying so far simply to hear the wisdom of Solomon. In Jewish and Christian folklore are many miraculous tales about the Queen's visit, but in the Biblical records, in the books of "Kings" and "Chronicles," the only miracle is the entire absence of anything marvellous, magical, or even occult. The Queen was impressed by Solomon's science, wisdom, the edifices he had built, the civilisation he had brought about; they exchanged gifts, and she departed. It is a strangely rational history to find in any ancient annals.

The saying of Jesus cited by Clement of Alexandria, "He that hath marvelled shall reign," uttered perhaps with a sigh, tells too faithfully how small has been the interest of grand people in the wisdom that is "clear, undefiled, plain." They are represented rather by the beautiful and wealthy Marchioness in "Gil Blas," whose favor was sought by the nobleman, the ecclesiastic, the philosopher, the dramatist, by all the brilliant people, but who set them all aside for an ape-like hunchback, with whom she passed many hours, to the wonder of all, until it was discovered that the repulsive creature was instructing her ladyship in cabalistic lore and magic.

There is much human pathos in this longing of mortals to attain to some kind of real and intimate perception beyond the phenomenal universe, and to some personal assurance of a future existence; but it has cost much to the true wisdom of this world. Some realisation of this may have caused the sorrow of Jesus at Dalmanutha, as related in Mark. "The Pharisees came forth and began to question with him, seeking of him a sign from heaven,

testing him. And he sighed deeply in his spirit, and saith, Why does this people seek a sign? I say plainly unto you no sign will be given them. And he left them, and reëntering the boat departed to the other side."

They who now long to know the real mind of Jesus are often constrained to repeat his deep sigh when they find the most probable utterances ascribed to him perverted by the marvel-mongers, insomuch that to the protest just quoted Matthew adds a self-contradictory sentence about Jonah. That this unqualified repudiation by Jesus of miracles should have been preserved at all in Mark, a gospel full of miracles, is a guarantee of the genuineness of the incident, and of the comparative earliness of some parts of that Gospel. The period of sophistication was not far advanced. Miracles require time to grow. But the deep sigh and the words of Jesus, taken in connexion with the entire absence from the Epistles—the earliest New Testament documents—of any hint of a miracle wrought by him, is sufficient to bring us into the presence of a man totally different from the "Christ" of the four Gospels.¹

Those who seek the real Jesus will find it the least part of their task to clear away the particular miracles ascribed to him; that is easy enough; the critical and difficult thing is to detach from the anecdotes and language connected with him every admixture derived from the belief in his resurrection. To do this completely is indeed impossible.

Paul, probably a contemporary of Jesus, knew well enough the vast difference between the man "Jesus" and the risen "Christ"; he insisted that the man should be ignored, and supplanted by the risen Christ, as revealed by private revelations received by himself after the resurrection. The student now reverses that: for he must ignore those post-resurrectional revelations if he would know Jesus "after the flesh"—that is, the real Jesus.

In an age when immortality is a familiar religious belief we can hardly realise the agitation, among a people to whom life after death was a vague, imported philosophy, excited by the belief that a man had been raised bodily from the grave. Immortality was no longer hypothesis. If to this belief be added the further conviction that this resurrection was preliminary to his speedy reappearance, and the world's sudden transformation, a mental condition could not fail to arise in which any ethical or philosophical ideas he might have uttered while "in the flesh" must be thrown into

¹ The name Jesus is used here for the man, Christ being used for the supernatural or risen being.

the background, as of merely casual or temporary importance. Such is the state of mind reflected in the Pauline Epistles. In them is found no reference whatever to any moral instructions by Jesus. And when after some two generations had passed, and they who had expected while yet living to meet their returning Lord, had died, those who had heard oral reports and legends concerning him and his teachings began to write the memoranda on which our Synoptical Gospels are based, it was too late to give these without reflexions from the apostolic ecstasy. His casual or playful remarks were by this time discolored and distorted, and enormously swollen, as if under a solar microscope, by the overwhelming conceptions of a resurrection, an approaching advent, a subversion of all nationalities and institutions.

The most serious complication arises from the extent to which the pretended revelations of Paul have been built into the Gospels. The so-called "conversion of Paul" was really the conversion of Jesus. The facts can only be gathered from Paul's letters, the book of "Acts" being hardly more historical than *Robinson Crusoe*. The account in "Acts" of Paul's "conversion" is, however, of interest as indicating a purpose in its writers to raise Paul into a supernatural authority equivalent to that ascribed to Christ, in order that he might set aside the man Jesus. The story is a travesty of that related in the *Gospel According to the Hebrews*, concerning the baptism of Jesus: "And a voice out of the heaven saying, 'Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased': and again, 'I have this day begotten thee.' And straightway a great light shone around the place. And when John saw it he saith to him, 'Who art thou, Lord?'" John fell down before Jesus as did Paul before Christ. "At midday, O King, I saw on the way a light from heaven, above the brightness of the sun, shining round about me, and them that journeyed with me. And when we were all fallen to the earth, I heard a voice saying to me in the Hebrew language, 'Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? It is hard for thee to kick against the goad.' And I said, 'Who art thou, Lord?'" (Precisely what John said to Jesus at the baptism.)

This story (Acts xxvi. 13-15), quite inconsistent with Paul's letters, is throughout very ingenious. Besides associating Paul with the supernatural consecration of Jesus, it replies, by calling him Saul, to the Ebionite declaration that Paul had been a Pagan, who had become a Jewish proselyte with the intention of marrying the High Priest's daughter. There is no reason to suppose that Paul was ever called Saul during his life, and his salutation of two

kinsmen in Rome with Latin names, Andronicus and Junia (Romans xvi. 7), renders it probable that he was not entirely Hebrew. The sentence, "It is hard for thee to kick against the goad," is a subtle answer to any who might think it curious that the story of the resurrection carried no conviction to Paul's mind at the time of its occurrence by suggesting that in continuing his persecutions he was going against his real belief—kicking against the goad.

Paul, however, knows nothing of this theatrical conversion in his letters. But in severe competition with other "preëminent apostles," who were preaching "another Christ" from his, he pronounces them accursed, supporting an authority above theirs by declaring that he had repeated interviews with the risen Christ, and on one occasion had been taken up into the third heaven and even into Paradise! The extremes to which Paul was driven by the opposing apostles are illustrated in his intimidation of dissenting converts by his pretence to an occult power of withering up the flesh of those whom he disapproves (1 Cor. v. 5). He tells Timothy of two men, Hymenœus and Alexander, whom he thus "delivered over to Satan" that "they may be taught not to blaspheme,"—the blasphemy in this case being the belief (now become orthodoxy) that the dead were not sleeping in their graves but passed into heaven or hell at death. In the book of "Acts" (xiii.) this claim of Paul's seems to have been developed into the Evil Eye (which he fastened on Bar Jesus, whose eyes thereon went out), and may perhaps account for the similar sinister power ascribed to some of the Popes.

In this story of Bar Jesus, Christ is associated with Paul in striking the learned man blind (xiii. 11), and the development of such a legend reveals the extent to which Jesus had been converted by Paul. In 1 Cor. ii. he presents a Christ whose body and blood, being not precisely discriminated in the sacramental bread and wine, had made some participants sickly and killed others, in addition to the damnation they had eaten and drank. He does not mention that any who communicated correctly had been physically benefited thereby; only the malignant powers appear to have had any utility for Paul.

That this menacing Christ may have been needed to intimidate converts and build up churches is probable; that such a being was nothing like Jesus in the flesh, but had to come by pretended posthumous revelation, as an awful potentate whose human flesh had been but a disguise, is certain. We need not, therefore, be surprised to find that nearly everything pharisaic, cruel, and

ungentlemanly, ascribed to Jesus in the synoptical Gospels, is fabricated out of Paul's Epistles. Paul compares rival apostles to the serpent that beguiled Eve (2 Cor. xi. 3, 4), and Christ calls his opponents offspring of vipers. The Fourth Gospel, apostolic in spirit, degrades Jesus independently, but it also borrows from Paul. Paul personally delivered some over to Satan, and the intimation in John xiii. 27, "after the sop, then entered Satan into Judas," accords well with what Paul says about the unworthy communicant eating and drinking damnation (1 Cor. xi. 29).

The Eucharist itself was probably Paul's own adaptation of a Mithraic rite to Christian purposes. There is no reason to suppose that there was anything sanctimonious in the wine supper which Jesus took with his friends at the time of the Passover, and Paul's testimony concerning the way it had been observed is against any sacramental tradition.¹ The two verses preserved by Epiphanius from the Gospel according to the Hebrews show that he desired to draw his friends away from the sacrificial feature of the festival: "Where wilt thou that we prepare for the passover to eat?" . . . "Have I desired with desire to eat this flesh, the passover with you?"² Had it been other than a pleasant wine supper it could not in so short a time have become the jovial festival which Paul describes (1 Cor. xi. 20), nor, in order to reform it, would he have needed the pretense that he had received from Christ the special revelation of details of the Supper which he gives, and which the Gospels have followed. Having substituted a human for an animal sacrifice ("our passover also hath been sacrificed, Christ," 1 Cor. v. 7), he restores precisely that sacrificial feature to which Jesus had objected; and in harmony with this goes on to show that human lives have been sacrificed to the majestic real presence (1 Cor. xi. 30). He had learned, perhaps by "Pagan" experiences, what power such a sacrament might put into the priestly hand.³

¹About 1832 the Rev. Ralph Waldo Emerson notified his congregation in Boston (Unitarian that he could no longer administer the "Lord's Supper," and near the same time the Rev. W. J. Fox took the same course at South Place Chapel, London. The Boston congregation clung to the sacrament, and gave up their minister to mankind. The London congregation gave up the sacrament, and there was substituted for it the famous South Place Banquet which was attended by such men as Leigh Hunt, Mill, Thomas Campbell, Jerrold, and such women as Harriet Martineau, Eliza Flower, Sarah Flower Adams (who wrote "Nearer, my God, to Thee"). The speeches and talk at this banquet were of the highest character, and the festival was no doubt nearer in spirit to the supper of Jesus and his friends than any sacrament.

²Dr. Nicholson's *The Gospel According to the Hebrews*, p. 60. In all of my references to this Gospel I depend on this learned and very useful work.

³It has always been a condition of missionary propagandism that the new religion must adopt in some form the popular festivals, cherished observances and talismans of the folk. It will be seen by 1 Cor. x. 14-22 that Paul's eucharist was only a competitor with existing eucharists, with their "cup of devils," as he calls it.

It is Paul who first appointed Christ the judge of quick and dead (1 Tim. iv. 1). He describes to the Thessalonians (2 Thes. 1) "the revelation of the Lord Jesus from heaven with the angels of his power in flaming fire, rendering vengeance to them that know not God," and "the eternal destruction" of these. Hence, "I never knew you," becomes a formula of damnation put into the mouth of Christ. "I know you not," is the brutal reply of the bridegroom to the five virgins whose lamps were not ready on the moment of his arrival. The picturesque incidents of this parable have caused its representation in pretty pictures which blind many to its essential heartlessness. It is curious that it should be preserved in a Gospel which contains the words, "Knock, and it shall be opened unto you: for every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened." The parable is fabricated out of 1 Thes. v., where Paul warns the converts that the Lord cometh as a thief in the night, that there will be no escape for those who then slumber, that they must not sleep like the rest, but watch, "for God hath appointed *us* not unto wrath."

The Christian dogma of the unpardonable sin, substituted for the earlier idea of an unrepentable sin, was developed out of Paul's fatalism. He writes, "For this cause God sendeth them a strong delusion that they should believe a lie" (2 Thes. ii). Although this is not connected in any Gospel with the inexpiable sin, we find its spirit animating the Paul-created Christ in Mark iv. 11: "Unto them that are without all these things are done in parables, that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand: lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them." This is imported from Paul (Rom. xi. 7, 8): "That which Israel seeketh for, that he obtained not; but the elect obtained it and the rest were hardened; according as it is written, God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this very day."

Whence came this Christ who in the very chapter where Jesus warns men against hiding their lamp under a bushel, carefully hides his teaching under a parable for the express purpose of preventing some outsiders from being enlightened and obtaining forgiveness?

Jesus could not have said these things unless he plagiarised from Paul by anticipation. Deduct from the Gospels all that has been fabricated out of Paul (I have given only the more salient ex-

amples) and there will be found little or nothing morally revolting, nothing heartless. Superstitions abound, but so far as Jesus is concerned they are nearly all benevolent in their spirit.

But even after we have removed from the Gospels the immoralities of Paul and the pharisaisms so profound as to suggest the proselyte, after we have turned from his Christ to seek Jesus, we have yet to divest him of the sombre vestments of a supernatural being, who could not open his lips or perform any action but in relation to a resurrection and a heavenly office of which he could never have dreamed. Was he

"The faultless monster whom the world ne'er saw?"

Did he never laugh? Did he eat with sinners only to call them to repentance? Did he get the name of wine-bibber for his "salvationism," or was it because, like Omar Khayyám, he defied the sanctimonious and the puritanical by gathering with the intellectual, the scholarly, the Solomonic clubs?

To Paul we owe one credible item concerning Jesus, that he was originally wealthy (2 Cor. viii. 9), and as Paul mentioned this to inculcate liberality in contributors, it is not necessary to suppose that he alluded to his heavenly riches. At any rate, the few sayings that may be reasonably ascribed to Jesus are those of an educated gentleman, and strongly suggest his instruction in the college of Hillel, whose spirit remained there after his death, which occurred when Jesus was at least ten years old.

To a Pagan who asked Hillel concerning the law, he answered: "That which you like not for yourself do not to thy neighbor, that is the whole law; the rest is but commentary." It will be observed that Hillel humanises the law laid down in Lev. xix. 18, where the Israelites are to love each his neighbor among "the children of thy people" as himself. Even Paul (Rom. xiii. 8, Gal. v. 14) quotes it for a rule among the believers, while hurling anathema on others. But Jesus is made (Matt. vii. 12) to inflate the rule into the impracticable form of "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them." By which rule a wealthy Christian would give at least half his property to the first beggar, as he would wish the beggar to do to him were their situations reversed. This might be natural enough in a community hourly expecting the end of the world and their own instalment in palaces whose splendor would be proportioned to their poverty in this world. But when this delusion faded the rule reverted to what Hillel said, and no doubt Jesus also, as we find it in

the second verse of "*Didache*," the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*. It is a principle laid down by Confucius, Buddha, and all the human "prophets," and one followed by every gentleman, not to do to his neighbor what he would not like if done to himself. But it is removed out of human ethics and strained *ad absurdum* by the second adventist version put into the mouth of Jesus by Matthew. I have dwelt on this as an illustration of how irrecoverably a man loses his manhood when he is made a God.

Irrecoverably! In the second Clementine Epistle (xii. 2) it is said, "For the Lord himself, having been asked by some one when his kingdom should come, said, When the two shall be one, and the outside as the inside, and the male with the female neither male nor female." Perhaps a humorous way of saying *Never*. Equally remote appears the prospect of recovering the man Jesus from his Christ-sepulchre. Even among rationalists there are probably but few who would not be scandalised by any thorough test such as Jesus is said, in the Nazarene Gospel, to have requested of his disciples after his resurrection, "Take, feel me, and see that I am not a bodiless demon!" Without blood, without passion, he remains without the experiences and faults that mould best men, as Shakespeare tells us; he so remains in the nerves where no longer in the intellect, insomuch that even many an agnostic would shudder if any heretic, taking his life in his hand, should maintain that Jesus had fallen in love, or was a married man, or had children.

CAN SOLDIERS BE CHRISTIANS?¹

BY MARTIN LUTHER.²

OF A GOOD CONSCIENCE.

IN order to give counsel so far as in our power to weak, timid, and doubtful consciences, and to furnish better instruction to the reprobate, I have composed this treatise. For he who fights with a good and well-instructed conscience can indeed fight well; since it cannot fail that where there is a good conscience there is also good courage and a bold heart, and where the heart is bold and the courage assured there is the fist the stronger and both man and mount the more spirited, and all things turn out better, and all chances and affairs lead the more easily to the victory, which accordingly God grants.

On the contrary, where the conscience is timid and hesitating neither can the heart have the right boldness. For it cannot fail that an evil conscience makes cowardly and fearful; and thus it follows that man and steed are slack and unfit, and no plan succeeds, and all finally succumb.

As for those rough and reckless consciences which are found

¹Literally the title of this pamphlet, which appeared in 1526, is "Whether Soldiers Can Be Saved," but the modern shifting of theological emphasis seems to favor the title above used. The direct occasion for the writing of it was a request for an answer to this question, presented to Luther by a nobleman of Brunswick, Assa von Kram. Lucas Cranach, the painter, a personal friend of Luther, presented a copy of the pamphlet without the author's name to Duke George of Saxony, one of the bitterest enemies of Luther and the Reformation. After reading it Duke George said: "You are always boasting of your Wittenberg monk, how he is the only scholar and the only one who can talk good German and write good books, but you are wrong here as in other matters. Here is a book that is indeed good and better than anything Luther could ever make." But when Cranach gave him a copy of the book with Luther's name as author, the Duke was vexed and exclaimed: "It is too bad that such an abominable monk should have made such a good book." The pamphlet is here abridged.

Luther treated the same problems to some extent in the writings: "Of Civil Authority, and How Far We Owe Obedience to it;" "An Admonition to Peace, in Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Suabia;" "Against the Murderous and Robbing Bands of Peasants;" and in letters to Chancellor Müller and the Saxon princes.

²Translated from the German by Prof. W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

in every company, whom we call madcaps and daredevils, with them all goes headlong whether they win or lose. For whatever befalls those who have good or bad consciences, the same befalls these rough fellows because they are part of the company. No victory comes through them, for they are the shells and not the kernel of the army. Accordingly I send forth this instruction, according to the light that God has given me, so that those who wish to wage war righteously may not lose God's grace and the life everlasting, but may know how to arm and inform themselves.

OF OFFICE AND PERSON.

In the first place let us consider the distinction, that office and person, deed and doer, are two different things; for an office or work may be good and proper in itself, but evil and wrong if the person or doer is not good and right, or does it in a wrong spirit. The office of judge is a precious and divine office, whether it be that of the trial judge or the executioner. But if any one assumes it without authority, or one who has authority performs it for gold or favor, it ceases to be good and right. Thus also the state of matrimony is precious and divine, nevertheless there is many a rogue and knave in it. So it is with the soldier's estate, office or work, which in itself is right and divine. But we are to look to it that the person who fills it is the same, and upright, as we shall hear.

In the second place I must explain that I am not talking this time of the righteousness that makes people pleasing to God. For that comes from faith in Jesus Christ alone, without any work or merit of ours, given and granted from the pure mercy of God; but I am talking of outward righteousness such as is meant in connexion with offices and works, that is, to speak plainly in the matter, I am treating here the question: Whether the Christian faith, through which we are accounted pleasing to God, can permit that I be a soldier, wage war, slay and stab, rob and burn, as one does to his enemy according to the usages of war; whether this work is sin or wrong and concerns one's conscience toward God; or whether a Christian is bound to do none of these works, but only do good and love, and never slay or harm any one. I call this an office or work, which, though it were divine and right in itself, may yet become wrong and evil if the person is wrong and evil.

In the third place, I do not intend here to write at length of the work and office of warfare and how it is right and divine in itself, since I have written amply of that in my booklet "On Civil

Authority." For I might fairly boast that since the time of the apostles the civil sword and authority have never been so clearly described and so finely eulogised as by me, as indeed my enemies have to admit, for which I have earned the honest reward that my doctrine is abused and condemned as seditious and hostile to authority. For which God be praised ! For since the sword is appointed by God to punish the wicked, protect the good, and maintain peace, it is sufficiently proven that warfare and slaying is appointed by God, and all that warfare and justice bring with them. What else is war but punishing wrong and evil? Why do we fight but to have peace and submission ?

WAR AS A WORK OF LOVE.

Now although it does not seem indeed that slaying and robbing is a work of love, whence a simple man may think that it is not a Christian work and beseems not a Christian to do, yet in truth it is after all a work of love. For a good physician, when the disease is so deep and virulent that he has to cut off and destroy hand, foot, eye, or ear in order to save the body, seems, when we consider the limb that he cuts off, a terrible, merciless man, yet considering the body that he thus tries to save, he is in truth an excellent, faithful man, and is doing a good Christian work to the best of his ability. Even so when I consider the work of war, punishing the wicked, slaying wrong doers, and causing so much misery, it seems to be a very un Christian work and directly contrary to Christian love ; but when I consider how it protects the good, women and children, homes, property and honor, and sustains and preserves the peace withal, then it appears how precious and divine the work is, and I see that it too cuts off an arm or a leg to save the whole body. For if the sword did not keep the peace and prevent, riot would needs ruin everything in the world. Therefore such a war is nothing else than a small and brief breach of the peace to prevent a long and limitless breach of the peace, a small misfortune to prevent a great one.

All that is said and written about the war being a great curse is true ; but at the same time people ought to consider how much greater is the curse that is prevented by war. To be sure, if people were good and willingly kept the peace, wars would be the greatest curse on earth. But what will you do with the fact that the world is wicked, that people will not keep the peace, but rob, steal, kill, abuse women and children, and take honor and property? This general and universal breach of the peace, which leaves

no man safe, must be checked by the little breach of the peace that is called war, or the sword. Thence doth God honor the sword so highly that he calls it His own ordinance, and will not have it said or thought that men invented or ordained it. For the hand that wields this sword and slays with it is no longer the hand of man, but the hand of God, and it is not man, but God, who hangs, breaks, beheads, slays, and makes war: all is His work and His decree. In short, we must not consider in the work of war how it slays, burns, strikes, and captures, etc., for this is what the half-open child-eyes do, which see in the physician only how he cuts off the hand or saws off the leg, but do not observe that it is to save the whole body. Even so we must view the work of war or the sword with grown-up eyes, considering the reason why it so slays and does such dreadful deeds, whence it will appear of itself that it is an office in itself as divine and as necessary and useful to the world as eating and drinking or any other work.

THE ABUSE OF WAR.

But that some abuse the office, and slay and beat without cause, from mere wantonness, is not the fault of the office, but of the person. For where was ever an office, work or anything whatever, which wanton men do not abuse? They are like mad physicians who might propose to cut off a sound hand without cause and from mere wantonness. They are a part of that general lack of peace which must be prevented by righteous war and sword, and forced to peace, as indeed it always happens and has happened that those are beaten who begin war without cause. For in the end they cannot escape God's judgment, that is, his sword; it finds and strikes them finally.

And think for thyself, if we conceded that war were wrong itself, we would needs concede everything, and let wrong go. For if the sword were wrong in fighting, it would also be wrong when it punishes evil-doers and keeps the peace. And in brief all its functions would be wrong. For what else is proper warfare than punishing evil-doers and keeping the peace. When we punish a thief, a murderer, or an adulterer, that is punishing a single evil-doer. But in a proper war, we punish all at once a whole great company of evil-doers, who do evil in proportion as the company is great. Now if one function of the sword is good and right, they are all right and good, for it is a sword, indeed, and not a fox-tail, and its name is the wrath of God.

CHRISTIANS FIGHT AS CITIZENS.

To the objection that is made, that Christians have no command to fight, and that examples are not enough, because they have the teaching of Christ that they should not resist evil but endure everything, I have made sufficient reply in the pamphlet "On Civil Authority." For indeed Christians do not fight, nor have civil authority among themselves, for their government is a spiritual government, and according to the spirit they are subject to no one but Christ. But yet as to their bodies and property they are subject to the civil authority, and bound to be obedient. If then they are summoned by the civil authority to combat, they are to fight and must fight from obedience, not as Christians but as members of the whole and as obedient subjects according to the body and temporal goods. Therefore when they fight they do not do it for themselves, nor on their own account, but in the service and under the orders of the authorities under whom they are placed.

To sum it all up: The office of the sword is in itself right and a divine and useful institution, which God does not wish to see despised, but feared, honored and followed, for He beareth not the sword in vain. For He hath ordained two sorts of government among men, one spiritual, by the word and without the sword, whereby men are to become acceptable and righteous, so that through this righteousness they may attain eternal life, and this righteousness he administers through the word, which he has entrusted to the preachers. The other is a civil government by the sword, so that those who are not willing to become acceptable and righteous unto eternal life through the word may nevertheless be constrained by this civil government to be righteous and acceptable before the world, and this sort of righteousness he administers by the sword. And although he does not propose to reward this sort of righteousness with eternal life, yet he desires to have it in order that there may be peace among men, and rewards it with temporal goods. For on this account does he give to authority so much property, honor, and power, which it possesses justly above others, that it may serve him in administering this civil authority. Therefore God himself is the founder, lord, master, promoter and rewarder of both sorts of justice, of both spiritual and civil, and there is no human institution or power about them, but the matter is all divine.

OF THREE SORTS OF PERSONS IN WAR.

Next we will speak of righteousness in war, or the fashion of war as far as persons are concerned. In the first place, war may be waged by three sorts of persons. One, when an equal makes war upon an equal, that is, when neither of the two parties is pledged or subject to the other, without regard to whether the one is as great, lordly or mighty as the other. Again, when a superior makes war upon an inferior; and last, when an inferior makes war upon a superior.

OF SUBJECTS' WARRING AGAINST SOVEREIGNS.

Let us take up the third case first. Here stands the law and says that no one should contend nor fight against his superior, for we owe to the authorities obedience, honor and respect. And he who strikes upward receives the chips in his eyes, or as Solomon says, He who throws stones into the air will find them falling back upon his own head. This is the law in brief, established by God and accepted by men. For there is no combining the ideas of obedience and opposition, of being a good subject and yet refusing to tolerate a master.

The heathen, knowing nothing of God, and not perceiving that civil government is instituted by God (but they regarded it as the work and benefit of men), went boldly at this matter and considered it not merely just but commendable to depose, slay or expel useless and wicked rulers. Hence it came that the Greeks by public decrees offered jewels and presents to tyrannicides, that is, those who should stab or dispose of a tyrant.

But such examples are not satisfactory for us. For we do not ask here what the heathen did, but what it is right and proper to do, not merely spiritually before God, but also in the divine and outward order of the civil government. For even though to day or to-morrow some people should rise and depose or slay their ruler, well, it would be done, and rulers must expect it if God so wills. But it does not follow from that, that it would be just and right. No instance has ever come to my notice when it would be just, neither can I now imagine one.

OF DEPOSING INSANE OR TYRANNICAL SOVEREIGNS.

It is indeed proper, if a king, prince, or ruler should become insane, that he be deposed and taken into custody. For such a one

is no longer to be regarded as a human being since reason is gone. Yea, sayest thou, a brutal tyrant is also insane, or to be regarded as worse than insane, for he does much more harm. It looks here as if the answer would be difficult. For such an argument is very plausible, and seems to have justice on its side. Nevertheless I will speak my mind, that a madman and a tyrant are two different things. For a madman cannot do or permit anything reasonable, and there is no hope, since the light of reason is gone. But a tyrant adds much to this: he knows when he is doing wrong, and he has conscience and understanding, and there is hope that he may reform, receive advice, learn and follow, which is not the case with the madman, who is like a block or a stone. And behind this is the question of the dangerous consequences and example, so that if it were justified to slay or expel tyrants the custom would soon spread and become a general craze, and they would call those tyrants who are not tyrants, and murder them just as the mob might take a mind to. This is shown us in the Roman annals, where they slew many an excellent emperor merely because he did not suit them, or would not do their will, but let them be the masters and regarded himself as their servant or puppet, as was the case with Galba, Pertinax, Gordian, Alexander and others.

You must not pipe to the populace too much for they are too fond of dancing; it is better to cut them down ten yards than to concede them a handbreath, yea even a finger's breadth in such a case, and better that the tyrants do them wrong a hundred times than that they do wrong to the tyrants once. For if any wrong is to be suffered, it is preferable that it be suffered from the authorities rather than by the authorities at the hands of the subjects. For the populace has and knows no moderation, and there are more than five tyrants in every one of them.

OF TOLERATING TYRANTS.

Here thou wilt perchance say: Yea, how is all this to be tolerated from the tyrants; thou yieldest them too much, and their wickedness will only become stronger and stronger by such teachings. Shall we endure it that everybody's wife and child, person and property shall be in such danger and shame? Who will undertake anything decent if we are to live thus? To this I answer: I am not teaching thee, who wilt do what suits thy whim and pleasure; go, follow thy desire and slay all thy rulers, and see how thou thrive. I teach only those who really wish to do right. To these I say that the authorities are not to be restrained by crime or sedi-

tion, as the Romans, Greeks, Swiss, and Danes have done; but there are other ways.

In the first place this, when they see that the sovereign esteems his own soul's salvation so lightly that he is brutal and does wrong, what carest thou if he destroys thy property, person, wife and child? He cannot harm thy soul, and is doing himself more harm than thee, since he is ruining his own soul, whence must follow the ruin of life and property. Thinkest thou not that this is vengeance enough?

Again, how wouldst thou do if this sovereign were at war, wherein not merely thy property, wife and child, but thou thyself must needs be wrecked, be captured, burned, slain for thy sovereign's sake. Wouldst thou slay thy sovereign for this? How many fine people Emperor Maximilian lost in battle in the course of his life! And yet nothing was ever done to him for it, though nothing more shocking would have been heard of if he had slain them arbitrarily. And yet he is the cause of their death; for on his account they were slain. Now what else is a tyrant and butcher than a dangerous war in which many a fine, honest, innocent man risks his life.

OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULERS.

Yea, sayest thou, but what if a king or other ruler bind himself by oath to his subjects to rule them according to certain articles agreed upon, but does not keep it, and accordingly is bound to resign the government? As for instance, they say that the king of France has to rule in accordance with the parliaments of his realm. Here I answer: It is fine and proper for the sovereign to rule in accordance with laws and to observe them and not follow his own whims. But throw into the consideration that a king vows not only to observe his own local laws and constitution, but that God himself bids him be good and he vows to be so. Now then, if such a king keeps none of these vows, neither the law of God nor of his country, shouldst thou for this attack him, to judge and avenge the same? Who gave thee warrant thereto? Some other authority must needs come in between you, to hear you both and condemn the guilty, otherwise thou wilt not escape the judgment of God where he says, "Judgment is mine," and again, "Judge not."

For to be wrong and to punish wrong are two different things. To be right or wrong is common to all, but to dispense wrong and right, belongs to him who is lord of right and wrong, even God

alone, who commits it to the sovereign in his stead. Therefore let no one presume upon this office unless he is certain that he has a warrant therefor from God or from his servant, the sovereign.

If it were to be permitted that every one who was in the right should himself punish him who was in the wrong, what would be the result in the world? The result would be that the servant would slay his master, the maid her mistress, children their parents, pupils their teacher; that would be forsooth a beautiful condition; what need would there be of judges and civil authority instituted by God?

SUBMISSION OF THE SUBJECT ABSOLVES NOT THE SOVEREIGN.

But at this point I must give heed and hear my critics who cry: Aha, meseems that is deliberately flattering the princes and rulers; wilt thou too creep to the cross and ask mercy? Art thou afeared? etc. Well, I will let these hornets buzz and fly past. Whoever can, may better my sermon; I am not preaching this time to princes and rulers. I think indeed this hypocrisy of mine shall win me little favor, nor they have much joy of it, seeing that I put their order into such danger as is said. For I have said elsewhere sufficiently, and it is all too true, that the majority of princes and rulers are godless tyrants and enemies of God, that they persecute the Gospel and are withal my ungracious lords and barons, of whose favor, moreover, I make little account. But this is what I am teaching, that every one should learn how to behave in this matter of the office and relation to his sovereign, and to do what God commands, leaving the sovereign to look to himself and act on his own account; God will not forget the tyrants and sovereigns; he is their match, as he has been from the beginning of the world.

Moreover I do not wish this my message to be taken as applying to peasants alone, as though they alone were subjects, and not the nobility. Not so, but what I say of subjects or inferiors is to apply to all, peasants, citizens, noblemen, counts and princes. For all these have also sovereigns and are themselves subjects of some one else. And as quickly as a rebellious peasant should lose his head, just as quickly should a rebellious nobleman, count or prince lose his, all alike, and no one will be wronged.

OF WARFARE BETWEEN EQUALS.

So much for the first branch of the subject, that no contest or warfare against the authorities can be right. And although it often happens and is in daily danger of happening, just as all other mis-

chief and wrong happens where God decrees it and does not prevent, yet the outcome is bad and it goes not unpunished, though for a time they thrive. But now let us take up the second point, whether equals may fight against equals, on which I wish to be understood thus: That it is not right to begin war after the suggestion of every hot-headed ruler. For this I would say first of all, that he who begins a war is wrong, and he deserves to be beaten, or at least punished, who first draws the knife. And indeed it has happened as a rule in all history that those have lost who began a war, and those were seldom beaten who were on the defensive. For civil authority was not instituted by God to break the peace and begin war, but to administer peace and prevent war; as Paul says, that the office of the sword is to defend and to punish, defend the well-disposed in peace and punish the wicked with war. And God, who will not permit wrong, ordains it that war has to be waged upon war-makers; in the language of the proverb, "There was never any so bad but he found a worse," and God has the Psalmist sing "The Lord hath scattered the peoples that delight in war."

ONLY DEFENSIVE WARFARE JUSTIFIED.

So have a care, He is not mocked, and take thou good heed that thou put far apart desire and necessity, will and need, desire to make war and will to fight. Let not thyself be aroused, though thou be the Turkish emperor; wait until need and necessity come, apart from will and desire; thou wilt have enough to do withal and get war enough,—wait that thou mayest say and thy heart boast: Good, how gladly would I have peace if only my neighbors were willing. Then canst thou make defence with a good conscience. For then thou hast God's word, "He scattereth the peoples that delight in war." Consider the veteran soldiers who have seen battle; they are not quick to draw, they do not bully and are not anxious to fight; but when they are forced so that they must, then look to thyself; they are not noisy, their weapon is fast in its sheath, but if they have to draw it, it will not be returned without blood. On the other hand, the heedless fools who fight first in thought and make a fine beginning and devour the world in words and are the first to draw the sword, they are the first to flee and to sheathe the sword.

Let this then be the first point under this head, that war is not right, even though equals be pitted against equals, unless it have a claim and conscience such that it can say: My neighbor

crowds and forces me to war; I would gladly avoid it, so that the war might be not merely war but an obligatory protection and defence. For there is a distinction in wars, some being begun from will and desire without any attack by others, some being forced upon the defender by need and constraint after the attack has begun. The first sort may be called wars of aggression, the latter wars of defence. The first are of the Devil, may God grant them no success; the other are a human misfortune, may God help those who have to wage them.

Therefore, my lords, give ear and avoid war unless you are compelled to repress and defend, and your official duty constrains you to make war. But if it does, let it be vigorously and hew away, be men and prove your mettle; it will not do to fight with fancies. The cause will bring with it enough of seriousness, and the wrathful, proud, defiant iron-eaters will find their teeth so dull that they can scarcely bite fresh butter. The reason is this: Every ruler and prince is bound to protect his subjects and give them peace. This is his office, and for this he has the sword. And this is the point on which his conscience is to depend, so that he may know that this function is right in the sight of God and ordained by him. But I am not now teaching what Christians should do. For we Christians have nothing to do with your government; but we serve you and will say what you should do in your government before God. A Christian is a person by himself; he believes for himself and for no one else. But a ruler and prince is not a person by himself, but for others, to serve them, that is, to protect and defend them, although it were well if he were a Christian besides and believed in God, for then he would be blessed. But it is not prince-like to be Christian, wherefore few princes can be Christians, or as the saying goes, A prince is a rare animal in heaven. But even though they be not Christians, yet should they do right and well according to the outward ordinances of God, for this is what he expects of them.

OF THE FEAR OF GOD.

So much for the first point in this division. And the next is also to be carefully heeded. Even though thou be sure and certain that thou hast not begun it, but art forced to fight, yet must thou fear God and have Him before thine eyes, and not burst forth with, "Yea, I am forced, I have good reason to fight," and depending on this rush madly in; that will not do either. True it is that thou hast good and righteous cause to fight and defend thyself, but for

all that thou hast not yet seal and compact from God that thou shalt win. Yea, this very presumption might well cause thee to lose, although thou hadst just cause to make war, because God cannot endure pride or presumption, but only those who humble themselves before Him and fear Him. He is well pleased that one should fear neither man nor the Devil but should be bold and defiant, stiff and courageous against them, provided they begin and are wrong. But that then the victory should come as though we ourselves did it or had the power, that will not do, but He must be feared, and wants to hear such a song as this come from the heart: "Dear Lord, my God, thou seest that I must fight; I would gladly keep from it, but I am not counting on the justice of my cause, but on Thy grace and mercy. For I know that if I depended upon the justice of the cause and were defiant, thou mightest fitly let me fall as one deserving to fall, because I depended on my right and not upon Thy mercy and kindness." And hearken here what the heathen, the Greeks and Romans, did in this case, knowing nothing of God and the fear of God. For they believed that they themselves warred and won; but through manifold experiences, wherein often a great and armed force was beaten by a few that were unarmed, they had to learn and frankly confess that in war nothing is more dangerous than to be confident and defiant; and they conclude that one should never despise his foe, be he ever so small. Also that one should surrender no advantage, however small it be,—as though every feature of the matter were to be weighed with the jeweler's scales. Fools and defiant, heedless people, do nothing in war but harm. The phrase *non puttassem*, "I wouldn't have thought it," the Romans considered the most discreditable expression that a soldier could use. For it indicates a self-confident, defiant, careless man, who can destroy more in one moment, with one step, with one word, than ten men can make good, and at the end he will say, I wouldn't have thought it. How terribly did Prince Hannibal defeat the Romans as long as they were defiant and confident toward him. And there are innumerable instances in the past and daily before our eyes.

Now the heathen learned and taught this, but could give no reason or cause, but laid it to Fortune, which nevertheless they could not but fear. But the cause and reason is, as I have said, that God wishes to give evidence in and through all such events that He must be feared, and even in such affairs can nor will not tolerate any defiance, contempt, rashness or self-confidence, until we learn to accept from his hands as pure grace and mercy all that

we wish or are to have. Thence comes a strange thing: a soldier who has a just cause should be at once courageous and fearful. Now how can he fight if he is fearful? And yet if he fights fearlessly he incurs great danger.

Now this is the way of it: before God he should be fearful, timid, and humble, and commend the affair to Him, to ordain it not according to our righteousness but according to his grace and goodness, so that with God in front one may win with an humble and contrite heart. Against men one must be bold, free and defiant, assuming that they are wrong, and so assail them with defiant and confident spirit. For why should not we deal with our God as the Romans, the greatest warriors on earth, did to their false god, Fortune, namely fear Him. And if they did not do it, they fought in great danger or were badly defeated.

Let this, then, be our conclusion on this head: that warfare against one's equal must be waged only under compulsion and in the fear of God. But compulsion means when the enemy or neighbor attacks and begins, and then it does no good to offer justice, or examination, or compromise, to endure and forgive all sorts of abuses and wiles, but he simply goes at you headlong. For I always assume that I am preaching to those who would like to do right in the sight of God; but as for those who will neither offer nor accept justice, they do not concern me.

OF SUPERIORS' WARRING ON INFERIORS.

The third question is whether superiors may rightly fight against inferiors. We have already heard how subjects should be obedient and even suffer wrong from their rulers, so that, if matters go rightly, the authorities will have nothing to do towards the subjects but to administer judgment, right and justice; but if they revolt and rebel, it is right and proper to fight against them. Likewise a prince is to proceed against his nobles, the emperor against his princes, if they are rebellious and begin war. But here too it is to be done in the fear of God, and no one may rely too defiantly upon the righteousness of his cause, lest God decree that the rulers be punished by their subjects even with wrong, as has often happened. For being in the right and doing right do not always go together, nay, never do unless God so dispose. Therefore, though it is right that the subjects sit quiet and endure everything, and rebel not, yet is it not within the control of men that they should always do so. For God has placed the inferior person quite alone by himself, taken the sword from him and left him only the

prison. But if in spite of this he forms bands and conspires, seizes the sword and breaks loose, he deserves the judgment and death before God.

The same is to be said of all authorities, that when they turn towards their own superiors they have no more authority but are deprived of it all. When they look downward they are endowed with all authority ; so that finally all authority ends in God, whose alone it is. For He is the emperor, prince, count, noble, judge, and everything, and distributes it as He will among his subjects, and it rises again to Him. Therefore no individual is to oppose the community, nor to win the community to his support. For in so doing he is hewing upwards, and the chips will surely fall back into his eyes. And from this thou seest how those are opposing the ordinance of God who resist the authorities. And at the same time St. Paul says, that God will abolish all rule and all authority and power when He himself shall rule.

OF FIGHTING FOR HIRE.

Inasmuch as no king or prince can make war alone, he must have men and forces for it who will serve him, just as he cannot administer courts and laws without having councillors, judges, attorneys, jailers, and executioners and all that goes with a court. If the question is asked whether it is right to take pay, or as it is called, wages or hire, and therefor agree to obligate oneself to serve the prince whenever the time comes, as is customary nowadays, we must make a distinction among the soldiers.

The first case is that of subjects, who are in duty bound anyway to serve their sovereign, to support him with life and property and follow his call, especially the nobles and such as hold fiefs from the sovereign. For the estates which are held by counts, barons, and nobles were of old bestowed by the Romans and the German emperors upon condition that those who held them should be constantly armed and ready, the one with so and so many horses and men, another with so many, according as the estates could furnish ; and these estates were the hire wherewith they were hired ; for this reason they are called fiefs, and there are still such obligations attached to them. These estates the emperor has got by inheritance, and this is well and good in the Holy Roman Empire. But the Turk, they say, allows no inherited fiefs or principalities, landgravates or estates whatever, but fixes and gives fiefs when and to whom he will ; this is why he has such immense

amounts of gold and land, and is, in brief, master in the land, or rather a tyrant.

Now therefore the nobility need not think that they have their estates for nothing, as though they had found them or won them at play. The obligations upon them and their feudal duty show whence and why they have them, to-wit, loaned by the emperor or prince, and not that they may riot and make a display upon them but shall hold themselves armed and ready to protect the country and secure peace. If then they make much ado of having to keep horses and serve princes and lords while others have repose and peace, I say: My dear sir, get your thanks out of the fact that you have your pay and fief and are appointed to do just this thing; the pay is sufficient. And have not others labor enough with their property? Or are you the only ones who have labor? And whereas your office is seldom needed, others have to labor daily. But if thou wilt not be satisfied, and thy lot seem too hard and unequal, leave thy estate; there will be no lack of those who will be glad to take it and do in return what is expected.

OF WARFARE AND TILLAGE.

Therefore the wise have summed up and divided all the works of men into two divisions: tillage and warfare, which is indeed a natural division. Tillage is to provide, warfare is to protect; and those who are set aside for protection are to receive their pay and food from those who are devoted to providing, in order that they may be able to protect. On the other hand, those who provide are to be protected by those who are devoted to that office, in order that they may be able to provide. And the emperor or prince of the land is to have an eye to both offices, and take care that the protectors are armed and equipped, and that the providers do their best to improve the food. And useless people, who serve neither as protectors or providers, but who can only consume and idle and lie around, should not be tolerated, but be driven out of the country or forced to work, just as bees do, drive away the drones which do not work but steal the honey from the other bees. Therefore Solomon in Ecclesiastes calls kings tillers, who till the land. For that is really their office. But Heaven protect us Germans¹ from such a sudden attack of wisdom, so that we may remain a long while good consumers, and leave providing and protecting to such as like it or cannot help it!

That these thus considered may rightly receive their pay and

¹ It may need to be explained that this is irony.—Tr.

their fiefs, and do right in helping their sovereign make war and serving him therein according to their duty, is confirmed by John the Baptist. When the soldiers asked him what they should do, he answered: Be content with your wages. For if their wages had been a wrong thing or their office displeasing to God, it must be he would not have let it alone, permitted and approved it, but as a divine and Christian teacher would have condemned and prohibited them from following it. And this is the answer to those who declare from timidity of conscience (though this is now rare in people of this class), that it is dangerous to accept this office for the sake of temporal reward, inasmuch as it means nothing else than bloodshed, murder and doing one's neighbor all possible harm, as it comes in war. For these may correct their consciences to this effect, that they do not pursue this office from meddlesomeness, pleasure, nor malice, but that it is God's office and that they are under obligation to their prince and their God to follow it. Therefore, since it is a proper office and instituted by God, it deserves its reward and wages, as Christ says: The laborer is worthy of his hire.

OF FIGHTING FOR GAIN.

True, indeed, it is, that if any one goes to war with heart and mind set on nothing but gaining self, and temporal gain is his only reason, so that he is unwilling to have peace, and sorry when there is not war, he has left the right road and is the Devil's own, even if he fights under the orders and summons of his sovereign. For he is making of a good work an evil one for himself by failing to observe that he is to serve from obedience and duty, and seeking only his own. Hence he has no good conscience so that he could say: Very well, so far as I am concerned I would gladly remain at home, but because my sovereign summons and needs me I come in God's name, knowing that I am serving God, and I will earn my hire and take what is given me for my service. For a soldier ought by all means to have the consciousness and the confidence within him that he must and ought to do it, in order thus to be sure that he is serving God and that he may say: It is not I that strike, thrust, and slay here, but God and my prince whose servants my hand and powers are. This is what is meant by the watchword and battle-cry in war: Strike for the emperor! For France! For Lüneburg! For Brunswick! Thus the Jews too cried: For the Lord and for the sword of Gideon!

A man who fights from greed counteracts all his other deserts,

just as one who preaches for worldly pelf is lost ; and yet Christ says that a preacher of the Gospel deserves his food. To do anything for worldly pelf is not wrong, for dues, hire, and wages are also worldly pelf, and in this case no one would dare to work or do anything to support himself, because it is all done for the goods of this world. But to be greedy of worldly pelf and make mammon of it is wrong always in all classes, in all offices and employments. Put aside greed and other wrong aims, and warfare is no sin and thou mayest take thy wages and whatever is given thee. This is why I said above that the work in itself is good and godly, but when the person is wrong or abuses it, then it is wrong.

OF FIGHTING IN A WRONG CAUSE.

The second question is: How is it if my sovereign is wrong in making war? The answer is: If thou knowest for sure that he is wrong, then do thou fear God more than man, and go thou not to war nor serve, for in such a case thou canst have no good conscience before God. Yea, sayest thou, my sovereign compels me, takes my life, or will not give me my money, my wage and hire, and besides I should be despised and disgraced in the eyes of the world as a coward and deserter who left his sovereign in need, and so on. I reply: thou must take the risk, and lose for God's sake what may be lost; He can return it to thee a hundred-fold, as He has promised in the gospel: He that hath left house and home, wife and property for my sake, shall receive it a hundred-fold. And one has to be prepared for such dangers in any other affair where the authorities compel us to do wrong. But since God would have us leave father and mother for His sake, one must surely leave a sovereign for His sake.

But if thou dost not know, or canst not find out, whether thy sovereign is wrong, then do thou not relax thy uncertain obedience because of an uncertain matter of right, but believe the best of thy sovereign as love commands. For love believeth all things and thinketh no evil. Thus wilt thou be secure and act well before God. If for this thou be disgraced or called faithless, it is better that God call thee faithful and true than that the world do so. What good will it do thee if the world regarded thee as a Solomon or a Moses if God knew thee to be as wicked as Saul or Ahab?

OF FIGHTING FOR A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN.

The third question is: May a warrior hire himself to more than one lord, and accept wages and hire from everybody? My

answer is: I have already said that greed is bad, whether it be shown in a good office or a bad one. For though husbandry is one of the best of offices, yet is a greedy husbandman bad and condemned before God. Thus here also: it is right and proper to accept hire and to go into service, for it is right; but greed is not right, even if the year's hire were scarcely more than a florin. On the other hand: it is right in itself to take and earn pay, be it from one, two, three, or ever so many masters, provided no duty to one's prince and sovereign be neglected and the service to others is given with his knowledge and consent. For just as a good tradesman may sell his skill to whoever wants it and serve therewith, provided it do not harm his sovereign and his community, so a warrior, having from God his gift of fighting, may serve with it as being his skill and trade any one who wants it and take his pay for it as for his labor. For this too is a calling which springs from the law of love: to wit, when any one wants and needs me, to be ready and willing and to accept my dues or what is given me. For thus saith Saint Paul: What soldier serveth at his own charges?—thus approving this as right. Therefore when a prince needs and desires another prince's subject for warfare, the latter may certainly serve him with his own prince's knowledge and consent and take pay for his services.

But what if one prince or lord were making war upon another, and I were under obligation to serve both, but preferred to serve the one who was wrong because he had done me more good and favor than the one who was right and because I should profit less from the service of the latter? Here the straight brief answer is: Right, that is, pleasing God, must stand above property, life, honor, friends, favor and profit, and no individual is to be considered under such circumstances, but only God. And here again one is to endure for God's sake being despised and regarded as thankless. For there is excuse enough, namely God and right, which will not permit one to serve one's favorite and desert him who is less liked, but which on the contrary absolutely forbids this, as is right and proper. Although the old Adam may not like to hear this, yet thus must it be if indeed it is to be right at all. For we should not fight against God; yet he who fights against the right is fighting against God, who fixes, decrees and disposes all right.

OF FIGHTING FOR GLORY.

The fourth question is: But what shall we say of him who fights not simply for pelf, but for worldly honor, that he may be

esteemed and valued as such a valiant man, and so on? My answer is: Greed of honor and greed of gold are both greed and one as wrong as the other; whoever fights in such a vicious spirit will gain hell. For we are commanded to give and yield all honor to God, and to be satisfied with our hire and our food. Hence it is a heathen, and not a Christian, fashion to address soldiers thus before action: Comrades, soldiers! Be bold and confident; please God we will to-day win honor and grow rich! But thus and this fashion they should be addressed: Comrades! We stand here in the service and obedience of our prince, being bound by God's will and law to support our sovereign with life and property. Though in God's eyes we are wretched sinners, just as much as our enemies are, yet since we know, or know not otherwise but that our prince is right in this cause, and are thus certain that we are serving God by our service and obedience, therefore let every man be bold and fearless, and think only that his hand is God's hand, his pike God's pike, and cry with heart and voice: For God and the emperor! If God gives us the victory, the honor and praise shall be not ours but His, who accomplishes it through us poor sinners. But the spoils and the pay we will accept as given and bestowed by His divine kindness and favor upon us unworthy men, and thank Him from our hearts. Now as God will; upon them with joy!

For without doubt if we seek the honor of God and leave it to Him, as is right and proper and bound to be, more honor will come than any one could expect, for God has promised, "Whoso honors me, him will I honor; and whoso dishonors me, he shall be dishonored." Thus He is bound by this His promise: He must honor them that honor Him. And it is one of the greatest sins to seek one's own honor, since this is an infringement upon the divine prerogative. Therefore let others boast and seek honor, but be thou quiet and obedient; thy honor will take care of itself. Many a battle has been lost which would have been won had it not been for empty honor. For your honor-seeking warriors do not believe that God is present in battle and gives the victory, and hence they do not fear God; therefore they are not joyous, but rash and mad and at last are beaten.

OF GODLESS SOLDIERS.

But to my mind those are the most reckless fellows who before the battle encourage themselves and one another by the delectable memory of their sweethearts, and say one to another, "Hurrah now, let each man think of his sweetheart." If I had not heard

from two credible men, familiar with such practices, that this is actually done, I should never have believed that the heart of man could be so reckless and flippant in such a serious matter, when the fear of death was before his eyes. Indeed no one does it who fights alone with death, but in the ranks one incites the other, no one considering what is threatening, because it is threatening all. But it is shocking to a Christian heart to think and to hear that any one can tickle and solace himself with the thought of sensual love in the hour when the judgment of God and the fear of death are before his eyes. For those who are slain or die in this frame of mind send their souls of a surety straight to hell without any delay.

Yea, say they, if I were to take hell into consideration I should needs keep out of war. This is still more shocking, that men should deliberately put God and His judgment out of mind, and determine not to know or think or hear anything of it. This is why a great part of the soldiers go to the devil, and some of them are so full of devils that they know no better way of showing their joy than by speaking contemptuously of God and his judgment, as though it proved them to be tremendous fire-eaters to curse dreadfully, swear, torture and defy God in Heaven. They are a forlorn flock, yea chaff; as indeed there is much chaff and little wheat in all classes.

OF FAITH IN LUCK.

Finally, soldiers have all sorts of superstitions in battle, one commending himself to St. George, another to St. Christopher; one to this and another to that saint. Some can charm steel and flint; some can make horse and rider fey; some carry about them the Gospel of St. John or something else on which they depend. All such are in a dangerous state. For they do not believe in God, but on the contrary are all committing a sin against God with their unbelief and superstition, and if they should die thus they would all be lost. But thus should they do: when the battle approaches and the admonition has been made which I mentioned above, then let them simply commend themselves to the mercy of God and behave in this matter like Christians. For in that admonition is set forth merely the form in which one may go about the outward work of war with a good conscience; but inasmuch as no good work is sufficient for salvation, every man should say or think to himself after that admonition: Heavenly Father, here am I by Thy divine will in this outward work and service of my sovereign, as is my duty, first of all to Thee and then to my sovereign for Thy sake;

and I thank Thy grace and mercy that Thou hast placed me in this work, where I am sure that it is not sin, but right and an agreeable obedience to Thy will. But because I know and have learned from Thy gracious word that none of our works can help us, and that no one is saved as a soldier, but only as a Christian, neither will I rely upon this my obedience and work ; but I will do it freely in service to Thy will, while believing heartily that nothing but the innocent blood of Thy dear Son, my Lord Jesus Christ, can redeem and save, which He shed for me in obedience to Thy divine will. I stay by this, I live and die by this, I fight and do everything by it ; Dear Lord God and Father, keep and strengthen this belief in me by Thy spirit, Amen. If after that thou say the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, thou mayest do so, and let that be enough. Then commend body and soul into His hands, and draw and strike in God's name.

OF FAITH IN GOD.

If there were many such soldiers in any army, friend, who, thinkst thou, would harm them? They would devour the world without striking a blow. Yea, if there were nine or ten such in a company, or even three or four who could say that with a good heart, I would rather have them than all your guns, pikes, horses, and armor. But friend, where are those who believe thus and can speak thus? But though the majority do not do it, yet we must know and teach the same for the sake of those, be they ever so few, who will do it. The others, who despise the teaching that is intended for their salvation, have their judge to whom they must answer. We are excused, having done our part.

STAUROLATRY.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE cross as an instrument of execution was an object of horror to the Romans of classical antiquity. It was the symbol of suffering and of death, and this is perhaps one important reason why the cross is not represented in early Christian art. The figure of two intersecting lines was in itself not objectionable, for it was




ARAMÆAN WARRIORS, WEARING THE
CROSS AS AN AMULET FOR PRO-
TECTION IN BATTLE.¹

actually used as a salutary symbol under other names in various religions, but it became objectionable as soon as it was commonly designated as a cross. At this juncture Constantine's adoption of the labarum, subsequently followed by the official identification of this sign with the Chrisma, served excellently the purpose of gradually accustoming the cultured and aristocratic classes of the Roman Empire to the basic thought of the religion of the cross.

Constantine, the first Christian emperor abolished crucifixion, not for reasons of humanity but because it had become too honorable a death for criminals, and its continuation appeared to him as a profanity. Only then when crucifixion became a tale of past ages and the ignominious details of this kind of execution faded from memory, did the cross

¹ From Egyptian monuments of the eighteenth dynasty. (After Wilkinson. Reproduced from Lenormant, *L'Hist. de l'Orient*, I. p. 290.) The same use of the cross, as an amulet worn round the neck, was made in Greece, as we know from ancient pictures, published by Gerhard.

become the emblem of the Christian church, its coat of arms, the symbol of invincible power and transcendent glory.



THE TRANFIGURATION OF CHRIST, SHOWING A COMBINATION OF CROSS AND CHRISMA. (From L. Veuillot.)

The Chrisma, having served its purpose in the time of transition, lost more and more its significance as the coat of arms of

Christianity and yielded its place to the cross, which now assumes a definite shape, the four-cornered upright cross, an erect, elongated figure of two intersecting lines (†).

The Rev. Mr. Sinker sums up his opinion of the adoption of the cross (which is from the standpoint of the orthodox believer) as follows :

"A double, and indeed manifold, meaning attached to the cross from the earliest ages. Derived as a Christian sign from the monogram, and connected with traditions of ancient learning, by its Egyptian form, it may be said to have stood for all things to all men. To the earliest members of the Church it represented their Master, who was all in all to them; and thus in their view, a somewhat wider and happier one than in later days, it represented all the faith—the person of Christ, His death for man, and the life and death of man in Christ. The Laternan and other crosses point to baptism and all its train of Christian thought, without immediate reference to the Lord's sacrifice."



THE COAT OF ARMS OF CHRISTIANITY DURING THE CRUSADES.

Wall-painting in the École des Beaux Arts, Paris. (From L. Veuillot.)


Originally (i. e., in the Epistles of Paul) the cross is a mere idea, the thought of the death of Christ and the mortification of the flesh; but soon the shape of the cross becomes the main object of interest; yet this shape remains for a long time quite indefinite.

The Church Fathers compare the cross to almost anything: the tree of life in Paradise, Noah's Ark, the staff of Moses, the rod of Aaron, the pole on which Moses erects the serpent, the wood of the burnt-offering on the altar of Abraham, the arms of Moses upheld in prayer for his people, the horn of the unicorn, the four quarters of the compass, the posture of the swimmer, the attitude of adoration, the nose of the human face, the combination of ideas as a crossing of thoughts, the pole of a wagon, the spit of the paschal

lamb, the letter T, the military standard, the anchor, the sail yard of a ship, and the oars of a boat. Nor is the list exhausted.¹

Here is an instance of the praise of the cross by Justin Martyr:

“And this [the cross], as the prophet foretold, is the greatest symbol of His power and rule; as is also proved by the things which fall under our observation. For consider all the things in the world, whether without this form they could be administered or have any community. For the sea is not traversed except that



THE CROSS IN PRACTICAL LIFE, ACCORDING TO THE CHURCH-FATHERS.
(Reproduced from Lipsius *De Cruce*.)


trophy which is called a sail abide safe in the ship; and the earth is not ploughed without it: diggers and mechanics do not their work, except with tools which have this shape. And the human form differs from that of the irrational animals in nothing else than in its being erect and having the hands extended, and having on the face extending from the forehead what is called the nose, through which there is respiration for the living creature; and this shows no other form than that of the cross. And so it was said by the prophet, ‘The breath before our face is the Lord Christ.’² And the power of this form is shown by your [the pagans] own symbols

¹ Justin Martyr, *Dial. with Tryph.*, c. 86; Tertullian *adv. Marc.* III, 18; Cyprian *Test. Against the Jews*, 22, and other passages in Origen, Minutius Felix, Nicodemus, etc.

² From *Lamentations*, iv. 20.

on what are called banners ['vexilla'] and trophies, with which all your state processions are made, using these as the insignia of your power and government, even though you do so unwittingly. And with this form you consecrate the images of your emperors when they die, and you name them gods by inscriptions.¹

"For it was not without design that the prophet Moses, when Hur and Aaron upheld his hand, remained in this form [of the cross] until evening. For indeed the Lord remained upon the tree almost until evening."



CROSS-MONOGRAMS ON THE DOORS OF HOUSES IN RETURZA AND SERDJILLA.
(After De Vogüé.)

In the third century, the glorification of the cross had assumed such dimensions that Christians were called *staurologaters*, or worshippers of the cross. This accusation elicited an answer from Ter-



CROSS BEFORE A SYRIAN HOUSE. (After De Vogüé.)

tullian and from Minutius. Tertullian does not positively deny the charge. He says (*Ad Nationes*, 12):


"As for him who affirms that we are 'the priesthood of a cross,' we shall claim him as our co-religionist. A cross is, in its material, a sign of wood; amongst yourselves also the object of worship is a wooden figure. Only, whilst with you the figure is a human one, with us the wood is its own figure. Never mind for the

¹ This passage is important, for it implies that not only among the savage tribes of Asia and America but also among the ancestors of the Græco-Romans the custom of making the cross over the dead as a benediction antedates Christianity.

present what is the shape, provided the material is the same: the form, too, is of no importance, if so be it be the actual body of a god."

"The camp religion of the Romans is all through a worship of the standards, setting the standards above all gods. Well, all those images decking out the standards are ornaments of crosses. All those hangings of your standards and banners are robes of crosses. I praise your zeal. You would not consecrate crosses unclad and unadorned."

Tertullian actually places the cross with its magic power above Christ and speaks of it as the cause of his victory whereby that old "serpent, the devil, was vanquished."¹ Moses showed by the mir-



THE CHRISMA IN THE CATACOMBS.²

acle of the brazen serpent on the pole the power of the Lord's cross.

"Whereby also to every man who was bitten by spiritual serpents, but who yet turned with an eye of faith to it, was proclaimed a cure from the bite of sin, and health for ever more."

¹Ap. 16. *Ante N. Ch. L.*, xi. p. 85.

²The Catacombs contain no crosses which date back to the Pre-Constantine age. All the crosses whose age can be determined, as for instance such forms as *f*, are later. The Chrisma however, is very prevalent and appears sometimes in the Egyptian form as in *c* and *d* (transformed from the key of life), or in the labarum-form, as in *a*, *b*, *c*. The symbol $\Lambda\omega$ (as in *b*) is frequently added to the Chrisma. Glass vessels (such as *g* and *h*) were formerly thought to contain blood of martyrs. Some of them, for instance *h*, contain the inscription *SA, Saturni*, which is read either *Sanguis Saturnini* or *Sanctus Saturninus*. Similar vessels are found in pagan tombs.

Nicodemus (or rather the author who under that name wrote the Gospel of Nicodemus) tells the story of the soul of the good thief who was crucified with Christ. While Enoch and Elias were speaking to the prophets, a man of a miserable appearance arrived carrying the sign of the cross on his shoulder. We read (ch. xx. 5-12):

"And when all the saints saw him, they said to him, Who art thou? For thy countenance is like a thief's; and why dost thou carry a cross upon thy shoulders

"To which he answering, said, Ye say right, for I was a thief, who committed all sorts of wickedness upon earth.

"And the Jews crucified me with Jesus; and I observed the surprising things which happened in the creation at the crucifixion of the Lord Jesus.

"And I believed him to be the Creator of all things, and the Almighty King and I prayed to him, saying, Lord, remember me, when thou comest into thy kingdom.

"He presently regarded my supplication, and said to me, Verily I say unto thee, this day thou shalt be with me in Paradise.¹

"And he gave me this sign of the cross saying, Carry this, and go to Paradise and if the angel who is the guard of Paradise will not admit thee, shew him the sign of the cross, and say unto him: Jesus Christ who is now crucified, hath sent me hither to thee.

"When I did this, and told the angel who is the guard of Paradise all these things, and he heard them, he presently opened the gates, introduced me, and placed me on the right-hand in Paradise."

Methodius in his *Sermon on the Cross* calls it "an instrument consecrated to God, freed from all discord and want of harmony." The form of the cross is to him Divinity itself. He says:

"Man with his outstretched hands represents the cross. Hence when the Lord had fashioned him in this form in which He had from the beginning framed him, He joined on his body to the Deity."

The cross accordingly is "the confirmation of victory;" "the way by which God descends to man" and "the foundation of man's ascent to God." "Through the cross the demons can be conquered by men who are otherwise weaker than they;" and adds the pious preacher:

"It was for this mainly that the cross was brought in, being erected as a trophy against iniquity, and a deterrent of it, that henceforth man might be no longer subject to wrath," etc.

The cross has as little been represented by the early Christians as Christ, for in fact they repudiated all art as idolatry, but as Christ was worshiped by them as God incarnate, so the idea of the cross became an object of adoration, and nothing is more natural

¹Although the Gospel of Nicodemus (formerly the acts of Pontius Pilate) was not written by Nicodemus who visited Jesus by night, it is an important book (probably a product of the third century) which was much read and admired among the early Christians.

than that with the gradual adaptation of Christianity to its surroundings Paganism should again assert itself and reappear as unconcealed image-worship which was practically the old Paganism clad in a Monotheistic interpretation.

The Christian sentiment of the cross as "consecrated by the body" of Christ and full of "comeliness and beauty" becomes more and more an important feature of pious literature, finding a classical expression in St. Andrew's address to the cross, which he delivered in the presence of his executioners. St. Andrews is reported as having said :

"Rejoice, O cross, which has been consecrated by the body of Christ, and adorned by His limbs as if with pearls. Assuredly before my Lord went up on thee, thou containedst much earthly awe ; but now invested with heavenly longing thou art fitted up according to my prayer. For I know, from those who believe how many graces thou hast in Him, how many gifts prepared beforehand. Free from care, then, and with joy, I come to thee, that thou also exulting mayst receive me, the disciple of Him that was hanged upon thee ; because thou hast been always faithful to me, and I have desired to embrace thee. O good cross, which hast received comeliness and beauty from the limbs of the Lord ; O much longed for, and earnestly desired, and fervently sought after, and already prepared beforehand for my soul longing for thee, take me away from men, and restore me to my Master, in order that through thee He may accept me who through thee has redeemed me."¹

This sentiment formerly limited to the circle of a few sectarians now begins to assert itself, and takes possession as by intoxication of the whole population of the Roman Empire.

The cross in any shape (as a T as a X and standing upright with four corners +) became a sign of magic power which was used for exorcism and for the performance of miracles. Thus the author who assumed to be Barnabas says of the magic power of the cross :

"In like manner He points to the cross of Christ in another prophet who saith, 'And when shall these things be accomplished? And the Lord saith, When a tree shall be bent down, and again arise, and when blood shall flow out of wood. Here again you have an intimation concerning the cross, and Him who should be crucified.

"Yet again He speaks of this in Moses, when Israel was attacked by strangers. And that He might remind them, when assailed, that it was on account of their sins they were delivered to death, the Spirit speaks to the heart of Moses, that he should make a figure of the cross, and of Him about to suffer thereon ; for unless they put their trust in Him, they shall be overcome for ever. Moses therefore placed one weapon above another in the midst of the hill, and standing upon it, so as to be higher than all the people, he stretched forth his hands, and thus again Israel acquired the mastery. But when again he let down his hands, they were again destroyed. For what reason? That they might know that they could not be saved unless they put their trust in Him.

¹ Acts and Martyrdom of the Holy Apostle Andrew.

"And in another prophet He declares, 'All day long I have stretched forth my hands to an unbelieving people, and one that gainsays my righteous way.'

"Moses then makes a brazen serpent, and places it upon a beam, and by proclamation assembles the people. When, therefore, they were come together, they besought Moses that he would offer sacrifice in their behalf, and pray for their recovery. And Moses spake unto them, saying, 'When any one of you is bitten let him come to the serpent placed on the pole; and let him hope and believe, that even though dead, it is able to give him life, and immediately he shall be restored. And they did so. Thou hast in this also [an indication of] the glory of Jesus; for in Him and to Him are all things."

When in the age of Constantine, the reverence of the cross that must latently have prevailed among the lower classes for a considerable time, overcame the prejudices of the cultured classes, the need was felt of having its form definitely settled and this was finally done in favor of the elongated erect form (†) which at once became the coat of arms of Christianity. Unfortunately the victory of this form of the cross was ultimately established by one of the grossest pious frauds that were ever committed in the history of religion, viz., the "invention of the cross," which is still celebrated among Roman Catholics as a festival of great importance.

To narrate the history of this farce would lead us too far; suffice it to state that Cyril, a bishop of Jerusalem, informs us in his *Catecheses* of the discovery of the cross of Christ by the pious Empress Helena, the mother of Constantine.

Contemporary writers know nothing about it and the bishop is not a very reliable authority. His reputation is of doubtful character, for he is a man who was tried and found guilty of robbing the church of precious vessels and other marketable goods. Cyril found willing ears and succeeded in selling large quantities of the wood of the cross of Christ. The business flourished beyond all expectation, and now a new miracle happened: the miraculous wood became self-propagating, and thus God in his mercy enabled the good bishop to satisfy the demands of all pious Christians, who gladly availed themselves of this opportunity of buying pieces of wood for outrageously high prices.

Cyril was an eloquent preacher and he used all his oratorical art to glorify the cross. He says in his *Catechetical Lectures* :

"Let us not be ashamed of the cross of Christ; but though another hide it, do thou seal it on thy brow, that the devil, beholding that princely sign, may flee far away, trembling. But make thou this sign, when thou eatest and drinkest, sittest or liest down; risest up, speakest, walkest; in a word, on every occasion" (p. 40).

"Be the cross our seal, made with boldness by our fingers on our brow, and in everything; over the bread we eat and the cups we drink; in our comings in and goings out; before our sleep, when we lie down and when we awake; when

we are in the way, and when we are still. Great is that preservative. And it is without price, for the poor's sake; without toil for the sick, since all its grace is from God. It is the sign of the faithful, and the dread of devils; for He has triumphed over them in it, having made a show of them openly. For when they see the cross, they are reminded of the Crucified; they are afraid of Him that hath bruised the head of the dragon" (p. 161).

"Every deed of Christ is a boast of the Catholic Church; but her boast of boasts is the cross. . . . The glory of the cross has led into light those who were blind through ignorance, has loosed all who were held fast by sin, and has ransomed the whole world of men. . . . It has ransomed the whole world" (p. 142).

But Cyril had good reasons to extol the miraculous wood of the cross which he offered for sale. He says:

"Though I should deny it (the crucifixion), this Golgotha confutes me, near which we are now assembled; the *wood of the cross* [*stauros*] confutes me, which has from hence been distributed piecemeal to all the world."—*Cyr. Cat. Lect. Lib. Fath.*, p. 144.

Henry Dana Ward who quotes these same passages in his *History of the Cross* (p. 46), adds in comment of the lucrative business which the cunning bishop made with this "self-propagating wood":

"The *wood* receives the glory and Cyril the *price*."

Compare Paul with Cyril, and you will appreciate the change which the triumph of Christianity and its establishment as State religion has wrought in the minds of its leaders. Historians speak of the downfall of Paganism, but practically we have a rehabilitation of Paganism under the new name of Christianity.

The cross triumphed, but it was no longer the cross of Calvary. The old Pagan symbol of intersecting lines was re-adopted with a new interpretation. It was adopted by the Christian church in an age of superstition and ignorance, leading to image-worship and staurolatry which was not much better than the Paganism which it replaced. And yet the new interpretation of the cross contained a deep thought that could not be crushed by the heathen reaction of Constantine's age.

The Crucifixion was abolished, and the cross became the emblem of power and authority. Kings and emperors set it upon their crowns and scepters. They placed it upon a globe (in the same way as did the ancient Egyptians in this shape ☉) and carried it in their hands on festive occasions.¹

In modern times the cross has become the favorite form of decorations with which princes honor their retainers for faithful services.

¹ The ball with the cross appears first on coins of Theodosius II. who holds it in his left hand while the right hand grasps the labarum.

After Christianity had become victorious, the persecuted at once turned persecutors, and Theodosius issued edicts which forbade all Pagan worship, and there was soon scarcely a temple or a statue of the old gods left in the Roman Empire which had not been destroyed, or mutilated, or desecrated, by the hands of fanatised Christian mobs. When Theophilus, the Bishop of Alexandria, demolished the Serapeum at Alexandria, the monks were astonished to find the sign of the cross engraven in its sanctuary. Socrates, the church historian (book 5, ch. 17), says:

"In the temple of Serapis, now overthrown and demolished throughout, there were found engraven in the stones certain letters which they call hieroglyphical; the manner of their engraving resembled the form of the cross. The which, when both Christians and Ethnics beheld before them, every one applied them to his proper religion. The Christians affirmed that the Cross was a sign or token of the passion of Christ, and the proper symbol of their profession. The Ethnics avouched that therein was contained something in common, belonging *as well to Serapis as to Christ*; and that the sign of the cross signified one thing unto the Ethnics, and another to the Christians. While they contended thus about the meaning of these hieroglyphical letters, many of the Ethnics became Christians, for they perceived at length the sense and meaning of those letters, and that they prognosticated salvation and life to come."

Sozomenes reports the same event as follows:

"It is reported that when this temple was destroyed, there appeared some of those characters called hieroglyphics, surrounding *the sign of the cross*, in engraven stones; and that, by the skillful in these matters, these hieroglyphics were held to have signified this inscription—the life to come! And this became a pretence for becoming Christians to many of the Grecians, because there were even other letters which signified this sacred end when this character appeared."

The cross, i. e., the figure of intersecting lines was used as a religious symbol in pre-Christian times; it was preserved in such modernised religions of imperial Rome as the Serapis cult, and we can fairly assume that it was a sacred symbol with almost all Gnostic sects, gaining a rapid recognition among the Christians who at once identified it with the martyr instrument, on which Jesus died. Now when the victorious Christians destroyed the last remnant of Paganism, they were astonished to find that the symbol of their own faith had served similar purposes in the old Pagan religions.

If they had been familiar with the institutions and doctrines of the Serapis cult, they would have discovered that many typically Christian ideas, such as the sonship of God, God the Son as the Saviour, the death of God and his resurrection, God the Son as the Divine Word, the divinity of the Mother of the Saviour, and also

celibacy, monkhood, tonsure, rosaries, sacraments, etc., find their prototypes in Pagan institutions.



COIN OF CONSTANTINE.

The Emperor is represented as holding in his hand the ball of empire, still without the cross.

The historian must bear in mind that the Christianity of Jesus was different from the Christianity of the State Church of Constan-



COIN OF CONSTANTINE.

The Emperor holds in his hand the ball of empire with the phœnix perched on it.

tine, surnamed the Great. They are as contrary to one another as two opposite poles. The intermediate link is the early Church of



COIN OF JUSTINIAN.

The Emperor is represented with a Greek cross on his crown and on the ball of empire.

gentile Christians founded by St. Paul. The character of the Christianity of Jesus is reflected in the Gospels, especially, the Gospel

according to Mark, which is the oldest and most reliable account of the life of Jesus of Nazareth. The Christianity of the State Church of Constantine is a medley of Roman, Greek, Egyptian, Assyrian, Syrian, and Indian religions, somewhat tempered by Platonic philosophy and translated into the terminology of the early Christian Church. Its appearance is due to the fermentation of religious belief, which resulted from the general exchange of thought among the nations after the days of Alexander the Great, and it is the product of development and the résumé of a powerful crisis.

Although the State Church represents in many respects a new and a higher phase in the religious life of mankind, there is no break, no sudden rupture, except in the minds of those who had lost the historical connexion with the past.

The Christianity of Jesus became the centre of the new religion that was preparing itself in the minds of the people under the name of Christianity, and when it was officially recognised by the Roman Empire, the imperial State-Christianity reassimilated all those Pagan elements which proved strong enough to survive the crisis.

KING BAULAH.

THE EGYPTIAN VERSION OF THE STORY OF KING JOHN
AND THE ABBOT OF CANTERBURY.

BY PROF. CHARLES C. TORREY.

THIS Egyptian story, which has never before been published, is taken from the Arabic *Futūh Misr*, or "Conquest of Egypt," written by one of the very earliest of the Moslem historians, Ibn 'Abd el-Hakem, who died in Egypt in the year 871 A. D. The king of whom it is told is identified in the Arabic histories with Pharaoh Necho II., who defeated King Josiah of Judah, and put the land of Palestine under tribute (2 Kings xxiii. 29-35). His name is given by the historians in several forms, the difference being generally due to the variation of a single diacritical point. The most common form is Naulah; but in the manuscripts of the "Conquest of Egypt" the spelling Baulah is given. It is said of this king that he reached such a height of power and glory as no one of his predecessors had attained, since the time of Rameses II. But he was exceedingly wicked, as well as tyrannical, and made himself detested by his people. The following account of the way in which his reign came to an end was current in Egypt at the time of the Mohammedan conquest, but seems to have been preserved only in the *Futūh Misr*.

Here is a literal translation :

"One day, he [King Baulah] summoned his vezirs before him and said to them : 'I will ask of you certain questions. If you can answer them for me, I will add to your pay and increase your power; but if you fail to answer them, I will cut off your heads.' They replied : 'Ask of us whatever you will.' So he said : 'Tell me these three things : *first*, what is the number of the stars in the heavens? *Second*, what sum of money does the sun earn daily by

his labor for mankind? *Third*, what does God Almighty do every day?' Not knowing what to answer, the vezirs besought the king to give them a little time; and he granted them a month's respite.

"They used therefore to go every day outside the city of Memphis and stand in the shade of a potter's kiln; where they would consult together in hope of finding a solution of the difficulty they were in. The potter, observing this, came to them one day and asked them what they were doing. They told him their story. He replied: '*I* can answer the king's questions; but I have a kiln here and cannot afford to leave it idle. Let one of you sit down and work in my place; and do you give me one of your beasts to ride on, and furnish me with clothing like your own.' They did as he asked.

"Now there was in the city a certain prince, the son of a former king, whom ill fortune had overtaken. To him the potter betook himself, and proposed to him that he should try to regain his father's throne. But he replied: 'There is no way of getting this fellow (meaning the king) outside of the city.' 'I will get him out for you,' answered the potter. So the prince collected all his resources, and made his preparations.

"Then the potter, in the guise of a vezir, went and stood before King Baulah, and announced himself ready to answer the three questions. 'Tell me, then,' said the king, 'the number of the stars in the sky.' The potter produced a bag of sand which he had brought, and poured it out before him, saying: 'Here is just the number.' 'How do you know?' demanded the king. 'Order some one to count it, and you will see that I have it right.' The king proceeded: 'How much does the sun earn every day by his work for each son of Adam?' He replied: 'One kirat; for the day-laborer who works from sunrise to sunset receives that amount.' The king then asked: 'What does God Almighty do every day?' 'That,' answered the potter, 'I will show you to-morrow.'

"So on the morrow he went forth with him from the city until they came to that one of the king's vezirs whom the potter had made to sit down in his place. Then he said: 'What God Almighty does every day is this; he humbles men, and exalts men, and ends the life of men. To illustrate this: Here is one of your own vezirs sitting down to work in a potter's kiln; while I, a poor potter, am mounted on one of the royal beasts and wear the royal livery. And further: such a one (naming the rival prince) has just barred the gates of Memphis against you.'

"The king turned back in hot haste; but lo! the gates of the

city were already barred. Then the people, led by the young prince, seized King Baulah and deposed him. He became insane, and used to sit by the gate of the city of Memphis, raving and drivelling.

"And that [adds the narrator] is the reason why a Copt, when you say to him anything that displeases him, replies: 'You are descended from Baulah on both sides of your family!' meaning the insane king."

An especially interesting feature of this Egyptian story is the close resemblance which it bears to a certain well-known popular tale, current in almost all parts of Europe from the latter half of the Middle Ages onward, and best known to English readers in the form of the ballad of King John and the Abbot of Canterbury. In the latter, King John is introduced as a powerful, but unjust, ruler who

". . . ruled England with maine and with might,
For he did great wrong, and maintain'd little right."

He decides that his Abbot of Canterbury is much too rich and prosperous, and announces his intention to cut off his head; but finally agrees to spare his life on condition of his answering three questions which the King propounds. The questions are: (1) How much am I, the King, worth? (2) How long would it take me to ride around the earth? (3) What am I thinking? The Abbot regards himself as a dead man, but is finally rescued by a shepherd, who goes to the King disguised as the Abbot, and answers the three questions without difficulty. The King is worth twenty-nine pence; since Jesus Christ was valued at thirty. The ride around the earth can be accomplished in just one day, by keeping directly under the sun for that length of time. The answer to the third question turns on the fact of the shepherd's disguise: what the King "thinks" is this, that the man speaking to him is the Abbot of Canterbury, but he is in reality only a poor shepherd.

Thus the old English tale, with which the various European versions, already mentioned, substantially agree.¹

As for the relation which all these bear to one another, and to the Egyptian legend of King Baulah, it seems almost certain that we have here a striking example of the migration of a popular tale. The evidence for this conclusion is found not only in the fact of substantial identity, extending in one or two cases even to unnecessary details, but also in an interesting fact bearing on the

¹ See the Introduction to the ballad of King John and Abbot, in Child's *English and Scottish Ballads*.

question of the way in which the tale may have travelled from Egypt to Europe. The *Futūh Misr* of Ibn 'Abd el-Hakem contains one of the oldest and most interesting narratives of the Mohammedan conquest of Spain; and this history was therefore one of those best known among the Spanish Arabs, from the ninth century on. We may conclude, therefore, with some confidence, that the Coptic-Arabic tale of the King and the Potter, having been brought to Spain in the *Futūh Misr*, soon became a part of the native folklore; and that it then made its way, by oral and literary transmission, into France, England, Italy, Germany, and Denmark.

Another is thus added to the list of those folk tales which, in more or less altered form, have made their way from the East into Western lands. The extent to which these Oriental treasures were imported in the Middle Ages, especially after the Moslem conquest of Spain and during the Crusades, is well known. See, for example, the interesting article, "Die Mährchen der tausend und



einen Nacht," by the late Prof. August Müller, in the *Deutsche Rundschau* for July, 1887. Egypt, it may be noted, has furnished a goodly share of this material. The Egyptians, from the earliest times, were a people gifted with strong imagination, and a keen sense of humor. Some faint idea of what they were capable of producing, in the field of imaginative fiction, may be gained from Maspero's *Contes populaires de l'Égypte ancienne*, 1882; Flinders Petrie's *Egyptian Tales*, 1895; or from Spiegelberg's excellent little pamphlet, *Die Novelle im alten Aegypten*, Strassburg, 1898. Almost every new discovery of papyrus rolls adds to the store of interesting popular anecdotes which have a startlingly modern sound; and on some of the old monuments are found amusing caricatures which would do credit to the *Fliegende Blätter*. It is in every way probable that the story of King Baulah, though we are not now able to trace it farther back than the Copts of the seventh century A. D., was in reality current in the land many centuries before Christ.

IS RELIGION A FEELING OF DEPENDENCE?

BY THE EDITOR.

WHILE the Bible declares that man is made in the image of God, anthropologists claim that Gods are made in the image of man; and we do not hesitate to say that there is a truth in both statements. The fact is that man, a sentient, rational, and aspiring being, has originated somehow: the world appears as a chaos, yet man's mind is such as to enable him to become the framer and shaper of his own destiny. His rationality makes it possible that he can pursue a purpose, make designs, execute plans. Other things are at the mercy of circumstances. So he was before he acquired his mentality and is to some extent still, for his knowledge of facts is inchoative and in many fields purely tentative. But whenever he is familiar with the situation, he is able to marshal affairs and build his fate himself; and recognising the laws of existence he can, instead of being crushed by the forces of nature, use them for his own enhancement. By adapting himself to the world he practically becomes an embodiment of the factors of rationality and thus realises the ideal of what religiously has been called an incarnation of God. His reason reflects the logic of facts, his conscience the moral order of the cosmos his religion the sentiment of the glory of the whole.

We define God as that which makes man and is still leading him on and upward. Yet while man is thus the incarnation of that which is divine in nature, rendering manifest the latent spirituality of the universe, we shall find that every man's conception of God is a measure of his own stature. He pictures God according to his comprehension, and thus it is natural that every man has a different notion of God, every one's God being characteristic of his mental and moral caliber. The god of savages is a bloodthirsty chieftain; the god of sentimentalists is a good old papa; the god of the superstitious is a magician and a trickster; the god of the slave

is a tyrannical master; the god of the egotist is an ego-world-soul; and the gods of the wise, of the just, of the free, of the courageous are wisdom, justice, freedom, and courage.

This difference of the God idea according to the character of the man explains the paradox that what is God to one may be Satan to another. Thus Schleiermacher, a learned and thoughtful man but of a weak constitution, physically as well as spiritually, still bows down in submissive awe before a God whom he conceived most probably after the model of the Prussian government and defines religion as the "feeling of absolute dependence."

Poor Schleiermacher! What an abominable religion didst thou preach in spite of thy philosophical caution which, in the eyes of zealous believers, amounted to heresy!

It is worth while to criticise Schleiermacher's definition of religion, because it found favor with many people, especially in liberal circles; for it appealed to the free religious people as a definition which omitted the name of God and retained the substance of religion. Would it not be better to retain the name of God and purify its significance, than to discard the word and retain the substance and source of the old superstitions? But it is an old experience that the Liberals are iconoclasts of external formalities and idolators of reactionary thoughts. They retain the cause of obstruction, and discard some of its indifferent results, in which it happens to find expression. They cure the symptoms of the disease but are very zealous in extolling its cause as the source of all that is good.

Schopenhauer said in comment upon Schleiermacher's definition, that if religion be the feeling of absolute dependence, the most religious animal would not be man, but the cur.

To the lovers of freedom the feeling of dependence is a curse, and Sasha Schneider has well pictured it as a terrible monster whose prey are the weak—those whose religion is absolute submissiveness. (See our Frontispiece.)

Truly if we cannot have a religion which makes us free and independent, let us discard religion! Religion must be in accord not only with morality but also with philosophy; not only with justice, but also with science; not only with order, but also with freedom.

Man is dependent upon innumerable conditions of his life; yet his aspiration is not to be satisfied with the consciousness of his plight; his aspiration is to become independent and to become more and more the master of his destiny. If religion is the expres-

sion of that which constitutes the humanity of man, Schleiermacher's definition is wrong and misleading, for religion is the very opposite. Religion is that which makes man more of a man, which develops his faculties and allows him more independence.

We must only learn that independence cannot be gained by a rebellion against the constitution of the universe, or by inverting the laws of life and evolution, but by comprehending them and adapting ourselves to the world in which we live. By a recognition of the truth, which must be acquired by painstaking investigation and by accepting the truth as our maxim of conduct, man rises to the height of self-determination, of dominion over the forces of nature, of freedom. It is the truth that makes us free.

So long as the truth is something foreign to us, we speak of obedience to the truth; but when we have learned to identify ourselves with truth, the moral ought ceases to be a tyrannical power above us, and we feel ourselves as its representatives; it changes into aspirations in us. True religion is love of truth, and being such it will not end in a feeling of dependence, but reap the fruit of truth, which is liberty, freedom, independence.

PLAYFUL INSTRUCTION, AND GENIUS.

BY THE EDITOR.

AN old friend of mine asked me some time ago whether it was advisable to begin teaching children at a tender age, not of course by systematic lessons, but by playful instruction. One of the professors of a school had advised him not to impart any playful instruction, "because," he said, "instruction is a serious thing, and if it were taught playfully it would demoralise the boy's nature. He would never learn to apply himself with seriousness in later life."

The reason of this advice is good, but the advice itself is bad. The spirit of the old schoolmaster's advice can be recommended, for the acquisition of knowledge is indeed a serious thing and should be taken seriously, but the professor's logic is perverse. It is true enough that the time will come when children must learn to apply themselves seriously, but that is no reason why children should not acquire playfully as much knowledge as they possibly can. Would it be right to prevent mental growth? Certainly not! On the contrary, mental growth should be fostered by all means in our power. Our aim, however, must not be to change the acquisition of knowledge into sport, but to utilise the plays of the child for the higher ends of education.

It is a design of nature to let the life of adult creatures be foreshadowed in the games of the young; and educators are bound to take the hint.

The plays of children should not be simply a waste of time, but ought to be utilised for furthering their intellectual life. They should serve higher purposes than merely keeping the little folk out of mischief. The old schoolmaster's maxim, therefore, is wrong, although his intentions may be appreciated; and we must let the child learn playfully as much as possible.

Let the letters of the alphabet appear on the child's toys, let him become familiar with the various pursuits of life in his games, let his little hands become accustomed to the shovel, the pick-ax, the drill, the plane, and, if certain precautions are taken, also the knife, the scissors, and the compasses. Let him hear in great outlines and in the simplest words the stories of invention, the deeds of heroes, and the feats of discoverers. When the time comes for him to apply himself with greater concentration upon school work he will be better prepared for it. The exertion will be easier for him, his labors will be lessened, and he will pass through his studies more joyfully than the boys to whom, for the mere purpose of teaching them the seriousness of learning, the acquisition of useful knowledge is made irksome.

Seriousness in the performance of duties is of great importance in life, but seriousness is nothing if it is not guided by intelligence and accompanied by zeal. Our young folk, in order to learn to apply themselves, must be taught to love work and be anxious to do something. Their enthusiasm must be roused and their endeavors must be guided at an early age.

For this purpose the kindergarten has been invented and is doing splendid work.

No doubt that there are kindergartens which are not conducted in the right spirit. Instead of lifting the children up to a higher level and helping them to understand the significance of life, some of the teachers stoop to them and let childishness have full sway. Instead of teaching the little folk playfully how to work, giving them glimpses of truth and the elements of right conduct, they dissipate them by idle plays and foster the spirit of sport. But in all innovations it is natural that mistakes will be made, and we need not for that reason reject the whole system.

The kindergarten is a great advance in our educational methods; and when public kindergartens shall be instituted all over the country we may expect a decided and noticeable improvement of the race accompanied by an increase of intelligence and a decrease of crime.

In a recent number of one of our best magazines,¹ an educational writer, apparently a grammar-school teacher who took a dislike to the pupils, and perhaps also to the principal, of a special kindergarten, condemns the whole system for its lack of seriousness. She claims that the kindergarten children expect interesting

¹ *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1899, pp. 358-366.

stories and not instruction, they want amusement, and refuse to pay attention ; they go to school to play, not to work.

Granting that there are kindergartens which are not yet conducted with the necessary seriousness and that mistakes are made, we must also know that seeds sometimes fall by the wayside or on rock. If there are some kindergartens that fail to produce the right results, this is no reason for doing away with the method altogether.

The kindergarten is not for play, but for playfully imparting lessons, and the main thing to be taught must be method ; method in small things, in games, in behavior, and in human activity generally. Far from abolishing the kindergarten, we would advocate its extension and the introduction of certain of its methods into the high schools and universities.

The gist of the educational problem is this : Teach the methods of work and the elements of any science or art, not in a dry and abstract manner, but by infusing enthusiasm into the pupils. Lessons can be made interesting by pointing out the connexion which the object of instruction has with life by showing its value in the economy of human society, and indicating the wants which it serves. Pupils must feel the thrill which the inventors and scholars feel in their attempts at making discoveries and solving the various riddles of life.

The kindergarten method will accomplish miracles in the field of education. It is a new dispensation, a dispensation of love, of voluntary good will, stimulating the springs that work from within, which must replace the old dispensation of the rod, the law that enforces virtue by punishments and makes noble and good aspirations a burden.

A spiritual sunshine should spread over all exercises of the kindergarten, but for that reason there need be no dillydallying with toys. The teacher must never lose sight of the ultimate aim, which is the building up of character. She herself must therefore at once be earnest and cheerful, qualities which it is by no means impossible to combine, and while she keeps her children buoyant and joyful, she must not fail to impress them with the importance of duty, of application, of seriousness.

It might be an improvement in the system of the kindergarten if it were not exclusively in the hands of women, and if at least from time to time the influence of male teachers could be brought to bear upon children.

Old-fashioned teachers who still cling to the method of rendering lessons tedious, must, from sheer prejudice, have become

blind to the results that can be obtained in this way; for it is remarkable how persevering and patient children can be when they are interested in a certain kind of work.

The difference between a genius and a pedant consists exactly in this, that the genius performs his work playfully, while the pedant groans under the drudgery of his task. No doubt the pedant's work would be preferable, if its worth were to be measured by the resistance overcome, but the fact is that the work of the genius always increases in excellence according to the ease with which it is accomplished.

Genius is sometimes looked upon as a mystery, but there is no mystery about it. While it is difficult and often impossible to account for the appearance of genius in special cases, because it crops out where we least expect it, its nature in and of itself is no mystery. The soul of a genius consists of motor ideas which are correct representations of things in the objective world and of the work to be performed. They interact without the laborious effort of conscious concentration. They act with machine-like accuracy, so as to allow all attention to be concentrated upon the main purpose of the work and not upon its details. A genius originates partly by inheriting a disposition for easily acquiring certain functions, or generally by possessing the knack of viewing the world correctly. Whatever may be the cause of genius, it certainly shows itself in the playful ease with which work of great importance is performed. It would be wrong to think that a genius need not work, for a genius as a rule is a great worker, but he enjoys his work and can therefore accomplish more than those who constantly remain conscious of the seriousness of their labors.

Genius is instinct on a higher plane. Certain inherited dispositions are probably indispensable for producing a genius of a certain kind and it may be that an educator can do nothing when they are absolutely absent. Nevertheless much can be done by a careful education. The impressions of children who, in a certain line of activity, see nothing but the right methods from their very babyhood, will be so organised that from their unconscious depths up to the conscious surface of their soul, they will be predetermined to hit naturally the right mode of action. The child of a musician, for instance, who has never heard anything but good music, and has playfully acquired since his very babyhood the various experiences of touch by contact with the keys of a piano, will naturally become a virtuoso. He will naturally find the right harmony, and the great wealth of melody that unconsciously slum-

bers in his early recollections will form a source of living tone-images, which upon the least provocation will well up automatically and engender new combinations of harmonious melodies that, through the influence of other conditions, may possess a character of their own.

What is true of music is true of poetry, oratory, all arts, the sciences, handicrafts, and industrial pursuits. The condition of genius is a ready and automatic interaction of a sufficient number of clear and correct thought-images, or representative pictures, which must be brought under the control of a guiding purpose.¹

The whole method of making education irksome is wrong. It reminds one of the Gothamites who, according to the principle that we should do the disagreeable part of a task first, unloaded the wood from their wagons by pulling out the lowest trunks first, which they did with great difficulty; and they were delighted that by and by the work grew easier. They rejoiced when the last pieces could be simply taken off without trouble.

Why not begin to teach children without causing them trouble from the beginning? All learning is a pleasure, and our teachers will find that it is unnecessary to make instruction irksome to children during their school years. Acquisition of knowledge is a growth of soul, and our children ought to feel the joy of mental growth. There need be no fear that their minds will be dwarfed thereby. On the contrary, they will develop all the better, as much so as plants that are transplanted from a barren land to fertile soil, or from the shade to the sun, and when the time arrives in which some great purpose will demand special concentration, the growing boy will apply himself with all the vigor of his youthful ambition.

A youth will be more confident of success in life if he has been playfully made accustomed to its serious duties and to their difficulties, and he will thereby acquire a buoyancy which under the present conditions of education is rare. We must, however, see to it that the seriousness of work, far from suffering from playful instruction, shall be intensified and strengthened by it.

¹ Mr. Nicola Tesla's lecture before the Commercial Club of Chicago (May 14, 1899) was of special interest to the psychologist. He dwelt at length on the vividness of his visual conceptions which appeared before his eye like real things. Thus he would, when speaking of a cat see a real cat; or when thinking of a machine, see a machine in all its details and in accurate proportions so plainly as to enable him to make measurements. This condition was oppressive to him in childhood and early youth, so long as he could not control it; and he felt relieved as if ridding himself of a nightmare when with increasing strength in his riper youth he succeeded in gaining control over the appearance and disappearance of these images.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING.

Of modern experimental psychologists there are few who write more pleasantly or better understand the art of lucidly presenting the results of the research of their domain than Dr. Alfred Binet, Director of the Laboratory of Physiological Psychology in the Sorbonne, Paris. The present work by M. Binet, *The Psychology of Reasoning*,¹ which has just appeared, is a translation, from the recent second French edition, of a book, which on its original appearance some years ago attracted wide-spread attention in the thinking world, and was quoted in the controversy on Language and Thought between Max Müller, the Duke of Argyll, Francis Galton, Professor Romanes, and others.

This interesting little book is a development of the thesis that "reasoning is an organisation of images, determined by the properties of the images themselves and that the images have merely to be brought together for them to become organised, and that reasoning follows with the inevitable necessity of a reflex."

Perception is the topic first considered, and is defined as "the process by which the mind completes, with the accompaniment of images, an impression of the senses." Perception is itself unconscious reasoning; it involves the addition of something new to the simple sense-impression, it involves a species of judgment; and Dr. Binet contends that in studying the nature of this addition he is also studying the mechanism of reasoning in general. This is done largely by an investigation of the illusions and hallucinations of the senses, which furnish the very interesting chapter on images, where all the various types of representation, visual, motor, auditory, etc., are studied. The third chapter treats of reasoning in perception, and shows that the mechanism of reasoning in general is that of a natural fusion of images, comparable to that of the cinematograph and of the old scientific toy called the zoötrope, and that the formation of concepts has its physical counterpart in the production of composite photographs. Just as perceptive reasoning, or the recognising of exterior objects as the things which they really are, is a perfectly natural and mechanical process, so also logical reasoning is a natural process. "The organisation of our intelligence," he says, "is so arranged that when the premises of a reasoning are stated, the conclusion results from them with the ne-

¹*The Psychology of Reasoning*. Based on Experimental Researches in Hypnotism. By Alfred Binet, Doctor of Science, Laureate of the Institute, Director of the Laboratory of Physiological Psychology in the Sorbonne. Translated from the Second French Edition, by Adam Gowans Whyte, B. Sc. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1899. Pages, 191. Price, 75 cents (3s. 6d.).

cessity of a reflex action. In other words, we reason because we have in our brain a machine for reasoning."

To enforce his doctrine, Dr. Binet makes use of the following pretty comparison; "If it were necessary to make use of a comparison in order to describe the mechanism of reasoning, we would mention those flowers which are formed during frost on the window panes of rooms. Let us thaw them with our breath and then observe the regelation of the liquid layer. While crystallization is taking place round a first crystal, you notice one feature which is perfectly unalterable and that is, angular magnitude. The spiculae branch from the trunk, and from these branches others shoot; but the angles enclosed by the spiculae are unalterable." Just as these crystallisations are produced by the forces inherent in each of the molecules, so reasoning is produced by the properties inherent in each of the images; just as crystallisation, in its oddest eccentricities, always observes a certain angular value, so reasoning, true, false, or insane, always obeys the laws of resemblance and of contiguity."

In conclusion he remarks: "Images are not by any means dead and inert things; they have active properties; they attract each other, become connected and fused together. It is wrong to make the image into a photographic stereo-type, fixed and immutable. It is a living element, something which is born, something which transforms itself, and which grows like one of our nails or our hairs. Mental activity results from the activity of images as the life of the hive results from the life of the bees, or, rather, as the life of an organism results from the life of its cells."

The book cannot, on the score of its suggestiveness, be too cordially recommended. The work of the translator has been very well done.

DE MORGAN'S ELEMENTARY ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CALCULUS.

The publication of this new reprint of De Morgan's *Elementary Illustrations of the Differential and Integral Calculus*² forms, quite independently of its interest to professional students of mathematics, an integral portion of the general educational plan which the Open Court Publishing Company has been systematically pursuing since its inception,—which is the dissemination among the public at large of sound views of science and of an adequate and correct appreciation of the methods by which truth generally is reached. Of these methods, mathematics by its simplicity, has always formed the type and ideal, and it is nothing less than imperative that its ways of procedure, both in the discovery of new truth and in the demonstration of the necessity and universality of old truth, should be laid at the foundation of every philosophical education. The greatest achievements in the history of thought—Plato, Descartes, Kant—are associated with the recognition of this principle.

But it is precisely mathematics, and the pure sciences generally, from which the general educated public and independent students have been debarred, and into which they have only rarely attained more than a very meagre insight. The reason of this is twofold. In the first place, the ascendant and consecutive character of mathematical knowledge renders its results absolutely unsusceptible of presen-

¹ Tyndall, *Light*, p. 101; American ed., p. 104.

² Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd. Cloth, \$1.00 (5s.). Pp. 144.

tation to persons who are unacquainted with what has gone before, and so necessitates on the part of its devotees a thorough and patient exploration of the field from the very beginning, as distinguished from those sciences which may, so to speak be begun at the end, and which are consequently cultivated with the greatest zeal. The second reason is that, partly through the exigencies of academic instruction but mainly through the martinet traditions of antiquity and the influence of mediæval logic-mongers, the great bulk of the elementary text-books of mathematical have unconsciously assumed a very repellent form,—something similar to what is termed in the theory of protective mimicry in biology "the terrifying form." And it is mainly to this formidableness and touch-me-not character of exterior, concealing withal a harmless body, that the undue neglect of typical mathematical studies is to be attributed.

To this class of books the present work forms a notable exception. It was originally issued as numbers 135 and 140 of the Library of Useful Knowledge (1832), and is usually bound up with De Morgan's large *Treatise on the Differential and Integral Calculus* (1842). Its style is fluent and familiar; the treatment continuous and undogmatic. The main difficulties which encompass the early study of the Calculus are analysed and discussed in connexion with practical and historical illustrations which in point of simplicity and clearness leave little to be desired. No one who will read the book through, pencil in hand, will rise from its perusal without a clear perception of the aim and the simpler fundamental principles of the Calculus, or without finding that the profounder study of the science in the more advanced and more methodical treatises has been greatly facilitated.

The book has been reprinted substantially as it stood in its original form; but the typography has been greatly improved, and in order to render the subject-matter more synoptic in form and more capable of survey, the text has been re-paragraphed and a great number of descriptive sub-headings have been introduced. An index also has been added, and a Bibliography of English, German, and French works on the Calculus.—From the Editor's Preface.

THE PRINCIPLES OF BACTERIOLOGY.

Dr. Hüppe's book on Bacteriology¹ is universally recognised as one of the broadest treatments of the subject that have yet appeared. It is not a book on the technique of bacteriology, but a summary of the important discoveries of the science, which, as treating of knowledge which should be universally disseminated, will be of the greatest value not only to the physician, the scientist, and the student of hygiene, but to practical people in all walks of life. The structure of bacteria is thoroughly investigated, as are also the conditions of their life. The most important of the disease-producing bacteria are described, the causes of infectious disease, immunity, inoculation, and the history of bacteriology, all are duly considered. The diagrams are numerous, and not the least noteworthy exterior feature is the colored plates. While thoroughly rigorous in its treatment, there are chapters of the book, especially that on the "Prevention of Infectious Disease" by hygienic measures, which are within the reach of every reader, and which are of the highest importance.

¹*The Principles of Bacteriology.* By Dr. Ferdinand Hüppe, Professor of Hygiene in the University of Prague. Authorised translation from the German, by Dr. E. O. Jordan, Assistant Professor of Bacteriology in the University of Chicago. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Limited. 1899. Pages, viii, 467. Price, \$1.75 (9s.).

PSYCHOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS.

Mr. Hiram M. Stanley, of Lake Forest University, has attempted no easy task in writing *An Outline Sketch of Psychology for Beginners*;¹ but for the purpose for which he has designed the book—that of furnishing for high schools, summer schools, academies, and secondary schools, and also for independent students of any age, a practical *résumé* of the most important points of view of psychological thought—he has been quite successful. His book is clear and quite untechnical; the author has restricted himself to the indication of the simplest methods of individual introspection and individual experimenting. It has been his main object to have the beginner acquire "psychic insight and familiarity with method." The student is told a little as possible, and is always allowed to learn and conclude for himself from his own psychological experience. The book is a small one, containing only forty-four pages. The main titles are: Sensation and Perception, Memory, Ideation and Introspection, Feeling and Will, and finally Special Psychology in which brief reference is made to the various forms which psychologic research has recently taken. After each paragraph of the text original exercises are given and blank pages are provided at the end of the book for recording these exercises.

It is hoped that the little volume will place within the means of every reader however limited his scientific knowledge may be, a means of becoming acquainted with the general scope and character of psychological science.

THE MIXE IDOL.

To the Editor of the Open Court:

An error occurs in the statement under the picture of a Mixe idol in *The Open Court* for July. Had I seen proof of this I should have struck out the words—"for nearly four hundred years, as the image of a saint." The idol represents no saint but a pagan deity. It had *not* been in the church "for nearly four hundred years." It must have been placed there between two visits of the priest. At many small Indian churches in Mexico the priest is seen but once or twice a year. The idol could not have been on the altar one year. No Christian priest would tolerate such a thing knowingly.

FREDERICK STARR.

CHICAGO, August 8, 1899.

BOOK NOTICES.

Despite his seventy-six years, Prof. F. Max Müller, the great philologist and philosopher of Oxford, is still untiring in his research. The latest volume which has come from his pen is *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, published by Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. (Pages, xxxi, 618. Price, \$5.00.) Every volume which bears Professor Müller's name is bound to be charmingly written, and his work will undoubtedly find a large circle of readers outside of the purely scientific ranks. His enthusiasm for Indian philosophy knows no bounds. To him it seems that human speculation "has reached its very acme" in the Vedānta philosophy. With the present facilities which we have for becoming ac-

¹ *Psychology for Beginners*. By Hiram M. Stanley, Member of the American Psychological Association, etc. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1899. Pages, 44. Boards, 40 cents (2s.).

quainted with Hindu thought, he would allow to no one the unqualified title of "philosopher" who was unacquainted with at least the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philosophy,—the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya. One of the signal merits of the Hindu systems of thought in Prof. Max Müller's eyes is that they never leave us in doubt as to their exact meaning. Enormous labor is being spent in order to ascertain the exact views of Plato, Aristotle, and even of Kant and Hegel, on some of the most important questions of their systems of philosophy; but the Hindu systems "never equivocate or try to hide their opinions, even where they may be unpopular." If they are atheistic, they are outspokenly so; if they are dualistic, materialistic, or monistic, they are outspokenly so. For him there was no country so pre-eminently adapted as India for the development of philosophical thought, and no races of mankind more highly gifted than the Indian, or better qualified to solve "the eternal riddles of the world." To those who are familiar with Prof. Max Müller's own philosophical views, his unbounded admiration for the Vedānta system will be readily intelligible; but none can withhold their admiration for the facility and clearness with which he has expounded his matured reflexions upon the Indian philosophy, which at intervals have occupied his mind for more than forty years.

Starting from the approved thesis that the dogmas of the most ancient religions and systems of ethics disappeared merely to assume vitality under new forms, Dr. Félix Thomas, in his little book *Morale et Éducation*, has examined the chief modern systems of ethics and religion, with a view to indicating the transmutations from which these creations in their turn may have sprung. These systems have all grown up about the old religions as species of concretions; they all bear the varied impress of the reigning views of philosophy, science, and art; they are partly new, they are partly mere rejuvenations of old and forgotten doctrines. What is new and durable in them it is M. Thomas's purpose to discern, and he has also specially endeavored to point out what influence they may be made to exercise upon the education of children. (Paris: Félix Alcan. 1899. 12mo. Pages, 171. Price, 2 fr. 50.)

NOTES.

Prof. Karl Budde, who (as our readers may remember) was invited by the American Lecture Bureau to lecture on the Old Testament at the various universities of the United States, publishes in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Nos. 144 and 145, June 28th and 29th respectively) an account of his trip to America. His account is interesting, and upon the whole quite fair; but it is amusing to witness his astonishment at what he defines to be "American Individualism," viz., the principle that every one claims the privilege of asserting himself and allowing others to do the same. "Every openly claimed power over the wills of others," he says, "as well as every confessed dependence, is an abomination to Americans." He regards it as very strange that in America events of primary importance that happen in Germany are overlooked, while much importance is attributed to the convictions of the German Courts for *lèse majesté*, which after all are, in the opinion of Continental Europeans, only matters of secondary importance, nay, even, as Professor Budde says, "events of the third and fourth degree." The importance which is attributed to personal rights in the United States is to him a matter of American naiveté.

American individualism asserts itself in the church and in politics. As a rem-

edy for the many contradictions which originate by local legislation, such as prohibition, etc., Professor Budde would recommend as the sole effective means "a vigorous, inexorable and exacting central power; but," he adds, "the American shuns that most of all, and prefers to suffer a number of palpable inconveniences."

Professor Budde claims that the rule of the majority is quietly submitted to in the United States, but here he is mistaken, for the majority decides the *personnel* of the executive as well as of the legislative branches of the government. The last instance is not majority rule, but the rule of the law; for even a law may be invalidated by the decision of the Supreme Court, if it be unconstitutional. It is true, even in the United States the idea prevails that the nature of republicanism consists in replacing monarchs by a rule of the majority; but the idea is nevertheless as wrong as it is to consider the old monarchies as tyrannies pure and simple. While legally a monarch stands above the law, we are perfectly justified in stating that practically the law is, after all, recognised as the ultimate principle of monarchical governments.

As to England, he is astonished to find the sympathy between the two English-speaking nations very deep-seated. But he confesses that the Americans are much closer to the Germans than the English, because, as he says, they do not possess the insular and isolating character of the latter.

While staying in England, Professor Budde had passed into another country and yet felt as if living on another continent; but in the New World, he simply felt that he had travelled into another country. He recommends Germans to cultivate friendly relations with the United States, and deems frequent visits as an indispensable means of becoming familiar with our characteristic nationality. "The new Germanic nation beyond the ocean," he says, is to me exceedingly charming and attractive."

As to the prospects of theology in the United States, Professor Budde takes a very optimistic view. The apparently chaotic conditions which allow liberty to every church and permit an easy formation of new sects, he finds, after all, and judging from his own experiences, a guarantee of a deepening of the religious conception, and of a sound development of theological science.

Mr. Moncure D. Conway's article on "The Christ of St. Paul" is of deep interest because it treats of the main problem of the history of Christianity, and the topic is one concerning which there has been much discussion and a great difference of opinion. Mr. Conway takes a view which is perhaps too severe on Paul and credits the convert of Tarsus with the invention of all that may give offence in the Gospels. He believes that Jesus was free from the narrowness of the Pharisee convert. We believe that much can be said in favor of Paul which Mr. Conway omits to mention and yet all the points made are worthy of consideration. There is a harshness in the character of Paul which is not always commendable and it is a habit of his to give currency to his pet theories (for instance his doctrine of the second advent of Christ) by calling them a "word" of the Lord. But, after all, he was a powerful personality who succeeded in impressing his view of Christ upon Christianity, and there is no one who doubts that he is the creator of the Gentile church,—the only form of Christianity that survived after the disappearance of the Judaistic congregations, the so-called Ebionites, or Nazarees. A few hints as to the importance of Paul are contained in the editorial on "Paul's Conception of the Cross," page 476 of *The Open Court* for August, 1899.



DEFEATED BUT NOT CONQUERED.

BY JULIUS SCHRADER.

Frederick the Great showed his genius most brilliantly in times of adversity.
The illustration represents him after the battle of Kollin.

Frontispiece to The Open Court for October, 1899.

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THE FATHERLAND.

INTRODUCTORY TO THE ARTICLES OF THE PRESENT
NUMBER.

BY THE EDITOR.

GERMANY is rightly called the Fatherland in Anglo-American speech, for she is the original home of the great majority of the inhabitants of the United States, viz., the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans; and, in addition, she has been, since the beginning of history, the centre of all Teutonic races. She is the mother country of England and may be regarded as the oldest sister among the other Teutonic nations of Europe, the Dutch, the Swiss, the Danes, the Swedes, the Norwegians, and the Austrians.

Teutonic love of liberty was the barrier against which Roman imperialism broke, and had not Arminius, the Cheruscan, defeated the proud Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest, our present civilisation would not be Teutonic but Roman; for Germany was the bulwark of the smaller Teutonic races, and if Germany had succumbed to the Roman yoke there would have been no power in the world that could have prevented the spread of Rome's dominion over the whole north of Europe. The Slavic races would have been assimilated by Rome as easily as, and perhaps even more quickly than, the Celts.

Consider what the consequences would have been! Teutonic speech would have been superseded by some Romance dialect which would be classed by philologists in the same category with Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese; and these Romance languages alone would now be regarded as cultured speech. English would probably never have originated, and the other Teutonic

tongues would be on the death list not otherwise than the Basque, the Welsh, the Old Irish, and the Gælic.

Further, the thought of the Northern peoples would have run in Roman channels, and the Reformation would either never have taken place or would have assumed so different a character as to bring about different results. Protestantism is essentially a Teutonic Christianity, and if some Romanist historians are lamenting over the split in the Church, we cannot help thinking that the division was for the best of mankind. Even the Roman Church has profited by being obliged to compete with Protestant Churches, and it is well known that Roman Church institutions in Protestant countries, especially in North Germany, England, and North America, are better and purer and in every respect superior to those of purely Roman Catholic countries, such as Italy and Spain.

The battle in the Teutoburg Forest decided the destiny of nations as yet unborn, and the English have good enough reason to honor Arminius, for he preserved the original folk-character of the Fatherland, thus saving Saxon speech, Saxon habits and laws, and Saxon institutions, four centuries before they were transplanted to the shores of Albion whence they were destined to girdle the world. Without Arminius there would have been no Hengist and Horsa, no Alfred the Great, no Bede, no Magna Charta, no Milton, no Elisabethan Age, no Shakespeare.

We Americans owe even more than England to the Fatherland, for we have imbibed German science, German philosophy, German methods of education,—not to mention the enormous amount of German blood that is coursing through American veins.

No nation in the world, not even ancient Greece or modern England, has produced such a galaxy of great men as Germany, stars of first magnitude whose light shone to the whole world, Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Herbart, Beethoven, Mozart, Wagner. Further, the astronomers Copernicus and Kepler; scientists such as Liebig, Helmholtz, etc. Nor are men of action missing, great generals, such as Prince Eugene, Frederick the Great, Gneisenau, and Moltke, or politicians such as Bismarck; and if among them we should name a man of philosophical depth and cosmopolitan sympathies, we should without hesitation select Frederick the Great, the philosopher on the throne.

We Americans have no reason to begrudge the glory of Germany's great men, for we have profited not a little by their labors and have considerably utilised the results of their work in building

up the nation of the West which promises to be the nation of the future. Indeed, we have a good title in regarding ourselves as their legitimate heirs, for we have incorporated into our body politic the best features of German life, and the soul of its aspirations continues in us destined to carry its ideals to new fields and stake them to wider issues.

The tension which shortly ago existed between the Fatherland and the United States has happily passed away, and it becomes now more and more apparent how unwarranted it was and how foolish a continuance of a hostile feeling between the two nations would be. But it will be well to have the situation reviewed, and to discuss openly the conditions which caused the disturbance of the old and well-established friendship between the two nations. Germany has become convinced that the military power of the United States is not an item that can be neglected in the calculation of political possibilities, and the emperor has shown of late, repeatedly and unequivocally, that he cares for the friendship of the great Republic of the West. While German expectations in South America have become for more than one reason Utopian, the signs of the times indicate with great clearness that Germany's rôle in Central Europe, in Austria, and in the Levant, is of increasing importance and will more and more demand the concentration of all her energies. Instead of a bird in the bush, she will find there several in her hand.

In devoting this number to a discussion of the latest phases of the relation of the United States to the Fatherland,¹ we offer at the same time an article on the philosopher on the throne, Frederick the Second of Prussia,—best known among his own people as *der alte Fritz*, or Frederick the Great. His sense of duty, his idea that the ruler of the state is "the first servant of the people," the simplicity of his habits, were a lesson and set an example in his days which did not remain unheeded on this side of the Atlantic at the time of the national birth of the United States.

¹ The first article by the Rev. William Weber, Pastor of St. Paul's Church of Belleville, Ill., is a discussion of the political situation, while Maximilian Groszmann's is a causerie on the symptoms of the estrangement which, being of a transient nature, will, as we confidently hope, soon pass away. The editorial, "The German in America," treats the subject in a general way. We would remind our readers that a former number of *The Open Court* contains an article by William Vocke of Chicago which reflected the views of a large portion of our German-American fellow citizens—viz., of those who hold England responsible for the whole embroglio. The Hon. Joseph Reinhardt, a representative German-American of Illinois, who, while a member of the State Senate, distinguished himself through his interest in school-legislation takes another view of the situation, as may be learned from his letter in the present number.

THE RELIGION OF FREDERICK THE GREAT.

BY PROF. W. H. CARRUTH.

1975

SUCH is the unreasonable prejudice regarding the philosophers of the eighteenth century, so strong the general impression of their godlessness, that the title of this article is likely to beget a smile of incredulity in those who have not given the subject more careful consideration. To the narrow orthodoxy of that time, all designations of those who could not accept the traditional doctrines of the Church were synonyms: Arian, Socinian, deist, rationalist, atheist, infidel, free-thinker, were but equivalent names of various enemies of the true faith. In large measure, and to the indiscriminating world, this confusion has been preserved until the present day, and certain thinkers of the ~~last~~ century are still thoughtlessly designated as atheists by persons whose own views, judged by the confessional standards of to-day, are less orthodox than ~~those of the~~ ^{the most} ~~ones~~ whom they thus misrepresent. Then as now, however, not to be an adherent of one's sect, was as much as being hostile to Christianity, and critical of the Christian hierarchy, was as much as having no religion at all. "Every age, every people, every individual," says Von Raumer, "interprets the word 'religious' in accordance with its own convictions, or its whims; and often the gentlest of souls cry aloud and accuse others of atheism because they do not find their own miniature idol of God in every chamber, every book and every heart." Voltaire and Thomas Paine, for instance, have been the bugbears of religious instruction in the evangelical churches of our own time to such an extent that glib tongues would scoff at mention of their religion; yet religion they undoubtedly had, of a very real sort, and their tenets would actually appear conservative if compared with the positive beliefs of not a few of those who still teach in orthodox Christian pulpits. We need not expect it to be otherwise with Frederick the Great, a man whose religious views

These

were shaped by disciples of Wolff and Leibnitz, by the reading of Epicurus, Locke and Voltaire.



THE YOUNG KING WITH HIS GUESTS AT THE ROUND TABLE.¹ (By Adolf Menzel.)

Strictly original views of religious problems we shall not find in Frederick, as indeed strictly original views are few and rare at

¹ The details of Menzel's picture of the Round Table of Frederick the Great are all strictly historical. The dining-room in which the scene is represented is situated on the ground floor of

any time. But there is no good reason for thinking that the views he expressed were not sincerely his own. He had thought through and lived through his philosophy of life. While even his phraseology borrows freely from that of his masters, yet of his deeper convictions I feel justified in saying, as Lowell said of Parker's words, that they had been "fierily furnaced in the blast of a life that had struggled in earnest."

But if serious thought and deep convictions on the mysteries of the universe and the greater problems of human life and destiny: the existence and nature of God, the nature of the soul and its future, the relation of the creature to the Creator, the right relation of the individual to his fellows,—if convictions on these subjects so deep as to control the course of one's life constitute religion, then Frederick was certainly a religious man. It is true, he had little of the emotionalism and the outward devoutness which ~~with~~ some people seem indispensable manifestations of religion, if not the very essence of it. But Frederick's training and life, if not his nature, inclined him to stoicism, notwithstanding the evidence of a certain lachrymose effusiveness manifested in some of his writings. This manifestation is superficial, and due to the prevailing epistolary tone of his French correspondents.

Baron von Suhn, one of Frederick's most intimate friends, reports in 1736 that he found him "so far gone in materialism as not to hesitate at the denial of all independent and separate soul life." Suhn undertook to cure his friend, and to this end translated into French, for his use, Wolff's *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele*. Very soon after submitting to this wholesome treatment Frederick wrote: "Gradually I begin to perceive within me the dawn of a new day; it does not yet gleam and glow fully before my eyes, but I see that it is within the possibility of human nature that I have a soul and that this is immortal. Henceforth I will hold to Wolff, and if he can demonstrate the immortality of my individual nature, I shall be content and calm." Very soon the prince was

the chateau of Sans Souci. The King is seen in the midst of his distinguished company. He is engaged in a lively discussion with Voltaire, who is just developing some argument. General Von Stille, who sits between the two, watches Voltaire, and is greatly interested in the discussion. At the corner, on the left-hand side of the picture, Mylord Marischal is engaged in a conversation with his neighbor whose back is turned toward the spectator. One of the famous greyhounds of the King comes out from under the table. Next in order is the Marquis D'Argens, who speaks with Monsieur De LaMettrie. Behind the latter appears Count Rothenburg, who smiles at the remarks of Voltaire. Count Algarotti shows a greater interest still, for he is leaning over the table, anxious not to lose a word of the argument. Marischal Keith leans back in his chair, apparently enjoying the conversation of the witty Frenchman. We need not add that the scene is a masterpiece of composition, and will forever remain one of the best and most classical art productions.

led from Wolff to Leibnitz, and from Leibnitz to Locke, whom he continued to regard as the master of modern thinkers, and whose method he endeavored to apply in his own reflexions upon science and religion.

Frederick met Voltaire in 1736, and in a letter to him, less than a year after the one just quoted, he writes: "Metaphysical subtleties are beyond our grasp; my system is restricted to the worship of the Supreme Being who alone is good, merciful, and therefore deserving of my reverence, and to trying with all my power to alleviate and lessen the sorrows of mankind, in all else submitting to the decrees of the Creator, who will do with me as to Him seems good, and from whom, come what may, I have nothing to fear." Whether he was aware of it is not evident, but certainly this beautiful confession of faith comes close to the ~~Gospel~~ requirement of a complete religion, "do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God," while the trust expressed in the last phrase suggests Whittier's faith, "No harm from Him can come to me, on ocean or on shore."

(G. O. A.)

prophet Am.

While not always expressed with the same gentleness and positiveness, we shall find essentially the same belief in all Frederick's utterances, of whatever date. Seckendorf's report, in the year 1740, "He has the religion of a gentleman: believes in God and the forgiveness of sins," seems for its latter part to lack confirmation, for I nowhere find Frederick referring to the theological doctrine of sin and vicarious atonement. But a selection of passages from various periods of his life on the great topics of religion will show how constant was his interest in them and how consistent his thought on the whole.

Frederick's belief in the existence of God and his faith in the divine wisdom were constant and strong. Only once, perhaps, in the *Epistle to Mylord Marischal* on the death of his brother, is there anything that sounds like faltering. "They tell us that the God whom we adore is just and gentle,—yet we suffer so much! How reconcile paternal feeling in him with the burden of misery under which men struggle?—Cannot the value of the sacrifice move this God? Nor clouds of incense? No; deaf is his ear toward the prayers of the men whom his decree lays low!" But, mingled as this is with appeals to the gods and allusions to Fate and Elysium, it seems fair to regard it as merely a rhetorical attempt to express the intensity of his grief, rather than the statement of a mature reflexion. This presumption is supported by the numerous and explicit declarations of his faith from various periods of his life. The *Ode on the Good-*

G. O. A.

ness of God was composed in the year 1737. In a letter accompanying a copy of the ode which he sent to the Berlin preacher, Beau-sobre, Frederick says: "I have endeavored to depict God as I think of him and as he really is. His character is goodness, and I know him only by his loving kindness. How then could I maliciously distort him and attribute to him a cruel and barbarous character when all that surrounds me proclaims his mercy? I try to make God as lovable to others as he appears to me, and to inspire them with the same gratitude for his benefits as that which fills me." The *Ode* itself is a creditable hymn to the praise of God. A few stanzas of it will appear later. The tone of this letter as well as that of the first stanzas of the *Ode* suggests Whittier's *The Eternal Goodness*, for instance in the lines, "I know not of his hate, I know his goodness and his love," and "Forgive me if too close I lean my human heart on thee." Only a few years before his death Frederick composed the *Verses on the Existence of God*, again strangely suggestive of Whittier's thought in his *Questions of Life*, and especially of the lines, "I am; how little more I know; whence came I? whither do I go? A centered self, that feels and is; a cry between the silences." Some of Frederick's lines run as follows:

"Whence came I? Where am I? And whither am I going?

I do not know. Montaigne admits not knowing.

I, sent into the world but yesterday,—

A being anything but necessary,—

This being is, was ever, and must aye,

Body or soul, continue, never vary;

This point, at least, I hear no one deny.

Yet, wretched, very limited creature I,—

E'en though deep insight do the fact reveal

That nought I know,—I think and will and feel,

And weigh my every action's consequence.

Think ye, that being of omnipotence,

Author of all, and eke of humble me,

Would without will have worked and without aim?

Who gave me understanding, maker he,

Could give to me and not possess the same?

"Dare not to call the wisdom of God unkind,

But rather feel the weakness of thy mind,

Rebellious atom, thou, ambitious man!

The boldness of the inquisitive sense to bridle

The Almighty set this barrier in his plan;

Perchance Omniscience, by this darkness, can

Put thee to shame, and prove thy reason idle."

Who will fail to be reminded here, both by the thought and the style, of Pope's *Essay on Man*?

Frederick's faith in the goodness of God is most touchingly expressed in his repeated declaration that even if God should see fit to extinguish his being with death, that faith would not be shaken. The old theological crux, whether he would be willing to be damned for the glory of God, never occupied him, but this faith



THE ROYAL AUTHOR IN TIMES OF WAR.¹ (By Adolf Menzel.)

comes as near as mortal can to an affirmative answer. In the *Ode on the Goodness of God*, he exclaims:

“Ah, even if my soul, a weary,
 Slave of the body, blotted out
 Goes down into the cavern dreary
 Of death's pale realm beyond all doubt,
 This soul, unfaithful to thee never,
 Thy praise will sing while here forever,

¹ Frederick the Great found sufficient leisure in his campaigns to express his thoughts in philosophical essays and his sentiments in verse; he wrote in French, believing that language to be superior to his native German, for we must remember that the revival of German literature had not yet set in in his day; it began with Klopstock and culminated in Goethe.

Ready alike for life or death ;
 Life was no debt thou hadst to pay me,
 And should the endless silence stay me,
 Man ends his sorrows with his breath."

And in the letter to Beausobre he says: "I will venture to undertake the defence of God even in case he should not have thought best to endow the soul with immortality, and finally I infer from the goodness which he is now showing me that which he will show me in the future." The last phrase refers to a stanza to be quoted presently in which Frederick expresses a modest hope for immortality. Before taking up that subject, however, we should complete the summary of Frederick's thought of God. The existence and the everlasting goodness of God are to his mind all that we should attempt to predicate of him. In the *Essay on Self-Love Considered as a Moral Principle*, sent to D'Alembert early in 1770, Frederick says on this point: "The finite cannot grasp the infinite; consequently we can get no accurate conception of the Divinity; we can only satisfy ourselves in a general way of his existence, and that is all. Let us be content to adore in silence, and to restrict the emotions of our hearts to the sentiments of profound gratitude to the Being of Beings in whom and through whom all beings are." The same thought is repeated in a poetic *Epistle to D'Alembert* three years later:

"Let us agree; a reasoning being wise
 Sits at the source whence all these splendors rise;
 But let my heart adore,—not venture to define."

On the question of the immortality of the soul Frederick's expressions vary more, being, indeed, mostly sceptical, but extending on a few occasions to a faint utterance of "the larger hope." Reference has already been made to the materialism of his youthful views. In a letter to Rev. Mr. Achard, in March, 1776, he writes:

"I ask you whether you have any conception of an intellect without organs? or, to make myself clearer, of any existence after the destruction of the body? You have never been dead, consequently you know what death is only from your sad observations. You see when the circulation of the blood stops and when the fluid parts of the body curdle or separate from the solid parts, that the person is dead who lived a moment before. You may philosophise on this fact, but what has become of the mind of this person, and what has become of the being that animated the body, you cannot explain. You were never dead; but as you still live, human pride and vanity flatter you to believe that you will survive the destruction of your body; but I believe, as I tell you frankly, that the wisdom of the Creator gave us reason to be used in the various situations of life where we need it, and that it is

no more inconsistent with the goodness of God to destroy us after death (for if we are destroyed we suffer no more evil) than to permit sin in the world."

In a letter to Voltaire, in 1775, Frederick states very positively his inability to accept the dualistic conception of the individual: "I know that I am a material, animated, organised being which thinks; thence I conclude that matter can think, just as it has the quality of being electrified."

As the logical sequence of this view Frederick's utterances touching the subject of the persistence of personality indicate a more or less definite expectation of annihilation. His *Last Testament*, composed early in 1752, begins as follows: "From the moment of our birth to that of our death our life is a swift transition. During this brief moment man should labor for the good of the society to which he belongs." Thereupon the king declares that it has been his ambition to rule wisely and justly, and proceeds: "Willingly and without regret I render back to kind Nature who gave it the breath that animates me, and my body to the elements of which it is composed. I have lived as a philosopher and wish to be buried as such, without processions, display, or pomp; I wish to be neither dissected nor embalmed; I wish to be buried on the terraces at Sans Souci, in a tomb that I have had prepared.¹

Over and over again the expectation and even hope of personal annihilation is expressed during the dark times of the Seven Years' War. Thus in the *Epistle to His Sister of Bayreuth*, August, 1757:

"I see, man is a plaything in the hand of Fate.
But if a being lives, severe and yielding never,
Who lets the vulgar multitudes increase forever,
He looks upon the world with coldness, calmly sees
How Phalaris is crowned, and fettered Socrates;
Indifferent sees vice, virtue, war's wild woes, the scourges
Which desolate the earth and fill the air with dirges.
And therefore, precious sister, nothing but death's arm
Will be my sole resort, last refuge from all harm."

Again, in writing to the Margrave of Bayreuth after the death of this sister the following year: "After this terrible loss life is more hateful than ever, and there will be for me no happier moment than the one that unites me with those whom the light no longer sees." This, to be sure, may owe something of its form to rhetorical stress. The same might be maintained regarding the following

¹ Strangely enough this last simple and explicit wish was not observed by Frederick's successor.

from a letter to the Lord Marischal Keith, in the same year, on the death of the latter's brother: "Viewing the narrow circle of years I feel anew commingled torment and bitter sadness; when at the close of life my evening falls, Atropos will silently press down my weary lids." But the same could not be said of the deliberate utterance in the *Epistle to the Marquis d'Argens*, written the year before the preceding:

"Death hath, O friend, for us nothing to rouse our terror,
It is no skeleton to fright our gaze,—all error!
This phantom dread, which drives the color from the face,
We praise it as the haven rather
Where the great Romans all did gather
When ruin faced them and disgrace.

With Epicurus I agree,
That soon or late all things which be
Are by the tooth of Time destroyed;
That to this breath, life's kindling ray,
Spark of the fire by which brute matter's purified,
It is not given to last for aye;
Together with the body 'tis begot, increases,
Endures with it its share of woes,
Then it grows blurred and dark and finally it ceases,
And surely perishes when the night's shadows close
To bid the living from this world a last farewell.
Soon as the soul its flight has taken
All memory is gone, thought has its home forsaken;
The state that unto death succeeds
The inexorable dictate heeds
Of the same law that ruled the earth
Before the body came to birth;
According to this iron law
All mortals must at last surrender
What to the elements they owe.
The power that all impels, whence the quick atoms flow
Which the reality of life engender,
And from which Nature's self derived material form."

Aside from his inability to conceive of the phenomena of personality apart from tangible physical organisms, which would, perhaps, have left his disbelief in immortality rather agnostic than positively sceptical, Frederick's opinions were intensified by his hostility to the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, which he regarded as an unsound and ignoble basis for morality. Thus in his *Epistle to Keith*, apropos of the death of the Marshal of Saxony, written in 1750, he exclaims at the close:

"Ah, wretched mortals, if the eternal fires
Alone can purge your criminal desires,

Your austere virtues are a mere pretence.
 We who reject all future recompense,
 Who spurn belief in endless punishment,—
 Self-interest soils not our pure sentiment.
 With us the common weal and virtue sole are strong,
 And love of duty keeps us from the wrong.
 Yea, let us end in peace and die without regret
 If we may leave the earth some benefit.
 Thus the day-star, before he sinks in night
 On the horizon spreads a gentle light,
 And the last rays he to the zenith darts
 Are his last sighs ere from the earth he parts."

Similarly in the *Eulogy on Prince Henry of Prussia*, 1767, Frederick writes: "I see already the end of my own course, and the moment, dear prince, when the Being of all Beings shall mingle forever my ashes with thine. . . . Death, sirs, puts an end to all men; happy they who die with the comforting assurance that they deserve the tears of those who survive!"

On the other hand, there is no lack in Frederick's writings of expressions that show that he, too, sometimes cherished the thought of immortality as "a pleasing hope, a fond desire." In the *Ode on the Goodness of God*, already quoted, and just following the verses which express the faith that annihilation of our personality is quite consistent with the eternal goodness, occurs the following:

"But if, enduring on, my spirit
 The shears of Atropos survive,
 And, purified, it have the merit
 From the tomb's sleep to wake alive,
 How sweet the promise of that waking!
 I die content, and without quaking,
 I hasten to the infinite heart.
 My God, if filled with love supernal
 My soul, like thee, should prove eternal,
 Eternal joy would be its part."

Hope of
 Immortality

Twenty years later, in the *Epistle to Mylord Marischal* on the death of the latter's brother, which followed quite closely the death of Frederick's mother and sister, the king writes with perhaps more rhetoric than reflexion in his expression: "O when shall I burst my heavy, golden fetters! When shall I escape this vale of tears, to near the moment that seems to me so sweet because it will unite me with thee forever, sister, dear! Then, by the grace of the gods, yonder in Elysium, in its green fields, with its happy inhabitants, our shades, freed from fear, will comfort each other for the much sorrow experienced here, and our hearts, true to the eternal laws of friendship, will then in peaceful delight cultivate this union, sur-

rounded by eternal light." However, hope and doubt are equally balanced here, for Frederick continues, "But what! What illusion of Elysian fields does the deceitful picture show me? Yes, reason, anxious for clearness, destroys the dear fancy of an eternal life;



FREDERICK THE GREAT IN HIS PRIME. (By Adolf Menzel.)

what Atropos and her shears promise us is but deep forgetfulness and eternally sound repose."

But while Frederick inclined to the doctrines of Epicurus in this respect, in his theory of ethics he mingled with Epicureanism

a strong element of the categorical imperative, and his life and example were rather those of a Stoic and Puritan. His repeated characterisation of himself as "the first servant of the State," sprang from profound and practical conviction. His most stirring appeals to the fulfillment of duty are supported by example rather than by argument, as in the case of the famous *Address before the Battle of Leuthen*. The king details briefly the desperate nature of the situation; he expresses his confidence in the patriotism and courage of his officers, and then simply proceeds: "I have to say that I shall attack the army of Prince Charles with its threefold greater strength wherever I find it. We must beat the enemy or be buried by his batteries. Thus I think and thus I shall act. You are Prussians, and will certainly not make yourselves unworthy of that honor. . . . Farewell, gentlemen; we shall soon have beaten the enemy or we shall never meet again." Similarly he writes to Voltaire, in 1757:

" But I, beset by threatening storm,
Defiance bid to every stress
And as a king must think, live, die."

In his theoretical writings on ethics, as the *Moral Dialogue for the Use of the Youth of Noble Houses*, and his *Essay on Self-love regarded as a Moral Principle*, Frederick insists on the right and the reason of appealing to self-love, or self-interest, as the only sound mainspring of human action. But this self-love is not to be blind, not to involve the gratification of the senses at the expense of others; it is to be "enlightened selfishness." The royal philosopher recognises that the real value of such a principle depends wholly upon the view held of the strongest, longest and highest gratification which self-love may seek. This he does not find with Epicurus in a temperate gratification of the appetites and passions, nor with Zeno in living in harmony with the laws of Nature, but in the approval of the reason and the conscience. Further than this, to the analysis and origin of the conscience, he does not go in theory, but treats it practically in the spirit of Kant. The *Moral Dialogue*—begins by declaring virtue to be "a fortunate frame of mind which impels us to fulfil our duties to human society for our own advantage." "But what advantage would you derive from doing all this for society?" asks the interrogator after some specifications have been made. "The sweet satisfaction of being what I wish to be: worthy of having friends, of the esteem of my fellow men, and of my own approval," is the reply. But the questioner asks whether the philosopher would be sure to think thus if he could safely do wrong unpunished. "Would I be able to stifle the

Duty
Categorical
imperative

Essays
on Self-love?

out

voice of my conscience and of tormenting remorse? Conscience is like a mirror; I would appear in my own eyes an object of abomination! No, never will I expose myself deliberately to this humiliation, this pain, this torment!"

In the *Essay on Self-Love* he first reviews the motives to which various religions and philosophies have appealed. He objects, as already shown, to future rewards and punishments. He also finds the Christian appeal to the love of God inadequate, because we cannot "expect of untutored souls that they shall love a being whom they cannot grasp in some tangible form." Finally he proceeds: "The powerful motive which we are seeking is self-love,—this guaranty of self-preservation, this founder of our happiness, this inexhaustible source of our vices and virtues, this secret spring of all human action. I could wish that this motive should be appealed to, to show men that their true advantage demands that they be good citizens, good parents and good friends, in short, possess all the moral virtues; and since this is indeed so, it would not be difficult to convince them of it. . . ." "The difficulty of reconciling the happiness which I connect with good actions and the persecutions which are suffered by virtue, is overcome if we restrict our conception of happiness to perfect peace of mind. This peace of mind depends upon the approval of our own conscience. I repeat, there is no other happiness than peace of mind or soul; wherefore our own advantage must bring us to seek such a precious possession, and from the same motive to subdue the passions which disturb it."

Frederick seems to have been well aware that such a conscience as that upon which he depends owes much, to say the least, to early training, wherefore he urges: "We ought to begin by following the example of the ancients, and give all encouragement for the improvement of the human race; give preference in the schools to the teaching of morals above all other learning, and devise some easy method of giving instruction therein." And in another place in the same essay he writes: "We ought perpetually to be appealing to men: Be gentle and humane, because you yourselves are weak and need aid! Be just to others in order that the laws may protect you, too, against all violence from others! In a word, do not do to others what you do not wish them to do to you!" The same Confucian form of the Golden Rule occurs in the *Moral Dialogue*. "Nothing is more evident," the *Essay* continues, "than that society could neither exist nor continue without morality in those who constitute it. Corrupt morals, offensive and inso-

secret
motive.

such
step

secret

cut

lent vice, contempt of virtue and of those who respect it, dishonesty in trade, perjury, treachery, selfishness which ignores the welfare of the Fatherland, are the forerunners of the ruin of states and of the downfall of empires, because as soon as the notions of right and wrong are confused there are no longer praise or blame, punishment or reward."

Such is the tone that inspires Frederick's spirited poetic appeals to patriotism in the *Ode to the Germans* and the *Ode to the Prussians*. In the first, written in 1760, after depicting the disunion and decay of Germany, he addresses the Prussians:

"Come on, my Prussians, from this country let us turn,
Where wrong is aye triumphant and where dread wars burn;
Where madness now has made your German brothers blind.
Germany to the foe her bulwark has surrendered,
Betrayed her freedom, fetters on herself to bind,
Herself as victim to the foreign tyrant tendered.
These fools be to the fate resigned
To which they clearly are abettors,—
It seems that they were born for fetters,
In tyrants' smiles their joy to find."

cut

This stanza reflects the same despair of improvement at home which made the innumerable imitations of *Robinson Crusoe* so popular in Germany during the first half of the century. The German *Robinsons* were nearly all content to stay in the paradises which they found in foreign climes. But Frederick does not rest in such a mood; and in the fact that he did not do so, either in word or in deed, lies much of the secret of his influence over all the life of his time. This is why the century deserves to be called The Age of Frederick the Great. The *Ode* goes on:

"No, no, my friends, a noble soul must all things stake,
Not loiter in idle ease and rest ignoble take;
Low purposes be stifled ere distinctly thought.
Our honor we'll maintain, and face whatever danger.
Already the just God his thunderbolt has wrought;
Themis, to keep the peace, will find her own avenger.
On, then, and plunge into the fray
With souls of fire, my gallant yeomen!
Wash with the red blood of your foemen
All the long-gathered stains away!"

cut

Another interesting utterance on this subject is found in the *Eulogy on Prince Henry of Prussia*. "Does the greatness of states consist in the widening of their borders? No; it consists in the great men whom Nature from time to time begets in them. If we turn the pages of history, we see that the times of elevation and

glory of states are those in which lofty spirits, virtuous souls, men of extraordinary talent have flourished in them, lightening the burdens of government by their exertions.—You, sirs, know that absolute unselfishness is the source from which all virtue flows; this it is that leads us to prefer an honorable name to the advantages of wealth; the love of right and justice to the impulses of unbridled desire for possessions; the public welfare and that of the state to one's own and that of his family; the safety and preservation of the Fatherland to his own health and life; in a word, it is this which raises man above the human and almost fits him to be a citizen of heaven." The special interest here, is in the use, by Frederick, of the word "unselfishness." It is plain, however, that self-love, in the high sense defined by him, is quite consistent with unselfishness.

Frederick cannot be claimed as an adherent of organic Christianity. Yet in its purity he esteemed the religion of Christ highly, though, to be sure, from the same basis as all other religions. He regarded Jesus as a philosopher and reformer, but rejected all claims for his supernatural origin or authority. In his essay *On Religion Under the Reformation* he says:

"Nothing compares with the ethics of Christianity in its beginning. But the evil inclinations of the human heart soon corrupted it in practice. Thus the purest springs of good became the occasion of all sorts of evil for men; this religion, which taught humaneness, mercy and meekness, established itself by fire and sword; the priests of its altars, whose lot should have been sanctity and poverty, lead a shameful life; they accumulated wealth, became ambitious, and some of them became powerful princes."

He continues:

"Religion changed as well as morals; from century to century it lost more and more of its natural simplicity and became quite unrecognisable because of its outward mask. All that was added to it was the work of men, and could but perish."

Therewith Frederick begins a *résumé* of Church history, emphasising the history of dogmas, which he plainly disapproves. It would not be profitable to enumerate all these. The outline of them closes:

"In short, all sorts of deceptions were devised to deceive the simple faith of the multitude, and false miracles became almost every-day affairs."

"However, changes in the objects of worship could not bring about the reformation of religion; of thinking people the majority apply their whole keenness in the direction of self-interest and ambition; few concern themselves with abstract notions and still fewer think profoundly about such important subjects."

After outlining the work of the Reformation, Frederick resumes as follows :

"Religion now assumed a new form and approached its primitive simplicity. This is not the place to consider whether it would not have been better to have left it more pomp and outward show, whereby to make a greater impression on the people, who judge only according to the senses; it appears that a purely spiritual worship, especially such as that of the Protestants, is not adapted to rude and material men who are incapable of rising in thought to the adoration of the loftiest truths."

This would seem to be sufficient to show that a pure and primitive Christian church might have found in Frederick a warm adherent. He did not himself desire to be recognised as an orthodox Christian; whether the founder of Christianity would have condemned him as without religion, those who read may judge. He wrote in 1737 to Colonel Camas: "Living faith is no affair of mine; but Christian ethics are the rule of my life." And in his age he wrote to D'Holbach: "How can any one declare that Christianity has been the cause of all the misfortune of the human race? If in the whole New Testament there were but the one commandment: 'Do unto others as ye would that they should do to you,' one must admit that this contains the summary of all ethics."

Like Nathan the Wise, Frederick recognised good in all religions, and tried to see it in all sects. He judged them all from the standpoint of their ethics, and said in the *Essay on Self-love*: "The Christian, the Jewish, the Mohammedan, and the Chinese religions have almost the same moral code." Yet he recognised that it was with Christianity that he had to deal, and wished to reconcile his philosophy to it. In the same essay he writes:

"I declare that all the means that can be adopted to improve persons of such character (freethinkers whose morals rebel against the stiff yoke of religion) but conduce to the greater advantage of the Christian religion, and I venture to believe that self-love is the most powerful motive that can be appealed to to save men from their errors. As soon as a man is really convinced that his own advantage requires him to be virtuous, he will do commendable deeds, and when he finds that he is in fact living in accord with the ethics of the Gospel it will be easy to persuade him that he is doing from love of God what he was already doing from love of self; this is what the theologians call converting heathen virtues into virtues sanctified by Christianity."

While, like Voltaire, whom he eulogised for this very fact, Frederick endeavored to be fair toward those members of the clergy whose virtues were really an ornament to the Church, he distrusted and assailed the hierarchy as a whole. He, too, desired to *écrasser l'infâme*. This was owing partly to the unfounded pretensions of the clergy, and partly to the dogmas which they taught. We have

already noted his criticism of Christian creeds as containing "such abstract doctrines that every catechumen must needs be changed into a metaphysician in order to comprehend them." In his eulogy



"DER ALTE FRITZ." (By Adolf Menzel.)
Frederick the Great in advanced years.

of Voltaire he attributed the persecutions of him by the clergy to the fact that Voltaire had told the truth about them. Thus they maliciously accused him of denying the existence of God who had

employed all the resources of his genius to prove it. In the Preface to the *Abridgement of Fleury's Ecclesiastical History*, 1766, Frederick writes: "Church history is the tourney-place of politics and of the ambition and the selfishness of priests; divinity is not there, but only the most blasphemous misuse of the divine name, employed by the priests, who possessed the respect of the people, only as a cloak for their criminal passions." The same charge is repeated in the essay *On Religion under the Reformation*, and Frederick is at first inclined to make no distinction between Luther and the organisation which he attacked. He explains as the basis for Luther's action:

"The Augustines were in possession of the traffic in indulgences; the Pope commissioned the Dominicans to preach it also, which aroused a furious quarrel between these two orders. The Augustines denounced the Pope; Luther, one of their number, attacked violently the abuses of the Church; with bold hand he tore away part of the bandage from the eyes of superstition; soon he became the head of a party, and since his teachings deprived bishops of their income and took from the monasteries their wealth, the princes followed the new reformer in numbers."

But later, in the *Preface to Fleury's History* the king evidently tried to do greater justice to Luther, as follows:

"A Saxon monk, brave to rashness, of mighty imagination, shrewd enough to utilise the general spiritual unrest, became the head of a party which declared itself against Rome. (Here follow some comments on Luther's rude style). But if we consider the work of the reformers as a whole, we must concede that the human mind owes part of its advance to their efforts. They freed us from a mass of errors that overshadowed our ancestors. By making their opponents cautious they stifled the germs of new superstitions, and being themselves persecuted they became tolerant. Only in this sanctuary of toleration introduced into the Protestant states was it possible for the human reason to develop, for philosophers to cultivate wisdom, and for the borders of our knowledge to expand. If Luther had done no more than free princes and people from the yoke of Rome, he would have deserved to have altars erected to him as the liberator of the Fatherland; and even if he tore but half of the veil of superstition away, what recognition of the truth do we not owe to him!"

It is plain that the reference to "half the veil" is a hint at the errors still remaining in the Lutheran Confession. Frederick could not tolerate theological creeds. In the letter to Beausobre, already quoted, he says of the *Ode on the Goodness of God*: "You may find passages in it which are not in harmony with the Augsburg Confession; but I hope you believe, sir, that one can love God without the aid of either Luther or Calvin." One of these passages was aimed at the doctrine of eternal punishment, and this may be the proper place to introduce it.

"And ye whose fierce and gloomy error
Enkindles your fanatic zeal

To paint for us a God of terror,
 Wrathful and deaf to all appeal.—
 More like a Fury's image he,
 The product of your blasphemy !
 His anger ye do well to shun,
 If there be devils for our snoring, ^a
 For hating God, for cursing, swearing,
 Ye are such devils, ye alone."

The same. A king with such views could not have been otherwise than tolerant, if sincere and filled with the courage of his opinions. And Frederick's courage was as great in the world of thought as on the field. The maxim with which he began his reign, "Every one shall be saved here in his own fashion," was adhered to, and found many repetitions and pleas in the king's writings. In the review of the Reformation he congratulates the world on the division of the Church, because the existence of several sects compels toleration. He speaks with pride of the policy of his house in this respect, adding :

"All these sects live here in peace, and alike contribute to the welfare of the State. There is no religion which deviates much from the others in point of moral teaching; therefore government may treat them alike, and leave to each man the liberty of pursuing his own favorite way to Heaven; all that is asked of him is that he be a good citizen. False zeal is a tyrant who depopulates lands; toleration is a tender mother who fosters and cultivates them."

In brief, then, Frederick's beliefs were: The existence ~~of~~ ^{good and} ness of God; the sufficiency of the motive of the highest happiness as the spring of action, supported by the categorical imperative of the conscience; the excellence of the Christian ethics, as well as that of all great religions; the duty of service to mankind and the State. He denied: All dogmatic affirmations regarding the independent existence of the soul and of the persistence of the personality; all dogmas regarding the supernatural character of Jesus; future rewards and punishments. He indulged on occasions some hope of meeting his friends after death. He firmly held the right and duty of religious toleration. He lived a life so great and honorable and consistent with these principles that those who find themselves in possession of many more positive beliefs than he had may well hesitate to cast doubt upon the reality or aspersions upon the character of his religion.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES.

BY THE REV. WM. WEBER.

THE accession of the present German emperor to the throne, or rather Prince Bismarck's dismissal, marks a new era in the political life of Germany. The people of the fatherland have since then generally learned to see that their empire, in order to remain and to become one of the leading powers of the world, must grow considerably both in territory and population. At the same time Captain A. T. Mahan's book on *The Influence of Sea-Power Upon History* has done more than any other single factor to call the attention of the Germans to the extraordinary advantages which transmarine enterprises have offered in the past, and has greatly assisted in converting a nation, that only a short while ago ridiculed their advocates of transmarine expansion as colonial cranks, into ardent expansionists. This is the more remarkable, as the colonial aspirations of the Germans, so far at least as they have assumed definite shape in the public mind, are opposed to certain vital interests of the United States and have threatened to bring about a war between the two countries.

In attempting to point out these aspirations to my fellow-citizens, I have to state beforehand that I am not in possession of any state-secrets. All I have to communicate are ideas that have been publicly discussed by more or less prominent writers in the press of the fatherland. They were little heeded on this side of the Atlantic and have come into the foreground only of late when the time seemed ripe for action. I likewise know that those men, though influential in the highest circles, by no means exercise any direct influence upon the foreign policy of the German Empire. The fact ought never to be lost sight of that public opinion in Germany does not control the actions of the government to such an extent as with us. German statesmen are not necessarily compelled by popular

clamor to pursue a course which is in their opinion against the best interests of their country, nor will they thereby be induced to act before they are sure that the proper time has arrived and all preparations have been finished. Nevertheless, in Germany as everywhere else, the men at the helm have to consider public opinion carefully and will endeavor to satisfy its hopes and expectations, if possible.

In order to form a fair and appropriate judgment on Germany's colonial aspirations we have first of all to understand her home conditions. For that purpose we shall compare the German Empire, with regard to area, population, and past development, with the other great powers, namely, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia.

The German Empire has an area of 208,670 square miles, while the area of the United States comprises not less than 3,501,000 square miles, not to speak of her recent acquisitions. The population of Germany amounted in 1890 to 49,428,470, or 236.7 per square mile; whereas the inhabitants of the United States in 1890 numbered 62,622,250, or 21.3 per square mile. The population of the territories which are at present included in the German Empire was 24,831,396 in 1816, when the total population of the United States was about eight millions. The exact figures for the census of 1810 and 1820 are 7,239,881 and 9,633,822.

In 1816 the population of European descent in the United Kingdom and its dependencies amounted to about eighteen millions. On account of the bloody Napoleonic wars which were waged between 1811 and 1816 Germany's population must have been about the same in 1816 as in 1811, that is, about twenty-five millions. In 1890 however the European inhabitants of Greater Britain had become equal in number to those of the German Empire. But those forty-nine millions of Englishmen controlled an area of 11,371,391 square miles and more than three hundred and eighty millions of dependent people.

The same thing is to be observed in Russia. That country had in 1815 a population of forty-five millions, which had increased in 1896 to one hundred and twenty-nine millions. The area at the disposal of the Russians is 8,660,394 square miles.

The preceding figures show that Germany, about eighty years ago, had thrice as many inhabitants as the United States, almost one third more than the British Empire, and fully five-ninths as many as Russia. In the course of little over seventy years the United States have become almost one fourth more populous than

Germany, the British Empire has equalled it, and Russia's population has grown to be a good deal more than twice that of Germany. Moreover, that development has only entered upon its initial stages. The extensive and fertile domains of the United States, the density of whose population was not quite one eleventh of that of Germany in 1890, invite and foster a much more rapid increase in population than the overcrowded corners of the fatherland. The British Empire as well as Russia enjoy the same conditions. A very great part of the British colonies offers splendid homes to European emigrants, and the development of Canada and Australia for instance can hardly be said to have fairly started. There can be no doubt that the English-European population of Greater Britain will continue to grow steadily and leave that of the German Empire far behind. In like manner there is no conceivable limit for a continuous growth of the number of Russia's inhabitants who are still sparsely scattered over an immense territory. The inevitable result of this comparison is—and it may be added that it is well recognised in Germany itself—that the United States, Great Britain, and Russia will in the coming century number their populations of European descent by hundreds of millions; and that the German Empire, unless the natural course of events is yet to be changed in favor of Germany, so to speak in the eleventh hour, will cease to be a first-class power and to exercise political influence beyond the pale of its narrow boundaries. Nay, even Germany's political independence seems to be threatened by her neighbors' growing over-powerful.

From a German standpoint it does not appear very difficult to realise such a change in favor of the German Empire. There is nothing required but to direct the large stream of German emigration into German colonies, where the German immigrant will preserve his language and customs as well as close commercial and political connexions with the fatherland. The number of people that have emigrated from Germany is indeed astonishingly great. From 1871–1896, in the course of twenty-five years, not less than 2,404,782 Germans have left their country, that is, an average of nearly 100,000 a year. From 1820–1896 the German immigration into the United States amounted to 5,230,000. These German immigrants together with their descendants are to-day very probably equivalent to about fifteen millions of our population. For immigrants, as a rule, stand in the prime of their life, and multiply accordingly much faster than the whole population. Besides our last census shows very clearly that our foreign-born population has

more children than our native population. In 1890 our native white population represented 73.24 per cent. of our whole population. Our native children of native parents however amounted to only 54.87 per cent. of our total number of children. Our foreign-born white population at the same time amounted to 14.56 per cent. of our whole population, while our children of white foreign-born parents formed 18.37 per cent. If those five millions of German emigrants had therefore founded new homes in German transmarine possessions, there would now exist German colonies with about fifteen million German inhabitants. These were of course to be added to the European population of the German Empire and to be deducted from the population of the United States, with the result that the population of Germany would by far surpass that of the United States.

It is of course much easier to avoid mistakes than to repair losses which have been caused by them; and we should consider it Germany's first task to obtain possession of territories that present new homes to her emigrants. But it looks as if Germany had joined too late in the partition of the earth. She has indeed from 1884-1890 gained control over extensive parts of the dark continent, namely Togoland, Cameroons, German South-West Africa, and German East Africa, an area of 920,920 square miles. But the latest statistics accessible to me, those of the *Gothaer Hofkalender*, state that in 1897 Togoland had only 110, Cameroons 253, German South-West Africa 2,628, and German East Africa 922 European inhabitants of all nationalities. It is certainly not encouraging that in a period of thirteen years Germany has settled in her own colonies only 3,963 European inhabitants, while it has sent during the same time about a million and a half of Germans to other countries. Some foreign critics have called attention to this fact as sufficient proof that Germany does not know how to establish colonies. But Africa has always and everywhere proved a rather inhospitable continent, as far as European settlers are concerned. In the French colonies on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea the European population is said to be actually decreasing. The Cape Colony at the southern extremity of the continent had in 1891 an area of 221,311 square miles. Its European population, although the first European settlement dates back to the year 1652, numbered only 376,987 souls. It has grown since 1875 rather rapidly; but there is nothing to warrant the hope that Africa will ever become a white continent. If the number of Europeans has increased, the number of negroes has multiplied much more. Accordingly the Germans seem to

have abandoned all hope and intention of inducing their emigrants to go to the German possessions in Africa.

The only continents where the necessary room and proper climate for European agricultural and industrial communities is found are Australia, South America, and North America. Among these Australia has received but an insignificant share of Germany's surplus population. Moreover it belongs to the British Empire, and Germany would first have to break Great Britain's supremacy as sea-power, before it could dream of conquering Australia. South America on the other hand is composed of quite a number of weak and impotent states which Germany might overpower without any difficulty; and North America has always received the lion's share of German emigration. For these reasons the patriots of Germany have of late turned their eyes eagerly in the direction of both North America and South America, with a view to espying there an opening for a German colonial empire.

Our census of 1890 showed that there lived in that year not less than 2,784,894 persons in the United States who were born in Germany, and it has been figured out by statisticians that about one third of the population of the United States is of German descent. In view of these facts some Germans deem it possible to carve out from the present North American dominion of the United States a German empire. For instance in May 1896 an article appeared in the well-known *Preussische Jahrbücher* on *Deutschland und die Welt-politik* (Germany's aspirations as a world-power). The author of that article, after having stated that under present conditions the Germans in the United States and still more their descendants are lost as to the fatherland, continues page 328 :

"Those Germans could only be saved, if they had the good sense to unite in adjoining settlements; to form one or more German states within the Union, and to secure thus as one solid body political influence and preserve their nationality. There is nothing in the constitution of the United States that is in the way of such an undertaking, nor are they lacking the room. As soon as a leader were found, the work would become possible. The rest depends upon the future development which can but result in forcing by and by hostile differences between the states to the foreground by which the ever more artificial and unnatural unity of the great republic will be destroyed."

The author goes on to say, page 331 :

"In the British Dominion of Canada of to-day there live about 1,300,000 Frenchmen, and of 211 representatives of the Canadian Parliament not less than 55 are Frenchmen by descent and language. Besides, the attempted revolts of 1838, 1869, and 1885 have proved that this French population has by no means lost consciousness of its past and its national rights. If thereto be added those Frenchmen

who to the number of about 500,000 live scattered, but as Frenchmen, in the United States, there exists in case of a French-English conflict a reserve of French strength upon which a resolute French policy can build with hope of success. Then however the moment would have arrived when it should be the task of Germany, in co-operation with France whose sphere of influence would be the eastern half of British America, to attempt to gain a foothold from the west in the regions on the Pacific Ocean and to try whether it be impossible to arouse the two and three-quarter millions of Germans in the United States from their 'national lethargy,' and to induce them to lay with the assistance of the fatherland on British ground the foundation of a colony on the Pacific Ocean."

We may be inclined to smile indulgently at such wild flights of the imagination which to Americans demonstrate nothing but an encyclopædic want of acquaintance with American conditions. But such vague ideas represent according to all appearance the ripest public opinion in Germany about the United States, otherwise they would never have been published in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*. Their author, who signs as "Vindex," is very likely a member of the class of high government officers in Germany, because a writer occupying a private station would never have thought of hiding his individuality behind a pseudonym. We are therefore also unable to decide in how far those views are shared by the German government. In any case we shall do well neither to despise nor to overlook such significant utterances.

Only recently a Frenchman, M. Francis Laur, is reported to have made in all earnest a similar prophecy about the future of the United States. I quote from *The Literary Digest* of July 15, 1899, as follows:

"The concentration of Germans in the Northern States will form there a German Empire. The French in the South will join together and form a kingdom of Orleans. And who knows whether the Chinese of the Pacific coast may not ask for the protection of the Celestial Empire? Then too we shall see Mexico retake the provinces torn from her in the time of her weakness. The poor Indians too will aspire perhaps after well-won independence."

"All this," is added by the editor of *The Literary Digest*, "is not from a humorous journal, but is put forth as a genuine deduction from sociological premises." Even the best educated scholars and men of affairs in Europe are from their European experiences absolutely unable to see in the people of the United States a homogeneous nation, striving after a common national ideal. In their eyes we are nothing but an agglomeration of individuals, differing from one another in nationality, language, customs, etc., and being ready to cut each other's throats at the least provocation.

Such forecasts on the political development of the United

States are the excrescence rather of prejudice than of ignorance. The nations of continental Europe, France included which is but a republic in name, do not believe in fostering personal independence. The initiative and control in all public, and to a great extent even in private, affairs, belongs to the State that is, to the ruler and his officers. If they for example wish to found a colony, they send there first of all an imperial governor with a large staff of officials and a military force in order to establish in the would-be colony law and order, peace and security, and regulate commerce and land-tenure, long before a single actual settler has arrived. This paternal care for their subjects goes to very great lengths. They openly prevent ambitious people from emigrating to their newly acquired territories, until the government officials have discovered by careful observation and scientific experiments not only that the climate is not hostile to colonisation, but also what agricultural products are best raised, and how the land is to be cultivated to that end, etc. Accordingly there remains nothing else to be done by the colonist but to faithfully follow and obey the advice and orders of the government.

Such ideas are cherished as infallible truth by the brightest and most prominent men of continental Europe; and we cannot fail to perceive that they must be looked upon as such by monarchs and their bureaucracy. They prove their *raison d'être* and inspire them with a high and edifying sense of their own necessity and indispensability. On the other hand, they cannot help looking upon a commonwealth like the United States where the individual appears to recognise no other authority than his own sweet will, and which seems to be torn by internal dissensions, with the deepest distrust and the most gloomy forebodings. Their honest conviction concerning our present and future development is best expressed by citing Milton's description of the realm of Chaos:

"To whom these most adhere
 He rules a moment : Chaos umpire sits,
 And by decision more embroils the fray
 By which he reigns ; next him high arbiter
 Chance governs all.—This wild abyss,
 The womb of nature and perhaps her grave,
 Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, nor fire,
 But all these in their pregnant causes mixed
 Confusedly, and which thus must ever fight,
 Unless the Almighty Maker them ordain
 His dark materials to create more worlds."

Of such prejudices, which nothing but time can remove, we

must not for a moment lose sight, in our dealings with the powers of continental Europe. We must know that by presenting them a weak and unprotected side we invite their attack, because, very far from realising our immense strength and abounding resources, they are unable to imagine us otherwise than rotten to the core.

Still it is rather on account of their curiosity that I have mentioned the hopes on which German patriots base their ideas of the political attitude and the "national duty," as they call it, of the German element in the United States. Those expectations are certainly extravagant and will never be fulfilled. Their South American plans however are to be taken quite seriously. For it is there that the Germans confidently expect to acquire their first colonies. Of the German emigrants that did not come to the United States the greatest part went to Brazil. Their number has indeed not been very large. For, while from 1871-1896 the total emigration from Germany to the United States has been 2,370,958, only 48,444 settled in Brazil. Besides the number of German immigrants into Brazil, as into all other South American Republics, has always been much smaller than the number of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish immigrants. But most Germans going to Brazil settled in the three southern States of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul. These three States, which have an area of more than 200,000 square miles, are almost as large as the German Empire itself. Their population amounted in 1890 to about one and one-half million. Although the Germans formed less than one fourth of this sum, people in Germany thought and think it possible to give them within a few years a majority by directing the whole stream of their emigrants to those states. That looks quite feasible as a simple problem of arithmetic. For Germany has sent for many years annually 100,000 emigrants to transmarine countries.

To this end the German Diet passed in 1897 a new emigration bill, which became a law on the first of April 1898. Of this emigration law *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia* of 1897 states:

"The Government carried through an emigration bill in furtherance of its policy to deflect the stream of emigration from the United States to countries of South and Central America, where large agricultural and industrial colonies will develop autonomous institutions, preserve their language and customs, and preserve a commercial and political connection with the fatherland; or to the Transvaal or other regions where the colonists can advance the political prestige of the empire; as far as possible also to German transmarine possessions. Companies undertaking to settle such colonies will be aided by grants of money and by political protection wherever required. Such a company was organised in Hamburg to take over a tract of 1,700,000 fertile acres in the Brazilian state of Catharina, with a

railroad leading to the German colonies already established there. Permission to transport German emigrants will have to be obtained after April 1, 1898, from the German Chancellor, acting with the assent of the Federal Council, and can only be granted to German subjects or companies operating in German territory. A license granted to a navigation company or emigration agent can be cancelled by the same authorities. The bill provides that consuls shall be appointed in ports of debarkation approved by the Government to protect the interests of emigrants; that the Government shall facilitate the discharge of their military obligations by Germans living abroad; that an official bureau of information shall be instituted to direct the stream of emigration to territories where the conditions are favorable for prosperity, and where there is the best prospect of the German nationality being perpetuated and relations to the mother country being maintained."

Geographical conditions greatly favor the German plan in Southern Brazil. The states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul form a kind of spur extending southward away from the solid mass of the empire. Means of inland communication are little developed. There is no road passable by wagons connecting the three southern states with the north; especially Paraná is covered with mountains. All intercourse is carried on at present by sea. If therefore Germany should be opposed alone by Brazil, when making an attempt upon Southern Brazil, she could with her powerful navy easily prevent the Brazilians from coming to the aid of their oppressed countrymen; whereas she herself would be absolutely unhampered in transporting thither all the soldiers and all the material of war she wanted.

The German settlers in Southern Brazil or at least some of their spiritual and intellectual leaders, do not appear to be averse to such ideas. Towards the end of 1896 and in the beginning of 1897 several papers, written by Rev. Dr. Rotermund of São Leopoldo, R. G. D. S., on the "Prospects of the German Element in Southern Brazil," were published in the *Deutsche Post*. The author declared in the course of his discussions for instance:

"The statement that we wish to preserve our nationality does not mean anything. The Status Quo cannot be maintained for any length of time. Here also it is an "either—or;" either the Germans agree to being absorbed or they absorb whatever suits them; hammer or anvil! We have made our choice long ago; it only remains to look steadfast at the goal! A German South Brazil!"

He further says:

"We have given our articles the heading: 'The Prospects of the Germans in Southern Brazil,' and that not alone, because we Germans have our main strength in the three southern states, but also, because these three states, as we think, will not stay united with Brazil for ever. Their secession from Brazil can but be a question of time." "We are able to observe quite distinctly how love for one's own state is growing at the expense of Brazil's unity; and we should not wonder, when,

especially in consequence of the maladministration at the federal capital, Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande Do Sul should some day declare for secession and independence. Then however a new outlook will be opened to the Germans.'

The United States have certainly neither a right nor the least desire to become entangled in the internal affairs of any South American Republic. If in South America any number of states or provinces should deem fit to renounce their present allegiance in order to form an independent republic of their own, the United States would as a matter of course recognise the new republic, as soon as it had firmly established its independence. The United States will likewise under no circumstances trouble themselves about the language an independent South American Republic may prefer. The present Brazilian states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande Do Sul may therefore, as far as the United States are concerned, sever their connexion with Brazil at any time they choose and prove able to do so. They may enter into a league with one another and, as the Germans think possible, with the Republics of Paraguay and Uruguay. They may even compel the Argentine Republic to give up its provinces east of the river Paraná, so-called "Mesopotamia Argentina," and to permit them to join the new republic, which is perfectly entitled to adopt the German language as its public language, if a majority of its citizens decides in favor of such an important change.

Yet it is more than doubtful whether the German settlers in Southern Brazil will ever become numerous enough to gain control of their states in the manner which has just been described, and which has been defined as perfectly legitimate from the standpoint of the United States. It is indeed only a question of numbers, and Germany is absolutely able to pour a continuous stream of emigrants at the rate of 100,000 per annum into the three Brazilian states and the neighboring republics, Paraguay, Uruguay, etc. But those countries are under present conditions not capable of absorbing and accommodating so great a multitude of new arrivals. It is very difficult for people that have never been outside of Europe to understand the reasons why those regions cannot at a moment's notice feed and clothe and house any number of "greenhorns." They will answer all objections by the following calculation: In Germany there are more than 250 persons to the square mile. In Paraná you find only 2.9, in Santa Catharina 10.3, and in Rio Grande Do Sul 9.7. Hence there is plenty of room for hundreds of thousands of colonists in those countries. While that has to be admitted as true, practical experience has nevertheless demonstrated that, if

vacant land and people willing to settle there are given, it requires first of all proper means of communication and sufficient centers of trade and industry to fill the vacant land with prosperous homesteads. One hundred thousand German emigrants dumped upon the shores of Southern Brazil in a single year without the most careful and expensive preparation for their immediate accommodation would unfailingly ruin the labor-market of that country as well as the market for all agricultural and industrial products and cause untold misery. Accordingly the German Government will hardly dare send all its emigrants to Southern Brazil; and I should not be surprised the least bit, if after a while statistics should demonstrate that the relative proportion of German colonists to that of Latin settlers in Southern Brazil as well as elsewhere in South America has not materially changed. Then however Germany may be strongly tempted to seize by force of arms what it cannot obtain in peaceful competition; and that is the moment when the United States will have to take a lively interest in Germany's colonial policy.

The United States are very proud of their Monroe Doctrine, which represents a solemn promise never to permit any European power to encroach on the South and Central American Republics, and especially to establish new European dependencies on American soil. The simple proclamation of this doctrine proved sufficient to deter the Holy Alliance from making any attempt to restore the rule of the Bourbons over the Spanish-American Republics. The same doctrine, backed by the veteran army and navy of the Civil War, compelled Napoleon III. to renounce his intention to set up the Austrian prince Maximilian as emperor of Mexico and to withdraw his troops from Mexico. It was the Monroe Doctrine that guided President Cleveland's conduct, when he sent his ultimatum in the Venezuela controversy to England. In view of such precedents it is not to be doubted for a moment that, whenever the German Empire shall stretch out its mailed hand for the purpose of laying hold on South American territory, the United States would enter the lists as the champion of South American independence. No American administration could hesitate to take up this task.

The people of Germany are not unacquainted with these facts. As soon as the South American projects were publicly discussed, even before the emigration bill was passed, the Monroe Doctrine became the object of intense interest. The German newspapers hastened to proclaim that the Monroe Doctrine had never been adopted as a principle of international law, either by Germany

or by any other European power, and that consequently none of them was bound by it. Of Prince Bismarck it was related that he had called the Monroe Doctrine a piece of sheer impudence. As late as July 15, 1899, a German writer declares in an article on *Die nationale Aufgabe der Deutschamerikaner* (the national duties of German-Americans), published in the *Gegenwart* of Berlin :

"The famous and impudent Monroe Doctrine the Yankees have renounced on their own initiative by overstepping the boundaries of a policy strictly confined to America, and by inaugurating an aggressive imperialistic policy the consequences of which cannot yet be overlooked."

Another German paper criticised the phrase "America for the Americans," saying that the United States mean "the whole of America for the North Americans," suggesting that it ought to be changed into "North America for the North Americans."

The long and the short of it is that the Monroe Doctrine is in fact not a universally recognised principle of international law, but simply and exclusively a question of might. It means that the United States want the new world reserved for the republican form of government; they would regard it as a threat to their own institutions, if some monarchical power of Europe should establish itself on American soil, and thus they declared that they would regard such an attempt as a hostile act and a menace to their own safety. The political pretensions of the United States defined in the Monroe Doctrine will be respected just so long as the United States are resolved and able to prove and demonstrate the good right of their pretensions by force of arms.

In this connexion we must not neglect to notice that the remarkable increase of Germany's naval armament is in the popular German mind intimately related to the colonial aspirations of the empire. The public demand for a stronger German navy arose indeed immediately after the Emperor had despatched his famous telegram to Oom Paul of the Transvaal. That the German Emperor had helped to twist the British Lion's tail so audaciously rendered him at once very popular among Germans the world over. But when Great Britain assembled a squadron of mighty warships in the English Channel, it became all at once clear that Germany, notwithstanding her powerful army, was no match for England. Then the Germans grew loud in their clamor for a larger navy. Everywhere public collections were instituted with the intention of presenting men-of-war to the government. Some time however elapsed, before the German government had worked out its plan and could lay a naval bill before the Diet.

Meanwhile international conditions had somewhat altered. The first enthusiasm for the political independence of the Boers or rather for the idea of bringing South Africa, the English colonies included, where a majority of the European population is of Dutch and German descent, under the paramount influence of the German Empire had cooled off considerably, if it had not entirely subsided. Great Britain and Germany had reappraised and come to terms, as was publicly demonstrated by the German annexation of Kiao Chau Bay in 1897 when the German war-ships on their way to China were furnished with coal at the British coaling stations. The attention of the Germans had been called away from Africa, perhaps by the English themselves who immediately after the Venezuela Message could not entertain too friendly feelings towards the United States, to the advantages offered to German colonial enterprises by the conditions in South America. But while the prospect of South American colonies was appearing above the horizon, the spectre of North American interference loomed threateningly in the background. The increase in naval armament which the German government demanded and obtained from the Diet accordingly provided for a navy that was to be stronger, not than the navy of Great Britain, France, or Russia respectively, but than the navy of the United States. In the spring of 1898, immediately before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the naval bill was passed. It authorised the construction of a navy, which was to be completed within a term of six years, that is, by 1904, and was to consist of 19 battle-ships, 8 armored coast-defense vessels, 9 first-class cruisers, 26 second-class cruisers, and of a reserve of 2 battle-ships, 3 first-class cruisers, 4 second-class cruisers, together with quite a number of gunboats and torpedo-vessels. Hand in hand with building the ships was to go a corresponding increase in the personnel of the navy. In 1897 the personnel consisted of 960 officers and engineers, 5,069 petty officers, and 15,592 men and boys, making a total of 21,835 men, including surgeons, paymasters, etc. The total of the personnel of the United States navy in the same year amounted to but 13,659 men. But hardly six months having passed, cries for a still greater naval armament became loud in Germany. This time they want a navy which is to comprise not less than 57 battle-ships, 15 first-class cruisers, and 36 second-class cruisers. This immense number of warships, which would make the German Empire by a single stroke the foremost naval power of the world, is to be built from 1904-1920 at a cost of \$425,000,000 and an annual naval budget of \$75,000,000. They also

propose to accomplish that end without having recourse to additional taxation.

What is the meaning of such almost unlimited warlike preparation? The German Emperor some time ago told American visitors that his strong navy is to serve the same end as his large army, namely, the preservation of peace. These imperial words however have to be construed in the light of historical facts. The German army never was intended simply as an instrument of peace. It was in the first place organised by Gneisenau for the war of independence against Napoleon I., and reorganised through William I. under the auspices of men like Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon. While it was still the army of Prussia, it conquered an adequate position for the kingdom of Prussia, first among the German states and next among the nations of Europe. It fought in pursuance of this its task many a bloody battle. No one can blame Germany, for the policy of conquest was forced on the nation by circumstances. But, having obtained what the army had been created for, it became necessary to preserve the peace of Europe, that is to say, to guard and keep what Germany had gained in war, if possible, by the mere existence and ever watchful readiness of the German army or, if need be, by crushing the bold aggressor on the field of battle.

The German Empire has up to the present time not made any transmarine conquests which could arouse the envy and revengeful hatred of other powers so that they would have to be guarded and defended by a strong navy. Its geographical position in Europe is such that Germany can keep her own without the assistance of numerous warships, as was convincingly illustrated in the course of the Franco-Prussian war. Although the French in that war were in possession of a navy in comparison with which the few Prussian war-vessels were insignificant, they were powerless against the German sea-coast and had very soon to recall their ships from their blockade-stations off the German harbors in order to employ both marines and sailors in the defense of their native soil. The only explanation which under these circumstances the extraordinary efforts of Germany to secure a first-class navy admit of is that they evidently intend to overawe, when occasion offers, any opponent the empire may encounter, while it pursues its course of national aggrandisement in countries lying beyond the sea.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we shall find it to our advantage to briefly recapitulate what we have learned about the straits and aspirations of the German Empire. We behold Ger-

many confronted by the desperate problem, a mere question of self-preservation, how to maintain its present standing and rank among the nations of the world. Being in desperate circumstances, we may look for desperate actions from her. For the chances are that she will be left behind in the race forever for want of elbow-room. We find even the general public of Germany aware of these conditions, and her statesmen and lawgivers seeking for new countries suitable for propagating the fertile German race and arming their warriors to snatch these countries away from any possessor and defender. We can but sympathise heartily with their eager resolution and strong efforts to turn the tide of events. We may even, as strong and healthy men, rejoice at the prospect of the gigantic struggle between Germany and the power which will be caught standing in her way. But we must not be unmindful of the ominous fact that the United States may be and in all probability is that power with which Germany will fight for life and death.

Present conditions may of course change at any time. Germany may after all decide to seek in the future as in her glorious past, expansion by land, namely, in Europe, Asia Minor, Syria, etc. This seems to us the wiser course which promises success. The Germans in the Austrian Empire are threatened in their nationality by their Czechic, Polish and other compatriots. The death of Francis Joseph which may occur at any moment may unchain there a revolution that will give ample employment to Germany's surplus energy and recall her from a wild-goose chase across the Atlantic Ocean. There are indications too that Great Britain is more than willing to welcome the German Empire not alone as the rightful heir of the House of Hapsburg, but also of the sick man at Constantinople. The present German ambassador at Washington who is favorably known for his clear insight and sound judgment has also in all probability supplied his government with the necessary information as to the inadvisability of its colonial policy in both Americas. Still it behooves us as prudent and cautious men to arrange betimes for the proper safe-guards, lest we should be involved in a dangerous war at a moment when we are least prepared for it.

A war with Germany would be the greatest misfortune that possibly could befall us, and *ought to be rendered impossible*. A very large percentage of our adopted and native citizens are of German descent and would in such a war very naturally vacillate in their sympathies between their old and their new country. In our opinion even a higher percentage of German-Americans would stand by

the stars and stripes in case of war with Germany than ever English-Americans did in war conflicts with Great Britain; but their loyalty would be suspected, and that would result in bitter re-creminations. Modern German immigration into the United States before 1870 was quite different from what it has been since that year. The great bulk of German immigrants has indeed always been impelled by purely economical considerations to leave their native land. But their intellectual leaders in the period before the Franco-Prussian War were confirmed republicans, even before they arrived here. Since the establishment of the German Empire, however, the educated Germans that have come to this country as a rule no longer believe in a republican form of government. That may, for instance, be learned from the article on "The Germans and the Americans" by Hugo Münsterberg in the September number of *The Atlantic Monthly*. He declares, page 406:

"If I say that I have never been a more thoroughgoing monarchist than during my stay in America, I can really not claim to be an exception."

It would lead us too far, if we should attempt to explain that phenomenon. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out the fact that it requires, so to speak, a special education, an intimate acquaintance with our national history, and a vivid consciousness of our national destiny to render educated Germans that have lately settled among us true Americans. As long as they look upon monarchy as the best form of government, they will fail to perceive that it can at all be our duty to prevent the German Empire from propagating their monarchical system in South America, and will accordingly oppose such a policy on the part of the United States to the best of their ability.

The only and best as well as cheapest means to ward off all that trouble consists in keeping our navy always and in every respect, in number and quality of ships, in armament, in personnel, in discipline and training, well abreast, if not ahead, of the German navy.

Our Spanish war ought to have taught each one of us at least one thing, namely that the old adage is still as true as ever. *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. If we had had a stronger navy, before the war broke out, Spain would have surrendered Cuba for a reasonable cash indemnity without drawing the sword; and we should have been saved all our trouble with the Philippine Islands, so loudly lamented by our anti-expansionists.

An imperfect, unfinished warlike armament will always tend to

produce war. As the conditions were, all European countries, with perhaps the sole exception of Great Britain, confidently believed and predicted that the United States, although probably victorious at the end, would suffer severe reverses at the beginning. Germany was so strongly convinced of the weakness of both belligerents that she ordered almost her whole Asiatic squadron to Manila Bay in order to be ready to protect her interests in those regions herself. To avoid such and similar occurrences in future, to uphold our national dignity, to secure prompt recognition of our national rights, and to preserve internal peace, we are in urgent need of a navy strong and powerful enough and ever ready to meet on favorable terms any foreign power that may be forced by sheer despair to risk a war with us, as long as there is the least hope of success.

THE ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN AMERICA AND GERMANY.

BY MAXIMILIAN GROSZMANN.

THE very interesting discussion of the present relations between my native land, Germany, and this my adopted country, to which you have recently opened your columns, brings back to my memory some facts and experiences which may be helpful in the consideration of recent developments.

It has become customary with the newspapers in Germany to accuse the American press generally of a wilful misrepresentation of the German attitude towards the United States, and to maintain that the estrangement between the two countries is largely due to perfidious insinuations which can be traced back to British influence. A German professor with whom I had become acquainted on my recent trip through Germany, sent me, a little while ago, a number of clippings from various papers, notably the *Tägliche Rundschau*, *Magdeburgische Zeitung* and *Kölnische Zeitung*, by whom a great cry is raised against the American press which they charge with mischievous and systematic "well-poisoning" (*Brunnenvergiftung*) of a most alarming kind. The *Magdeburgische Zeitung* makes a touching appeal to the Americans travelling in Germany as best qualified to dispel the "foolish" illusion that there exists an animosity on the part of the Germans against the Americans.

The alleged misrepresentation of the German sentiment by American papers is surely not so universal and mischievous as our German friends seem to suppose. Of course, if they read only the silly and despicable declamations of the Jingo press, and of such German-American publications as are edited under the influence of un-American ideas, they may feel justified in thinking so; but that would only prove that they know little of true American conditions and of the true American spirit. The great mass of Americans is

not likely to be carried away by such talk; they are much more apt to preserve their independence of judgment than other people may be, not only because their republican form of government gives them a keen sense of responsibility as well as continuous training in the exercise of this responsibility, but also owing to the fact that they are in the habit of more extensively reading newspapers that present different sides of the same question, and magazines of all kinds in which the problems of the day are more or less comprehensively discussed. Indeed, the number of publications which mediate information to the American readers is enormous, testifying to the eagerness with which we endeavor to follow up the evolution of history as making in our own time. There are over 21,000 newspapers published in the United States and Canada, as against 6000 in Germany. As we are always interested in what is going on in the old country, and in what other nations think of us, the papers contain a great quantity of reading matter covering these topics, and reporting all shades of opinion entertained abroad concerning our own development and conduct. The news-service here is so well organised that we are daily informed on everything that occurs in all parts of the world, especially in Europe; we receive this information simultaneously with our foreign contemporaries, and perhaps with even greater comprehensiveness and wealth of detail than the people in these foreign parts themselves. For we are here unrestricted by press censorship and every editor is at liberty to express his views as rigorously as he pleases; he can print anything and everything. Further the publishers of our great dailies are more enterprising than is the average publisher on the continent. The daily despatches are supplemented by weekly cable letters and mail matter, and also by extensive reproductions from the foreign press. All this makes it very improbable that the average American should long remain ignorant of the facts of a case of international importance. Deplorable as the malicious ranting of "yellow" papers may be, they stand a thousand times corrected and called to order by the consensus of the great majority of publications, so that in the United States there is little danger of a universal "well-poisoning" by the sensational press.

The press conditions in Germany exhibit a notable contrast. In the first place, the news-service is very inadequate, and American events especially are treated in a rather perfunctory manner. I had occasion to travel through the Fatherland several times in recent years when there were periods of great political excitement in the United States, and I remember how annoyingly difficult it

was to glean information as to the trend of events at home, from the meagre news columns of the German papers. And yet, one time there was a presidential campaign in progress the outcome of which was destined to influence to a considerable extent our foreign relations, particularly with Germany, in matters of commerce; and another time there was a war. To those especially who were unfamiliar with American conditions, the press despatches were almost unintelligible.

But worse than that. We have, on this side of the Atlantic, a much greater right to complain of malignant and systematic misrepresentation as practised by the German press towards the United States than the Germans have to speak of American "well-poisoning." And this is a matter of very long standing, for rarely do German newspapers take the pains to secure and print reliable information about American affairs. Consequently, the average German entertains the grossest prejudices against America and her citizens, and listens willingly to the most preposterous calumniation of our country. This happens in spite of the fact that so many thousands and hundreds of thousands of German families are represented here by immigrants who have learnt to love their adopted country which has given them political liberty and prosperity; and that thousands of Americans of all classes are travelling through Europe year after year, seeking knowledge and recreation. Much of this prejudicial sentiment has remained to me a psychological mystery; but surely, the unfriendly attitude of the German press towards everything that comes from this country has a large share of the blame—the same press which is now exercised over the anti-German attitude of a few Jingo papers.

Mr. Wilhelm Mueller, formerly editor of the German edition of *Puck*, had a very instructive article in the *New Yorker Staatszeitung* from which I may be allowed to translate a few telling passages.

"A few years ago, during an extended sojourn in the Fatherland, I became acquainted with the editor of a widely-read journal. In the course of our conversation, we frequently touched upon questions of American politics and exchanged opinions from our respective standpoints. Once when I had succeeded in throwing a new light on a puzzling problem to the surprise of my German colleague who had occasion to correct his own views, he invited me to send him an occasional article on American affairs, *Provided I would write in the satirical style so pleasing to the German reader.*¹ A German journalist who after settling in New York continued to write for a newspaper published in his native land, records a similar experience. As long as he regarded the conditions of American life with German

¹ The italics are mine.

eyes, and consequently formed his judgment mainly from outward appearances such as strike the foreigner first, naturally finding in this way much more to criticise than to praise, his articles were welcome. But no sooner had his growing familiarity with America and Americans begun to clear his vision, to ripen his judgment, and no sooner had he commenced to insert words of appreciation for our institutions, than the German editor first struck out these paragraphs from his contributions, and when my friend protested, he was told that they had no use for other than fault-finding reports on American affairs. The same standpoint is represented by many other German papers. The news they publish about America is extremely meagre.

"The truthful and reliable reports which some of the great political dailies sometimes print in the form of articles or even weekly letters from well-informed American correspondents, attract not the attention and are not so widely circulated as they deserve. It is preferably descriptions of extraordinary happenings, distorted statements of such abnormal phases of New World life as are apt to occur from time to time, that are printed and reprinted. The evils which accompany our political development are pointed out with chuckling delight; but never a word is said appreciative of the vast benefits which our institutions have brought forth.

"The average German newspaper reader learns terrible things about bossism and corruption in many of our municipal administrations; but of the powerful influence of our free institutions upon the blending of many nationalities into one people and upon the calling forth of all the latent energy of its citizens in making productive the enormous wealth of our great country in natural resources and staples; of the new, strong, and self-reliant national spirit which is here evolving—of all this he hears nothing. The ridiculous excrescences of American shoddiness are attacked with biting satire; the noble impulses of the genuine American, however, his boundless generosity, his practical philanthropy, the grand creations which owe their existence to him, are rarely mentioned.

"Little attention is attracted to the comprehensive and sustained efforts in behalf of progressive civilisation which are characteristic of American nature efforts which are made with an unflinching energy, a definiteness of aim, and a degree of success seldom witnessed elsewhere. When reference is made to these things at all, it is to belittle them. . . .

"Most German newspapers have for many years past been in the habit of branding as "characteristically American" (*echt amerikanisch*) only the dark side of our institutions, the fungus-growth in our public life, the cranky and abnormal features of our national character, and have thus given to their readers, instead of a picture of reality, a caricature of true Americanism."

Under these circumstances, was it possible for the average German to judge our attitude in the Spanish-American imbroglio with any amount of fairness? And can it be expected that the German newspapers will do what they demand their American colleagues to do, viz., to publish statements of facts, from the pen of people competent to know and to judge, so as to dispel erroneous impressions?

It may be of interest to consult what Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, of Harvard, has to say in connexion with this matter. How has it happened that the real America is still as undiscovered by the edu-

cated Germans as if Columbus had never crossed the ocean? he asks in the September *Atlantic*, and answers his own question thus:

"The German immigrant can justly claim to be a respectable and very desirable element of the American population; he has stood always on the side of solid work and honesty; he has brought skill and energy over the ocean, and he has not forgotten his music and his joyfulness; he is not second to any one in his devotion to the duties of a citizen in peace and in war, and without his aid many of America's industrial, commercial, and technical triumphs would be unknown. But all that does not disprove the fact that he is somewhat unfit to form a fair judgment on the life which surrounds him. First, he belongs almost always to a social stratum in which the attention is fully absorbed by the external life of a country, and which is without feeling for the achievements of its mental life; he was poor in his Fatherland, and lives comfortably here, and thus he is enthusiastic over the material life, praises the railroads and hotels, the bridges and mills, but does not even try to judge of the libraries and universities, the museums and the hospitals. On the other hand, he feels socially in the background; he is the Dutchman who through his bad English, through his habits and manners, through his tastes and pleasures, is different from the majority, and therefore set apart as a citizen of second rank,—if not slighted, at least kept in social isolation. The effect of this situation is on the German side an entire ignorance of the Anglo-American life; he may go his way here for thirty years without ever breaking bread at the table of any one outside of the German circle; he may have even become rich, and yet he is not quite in the social current. . . . And worst of all, in this atmosphere live nearly all those journalists, from the editor to the penny-a-liner, who fill the eight hundred German-American newspapers and supply most of the papers in Germany. . . ."

Münsterberg's picture is somewhat overdrawn and emphasises one phase of German-American life too strongly, omitting others equally interesting and more creditable; yet what he says throws light on certain indisputable facts which account for some of the misconceptions that are now prevalent.

On the other hand, there is no need of entertaining any fear that the great influence of German science, art, and industry in the building-up of this country will be underestimated. Prof. Harry Thurston Peck, of Columbia University, and as editor of the *Bookman* one of our most prominent critics, showed in a recent article that the old traditions of American education have been wiped out by German influence, that a vivid interest in German pedagogy is asserting itself more and more, and that German language and literature are crowding out other foreign influences. He went so far as to say: "German influence has altered the racial character of our people."

This admission with its sweeping significance is very noteworthy at the present moment when short-sighted jingoism empha-

sises an alleged Anglo-Saxon kinship of Americans. And I have quoted Professor Peck because he found himself forced to make this admission not by any native predilection of the German influence, but contrary to his own desires. His words are therefore convincing proof that our German cousins need not be exercised over lack of appreciation.

We may also remember Ambassador Andrew D. White's words in his Fourth of July oration before the American colony in Leipzig, in 1898. Strong and convincing as they were, they found a feeble echo in the German press and were ignored as much as possible. And why was it that President White felt called upon to express himself so frankly and emphatically? Because he considered it timely to check, if possible, the flood of calumniations and misrepresentations of Americans and American motives that had swollen to such a dangerous height during the Spanish-American war. These calumniations have indeed aroused a strong resentment on this side of the ocean. At this the German editors who are now so violent in their condemnation of American jingos, ought not to be surprised; it has been caused by their own indiscretion and unfair criticism of American methods.

When, in the spring of 1898, shortly after the outbreak of the war, I set sail for my German Fatherland, I wore a small badge in the American colors such as were worn in those days by most of us as an outward symbol of patriotic enthusiasm. To my astonishment, many of my fellow-passengers advised me to take it off before landing, to avoid unpleasant experiences. And indeed, even the officers of the German steamer which carried me across, who might have been expected to know a little more about us than those who never touched our shore, could not refrain from dropping occasionally supercilious and disparaging remarks on our politics and our conduct of the war. But the prejudice and lack of knowledge displayed by many of those I met during my sojourn in the Fatherland surpassed my anticipations. Truly, I found very few who were inclined to do the Americans justice, or who would listen to an argument. As a rule, we were treated to all sorts of sneering reproofs of the policy of the United States in the Spanish-Cuban imbroglio, as soon as we were recognised as coming from across the water. How often we had to hear what hypocrites the Americans were, and how they could not begin to be compared with the Germans in point of character, magnanimity, bravery, and warlike qualities. Remonstrations and statements of facts were of no avail;

we were simply not believed ; they knew everything better than we did.

There was a physician in my native city of Breslau who was particularly scandalised over the sham-humanitarianism (*Humanitätshuchelei*) of the Americans. He would not allow himself to be persuaded into believing, he said, that in declaring war against Spain a single Yankee had ever thought of down-trodden Cuba ; it was but the meanest greed and self-interest that was behind it all. When I replied that he seemed to be unacquainted with the qualities and sentiments characteristic of the American people ; that there had been an irresistible public opinion which had decided the question of peace or war ; and that the American is much more swayed by sentiment (*Gemüth*) than he received credit for in Germany,—he laughed in my face. “An American, and sentiment ! A Yankee has a money-bag in place of a heart.”

I had my half-grown son with me on my trip to show him the beauty and grandeur of the land of his fathers. Though he received many inspiring impressions, to be sure, it can be imagined what a shock it was to him to experience the narrowly prejudicial condemnation of the land of his birth, to which his ardent patriotism and enthusiasm justly belonged. The sad effect may never be wiped out.

In Dresden I met some Austrian friends who expressed themselves even more prejudicially than the Germans. This was perhaps due to the fact that Austria's sympathies were outspokenly with Spain, their ruling families being related by ties of blood. Particularly curious, however, was the zeal of a guide in the Cologne cathedral. No sooner had he made out that our little party was composed of Americans than he began to spice his explanations of the wonders of this famous structure by invectives directed against the terrible Yankees ; it was extremely amusing, in one sense, to witness him spurting out his harangues in dialect German and broken English. He even called upon the mildly smiling priest who was stationed as a guard in the dazzling treasure chamber, to testify to the treachery committed by the Americans against Spain. After receiving his customary tribute from us, he felt constrained to shout after us from the portal of the great church : “And yet you will not get Cuba,—think of me, the poor cathedral guide !”

The military pride of my German countrymen was especially tickled to make fun of American field operations. Easy enough it was, they said, to attack so weak a nation as the Spaniards. But if an army like the German had been opposed to us, the case would

have been very different indeed. A single German regiment would have been sufficient to annihilate an entire American army corps, of that we could feel sure.

Boasting never sounds well, and it hurt more my German than my American patriotism; it is a bad symptom and reminds me of the proverb, "Pride goeth before destruction."

As a military power, Spain might have been expected at least to rival the United States. No American, indeed, had anticipated so speedy and complete a collapse of the Spanish forces, and the talk of our falling upon an enemy whom we knew to be weak, is therefore quite idle. Did Austria and Prussia with their united strength consider it cowardly to attack poor Denmark, and did not even France prove very weak? On the other hand, the United States has never been a military power in the European sense of the term, and let us hope will never be one. Spain, on the other side, had the advantage of military tradition and experience, and in Cuba she had a body of troops at her disposal which was our superior in numbers as well as in position. Then, Spain had been a mistress of the sea for centuries, while the efficiency of our navy had, practically, to be tried for the first time. That our victories were so decisive should certainly not be counted against us.

And it remains to be proved whether German troops would have been so much more successful than were the Spanish, or if you please, the Americans. No sensible American will for a moment underestimate the military efficiency of the German army and its management; we are not jealous of this well-earned glory. Yet we must take into account the difference of conditions. A war in little Europe which has long been laid out in checker-board fashion by her military experts, can hardly be compared with operations extending over three continents. Our German friends may find it difficult to form an adequate idea of the enormous distances, of the climatic difficulties, and the perplexities of transportation with which our American troops had to cope. Their sufferings baffle description; had the commissary department been ever so much more efficient than it was, in consequence of lack of experience, and perhaps of competency, this suffering could not have been entirely avoided. The greater is the glory of our citizen-soldier whose bravery, endurance, and self-sacrifice deserve full recognition.

It was painful to read, day after day, what the papers saw fit to print on the progress of the war. There were continuous belittlings of the American successes, and attempts to cast suspicion

on American motives. Whatever could vilify our good name as a nation was dwelt upon with apparent satisfaction, and only reluctantly did the victorious bravery of our troops receive a scanty recognition. I may be permitted to quote two examples of editorial comment, to illustrate my point.

In reference to Cervera's defeat and the fall of Santiago, the *Dresdner Nachrichten*, of July 5, wrote as follows :

"With regard to its effect upon America, the result of the war must arouse even greater misgivings than the future of Spain. There may, of course, be one advantage for Europe in this rapid success : knowing as we do the character of the Americans, we can rest assured that their blind admiration for the efficiency of their militia will now cause them to give up the recently developed plans to make the United States a military and naval power of first rank. On the other hand, we can expect the arrogance of the Yankees now to assume intolerable proportions, and their fresh enthusiasm for national expansion will perhaps induce them to prove their strength in more or less dangerous fields. Clearly, such a development of events may conjure up perils if in the case of a disagreement of the European nations there should ever come a clash between the Yankee republic and one or the other of the great powers of Europe. The common European interests demand, therefore, that we carefully watch the further development of the foreign policy of the United States. As soon as the Americans will find themselves confronted with the unanimous opposition of Europe (*europäischer Gesamtwille*) they will in good time restrain their greed for more territory. To effect this Europe must of course prove that it is not merely a geographical term, and an empty name, but an essence and a reality. If it does that, there is hope that the negotiations referring to the Philippine question which after the close of the war will necessarily assume an acute character, may be conducted in a matter satisfactory to the interests of Europe."

And the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* of July 13 had this to say :

"Spanish pride which still resents making peace with America—a peace to be paid dearly for anyway, it appears—and which yet is clinging to hopes that can never be realized, even though this pride may not be unmixed with fancy, is certainly justified ; for it represents nothing less than the sense of national honor to which it can be but repugnant to yield in a struggle against palpable wrong and aggression. Even the sworn defenders of the United States could after the outbreak of the war no longer uphold the phrase of humanity in whose name the United States had pretended to fall upon Cuba ; some acknowledged the full truth and spoke openly of hypocrisy ; others at least admitted the selfish designs of the Americans. Spanish honor rebels the more against humiliation the clearer it becomes to Spain that she is being deserted by the European powers. We have here the second edition of the European concert of Armenian-Cretensic memory, with but this variation that the powers are now still more unanimous than they were then, viz. in doing nothing. . . . If it should come to a final overthrow of Spain as a colonial power (and all events seem to point to this) England will have this result on her conscience. . . . Not only England's attitude however, but also certain utilitarian considerations must be held responsible for decrepit Europe to allow Spanish honor to waste itself in hopeless resentment. For industrially and commercially, little is to be expected from Spain.

and we do no longer get excited over mere ideals of right and justice. [*sic!*] Yet there may come a time when the advantage of a continental European concert, based on the idea of righteousness pure and simple, will—too late—be recognised; when the humiliation of Spanish self-respect will prove injurious to the self-respect of Europe. And what will, in the end, prevent the Yankee, power-swollen as he now is, from stopping short at the boundary of Canada? England ought to consider that."

Protestant and Catholic organs piped the same tune; but the German government succeeded in maintaining a strict neutrality. Yet there is no telling what may have been behind it all; prudence and sentiment clashed, perhaps. At any rate, there can be no mistake about the meaning of these press utterances whose echo ran through the land; and though American good nature can be relied upon to a fault, we should stultify ourselves if we should consider the German attitude at that time, when our national honor was at stake, as anything but unfriendly. Is it so very strange that Americans, many of whom witnessed this ill-feeling against their country directly on their travels, have now a strong apprehension of German motives and sentiments? If our German cousins wish to be recognised as the friends of the United States, it will depend largely upon them, and upon nobody else, to make us forget their unfairness of a year ago.

Surely I love my native country no less than the one in which my children were born. The present strained relations between the two are very painful to me; but the mischief done so far can only be repaired by a frank discussion of the causes. It would be folly to blind ourselves against the facts of the case. It is an old experience that it is easier to create prejudices than to allay them; but *if those among us who take a vital interest in preserving good-will between Germany and America, from love of both, will unite their efforts in establishing a mutual better understanding and appreciation, there need be no danger of further estrangement.* However, let us also be sincere and defy hypocritical opportunism. Better an open criticism than a suppression of unfriendly sentiment.

Americans and especially German-Americans have the best intentions to restore the traditional *entente cordiale* between the United States and the Fatherland, but our brothers beyond the sea must assist us in the task and not make us suffer abuse which is both uncivil and unjust.

THE GERMAN IN AMERICA.

BY THE EDITOR.

PROF. Hugo Münsterberg of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., has written in German papers some very sensible articles on America, which will naturally tend to clear up the situation in Germany, and his article "The Germans and the Americans" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, (with the exception, perhaps, of some incidental remarks), is a splendid psychological diagnosis of the rising antipathy between the two nations. The common interests between German culture and American civilisation are so great that we would deem it a great misfortune for the development of both nationalities if the estrangement were perpetuated, and we hope by a free ventilation of its causes to nip the growing hostility in the bud.

Professor Münsterberg is a German, and has remained a German in this country. He is not nationalised, but, being engaged at the University of Cambridge, he has lived in a truly American atmosphere, and knows more about genuine American conditions than many other Germans who have spent the greater part of their lives on this side of the ocean. His judgment, accordingly, rests upon an immediate observation of facts, which he presents with impartiality and fairness, and he may be excused for the little exaggeration which occasionally slips in by way of emphasising his statements. He says,¹ for instance:

"The German-Americans have done but little to make the Germans understand America better, and perhaps still less to make the Americans understand the real Germans; they have given little help toward awakening in the two nations the feeling of mutual sympathy."

¹ *The Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1899, page 402.

This statement is, to say the least, very one-sided; I might with equal force make the very opposite statement and say:

"The German-Americans have done very much to make the Germans understand America better; but even more to make the Americans understand the real Germans. They are the main cause of the mutual sympathy that exists between the two nations."

The truth is that about fifteen or twenty years ago the sympathy of the German people with the United States of America was very strong,—a fact which I know from my own experience, having passed my childhood and youth in the Fatherland. There was no antipathy whatever to the rising republic of the New World, at least not in the atmosphere which I breathed; and the communications from relatives beyond the sea made every one cherish the best wishes for the welfare of the new democratic empire on the other side of the world. Our cousin from America was a great favorite with the children as well as with the adults, and we were dazzled with the new ideas with which we became acquainted through his conversation. The German school-boys at that time knew that across the Atlantic there were great opportunities and an expanse of life which could not fail to be welcomed by every man of enterprise and energy. I still remember the impression which the lines of the poet made on me.

"Beyond the sea there is a mighty building,
And cities rise in unexpected growth!
The workman there looks gayly to the future
And honest toil will find its just reward."

When I came to America I found in this country an appreciation of German science, German education, and German culture in general which I scarcely could anticipate. I positively deny that there exists in America an antipathy to German civilisation, or to the Germans in general, and he who would interpret a joke about German beer-drinking or German smoking, or other German habits, which rightly or erroneously are supposed to be typically German, as a slight upon the German character as such, or even upon the mission of Germany's culture, misapprehends the entire situation. In addition to the knowledge of the conditions of the Fatherland which native Germans bring to this country, there is a legion of native Americans who have studied at German Universities, who speak the language to perfection and are deeply imbued with the spirit of German science. I know several American clubs and societies, philosophical, medical, and art associations, in which ad-

dresses could just as well be delivered in German as in English, and the large majority of the members would be able to follow the speaker. There are but few members, e. g., of the Oriental Society who have not studied in Germany. It would be difficult to find a learned society in Germany whose members are so well acquainted with American conditions or have the same familiarity with the English language. I cannot accept Professor Münsterberg's statement without describing it as very one-sided, for it is an indisputable truth that in the circles of true American refinement Germany is not only well known but also highly respected, and its preferences are greatly admired.

The ill feeling that of late prevailed between the two nations is of recent origin, and cannot be traced back farther than about one decade. It originated in Germany, and not in America, and can be cured only through a better understanding of the ideals of the American republic by the leaders of German thought. The antipathy which has originated in this country is certainly not older than two years, and is still very superficial, for it has not yet had time to take deep root in our national consciousness; but for that reason it is sufficiently serious to command our solicitude, and the disease should be treated before the acute state becomes chronic.

One of the most important features of this republic is its faculty of assimilating innumerable varieties of nationalities into one new nation, which is destined to merge its patriotism with cosmopolitan ideals and thus promises to be an advancement upon the nations of the Old World. The secret of this extraordinary power of assimilation lies in the principle of liberty which wrongs no one, and affords an opportunity to every one to assert his own idiosyncrasy and to pursue the propaganda for his own ideals as best he can. The sole condition of our liberty is respect for the liberty of others, implying a loyalty to law; and this feature has become a national characteristic of American life.

Consider, for instance, the gigantic struggles which take place in this country between capital and labor. Germany has its strikes too, but there the government is ready to crush with military power the unruly laborer, at the point of the bayonet. Here, the striker is permitted to have his way until he infringes upon the law, and should a strike assume the aspect of a revolt it will be suppressed more by public opinion than by military force. The reports of the great railroad strike under Eugene Debs a few years ago were misrepresented in European papers, because European writers as well as the European reading public cannot understand the conservative

spirit and the law-abiding nature of the inhabitants of the United States. Thus, the reports of this event were distorted into unintelligibility, and must have made a wrong impression upon European readers.

The American nation is regarded as restless and given to all kinds of innovations, while the fact is the very opposite. Even Professor Münsterberg speaks of the Yankee's motor restlessness which he attributes to "an ability to suppress and inhibit." In spite of the free institutions of the country, *the character of the American nation is a conservatism which is unknown in Europe.* A change in the constitution is more difficult here than in Europe, and almost out of the question; and the fact is well known, though little heeded, that the American flag is one of the oldest flags in the world, all the European flags having been altered in recent times. The German, the Austrian, the French constitutions are of recent date while the American Constitution is still that of 1787.¹

It seems strange to the Germans in the Fatherland that the Germans in America can remain faithful to the ideals of German thought, and yet become good Americans; but such is the true condition of things, and it would be futile for German politicians of the Fatherland to expect any support from their German-American brothers in any scheme that would directly or indirectly invalidate the unity, the power, or the present constitution and national character of the United States. The mere idea of it would be spurned as treason—even if the appeal for such conduct came from the mother country. The situation can be misapprehended only by those Germans of the Fatherland whose views of American conditions have been distorted through the usual misrepresentations. Perhaps it is true that we are not yet a nation in the European sense of the term, but it is equally true that we are building up a nation and every one who believes in American ideals is welcome to contribute his share. The Germans are left at liberty to work out their own salvation in their own way; they are welcome to bring the best they have, and to preserve all the good features of their national

¹ The Constitution was formed in 1787, and the new form of government adopted in 1789. The American flag consisting of thirteen stripes alternately red and white with thirteen stars (the number of the States of the Union) in a blue field was adopted by Congress in 1777. In 1794 (after the admission of Vermont and Kentucky) the stripes were increased to fifteen, but at the suggestion of Samuel C. Reid the original form of thirteen stripes was restored in 1818. The number of the stars depends upon the number of States that at the time constitute the nation. Thus the flag, like the Constitution, is rigid in its general structures but admits of variations within definitely prescribed outlines, allowing for further growth and expansion.

The Union Jack (which since James I. consisted of the combined crosses of St. George and St. Andrew) was fixed in its present shape as the flag of Great Britain in 1801 after the incorporation of Ireland, twenty-four years after the adoption of the stars and stripes.

character in the New World. They can preserve the German spirit, the German traditions, the culture of the German language, German humor, German music, German love of science, etc., etc. So long as they do not interfere with the rights and liberties of their fellow-citizens, they are welcome to live in their own way; and the good features of German life are welcome as important and desirable ingredients in the make-up of the new nation that is developing on this continent.

There can be no doubt that the influence of German thought, German sentiment and German modes of life have so powerfully altered the Puritan foundation of our national character, that a new nationality has developed from it with a greater mental breadth and a deeper comprehension of the significance of life. I make this statement not to belittle the Puritan element or to criticise its rigidity, nor do I believe that the result is a Teutonisation of the Yankee. It is very fortunate that the basis of our national life is dominated by the religious rigidity, the undaunted courage, the manly independence of the Pilgrim fathers. The stubborn character of the Yankee was in the beginning toned down by the gentle breadth of the Friends of Pennsylvania, not less firm wherever principles are at stake. Then the spirit of the Southern States with its aristocratic tendencies, the immigration of the Pennsylvania Dutch so called, of large numbers of the Irish,¹ of a sprinkling of French, Italian and Spanish, and above all of the Germans, have modified the character of the nation not by detracting from the Anglo-Saxon foundation, but by adding to it; by enlarging the general horizon and engrafting upon the strong roots in the ground of past events new branches of noble promise.

One statement of Professor Münsterberg will probably be endorsed by every German who visits this country and yet I would not allow it to pass without an important modification. He says: "The average German-American stands below the level of the average German at home."

¹ In this connexion I feel called upon to say that the Irish are frequently made the target of unpleasant criticisms among Anglo-Americans and German-Americans. There is perhaps a deep-seated racial antipathy between the Celt and the Teutonic nations: and the immediate cause of animosities is the fact that Irish clanishness enables the son of Erin to play a very prominent part in the petty politics of almost all our city administrations, without however having ever succeeded in influencing the national policy of the United States. Whatever may be said of the faults of the Irish (every nationality has its faults) we must emphasise here that the derogatory tone in which they are frequently spoken of is quite out of place. A sprinkling of Irish blood in the veins of the steady Saxon has so far proved very beneficial and great men of military, literary and artistic fame were the result. The Irish are not as strong as the Teutonic races, but their wit, their quickness, their congeniality can not be underrated by those who have learned to appreciate the Irish temperament.

The truth is that the large mass of German immigrants are recruited from the lower ranks of life; they come from the country and settle here on farms. In addition, however, there are goodly numbers of able artisans of all trades, merchants, and also not a few scholars who have enjoyed all the advantages of the German universities. The average German here is probably of the same stamp as the average German in Germany. But here the commoner is more frequently seen, because not so rigidly excluded from polite society as in the Old World, and therefore cuts a more striking figure.

But granting even what presumably Professor Münsterberg intends to say, that there are many uneducated German-Americans I would still raise my protest against the proposition of their "standing below the level of the average German at home." The educative influence of the American atmosphere should not be underrated and I have not as yet seen a German farmer who has not been favorably affected by it. I have sometimes been startled by a breadth of view and independence of judgment where I least expected it. I will mention one case only which characterises the average German-American.

A German-American of Chicago, by no means a rich man but one who earns a comfortable living, told me that he was the eldest son of a poor laborer in Germany, but that two of his younger brothers held high positions in the Fatherland, one of them being a member of the cabinet of his little native state; and he added with pride, "I sent them the money to go to school with and to attend the University." Certainly, we cannot say that the uneducated German-American stands below the level of his two brothers in the Fatherland, for learning and social polish are not the sole standard by which we must make our measurements.

It is true that German cannot become the language of the country, and there are few among the German-Americans who would deem the adoption of German as the official language at all desirable. The German-Americans, as a rule, speak German at home, for every one here is at liberty to speak any language he may please, be it Polish or Russian or Chinese. There are no laws which would deprive parents of the right to educate their children in accordance with their own views, and no Governor here would follow the example of Von Köller. The Germans might easily be made as restive as are the Danes in the Danish parts of German Schleswig, if ordinances were passed requiring them to speak English and cease to be Germans; but as matters are now they are

perfectly satisfied with the present conditions; they speak German when they please, and English when they please; and their grandchildren *always* prefer the English.

Here is a passage from *Die Deutsche Post* which is devoted to the interests of the German-Americans, and proposes to uphold the German language and strengthen German influence in this country. The editors and contributors are German to the backbone, and an expression of their views will be most characteristic of those German-Americans who propose to assert their nationality in the national life of the United States. The article is apparently an expression of the editorial¹ sentiments, and while the author regrets that German is not the official language of the country, he denounces the mere thought of attempting to make it such as ridiculous and as undesirable. While it proposes to cherish the German language as the bond of union of all the Germans throughout the world, it strongly emphasises the principle that *one* language should rule from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, and from the Great Lakes to the Mexican Gulf. We quote the main passage of the article in its original German as follows:

“Es ist ein eigen Ding, im Namen eines Volksthums, das nach Millionen zählt das Wort zu ergreifen.

Wir glauben aber doch die Stellung des Deutschthums hier im Lande dahin präzisiren zu dürfen, dass der Deutsch-Amerikaner in politischer Beziehung sich nur als Amerikaner fühlt.

Alle Versuche zu Gunsten irgend einer anderen Nation, die inneren Verhältnisse der Union zu ändern, würde an der Vaterlandsliebe des Deutsch-Amerikaners gerade so abprallen, wie bei dem auf seine Abkunft von den Pilgrim-Vätern stolzen Stockamerikaner.

Kein vernünftiger Deutsch-Amerikaner kann wünschen, dass in das feste Gefüge der englischen Staatssprache Bresche geschossen wird, durch Erhebung des Deutschen zur offiziellen Sprache in einzelnen Staaten der Union.

Dies wäre der Anfang vom Ende dieser grossen Republik.

Sind vielleicht die gegenwärtigen Verhältnisse in Oesterreich, mit seinem Sprachengewirr, wo das Deutsche als Staats- und Armee-Sprache langsam dem Verfall entgegen geht, zu derartigen Experimenten verführerisch?

Eine Sprache muss herrschen vom Atlantischen bis zum Pacifischen Ocean und von den grossen Seen bis zum mexikanischen Golf.

Dass dies nicht die deutsche ist und sein kann, bedauert Niemand mehr als wir Deutsch-Amerikaner.

Wenn wir trotz der pessimistischen Ansicht bezüglich der Zukunft unseres Volksthums in den Vereinigten Staaten kräftig auftreten für die deutsche Sprache, die deutsche Schule und deutsche Art überhaupt, so beruht dies vor Allem in un-

¹ This editorial in *Die Deutsche Post* was written in reply to a recent article in the *Gegenwart* of July 15, entitled: “The National Duty of German-Americans; An Appeal.” in which the German-Americans are expected, for the sake of the German Empire, to make opposition to the employment of English as the official language of the United States.

serer Liebe zur alten Heimat, in gemeinsamen Traditionen und in dem Stolz auf die hohe germanische Kulturmission.

Die Sprache Goethe's und Bismarck's ist für uns die schönste der Welt und auch auf verlorenem Posten werden wir für dieselbe bis zu unserem letzten Athemzuge eintreten.

Mit warmer Theilnahme verfolgen wir die blühende Industrie und die riesige Ausdehnung des Handels im deutschen Reiche.

Und als *Deutsche* fühlen wir mit Freude und Schmerz, Hoffnungen und Enttäuschungen, die den Werdegang der grossen deutschen Nation begleiten.

Politisch getrennt, marschiren wir doch gemeinsam mit unseren deutschen Reichsbrüdern, um deutschem Wesen und Wissen, deutscher Gründlichkeit und Gewissenhaftigkeit die Bahn zu den höchsten Erfolgen zu ebnen.

Wir haben dem Amerikanerthum unauslöschliche Spuren deutschen Geistes eingepägt; wir haben in das starre Zelotenthum amerikanischer Unduldsamkeit den frischen Luftzug einer freieren Lebensanschauung geleitet und dadurch unseren Nachkommen wie dem ganzen Amerikanerthum den Ausblick auf eine bessere, freiere Zukunft eröffnet.

Wenn auch die Tragik des Schicksals es wollen mag, dass dabei schliesslich unser Deutschthum auf der Strecke bleiben wird, so haben wir doch unsere Pflicht erfüllt, indem wir eingetreten sind für das Erbe unserer Väter, errungen in tausendjährigem Kampfe: die deutsche Kultur.

Und unsere deutsche Sprache wollen wir hochhalten und pflegen, denn sie ist das Bindeglied aller Deutschen auf dem weiten Erdenrund."

There will be few German-Americans who do not heartily agree with the editorial of *Die Deutsche Post*, but I wish to add a few comments concerning the "pessimism" expressed by our German-American countryman. Being a German-American myself, I, like him, cherish a high regard for the German language, and I believe that it should be kept up as much as possible in our families and schools. Indeed, I believe that a study of the German language is indispensable in our educational system for a proper comprehension of the English language. This fact is sufficiently well known among educators, and the study of German is greatly encouraged, more so than that of any other modern language. In our English grammars and in every scientific treatment of the English language, German is recognised as the greatest help in the comprehension of the English, not only in the United States of North America but also in England. Any student who would devote himself to a historical and philological study of the English language begins to learn German and then Anglo Saxon.

One quotation which characterises the view of all students of English, may suffice: Clair James Greece, in the preface to his translation of Matzner's *English Grammar*, from the German into the English, says:

"That the Grammar of the tongue should have been approached by Germans

from that purely scientific point of view, from which natives have not hitherto regarded it, will not surprise us, when we consider the relations of German to the classical tongues of antiquity and to our own vernacular. *The German is the living classical tongue*, while the modern tongues of the West of Europe are constructed out of the débris of Latin, as English is from the débris of Romance and of a decayed and decapitated German idiom; the modern high Dutch or German exhibits even more than the classical tongues themselves, a systematic orderly development from indigenous materials. The growth and development of language, which to a Frenchman or an Englishman lie external and remote, are to a German ready to hand; and as the cloudless nights of the plains of Shinar prompted the ancient Chaldæans to study the motions of the heavenly host, the purely indigenous structure of their native speech has suggested to the Germans the investigation of the laws of the vocal material in which thought is deposited and communicated."

In the general competition for a proper sphere of influence, the German language need not be afraid of ever being set aside. Its influence upon the thought of the American nation will be lasting, and it will remain an indispensable factor in the education of our youths. That the German language will not become the language of the country is in my opinion no loss, and need not be regretted by my German-American fellow-citizens. The English is preferable as a world language, and among the non-English speaking peoples the Germans ought to feel the least animosity toward the English, for the English is, after all, a German dialect which has developed into a most glorious and noble growth, having acquired by its separation from its mother language a greater freedom, a greater flexibility, a universality, and a rare adaptability to all kinds of uses,—scientific, philosophical, commercial, and what not. Let me quote as an authority on the subject the great master of comparative philology, Jacob Grimm, who, being a German himself, certainly knew the preferences of the German language to perfection, and is one of the greatest admirers of Teutonic speech. In "The Origin of Language," he expresses his view concerning the English as follows:

"Keine unter allen neueren Sprachen hat gerade durch das Aufgeben und Zerrütten alter Lautgesetze, durch den Wegfall beinahe sämtlicher Flexionen eine grössere Kraft und Stärke empfangen als die englische, und von ihrer nicht einmal lehrbaren, nur lernbaren Fülle freier Mitteltöne ist eine wesentliche Gewalt des Ausdrucks abhängig geworden, wie sie vielleicht noch nie einer andern menschlichen Zunge zu Gebote stand. Ihre ganze überaus geistige, wunderbar geglückte Anlage und Durchbildung war hervorgegangen aus einer überraschenden Vermählung der beiden edelsten Sprachen des späteren Europas, der germanischen und romanischen, und bekannt ist wie im Englischen sich beide zu einander verhalten, indem jene bei weitem die sinnliche Grundlage hergab, diese die geistigen Begriffe zuführte. Ja die englische Sprache, von der nicht umsonst auch der

grösste und überlegenste Dichter der neuen Zeit im Gegensatz zur classischen alten Poesie, ich kann natürlich nur Shakespeare meinen, gezeugt und getragen worden ist, sie darf mit vollem Recht eine Weltsprache heissen und scheint gleich dem englischen Volk ausersehn künftig noch in höherem Masse an allen Enden der Erde zu walten. Denn an Reichthum, Vernunft und gedrängter Fuge lässt sich keine aller noch lebenden Sprachen ihr an die Seite setzen, auch unsre deutsche nicht, die zerrissen ist wie wir selbst zerrissen sind, und erst manche Gebrechen von sich abschütteln müsste, ehe sie kühn mit in die Laufbahn träte."

Bayard Taylor translates this passage as follows :

"No one of all the modern languages has acquired a greater force and strength than the English, through the derangement and relinquishment of its ancient laws of sound. The unteachable (nevertheless *learnable*) profusion of its middle-tones has conferred upon it an intrinsic power of expression, such as no other human tongue ever possessed. Its entire, thoroughly intellectual, and wonderfully successful foundation and perfected development issued from a marvellous union of the two noblest tongues of Europe, the Germanic and the Romanic. Their mutual relation in the English language is well known, since the former furnished chiefly the material basis, while the latter added the intellectual conceptions. The English language, by and through which the greatest and most eminent poet of modern times—as contrasted with ancient classical poetry—(of course I can refer only to Shakespeare), was begotten and nourished, has a just claim to be called a language of the world; and it appears to be destined, like the English race, to a higher and broader sway in all quarters of the earth. For in richness, in compact adjustment of parts, and in pure intelligence, none of the living languages can be compared with it—not even our German, which is divided even as we are divided, and which must cast off many imperfections before it can boldly enter on its career."¹

On consulting my own sentiments concerning the English language, I must confess that I do not feel as if it were a foreign tongue, but only a kindred dialect of my native speech; in fact, it is in many respects nearer the language of my ancestors, who, so far as I can trace them back, all came from Northern Germany the country of low German dialects. English is a low German dialect, and modern high German was forced by the course of events upon the North Germans, subsequently to the Reformation. If we regard changes in the speech of a country as sad, and view the necessity of them so pessimistically we ought to be deeply affected by the fact that our ancestors gave up their low German which is a most beautiful language in favor of the harder and more guttural high German with its complex constructions, acquired under the influence of Latin Schools. As the English nation including the lowlands of Scotland is more purely Teutonic in blood than any province of Germany, so the structure of the English language has

¹ *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, 1851. Berlin edition, 1866, p. 53. See Taylor's translation of *Faust*, Vol. I., p. xii. See for different translations, Trench's *English: Past and Present*, p. 39, and *Standard Dictionary*, p. ix.

more faithfully preserved the Germanic and especially the Saxon character than the High German that is now spoken in the Fatherland.

It is not my intention to descant on the several preferences which the two languages, German and English, actually possess; but I would say that English has become the language of the country, not alone through the fact that the thirteen oldest states were English colonies, nor because the majority of the people speak English, but by its own intrinsic virtue. The English is to become the world language because it is best adapted to the purpose. Supposing the English had not yet been adopted as the official language of some of our States, we have not the slightest doubt that even if the majority of the people spoke other languages the English would in a free competition conquer and remain the victor by dint of those intrinsic virtues which the father of comparative philology, Jacob Grimm, fully appreciated, and which any one who for any length of time has been compelled to make use of the English will recognise.

We German-Americans stand up for German ideals, for German science, German music, the German spirit as incorporated in the great men of the Teutonic nation, Luther, Kepler, Copernicus, Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Kant, Frederick the Great, Beethoven, and their kind, but we see our duty in building up in unison with our Anglo-American countrymen, not in tearing down their work. We want to build higher and better than it was permitted us in the Fatherland, and if there is to be any rivalry between the different ingredients that are united here in the work of shaping the future of our nation, let it be the competition of vieing with one another in doing the best work. Let no outsider dare to set enmity between the Anglo American and the German-American, for the interests of both are irrevocably cemented together in their common ideals, their common tasks, their common duties.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE GERMAN-AMERICAN MASS-MEETINGS.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I have read with great interest your reply to the article by Mr. William Vocke, in the July *Open Court*. It is difficult to understand how the suggestion merely of an Anglo-American Alliance could have become such a bugbear to our German-American citizens, and that it could have grown to such proportions that prominent men in large and small cities have held mass-meetings to protest against it. If the question took a really practical form, and were put before the country for endorsement, not one in a thousand Americans would vote for it. The United States can fight its own battles, and our international complications are few indeed compared with those of England. At the same time, we should never forget the moral support which England gave us during our struggle with Spain. It was the only nation in all Europe that was outspoken in its attitude. The other countries, it is true, were neutral, but their press and public were hostile to us. It was different in the Civil War: Germany and Russia gave us all the moral support and encouragement which we could desire, and they may both be sure that their attitude during the War of the Rebellion, like that of England in our late war with Spain, is duly appreciated and will be reciprocated at the proper time.

As a German-American, who though having lived nearly fifty years in this country still dearly loves his native land, I greatly deplore the fact that mass-meetings of this kind took place, the more so as no prominent men or prominent newspapers have really advocated a formal alliance of this character. Judging from my acquaintance with the German-Americans of this State I can not regard the resolutions adopted at the mass-meetings as a genuine expression of German-American sentiment. So absurd does the whole affair seem that if we were living in Bis marck's time suspicion would be immediately cast upon the *Reptilienfond*.

PERU, Ill.

J. REINHARDT.

THE CHINESE PROBLEM.

Mr. Tan Tek Soon, a descendant of Chinese ancestors, living in Singapore in the Straits Settlement, treats the Chinese problem in a very lucid and intelligent manner in an article running through several numbers of the *Straits Chinese Magazine*. Being a descendant of the Chinese race, and perfectly familiar with Chinese literature and civilisation, he has preserved his sympathy for the country of his ancestors, and yet sees it through the spectacles of an English education which he had the benefit of receiving. He concludes his article as follows:

"The Imperial Government is but a crude combination of an enlarged Family and an enlarged Guild. Hence all the characteristics of the two, good or bad, reappear in it in an exaggerated degree; and according to times and circumstances virtue or vice predominates, or both are held in equilibrium. Prestige, authority and power may nominally lie with the Emperor but unless he governs for the benefit of his people they will not accord willing obedience to his decrees. *Vox populi vox Dei* is thoroughly understood by the whole nation and whenever vicious excesses are carried beyond a certain limit the remedy has lain in the hands of the people. The advent of Foreign Powers has however to some extent complicated the situation. But even in the case of extreme aggressions should they succeed in annihilating the political independence of the Chinese and substituting themselves at their head, they must nevertheless govern on the recognised principles and assimilate themselves to the development of Chinese nationality. This would be in fact engrafting a new culture upon the ancient roots. It would not mean in any way the destruction of their civilisation, but rather its re-invigoration, and whatever may be its ultimate nature it will always remain typically Chinese. Foreign domination must inevitably fulfil the racial aspirations and no system of state-craft or policy will avail to thwart the destiny of the race. Russia evidently comprehends the situation better than the English, hence the success of her diplomacy. What the Chinese lack at the present juncture is therefore easily seen, viz., a *Great Leader*, who should be strong enough to ensure respect from all quarters, and wise enough to utilise to advantage the immense resources at his disposal. Whether he is to appear as one of themselves like *Tang Tai Tsung* or *Hung Wu of the Mings*, or as a semi-foreigner like *Tsin She Hwang Te* or *Kublai Khan* is immaterial, so long as he is able to maintain by his merits his great pretensions. For the rest, the nation under him is quite prepared to be led anywhere, and be moulded in any direction of progress. For the people are yet *children* and vigorous although fifty centuries old."

THE CHURCH OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has appointed Dr. James E. Talmage to write a series of lectures¹ on their Articles of Faith, which are now published by the Deseret News of Salt Lake City, Utah. The Articles of Faith are strictly Christian, perhaps with the sole exception that they endeavor to restore the primitive Christian institutions. They practice baptism by immersion, the laying on of hands for the gift of the Holy Ghost, and have in their midst apostles, prophets and evangelists practising the gift of tongues, prophecy, revelation, visions, healing, etc. In addition to the Bible they accept the Book of Mormon as the Word of God, which, as is stated, has been translated into English by the prophet, Joseph Smith, from the original, which is written in Oriental script and language. It contains the history of the Nephites and Jaredites—a remnant of the house of Israel who by divine guidance reached the continent of America on which God intends to build up the new Zion.²

¹ *The Articles of Faith. A Series of Lectures on the Principal Doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.* By Dr. James E. Talmage. Salt Lake City, Utah: The Deseret News. 1899. Pages. viii, 490.

² For a Mormon statement of the details see the present volume, pp. 263 ff. When Joseph Smith had prepared a translation of the first part of the writings of Mormon (which are an abbreviation of the plates of Nephii), Martin Harris, the prophet's friend and supporter appropriated the MS. in order to make him do the work over again for the sake of allowing him to test the correctness of the translation. But Joseph Smith was on his guard and translated another book

Dr. Talmage declares that "the genuineness of the Book will appear to any one who undertakes an impartial investigation into the circumstances attending its coming forth. The many so called theories of its origin advanced by prejudiced opponents of the work of God are in general too inconsistent, and in most instances too thoroughly puerile, to merit serious consideration. Such fancies as are set forth in representations of the Book of Mormon as the production of a single author, or of men working in collusion, as a work of fiction, or in any manner as a modern composition, are their own refutation. The sacred character of the plates forbade their display as a means of gratifying personal curiosity; nevertheless, a number of reputable witnesses examined them, and these men have given to the world their solemn testimony of the fact."

It is well known in history that the Mormons practice polygamy, but the present lectures on their *Articles of Faith* contain only a brief allusion to the institution of "plural marriage" (p. 435). It had been introduced as a result of direct legislation but is now officially abolished in submission to United States law (p. 436). Marriage is spoken of (on pp. 455-459) in no other terms than might be found in any Christian catechism. The holiness of marriage is insisted upon, and it is said to be a bond which "is not merely a temporal contract to be of effect on earth during the mortal existence of the parties, but a solemn agreement which is to extend beyond the grave." Not merely "until death do you part," but "for time and for all eternity."

The book is instructive on account of the firm conviction as to the divine origin

Joseph Smith's revelations and the implicit belief in the book of Mormon—the original plates of which seem to have disappeared. The statement here made looks as rational and convincing as that of any other religious doctrine and does not materially differ in ethics or practical morals. And this religion originated in historical times. The lives, the characters, the deeds of their founders, first of Joseph Smith and his helpmates and then of Brigham Young, are well known. The history of the Mormon church (or as they call themselves "The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints") is described from a Gentile standpoint in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* vol. xvi. pp. 825-8.

BOOK REVIEWS.

*From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*¹ is the prosodic title of a new work on Sociology, by Dr. Robert Mackintosh. Comte's place in the history of thought would hardly seem to warrant juxtaposition with the author of a popular and ephemeral book having but the vogue of a day. But for us moderns there seems to exist no appreciation for the gradations of genius, and we are now as apt to speak of the history of philosophy from Pythagoras to McFadden as we are from Plato to Kant. Otherwise, Professor Mackintosh has written a very readable book. He has reviewed the history of sociology in England, as influenced by the different theories of evolution, and added some luminous remarks of his own. But he has neglected recent German and French thought, which has been particularly rich in sociologi-

The Records of Nephí which was actually published (p. 272). The Jaredites came from the scenes of Babel and after them Lehi and his Israelitic companions came about 590 B. C., dividing into Nephites and Lamanites; the former becoming extinct about 385 A. D., while the latter degenerated into Indians (p. 292). The last prophet of the Nephites, Moroni, deposited the plates in a stone box and his spirit appeared to Joseph Smith and communicated to him the secret (pp. 10-12).

¹ *From Comte to Benjamin Kidd*. The Appeal to Biology or Evolution for Human Guidance, By Dr. Robert Mackintosh. New York: The Macmillan Co. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899. Pages, xxiii+312. Price \$1.50.

cal inquiry, and his conclusions have suffered accordingly, especially his discussion of the doctrine that "society is an organism." His personal view is that "the one attempt to give authority to biology as a guide for human conduct is the doctrine of evolution. The only accredited theory of naturalistic evolution is natural selection. And it does not, it cannot, apply where reason is at work." But "all is not done when we recognise the importance of reason and will." Idealism (the author's philosophy) "tells us that reason is the fulfilment (as well as the transformation) of nature; that man is the meaning, and therefore the goal, of the cosmic process, which is seen in this world."

Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Herbart, Spencer, Harris, Butler and Eliot is the galaxy of names stamped on the title-page of the *Educational Nuggets* of Fords, Howard and Hulbert, of New York (Pages, 215). The book is a collection of extracts from the above-named thinkers, on questions of education, and has been compiled by John R. Howard. Their object is "suggestiveness, inspiration, and encouragement, for the training of right-minded men and women as citizens of our American Republic." The selections as a whole are very good, and the little book is adorned by a fine title-page portrait of a bust of Plato. The idea of the *Nugget Series* is excellent. The books are small pocket-size, bound in flexible cloth, and cost but 40 cents. The numbers already issued are: *Don't Worry Nuggets*. From Emerson, George Eliot, Robert Browning; *Patriotic Nuggets*. From Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, Webster, Lincoln, Beecher; *Philosophic Nuggets*. From Carlyle, Ruskin, Charles Kingsley, Amiel.

Drs. Fisher and Schwatt, of the University of Pennsylvania, have performed a very commendable task in their *Text-book of Algebra*.¹ Upon the face of it, 500 pages of mathematics would seem an enormous amount of material for the average student to digest before reaching quadratics, and one apt to tire his patience; but the authors have made every endeavor to be explicit and thorough with the elementary parts, and to lay the foundations of accuracy, ease and comprehensiveness in the higher branches; they have incorporated into the book an unusual number of exercises and have spared no space in simplifying their developments. In the hands of an intelligent teacher the bulk of the book could be easily offset by economic methods of studying. The full development of particular examples previous to the logical and formal statement of mathematical truths is the only true didactic method and is to be unqualifiedly commended. The use of the smaller signs of "quality" with plus and minus numbers, as distinguished from signs of "operation," is a helpful mechanical expedient, but it should not be permitted to obscure the real origin of "quality," which is operation enshelled, so to speak. Fulness and the introduction of many of the more systematic and logical of modern pedagogical devices are the characteristic features of the book. We could wish the authors had gone farther and incorporated the more simple and salient principles of the graphic method, curve-tracing, and so forth, with its applications; but perhaps this is reserved for the second part. Just recently, the same authors have issued an abridgement of their *Text-book of Algebra* for younger students, in two forms: (1) *School Algebra*, with examples, and (2) *Elements of Algebra*, the latter being slightly more advanced, and containing the matter required for admission to universities and scientific schools.

¹ *Text-book of Algebra*. With Exercises for Secondary Schools and Colleges. By George Egbert Fisher, M. A., Ph. D. and Isaac J. Schwatt, Ph. D., Assistant Professors of Mathematics in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Fisher and Schwatt. 1898. Pages, xiii+683



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CONFUCIUS.

Frontispiece to The Open Court for November, 1899.

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RHYME AND RHYTHM IN THE KORAN.

BY WILLIAM F. WARREN.

FEW English readers of the Koran realise that it is a book of poetry, and that its rhyme and rhythm have immensely helped its currency in all lands where the Arabic language is spoken. Our prose translations can give no adequate idea of the flow and cadence of the original. An unrhymed paraphrase even in the musical Arabic would as little represent the real Koran as an English prose paraphrase of Tennyson's Bugle Song would represent that masterpiece of melody. Undoubtedly the metrical swing of the book explains in some measure the great prominence given to the intoning and reciting of it in the mosques and schools of the Mohammedan world.

To illustrate these metrical movements, alliterations, and phonetic returns at intervals to a thematic keynote or sound, the last two of the one hundred and fourteen Suras are perhaps as good as any. In Rodman's translation they read as follows :

SURA CXIII.

In the name of God, etc.

Say : I betake me for refuge to the Lord of the Daybreak
Against the mischief of his creation ;
And against the mischief of the first darkness when it overspreadeth ;
And against the mischief of enchantresses ;
And against the mischief of the envier when he envieth.

SURA CXIV.

In the name of God, etc.

Say : I betake me for refuge to the Lord of Men,
The King of men,
The God of men,
Against the mischief of the stealthily withdrawing whisperer,

Who whispereth in man's breast—
Against djinn and men.

The original has been transliterated by an expert, Professor
H. G. Mitchell, as follows :

SURA CXIII.

*Bismi ('l)llahi ('l)rrahmani ('l)rrakmi.
Kul 'a'ādhu birabbi ('l)falaki
Min sharri mā halaka
Wamin sharri gāsikin 'idhā wakaba
Wamin sharri ('l)nnaffāthati ft ('l)ukadi
Wamin sharri hāsidiin 'idhā hasuda.*

SURA CXIV.

*Bismi ('l)llahi ('l)rrahmani ('l)rrakmi.
Kul 'a'ādhu birabbi ('l)nnāsi
Maliki ('l)nnāsi
'ilahi ('l)nnāsi
Min sharri ('l)waswāsi ('l)hannāsi
(')lladhū yuwaswisu ft sudūri ('l)nnāsi
Mina ('l)jinnati wa(')nnāsi.*

I hope I shall not be mistaken for a master in the tongue if I say that no knowledge of Arabic is needed to enable one to see and to hear the difference between Rodman's version and the original. The one is stiff, hampered, and not very clear prose; the other is poetry, measured, melodious, rememberable. It is not the highest order of poetry—the matter is too often sacrificed to form for that—but it is poetry that charms the popular ear, and wins for itself a place in the popular memory.

The Arabic is so rich in open vowel sounds that a successful metrical paraphrase in any other tongue is extremely difficult. Probably a first-class genius, using the Persian or Italian language, could come nearer to a real reproduction of the original than any one else. In a moment of recklessness, one of especial audacity, the present writer once tried an experiment to see what could be done in this direction in German. Keeping as closely as possible to the original, his result was as follows :

Im Namen Gottes, etc.

Sprich :	Vor all'n Hexenmeistern,
Tagesanbruchsherr, zu Dir,	Vor Menschen und Geistern,
Nehm' ich Zuflucht für und für.	Zu Allah,
Vor der finstern Schöpfung Schaden	Zum Allerhöchsten,
In des lichten Schöpfers Gnaden	Begeb' ich mich.
Begeb' ich mich.	Ach, ja,
Jeder Zeit	Akbar,
Vor hässlichem Neid,—	Menschenkönig, Menschenherr,
Des Abtrünnigen Trug	Gott der Menschen, immermehr
Des Flüsterers Lug,	An Dich
	Wend' ich mich herzniglich.

Dissatisfied with this non-Koranic form of direct address, and especially with the frightful, if not unintelligible, compound with which it begins, he some days later tried again, and selecting *u* and *a* as the key-vowels, wrote in more condensed form the following:

In Gottes Namen, voll Erbarmen. Amen.
 Nur zu Allah,
 Aller Tage Schöpfer, täglich
 Begeb' ich mich.
 Vor dem Unheil der Natur,
 Groll und List der Kreatur,
 Neid des Neiders, Nachtaufruhr,
 Spukunfug, und Hexenschwur,
 Nur zu Allah,
 Aller Menschen Schöpfer, ewiglich
 Begeb' ich mich.

This, it will be observed, has fewer words, by more than a dozen, than the original, yet, thanks to easy German compounds, no idea is left unsuggested. It also gives a happier rendering for the ever recurring superscription of all the Suras save one; *Bismi* ('*Illahi* ('*I*)*rrahmani* ('*I*)*rrahimi* than seems attainable in English.

By this time the curiosity to see what could be done in the vernacular became too strong to be resisted. The result was a new conviction of the inadequacy of English resources in the broad vowel sounds, and of the hopelessness of effort in this direction. Possibly a Tennyson or a Poe could overcome the difficulty; but the following was the best that any responding muse had to offer in answer to my invocation. The number of words is almost exactly the same as in the original. Perhaps some more practised hand will favor the readers of this with something more satisfactory.

In the name of God, etc.
 Say:
 Unto the Lord of Dawning Day
 My soul from ill shall flee away.
 From Nature's night,
 Its hidden harm,
 From ghostly sprite,
 And witches' charm,
 From envy's sting,
 And tempter's lure,
 Neath Allah's wing
 I'll rest secure.
 From men to God, man's Lord most high,
 For refuge evermore I fly.

CONFUCIUS.

(551-479 B. C.

BY TEITARO SUZUKI.

KUNG-FU-TZŪ, or 孔子 (Kung-tzū), popularly known as Confucius, was neither a philosopher nor a founder of religion; he was a moral teacher, or more properly a statesman, whose maxim was that the people should be governed by the ethical law of sympathy,¹ rather than by the jurisprudential principle of right and duty. Therefore those ontological and epistemological problems which led Greek and Indian minds into a maze of metaphysical speculation did not claim much attention from the Chinese sage, nor did the deep and pessimistic religious feelings which occupied the heart of the Semitic prophet stir in him any aspiration for God or kingdom of heaven.

Meng-tzū, or Mencius,² one of the most prominent leaders of Confucianism, spoke of him as one who collected ancient traditions and brought them to perfection. Confucius himself once said that he propounded the old doctrine of ancient sages and did not proclaim anything new and original.³ This spirit of conservatism and common sense being the spirit of Confucianism as well as the national character of the Chinese, Confucius, who was living at the time when the Chou dynasty was separating into smaller dukedoms or kingdoms known as the *Ch'un ch'iu* and *Chan kwo*⁴ period, naturally desired to rescue the dynasty from disintegration and to actualise again if possible the administration of Yao and Shun, the two most revered sage-kings of China.

Confucius, accompanied by his disciples, wandered from one

¹ In Chinese 仁 (*jên*).

² He lived about a hundred years after Confucius and was a contemporary of Chwang-tzū, the best known follower of Lao tzū, though they did not know each other.

³ A liberal translation of "shu erh pu tso, hsün erh 'hao ku."

⁴ *Ch'un ch'iu* means "Spring and Fall," and *chan kwo* "war country."

place to another till he was sixty-five years old, trying to persuade the feudal lords to adopt his method of administration and to make a practical application of his ethical teachings. He did not think of propagating his doctrine of sympathy directly among the masses, and expected to reform the people through the government solely; but he encountered many disasters and much suffering and was at last obliged to retire from the world and to find comfort in the contemplation of his doctrine which now became the principal subject of his dialogues with his disciples. The *Lun Yü*, one of the canonical books of Confucianism, is the record of the "sayings and conversations" of this latter phase of his life, and must be deemed of paramount importance for the students of Confucianism as being the only authentic statement of Confucian ethics.

In Confucius and in his doctrine are solidly crystallised the essence and the ideal of the Chinese people. When we understand Confucius we understand the Chinese. The greatest man who has acquired unshakable national renown and reverence in a long course of time can be looked at as the perfect mirror of the nation, in which their prominent characteristics are revealed in their brightest and clearest colors.

What reflexions of the Chinese mind, then, can we see through Confucius? They are a lack of imagination and a tendency to positive conservatism, utilitarianism, practicality, and optimism. These elements are deeply rooted in every tissue of the Chinese mental constitution.

The most metaphysical book of Confucianism is the ancient *Yih King*, or *Book of Changes*, on which Confucius is said to have written a commentary known as the *Hsi ts'ü ch'uan*, and this fact is confirmed by the tradition which says that by his constant study and handling of the book its leather binding-string was thrice worn out. Though this proves to a certain degree that he had a speculative mind, we observe even there the predominance of ethical elements which put aside all abstruse philosophical arguments and soaring poetical imaginations. How sober, positivistic, and in a sense agnostic he is, when compared with his elder contemporary Lao tzü whose mind, transcending this phenomenal world, wanders in the eternity of the 道 (Tao)! It is true, Confucius occasionally makes mention of 帝 (*Ti*), the Lord, or *Shang Ti*, the Lord on High, or *Tien*, Heaven, which some Christian Orientalists would like to render *God* or *Heaven*, but he, even if there might have been in his practical mind some vague conception of the All-Containing-One, did not assume any such attitude towards it as Christians do.

When he was wandering about almost in a state of exile, unable to find any royal listener, he ascribed his misfortune to the iron hand of fate (*ming*) but he did not personify it, nor did he exclaim, "Thy will be done."

His *Tien* or *Tien ming* is not animated; it is merely another name for nature or natural order. Of course, he tried every means in his own power to realise what he thought good, but when he had done all in his power he calmly resigned himself and suffered the law of causality to take its own course. When his disciples were exasperated with their misfortunes, he consoled them by simply saying, "A superior man calmly endures misfortune."¹

Confucius was therefore an advocate of realism; he did not dare to propound definite speculations about the beyond. When he was asked his opinion of death, he said: "How can one know death when one does not know life?" and when questioned regarding supernaturalism he replied, "A superior man does not talk about mysterious powers and supernatural spirits." This keeping within the limits of experience is throughout characteristic of Confucianism, and it is the very reason why his doctrine has acquired such a controlling and enduring influence over Chinese minds as we observe to-day. Even such philosophers as Chou-tzū (1022-1073), Chu-tzū (1130-1200), Liu-hsiang-san (1139-1192), and Wang-yang-ming (1472-1529), all of whom were greatly influenced by the highly-speculative philosophy of the Mahâyâna Buddhism, could not forsake their native agnostic teacher nor shake off the fetter of their national peculiarity. While they borrowed many things from Buddhism, they still continued faithfully to transmit and to interpret the doctrine of Kung-fu-tzū.

Morality goes side by side with peace, and peace means order, a necessary product of conservatism. How then can Confucianism be other than conservatism? Besides, Confucius was born, as said before, in a time of disorder and transformation, and all he wanted was a reform of the evils of his age. He proposed to restore the moral relations of human society as they were in the by-gone golden age. And to effect this, he found the guiding principle in sympathy (*jén*) and benevolence (*shu*). The basis of his doctrine, "Do not do to others what you would not have done to you by others," has a striking similarity to the golden rule, the saying of Christ. Lao-tzū also speaks about compassion (*ts'ü*) as one of the three treasures, but he entirely disregards the form by which this inner principle might become manifest to others. His

¹ *Chün t-zū ku ch'üung.*

whole emphasis fell upon our subjective attitude, while Confucius, being more of a Chinese than Lao-tzū, considered it necessary to have a proper way of manifesting what is going on in one's mind. To this end he repeatedly appealed to the observation of the ancient habits and customs and of the traditional rules of propriety. His disciples therefore minutely describe in the *Lun Yü* how the teacher appeared and behaved on certain occasions.

When reading the accounts of the *Lun Yü*, we have a very vivid impression of him, stately and dignified in every respect, yet full of benevolence and piety. This could not, however, restrain Lao-tzū from making him a subject of ridicule and from laughing at his artificiality. Lao-tzū appears as a rugged mountain thickly covered with wild trees and with huge boulders scattered here and there, whereas Confucius may be compared to the cultivated aspect of a velvet lawn smooth and in perfect order and with everything arranged according to the law of symmetry.

The main object of Confucius, however, was the promotion of national welfare and the amelioration of social conditions. He taught the doctrine of sympathy and benevolence, not that the people might be fairly rewarded in the future or reborn in heaven, not that they might thus be released from the bond of material existence, not that they might save their hypothetical souls from eternal damnation and the curse of the last judgment, but that they might live righteously in this present life, be in peace with their neighbors, and enjoy the happiness of a good conscience,—this was the ideal of the Chinese sage.

Not being a religious teacher, he made no effort to teach the masses and to awaken them from ignorance; he on the contrary wished to follow the example of Chou-king, his ideal statesman, because he thought it the best way of actualising his benevolent administration and of making the people happy materially as well as morally. The political condition of the time seems to have been so precarious as to induce even the apparently world-abandoned author of the *道德經* (*Tao-teh-king*) to dwell on the policy of governing a state. Speaking in general, the most cherished idea of the majority of Chinese philosophers and moral teachers is to enforce the practical application of their views through the authority of the administration.

The practical turn of the Chinese character is clearly shown in the biography of Confucius as recorded by his disciples and followers. Their memoirs are singularly free from the clouds of miracles, superstitions, and impossibilities which usually gather around the

life-histories of religious sages. There are no legends about him. He stands before us as a plain human being who said and did what any other mortal could say and do. Look, for example, how the imagination of Indian and Semite, overleaping the natural limits of probability and possibility, heaps up the tinsel glory of miracles on the heads of their spiritual leaders! Is it not indeed surprising to notice in what plain language the life of the Chinese sage is described, and yet before his statue the proudest kings reverentially bow down, and in his analects, however fragmentary, millions of human beings for more than a score of centuries have found wisdom and consolation?

Confucius was not indeed the leader of a religious movement in any sense, nor could Chinese minds conceive any such spiritual reformation. Deeply immersed in practicality, they could not see any significance in things beyond this life. What they most cared for was the betterment of social conditions,—that kings should be benevolent, subjects loyal; that parents should be loving, sons filial; that husbands should be affectionate, wives devoted; that friends should be faithful to one another; that brothers and sisters should be mutually attached. When these virtues are practised by every individual in the empire, peace will prevail on earth; then the aim of our life is attained, and there is nothing left beyond to be desired.

The utilitarian phase of Confucianism may be further illustrated by an example furnished, not by Confucius himself, but by one of his most distinguished followers. As Buddhistic monarchism was not known in China at the time of Kung-tzū, we cannot exactly say what personal attitude he would have assumed towards it, but most probably his positivistic tendency would not have approved it. When Buddhism attained its most flourishing stage under the Tang dynasty, it greatly annoyed Han-yü who was one of the famous Confucian sages of the time and who boasted himself to be a second Mencius. He wrote an article entitled *Yüan Tao*, i. e., "Fundamental Principle," in which he bitterly attacked Buddhism, exclaiming: "While the doctrine of the ancient sages teaches us to promote our social welfare by co-operation and division of labor, what rôle do the followers of Buddha play, who remaining in idleness consume all that is produced by other classes of the people?" It must have been an assault least expected by the Buddhists, who, having lived in abundance of food and clothing in the most favored quarter of the globe, were probably not prepared to hear such a practical complaint, although their theoretical

weapons must have been well sharpened to meet and crush opponents. But these two characteristics, practicality and speculative-ness, may be considered to be the most striking marks of division between Confucianism and Buddhism.

At all events, Confucius was the Chinese ideal of a perfectly developed virtue. How could he otherwise command the national admiration, reverence, and worship? It is the law of evolution that those who are best adapted to their inner and outer surroundings alone can survive. Lao-tzū and Confucius are doubtless the two greatest minds ever produced on the soil of China, but the latter was more native and thus his doctrine was better fitted to send deep roots down into the hearts of his countrymen to develop and prosper all over the land of his birth. Those who are capable of finding some admirable traits in the people of the celestial kingdom beside their conservatism and odd traditions, will also be able to appreciate the high moral tone and the spirit of practicality in Confucius as well as in Confucianism.

THE BIRTH OF CHRISTIANITY.

JOHN THE BAPTIST AND JESUS OF NAZARETH.¹

BY PROF. H. GRÄTZ.

WHILE Judea was trembling in the expectation of seeing the governor, Pontius Pilate, perform some deed of violence which might result in new excitement and new sufferings, there struggled into life a phenomenon so small in its beginnings that it was scarcely heeded after its birth, although, being favored by circumstances and the peculiar manner of its appearance, it gradually acquired such a mighty impetus and such Titanic power that it opened new channels for the history of the world. For the time had come when the essential truths of Judaism, bound hitherto and appreciated at their true value only by deep thinkers, were to be freed from their fetters and go forth free to spread among the nations of the world. The abundance of lofty thoughts of God and of a holy life for the individual and for the State was to overflow into the empty channels of other nations and enrich them. Israel was to begin seriously to fulfil its mission of being the teacher of the nations. If this ancient doctrine was to find acceptance in the godless and degenerate Pagan world, it must needs assume new names and new forms if minds and spirits were to be receptive for it, since Judaism with its positive character and under its old name was unpopular among the Pagans.

It was the new development which appeared during the governorship of Pilate that was to prepare the way for a deeper and warmer interest in the teachings of Judaism on the part of the Pagan world. But as a result of the absorption of alien features and of divergence from its original source the new movement soon became sharply opposed to Judaism. The Jewish religion, which

¹From the *Volkstümliche Geschichte der Juden* by H. Grätz, Professor in the University of Breslau; volume I., p. 570 ff. Translated by W. H. Carruth, of the University of Kansas.

had given birth to the phenomenon, could take no maternal pride in it, because the daughter soon turned coldly away from her progenitor, and entered paths which it was impossible for the latter to pursue. This new development, this old doctrine in new garb, or more correctly this Essenism mingled with alien elements, is Christianity, whose origin and early career belong to the Jewish history of this period.

Christianity owes its origin to a vague feeling which dominated the higher classes of the Jewish people, and grew stronger every day the more uncomfortable and intolerable the political situation and its results became to them. The innumerable and daily recurring sufferings caused by the merciless Roman domination, and in addition the shamelessness of the Herodian princes, and the self-degradation of the high priesthood had so intensified the longing for the Redeemer, the Messiah (Meschiach) promised by the prophets, that any highly gifted person could easily succeed in finding followers ready to recognise him as the Messiah, provided only he was able either by his physical appearance or by his moral and religious conduct to make a strong impression. For indeed profounder minds were already wont to regard the entire political situation after the Babylonian exile as merely transient, a mere period of probation until the coming of the true prophet, until the return of Elias to reconcile the hearts of the fathers with the hearts of their children and to restore the tribes of Israel.

The Messianic period which was so definitely expected was to introduce an entirely new order, to create as it were "a new heaven and a new earth." With the appearance of Elias, who was to be the forerunner of the Messiah, they expected the resurrection of the dead to begin and the new world to take shape.

Accordingly, within the short space of thirty years there appeared a succession of visionaries who without any dishonest intention believed themselves able to shake off the yoke of suffering from the neck of the nation, proclaimed themselves to be prophets or Messiahs, and found disciples who remained faithful to their cause even unto death. But easy as it was to find credulous followers for a Messiah, it was very difficult to win and maintain ascendancy in the whole nation as the Chosen One. Their understanding had been so much aroused by the study of the Holy Scriptures, and the people were split up into so many factions, each making its own demands upon the coming saviour, that no one person appearing with the tokens of the Messiah could satisfy the whole nation.

The republican Zealots, the disciples of Judas the Galilean, expected for their part that the Messiah would put an end to the Roman Empire and restore the Golden Age of Davidic dominion. The Shammaites probably added to this ideal of the Messiah the strictest religiousness and the profoundest moral purity. The Hillelites, who were less political and less fanatic, probably pictured in the Messiah a prince of peace who should end the inner and outer dissensions. But they were all agreed that the Messiah must come from the family of David, as indeed the expression Son of David had in the course of time become equivalent to Messiah. It was the common belief of the time that the Messianic fulfilment must be confirmed by the return home of the widely dispersed tribes of Israel, laden by the Gentiles with liberal gifts as compensation for the long sufferings laid upon them. Even the educated, who were influenced by the spirit of Hellenism, filled the future period of glory with miracles. A superhuman apparition, visible to the faithful alone, was to lead home from Greek and barbarian lands the exiled and repentant offspring of Israel.

The Essenes probably gave the most idealistic features to the Messiah and the Messianic dispensation, their whole ascetic manner of life having the sole object of advancing the Kingdom of Heaven and the time to come. A Messiah who expected to gain the adherence of the Essenes must needs renounce the world and its vanities, have power over spirits, and introduce a state of communal property, in which Mammon should count for naught, but poverty and indigence be the chief ornaments of men.

And from the Essenes proceeded the first announcement in this time that the Messiah must soon appear, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." But he who first raised his weak voice in the desert did not dream that it would sound far over lands and seas and summon the nations of the earth about the standard of a Messiah. He proclaimed the kingdom of heaven merely to invite to repentance and reform the sinners of the Jewish people.

The Essene who issued this summons was John the Baptist (that is to say, the Essene who daily purified himself with spring water). His manner of life was wholly after the Essene fashion. He lived on locusts and wild honey and wore the garb of the prophets of old, a cloak of camel's hair and a girdle of leather. John seems to have been inspired by the conviction that the promised Messianic dispensation must come if only the whole Jewish people would repent of their sins and bathe in the Jordan, that is, accept the Essene rule of life. Therefore he invited the people to

accept baptism in the Jordan, to confess and put away their sins and thus be prepared for the early approach of the kingdom of heaven (about 29 A. D.).

It is probable that John with other Essenes had his permanent abiding-place in the desert, in the vicinity of the Dead Sea, in order to be always ready to instruct the repentant in the deeper moral significance of baptism in water. Unquestionably admission into the Essene order was associated with this. Probably not a few were found, deeper and more enthusiastic spirits, weary of the misery of the present, who streamed out to the Essene baptist. Who would not contribute to the great work of salvation and the advancement of the kingdom of heaven if it could be attained through any means that lay within the circle of tradition and custom? And did the multitude return home improved by the baptism in the Jordan, and did the symbolic act leave behind a deep moral impression? On the whole the Jewish people, and especially the middle-class citizens, did not need this spasmodic agitation on behalf of inner reform; it was by no means so vicious and degraded, and the means afforded it by the established form of religion were adequate to sustain it on the path of righteousness.

In two directions John's summons to repentance might have had a salutary effect,—downwards and upwards, upon the wealthy and the aristocrats who were corrupted by the Romans, and upon the country people whom the frequent conflicts had driven back into barbarism. But the great probably made sport of the fanatic who expected to introduce the wonders of the Messianic age by baptism in the Jordan, and the sons of the sod were too imbruted to follow the call to reform.

John's summons was much too harmless and exceeded too little the sphere of familiar ideas to give offence to the dominant party of the Pharisees. The disciples who attached themselves closely to him and followed out the manner of life of the master observed the law with all strictness and even submitted to the outward commandments regarding fasts. Even though the Pharisees, that is, at that time the Hillelites and the Shammites, were not much attracted by the Essene enthusiasm and excesses, yet there was no opposition between them and those who believed in daily baptism or bathing.

From this direction John probably experienced no interference with his activity; but the Herodians were suspicious of a man who attracted a popular concourse and who would have been able to carry people into any sort of undertaking by catch phrases which

deeply moved their hearts. Herod Antipas, in whose territory John was, is said to have sent out his guards to take him and put him into prison. Whether he spent any length of time in prison and lived to know that one of his disciples was being worshipped as the Messiah, as was reported later, is doubtful on account of the unreliability of the sources. But it is certain that Antipas had him beheaded. The story of Herodias and her young daughter, who brought to her mother the bloody head of the Baptist on a salver, cannot possibly be true.

After the imprisonment of the Baptist his work was continued by some of his disciples of whom none had such imposing success as Jesus of Galilee. The disciple soon became greater than his master.

Jesus (Jeschu, abbreviated from Jeschua, born probably about the year 4 before the Christian Era) of Nazareth, a small city in Lower Galilee, south of Sepphoris, was the firstborn son of an otherwise unknown carpenter, Joseph, by his wife Miriam or Mary, in addition to whom she bore four other sons, James, Joseph, Simon and Judas, and several daughters. Whether either Joseph, the father of Jesus, or his mother, was a descendant of the house of David is historically unproven and incapable of proof. Moreover we have not a trace of knowledge of Jesus' youth.

The measure of his knowledge may be estimated to some extent from the general condition of culture in his native province. The Galileans, removed from the capital and the temple, were far behind Judea in information and in knowledge of the law. The living exchange of religious thoughts and of discussions of the law, which made the Scripture common property for the visitors of the temple, was missing entirely in Galilee. The province which was to possess later the advanced schools of Sepphoris and Tiberias, was poor in institutions of knowledge before the destruction of the temple. But as offset to this the Galileans were strict and steadfast in manners and customs, and were unwilling to dispense with a single tittle; moreover things which were regarded as permissible in Judea were not allowed in Galilee. They were in discredit as being hot-tempered and dogmatic. From their heathen neighbors, the Syrians, the Galileans learned all sorts of superstitions. There were in Galilee many persons possessed and tormented by devils, since the ignorant narrowness of the Galileans ascribed many forms of disease to the influence of evil spirits. Through the proximity of Syria also the Galilean dialect was corrupted and mingled with Aramaic elements. The Galileans were unable to pronounce the

Hebrew purely, and confused and eliminated the gutturals so much that they often incurred the ridicule of the Judeans who made much of a correct pronunciation. The Galileans were recognised by the first words they uttered, and were consequently avoided as leaders in prayer because their degenerate pronunciation aroused laughter.

There was nothing noticeable about the birth-place of Jesus; it was a little hill-town and not at all more fertile than the other parts of Galilee. It was not to be compared with richly watered Shechem.

By the very fact of his Galilean birth Jesus cannot have had such an intimacy with the law as the schools of Shammai and Hillel had made possible in Judea. Through the limited extent of his knowledge and his degenerate, semi-Aramaic speech, his activity seemed restricted to Galilee. But what he lacked in knowledge was made up in spiritual endowment. He must have possessed deep moral earnestness and purity of life. Jesus' gentleness and humility call to mind Hillel, whom he seems to have taken in general as model, and whose golden rule: "What thou wilt not have done to thee, do not thou to others" he made the initial point of his teachings. Like Hillel Jesus regarded peaceableness and amity as the highest virtue. His nature seems to have been filled with that higher religiousness which is not content to consecrate to God merely the hour of prayer, or a single day. He was permeated with that love of mankind which Judaism inculcates toward even our enemies. In the passive virtues he may have attained the ideal set up by the Judaism of the Pharisees: "Reckon thyself among the oppressed rather than among the oppressors, listen to abuse and return it not, do everything from love of God and rejoice in afflictions." And Jesus probably had a sympathetic, winning nature which gave effect to his words.

His whole spiritual tendency could not fail to ally Jesus with the Essenes, who led a contemplative life and renounced the world and its vanities. Therefore when John the Baptist, or more correctly the Essene, sent forth his call to repentance and the advancement of the kingdom of heaven, Jesus went to him and was baptised. Even if not formally adopted into the Essene order, he must have accepted the Essene doctrines. Like the Essenes, Jesus put a high value upon voluntary poverty and despised wealth, Mammon. Into his mouth are put the sayings: "Blessed are the poor (in spirit), for theirs is the kingdom of heaven;" "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the

kingdom of heaven ;" "No one can serve two masters, God and Mammon."

Jesus shared with the Essenes the aversion to marriage ; "It is well not to marry." He commended those who make eunuchs of themselves for heaven's sake. The community of goods, a characteristic doctrine of the Essenes, was likewise not simply approved by Jesus, but directly recommended. Furthermore, just like the Essenes, he inculcated the avoidance of oaths. "Swear not at all," thus Jesus taught, "neither by heaven, nor by the earth, nor by your heads, but let your yea be yea, and your nay nay." Miraculous cures, which are ascribed to him, especially the driving out of devils from those possessed by means of conjuration, were familiar occurrences in the circle of the Essenes.

When John was imprisoned by the Herodian prince, Herod Antipas, as politically dangerous, Jesus simply determined to continue the work of his master. Like him he proclaimed: "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," perhaps without thinking that he was to have a leading part in the kingdom of heaven, that is, in the impending Messianic age. However, Jesus may have seen that if his call was not to die away in the desert, but produce some result, he must direct it not to the Jewish people in general, but to some certain class.

The Jewish middle class, the inhabitants of smaller and larger cities, were so permeated with devoutness, piety and reasonable morality that the summons to repent and renounce their sins meant nothing to them. The utterance which is said to have been made to Jesus by the young man who sought eternal life: "From my youth up I have observed the commandments of God, have not murdered, nor committed adultery, not stolen nor borne false witness ; have honored father and mother and loved my neighbor as myself," is expressive of the average moral attitude of the Jewish middle class of that time. The disciples of Shammai and Hillel, the adherents of the Zealot Judas, the bitter enemies of the Herodians and the Romans, were not morally diseased and had no need of a physician. Rightly enough Jesus did not undertake to reform these. But neither did he set himself up as a reformer of the rich and aristocratic, the friends of the Romans and Herodians. These would have treated the untutored censor and preacher with ridicule and mockery if he had rebuked them for their arrogance, their venality and lack of convictions. Therefore, with a right tact Jesus turned solely to those who were cast out by Jewish society.

There were in Judea those who had no knowledge of the sal-

utary truths of Judaism, its laws, its brilliant ancient history and its future. There were violators of the law, or as they were called in the language of the time, sinners, who, cast out of society on account of religious offences, either did not seek or did not find restoration. There were publicans and tax-brokers who, avoided by patriots on account of the aid they gave to the Roman interests, turned their back on the law and led a morally wild life, indifferent to past or future. Not for these had Sinai burst into flame and the prophets preached; for the teachers of the law, busied more with the development of the body of doctrine than with teaching, did not explain to them the law and the prophets, but instead repelled them with their hyper-piety.

Jesus proposed to address himself to these classes of the population in order to snatch them from the gloomy stupor of their ignorance and godlessness. "To save the lost sheep of the House of Israel" was his purpose; "the well, that is, those who knew and studied the law, needed no physician," was his frank expression, "but the sick, lest one of these least be lost."

Filled with this purpose of rousing by means of the semi-Essene mode of life that portion of the people who were ignorant of the law and unmindful of God, the sinners and publicans and out-cast women, to repentance and preparation for the impending Messianic age, Jesus made his first appearance in his native place of Nazareth. But here, where he had been known from childhood, he met only spiteful contempt. When he spoke of repentance in the synagogue on the Sabbath, the auditors asked one another: "Is this not the son of Joseph the carpenter? Are not his mother and his brothers and sisters among us?" They called out to him: "Physician, heal thyself." This contemptuous treatment in his own birthplace gave rise to the remark: "The prophet counts for least at home." He left Nazareth never to appear there again.

Jesus' activity met with better results in the city of Capernaum, situated on the west side of the Sea of Tiberias. The inhabitants of this city, which was located in a Paradise-like region, differed from the Nazarenes as a mild coast climate differs from a rough mountain landscape. There were in Capernaum probably more voluptuaries, more persons sunken in vice, and probably a greater contrast of wealth and poverty. Therefore this city afforded more room for his activity. His searching, earnest instruction, coming straight from the heart, found more acceptance here. Listeners from the lower classes came to him, attached themselves to him and "followed" him. Among his first adherents in Capernaum

were Simon, with the appellative Cephas or Peter, and his brother Andreas, sons of Jonah, both fishers; further the two sons of a certain Zebedee, named James and John. Also he was followed by a rich publican, called by the sources now Matthew, now Levi, in whose house Jesus tarried frequently, associating with other company from the most despised class. Women of questionable reputation, also, were among his followers, most famous of them Mary Magdalene (from the city of Magdala near Tiberias) from whom he cast out seven devils, that is, according to the phraseology of the time, seven vices. Jesus made these outcast sinners rueful penitents. This was indeed an unheard of thing at that time, that a Jewish teacher should associate with women, and especially of such reputation.

However, Jesus was able by word and example to lift these sinners and publicans, these reprobate and immoral creatures, to himself and fill their minds with the love of God, "that they may be worthy children of their father in heaven," to ennoble their hearts by devotion and holiness, and to improve their conduct by the prospect of entering into the kingdom of God. This was the greatest miracle that he performed.

Above all Jesus taught his male and female disciples the Essene passive virtues of self-denial, humility, contempt of property, amicableness and peaceableness. He commanded his adherents to keep neither gold nor silver nor bronze in their scrip, not to possess two cloaks, not to wear shoes on their feet. He set children before them as examples, that they should become as free from sin as these and experience in themselves a new birth, in order to become members of the approaching Messianic kingdom. The commandment to love one's neighbors and cherish good-will he developed into unselfishness. "If any one strike thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also, and if any one take thy cloak, give him thy coat also." He taught the poor not to worry about food and drink and clothing: he pointed out to them the fowls of the air and the lilies of the field, who are fed and clothed without taking care. The rich he taught how rightly to give alms, "that the left-hand might not know what the right-hand was doing." He gave directions how they should pray in their chambers, and composed for the purpose a short form (the Lord's Prayer), which was perhaps already in use among the Essenes.

Jesus made no attack on existing Judaism; he had no thought of becoming a reformer of the Jewish doctrines, or indeed of introducing anything new, but simply of leading sinners into righteousness and holiness of life, in order to make them fit for the Messianic

age. He dwelt with emphasis upon the unity of God, and had not the remotest intention of modifying the Jewish conception of God. Once when a scribe asked him what was the essence of Judaism, he replied: "Hear, O Israel: our God is one God; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Those, he said, were the chief commandments. His followers, who remained true to Judaism, handed down this declaration by him: "I am not come either to increase or to diminish the law. Heaven and earth shall pass away sooner than one jot of the law." Jesus had no objection to raise to the existing system of sacrifices; he only demanded, as indeed the Pharisees also did, that reconciliation with men should precede atonement with God. Jesus did not even reject fasting absolutely, but demanded that it be practised without display and hypocrisy. He wore on his robe the tassels prescribed by law. He stood so wholly within the Jewish fold that he even shared the Jewish prejudice of his time so far as to thoroughly despise the heathen world. He wished to have nothing to do with the heathen. "One should not cast that which is sacred to the dogs, nor throw pearls before swine, lest they tread them under foot and destroy them."

The merit of Jesus, and it is no slight one, consists chiefly in putting new earnestness into the regulations of Judaism, as Hillel had done, interpreting them with the heart and the soul, emphasising particularly the relation of the Israelites to their God as that of children to a father, making strongly prominent the brotherhood of men, wishing to put the laws of morality into the foreground, and finally making this doctrine of sanctity and intimacy with God acceptable to beings whose moral character was wrecked.

But Jesus would scarcely have won such a devoted following and had such a successful activity through mere instruction, if he had not aroused the sense of the marvellous in men's minds by something extraordinary. His outward appearance, his eccentric manner, his appealing mode of teaching, may indeed have made a strong impression. But in order to rouse a lasting enthusiasm in stolid people who were indifferent to ideals, and to gain their unconditional confidence, required some extraordinary performance which would captivate the imagination of the masses. Now the sources of Christian history are full of accounts in the most manifold garb and phraseology of the marvellous cures effected by Jesus. The ability to effect marvellous cures, especially upon those possessed, was so much an essential feature of the results ascribed to Jesus, that his followers made more of this power than of an especially holy life. The multitude admired more Jesus' power

over evil spirits and Satan than his moral greatness. To persons of a low grade of culture he appeared to be an extraordinary being only when he had once, or several times, cured an epileptic, perhaps by mental influence.

Encouraged by his success in Capernaum, where he first found a group of disciples, Jesus travelled about among the cities of Galilee and spent some time in the second capital, Bethsaida (Julias), in Magdala, and in Chorazin, gathering followers.

However, his influence in Bethsaida and Chorazin cannot have been lasting, for a denunciation of these cities is ascribed to him, on account of their indocility. They were anathematised by him as like Sodom and Gomorrah. But his faithful disciples, male as well as female, who followed him everywhere, did everything as he directed. As they weaned themselves from their former immoral and impious life, so also they put away their possessions and adopted community of goods. Communion in food and drink was the outward tie that bound Jesus' disciples to one another. By the contributions of the rich publicans even his poor followers were relieved of all care for food, and this attached them to Jesus still more. Among his followers Jesus selected for more intimate intercourse those who seemed to him by virtue of their greater receptivity or their stronger character more calculated to advance his purpose.

The aim, the center, of all his thoughts, the secret locked up in his own breast, was revealed by Jesus one day to this more intimate circle of disciples. He led them into a secluded region at the foot of Mount Hermon, not far from Cæsarea Philippi, the capital of Philip the tetrarch, where the Jordan gushes forth from gigantic rocks; this solitary region he chose in which to reveal to them his most secret thoughts. But he managed it in such a way that the disciples seemed to draw out from him this notion: that he was the expected Messiah. He asked them for whom his followers took him. Some said, he was the expected Elias, the immediate forerunner of the Messiah; others said that he was the prophet whom Moses had foretold. Then Jesus asked, "But whom say ye that I am?" Simon Peter answered, "Thou thyself art the Messiah" (Christ). Jesus commended the insight of Peter, admitted his Messianic calling, but forbade his disciples to reveal it, or to say anything about it for the present. This moment veiled in mysterious darkness, was the birth-hour of Christianity. When later his most intimate disciples, Simon Peter and James and John the sons of Zebedee, timidly remarked to him that the Messiah was to be preceded by the forerunner Elias, Jesus intimated that he had

already appeared in the person of John the Baptist, without having been recognised.

Jesus never called himself the Messiah, but used instead other expressions which were probably current in Essene circles. He called himself Son of Man, with reference to a verse in the Book of Daniel, "Behold a son of man came in the clouds of heaven and appeared before the ancient of days." This verse indeed characterises the People of Israel by its connexion as the Messianic people, but at this later time it was interpreted by a forced construction as referring to a Messianic personality. Another designation was used by Jesus for his Messianic function, the significant word "Son of God," also, probably, an allusion to the verse of the Psalm, "God spoke to me: Thou art my son, to-day have I borne thee." Did Jesus use this expression merely as a symbol for Messiah, or did he intend to have it taken literally? He never declared himself on the matter more closely, not even later when he was tried for it. His followers themselves were not agreed later as to the sense of the phrase, and their varying interpretations of it divided them into sects; out of this came a new deification.

II.

When Jesus revealed himself to his disciples as the Messiah, and yet commanded them to keep the matter a secret, he comforted them with the declaration that the time was not yet come, but that a time would come when "they would be able to proclaim in the light what he had told them in the darkness, and then they would be able to preach from the housetops what had been whispered into their ears." But the opposite of what Jesus and his disciples expected actually happened. As soon as it was noised abroad—for the disciples probably were not discreet—that Jesus of Nazareth was not merely preparing the way for the kingdom of heaven, but was himself the expected Messiah, public opinion turned against him. People expected of him signs and proofs of his Messianic mission which he did not give, and he evaded questions regarding it. Many of his followers are even said to have taken offence at him and left him, "going no longer in his way."

If he did not wish to give an impression of weakness to his disciples he must needs do something to crown his work, or he must give up. They expected that he should soon appear as Messiah before the eyes of the whole nation in the capital of the country. His own brothers are said to have appealed to him to go to Jerusalem, in order that his disciples might see his works. "For no

one doth anything in secret, but desireth to make himself known; if thou doest such things, reveal thyself to the world." And so Jesus finally determined to enter upon the painful journey to Jerusalem. He was not secure in Galilee anyway, and seems to have fled from place to place, hunted and pursued by the spies of the tetrarch Herod Antipas. When in his persecution some one proposed to join him Jesus said to him: "The foxes have holes, the fowl have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head." As though to avoid any mistaken notion that he proposed to abolish the law, he replies to a Pharisee who wished to join him and had asked about the conditions: "If thou wouldst attain eternal life, observe the law, sell what thou hast and give it to the poor," that is, share it with his followers who were vowed to poverty.

Having passed through Jericho and reached the vicinity of Jerusalem he did not establish himself in the midst of the capital, but took up his abode in the neighborhood of the wall, in the village of Bethany, at the foot of the Mount of Olives, where at the time were settled the lepers who were excluded from the Holy City. He found refuge in the house of one of these lepers named Simon. The other followers whom he found in Bethany belonged also to the humblest class: Lazarus and his sisters Mary and Martha.

Over Jesus' entrance into Jerusalem and his appearance in the temple, legend has cast a halo of glorification which contains few historical elements. The people are said to have conducted him to Jerusalem in triumph shouting Hosanna. But the same people are said to have demanded his death a few days later. Both these reports are inventions, the one to prove his recognition as Messiah on the part of the people, the other in order to place the blood-guilt of his execution upon the whole Jewish people. Just as unhistorical is the report that Jesus used violence in the temple, upset the tables of the money-changers for the temple tithes and drove the dove-sellers out of the temple.

The most important portion of his life, the attitude which Jesus assumed toward the people in Jerusalem, toward the sanhedrin, and toward the factions; whether he really proclaimed himself as the Messiah and how this was received, just this is depicted in the sources in such dazzling colors that one cannot distinguish the historical basis from the legendary embellishments. It is altogether likely that there existed prejudices against him in the capital. The educated portion of the people expected the Messianic salvation from anybody but a Galilean untrained in the law. Indeed the notions cherished for centuries were violated by the thought of see-

ing the Messiah come from Galilee, whereas he was expected from Bethlehem of the tribe of David. The proverb, "What good can come out of Nazareth?" probably grew up at this time. The orthodox were generally offended at him because he associated with sinners, publicans and harlots, and ate and drank with them. Even the disciples of John, that is, the Essenes, seem to have been offended by his violations of their code. All of these striking peculiarities, which seemed out of place in the Messiah, left the leaders of the nation, the Scribes, cold toward him, and he probably received no friendly welcome in Jerusalem. But all these offences were nevertheless no cause for an accusation against him, and accordingly nothing could be done against him. Free expression of opinion had become so much a matter of custom through the frequent debates between the schools of Shammai and Hillel that no one was very likely to be persecuted because of his difference in religious views, provided he did not violate generally observed religious regulations or offend against the Jewish idea of God.

In this very respect, however, Jesus exposed a weak side to attack. The report had indeed been spread that he called himself "Son of God," a phrase which, if it was to be taken in its surface sense, infringed too seriously upon the religious convictions of the Jewish nation for its representatives to pass it over with indifference. But how was the tribunal to arrive at certainty as to whether he had really proclaimed himself as the "Son of God," and what interpretation he gave to the term? How were they to find out a matter which was a secret of his private circle, and the sense in which he himself wanted it understood? To this end a traitor from this very circle was needed, and such a one was found in Judas Iscariot (Ischariot), who, impelled by greed, as the story goes, betrayed to the court the one whom he had hitherto revered as the Messiah.

As soon as the officers seized Jesus all his disciples deserted him and sought safety in flight; Simon Peter alone followed him at a distance. When day dawned on the fourteenth of Nisan, the feast of Passover, that is the day of preparation before the festival of unleavened bread, Jesus was brought before the sanhedrin, in which the high priest Joseph Caiphas presided. The hearing consisted of an attempt to satisfy the court whether Jesus pretended to be the Son of God, as certain witnesses had testified. It sounds quite incredible that he should have been tried on the charge of having previously declared that he could destroy the temple and build it again in three days. Such a declaration, if really made by

him, could have been nothing but an occasion for laughter. On the contrary, the accusation against Jesus was blasphemy, and whether he asked to be regarded as the Son of God. To the questions propounded to him to bring this out Jesus was silent and gave no answer whatever. When the presiding officer asked him a second time whether he was the Son of God, he is said to have replied: "Thou sayest it," and is said to have added, that they would "soon see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of God and coming in the clouds of heaven." From this utterance, if he may be believed to have made it, the judges were justified in inferring that he regarded himself as the Son of God. The high priest thereupon rent his garment over the blasphemy he had heard, and the court condemned him as a blasphemer. Appearances were against him. The confirmation of the sentence, or rather the permission for the execution, was obtained by the sanhedrin from the prefect Pontius Pilate, who was in Jerusalem at the time of the celebration.

Pilate, before whom Jesus was brought, questioned him regarding the political side of his activity, whether as Messiah he proclaimed himself to be the King of the Jews, and when Jesus gave the ambiguous answer, "Thou sayest it," the governor also pronounced sentence of death upon him. This was but his official duty. But the feature of the account is pure invention which represents Pilate as declaring Jesus innocent and wishing to save him, while the Jews were insisting upon his execution.

If Jesus was mocked and forced to wear a crown of thorns in ridicule of his Messianic royalty, this insult did not come from the Jews, but from the Roman soldiers, who were probably glad to mock in him the Jewish nation. On the contrary his Jewish judges were so little dominated by passionate hatred toward his person that they gave to him, as to every condemned person, the cup of wine and hyssop to numb him and soften the pains of death.

As Jesus was scourged before his execution Pilate must have treated him in accordance with Roman law; for the scourging of one condemned to death was entirely unknown to Jewish law. Hence it was the Roman bailiffs (licitors) who took delight in scourging with rods or ropes the alleged "King of the Jews." It was they also who nailed him to the cross, inflicting in accordance with Pilate's command the ignominious death prescribed by Roman law. For on the utterance of sentence of death by the Roman officials who had jurisdiction in capital crimes the condemned ceased to belong to his own nation, but became subject to Roman laws.

Not the Jewish sanhedrin, but Pilate, caused Jesus to be executed as a stirrer up of sedition and state offender.

The Christian sources claim that he was crucified alive at nine o'clock in the morning and gave up the ghost only about three in the afternoon, and that his last word was the phrase from the Psalms, in Aramaic: "God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me! (Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani). They also report that the Roman soldiers in mockery nailed over the cross the inscription, "Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews."

The crucifixion and probably also the interment of the body took place without the city in a burial-place set apart for criminals; it was called Golgotha (the Place of the Skull).

This was the end of the man who had labored for the moral improvement of the outcasts of his people, and had become perhaps the victim of a misunderstanding. His death became the occasion, though the innocent occasion, of unnumbered sufferings and of death in many forms for the children of his people. He is the only being born of woman of whom it can be said without exaggeration that he accomplished more by his death than by his life.

Golgotha, the Place of the Skull, became for the historical world a new Sinai.

Finally it is to be observed that these occurrences of so much importance for the Christian world made so little stir at the time in Jerusalem that the Jewish historians, Justus of Tiberias, and Josephus, who indeed mentions the smallest incidents in the time of Pilate, have not a syllable for Jesus and his execution.

When the first fright due to the capture and crucifixion of Jesus, which had scattered his disciples, was past, they gathered again to weep over the death of their beloved master. The whole following of Jesus, at least that portion of it then in Jerusalem, did not comprise more than one hundred and twenty members, and if all are included who believed in him in Galilee, not more than five hundred. Far from letting their belief in him pass like a dream, they grew still more enthusiastic for him; their reverence for Jesus grew into a sort of infatuation.

The only stone of stumbling for the disciples lay in the circumstance that the master who was to save Israel and bring the glory of the kingdom of heaven, had died an ignominious death. The suffering Messiah gave them serious pause. This occasion of offence in Jesus had first to be removed before his followers could surrender themselves fully to their belief in his Messianic calling. In this dilemma some scribe among them comforted himself an

them with the phrase from the prophecy of Isaiah, "He is snatched from the land of the living, and suffers wounds for the sins of his people," for this verse is applied, contrary to its intent, to the Messiah. This scribe probably helped the terrified and irresolute band out of the greatest embarrassment. By means of his interpretation he made to seem venerable and according to Scripture what had seemed new and strange. He gave a support to infant Christianity which was threatening at its very beginning to go to pieces.

Interpretation of the Scripture was at this time a power which could make the most absurd things acceptable and make the most incredible things seem matters of course. Without some support in Scripture, however weak, no innovation could find approval and permanence. With this strange interpretation of the Prophet Isaiah, to the effect that a period of suffering was foretold for the Messiah, the difficulty was solved for the believers in Jesus: all had come as it had been decreed. Even the fact that Jesus was executed as a criminal became significant, in order that the prophecy regarding the Messiah might be literally fulfilled. Was it not foretold that he would be counted among the malefactors? His disciples claimed to have heard from Jesus while he yet lived that he was to incur persecutions and even death. Thus suffering and death became a proof of his Messianic calling. His followers went through his career and found in every insignificant circumstance a higher Messianic meaning; even the fact that he was not born in Bethlehem, but in Nazareth, was declared to be the fulfilment of a prophecy: "That he may be called a Nazarene (Nasiræan?)" And so his followers were convinced that Jesus the Nazarene was the Christ (Messiah).

When the spirits of the believing were assured on this point, it was difficult to meet another question, "When, then, is the promised Kingdom of Heaven to come if the bearer and accomplisher of the kingdom has died on the cross? Hope gave the answer: "The Messiah will come again in his glory with the angels of heaven, and then he will reward every one according to his deeds." They believed that "some of those now living will not taste death till they have seen the Son of Man come to his kingdom." Therefore the believing expected the return of Jesus any moment, differing in this not at all from other Jews, but only in applying this Messianic expectation to an already known personage. Upon his return Jesus was to establish the Millennium, the Sabbatical Millennium after the expiration of the six thousand years of earth's existence, which was to bring to the faithful all the delights of

peace and every earthly bliss. In order to support this belief it would not do to admit that Jesus had succumbed to death, but it was necessary to claim that he had been resurrected. The Biblical account of the Prophet Jonah, who was said to have been in the whale's belly three days, was interpreted to mean: Jesus was three days in the tomb and then rose, and his tomb was found empty. Several of his followers claimed to have seen him, now here now there, after his death, and even to have eaten fish and honey with him. This credulity found not even the least reason to doubt his Messianic character.

However, greatly as the first believers revered and glorified Jesus, they did not remove him from the sphere of humanity; their infatuation did not reach the point of regarding him as God. They merely considered him an exceptionally gifted man, who, solely because he had fulfilled the law as none before him had done, was found worthy to be the Messiah of God. Accordingly they did not deviate from the law of Judaism, but observed the Sabbath, circumcision, the regulations regarding food, and considered Jerusalem and the temple sacred. But in addition to the belief in a Messiah who had already appeared, they had some peculiarities borrowed from the Essenes. The voluntary acceptance of poverty, which Jesus had taught them, was a prominent feature with the latter. From this voluntary poverty they were called Ebionites (the Poor), a name which they assumed themselves or received from outsiders. This of itself made the community of goods necessary, so that every new member sold his property and turned over the proceeds to the common treasury. In this respect the first Christians, or Jewish Christians,—called by the Jews Nazarites or Nazarenes,—did not deviate from their predecessors, the Essenes. For the management of their funds and the care of the common table they appointed seven managers, as was customary in every Jewish congregation. The Essene manner of life of the first followers of Jesus appeared also in their abstinence from meat and wine, their celibacy, their contempt of oil for anointing and of superfluous garments; a single garment of white linen was all they wore.

It is told of James the brother of Jesus, who was chosen on account of relationship as leader of the first Jewish-Christian congregation, and regarded by them as a model, that he drank no wine or other intoxicants, ate no meat, suffered no razor to touch his head, wore no woolen garment, but only one of linen, and had altogether but one garment. He lived in strict accordance with the

law, and was impatient when Jewish-Christians permitted themselves to violate it.

In addition to James the other elders of the first Ebionite congregation were Simon Cephas, or Peter ben Jonas, and John ben Zebedee. These favored disciples were called the pillars of Christianity. Simon Peter was the most active of all the disciples of Jesus, and exerted himself to gain adherents for the belief in Jesus and for the Christian rule of life. However, he is depicted as of wavering character. The Christian sources declare that he denied Jesus three times when the latter was taken prisoner, and that the master himself called him weak in the faith. He, as well as the other disciples, claimed to have been commissioned by Jesus to go to the "lost sheep of the House of Israel," in order to give them a share in the communion of the Kingdom of God. Like Jesus and John the Baptist, they were to proclaim the Kingdom of Heaven.

Hardly more than born, Christianity set about the conquest of proselytes; this was their inheritance from the Essene order. The disciples claimed to have received from Jesus the gift of curing the sick, of driving out evil spirits, and of raising the dead. The exorcism of evil spirits they regarded as a standing function of the elders, and spread the belief in the power of Satan,—a power which had been made real by this very belief.

Within orthodox Judaism the belief in evil spirits had been of an innocent nature, without religious coloring; only with Christianity was it raised to the rank of an article of faith, to which hecatombs of human beings were afterwards sacrificed. The reception of a new member was preceded by an exorcism of evil spirits, as though he had been possessed by the Devil before. The innocent bathing in the river of the Essene rule became in Christian circles an important, mystical ceremony. It is no wonder that the Jews regarded the Nazarenes, and the Pagans the Christians, as exorcisers and magicians.

During the first decades after the death of Jesus the Christians received little attention in Jewish circles. Because of the humble classes to which they belonged they escaped notice. They constituted a narrow sect, and were probably reckoned among the Essenes with whom they had so much in common. Indeed they would have vanished entirely had not a man arisen later who gave to the sect an extension and raised it to a height which assured it the dominion of the world.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NAMING THINGS IN THE NURSERY.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE AIM of all education is to enable the child when it attains to manhood to exercise dominion over the world of realities, and this is done by establishing in our children's minds clear representations of things and happenings.

In the book of Genesis we read that God gave man dominion over all the animals and things of creation (i. 26); and he brought them unto Adam to see how he would call them (ii. 19). The connexion between man's language and his superiority over all other creatures is not fortuitous, for by naming things man gains dominion over them. In language man mirrors the world and classifies its phenomena. Through language alone can he acquire exact knowledge and learn to foredetermine the course of events.

I had occasion to observe the truth of this broad statement when showing to an infant boy the movements of the machinery in a factory. The child was at first frightened by the noise and naturally did not take kindly to the formidable din of the rolling-mill. But it is easy enough to accustom even a baby to any monotonous noise by imitating its sound. The rollers produce two peculiar clangs, —one sharp, the other muffled. When the little fellow was frightened we retreated from the rolling-mill, but I continued to remind him of the noise by the words *clap, bum*, which imitated the peculiar sound. He seemed to regain his self-possession, and the banging of the mill ceased to be formidable, for he grew rather curious and turned his head to look. Then he was slowly carried back to the rolling-mill, where he began to anticipate the noise as accompanied by the words *clap, bum*. The constant repetition of the words *clap, bum*, kept the child prepared for what was coming, and he now soon became accustomed to the sight of the rollers which he began to contemplate, not without awe yet without terror.

I had occasion to make similar observations at the dump of a coal shaft. As soon as a child is prepared for the deafening noise of the falling coal by some adequate imitation of the sound, something like *bum-berum-bum-bum*, he will instead of fear show a desire to watch the process from a place of safety.

In performing such experiments care should be taken that he who carries the baby should never approach either nearer or more quickly than the child desires to go, and children are never at a loss to indicate their wishes unequivocally.

The naming of any happening is the first step towards mastering it. The image of the process, instead of being a bewildering sense-impression, becomes a mental act and is now clearly outlined in a sound symbol. Thus, to the memory of the event itself a new and higher soul-structure, a name representing the event, is added which becomes connected with, and will always at once awaken, a recollection of the original sense-impression. The recollection is comparatively faint, and being not as overwhelming as the immediate presence of the reality itself will allow a calm contemplation of the process. With such preparation a repeated approach will not disturb the child's self-possession. He will now begin to observe, and the former feeling of fear will yield to an eagerness to witness the scene.

There are in the bustle of a factory so many details which should be clearly apprehended, that it will be a great help to the growing intellect of the child if here again the most striking of them are named. While the coal car is being pushed to the verge of the dump, the process may be accompanied by some such words as *rolly-rolly-rolly*. The turning of wheels may be accompanied by rotatory movements of the baby's arm, and you can almost see how thereby the child is enabled the better to watch the rolling. In an analogous way the movement of hammers, the backward and forward motions of pistons, the rotation of cranks, etc., etc., can be imitated, which will help the child to grasp quickly and clearly the elementary features of sense-impressions.

The fires are best imitated by sounding the aspirate, *h'h'h'h'*, bells by *ding-dong*, the puffing of engines by *tch'-tch'*, etc., etc.

Adopting this method of naming events in baby language, I succeeded in teaching a very small child the mystery of the reversing lever with its accompanying machinery. When the reverse turned the drum of the coalshaft-elevator in one direction, say to the right, I called the oscillations of the reversing gear *vick vack, vick vack*, and when the lever was reversed and the drum turned in the oppo-

site direction I called it *vack vick, vack vick*. The reversion of the name suggests the reversion of the movement and helps to fix in a child's mind the sense-impression in its essential features. A little steam-engine model (which the late Olmsted Scientific Co. advertised under No. 816 of their catalogue) was an additional help, giving an inside view of the piston and side valves in their connexion with the reverse lever.

The child must have the most essential features of processes and events delineated in his mind in strong outlines and it will then be easy to add the more complicated details without causing mystification or confusion.

That the chicken-yard, farms, sheep-folds, and other places where living animals can be observed should be visited, that birds, dogs, horses, should be watched and their behavior noted, goes without saying, and everywhere the same method should be applied to render the sense-impressions more distinct by gestures as well as names.

If the imagination of the child is thus connected with definite sense-pictures, it will be easy to revive the memories of former experiences; and one is enabled to tell to babies when they are restless either in the evening or at night, stories which draw upon their little stock of memories, and it will quickly quiet them because they are greatly interested in hearing the tales of their own experiences which will be the more interesting to them the greater have been the terrors that had originally to be overcome.

The application of baby language is of manifold use especially at night, when for some reason a child is restless and the usual methods fail to quiet his imagination.

The usual lullaby songs are upon the whole very good; long-drawn notes, words of soothing sound, with prevailing *o* and especially *u* tones are most soporific; but it is sometimes difficult to put babies to sleep, and then you may in a hushed voice which will raise expectancy sing a story consisting simply of the repetition of familiar sounds. The child will listen to the song, nonsensical though it may appear to outsiders and to all people not initiated into the mysteries of baby language. It will quiet down, and give the nurse a chance gradually to change her song to more monotonous lullaby tunes, such as "the rolling-mill goes *clap-bum!*" or "the choo-choo says *ding-dong*," or "the little lamb says *baa, baa*," etc. The baby will listen with as much interest as older children manifest when a fairy tale is told, and the interesting images will by and by be transformed into dream visions.

It is easy enough for a nurse to watch and to influence the growing intellect of an infant, and every nurse ought to be able to account for and understand her charge's vocabulary of those sense-impressions which in the beginning play a prominent part.

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Special attention should be paid to such events and natural phenomena as are apt to frighten children. When thunderstorms come up, the father or mother should take the baby and quiet it. Show it the lightning with signs of an appreciation of its beauty and prepare the baby's ear for the rumbling thunder. The least evidence of fear on the part of the parents will affect the child and may make him a coward for life. Of course, you must avoid coming near the iron pipes and electric wires, and must remain in such places as are comparatively safe. Moving about is upon the whole better than staying in one place, because it diverts the child's attention from the formidable impression. It must be remembered that troops under fire who remain inactive break down and lose courage sooner than troops who are advancing or are otherwise kept busy.

In this connexion we may mention the ridiculous fear which ladies sometimes exhibit when a mouse runs across the floor. Parents should see to it that their babies never witness scenes of shrieking and the seeking of chairs for refuge at the appearance of these poor rodents. Wherever such things are likely to happen, they should be ridiculed in the presence of the child, so as to counteract in time their injurious influence. Let children (if there are mice in the house) rather learn to watch the mouse coming out from its place of safety, let them learn to keep quiet for a while and see what the little creature will do, and you will from the beginning extirpate that foolish sentiment of horror which is so common even among grown people.

These hints, if observed, help to establish in the child a self-possession which in later years will be so much needed.

Which impressions should be the first stratum of the child's soul, depends of course on surroundings and other conditions. However, we must expect that the comprehension of facts will be followed by a determination to handle the realities which have been watched in early childhood. Therefore when machinery is shown, the child should at once learn with what care and precautions it must be handled.

THE CRUCIFIX.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE identification of the salutary sign¹ (i. e., the figure of intersecting lines) with the cross of Golgotha, the stauros or the pole on which Christ died, does not as yet occur in the New Testament, nor can any trace of it be found in the oldest Christian writers, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, including even the Shepherd of Hermas of the beginning of the second century. It is utterly absent in the catacombs, where Christ on the cross is represented as a fish on a simple rod or pole. The second oldest form



ΙΧΘΥΣ, CHRIST AS THE FISH ON THE ROD.

Frescoes in the Catacombs, Ardeatine Cemetery. (The cross is here, in its oldest pictorial representation, a simple rod without cross-beam.)

of the cross in the catacombs is the T cross and that appears in the latter half of the fourth century, while the four-armed cross was not discovered earlier than the fifth century. Says the Rev. Richard St. John Tyrwhitt in Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, pp. 496-497 :

“ One example is given by Boldetti of a tau-cross, dating A. D. 370 according to the consuls: neither the *Crux Immissa* nor the Greek cross appear by actual examples till the fifth century. This question of date can hardly be decided in the Catacombs, from the number of crosses inscribed there by pilgrims of all periods.

“ The tau appears in the Callixtine Catacomb, in a sepulchral inscription, referred to the third century, thus: ‘IREΤΝΕ.’ This frequently occurs elsewhere (De Rossi, *Bullet.*, 1863, p. 35); and some of the crucifixes on the vessels of the treasury of Monza are of the same shape (see Didron's *Annales Archéologiques*.

¹ It is called in Latin *signum salutis*, the symbol of salvation, of wholesomeness, of redemption, of life and immortality.

Vols. XXVI.-XXVII.). Still in some of the earliest examples it may possibly have been used, even by Christians, in the pre-Christian sense, as a type of life in the world to come."

The sign of two intersecting lines, one form of the cross among many, had, since the age of Constantine, been more and more chosen as the main, and finally as the sole, representative symbol of the instrument of Christ's crucifixion and became at last definitely identified with it in the minds of the people.

These are established facts, and yet it seems to us that the identification must have been established at a very early date in certain Christian circles. We may fairly assume that these Christians belonged to the lowest walks of life and exercised at first no great influence on the Church. Their views were sometimes repudiated, sometimes tolerated, without being officially recognised; but being backed by old traditions, which, Pagan though they were, could not easily be set aside, and anticipating the authorisation of the Church, they slowly gained ground, probably in the second century, when the Pagans began to call Christians *staurolaters*, or worshippers of the cross.

Justinus Martyr seems to make the earliest attempt to see in the cross of Golgotha two intersecting lines; but his allusion is very vague. He says:

"The Paschal lamb, roasted whole, was a symbol of the passion of the cross; for the lamb, in roasting, bears a resemblance to the figure of the cross—one spit pierces it horizontally from the lower extremities to the head, and another across the back on which to hang the forelegs."

This is the oldest remark in Christian literature which speaks of the cross as represented by two intersecting lines, and yet passages quoted in former chapters, from this same author, Justinus Martyr, prove that his knowledge of the cross of execution with its projecting seat offered another aspect. But we must bear in mind that the Church-fathers improved every opportunity and strained their imagination considerably to find references and allusions to the cross of any shape, now to the T cross, then to the four-armed cross standing upright \dagger , then again to the same cross lying on two ends \times , and also to the simple pole, the rood, or the tree. But it is noteworthy that this effort of finding the cross everywhere represented cannot be traced back beyond Justinus Martyr.¹

Minutius Felix and Tertullian repudiate the charge of *staurolatry*, but their very repudiation seems to prove that crosses

¹ Barnabas, the companion of Paul, is older than Justinus, but the Epistle of Barnabas is a forgery of a later date.

were actually employed by some Christians in public or private religious worship.

Minutius Felix replies to the charge, saying :

"We (Christians) neither worship crosses nor desire them" (for dying thereon), but Tertullian seems to acquiesce in the charge, claiming that the Pagans are herein the coreligionists (*con-sacranei*) of the Christians in that the former worship wooden statues. He challenges the Pagans to tell him what difference there is between the material of a statue and a cross, "when each is represented by a rough stock without form."

If there were staurolaters in the age of Tertullian, the form of the cross need not have been that of later days, the so-called Latin cross, but may have been a more realistic representation of an instrument for capital punishment, for Tertullian adds :

"But an entire cross is attributed to us, with its transverse beam of course and its projecting seat."¹

Whatever may have been true of the charge of staurolatry, the cross was not yet accepted at that early date as a symbol of Christianity, nor was its form sufficiently fixed to serve as an officially recognised object of worship.



THEODOLINDA'S CRUCIFIX.² (About 590.)

* * *
The last step in the history of the cross, the manufacture of crucifixes, was probably taken only in the middle of the sixth century. So long as the spirit of classic antiquity retained the slightest influence, no artist dared to represent the highest ideal of religion in the shape of a dying man on the cross. The crucifix appears with the beginning of the Middle Ages, not before.

One of the oldest crucifixes, perhaps the oldest in existence, is the pectoral cross of Queen Theodolinda. But this is a private, not an official, use of the crucifix. The Christian Church authorities still shrunk from depicting Christ on the cross, and represented him as a lamb standing or lying under a cross, with streams of blood


¹ "Nobis tota crux imputatur, cum antenna scilicet sua et cum illo sedilis excessu." *Adv Nat.*, II.

² From Smith and Cheetham's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, Vol. I., p. 512.

issuing from its wounded neck. It was only at the end of the seventh century (A. D. 692) that the Trullan Council sanctioned the use of crucifixes, saying :

" We order that in the stead of the ancient lamb, Jesus Christ, our Lord, shall be shown henceforth in His human form, in the images, he being the lamb which bears the iniquity of the world."

The first attempts to indicate the crucifixion are purely suggestions of the event, not real representations, and instances of it are found in the designs on the oil flasks of Monza. Here the cross is worshipped and the head of Christ surrounded by a halo appears above the cross. Even the crucifixion of the thieves is merely indicated, and the scene at the tomb in which the angel proclaims Christ's resurrection fills the lower part of the design. (See p. 677.)



CHRIST AS A LAMB.²
(Fifth century.)

If Hallam's division of periods be accepted, which makes the end of the fifth century the beginning of the Middle Ages, the public representation of the Crucifixion may be said to be a mediæval usage in point of time. Further, Martigny (*Dict. des Antiq. Chrétiennes*, p. 190, s. v.) claims for France the honor of having possessed the first public crucifix-painting which ever existed; for which he refers to Gregory of Tours (*De Glor. Martyr.*, i. 23), and which he says must have been at least as old as the middle of the sixth century. But he says above, probably with great correctness, that all the most eminent Crucifixions known were objects of private devotion, instancing the pectoral cross of Queen Theodolinda and the Syriac MS. of the Medicean Library at Florence."

According to Franz Xaver Kraus, the reliefs in the wooden door of S. Sabina in Rome, and the London ivory plate (here re-

¹ Smith and Cheetham's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, p. 512.

² From Dr. Rock's *Hirurgia*, 2d ed., London. C. Dolmar, 1857, p. 362.

produced) belong to the fifth century and would have to be regarded as the oldest instances of crucifixions now extant. If Professor



OIL-FLASK OF MONZA.

Suggesting the crucifixion.
(After Garrucci. Reproduced from F. X. Kraus, *G. d. ch. K.*, I., p. 172.)



THE EIGHT-RAYED STAR.

A combination of the upright cross \dagger , and the letter χ (i. e., *Ch*), the initial of Christ, on an oil-flask of Monza.¹

Kraus's chronological estimate is correct, we must grant that the Church set the example for the adoption of crucifixes, although the



IVORY PLATE OF THE BRITISH MUSEUM, LONDON.² (Fifth Century.)
(F. X. Kraus, *G. d. ch. K.*, I., p. 174.)




RELIEF IN THE WOODEN DOOR OF S. SABIAN (Rome).
(F. X. Kraus, *G. d. ch. K.*, I., p. 174.)

usage was officially sanctioned only later on when the practice had spread over almost all Christendom.

¹ F. X. Kraus, *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 524.

² Christ is youthful and without beard, and his death on the cross is contrasted to the death of Judas on the tree.



A TYPICAL SYMBOLICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CRUCIFIXION.
(From an ivory-carving of the ninth century.)¹

¹ From Mrs. Jameson and Lady Eastlake's *History of Our Lord*, II., plate facing p. 144.

Professor Kraus sums up the case as follows :

"The assumption that authors of the fourth century bear witness to the prevalence of crucifixes is at present no longer tenable, and even the poem of Pseudo-Lactantius *De Ave Phœnice*, quoted by Gorrucchi, proves nothing, except that the believer saw behind the simple cross the Crucified One himself."

Commenting on remarks of later authors, Kraus continues :

"In the time of Emperor Justinian the Great, Choricus saw a fresco of Christ crucified between the two thieves in the church of S. Sergius at Gaza, and was informed that Anastasius Sinaiticus (about 550) affixed to his work *Hodogetikos* a picture of the Crucified. In the beginning of the Frankish era we find two valuable statements, the one by Venautius Fortunatus who saw a picture in stitch-work of the Crucified on a palla in a church of Tours, and the other by Gregorius of Tours that there was a crucifix at about 593 in a church at Narbonne which gave offence through its nudity."

Professor Kraus adds in explanation of the late appearance of crucifixes in Christian art :

"It is natural that in consideration of the contumelious character of capital punishment on the cross, which was abolished only under the rule of Constantine the Church felt for a long time a general disinclination to represent the horrors of the crucifixion, and when at last in the fifth century Christian art ventured to do so it preserved for a long time a taste of antique art by representing down to the beginning of the second millennium the living Christ on the cross and not the dead one."

Representations of the crucifixion became and remained very popular during the Middle Ages, and their number begins to decrease gradually in Protestant countries since the Reformation.

The symbolical representation of the crucifixion finds a typical expression in an ivory plate, reproduced from the *History of Our Lord*, by Mrs. Jameson and Lady Eastlake. The hand reaching out of the clouds represents God the Father, which is an ancient symbol found in the early Assyrian monuments indicating divine providence. The crown of Christ, to which the passion on the cross leads, is held up by two angels bearing torches, such as were used in the Eleusinian and other mysteries. The sun and moon are depicted here as in many other crucifixions, for instance on the oil flasks of Monza, after the fashion of Pagan deities, not otherwise than on Mithraistic monuments. The sun and the moon appear also on Theodolinda's cross and the gold-leaf dress ornament of Lombardy. The figures surrounding the cross are the Church



MINIATURE ILLUSTRATION.
(In the Chiesa Monzeze.
From Frisi's *Memoire della
Chiesa Monzeze.*)¹

¹ Cf. Mrs. Jameson and Lady Eastlake's *History of Our Lord*, II., p. 167.

with the palm leaf and the synagogue with the spear. Behind them stand on the left-hand side Mary, the Mother of Christ, and on the right John, his beloved disciple. Underneath the Earth and the



IVORY-COVER OF THE EVANGELIARY OF
BAMBERG.

(Now in the Library of Munich. F. X. Kraus,
Gesch. d. ch. K., II., p. 324.)

stances of which are reproduced and described by F. X. Kraus (*Chr. K.*, II., p. 234 f.). He says :

¹ We may mention by the way that the situation is not clear. If the position represents Christ

Ocean witness the great spectacle and deliver up the dead who are resurrected by the sacrificial death of Jesus.

Similar but more complicated is the ivory cover carving of a copy of the Bamberg Evangelary now in Munich.

A symbolical representation of the crucifixion gradually yields to a more historical conception, such as appears in the *Biblia Pauperum*. It is based upon the Gospel accounts and is accompanied by the portraits of its prophetic announcers and allegorical prototypes, the sacrifice of Isaac and the raising of the brazen serpent.

The passion of Christ now found innumerable illustrations, but none so classical and dignified as the famous picture of Albrecht Dürer, which shows Christ with the crown of thorns and a halo, bowed down by sufferings¹(p. 682).

The crown above the crucified Christ is sometimes actually placed on his head, the earliest in-


"The earliest instances of a head-cover appear in the highly noteworthy crucifixes here reproduced. The one (published first by Rocca and Gori) is said to be




GOLDLEAF AS DRESS-ORNAMENT,¹
(Probably of the seventh century.
Found in Lombardy.)



THE MAN OF SORROWS.
(By A. Dürer.)



ANCIENT CRUCIFIX.
(Made of Bronze. After Garrucci.)²



THE CRUCIFIX OF ST. GIOVANNI IN
FLORENCE. (After Stockbauer.)²

carved out of a relic of the genuine cross of Christ and was found in the Baptistry of Florence. Whether still there, is doubtful. It shows on the head of the Lord after the flagellation, how can the nail wounds appear on his feet? And if it is meant to show Christ after the crucifixion, he ought either to lie in the grave or must have the triumphant countenance of the risen Saviour. Any intermediate condition between the two would seem like a travesty.

¹ After Forrer and Müller, *Kreuz und Kreuzigung Christi*, from Kraus, *l. l.*, I., p. 176.

² See F. X. Kraus, *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, II., 1, p. 335.

a mitre such as was worn by the popes since Sergius III., 904-911. Somewhat different is the three-cornered cap or *pileus* which Cæsalio obtained from Aleppo, probably belonging to the end of the first millennium."

The piety of the new converts in northern countries, and most so in Ireland, shows a special preference for the crucifixion. The most interesting instances are a stone of Killoran and a bronze plate of the Dublin Museum. Both are of crude workmanship and



SLAB OF KILLORAN.¹

(From Anderson's *Scotland in Early Chr. Times.*)



CRUCIFIXION.¹

(Bronzework now in the Museum of Dublin. From Romily Allen's *Chr. Symbolism in Gr. Britain.*)


show still the influence of the ancient meander pattern which in the days of Paganism was very common all over the north of Europe. More artistic is the crucifixion above the doorway of the Maghera Church and perhaps the most beautiful instance of ancient Irish crucifixions is the cross of Muredach.

The most modern type of crucifixes, the only one which has been found acceptable to Protestants, appears (according to F. X.

¹ See F. X. Kraus, *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 618.

Kraus) for the first time in the wooden sculpture of J. Alcoverro, made in the year 1721.

While the crucifix was sanctioned by the Church only at the end of the seventh century, and while we find no historical evi-



DOORWAY OF MAGHERA CHURCH.

(After Stokes, *Early Christian Art in Ireland.*)

dences of the use of crucifixes before the fifth century, we may rest assured that the recognition of its use had been preparing itself in the Church at least for a century and should not be surprised to


find that it was quite common among pious heretics of the fourth or even the third century. Such changes in taste take place gradually, very gradually, and here we must assume that the uncultured and illiterate took the lead.

This view affords a simple explanation of the startling mural scrawl of the third century, found in 1856 in the rooms of the slaves in a Cæsarial mansion on Mount Palatine. It represents a



THE CROSS OF MUREDACH.

(After Stokes, *Early Christian Art in Ireland.*)



WOOD-CARVING OF J. ALCOVERRO. (1721)

(From F. X. Kraus, *Gesch. d. ch. K.*, II., 1, p. 331.)

man throwing a kiss with his hand to a crucified person with a donkey's head, and the inscription written in ungrammatical Greek reads: AAEZAMENOC CEBETE ΘEON, i. e., Alexamenos worships God. The first explanation that suggested itself will probably remain the best and the true one, viz., that Alexamenos was a Christian and a slave in the emperor's household and that some fellow-

slave of Alexamenos made this inscription in ridicule of his religion.

This view is corroborated by a passage in Tertullian who says:

"Like many others you are under the delusion that an ass's head is our God. . . . But lately a new edition of our God has been made public in Rome. It



MURAL SCRAWL OF THE THIRD CENTURY.
(Found 1856 on Mount Palatinus in Rome)

originated with a certain vile man, who was wont to hire himself out to cheat the wild beasts and who exhibited a picture with this inscription: "The God of the Christians of the lair of an ass, [ὄνοκοίτης or βουκοίτης]. He had the ears of an ass was hoofed in one foot, carried a book and wore a toga."

The belief that the Jewish God was ass-headed was quite common; and Tertullian returns the compliment of the Pagan accusation by saying "many a son of a donkey [ὄνοκούτης] is among you."

Tacitus (Hist. v. 4) tells the story of Moses discovering water by following the tracks of asses in the desert, which, he says, caused the Jews to worship that animal. The genealogy of Mary (quoted by Epiphanius) contains the story of Zacharias, the high-priest, beholding in the sanctuary of the temple, the deity of the Jews with an ass's head. He was struck dumb, and when he recovered his speech he told the people and was killed as a blasphemer. Henceforth, it is stated, the Jewish priests wore bells on their garments to warn their deity of their approach and offer him time to hide.

In Minutius Felix's Christian apology entitled Octavius the same belief of the Pagans that the Christians worship a donkey-headed [ὄνοειδής] God is referred to and we cannot therefore doubt that a scoffer would have painted some such image in ridicule of Christianity; and yet Mr. C. W. King rejects this interpretation and calls attention to the similarity between Anubis, the jackal-headed God of the Egyptians, and the picture described by Tertullian, a figure of that kind being given by Walter, Pl. II. C. No. 1, "save that instead of a book, he holds a palm branch and a caduceus." For this reason Mr. King interprets the drawing as representing the jackal-headed Anubis, and believes that Alexamenos was an Egyptian gnostic.

We grant that the early Christians had no images of the Crucified, which were not introduced before the sixth century. The Christian catacombs are adorned with christograms (the combined letters X P), but contain few crosses and no crucifixes at all. Mons. Perret says:¹

"In our walks through the catacombs we were struck with the absence of all representations of martyrdom. One does not meet there with an image of Jesus on the cross" (Vol. III., p. 72).

"For it is noticeable that in the primitive age they did not place before the eyes of the faithful any image of Jesus Christ on the cross. They were content, out of regard to feeble souls, to paint the cross at first naked, but oftener concealed in the monogram; next, adorned with flowers, precious stones, and crowns; afterwards, it was associated with a lamb lying beneath it. It was in the sixth century they began to delineate the bust of the Saviour, as one may see it in the Vatican cross; and even the whole body, with the hands and feet pierced with nails" (Vol. III., 81. See also *Schaff's Hist.*, Vol. III., 561).

The comment of Octavius in reply to Cecilius on the worship

¹L. Perret et L. Renier, *Catacombes de Rome*. Paris, 1852-1856.

of crucifixes contains a very startling remark. The entire passage reads as follows:¹

"Whereas you tax our religion with the worship of a criminal and his cross, you are strangely out of the way of truth to imagine either. As for the adoration of crosses, which you object against us, I must tell you that we neither adore crosses, nor desire them. You who worship wooden gods are the most likely people to adore wooden crosses, as being parts of the same substance with your deities. For what else are your ensigns, flags, and standards, but crosses, gilt and beautified? Your victorious trophies, not only represent a simple cross, but *a cross with a man on it*. The sign of a cross appears in a ship, either when she is under sail, or rowed with expanded oars, like the palm of your hand. Not a gallows (*jugum*) but exhibits the sign of a cross. And when a pure worshipper adores the true God with hands extended, he makes the same figure. Thus you see that the sign of the cross has either some foundation in nature, or in your own religion, and therefore is not to be objected against by you."

The italicised clause "*a cross with a man on it*" appears to imply that in the days of Minutius Felix the Pagans had crucifixes (i. e., crosses with a man attached), and on this ground Mr. King's hypothesis that considering the utter absence of Christian crucifixes before the sixth century, the graffito of Alexamenos may have been written by a pious gnostic, representing "a cross with a man (or God) on it," seems somewhat justified.² I am none the less reluctant to accept his interpretation, and still retain the view that we are confronted here with a Pagan ridicule of Christian idolatry. Although the making of images and their adoration was scorned by the church, it appears the crucified saviour was worshipped by the Christians, and idolatry may actually have been practised by Christians of the lower walks of life.

The expression "a cross with a man on it" need not signify a crucifix, but may mean the cross of a Roman ensign to which the effigy of a God or of the Emperor was attached. Yet we may grant that Dionysius was sometimes pictured as being attached to a tree, as the vine will cling to any stem for support.

It is true that the figure of the graffito reminds one strongly of the jackal-headed Anubis, but there is no evidence that he was ever represented on a cross. The vulgar notions of the Christian God as being ass-headed may on the other hand be regarded as a sufficient explanation for the idea that a Pagan scoffer would represent Christ in this undignified shape.

In the time of Alexamenos the form of the cross was apparently

¹ *Octavius*, section 29.

² King does not refer to the passage in Minutius Felix which we have quoted in full because it seems to be the strongest argument in his favor.

not yet fixed, for we see the crucified donkey-headed deity attached to a T cross and standing either on the ground or on a suppedaneum. A beam behind the head indicates that the scrawler thought at the same time of a Latin cross, and to make the confusion complete, he added a Y cross in the right-hand corner.

Thus in our opinion there are sufficient reasons to assume that the crucifix existed, as it were, in a latent form among the humbler members of the Christian church as early perhaps as the third century, but it came into use among the highest classes of the laity only in the seventh century while its official adoption by the church can be definitely fixed in the year of the Council of Trullo, viz., A. D. 692. After that crucifixes and pictures of the crucifixion became very common in the Christian world until the Reformation stemmed the tide. It took mankind seven centuries to become accustomed to the idea of having the Godhead incarnate represented in the shape of a dying man, but since then Christian churches have been filled with crucifixes and the crucifix has become the symbol of that conception of Christianity which glorifies world-flight, preaches asceticism, extols self-mortification and finds its final salvation in the death of our bodily existence.

* * *

Our review of the history of the cross until the authorised acceptance of crucifixes by the church is by no means complete, but sufficiently systematic to enable the reader to form his own opinion on the basis of the collected material.

The cross (i. e., the figure of intersecting lines) naturally and necessarily became the symbol of Christianity, not because its shape resembled the cross of Golgotha, but because it was in some way or another backed by the religious traditions of almost all the nations of antiquity who contributed their philosophies, their fears and hopes of the life to come, to the formation of Christianity. The Latin cross is the most simple resultant of all the crosses into which as in a composite photograph the varieties of the pre-Christian crosses are merged. The recognition of this figure has passed through misconceptions and superstitions, but has finally come to stay as the emblem of the new faith through which the echoes of former beliefs are still vibrating. Christians need not regret that the Christian cross is not the historical cross of Golgotha. They should be pleased with the idea that the emblem of their religion is more cosmopolitan and more universal than they thought.

The cross has lost much of its mediæval significance among

Protestants, especially those of the Reformed churches, and Martin Luther, the great Reformer, modified it by placing it upon a rose.

In modern times the cross is used on the battlefield as the emblem of charity and medical assistance, and both combatants are bound to respect it.

We have learned, in reviewing the history of the cross, how conservative mankind is in the retention of old ideas and also of old symbols. The progress of mankind is never the total abolition of the past, but always a modification; and thus we may expect that the cross will never cease to be a symbol of deep significance.



LUTHER'S COAT OF
ARMS.

The cross is still as in ancient days, an emblem of a regeneration of life; yet it means at the same time death and crucifixion. It has signified since the ascent of Christianity, humiliation and torture, and yet the old Pagan significance of conquest has been regained. The cross has become an emblem of victory through sacrifice, of alleviation of suffering, of salvation through love, of immortality in spite of the grave.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE NEED OF SINCERITY IN RELIGIOUS LIFE.

The Rev. Joseph Henry Crooker, pastor of the Unitarian Church at Ann Arbor, publishes a powerful plea for sincerity¹ addressed to his brother clergymen of other denominations in which he sets forth most urgently and almost anxiously the arguments for honesty in the pulpit. No one can deny that he is right, especially when the statement is abstractly made:

"Creeds are made to prevent changes of faith. Doctrines are formulated to be maintained, not to be set aside. Those who believe in religious progress do not make creeds."

Thus, the man who takes a pledge to defend a creed is expected not to grow; and there can be no doubt that the establishment of creeds excludes freedom, and opens no doors to free inquiry. The confession was made to be believed, and was looked upon as a finality. Mr. Crooker says:

"When I ask an Episcopal clergyman to give me something that describes the faiths and forms of his church, he hands me the Prayer Book. When I attend his church, I have a right to expect that he will preach the doctrine of the Trinity, the miraculous birth of Jesus, the blood atonement, the resurrection of the body, and the damnation of unbelievers, because these things are taught in that Prayer Book."

"The world has a right to expect that he will obey his ordination vow. If he does not, he is as immoral as the man who sends me goods unlike the samples from which I made my order. But a position equally immoral is implied by language often heard: If you have a new truth, say it, no matter about the Prayer Book. But I say: Be loyal to the Prayer Book as long as you use it. If you have a new truth, then lay down the Prayer Book and go where you can proclaim it in freedom and with honor."

Mr. Crooker pleads as follows:

"Insincerity is the poison that destroys all moral and spiritual life. It is not necessary that we have similar beliefs, but it is necessary that we have honest beliefs honorably espoused. I plead for co-operation among all religious bodies, but neither indifference nor insincerity is the pathway to that goal. I rejoice in religious progress, but only in a progress that is open, manly, ethically consistent."

We hope that Mr. Crooker's *Plea for Sincerity* will be heeded among his brethren both within and without the Unitarian fold; but we would suggest that

¹*A Plea for Sincerity in Religious Thought.* By Rev. Joseph Crooker. Boston: American Unitarian Association. Pages, 28.

the policy of the *Outlook*, criticised by Mr. Crooker, which lays down another course is for that reason not quite so far wrong as Mr. Crooker believes. The *Outlook* made the following statements :

"We say, therefore, to every liberal minister in a conservative church, Stay where you are, and preach the truth as God gives you to see the truth, without fear, without favor. . . . We advise the Presbyterian to remain in the church in which he has been brought up, and preach the freedom of faith for which his Puritan ancestry were willing to lay down their lives." (*Outlook*, Feb. 5, 1898, p. 315.)

Further, it seems to me that Mr. Crooker misinterprets the intention of creed-makers. Creeds are not meant to stop growth but to direct it and lay down general principles according to which it should take place. We do not deny that narrow creeds will have a narrowing tendency, but we cannot accept the proposition that creeds were made for the purpose of crippling the mind.

If the question were, Shall a man join a church the doctrines of which he finds unbelievable? Mr. Crooker is *absolutely right*; but the practical case as a rule is such that a young man with a fervid belief in the truth of a special church studies theology, ascends the pulpit, and becomes a clergyman, before his mind has perfectly matured, and now he does not at once reject the doctrines of his church, but begins to see them in a new light. There are no Episcopalian or Presbyterian clergymen, so far as I know, who believe in the positive falsity of their church doctrines; but there are a great number who feel themselves urged to put a new interpretation upon the old creeds. Few of them see that the new interpretation will finally change the whole fabric of their belief; or, if they do, they do not feel called upon to decide at once questions which the future will bring up and which may be decided by later generations.

Like Mr. Crooker, we look upon sincerity as the basis of all virtue; for without sincerity virtues are merely shining vices. But for that reason we have ourselves pleaded after due consideration of the difficulties of the case that when a clergyman sees his doctrines in a new light he should not rashly leave his church, but stay and wait until he is required to leave.

An important argument which seems to speak in favor of this course consists in the fact that this is the road progress travels. The church is not the only institution which grows; the church is that institution which is most conservative and grows most slowly, frequently lagging behind the times; but the same laws of life and development apply to the schools, to the courts, and to the life of the nation in general. The judge on the bench is frequently confronted with an antiquated law and it is easy enough, from the standpoint of the rigid believer in law, to enforce the law; taking comfort in the idea that if it be bad it will be abolished. The consciences of men vary in this line, and the fate of the individual in the case under consideration has also a claim to be considered. Shall the judge, when he sees the legal conditions in a new light, have a man hanged in order to induce the people to abolish an antiquated law? Whatever judges in special cases may think about it, the fact has been that progress was accomplished sometimes through the abolition of antiquated laws, but mostly by new interpretations of the old laws.

Let us bear in mind that the most progressive nations are at the same time the most conservative. Their progress consists not in tearing down the traditional forms whenever new truth begins to dawn on mankind, but in modifying them and adapting them slowly. The truth is that progress, since time immemorial, has not been by abrogation, but by gradual change; and the question rarely comes up

before the individual conscience in that bluntness for which Mr. Crooker's *Plea for Sincerity* is the proper answer.

We have discussed the problem in an editorial¹ in *The Monist*, and it is not impossible that the writer in the *Outlook* has read it. Being bent upon explaining the nature of progress and the way in which mankind and human institutions grow, we have perhaps not insisted enough upon the fact that although we advise a liberal man to remain in the church even though he may outgrow the current interpretation of the dogmas, we do not mean thereby to foster insincerity, and in this respect we hail Mr. Crooker's *Plea for Sincerity in Religious Thought* as a splendid companion article, and hope that it will contribute its share toward the abolition of the burdens on the consciences of the clergy which pledge them to defend some special antiquated dogma, while the living present (as we suggested) would simply demand that they be pledged to the service of the truth, to speak the truth, and to live the truth.

When the ideals of liberty and brotherhood first dawned upon the French and when they saw that outrageous suppression permeated their institutions, they overthrew the government, abrogated the entire order of things and started life from the beginning. How differently did the English behave. They proceeded more considerably and slowly without a sudden rupture with the past, and in the long run they succeeded better. Evolution is better than revolution.

The various churches are of an historical growth, and there is no need of undoing the work of past ages. Freedom of conscience can most easily be introduced without enslaving the conscience of the representatives of a special church by a frank confession that the dogmas of the church are not the formulation of absolute truth, but historical documents of the evolution of the Church in its conception of the truth. There is no need of tampering with the various confessions; let them stand as they are, for they are witnesses as to what our ancestors believed to be absolutely true. But the fact that a certain confession of faith was moved and carried by a majority of the bishops of the Christian church, assembled at Nice, more than fifteen centuries ago, is no reason that at present, with fifteen centuries of progress and so much more light in our comprehension of the truth, we should be bound to formulate our religious truths in the same words.

We must remember that we are now living in a time of transition. We hope that the ordination vows will be either entirely abolished or so modified that the conscience of a progressive man will not be oppressed; and Mr. Crooker's *Plea for Sincerity* will help to open the eyes of those conservative leaders who do not see the situation in the same light.

LEGISLATIVE REFORM.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

Mr. Bonney's brief article in the September *Open Court* entitled "A Basis for Reform" pleases me exceedingly. It seems very strange that the people of this country have allowed their legislative bodies to remain practically in the same condition that they were in over a hundred years ago.

Last winter there was published a work entitled *Democracy*, written by Prof. Jas. H. Hyslop of Columbia University, which book I perused with deep interest.

I wrote a letter to Professor Hyslop in which I detailed a plan for the creation

¹ "The Clergy's Duty of Allegiance to Dogma and the Struggle between World-Conceptions." *The Monist*. Vol. 11, No. 2, pages 276-286.

of a commission to frame laws for the State of New York. I proposed to him that this commission should consist of from six to nine members, each of whom should be appointed for not less than twelve, nor more than fifteen, years; that their report should be issued to the legislature within one month of the opening of each session, and that their deliberations should be private.

Professor Hyslop had suggested in his work that there should be five commissions, each commission having charge of some special subject. I suggested that there ought to be but one commission and said in reference thereto as follows: "The Supreme Court at Washington is composed of nine judges; and these men have had to pass upon questions of most diverse character, for instance: validity and construction of letters patent for inventions, collisions at sea and other nice points of admiralty jurisprudence, questions of real estate law, of equity, of commercial law, and of practice not only under the Common Law, but also under the Civil Law and under the Codes of many of our States, besides the grave constitutional questions which from time to time have come before it."

"The Court of Appeals of this State consists of seven judges, elected for fourteen years. These, too, have a large variety of matters to adjudicate on every year."

I further remarked that the members of the commission should be required to devote all their time and attention to their official duties, and should be precluded from engaging in any profession or business while holding office. The commission should be required to hold sessions open to the public during at least four consecutive days in each month, except during the summer, and these sessions should be held not only at Albany, but also in this City and in Buffalo. Citizens should be privileged to appear before it under suitable restrictions, and argue upon the merits and demerits of bills before it for consideration. It should have power to employ experts on certain subjects to assist in determining questions involving expert knowledge; and for this purpose adequate funds should be placed at its disposal.

The value of such a commission to the people of this State would depend largely upon the character and ability of its members. But it is reasonable to expect that many men of integrity and good judgment would serve on such a commission.

All proposals for new legislation should be made to the commission, who should draw up laws containing such suggestions as may be deemed valuable.

Any member of the legislature should be allowed to introduce a bill, even if the commission is adverse to it; but no such bill should be passed except by a two-third vote.

A great advantage to be derived from the commission would be that our laws would be couched in language more apt than the language now used which gives rise to questions requiring judicial construction.

Allow me to add in addition to what I wrote Professor Hyslop, that no person should be a member of the commission who is not thirty-five years of age at the time of his being chosen to the office, and who is not qualified by knowledge and experience to fill the position. They should be paid salaries equivalent to those of the judges of the highest court of judicature in the State.

It seems to me of no consequence whether the body that drafts legislation is called a commission or a senate; and it might be better to abolish the present senate, as now organised in this State, and reorganised it on the plan above mentioned for the commission.

Of course, nominating conventions can, if they see fit, select for the commis-

sion men who are mere politicians; but there is certainly every reason to suppose that we would have better men on the commission of nine, than we have now in the Senate composed of fifty.

I approve of Mr. Bonney's plan of having a Civil Service Academy, except that it might be as well to have professors in each large university throughout the country, who should give instruction such as would tend to qualify men to hold Civil Service commissions.

I wrote Professor Hyslop that the members of the Commission should be appointed. On reflection, I have come to the conclusion that they should be elected by the people of the entire State. This is, however, a matter of detail which does not require any especial attention at this moment.

M. R. KURSHREDT.

NEW YORK CITY.

A COLLECTION OF JAPANESE PAINTINGS.

The Art Institute, of Chicago, has had on exhibition for three weeks a collection of modern Japanese water color paintings which belong to The Open Court Publishing Company, illustrating scenes from the life of Buddha. The artist is Keichyu Yamada, who at the time of the execution of the pictures was professor at



KEICHYU YAMADA.

the Imperial Institute of Tokyo. In the meantime, he has accepted a call as president of the Art Institute of Kanazawa, which is one of the most prominent art institutions of his country.

We here reproduce one of the paintings, which represents King Bimbisāra's meeting with Bôdhisattva.

The Buddhist records tell us that when Gautama, the prince, had renounced his worldly life to become a recluse his appearance was so striking that his entry into the capital of the country created a sensation, and the rumor spread among the population that a monk had appeared whose dignity and noble features betrayed



THE MEETING OF GAUTAMA AND KING BIMBISARA.

royal descent. When the news reached the ears of King Bimbisara, he went out with his ministers of state to greet the noble recluse, and tried to induce him to return to worldly life, offering to share with him his kingdom, and saying, "O, shramana, your hands are fit to grasp the reins of an empire, and should not hold a beggar's bowl."

While the reproduction faithfully represents the composition of the picture, it leaves out the main thing, which is the delicacy of the tints and the harmony of the color effect.

The entire collection consists of thirty-three pictures, all of which are made on silk and possess a charm which shows modern Japanese art at its best.

A handsome Album of colored reproductions of eight of these paintings mounted on hand-made paper, is published by The Open Court Publishing Company. (Price, \$2.50.)

LIBERTY.

BY CHARLES A. LANE.

Because Toil holds thee overmuch in thrall,
Thine introspective senses fail thee, Soul ;
And all the surging tides of spirit roll
Unheeded to their shores : albeit one call
Thou hearest, thundering antiphonal
To thy desire from all the tides that toll
The message of the Deeps—one word is whole
And constant—Liberty's—pealing o'er all.
False warder of a lordly charge, grim Toil,
To prison from his life the Soul of man
Thou wast not sent ! and thro' the moan and moil,
Lo ! prophet threat'nings and a muttered ban
Bid justice from thy captive smite the chain,
Till man shall yearn for Manhood not in vain.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE. By Prof. *L. Lévy-Bruhl*, Maître de Conférences in the Sorbonne. With portraits of twenty-three French philosophers. Chicago : The Open Court Publishing Co. 1899. London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. Pages, 500. Price, \$3.00.

Readers and students familiar with Professor Lévy-Bruhl's very original study of the development of national consciousness in Germany, entitled *L'Allemagne depuis Leibnitz*, and with his profound study of the *Philosophy of Jacobi* will have welcomed with interest the announcement of another work by him. Readers of *The Open Court* have already had the privilege of sampling the new book, but even those who have thus read some chapters of it will be glad to find these in their connexion in the present handsome volume, together with other chapters not published and a series of carefully selected portraits of all the leading thinkers discussed by the author.

As a student of the history of civilisation, rather than a specialist in any of the technical fields of philosophy, we might anticipate from Professor Lévy-Bruhl just such a work as we in fact find, characterised particularly by breadth and catholicity. A glance at the Index gives a strong impression of the extent of the author's erudition. Yet it would be far from the truth to infer from this that the *History of Modern Philosophy in France* is an encyclopædic handbook. The many names that catch the eye in this Index are not those of the numberless and long forgotten

minnows of the philosophic sea, but of the great thinkers in other climes and times whose thought has influenced that of the leaders of French philosophy or been influenced by them. Only in the last chapter, "The Contemporary Movement," is more attention paid to writers whose names are less familiar to the general reader. And here, without doubt, the more minute treatment will be gratefully received by those who have not the time to keep closely informed upon current philosophic thought in France.¹

The author's own statement of his point of view will be his best recommendation to possible readers. "It is too narrow a conception of the history of philosophy to see in it exclusively the logical evolution of successive systems. Philosophic thought, even while having its especial and clearly limited object, is closely involved in the life of each civilisation, and even in the national life of every people. In its development it is solidary with the simultaneous development of the other series of social and intellectual phenomena, of positive science, of art, of religion, of literature, of political and economic life; in a word, the philosophy of a people is a function of its history. It is proper, therefore, to introduce into our history of modern philosophy in France, along with the authors of systems distinctly recognised as such, those who have tried under a somewhat different form to synthesise the ideas of their time, and who have modified their direction, sometimes profoundly."

Thus it is that of the sixteen chapters of the History, Pascal, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau receive one each, while another is divided between Renan and Taine. Very naturally the account begins with Descartes. Other chapters treat: Malebranche, Bayle and Fontenelle, The Encyclopædists, Condillac, Condorcet, The Traditionalists and the Ideologists, Cousin and Eclecticism, The Social Reformers, Comte, while the last is devoted to a review. The beginning is made with Descartes, not because there was a beginning in a literal sense, for "there is no such thing in the history of ideas," but because "he initiated a new philosophic method." He had "that higher sort of courage which is love of truth and devotion to science; and if the name of hero is due the men whose exertions have laid open new paths for human thought, Descartes is undoubtedly entitled to the name."

The author presents the leading doctrines of each philosopher or school, endeavoring to show how they were influenced by predecessors and contemporaries, by the experiences of the individual and the conditions of his time; but he does not attempt to give a complete account of all the teachings of each man, just as he finds it altogether unnecessary to introduce the secondary writers.

The great advantage of Professor Lévy-Bruhl's position and point of view is that he is not a partisan of any sect or school, wherefore contending views and tendencies receive fair treatment at his hands. If he is a disciple or adherent of any particular teacher or school this volume does not betray it. This does not mean by any means that he considers all doctrines and vagaries of equal value, but that all that seem worthy of any manner of treatment are handled without passion. We may illustrate by citing his remarks on Fourier. After praising the keenness of Fourier's criticism of modern society and of the unwarranted optimism of many of the eighteenth century philosophers, the author remarks: "But Fourier himself, when he abandons the rôle of critic and expounds his own doctrine, paralyses us by the candor of his optimism. He does not doubt that happiness may be secured for all in the society he dreams of, when men shall live 'harmoniously' together, instead of living in a 'civilised' state.—Such dreams appear to us almost childish;

¹ The article in the October *Monist* by L. Arréat will be found a helpful supplement to this chapter of the volume under consideration.

yet mighty minds in their youth have been carried away by them. Filled with enthusiasm for doctrines which promised less social inequality, more justice, more welfare and enlightenment for all, they were enraptured by a generous feeling of human solidarity. Such in their youth were many distinguished scientific men, engineers, manufacturers, and at least two philosophers, Auguste Comte and M. Renouvier." The presentation of the work of Comte is especially clear and valuable, but a brief review can find no opportunity for detaching specimens.

In his concluding chapter the author seeks to differentiate French thought and method from the philosophy of other nations, and discovers a clue to his result in the fact that so large a number of the leading French philosophers began as mathematicians. Such were Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, Fontenelle, D'Alembert, Condorcet, Comte, Renouvier and Cournot, to quote but a few names. "It seems allowable to infer, not that French philosophy was based on mathematics, but that there has been in France a close affinity between the mathematical and the philosophical spirit. Thus, as perfect clearness is an essential feature of mathematics French philosophy was also fond of clearness." And thus it is quite characteristic that we find a French philosopher entitling his doctrine "the philosophy of clear ideas." This concluding chapter is certainly a masterful production, and is itself a valuable contribution to the philosophy of clear ideas.

Among the author's final reflexions this will be found of interest, and characteristic for his point of view: "Yet, whatever be the future of civilised nations, significant symptoms already show that "national philosophies" are on the decline. While the French genius, as well as the English and the German genius, has played its special part in the evolution of modern European philosophy, it seems that this part is soon to be reduced to that of merely an important factor in a common development. We are progressing towards a state of things in which there shall no longer be any French, English, German, or American philosophy, but only one philosophy common to civilised mankind."

The *History of Modern Philosophy in France* is itself too philosophic to serve as a mere text-book, though it would be more lucid and more inspiring than many a one in use that is overloaded with details. But it will take its place as an indispensable handbook for college students of philosophy as well as for general readers, who will find its style quite free from the clog of a technical vocabulary. It is supplied with a brief but very practical bibliography and a full index. Every pains has been taken to make the translation faithful and clear. W. H. C.

AMERICAN INDIANS. By *Frederick Starr*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co. 1899
Pages, x, 227.

Frederick Starr, professor of ethnology in the University of Chicago, has condensed our knowledge of American Indians into a little book called *American Indians*, which is intended as a reading book for boys and girls in school. He discusses the origin of the American Indians, their mode of living, hunting, fishing and warfare, their dress, the education of their children, their language, picture writing, etc., their money, their medicine men and secret societies, their dancing, their worship, etc., etc. The material has been collected from various sources, and Professor Starr has added to the reports and illustrations of others his own valuable investigations; for he has devoted his life to the subject, and has been travelling among the Indians in various parts of North America almost every year.

The book may be recommended for various reasons, not only to give instruction to our children concerning the race that inhabited the country before the white

settlers took possession, but also on account of its ethnological information, which throws much light upon the evolution of our present habits.

Let us select one instance: Mr. Herbert Spencer still thinks that ornamentation precedes utility; he read in some old reports that the Indian first paints himself before he dresses himself, and by a false method of generalisation arrives at the conclusion that it is a habit of man to prefer ornament to the necessities of life. A closer inspection of the habits of the Indian, however, teaches us that what has become ornament was formerly an indispensable religious talisman; nose rings, lip rings, ear-rings, gorgets, etc., served for the protection of man's limbs, and the form of these amulets was rigidly prescribed by religious belief.

The same is true of sports. Professor Starr says:

"Among us hunting, fishing, and dancing are sport. They were not so with the Indians. When a man had to provide food for a family by his hunting and fishing, it ceased to be amusement and was hard work. When Indian men danced, it was usually as part of a religious ceremony which was to benefit the whole tribe; it was often wearisome and difficult—not fun."

Of special interest is the sun dance, because it reflects the religious views of savagery at a period when people believed that God's favor could be won best by self-inflicted pain. We quote the passage at length, because the ceremony characterises an important phase in the religious evolution of man. Professor Starr says:

"The sun dance was made to please Wakantanka, the sun. If there were a famine or disease, or if one wished success in war, or to have a good crop, a young man would say, 'I will pray to Wakantanka early in the summer.' The man at once began to prepare for the event. He took sweat baths, drank herb teas, and gave feasts to his friends, where herb teas were used. He had to be careful of what things he touched; used a new knife, which no one else might use; must not touch any unclean thing. He could not go in swimming. He and his friends gathered together all the property they could, that he might give many gifts at the time of the dance.

"At his house every one had to treat him kindly and not vex him. An *umane* was made near the back of the tent. This was a space dug down to the lower soil. Red paint was strewn over it, and no one might set foot upon it. Any of those who were to take part in the dance, after he had smoked would carefully empty the ashes from his pipe upon this spot. The spot represented life as belonging to the earth.

"Invitations to neighboring tribes were sent early, and long before the dance parties began to arrive. Some of these would spend several weeks about the village. At first they pitched their camps wherever it best suited them. A little before the dance orders were given, and all the visitors camped in one large camp circle, each tribe occupying a special place. The space within this circle was carefully leveled and prepared. A special building was erected in the center of this circle in which the young men made their preparations. In it were buffalo skulls,—one for each dancer,—a new knife and ax, and couches of sage for the dancers to lie upon.

"A sacred tree was next secured and set up. This was an important matter. Men of consequence were first sent out to select it. When they had found one they announced it in the village, and a great crowd rode out on horseback to the spot. Many strange things were done in getting it, but at last it was cut down. A bundle of wood, a blanket, a buffalo robe, and two pieces of buffalo skin—one

"cut to the shape of a man, the other to that of a buffalo—were fastened in the tree. It was then carried in triumph back to the camp and set up.

"A dance house was built around this tree. It was like a great ring in shape, and the space between it and the tree was not roofed. The dance house was built of poles and leaves. In it all the more important parts of the ceremony were performed. After the tree was set up and the dance house built, all the town was in excitement; men, dressed in all their finery, went dashing on horseback around the camp circle, shooting their pistols and making a great noise. The old men shot at the objects hung in the sacred tree. At evening the young men and women rode around, singing.

"During all this time the young men had been preparing for the dance. They were especially dressed, they had sung, drummed, and smoked. When the evening came that has been described, the dance really began. The young men danced from the lodge, where they had been making preparation, to the dance lodge.

"The leader carried a buffalo skull painted red. All cried as they went. On entering the dancing house they saluted the four cardinal points and seated themselves at the back of the lodge, singing. A spot, shaped like a crescent, was then cut in the ground, and the dancers placed in it the buffalo skulls they carried. Shortly afterward began the tortures, which have made this dance so famous. They were intended to test the bravery of the young men and to please the sun. Sometimes a man stood between four posts arranged in the form of a square. His flesh was cut in two places in the back, and thongs were passed through and tied to the post in front. Another had a buffalo skull hung to the thong passed through his back, and danced until the weight of the skull tore out the thong. From a pole hung eight thongs; one man took two of these and passed them through his cuts and fastened them; he then hung back and looked upward at the sun. Other men, who did not take part in the dance itself, sat near the sun pole, and with new knives cut bits of flesh from their shoulders and held them up to the sun pole. Sometimes a man took his horse with him into the dancing lodge. His chest was pierced in two places and thongs from the pole were inserted; he was then tied to his horse, and the animal was whipped up. The thongs were thus suddenly jerked and the flesh torn."

Professor Starr mentions only the facts without further comments, but we might add that the sun dance is of special interest to us, because it represents a period of religious belief in which God was worshipped through the most cruel tortures, executed on the victims at the sacred pole. The ceremonies possess great similarity to the practice of crucifixion which was exercised among Eastern nations especially the Phenicians and Carthagenians, to please the sun god and to make a special prayer effective.¹ The same idea underlies the origin of the dogma of the atonement by blood. How deepseated and prevalent among men is the desire of gaining the favor of the divine powers and what outrageous tortures are they willing to undergo to please God, the sun-god, or any other deity upon whom man feels dependent!

The sun dance has been abolished by the United States government and all other Indian institutions are to follow. Whether or not the Indians really die out, their old life will surely disappear. "It is only a matter of time; but" adds Professor Starr, "they ought always to be interesting to us as Americans."

¹ For further details, compare *The Open Court*, Vol. XIII., No. 3, pp. 149 ff.

THE MORAL EVOLUTION. *Lenten Sermons on Sin and Its Remedy.* By *Judson Titsworth*, Minister of Plymouth Church. Milwaukee, Wis. 1899. Pages, 144.

These *Lenten Sermons on Sin and Its Remedy* are a straw in the wind, showing the progressiveness of our ministers in the pulpit, who no longer preach the dead letter of antiquated dogmas but endeavor to live in the living present. The Rev. Judson Titsworth, like so many of his brethren, utilises the Biblical records as a basis from which to start, but he has broadened out into a more theological conception of Christianity than was customary in the days when a literal belief in the Scriptures was one of the essential conditions of orthodoxy. The preacher in the Plymouth Church pulpit sees the shortcomings of the Old Testament, but he understands at the same time that their ideas concerning human nature were essentially correct, and thus the moral spirit which pervades the whole remains true forever. This is true, we might add, not only of the Bible but of many sacred books of other religions which in their cosmology and science are antiquated.

It is a pity that our theological seminaries furnish their students with so little science, and make the results of modern theology frequently inaccessible. Thus, for instance, in the present case the Rev. Judson Titsworth would have profited greatly by a knowledge of the investigations of the Old Testament. Since Assyriology especially has grown into existence, we know much more about the Old Testament and the sense in which its passages are to be interpreted.

We would recommend to the author of these *Sermons* a study of the Polychrome Bible and in addition such books as *Schöpfung und Chaos*, by Gunkel, which however is only one among a great number of similar works.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT, ANCIENT AND MODERN. By *John M. Robertson*. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Large 8 vo. Pages, xv+447. Price, \$3.00.

This contribution to culture-history, by the author of *Buckle and his Critics* fully sustains his reputation for critical acumen.

After noting that no comprehensive history of Freethought has been produced by any professed Freethinker, and that previous "Histories" by ecclesiastical writers are rather indictments than histories properly so called, Mr. Robertson says, "In the present sketch, framed though it be from the rationalistic standpoint it is proposed to draw up not a counter indictment, but a more or less dispassionate account of the main historical phases of Freethought, viewed on the one hand as expressions of the rational or critical spirit, playing on the subject matter of religion, and on the other hand as sociological phenomena conditioned by social forces, in particular the economic and political." And it is contended "that there is an inherent tendency in all systematised and instituted religion to degenerate intellectually and morally, save for the constant corrective activity of freethought."

The scope of the work may be judged from his assumption that "Freethought may be defined as a conscious reaction against some phase or phases of conventional or traditional doctrine in religion—on the one hand, a claim to think freely, in the sense not of disregard for logic but of special loyalty to it, on problems to which the past course of things has given a great intellectual and practical importance; on the other hand, the actual practice of such thinking. This sense, which is substantially agreed on, will on one or the other side sufficiently cover those phenomena of early or rudimentary Freethinking which wear the guise of simple concrete opposition to given doctrines or systems, whether by way of special demur or of

the obtusion of a new cult or doctrine. In either case, the claim to think in a measure freely is implicit in the criticism or the new affirmation: and such primary movements of the mind cannot well be separated, in psychology or in history, from the fully conscious practice of criticism in the spirit of pure truth-seeking, or from the claim that such free examination is profoundly important to moral and intellectual health. Modern Freethought, specially so called, is only one of the developments of the slight primary capacity of man to doubt, to reason, to improve on past thinking, to assert his personality as against even sacrosanct and menacing authority." pp. 5-6.

Mr. Robertson then traces the evolution of this capacity from its crude beginnings in the savage culture-stage, through the ancient historical religions, Greek Roman, Medieval and Modern thought, to its manifold developments in the Nineteenth Century—closing with a survey of "The State of Thought in the Nations.

F. C. F. LANGDON.

*Social Phases of Education in the School and the Home*¹ is the title of a number of thoughtful contributions to practical pedagogy, by S. T. Dutton, Superintendent of Schools in Brookline, Mass. The keynote of Mr. Dutton's message is "coöperation" involving the correlation of all the educational and cultural forces of the community. He says: "There was a time when education was regarded as a matter belonging exclusively to the school. Its problems were not seriously studied except by teachers. To-day there is no subject that excites greater public interest. Fathers and mothers are anxious to understand the aims and methods of the school; they are also interested to know how other educational forces in the community may be utilised in such manner as to insure the best growth and development of their children." This coöperation has been realised in some measure in the city of Brookline, and Mr. Dutton has devoted one of the sections of his work to a brief statement of the method of operation of the Brookline plan, which will be helpful to teachers and directors of schools everywhere. He discusses in his opening chapter the social aspects of the home and the school, and takes "social serviceableness" to be the highest aim of education. The socialising of the individual, the formation of character, the making of school work and life-work a vocation rather than a task, and Herbart's ideal of the instillation of permanent "interest" rather than the inculcation of fixed quantities of knowledge are the fundamental notes of his thought.

The unusual success of Dr. Van Dyke's book, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt* has moved him to a more distinctively theological attempt to resolve the religious problem, and this his latest impulse has taken incarnation in a *Gospel for a World of Sin*.² That gospel is the "expanding message of the cross," which Dr. Van Dyke expounds with all the religious fervor and literary power at his command. He then asks: "Is such a gospel as this unsuited to the present age? Is such a gospel as this a low gospel, a narrow gospel, an immoral gospel, an obsolete gospel, a gospel to be ashamed of in the presence of learning and refinement and moral earnestness? Let the men whose hearts have been cleansed and ennobled

¹ New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1899. viii, 259. Price, \$1.25.

² *The Gospel for a World of Sin*. A Companion-Volume to "The Gospel for an Age of Doubt." By Henry Van Dyke, D. D. (Princeton, Harvard, Yale), LL.D. (Union), Pastor of the Brick Church in New York. New York: The Macmillan Co. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1899. Pages, viii+192. Price, \$1.25.

by it—the men like Paul, and Augustine, and Francis of Assisi, and Martin Luther and John Wesley—make answer. . . . Let the unchanged, struggling, sinful heart of man make answer." The following quotation will characterise Dr. Van Dyke's philosophical position on the question of the Atonement; it really appears to us as still affected with the old theological agnosticism; he says: "A sinful world cannot possibly know all that is needed to reconcile it with a holy God. Sin itself, in its root and in its relations, contains a mystery. So does love. But the Atonement is the work of God's love in its bearing upon man's sin. Therefore it must include more than we can explain."

The Rev. R. H. Quick was not only the best known of English educational experts at a time when the study of pedagogy was greatly neglected in England but he was also a man of powerful personality who left a deep impress upon the character of all with whom he came in contact. He was the author of a work on *Educational Reformers* which greatly helped to introduce to Anglo American thought the knowledge of the character and significance of the work of Comenius, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel. He was also the author of some educational articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Mr. Quick was born in 1831 and died in 1891. His *Life and Remains* have now just been edited by F. Storr, and published by The Macmillan Company. They consist of extracts from his diary which are of high pedagogical value. (New York and London. 1899. Pages, vii+544. Price, \$1.50.)

Dr. H. W. Hillyer, Asst. Professor of Organic Chemistry in the University of Wisconsin, has just published a *Laboratory Manual* of experiments illustrating the elementary principles of chemistry (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1899. Pages, vi.+200). The book is for the use of college students of general chemistry, and has been designed for three classes of learners: (1) for beginners (2) for students who have attended the usual high school course, and (3) for those who have pursued a more extended high school course. The work is clearly and simply written, and the explanations seem quite full enough for the independent student. The text is printed in large type with blank pages opposite each printed page; the figures are also good.

The Funk and Wagnalls Company are about to publish a large and comprehensive work under the title *The Jewish Encyclopædia*, embracing everything that pertains to Judaism,—its history, religion, literature and customs. Dr. Isidore Singer is the managing editor. Among the contributors are several most prominent Jewish scholars of this country as well as of Europe. The editorial supervision is in the hands of Cyrus Adler, Ph. D., Gottbard Deutsch, Ph. D., Richard Gottheil Ph. D., Marcus Jastrow, Ph. D., Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph. D., Kaufmann Kohler Ph. D., and George F. Moore, M. A., D. D.

The Annual Literary Index for 1898, edited by W. I. Fletcher and R. R. Bowler (New York: Office of the *Publishers' Weekly*) has appeared. It is the successor to Poole's *Indexes* and contains an index to periodicals, an index to general literature, an author-index, bibliographies, a necrology, and an index to dates. The Index to dates practically serves as an index to the files of any newspaper. It is unnecessary to say the *Annual Literary Index* is indispensable to all bureau newspaper-offices and reference libraries.



DENIS DIDEROT.
(1713-1784.)

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THE DELAYS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE LAW.¹

BY THE HON. CHARLES CARROLL BONNEY, LL. D.

Counsellor of the Supreme Court of the United States; Ex-President Illinois State Bar Association; Ex-Vice President American Bar Association, etc.

FROM sea to sea, and day by day, there come through the public press unceasing complaints that the administration of justice in this country has become dilatory and inefficient. It is but too true that in a large majority of cases, speedy and substantial justice is denied to suitors. It is, alas, too true that in this country there is but little worthy the name of justice administered by the tribunals established by law for the trial of the causes of the friendless and the poor. No words can exaggerate the magnitude of the evil.

The great difficulty which we meet at the outset—the cause of causes of the present delay and uncertainty in the administration of justice—arises from the fact that the country has outgrown the old methods provided for the transaction of legal business. While in other departments the increase of facilities has kept pace with the growth of business, the perfecting of the laws and the administration of justice have scarcely done more than to stand still. Certainly the increase of judicial methods and machinery has been so scanty in comparison with the progress and development of the country, that we may truly say there has been no progress worthy of the legal profession and of the cause of justice.

While the *law* should be fixed, *administration* should be flexible; and I conceive it to be one of the greatest evils of our day, that the practice-acts in the several states have descended into un-

¹ In criticism of a Committee Report to the American Bar Association.

necessary and minute details, which, being fixed by statute, are inflexible, and work more injustice than justice in their application. We must in the theory of legislation and in the practical application of the laws, draw sharply and clearly the distinction between the law, i. e., rules of right and conduct, and rules of mere judicial procedure.

It is beyond the power of the State Legislature, or the State courts, to make any rules or regulations which would change the administration of justice in the national courts, but surely it would be competent for Congress to make an important change. Now, if I have a case in California, or Maine, or New York, in equity, I can prepare my bill with a knowledge of all the facts, and send it to my correspondent in that state, and he can file the bill and prosecute the case advisedly; but if, on the other hand, I have an action at law, I, who know all the facts and have become acquainted with the circumstances in detail, am compelled to send a statement of those facts to my correspondent in another state, for him to prepare the pleadings; the man who knows all the facts can not prepare the pleadings, and the man who prepares the pleadings can not know all the facts. I testify from my own experience, and appeal to the experience of my brethren in the profession to witness, that in almost every such case there is some blunder or mistake which works a disadvantage more or less serious. Whereas, if Congress should repeal the Conformity Act of 1872, and enact that all proceedings in civil causes in the United States courts shall be according to the forms and practice in equity, saving a trial by jury where it may lawfully be demanded, we would then have a practice which is simplicity itself, and one which is familiar to all intelligent lawyers, from Maine to Oregon, and from Oregon to Florida. I urge that we advocate an extension of the practice under the rules in equity, to all civil causes, saving the right to a trial by jury in proper cases, instead of sweeping that practice away, and introducing the state practice in cases in equity, in the United States court, as recommended by the report. The success which would follow the change I advocate would, in my opinion, speedily lead the State Legislatures to adopt the same method of practice for the local courts, and thus secure the immense benefits of a uniformity of judicial procedure throughout the Republic.

I must most earnestly protest against the proposal that in no case should there be a postponement of a trial on account of the engagement of counsel elsewhere. I think such a rule would work

the greatest injustice. A client who has paid a lawyer for understanding and preparing to argue his case, should not be forced to trial, and compelled to employ a new lawyer, because the counsellor in whom he confides, and whom he has paid, is actually employed in another court. No client can afford to employ a lawyer who is at liberty to have but one case.

There is much complaint against what is called, *judge-made law*, and the proposed remedy is what is called a codification of the law. *What is codification?* I understand it to be a statement of the rules of law relating to the different topics of jurisprudence, with a sub-statement of the exceptions to those rules.

True codification would be, to take the statutes, text-books, and decisions, on evidence, contracts, real estate, personal property, carriers, corporations, damages, torts, trusts, insurance, equity, and other departments of the law, and reduce them to a clear and distinct statement of rules and exceptions, to be enacted into statutes. I beg you to consider for a moment, what amazing ability, what wonderful learning, what perfect knowledge of language, and what keenness of discrimination are required to perform this task. Certainly the highest qualities of a trained and gifted intellect would be taxed to the uttermost in accomplishing the vast and splendid work. But I am in favor of such codification, just as rapidly as the circumstances will allow it to be performed, with the necessary means to facilitate its progress, and bring it to a just conclusion. But such a codification can not be made by our legislative bodies. There never sat in any state, nor can be constituted under existing laws, a legislative body capable of performing the work of codification desired. It is as much beyond the qualifications of the average legislative bodies as would be the construction of a perfect chronometer or other complicated machine. As between legislature-made law and judge-made law, give me always that which is declared with some deliberation, based upon the professional knowledge of those who have made the study and application of laws a specialty.

In our system of jurisprudence, it is perfectly within the judicial province, when a new question of law arises, to answer it by declaring the new rule of law that results under the new circumstances, from established principles. The adaptability of what is decried as judge-made law, to new conditions as they arise, is its crowning glory; the want of such adaptability is one of the most serious objections to statutory law.

We advocate therefore the establishment of judicial commis-

sions, constituted of members of the profession who have served at the bar, or upon the bench, long enough to qualify them to execute the work of proper codification, department by department, and when completed, ask at the hands of the Legislature a declaratory statute, declaring the codification to be law. Legislatures may discover and declare the principles of human relations, but they can not make them, for they exist in the nature of human society.

Thus, a proper codification of the law is a reform that would help us greatly to overcome the delays and uncertainties of the laws. But there are other suggestions which I conceive to be the most needed specific remedies.

First.—No man should be allowed to bring a cause in any court, except upon filing his submission both to do and to receive *substantial justice*, without regard to any technicality or matter of form.

Second.—No man should be allowed to conduct litigation at the public expense except there be *probable cause* that there is something to litigate.

In every case there should be a *preliminary inquiry*, to determine the existence of such cause. And if no such cause appear, there should be an immediate decree, and its immediate enforcement, unless the trial judge, or an appellate judge, should certify probable cause for an appeal. The doctrine of probable cause has long been familiar to the profession in criminal jurisprudence, and there is no good reason why it should not be extended to civil cases.

Third.—At the end of every bill in equity, petition, complaint, or declaration, and as a part of every defense, and appellate proceeding, the pleader should be required to specify *the exact questions* about which the parties differ, and the adverse pleader should be compelled either to admit the questions to be truly stated, or to specify them, whether of law or fact, as he claims them to be, and the litigation should be confined to those exact questions, unless on grounds of public policy the court should otherwise order.

Fourth.—I think the greatest evils which the American people now suffer in their administration of justice, arise from the fact that the constitution of the primary courts is entirely wrong. We begin with a foundation of ignorance, incompetency, and resulting injustice, and then we wonder that trials are delayed, decisions unsatisfactory, and appeals multiplied. The remedy, first of all, is to put great and wise and learned judges at the fountain head. When the highest and most capable judges shall sit to hear, in the first

instance, the causes of the people, especially the complaints of the poor and friendless, whose court of first instance is, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, also their court of last resort—when it is made and accounted an honor to administer the utmost right and justice to the people in the first instance, then appeals will be lessened, litigation will decrease, and the administration of justice, fruitful of good results, will become indeed the crowning glory of the civilisation which is our boast.

The theme of the delays and uncertainties of the law has been near my heart for more than twenty years, and whenever the opportunity arises, an abiding sense of the grievous wrongs which the people suffer from the delays and uncertainties of judicial procedure, impels me to declare, at least briefly, the means by which, as it seems to me, those wrongs might be wholly, or in part, removed.

THE NATIVITY.

SIMILARITIES IN RELIGIOUS ART.

BY THE EDITOR.

BUDDHISM and Mazdaism¹ are older by five centuries than Christianity. That Mazdaism exercised a powerful influence on Judaism and especially on the Apocrypha of the Jews has never been doubted; and considering the fact that Buddhist missionaries were sent by Emperor Ashoka, the Buddhist Constantine, to the Yavanas, i. e., the Ionians or Greeks in Syria as well as in Egypt, there is no doubt that Buddhist doctrines, too, may have contributed an important share to the development of Christianity. But, on the other hand, an early influence of Christianity on later Buddhist ritual is by no means excluded, and we propose here to pass in review a few art-representations from various sources which may serve as tests and will illustrate the complications involved.

The following passage quoted from the well-known work, *The Cave Temples of India*, by James Ferguson and James Burgess (p. 138), proves how fruitful a thorough investigation and comparison of Christian and Buddhist antiquities would be, and it is a pity that a few only of the Buddhist sculptures and paintings have become accessible:


"One of the most interesting peculiarities of the Peshawar, or rather Gandhāra sculptures, is that it would not be difficult to select from among them several that would form admirable illustrations for a pictorial Bible at the present day. One, for instance, is certainly intended to represent the Nativity. The principal figure, a woman, is laying her child in a manger, and that it is intended to be such is proved by a mare with its foal, attended by a man, feeding out of a similar vessel. Above are represented two horses' heads in the position that the ox and the ass are represented in mediæval paintings.

¹ The worship of Ahura Mazda, i. e., Lord Omniscient, the religion of the Persians.

"A second represents the boy Christ disputing with the doctors in the Temple. A third, Christ healing a man with a withered limb, either of which if exhibited in the Lateran, and re-labelled, might pass unchallenged as sculptures of the fourth or fifth centuries.

"The scene in the annexed wood-cut may, in like manner, be taken to represent the woman taken in adultery. Two men in the background, it will be observed, have stones in their hands ready to throw at her. The similarity in this instance is a little more far-fetched than in the others, but still sufficiently near to render a comparison interesting. The study of these most interesting sculptures is now rendered impossible from the closing and dispersion of the India Museum."

Following the conception of Gruenwedel, who in similar Gandhâra reliefs interprets the club-bearing figure as Papiyân (or Mara) the evil one, I should not think that the threatening figures are men lifting up stones against the woman, but spirits of ill-will and evil who make it a business to deter the Buddha from his career of teaching the people and healing their soul's infirmities. I do not deny the similarity of this Gandhâra sculpture to the story of the adulteress in the Gospel, but I am perfectly convinced that it is purely accidental. It is nevertheless of great interest, as it proves that history repeats itself. As the multiplication table may be invented independently in different countries, so similar ideas may be thought, similar ethics may be preached, similar poems may be sung, similar discoveries may be made, similar truths may be uttered, and similar inventions may be made in perfect independence of another by people of different race and different climates.




CONVENTIONAL ELEVATION OF THE FRONT OF A CELL. From a sculpture at Jamal-giri, now in the India Museum, South Kensington.

Mr. Ferguson declares in another passage of the same work, that "photographs of nearly all the known specimens are in his possession" and we can only urge him to publish them for the benefit of archæological investigations.²

Gandhâra or Kandahâr is situated in the northwestern part of India. It is mentioned in the Ashoka edicts as one of the countries to which missionaries were sent and we learn that here the Greek invaders became favorably impressed with the doctrines of Buddhism. Menander, called in the Buddhist canon Milinda, a Yavana, a Baktrian king of Sâgala, who lived about 100 before Christ, showed so much interest in the religion of the Enlightened One that he held a dispute with Nagasena, a representative Buddhist saint and philosopher, the record of which is an important book of the scriptures of the Mahâyâna school. The Greek invaders became converted to Buddhism, which flourished for a long time, reaching its height in the fourth century of our era, until the Brahman reaction set in and the country was invaded by Mohammedans.³

The story of Christ's Nativity, although not frequently represented on early Christian monuments, is quite ancient but probably

not as ancient as the Gandhâra sculptures. Illustrations of the Christ child have been discovered as early as in the fourth century. The oldest one on record is dated from the year A.D. 343. The best Christian archæologist, Prof. Franz Xaver Kraus, says :



NATIVITY OF CHRIST.

From a sarcophagus of 343 A.D.

"The Nativity of Christ belongs to the rarest representations. Only in the year 1877 it was discovered in a wall picture in S.

Sebastiano, which, however, belongs to the post-Constantinian, time and was

¹ Footnote, p. 28.

² The wall-decorations of the Ajanta caves have been published of late in a very fine work.

³ The transition from Buddhism to the present Brahmanism is an unsolved problem still. There are evidences in some places that Buddhism was persecuted and many of the Buddhist sanctuaries were destroyed; in other places again the reaction appears to have been accomplished peacefully. At any rate, Buddhism ceased to be a legalised religion, and the Buddhists were obliged on penalty of expulsion to renounce their faith. Mr. Dharmapâla has made the interesting suggestion that the mass of the Buddhist population turned Mohammedans as the sole refuge that was left them, for they could not return to Brahmanism after having lost caste. This would explain why the Mohammedans of India, so similar in type to other Indians of Aryan descent, are so numerous all over India, for it is all but impossible that the Mohammedan population over fifty millions strong should consist exclusively of the descendants of the invaders. On the other hand, it is difficult to say what became of the many millions of Buddhists all over India.

painted, according to the testimony of Choricus, at Gaza in the sixth century. Some Nativities are found on sarcophagi; for instance, on that of Milan, in S. Ambrogio;¹ sometimes on cut stones, but more frequently on ivory.

"The presence of ox and donkey is a legend which apparently has been formed from Habakkuk, Chapter III, verse 17, mentioned since the third and fourth centuries in the Apocrypha (see the Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew), and known to Prudentius² and Hieronymus.³

"In the cemetery pictures, the shepherds are nowhere to be seen; but sometimes on sarcophagi and on an oil vase of Monza, also on an ivory cut of the sixth or seventh century."

The story of Christ's Nativity contains several features that are analogous to ancient Buddhist traditions, especially the incident that the child was born while the parents were on a journey and that the king of the country sought the life of the new-born baby on account of the prophecy that it should become the greatest monarch of the world. The massacre of children which Bimbisara, the Buddhist Herod, is reported to be guilty of is not even original with Buddhism, but dates back to the pre-Buddhist myths of Krishna, of whose happy escape from the persecution of his cruel uncle, the king, similar stories are told.

According to the Apocryphal gospels where the story of the manger is told more fully, Christ was born in a cave and thence transferred to a stable where the ox and ass worshipped him. The report of Pseudo-Matthew reads as follows:

"Now on the third day after the Nativity of our Lord Jesus Christ, the most blessed Mary went out of the cave, and, entering a stable, put her child in a manger, and the ox and ass adored him. Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, who said, The ox doth know his owner, and the ass his master's crib. The very animals, therefore, ox and ass, having him between them, incessantly adored him. Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Habakkuk the prophet, who said, Between two animals, thou art made known. In the same place Joseph tarried with Mary three days."

The Nativity of Christ, according to the canonical Gospels, takes place in a stable; but according to the Apocrypha in a cave and the agreement is absolute.⁴ These legends proved so strong that, in spite of the canonical version of the story, a cave near Bethlehem came to be finally regarded as the place of the Nativity, and a church was erected on the spot to commemorate the event and still stands as a lasting monument of this belief. It appears that the idea of a cave being the place of Christ's Nativity may be

¹ See Allegranza Monuments, page 63, table 5.

² Prudent. Cathem. XI. 77.

³ Peregrin. S. Paulae (Tobler Itin. terræ sanctæ I 33). See also De Rossi Mus. 18.

⁴ See Rudolph Hofmann *Das Leben Jesu nach den Apokryphen*, p. 102-107.

⁵ *Prot. v. c.* 17-20; *Hist. de nat. Mariæ*, c. 13; *Hist. Joseph*, c. 17; *Ev. inf. Arab*, c. 2-3.

attributed to the influence of the Dionysus myth, whose birth is said to have taken place in a cave, and this again may be the echo of older Oriental legends which were imported into Greece in the fourth or fifth century of Christ.

While there can scarcely be any doubt as to the Indian origin of the story of the massacre of the children at Bethlehem, we cannot rashly infer that the legend of the ox and donkey was taken from the same source, even though the Gandhâra sculptures seem to verify this view. We must bear in mind that a manger which appears in the monuments is not mentioned at all in any one of the



THE THREE MAGI WORSHIPPING THE CAVE-BORN SAVIOUR.
In the *Codex Vaticanus Græcus* (1613). Mary and the child
are seated inside a rock.

Buddhist legends known to us, and we have little reason to believe that the idea originated in Gandhâra.

While a mutual influence of Buddhist and Christian art is not excluded, the probability of their independent development seems to be more probable. Both may have developed from ideas common to the two religions, their similarity being either purely accidental or founded on notions derived from a common source of older traditions. This would explain the differences of detail which are strong enough to indicate their mutual independence. Thus the ass and the ox adore the Christ child, while the Gandhâra sculptures show two horses' heads in their place. The common

idea from which both representations may have sprung independently may be the tradition that both saviours were born on a journey.



BUDDHA HEALING. From the Gandhāra Sculptures. (Takht-i bahāi.)

This bas-relief, as well as many others, is an instance of the similarity between Buddhist and Christian illustrations.

That Nestorian rituals have influenced the Buddhism of Thibet in the sixth or seventh century of our era seems to be certain, but it is not probable that Christian art should have blossomed out in

the East before it was actually developed in the West. The Gandhâra sculptures are about contemporaneous with analogous productions in Christian countries, and it is not likely that the latter should have served as models for the former.

The common sources of Buddhism and Christianity are apparently not limited to Brahmanism, but may go back to Persian and Babylonian traditions. Some must have come down to the authors of Gospels from the hoary antiquity of Accadian wisdom and may successively have passed through the various media of Assyrian, Persian, Syrian and Greek versions. Considering the tenacity of the human race in preserving old traditions, it is natural that if a new era of thought dawns in history, the old stories are not forgotten but adapted to the new faith; and thus when we meet with striking similarities between analogous movements, representing



A LEADEN VESSEL WITH VARIOUS RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, PAGAN AS WELL AS CHRISTIAN. (Found at Tunis in 1866.)¹

the same crisis of the religious evolution of different countries, such as Western Asia and India, it is not surprising, but exactly what we must expect, when we find some most striking similarities not only in their fundamental principles, but also sometimes in their most accidental and apocryphal accretions.

As to art, we know positively that Buddhist as well as Christian sculpture originated under the influence of Greek masters, and it is therefore natural that much that is Greek, though modi-

¹ Conspicuous among the symbols on this vessel which is assumed to be of the fourth or fifth century, is a good shepherd. The others are the vine with grapes, the cross on the waters of life, a man with a crown near an altar (probably Mithraistic), a bear, a praying priest, palm trees with fruits, a Victory with wreath and palm branch, a Nereid and two peacocks. The vessel need not be Christian, and may be syncretic. Prof. Franz Xaver Kraus, from whom we reproduce the illustration, believes he finds on it a drunken Silenus in one of the figures, whom we are unable to discover. See his *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 242.

fied by a change of conditions, should have continued in the art-productions of both religions.


The Gandhâra bas-relief reproduced in this article, which suggests the story of the woman taken in adultery, may have no direct connexion with the Christian story, but representations of the scene may go back to common sources, artistic productions of a past age, which need not even have had the same significance. Thus the



THE GOOD SHEPHERD ON A LAMP FOUND IN THE CATACOMBS.¹



CHRISTIAN SYMBOLS ON A CORNELIAN SEAL, OF THE MUSEUM KIRCHERIANUM.²



HERMES KRIOPHOROS, THE RAM-BEARING HERMES. (Fragment of an altar at Athens.)³

statues and bas-reliefs of Hermes, represented in the act of carrying a calf or a ram to the altar at Eleusis, changes into the lamb-bearing Christ, a transition which seems to have taken place in the

¹ Reproduced from Louisa Twining, *Symbols and Emblems*, Plate XIV.

² The seal exhibits an anchor, the lamb, fishes, the T cross, the dove with the olive branch, a ship with a T cross mast, and the letters IXΘYC, i. e., Ichthys (fish), meaning Jesus, Christus, God's Son, the Saviour.

³ Probably the work of Kalamis, presumably an Athenian sculptor who flourished about the eightieth Olympiad. See Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, II., p. 774, *s. v.* Kalamis.

third century. But even before this transformation of a Pagan piece of art into a Christian conception with an entirely changed interpretation of its significance could have been completed, we find the same motive as a purely ornamental design in the Gandhâra sculptures. We do not doubt that the Greek artists who executed the Buddhist sculptures of Gandhâra were so much pleased with the beauty of the ram-bearing Hermes that they introduced the figure in an appropriate place. The picture of a lamb-bearing Christ was a welcome suggestion to Christians and fell on good



THE NATIVITY OF BUDDHA.

With a lamb-bearing shepherd on the pilaster. The face as well as the figure of the sheep is badly battered.¹ (Gandhâra Sculpture in the Museum of Lahore.)

soil in Christian art on account of the parable of the good shepherd which caused the original Pagan significance quickly to be forgotten; but the sacrificial idea was so foreign to Buddhism that we need not be astonished if the figure of a lamb-bearer remained an isolated instance in Buddhist art and found no further development because there did not happen to be in Buddhist literature

¹ The bas-relief shows Mâyâ in the grove of Lumbini. Her sister Prajapati on her left side, Brahma and Chakra on the right.

any thought or parable or Jataka tale that could endow the type of a good shepherd with new life. Thus it remained undeveloped.

Hermes was the leader of souls to the Nether World, and thus the ram-bearer becomes a symbol of divine guidance through the



THE GOOD SHEPHERD TOGETHER WITH
CUPID AND PSYCHE.¹
(Pagan Sarcophagus.)



MOTHER BRINGING HER CHILD
TO BUDDHA.
(Fresco in the Ajanta Caves.²)

portals of death. A Greek sarcophagus (obviously of Pagan workmanship) represents Cupid and Psyche together with the Kriophoros, i. e., a ram-bearing deity; and the catacombs of Rome (Pagan



THE GOOD SHEPHERD AND THE FOUR SEASONS.
Fresco in the Catacombs of St. Calixtus.³

as well as Christian) are full of shepherds carrying lambs on their shoulders. The religious syncretism of the age appears here as well as in other fields, and Christian symbols are frequently mixed


¹ Reproduced from Kraus. *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 102.

² Reproduced from a photograph kindly lent me by Prof. Charles S. Lanman.

³ Reproduced from Louisa Twining, *Symbols and Emblems*, Plate XIV.




CEILING OF THE CATACOMBS OF ST. CALIXTUS.
The good shepherd surrounded by purely Christian pictures.



THE GOOD SHEPHERD WITH THE FLUTE OF PAN IN HIS HAND.¹
Underneath the representation of an Agape or love-feast. (Fresco in the cemetery of St. Peter and Marcellinus.)

¹ Franz X. Kraus, *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 129.

up with figures of unequivocally Pagan thought. The picture on the ceiling of St. Lucina shows in the center a tree with two animals of doubtful nature, commonly supposed to be sheep. It is surrounded by ornamental heads, flowers, and birds, by Cupids and figures in the attitude of prayer. Considering the fact that this was the mode in which the ancients approached the gods and in which the souls of the dead were portrayed on their arrival at the throne



CEILING OF SANTA LUCINA. (After Rossi. Reproduced from F. X. Kraus.)

of Proserpine, there is not one emblem on this monument of the catacombs that can be regarded as typically Christian.

The idea of the Good Shepherd as a religious symbol appears also in Egypt and becomes very prominent in the Græco-Egyptian religion where the god Thoth is identified with Hermes and invoked under the name Poimander, which is a corruption of *ποιμὴν ἀνθρώπων*, i. e., shepherd of men.



THE GOOD SHEPHERD OF THE
LATERAN.¹



THE CALF-BEARING HERMES.
(From *Denkmäler des klassischen
Alterthums.*)




SARCOPHAGUS OF SOLONA.² (After Garrucci.)

¹ From Kraus, *Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*, I., p. 227.

² This sarcophagus was described first by Conze in 1872, then by Durand in 1874, and we reproduce it from Franz X. Kraus (*Geschichte der christlichen Kunst*) who says: "The front of the sarcophagus is marked by strong pillars and divided into three parts. The central part is covered by a roof ornamented with a garland carried by birds. Underneath it stands the good shepherd as a bearded man, the second stage of the development of the type. In the arcade on the right stands a man, on the left a woman, both surrounded by a multitude of children. These same persons with fewer followers reappear on one of the smaller sides of the sarcophagus, while the other shows a genius of death with the down-turned torch. We are here apparently confronted with a representation of teachers whose calling too is mentioned in the inscriptions."

The details of the posture of the lamb bearer agree so closely in all three cases, the Greek Pagan, the early Christian and the Gandhâra Buddhist figures, that there can be little doubt about the historical connexion in the development of this type; but there are other instances of a spontaneous similarity in which connexions can neither be traced nor be deemed probable. As an example we reproduce a picture of the Ajanta caves in which a mother brings her child to the Buddha and which if it were Christian might be an appropriate illustration of the Gospel verse "Suffer little children to come unto me." The hypothesis of Christian influence is fairly excluded in the Ajanta caves, and we must recognise here again that the same sentiment (viz, the desire of bringing children



THE NATIVITY.


Reproduced by Nork (in Scheible's *Kloster*, Vol. VII., Part I, p. 50).
The Magi bear other gifts than those mentioned in the Gospels.

at their tender age under the wholesome influence of religion) would produce similar art representations in Buddhism and in Christianity.

F. Nork, in his *Festkalender*, publishes an interesting illustration of what he calls the nativity of Mithras. He states that it is taken from a Mithras monument by Kircher, from whose *Roma Subterranea* it is said to be reproduced.¹ The illustration might, however, be taken for a representation of the Christian Nativity, except for the gifts which the three Magi bring to the new-born Saviour. According to the Gospels, they are gold, frankincense and

¹ Published in *Das Kloster*, edited by I. Scheible, Vol. VII., Part I., page 50. The illustration is here reproduced, but I have so far been unable to verify the authority. There is a mistake somewhere, for Kircher never wrote a book entitled *Roma Subterranea*. The illustration may be found in a book of that title by some other author, or in Kircher's *Mundus Subterraneus*. The stable indicates the influence of the Christian canonical Gospels and makes, in our opinion Nork's view unacceptable. But the relief remains interesting on account of the gifts of the magi, which indicate another and unknown tradition.

myrrh, while on the present bas-relief one of the Magi offers doves, another flowers, and the third holds in his right hand a vessel and in his left hand a wreath of roses, perhaps a rosary. The place of



BUDDHA'S RENUNCIATION.

Gandhāra Sculptures of Jamālgārhi. The upper part shows the prince surrounded by servants, musicians, and dancers. The lower part represents the moment when he leaves his wife. The ox in the gallery indicates the date, which was the full moon of the month Ashādā, when the moon stood in the zodiacal sign of the Bull (Uttarāshādhā). (See Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst.*, page 109.)

birth is not a cave, but a stable, and yet the child does not appear in a manger, but in a basket, and the ox and the donkey seem to worship the child.

The planets and constellations were pictorially represented in the Orient under the allegory of animals; hence the twelve signs of the ecliptic are even to-day still called the zodiac, i. e., circle of animals. In some ancient sculptures (as for instance in the Buddhist bas-relief of Jamâlgârhî here reproduced) the date of the event is indicated by the animal that serves as an emblem of the month, in the present case a bull. Might not the story of the ox and the donkey that witness the birth of Christ have originated in the same way? It would be difficult to prove, but some old-fashioned illustrations showing a similarity of treatment to the bull in the Jamâlgârhî bas-relief seem to speak in favor of this hypothesis. Mr. Nork, from whose essay we here reproduce an illustration taken from an ancient glass, interprets the two animals astronomically as the signs of the ass of Typhon and the bull of Osiris, and he is apparently not familiar with the Buddhist sculpture.

That the idea of the Star of Bethlehem is due to Persian influence cannot be doubted, because the Apocryphal Gospels state that the Magi had watched for the constellation of the Saviour, according to a prophecy of Zoroaster (Zerdusht). We read in the Arabic Gospel of the Infancy (chapter 7) the following account :



THE NATIVITY FROM AN ANCIENT GLASS.¹

"And it came to pass when the Lord Jesus was born at Bethlehem of Judah in the time of Herod the King, behold Magi came from the east to Jerusalem, as Zerdusht had predicted: and they had with them gifts, gold, incense, and myrrh; and they worshipped him and offered unto him their gifts. Then lady Mary took one of his swaddling bands and gave it them for a little reward, and they received it from her with great honor. And the same hour there appeared unto them an angel in the form of the star which had been the guide of their way before; and following the leading of its light they departed, until they reached their own country."²

¹ From *Sacrum monumentum in antiquo vitro Romæ*.

² Matt. ii. 1-12 The mention of Zerdusht or Zoroaster in this chapter accords with an old Christian notion in the East, that he was the same as Balaam, and predicted the rising of the star. Some made him a disciple of Elijah, but an old priest from Oroomiah mentioned the other opinion to me as the true one. See the article "Zerdascht" in D'Herbelot's *Bibliothèque Orientale*.

That stars, especially the planets, are divine beings, gods, or archangels, is an ancient Iranian idea which otherwise does not re-appear in Christianity.



COPTIC BAS-RELIEF. (From Ebers.)¹

The Zoroastrian prophecy expressly connects the Star of Bethlehem with the constellation of the Virgin ; and it appears that the

note. Brunet refers to the *Biographie Universelle*, Vol. lii., and Norberg's *De Zoroastre Bactriano*. See, too, Hottinger's *Historia Orientalis*, ii. 6, 16; and also the note of Thilo, *Codex Apoc.*, p. 139

¹ Ebers believes that this interesting bas-relief represents Mary with the child and Joseph, but Kraus thinks that it is Isis nursing the God-infant Horus.

constellation received its name from the very fact that its rise indicated the birth of the new sun at the winter solstice. Mr. Nork quotes a temple inscription at Sais which directly calls the Virgin the "Mother of the Sun" (Procl. in Tim. I. I.) and Eratosthenes of Alexandria identifies her with Isis, the mother of Horus. Scaliger describes her as a beautiful virgin with full hair, ears of corn in her hand, and nursing a boy-baby. The same author, Mr. Nork, quotes Albertus Magnus as having known that with the rise of the constellation of the Virgin our Lord Jesus Christ was born, and adds that he may have had a source which is now lost; but the item is interesting, and seems to verify the other statements connected with the legends of the Nativity. Roger Bacon, the learned monk of the thirteenth century, is another important witness. He places the birth of the Blessed Virgin herself at the time when the sun stood in the constellation of the Virgin, being the emblem of her, while nursing the infant Jesus Christ.

St. Paul says nothing about the birth of Christ and we know that the early Christians were little concerned with the details of the life of the Saviour. They clung to his doctrines and to the belief in his resurrection. The legends of the Nativity were formed under the influence of other religions which possessed aspirations similar to Christianity.

The similarity between the doctrines of the ancient Mazdaism and Christianity is well established. The followers of Zoroaster believed in a virgin-born saviour, later on identified with Mithras, whose arrival on earth would usher in a millennium of peace and happiness. The dead would rise and the world would be renewed; and the daily prayer was for the speedy coming of the kingdom.

Mithras is called the God that comes from the rocks (δ θεός ἐκπέτρας) and is represented as a child emerging from a rough stone. This name may have given rise to the idea that he was born in a



MITHRAS BORN FROM THE ROCKS.

Holding in his hand the grape which replaces in the West the Haoma of the Persians.¹

¹ Reproduced from F. Cumont, p. 231, after Lajard, Plate CIII.

cave, which would be the more probable, as the cave plays an important part in Mithras worship.

Mithras' worship was almost in possession of the world when Christianity came to the front and overthrew it. Judging from monuments discovered in France, on the Rhine, and on the Danube, the entire north of the Roman Empire was strongly addicted to the cult of Mithras.

The influence of Mithras worship on Christianity is well established.¹ We mention especially the rites of baptism, the Eucharist, facing the Orient in prayer, the sanctification of the day of the sun, and the celebration of the winter solstice as the birthday of the Saviour. Concerning this latter institution, the Rev. Robert Sinker says in Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities* (pp. 357-8):

"As Mithraicism gradually blended with Christianity, changing its name but not altogether its substance, many of its ancient notions and rites passed over too, and the Birthday of the Sun, the visible manifestation of Mithras himself, was transferred to the commemoration of the Birth of Christ.

"Numerous illustrations of the above remarks may be found in ancient inscriptions, *e. g.*, SOLI INVICTO ET LUNAE AETERNAE C. VETTI GERMANI LIB. DUO PARATUS ET HERMES DEDERUNT,² or ΗΑΙΩ ΜΙΘΡΑ ΑΝΙΚΗΤΩ³ (Gruter, *Inscriptiones Antiquae*, p. xxxiii). In the legend on the reverse of the copper coins of Constantine, SOLI INVICTO COMITI,⁴ retained long after his conversion, there is at once an idea of the ancient Sun-God, and of the new Sun of Righteousness.

"The supporters of this theory cite various passages from early Christian writers indicating a recognition of this view. The sermon of Ambrose, quoted by Jablonsky, is certainly spurious, and is so marked in the best editions of his works; it furnishes, however, an interesting illustration of an early date. The passage reads:

"Well do the common people call this somehow sacred day of the birth of the Lord "a new sun," and confirm it with so great an authority of theirs that Jews and Gentiles concur in this mode of speech. And this should willingly be accepted by us, because with the birth of the Saviour there comes not only the salvation of man-

¹The mysteries of Mithras were introduced into the Roman Empire at the end of the first century. They gained more and more influence until they reached a climax in the second and third centuries of the Christian era. Most of the many monuments which Mithras worship left all over the Roman Empire, especially in Gaul and Germany, date from this period when it had almost become a rival of Christianity.

²To the unconquerable sun and the eternal moon this is given by P. and H., the two children of C. V. G.

³*I. e.*, Helios (or the sun) Mithras the invincible.

⁴To the invincible Sun, the protector.

kind, but the brightness of the sun itself is renewed.' (*Serm.* 6, in *Appendice*, p. 397, ed. Bened.)

"In the Latin editions of Chrysostom is a homily, wrongly ascribed to him, but probably written not long after his time, in which we read :

"'But they call it the birthday of the Invincible (i. e. Mithras). Who, however, is invincible if not our Lord, who has conquered death? Further, if they say, "it is the birthday of the sun," He is the sun of righteousness, about whom the prophet Malachi says, Unto you that fear my name shall the sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings.'"¹

The preceding lines of this quotation from Chrysostom (*Hom.* 31) plainly state that Christ's birthday has been fixed upon the day of the birth of Mithras. Chrysostom says: "On this day (the birthday of Mithras) also the birthday of Christ was lately fixed at Rome in order that whilst the heathen were busied with their profane ceremonies, the Christians might perform their holy rites undisturbed." (*Sermo de Nativitate S. Joannis Baptistae*; Vol. II., 1113, ed. Paris, 1570.)

The Rev. Mr. Sinker continues :

"Leo the Great finds fault with the baneful persuasion of some to whom this day of our celebration is worthy of honor not so much on account of the birth of Christ as for the sake of the renewal of the sun."

"Again, the same father observes :

"'But no other day appears to us more appropriate than today for worshipping in heaven and earth the Feast of the Nativity, and while even in the material world (in the elements) a new light shines, He confers on us before our very senses, the brightness of His wonderful sacrament.' (*Serm.* 26, § 1, p. 87.)

"We may further cite one or two instances from ancient Christian poets: Prudentius, in his hymn *Ad Natalem Domini*, thus speaks (*Cathemerinon*, xi. init., p. 364, ed. Arevalus):

"'Why does the sun already leave the circle of the arctic north?
Is not Christ born upon the earth who will the path of light increase?'

"Paulinus of Nola also (*Poema* xiv. 15-19, ed. Muratori):

"'Truly, after the solstice, when Christ is born in the body,
With a new sun he will change the frigid days of the north wind.
While he is offering to mortals the birth that will bring them salvation,
Christ with the progress of days gives command that the nights be declining.

¹ Observe in this passage that the prophet thinks of the sun as God after the Babylonian and Egyptian fashion, as having wings which are of a wholesome or healing influence.

“Reference may also be made to an extract in Assemani (*Bib. Or.*, ii. 163) from Dionysius Bar-Salibi, bishop of Amida, which shows traces of a similar feeling in the East; also to a passage from an anonymous Syrian writer, who distinctly refers the fixing of the day to the above cause; we are not disposed, however, to attach much weight to this last passage. More important for our purpose is the injunction of a council of Rome (743 A. D.): ‘None shall celebrate the Brumalia on the first of January’ (can. 9, Labbé vi. 1548), which shows at any rate that for a long time after the fall of heathenism, many traces of heathen rites still remained.”

So far the Rev. Robert Sinker. In the *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities* (I., p. 357) he quotes the various passages in their original language, which we have taken the liberty to replace by English translations.

Now, in fine, what shall we say of all these similarities of Christian legends with Buddhistic, Mithraistic, Greek, and other myths? The common belief is that if these similarities could be proved to constitute actual connexions, and if they could be traced to a common source, it would be a death-blow to Christianity, because it destroys its claim to originality. That in our opinion is a mistake. Our knowledge of the origin of Christian legends neither establishes nor destroys Christianity; it only helps us to understand its mission better and learn to appreciate its place in the evolution of religious thought.

Christianity is a new phase in the history of mankind, but it could be acceptable to the people of the age in which it originated only by literally coming as a fulfilment of the ancient religions which it replaced. Thus the fabric of its legends will appear to the historians as a new combination of older traditions; and the light of its main ideas is a collection of the scattered rays of many more ancient notions which were then focussed into systematic form.

The legends of Christianity were undoubtedly believed by many early Christians, and their religious faith was not at once freed from the Pagan conceptions of pre-Christian traditions. In fact, many of these Pagan conceptions continue till to-day, and it is the duty of the present generation to sift truth from error and to understand religion better than did our ancestors. The history of mankind is not yet concluded and least of all the chapter of the development of man’s spiritual aspirations, his religious ideals and the hopes of the faith that is in him.

THE BROWNING-BARRETT LOVE-LETTERS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE.

BY HIRAM M. STANLEY.

THE greatest boon in the way of biographical record which has been vouchsafed to us in recent years is the love-letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett.¹ To the literary artist they are full of subtle and deep suggestion; to the lover they will be an ever dear delight; and to the psychologist they are human documents of the highest worth because the directest expression of the deepest experience of two of the deepest souls this earth has known. From psychologists in general the phenomenon of love has received little attention, even Professor James's large work dismissing the subject in two or three pages. Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann have endeavored to connect the theory of love with their philosophical systems; but with neither psychologists nor philosophers do I know of an analysis of a single case. But these incomparable letters furnish, however, a document, upon which at present I wish merely to make a few salient notes, and thus perhaps supply in some measure the correctly criticised incompleteness of my *Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling* on this point.

From these letters we discern that the first and main factor in their love—as perhaps in all romantic love—is mutual spiritual mastery. Before they ever met, Elizabeth Barrett felt Browning's mastery through his works and correspondence, a mastery of intellectual breadth and depth, of masculine force and various dramatic powers, and of a generous noble character. In a letter to a friend Miss Barrett refers proudly to her correspondence with the author of "Paracelsus" and the "King of the Mystics" and at the time of her marriage she wished the notice in the newspapers to men-

¹ *The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett Barrett*, 1845-1846. Harpers, New York, 1899.

tion Browning as the "author of Paracelsus." At the first meeting she at once feels his mastery, and yields with downcast eyes as to a supernal force. And long after she does not raise her eyes, so that we have complaint from him and rejoinder from her that make delightful reading—ininitely delightful and delicious. "Shall I dare write down a grievance of my heart, and not offend you? Yes, trusting in the right of my love—you tell me, sweet, here in the letter, 'I do not look so well'—and sometimes, 'I look better' . . . *how do you know?* When I first saw you—I saw your eyes—since then, *you*, it should appear, see mine—but I only *know* yours are there, and have to use that memory as if one carried dried flowers about when fairly inside the garden-enclosure. And while I resolve, and hesitate, and resolve again to complain of this—(kissing your foot . . . not boldly complaining, nor rudely)—while I have this on my mind, on my heart, ever since that May morning . . . can it be?" To which she answers "Now *is* it just of you? isn't it hard upon me? And if the charge is true, whose fault is it, pray? I have been ashamed and vexed with myself fifty times for being so like a little girl, . . . for seeming to have 'affectations'; and all in vain: 'it was stronger than I,' as the French say. And for *you* to complain! As if Haroun Alrashid after cutting off a head, should complain of the want of an obeisance!—Well!—I smile notwithstanding. Nobody can help smiling—both for my foolishness which is great, I confess, though somewhat exaggerated in your statement—(because if it was quite as bad as you say, you know, I never should have *seen you* . . . and *I have!*) and also for yours . . . because you take such a very preposterously wrong way for overcoming anybody's shyness. Do you know, I have laughed . . . really laughed at your letter. No—it has not been so bad. I have seen you at every visit, as well as I could with both eyes open—only that by a supernatural influence they won't stay open with *you* as they are used to do with other people . . . so now I tell you. And for the rest I promise nothing at all—as how can I, when it is quite beyond my control—and you have not improved my capabilities . . . do you think you have?"

To love, at least deeply, Elizabeth Barrett must happen upon a greater genius than her own; for certainly in general the woman cannot love the man of inferior intellect, and a woman of highest mind, like Miss Barrett, has slight chance of meeting a superior. Schopenhauer, indeed, makes the remark that "want of understanding does a man no harm with women; indeed extraordinary mental endowment, or even genius, might sooner influence them unfavorably as

an abnormality." But it is obvious to all observers and readers that genius reputed or real is the most powerful attraction to women. Elizabeth Barrett whose greatest capacity, as she says, was that of loving, and who for long weary years of suffering had been "eating her own heart" with her "face so close against the tombstones that there seemed no room even for the tears," yielding to the mastery of love, was overwhelmed by a flood of joy which fairly dazed her; and in all love literature there is no more powerful description of the joy of new-found love. She had hoped only for friendship and sympathy at the best from him she revered as past master of the divine art of poetry, as wise, noble, great; but that he should love her was more than any dream,—it was a miracle.

But the mastery was by no means one-sided; if Elizabeth Barrett feels at once that Robert Browning in her master, he equally feels that she is his "mistress." He sees at once in her a superior nobility, gentleness, and unselfishness which enthral him. And this paradox of a mutual mastery leads to the prettiest of lovers' quarrels, the constant protestation of each side against being looked up to by the other. Love seeks ever to adore and serve, and not to be served and adored; and so each lover spends a vast deal of time and energy in trying to get down from the pedestal erected by the other.

If the first and most notable element in this love is mutual mastery, which unconsciously disguises itself in mutual service, another element quite as paradoxical is the absolute frankness and simplicity and truthfulness which underlies all this romance. In their absolute trust and belief there is plain and direct speaking, complete utterance which does not fashion its phrases. Both Browning and Miss Barrett are frank by nature, and give fullest expression in all the love passages. But Elizabeth Barrett is peculiar above all women in being entirely open from the first concerning her age—being seven years his senior—her illness, and other disabilities which she knew ought to dissuade Robert Browning from wooing her, though she might reasonably hope for friendship. This absolute lack of artifice and coquetry, and this deep sense of unworthiness which she proclaims from the first, makes Elizabeth Barrett a highly exceptional woman; yet this trait became her chief attraction to Robert Browning after his long experience with the frivolities of society. Schopenhauer mentions as the essential prerequisites of love: health, strength, beauty, and youth; but in all these Elizabeth Barrett felt she was totally lacking, yet she attempted no gloss. Hence his trust in her was perfect from the be-

ginning as an absolutely true woman. And so also was hers in him as an absolutely true man; but she only slowly allowed herself to believe that his love could be more than passing infatuation, because she seemed to herself so unlovely. The "I trust you" and "I believe in you" is a constant refrain in these letters.

These lovers debate the reason of love, and of course with lover-like unreason find that they love for no reason at all. Thus Robert Browning declares, "I love you because I *love* you; I see you once a week because I cannot see you all day long, because I most certainly could not think of you once an hour less, if I tried, or went to Pisa, or abroad (in every sense) in order to be happy." To which she answers "Shall I tell you besides?—the first moment in which I seemed to admit to myself in a flash of lightning the *possibility* of your affection for me being more than dream work . . . the first moment was *that* when you intimated (as you have done since repeatedly) that you cared for me not for a reason, but because you cared for me. Now such a *parce que* which reasonable people would take to be irrational, was just the only one fitted to the uses of my understanding on the particular question we were upon . . . just the 'woman's reason' suitable to the woman." To all which we must say that love while in itself rational is of necessity always reluctant to analyse, or at least is dissatisfied with its own analysis—though it returns ever to this as we see in these letters. And it is but natural for love to take this stand, for love is intensely toward the person *per se*, and so it dislikes any abstraction of any quality; and further it is false to the nature of love to merely know its object, for knowledge is external to the object, but love seeks identification. In the most sacred love also there is to itself a measure of impiety in mere explication. But to the psychologist, of course, love has both its elements and its reasons, for whatever lovers may think, love cannot be accounted a supernatural phenomenon. But we cannot agree with Herbert Spencer that love is a mere complex of physical feeling, of feeling for personal beauty, of reverence, love of approbation, of self-esteem, of property, love of freedom and sympathy. But love is not a mere complex, nor does it find its power therein. This formula does not give the full real quality. Love in its highest types, at least in this case of Elizabeth Barrett, is a fire of absolute devotion which sets ablaze all its material. Again in her, "self-esteem," as in highest love generally, is drowned in the object. She even fears the refined selfishness that she may love his love rather than him, as we see from this exquisite love passage. "I

love your love too much. And *that* is the worst fault, my beloved, I ever can find in my love of *you*."

Further Spencer's category neglects *trust* which Elizabeth Barrett rightly regards as elementary, as when she says in one of her attempts at analysis: "The elements of love. . . (I say 'the love' *mine*, because I *will* not know, nor hear, nor be taught anything by any one else about 'love,' the one love everybody knows, it seems, and lives and dies by)—my love's elements are so many that the attempt to describe them is to bring about this failure. . . the first that comes is taken up and treated of at length . . . as that element of '*trust*' just now . . . and then in the feeling of incompetence which makes the pen sink away and turns the mind off, the others are let pass by unnamed, much less described, or at least acknowledged for the undeniable elements they are. What were all the *trust* without—and thus I could begin again!" And Elizabeth Barrett is undoubtedly right that mere enumeration of elements does not fully define love nor reach its essence, for love is a new psychosis which, given its bases few or many, rises as a simple, fervid, joyful emotion, leading toward union and absorption with the object. Romantic love then constitutes a new chapter in the evolution of life, as does the wing of a bird; and as a method of adaptation in evolution it signifies the complete co ordination of two psychisms in perfecting monogamy.

We have touched on the spiritual side of love as exemplified in these letters, and we have now to notice the sensuous side which, as might be expected, is chiefly revealed in the letters of Robert Browning. References to lips, hair, eyes, hands, kisses, are very frequent in his letters but there is scarcely a mention in her letters to these matters, save as he directly suggests and asks. Robert Browning draws out the contrast of spiritual and sensuous love in one of his letters in which he makes a supposed third person remark to him "'you can't kiss Mind! Mere intellectual endowments—though incontestably of the loftiest character—mere Mind, though that Mind be Miss B's—cannot be *kissed*.' So judges the third person! and if, to help him, we let him into your room at Wimpole Street, suffered him to see with Flush's eyes, he would say with just as wise an air, True, mere personal affections may be warm enough, but does it augur well for the durability of an attachment that it should be *wholly, exclusively* based on such perishable attractions as the sweetness of a mouth, the beauty of an eye? I could wish, rather, to know that there was something of less transitory nature co-existent with this—some congeniality of mental pursuit."

This is a very delicate and playful way of putting his sensuous regard to which she very properly replies, "nonsense." The sensuousness of love, though largely only latent, is yet basal even in this most exalted type of love, though we need not affirm with Schopenhauer that love is sublimated lust. Elizabeth Barrett's shyness and modesty—which is truly girlish—recoils from masculine impetuosity; but her expression of the sensuous side is most vivid in her "Sonnets from the Portuguese."

As contrasting with and hindering the sensuous caress Prof. William James in his *Psychology* remarks on what he terms "instinct of personal isolation," the repugnance to personal contact which with some people goes so far as to make shaking hands disagreeable. But it is greatly to be doubted both whether personal delicacy is instinct and whether it acts as repressive to sensuous love. Certain it is to any one who observes ordinary humanity in street cars that mere personal delicacy—apart from sexual—is practically non-existent, and further with very young children it is rarely in evidence. Thus, if instinct at all, it is deferred instinct, appearing often rather late, and very apt to increase with age. But the shunning of bodily contacts with strangers, not through fear or sex motives, but as mere personal delicacy, is not, so far as we can judge from these letters and other evidence a deterrent to sensuousness. Certainly no lover ever had this repugnance to conquer.

We have now to remark on what is called the illusion of love which is seen as clearly in these letters of two most wise and self-conscious individuals as in the love of two ordinary persons. Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett seek in vain to express the absolute value of the other to the one. Elizabeth Barrett declares to Robert Browning "you are all the world and the stars besides to me," but certainly this expresses the real feeling, the actual valuation of the moment, and all the universe is as nothing, for the whole individual life is lost in the other. Thus honest perfect love cannot exaggerate, and the standpoint of the world outside, to whom this particular individual is not supremely precious, and to whom the love language seems silly, is not the true standpoint. The individual standpoint is the true standpoint for the individual; what makes his life is his life. Still we can say that no person of sense allows the universe to fade into insignificance before the claims of a single mortal, but will keep himself to the highest work in the most general relations of truth, goodness and beauty. And this is the question which constantly disturbs these high-minded

lovers; they have constantly to urge upon each other that each does not, will not, stand in the way of the other's life work in poetry, will not allow personal service to interfere with world service. Elizabeth Barrett even, which may be counted rather exceptional with women, perceives the higher significance of the universal, and is quite ready with the sublime heroism of an absolutely unselfish nature to sacrifice her union with Robert Browning, if it shall reduce him from writing the highest poetry to scribbling pot-boilers. Truly we have in the marriage of Elizabeth Barrett and Robert Browning the extremely rare—even perhaps unique case—of two great creative minds accomplishing their peculiar universal work not in spite of, but largely by virtue of their personal relation and service. We cannot, indeed, say with certainty that Robert Browning's work might not have been as great if he had never loved and married Miss Barrett; yet she was his good genius to clarify and humanise his reckless abrupt originality. As to Elizabeth Barrett, her life work would certainly have been comparatively insignificant but for the inspiration of this love. She had a positive genius, profoundly womanly, for love, and her poetry before she loved Robert Browning was but the pale tendril of the cellar plant reaching vaguely toward light.

But there is another standpoint for what seems to the outsider, love illusion. Why may not romantic love in its highest forms be, like art, a world of its own, which is not to serve life, but life it; and the illusion so-called of love be like the self-illusions of art? Romantic love is then self-evidential, a mode of life and emotion which vindicates itself within and for itself. Romantic love may often in this form be self-conscious indulgence, as with Goethe, where the man is always master of his love, is never—unless momentarily—mastered by it, and continually self-consciously uses his emotions as materials for literary art. In flirtation again romantic love is nascent or playful but is always self-conscious indulgence. But romantic love, whether shallow or deep, whether evanescent or eternal, may be defined as a form of human experience which has developed like art for its own sake; it is a mode of super-biological evolution wherein psychic experience develops in manifold phases to higher and higher realisations for its own sake, and thus love belongs with pure art, science, philosophy, and other modes of self-developing experience.

But we may pass from the illusion of love as to the value to itself, which is after all no illusion, to the real illusion where the love overestimates its object not to its own personal relation but in gen-

eral relations. Thus Elizabeth Barrett regards Browning as always "the poet of the age," and to Robert Browning Elizabeth Barrett's juvenile essay on Mind is "every way a wonderful work." However, their critical artistic insight is usually strong enough to break through love illusions, and they render just judgments on each others works. But as to personal charm and attraction of character there is much the same exaggeration as with ordinary lovers. That love blinds to defects, and even transforms them into perfections, causing moles to appear as beauty-spots, is a significant and well-known fact. And this blinding to the truth by love is the reproach which common sense, scientific spirit, and philosophic thought alike make to all love. Self-love, filial love, maternal paternal, fraternal, patriotic love, sexual love, every kind alike tend to unduly magnify, as hate tends to unduly minify. Passionate personalism, particularism, individualism, herein set themselves against the common universalism of science and philosophy. The life of reason will not allow its sight to be clouded by any love, and thus it is enabled to see the whole of life in its real values, and so attain wisdom. So then neither truth nor wisdom come through human love, and a life ordered scientifically, philosophically, cannot admit them, at least as dominant forces. And if reason must disown exaggerating love, so must also practical prosaic life which sees herein only moonshine. And the injury which a love of every kind does to the loved ones and other individuals simply because it does not perceive rightly and truly the general relations is plainly multiform and great. The incessant frictions and discordances of life are due chiefly to the interferences of all these biased personal affections. Will then the age of science upon which we are entering congeal all affection, and so render the earth loveless and lorn, inhabited solely by acute investigators and logic machines? Or may not science have its perfect work and the human heart grow larger and stronger, because truer; and thus emancipate love of its illusion, making all love thereby deeper and nobler? We must say that these letters lead toward the last conclusion, that the highest love is nourished upon truth, and hence makes toward betterment. With the Brownings the blindness and distortion of personal affection is but momentary, and they, being fully conscious and self-conscious, quickly correct it by the largest measure. The success of their constant love was due not so much to their romanticism as to their realism; both were haters of sham and conventionality, were seekers of the real, true, vital, genuine; and after each had given up the search, Robert Browning finds in Elizabeth Barrett

the true woman, and Elizabeth Barrett in Robert Browning finds the true man. Perhaps the strongest impression left upon us by these letters is their absolute sincerity, frankness, simplicity, in other words, realism; so that two powerful noble natures are at once *en rapport*, in mutual understanding, appreciation, sympathy and confidence, all which is set at white heat by the glow of past sionate love.

We have mentioned the illusion of love—which is no illusion—as to the value of the beloved to the lover, and we have noted also the illusion of general exaggeration, but there is also another illusion, that of happiness. This is the illusion on which Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann insist, namely, that the so-called love-happiness is but a cheat by which nature secures the continuance of the species at the real expense of the individual. Romantic love is an instinct which, not seeing and aiming at the real end, yet makes the best selection for the good of the species under the guise of individual satisfaction and happiness, which at the best is only a passing phase, and is more than counterbalanced by all the difficulties and pains of the after-life. Thus Schopenhauer declares that love “exerts an adverse influence on the most important events, interrupts the most serious occupations of the hour, sometimes embarrasses for a while even the greatest minds, does not hesitate to intrude with its trash, interfering with the negotiations of statesmen and investigations of men of learning, knows how to slip its love letters and locks of hair even into ministerial portfolios and philosophical manuscripts, and no less devises daily the most entangled and the worst actions, destroys the most valuable relationships, breaks the firmest bonds, demands the sacrifice sometimes of life or health, sometimes of wealth, rank, and happiness, nay, robs those who are otherwise honest of all conscience, makes those who have hitherto been faithful, traitors; accordingly, on the whole, appears a malevolent demon and strives to pervert, confuse, and overthrow everything.” But what are the facts in this Browning-Barrett case? Here we certainly have the most unequivocal testimony, pre-nuptial and post-nuptial, as to complete unalloyed happiness, and on Mrs. Browning’s side it is life itself. There is no sacrifice of the individual, only furtherance, and it is the fundamental error of Schopenhauer that he contrasts the welfare of the individual and species, as if the nature of the new generation were not dependent upon the real welfare and so happiness of the individuals of the former generations. But apart from all this, the present instance is plainly a personal happiness of the

completest type; and if Schopenhauer rejoins that such cases are made so not by love *per se* but by friendship, sympathy, etc., which are radically independent of romantic love, it is yet certain enough from Miss Barrett's love letters that the real overwhelming, suffusing, constant joy of life was her love for Robert Browning, and that these other elements were pale in comparison.

The final point on which we must touch is the function of romantic love in the evolution of humanity. We have already intimated that while love helps monogamy, it may also be considered a self-sufficing mode of experience, like art emotion, and so ever to be enlarged and refined in the evolution of experience. Thus in all higher phases romantic love is not a mere servant of the species, and is not an instinct. In fact, there is much evidence that highly organised, cultured, romantic human beings tend even to eliminate the sexual instinct *per se*, and that what is fundamental is taught and learned. Certainly those that multiply and replenish the earth are not as a rule the most romantic, and from the point of view of the species the Browning-Barrett marriage was comparatively a failure, being unprolific, and resulting in no transmission of genius. From that standpoint Browning was certainly led amiss by the romantic love which Schopenhauer makes an unerring instinct toward the highest good of the species. Romanticism scientifically considered on this ground is a very fallible selective agent.

We have in this article traced in these Browning-Barrett Love-Letters the main elements basal to love in mastery, trust, and sensuous motive; but we have noted that love is none of these, but has its own quality; and we have considered the illusions of love, the only one that is really such being the illusion producing general exaggeration, and this does not seem essential to all love passions. Further as to the evolutionary function of romantic love, while it certainly in early phases has some relation to the species, yet in its culmination it may be accounted a life of its own. Such are some of the conclusions which we gather from these love-letters, letters which deserve a place among the richest treasures of humanity, for they express with absolute genuineness and in the fullest, deepest way the strongest of the emotions. We see here a love as beatific as earth-born humanity has ever felt, and we here find all the delicious *nuances*, all the fascinating battledore and shuttlecock of love. Love reverses the struggle of existence, tries always to give more than it receives, to freely confer advantage and exact no return; and in this instance of the Brownings we see the highest triumph of courtesy and chivalry, and in all the grand simplicity of

large and noble natures. Yet Elizabeth Barrett appears the saner of the two, and her letters, read in connexion with the "Sonnets from the Portuguese," are undoubtedly the finest expression in any language of woman's love. Robert Browning's letters are always written in that eager haste wherein he, as often in his poems, stumbles over himself like an interfering race-horse; but yet by these letters, with all their furious brevity and abrupt torrential rapidity, he would take that fort by storm which yet required a many months' siege of reiterated storming.

THE CROSS IN JAPANESE HERALDRY.

Communicated

By MR. ERNEST W. CLEMENT, Editor of the *Japan Evangelist*.

ONE of the most striking objects for the attention and admiration of rustic wayfarers along the highways of Tokaido, as well as to the frivolous sightseers in the streets of Yedo, in the old feudal days, was the heraldic bearings of the Lord of Satsuma—a golden ring encircling a golden cross. As they looked on the thousands of palanquins and innumerable baskets and boxes loaded with the paraphernalia and the impedimenta of the army of knights and retainers which formed the brilliant train of that mighty lord, they little suspected that the glittering heraldic crests that enhanced the brilliancy of the cavalcade, the so-called "Satsuma's Bridle-bit," were mementos of the Christian influences by which that feudal clan was once swayed. The crest passed by the name of a "Bridle-bit," which it resembles, simply to avoid giving umbrage to the Tokugawa family, which had pledged itself to the uprooting of Christianity from the hearts of the people.



A writer in a recent number of the *Nippon* makes a study of this class of heraldry used by the noble families in Japan, which retain the marks of Christian influence in the varied forms of a cross. Lord Shimadzu's bearings, thinks the writer in the *Nippon*, were as early as 1650 or thereabout a simple (Japanese) figure for ten, within a concentric circle, whilst a branch of the family used merely a cross. We would not at all be surprised to find that Satsuma, where Christianity was first introduced by Spanish traders, had kept this relic of Christian days in its heraldry; for the pioneer

Catholic fathers in Japan are said to have given their knightly converts new heraldic bearings. By some authority, even the so-called "Inverted sword" on the summit of mount Kirishima is believed to have been planted by some Christian zealot of the realms. Nor are we surprised, says the writer, that the Yamaguchi family, descendants of the Ouchi of Suwo Province, who had adopted later the name of the place, should be all using some form of a cross. It was there that St. Francis Xavier found the most successful field for his work.

In contrast to these two, we are somewhat surprised to find crosses under slight disguises used among the Samurai of the Hatamoto class, or the families that formed the Body Guard of the Shoguns. Such was the case with the Hatamoto family of Tada, which traces its genealogy to the Genji of Settsu Province, who were all at an early date converted to Christianity. In fact the Settsu Genji all employed a cross very extensively among their many branches. Other knights of fame such as Ukon Takayama, Murashige Araki, Kiyohide Nakagawa, Shuri Miyoshi, Danjo Matsunaga and others of the provinces of Kawachi and Settsu are known to have been among the most fervent followers of Christ in the earliest periods. Of these families, that of Nose had its descendants among the Hatamoto Samurai who used a cross with notched ends, or in the form of an English saltier with its ends indented. Others of the same family had the voided cross filled in black and upon it charged a smaller white cross somewhat in the style of the English cross *cleché* with the notched ends. That these three are all of Christian origin is proved by the fact that the Nose family formerly used one called "Twelve-Eyed Tie"



enclosed in a doubled circle as shown by the accompanying figure. This was changed to the cross form about 1560. Then it was called by the evasive name of "Notched Bamboo Cross." Other Samurai of the Hatamoto families, such as Okamura, Matsuno, Sudzuki and others, bore the same crest. One of them, by name Hiraoka, descended also from the Settsu Genji, began to use the bearing of a voided cross in a concentric circle. The same bearings were used by the Yagai and the Tazawa families, both of the Hatamoto. This is the same form as used by the Shimadzu family. Another Hata-

moto family used a Latin cross, with the horizontal piece nearer the upper extremity, and separated by a very narrow space from the inclosing ring. This family as far back as the Ashikaga days used a peculiar crest, as in the figure. Still another family—Nonoyama



—used, as late as 1750, a notched cross in a ring, but later on the cross lost its notches, and became voided, and the ring was also voided so as to become a concentric circle; later still the lines bounding the voided cross were connected at the centre.

Akin to the varied classes of crosses, which passed by disguised names, there is a variety which retained the Portuguese appellation of *Crus*. It is generally known that many Portuguese and perhaps Latin terms had to be used untranslated, to supply the want, or avoid misconstruction, of the Japanese equivalents. The word cross, for instance, when transformed into a Japanese symbol, became the figure ten, which would convey no meaning. Hence by the name of *Crus* it was, that such men as Kawaguchi, a Governor of Nagasaki, and others, wore bearings in a form of a cross-crosslet in a ring. Of course, the families themselves did not know what the word *Crus*, or as they pronounced it "kruss," meant. One of them Otaka Shintaro, of the Mito clan, had to be reminded by his learned liege, the Old Prince Reikko, that his crest was of Christian origin adopted by his Christian ancestor, and should therefore be replaced by a *Heisoku*, a paper fillet offered at Shinto temples. The descendants of Uchida Masayo were for generations the lords of the Komikawa Castle in Shimofusa, and had the crest of "flower *Crus*," which was nothing but a cross with various devices



for illumination and embellishment, perhaps so devised in order to escape ready identification. In his report to the Shogun's Government, he called it the flower of a certain rare plant. The famous pioneer Catholic, Nakagawa Kiyohide's descendants became the lords of Oka in Bungo, and, true to their family heritage, wore the bearings of a *Crus*. In the recent publication of the late Marquis


Matsura, named *Koshi-Yawa*, he refers to the Nakagawa crest, called usually "Modified bridle-bit," or *crus*, and infers that it must have been a cross, from the fact that at the time of Kiyohide the Catholic Church in Japan was at the height of its prosperity. The late Marquis also was of opinion that the names were so changed to escape censure.

The further evolution of these modified forms is seen in the form alleged to be the "Charm of the god of Giwon," chiefly the crest of the family of Ikeda of Tottori. The lord of Yanagawa, or the Tachibana family, uses the same charm in a slightly modified form, and its minor branches, or those that were later ranked among the Hatamoto Samurai, simplified their crests into this form. The history of the Tachibana family confirms the suspicion that the Miraculous Charm of the Giwon temple is nothing but the sacred emblem of Christianity. Tachibana Muneshige, the founder of these families, belonged to the branch of the Otomo of Bungo, and held a subordinate fief under that illustrious family. It is a well-known fact that the Otomo and the Ryuzoji and most of the Kyushu Daimyos embraced Christianity, and invited the Spanish and Portuguese missions through their merchants, for the sake of religion as well as trade, in the middle of the sixteenth century. Muneshige was not behind the others in adopting the same policy.



There is one more form left to be mentioned, and that is, strange to say, a simple adaptation of the Buddhistic emblem, for eternal happiness, called *manji* or the "Figure for ten thousand." It is a single cross with four ends at right and left angles. This seems to be one of the earliest forms, perhaps at the period of Takayama Ukon, who was christened Jute, Naito Masatoshi, christened Juan, and Konishi Yukinaga, christened Austin, one of the leaders of the Korean expedition under Taiko Hideyoshi; that is, towards the latter part of the sixteenth century. Naito is said to have worn on his helmet a golden image of the Saviour. Takayama's daughter, who was later banished from the country and went with her father to Manila, married Yokoyama Nagatomo, whose descendant, occupying the important position of a chief retainer in the Mayeda House of Kaga, still used the bearings. Later in the Tokugawa period, many eminent houses all of Christian ancestry wore this

crest,—a fact that conclusively proves the Christian origin of the emblem. One of the most conclusive proofs is furnished by the crest of the Hori family ruling over Muramatsu in Yechigo. Down to about 1684, the books of heraldry recorded the use of a crest resembling a *Cleché*, but later on the family used the *Manji*. A branch of the Tsugaru family of Mutsu, which all use the *Manji*, has a form that is distinctly a modified cross.



All these families, concludes the writer in the *Nippon*, upon whose remarks we have based the present classification, embraced Christianity during the period extending over the eras of Tembun, Keicho and Genna, that is from the early part of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth. But from the last mentioned period onward, the Tokugawa family, enraged against the Christians, steeped the nation in blood. The abandonment of the Christian faith being rigidly enforced by the persecuting government, it was but natural that various means of evasion were resorted to. In addition, we may mention the later adoption of the Buddhistic *Manji* in this form. One other form, suspicious of the same origin, is a kind of Cross-crosslet in a concentric circle covering its identity under the awkward name of "crossed mallets."

ANTICIPATE THE SCHOOL.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF CHILDREN.

BY THE EDITOR.

CHILDREN are imitative, and their souls are built up by the impressions which they receive. Every single experience, every observation of older folks, especially of elder brothers and sisters, of parents, of nurses, and generally of all belonging to the circle of their acquaintances, exercises a powerful influence in the building up of the character of the child.

The first impressions made on a child's mind are especially important, as they form the basis of all later impressions and remain for a long time, and sometimes forever, the standard by which they are measured. Should we not, therefore, exercise the greatest care, and instead of leaving the first mental impressions of children to accident, see to it that they are throughout correct?

The first education of babies is, upon the whole, left to uneducated nurses, who sometimes have not the slightest idea of the sacredness of their trust and know very little of the right treatment of infants. They are oblivious to the significance of the fact that whatever they do and say, whatever error they commit, whatever example they may set, is impressed upon and perpetuated in the little souls in their charge.

COUNTING.

A little boy of about five years was in the habit of counting 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and he stuck to this habit. He was told that he omitted 4 and 6, and he probably understood the correction, but whenever he began to count he fell back for a long time into his old habit of counting the numbers wrongly. The reason was that by accident he had learned the numbers in the wrong way and it stuck to him.

Another little child always called a seagull in his picture-book a swallow, for he had been told so by his nurse, and got irritated when contradicted, insisting even to tears again and again on its being a swallow. By and by, however, he relented, but even then he continued to say, "This is not a swallow, but a seagull," and only in time did he drop the negative expression and knew and declared without any irritation that it was a seagull. Such trouble originates by a little mistake, and shall we not be careful in laying the foundation of a human soul?

As to counting, I would say the easiest way to teach it is to count the steps by walking up or down stairs. If this be done patiently again and again, the child begins to listen to the numbers and will very soon begin to accompany each step with its proper number. The first mistake should be avoided, and my experience is that children will, without the slightest trouble, learn to count first to 12, then to 20. When they have learned to count to 20, they are prepared to count to any number up to 100 or more. The third step is an intellectual step, by learning to understand the function of the decades 30, 40, 50, etc., which are, however, clearly grasped as running parallel with 3, 4, 5, and so forth.

Before an attempt can be made to count the steps, a preliminary exercise might be the frequent repetition of 1, 2, 3, which can be practised on various occasions; for instance, when turning off or on the electric light, or by playing peekaboo, etc., whereby the order of the three numbers impresses itself mechanically upon the memory of a child. Then proceed to counting fingers and toes, and only when the first five numbers can be repeated without difficulty, proceed with counting other objects.

One peculiar phase in learning how to count is marked by the child's ability to stop at the right time. Children first acquire the mechanical memory of saying 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. When they are shown five spoons or five chips or other things of any description and are requested to count them, they begin to count mechanically without being able to stop at the right time. It indicates a more advanced degree of mentality when the child possesses a perfect parallelism between the names of the numbers and the things which, by being pointed at, are to be counted. The process of counting has reached its maturity when a child learns to stop at the proper time. In the beginning the tendency will predominate that whenever the child begins to count, it will count the whole series of numbers as far as it knows them; but the relation between things and the series of word-images of the numerals is easily estab-

lished by stopping the child and summing up the situation by saying: There are five spoons, there are five chips, or whatever it may be.

In the case of practising counting, as in all other instances of memorising, we must consider that a great number of mechanically impressed memories will subsequently render the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the ideas connected therewith easier. The subconscious memories which have been early acquired, form a very valuable capital which will never fail to be most serviceable. As children now are commonly educated, they have either no such mechanically impressed memories in their minds, or their impressions, be they numbers, images of things, or other conceptions, form an irregular conglomeration which will rather serve to bewilder than to help them when the years of school-life begin. A healthy development of mind is possible only when our subconscious notions are distinct and clear.¹ This can be accomplished by rendering as definite as possible the first sense-impressions, which precede the formation of more conscious and more intellectual operations.

NATURAL SCIENCE.

Use every opportunity in life to teach children the elementary facts and truths of the sciences which in later life will be of use to them. Familiarise them as much as possible with instructive observations. Teach them through the eye a knowledge of facts that will serve as examples of important scientific truths. Convey your first instruction by merely showing something, by making experiments, etc., but beware of superadding too quickly the theories invented to explain the facts, and if you mention them characterise them at once as hypothetical. Let the experiment speak for itself and remind the child of similar or analogous experiments and experiences.

Some of the simplest experiments in physics can be repeated in the nursery. Let the children lift an inverted glass from the bottom of the bathtub above the surface of the water; let them dip the inverted glass together with the air into the water; or take a toothbrush stand, with a hole in its lower edge and let the water run forth, whereby you can point out that the parabola of the out-flowing streamlet is proportionate to the pressure of the water inside the vessel. Then close tightly with your hand the top of the

¹ The terms *clear* and *subconscious* do not exclude one another. An idea or a sense-impression may be quite distinct and correct in its details without fully rising into the field of conscious attention.

toothbrush stand filled with water, in which case no water will come out, or perhaps only a few drops will drip down.

Make the children see the depth which blocks of wood require to float, let them compare blocks of different densities, and you will soon help them to discover for themselves the law that the weight of a floating body is equal to the weight of the water which it displaces.

Set the children to thinking why empty vessels, although made of porcelain or iron, will float, while they will go down when filled with water.

Further, the children who know that steel is heavy will take delight in seeing a needle float that has carefully been placed upon the surface of the water. The experiment will succeed more easily if the needle is dipped in butter. The cohesion of the particles of water among themselves is strong enough to carry little bodies such as needles, if they are smooth enough not to break the connexion of the surface which acts like a thin film. Small pieces of wire netting (such as is used for window screens), especially if lightly coated with paraffin, will also float, but a pin goes down, for its head will tear the film.

Again, on some occasion or other place a coin into a tub, or perhaps better into a dish or a mug, and let the children look at it from a given place where the coin is hidden behind the rim. Then fill the tub with water and the coin becomes visible on account of the refraction of the rays of light which produce the picture. Then put a spoon into the water and call their attention to the deflexion of the image.

A piece of the wire netting of window-screens is also useful to show the children the inside and whole make-up of a flame, by repeating all the simple experiments which are made in a lesson on physics.

When you take a walk with the children after a rain, show them the little streamlets, which are typical of rivers and their tributaries in their work of excavating river-beds and valleys.

Make electrical experiments with the silk samples for mamma's dresses, by rubbing them with the bottom of a glass, and watch the threads when approached twice successively by various objects, as by steel knives, silver spoons, the hand, celluloid or gutta percha, and glass. Comb their hair or your own beard in the dark when the air is dry, and let them see the sparks, and listen to the crackling noise of this baby-thunderstorm in papa's whiskers.

Show them the so-called illusions of the senses in which our

psychologists take so much interest, and let them measure the distances which, though they are equal, appear different.¹ It will interest the children, and they will wonder how their judgment is misguided. If you have a color-wheel repeat now and then for mere amusement color experiments and show the effects of contrast.

Whenever you buy presents for children bear always in mind the instructive feature of games and toys. Children are by nature anxious to learn, and they will themselves prefer playthings which serve to educate them and teach a lesson. A toy through which a child becomes familiar with a physical law of some kind is the best investment you can make and will, if properly used, amply repay the cost. Little steam engines, dynamos, motors and mechanical machinery of all kinds, pumps, fountains, etc., are now cheap enough to be the toys of the poor as well as of the rich. Of course the parents must not let the children work the steam engines themselves, except in the presence of their elders, with all necessary precautions, and should at once call attention to the danger of explosions connected with steam engines, and after one or a few practical trials should simply use these dangerous toys as models for instruction.²

FACTS NOT FANCY.

There is a vicious habit now in vogue in the kindergarten which superadds to the facts of nature the imagination of fairy tales. If you wish your children to acquire a sound conception of reality and a sense for genuine poetry, you had better avoid this pseudo-fiction of the nursery which only distorts nature and detracts from her intrinsic beauty. Facts as they are, are in themselves sufficiently poetical and need not the false glitter of a fairy-tale imitation. This idea of carrying the romance of the fairy-tale into the realm of science only revives and strengthens the old metaphysicism which personifies abstractions and is apt later on to mystify the young mind. Thus we read in Arabella B. Buckley's *Fairy-land of Science*, a book which otherwise contains many good things, such sentences as these (pp. 12-13):

"Can you see in your imagination fairy *Cohesion* ever ready to lock atoms together when they draw very near to each other: or fairy *Gravitation* dragging rain-drops down to the earth: or the fairy of *Crystallisation* building up the snow-

¹ See *The Monist*, Vol. III., p. 153, and Scripture's *Thinking, Feeling, and Doing*, p. 187.

² We recommend to teachers *Hinrich's Elements of Physics*, Davenport, Ia., Griggs, Watson, and Day, a school-book based upon the right principle, that should be revised and republished with plenty of illustrations. Very suggestive are such instructive toys as, for instance, Thomas M. St. John's *Fun With Electricity* (New York City).

flakes in the clouds? . . . Do you care to know how another strange fairy, '*Electricity*,' flings the lightning across the sky and causes the rumbling thunder? . . . And have you any curiosity about '*Chemical action*,' which works such wonders in air, and land, and sea? If you have any wish to know and make friends of these invisible forces, the next question is

"How are you to enter the fairy-land of science?"

"There is but one way. Like the knight or peasant in the fairy tales, you must open your eyes. There is no lack of objects, everything around you will tell some history if touched with the fairy wand of imagination. . . . The fire in the grate, the lamp by the bedside, the water in the tumbler, the fly on the ceiling above, the flower in the vase on the table, anything, everything, has its history, and can reveal to us nature's invisible fairies."

This is not the right way of making science poetical. The facts of nature are in themselves beautiful and need not the mythology of fairies created by a personification of scientific abstractions, the erroneously so-called forces of nature. The metaphysical assumption of forces which are supposed to work all the miracles of natural phenomena is the source of much confusion and should be carefully guarded against. If any personification be needed for the sake of imparting an additional interest to the stories of nature, speak of the actual things as living creatures. Speak of the water drop as expanding into vapor, as condensing in the cold air into a snow crystal, as falling upon the ground, as melting in the warm sun and running down hill, but do not people the child's mind with the fairies of crystallisation, gravitation, cohesion, electricity, and chemism. Teach children to see truth and beauty in the facts themselves, not in imaginary goblins and fairies. Make them watch the phenomena of nature and point out to them that all things are astir with activity and aglow with an eager disposition to do one thing or another according to circumstances.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES.

Acquaintance with foreign languages should be cultivated at an early age, by interesting the children in other nations. Teach children little German and French verses and phrases, only be careful that the pronunciation is perfect. Children catch the accent of strange sounds better than adults, and will reproduce them to perfection. According to the author's own experience, children take delight in listening again and again to little ditties and poems, and will soon begin to repeat them. It is advisable to practise such linguistic exercises before going to sleep and to rehearse on the next morning the recitations of the previous evening.

We recommend such poems as Lafontaine's fables in French,

some of Goethe's, Schiller's, Bürger's, and Heine's poems in German, Æsop's fables in Latin, the Lord's Prayer in Greek, etc., etc.

It is also advisable to introduce now and then counting in other tongues, which may be practised in the gymnasium where the number of jumps or other actions can be counted, or in any other place with similar opportunities.

Children will pick up foreign sounds without difficulty, if parents or teachers limit their instruction to the sounds only and do not tax the minds of their little pupils with grammatical explanations. The sound must come first, and the sound alone; the sense of the sound should be understood, but an exact grammatical analysis of its meaning must not be given at the beginning, for grammar bores children and is apt to destroy the pleasure they naturally take in learning something about other languages. If children have learned by rote a number of pieces in a foreign tongue, when they have grown older and maturer they will be glad to know something about the construction of sentences, and a grammar lesson, otherwise so tedious, will then be welcome to them. Later on, a long time after they have learned to read and to write in their mother tongue, children may in school be taught to read and write the foreign poems which they have learned by rote in their younger years, and they will attend their French and German lessons in school with greater zeal than if they knew nothing of these languages.

It may be permitted to add here a few words concerning the dead languages which in Europe as well as in America are still taught in the old-fashioned way. The author of these articles has had experience in teaching Latin according to a more modern method, and, while engaged as scientific teacher at the Royal Corps of Cadets in Dresden, Germany, he succeeded within the space of one school year in making the pupils of the fourth grade (Quarta) as proficient in speaking and in writing Latin as were the best scholars of the first class (Prima) after a four years' course.

And how was this accomplished?

Simply by making the boys learn by heart every week a few lines of Latin prose or verse. First simple stories should be selected for the purpose, in the style of Æsop's fables, then passages from historians and orations of famous men. There is plenty of material in Livy, Cæsar, Cicero, and also in Seneca, and the verses of Ovid are as simple as the occasion requires. The scholars had first to render these pieces into Latin from an oral dictation which was given them in their mother-tongue. Their translations were

corrected and their mistakes discussed. Copies of the passage had to be made until the whole piece was perfect, and finally it was recited before the class. This method of teaching Latin was in the beginning hard on some of the boys, but it grew easier with every new piece that was taught and learned. The old pieces were constantly repeated, and all grammatical rules were discussed in connexion with the sentences which had thus been committed to memory. At the end of the school year the boys knew about forty Latin stories by heart and were thoroughly familiar with them. In this way they had a direct command over a number of phrases and had acquired an unusual readiness in their practical use of the language, a result which within so short a time had never before been accomplished.

While the best scholars educated in the old method were able to tell the rule and follow it, these boys built their sentences correctly without thinking of the rule and deduced grammatical rules from the instances which they knew by heart.

A teacher of languages must be very exact in the beginning,—slow but painstakingly correct in every particular; he must choose the best passages for committing them to memory; he must insist on a clear pronunciation and leave no doubt about the details of grammar and construction. There is no use in rushing the boys, or overburdening them with home-work. On the contrary, the teacher should render the labor of committing these pieces to memory easy by discussing their difficulties, which will afford ample opportunity to make the scholars read the sentences and repeat them as pronounced by the teacher. The facility which pupils gradually acquire in learning a language serves to keep their enthusiasm alive, until they know enough to allow a cursive reading of literature which will involve a more rapid progress in acquiring a general proficiency.

MATHEMATICS.

Mathematical instruction should begin very early, but do not begin with axioms, theorems, and long-winded arguments with their monotonous refrain, *quod erat demonstrandum*. That is death to the spirit of mathematics. Not only is the doctrine, that all mathematics rest upon axioms an error,¹ but to begin the first lesson with explanations of axioms is a blunder. Let children begin to learn geometry by *doing*, not by *reasoning*. Let the reasoning

¹ For further details on the redundancy of axioms see the writer's *Primer of Philosophy*, pp. 51 et seq.

come in as an incidental aid to construction. Let the purpose be that of achieving something, but never let the child do any reflecting or arguing for the mere sake of thinking.

Action is the mainspring of life. No interest can be taken in anything, except there is a certain aim to be reached. Thought must step in as the assistant to work. Thought that does not serve a purpose known to the child, will be felt as an oppressive tyranny. Arguments will bore the child that is induced to reason about things before it feels the need of reasoning. Parents and teachers must not presuppose but create in the child the desire for knowledge.

In order to lay a foundation in mathematics, parents and teachers should give the child paper and a pencil. Then let them make a ruler of the paper by folding it. The fold in the paper is called a straight line, and, if folded again so that one end of the straight line covers the other end, the new fold will cut the old fold at right angles. These definitions of straight lines and right angles should be introduced, not argumentatively, but simply by naming the products of the child's operations.

After this brief introduction, hand the child a pair of compasses, giving him due warning to be careful with the points. Let the child become familiar with this new instrument by drawing a circle and dividing the circumference with the radius into six equal parts; which will serve to make a number of figures of various forms and combinations, stars with curved rays, hexagons, equilateral triangles, and six-cornered stars.

Another time ask your little friend to draw a straight line and name one end for himself, the other end for his brother, sister, cousin, or friend. Then tell him to divide the line with the assistance of the compasses, and construct a boundary line at right angles.

Our pair of compasses is a good fellow. He has no head, no body, but two long legs and can pace off the way for us. By sweeping with the same span of somewhat more than half of the line from both its ends, we draw two intersecting circles, and there will be few children who will not at once jump at the conclusion that when a straight line is drawn through the points of intersection, the problem will be solved.

Thereupon let your little pupil draw an angle for himself and one or several parallel angles for his brothers and friends. This would be an appropriate occasion to reveal to him the secrets of parallel lines with their vertical, alternating, and correspondent

angles. Their mathematical comprehension will now be mature enough to understand that an angle is not the surface between its sides, but their inclination, and that angles of the same inclination are equal.

Having divided a line into two equal parts, let the young mathematician divide an angle, which he will now easily accomplish.

All further work can begin to bear a more definite mathematical character. Let the child construct triangles from three sides, from two sides and one angle, from two angles and one side. Call his attention, without entering into details, to the fact that from three given pieces the other three not-given pieces are determined, bearing in mind an exception which leaves the choice between two possibilities; and also that triangles may be turned around.

The method of calculating areas can be taught to beginners by telling them the story of a farmer who exchanged his farm, which was in the shape of a square, for another one of exactly the same sides but with slanting angles. The former soon found out that there was less work in plowing and less seed-corn was needed, but that the crop too was greatly reduced. The man was no mathematician; he had allowed himself to be cheated. The solution of the problem will now be followed up with great interest and can easily be accomplished.

In a similar way let the children operate with circles for determining the nature and interrelations of tangents, sectors, central, and peripheral angles, etc., etc., and let them find the inscribed and circumscribed circles of triangles, the Pythagorean proposition, etc., etc. And all this can be taught in a kindergarten way, without ever resorting to arguments and demonstrations, but simply by setting the child to work and giving him a task to accomplish. When he has come into possession of a fair stock of mathematical knowledge, he will now and then go astray and become the dupe of some misconception. He will then be glad to become acquainted with methods of proof which will enable him to argue about his operations and to become sure that his constructions are right.

Arithmetic should in the same way be taught by setting children to work, i. e., by making them *do* something, by weighing, by measuring, and by comparing different lengths, areas, and volumes as well as different weights.¹

In spite of its importance, mathematics is still one of the neglected branches in the education of the child, while much progress

¹ The Speer method is very commendable and deserves the attention of all teachers of arithmetic.

has been made in the primary instruction of drawing, painting, music, and physics, where better methods suggest themselves more readily. Mathematicians of high standing devote their energies to a furtherance of the most abstruse problems of their craft and have so far not as yet shown any ambition to come to the assistance of the kindergarten and primary schools.

* * *

No attempt has been made here to be exhaustive; the writer preferred rather to be explicit in details, offered as samples, because if the principle be understood its application in the various branches of instruction will not be difficult.¹

¹The author would gladly add a review of the practical work that has been done in line with the principles suggested in this article and also a list of publications as well as other kinds of instructive suggestions on the subject, but he feels incompetent to do justice to this special branch, the history of education. He fears that he would either exaggerate the importance of, or be overcritical with, the work with which he is familiar, and overlook the significance of those educators whom he does not know.

Information as to methods employed and the results attained in various parts of the world will be gratefully received.

MISCELLANEOUS.

DIDEROT AND THE FRENCH ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

Among the mighty agencies which began to work for comfort and progress in the eighteenth century were the Cyclopædias. Voltaire was one of the one hundred and fifty contributors to the most famous of these teachers of useful knowledge in France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Great Britain, and her colonies. The editor-in-chief was Diderot (see the frontispiece to the present *Open Court*) who was the main contributor; his department being philosophy, and the arts and trades. For twenty years, persecuted and at times imprisoned, abandoned by his colleagues and at last deceived even by his own publishers who secretly mutilated his productions, he doggedly stuck to his task to the end. Diderot's importance in the history of thought, his excellences and shortcomings, have already been discussed in *The Open Court* (No. 519), and it remains for us only to refer to his universal interest in the sciences (Goethe called him "the most Germanic of French heads"), and to his great literary productiveness and untiring powers of application. In writing his articles for the *Encyclopædia*, it is said of him that he "passed whole days in work-shops, and began by examining a machine carefully, then he had it taken to pieces and put together again, then he watched it at work, and at last he worked it himself. He thus learned to use such complicated machines as the stocking and cut velvet looms."

The first of the thirty-five bulky volumes was published in 1751 for two thousand subscribers; and this number had more than doubled in 1765; but the last volume was not printed until 1780, by which time there were four piratical reprints and several imitations. Industrial subjects are treated with especial care; and the plates are still the best authority to show what kind of ploughs, looms, and coats were then in use. The exemption of the wealthy from taxation is denounced boldly; and so are game-laws, torture of criminals, and that system of compelling the peasants to keep up the roads, which was as deadly as the smallpox. The general tone is not disloyal or irreligious; Christianity is treated with ostensible respect; scepticism is called sinful; atheists are declared worthy of banishment; and future punishment is admitted to be eternal. Persecution, however, is condemned with great severity, as are other ecclesiastical evils; and the old fantastic systems of metaphysics are criticised keenly. Scarcely had the second volume appeared, when the literary censor told Diderot that the work would be suppressed, and advised him to hide the materials. "I have no place where they will be safe," replied Diderot. "Then I will let you have one," said Malesherbes. They were soon restored, and the philosophers resumed their work, for none of their enemies was competent to take it up.

Among the best articles in the early volumes were those on political economy by Turgot and Quesnay. The foundations of this science had already been laid by Hume, who announced in 1752 the great principle, afterwards set forth by Franklin, demonstrated still later by Adam Smith, and since found very valuable for keeping up friendly intercourse between nations, namely that each gains in wealth by the productiveness of her neighbors, and that each impoverishes herself by taxing imports.

FREDERIC MAY HOLLAND.

THE TEMPLE OF CONFUCIUS IN SHANGHAI.

The illustration accompanying the present note was intended for the article on Confucius, by Mr. Teitaro Suzuki, which appeared in the November *Open Court*.



The illustration was made from a beautiful engraving by Tyson. The part of the architecture of the temple here represented is the first portal of the entrance.

BUDDHIST MISSIONARIES OF JAPAN IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

Among the Japanese Buddhists the Shin-shu or "Sect of Truth" is the most powerful and influential. Its adherents are at the same time distinguished by great zeal. They were well represented at the Religious Parliament and sent out a number of leaflets and tracts in order that their doctrines might be presented in the true light.

We learn now that the West Hongwanji of the Shin-shu have decided to extend their missionary work to the United States of America. They have missionaries in Korea, China, the Malay Peninsula, the Hawaiian Islands, and other

countries, and have of late been emboldened to disseminate their religion among the nations of the West.

Dr. S. Sonoda and the Rev. K. Nishijima, educated at the Buddhist University of Kyoto, called "Hongwanji Daigakurin," have arrived in San Francisco, and as a first step in their work propose to gather round them their co-religionists in the Japanese community of that city. They have taken their headquarters at No. 807 Polk St., and were well received by their countrymen.

We have repeatedly expressed our strong adhesion to the principle of missionarising. We are glad to see Christians send out Christian missionaries, and we believe that a religion without missions is dead. But we think that at the same time Christianity would be greatly benefited if missions from other religions were sent to Christian countries; for an exchange of thought on the most important subject of life can only be salutary. A competition between the different religions spurs their adherents on to develop the best qualities and to be watchful in their own conduct. A religion which enjoys a monopoly in a country is apt to fall into decay.

We said lately in *Buddhism and Its Christian Critics*:

"Missionaries are religious ambassadors. Their duty consists not only in the propagation of their own religion, but also in the acquisition of a perfect comprehension of the religion of the people to whom they are sent, and Christians can justly pride themselves on the fact that all their great missionaries, such men as Duff, Judson, Hardy, Beal, Legge, and others, every one in his field, did an enormous amount of work which served to widen our own knowledge of the religious views that prevail in India, Ceylon, Burmah, and China. Indeed, had it not been for their labors, comparative religion would have made little advance. And I should not hesitate to say that the most successful part of their work consisted, not in making a few converts abroad, but in widening the horizon of the people who had sent them. Such is the advantage of an exchange of thought on the most important questions of life, that it would be a blessing all around if the non-Christian religions also decided to send missionaries on a larger scale to Europe and America in order to have their faith worthily represented among Christians, to facilitate comparison and invite investigation."

It is pleasant to notice that the Buddhists of the Shin-shu sect have taken up again the plan of missionarising, and we heartily welcome the two Buddhist missionaries who have recently arrived in San Francisco.

In order to allow our readers to note the spirit in which these strangers approach our country, we publish below extracts from a letter received from Mr Nishijima:

"I am very happy to say, we two Buddhist missionaries are heartily and sincerely welcomed by almost all the Japanese people living in the city and in all the districts of California, owing to the great thirst they feel for their own religion which they could not enjoy in this country until we opened the Buddhist Mission. And, furthermore, we find that we have many friends among the Americans who take great interest in investigating Buddhist doctrines.

"Our intention is to spread the Gospel of Buddha among the Americans who are sincere and earnest in their desire to pursue the truth, the highest truth revealed first by the enlightened Lord Buddha Sakyamuni some two thousand five hundred years ago, in India.

"We are not one-sided, however; we know that there are many strong and some weak points on each side of Buddhism and Christianity. We believe that we

Buddhists must learn from Christians, while on the other hand Christians can likewise learn from Buddhists.

"I am now very much pleased to see that our Hongwanji authorities are positively tending to the thought of spreading its religion, the true gospel of Buddha, widely abroad, by sending out not only emissaries, but also some active and able missionaries, to all important parts of the world.

"I have a very strong conviction that Buddhism is naturally destined to become the universal religion in the future, for the reason that there is perhaps no other religion equal to Buddhism, that would satisfy the refined minds of highly educated people of the twentieth century. And, at the same time, I cherish also another conviction not less strong than the above, that Buddhism, though supreme and grand and most beautiful in its doctrines as it is, may never be taken widely among mankind as their established faith as long as its followers themselves remain incompetent to prove its goodness before the public.

"I am now very fortunately called to the position in which I should like to devote myself to realize these two convictions. I feel very happy to become a martyr for the sake of mankind, but I find myself so poorly armed and so lamentably hindered by an imperfect knowledge of English that I should be overcome, no doubt, by bitter disappointments, if I had not an indestructible faith in my heart.

"I am most happy to say, however, I have a very pious belief in the boundless mercy of the Amitabhu Buddha who will assuredly support and protect me when I walk through the good and righteous path ordained by him.

"I came to America with such a belief, notwithstanding my apparent deficiency in all attainments required.

"My only goal is to attain myself and help others to attain the Maha-Nirvana, where the highest freedom and true happiness may be enjoyed, which our Lord Buddha has revealed for the first time to mankind, suffering constantly from their own passions and ignorance, inherited from previous existences." P. C.

A PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSIC.

Descartes's *Discourse on Method*, which constitutes the latest number of the Religion of Science Library,¹ a cheap series of books issued bi-monthly by the Open Court Pub. Co., was first published in Leyden, in 1637, and was followed by three brief tracts as appendices: the *Geometry*, the *Meteorics*, the *Dioptrics*.

The *Discourse on Method* was Descartes' intellectual confession of faith, his statement of his own peculiar method of reaching the Truth; the appendices were his documents of justification, specimens of the *actual* Truth that he had reached by his method. And splendid specimens they were: the invention of analytical geometry, which literally unshackled mathematical research; the researches in the theory of equations and algebraical symbolism; the enunciation of the law of the refraction of light, which is the foundation of the development of modern optics; the partial explanation of the rainbow; and so forth. All these achievements, far as they may seem from the common life, are shot through the warp and woof of our technical civilisation, and our entire spiritual and material existence bears their hidden impress.

Whether our calling, therefore, be that of a philosopher or not, and whatever be our attitude to the problems involved, the contemplation of the methods by

¹ *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* By René Descartes. Authorised reprint of Veitch's translation. With Portrait. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. Price, 25 cents.

which such unique results have been reached is of the highest concern. No one can fail to draw a most bountiful stimulus from these pages. Their freshness and independence of view, their wholesome common sense, their self-reliance, their apotheosis of Reason, are, when we consider the state of mind of the period in which they were written, almost unequalled in history. Here was an absolute break with the authority of tradition, an utter rejection of the past, an utter contempt of books, of the graces of literature and of erudition; while in their place were substituted the ideals of radical doubt, implacable critique, unerring certainty. Truth was no longer a "plurality of suffrages," the utterance of an Aristotle or a Pope; it was the outcome of right thinking and right seeing, the privilege of every man. The appeal throughout was made to "the great book of the world," to experiment, to observation. "Here is my library," said Descartes to an inquirer, as he pointed to a quartered calf he was busy dissecting.

Such an attitude would be impossible now; the present age has a real past of science behind it. But it was necessary then; the past which lay directly behind Descartes, with a few bright exceptions like Bruno and Campanella, was a past of slavish submission to authority, both in action and in thought; and the utter demolition of this past was the self-chosen task of the great recluse-philosopher who believed he had stript himself of every clog that the heritage of antiquity had placed upon man's intellect.

And here lies both the virtue and defect of his system. Descartes was primarily a mathematician. He found in mathematics, as did Kant and Comte, the type of all faultless thought—not in the traditional mathematics as such, but in mathematics as regenerated and inspirited by his own epoch-making discoveries. The geometrical analysis of Plato and the ancients was, at best, a haphazard procedure, depending almost entirely on the insight and skill of the manipulator, concerned for the logic rather than for the power of the method, and yielding in almost all cases isolated results, not general and comprehensive truths. But the method of Descartes was an engine of research; it reduced geometry largely to algebra; of the science of the eye it made a science of the mind; from a part it deduced a whole; for the rich exuberance of natural forms it substituted the economy and precision of a purely logical mechanism. Was he not justified, therefore, in pointing with pride to the maxims and rules by which his mediocre talents, as he termed them, had been enabled to advance the truth so powerfully? He was on the verge of a universal Mathematical Science, why was it not possible to construct a Universal Formal Science, manipulable with the same mechanical precision, and applicable to physics, chemistry, cosmology, biology, psychology, and theology? Why was it not possible to deduce God, man, and society from a few simple fundamental truths, as the properties of a curve were developable from an algebraical equation?

Hence resulted the Cartesian physics and metaphysics, half child of the science that he vaunted, half child of the dead tradition that he detested; for he had not stript himself entirely of the past. That is possible for no man.

Descartes stopped at Faith. His metaphysics was a rationalised theology, in which everything was merged in God,—a theistic monism. His psychology, his theory of the soul, were dualistic. Yet, despite their crudeness from the modern view, they were an advance, and despite their author's seeming submissiveness to the teachings of the Church, they were placed with his other doctrines on the Index. The very search for a "criterion of truth" was sufficient to condemn his system.

But there was in this action of the Church a presage of the disintegrating character of the new doctrines. Descartes's physics practically nullified his theology, yet he was careful not to give offence. With the fate of Bruno, Campanella, and Galileo before his eyes, he naturally felt, as a recent writer expresses it, "no vocation for martyrdom." Nonetheless he pushed his mechanicalism to the extreme and carried it to the very throne of his God, engulfing all nature and all life. With motion and extension alone, supported by the laws of geometry, he constructed the Universe. The construction was largely *a priori* and was in defiance of the experimental principles that he so highly lauded, and in contradiction to the real mechanics that Galileo had just discovered and which Descartes mistook, but it contained most of the theoretical elements of the modern mechanical explanation of nature, and its main hypotheses, as the theory of vortices, the uniform constitution of matter, etc., have persisted to this day. His ideas were, thus, more powerful than even his own application of them, and in the hands of his successors led to the undermining of the very Faith which, from prudence or conviction, he himself had desired to leave untouched.

His system, even now, as shattered by modern research, and in its ruins, with the towers of its real achievements projecting aloft, presents a magnificent spectacle, daring in its scope and execution. The defects of its construction are to be measured by the standard of its time, not by the standard which through its assistance succeeding centuries have been enabled to establish. If it appears repellent in its aspect, harsh in its rigor, it must be remembered that it came from a man to whom "there was no beauty but the beauty of truth," and to whom the natural severity of science was the proudest adornment of civilisation, and redounded most surely to the enhancement of real, practical life.

Descartes, it has been said, is the cross-roads from which the modern paths of thought diverge. He was the forerunner of Newton and Leibnitz on the one hand, and of Hume and Kant on the other. The picture presented in this book, of his mental autobiography, is one of the most pleasing chapters of the history of philosophy. It belongs to the world, from the great heart of which it sprung, untrammelled by the mustiness of the study; and its candor and manliness of view cannot, even now when most of it has become commonplace, and some of it antiquated, fail to arouse from their apathy a people who are hungering for enlightenment.

T. J. McC.

A NEW AND IMPORTANT WORK IN SOCIOLOGY.

The publication of a new work entitled *Science and Faith*,¹ by Dr. Paul Topinard, the distinguished French anthropologist, is certain to arouse much interest in the thinking world, and also to evoke not a little criticism and opposition. For the main problems of life are here boldly attacked from an independent point of view, and the tentative solution of them promulgated in the distinctest terms.

Dr. Topinard's book is essentially a contribution to sociology; but it possesses the additional merit that it has been made by an original inquirer of high rank in a department of science which constitutes the groundwork of sociology, and that consequently its conclusions have sprung from a direct and creative contact with the facts, and not from derivative and secondary theories about those facts. Whatever

¹ *Science and Faith: or Man as an Animal, and Man as a Member of Society. With a Discussion of Animal Societies.* By Dr. Paul Topinard, Late General Secretary of the Anthropological Society of Paris, and sometime Professor in the School of Anthropology. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. Pages, vi, 374. Price, \$1.50.

objections, therefore, some of its special tenets may evoke, its importance as a first-hand investigation, and the weight consequently due to its utterances, cannot be underrated.

But, while written by a specialist, the discussion is not exclusively anthropological and ethnological. The physical, historical, cultural, and psychological factors of social evolution receive the same emphasis of consideration as the biological and sociological proper.

We shall briefly indicate Dr. Topinard's central view.

To begin with, anthropology, supposing it not to concern itself with societies, discovers in man an animal only; man is in his primitive stage perforce subjective, and by a rigorous natural logic egocentric; the law of self-preservation, as determining his conduct, both towards nature and his fellow-animals, is paramount with him. Sociologically considered, therefore, man's animality, man's primitive and inherited egocentrism, is the primal source of all the difficulties that arise in society, the arch-enemy to be combated. And this contradiction, apparent or real, between the individual and society, between the social evolution as it actually is and the social evolution as we should like it to be, constitutes the problem to be elucidated. How has man been changed from an egocentric to a socio-centric animal? By what ideas? By what forms of reasoned conduct? By what organised impulses? By what forms of evolution, natural and artificial? And finally, what norm does the past furnish us for guidance in the future?

A glance at the Table of Contents will show the reader the manner in which Dr. Topinard has endeavored to solve this problem. Man as an animal, the factors and conditions of evolution, the animal family, animal and human societies, the human family, political and religious evolution, social evolution proper, the high rôle of ideas in progress, the functions of the State and of education in shaping conduct, are successively considered. We would call especial attention to the pages which deal with the evolution and differentiation of the ego, in all its multitudinous forms. Here lies the key to the situation; and the results of modern biological and psychological research on this subject Dr. Topinard has exploited to the full. The analysis of the ego, so called, furnishes the mechanism of establishing right conduct. Right conduct is originally to be based upon right reasoning, upon an adequate and comprehensive consideration, both from the individual and social point of view, of the determinative facts involved. For the purposes of practice, that reasoning is to be consolidated into fixed and automatic habits: the individual must, so to speak, be de-individualised, or rather, super-individualised; altruism, in the form of the maxim of Christ, "Love ye one another," and as a species of differentiated and enlarged egoism, is the basis of his system, habits and social instincts are the means. In a word, a rationally and socio-centrally acquired ego, mechanical in its habits and super-individual in its impulses, is to be substituted for the primordial, self seeking animal ego. This has been the method by which, in all history, right conduct has been secured; and modern psychology has found the mechanism of this method of education to harmonise with the results of its purely scientific analysis of the human soul.

T. J. McC.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

AUSWAHL AUS LUTHERS DEUTSCHEN SCHRIFTEN. Edited with introduction and notes, by *W. H. Carruth*, Professor of German Language and Literature in

the University of Kansas. Pages, lxxxii and 362. Ginn and Company, Boston.

The readers of *The Open Court* will not be unfamiliar with the name of Professor Carruth in connection with that of Luther. He has translated for us certain of the great reformer's writings, which seem to us to have still a strong interest for the modern world, and his work has always been marked by elegance and accuracy.

The present volume is not restricted by the consideration of vital current interest in the subjects, but endeavors to furnish a representative selection from the most important of Luther's writings: the great reformatory essays, those on education, on usury, and against Hans Worst, the fables, the hymns, the table-talk, the letters, and some chapters from both the Old and New Testaments. It is doubtless true, as the editor remarks, that "there is no other German writer whose work is so much praised and so little read by foreigners as Martin Luther's." It is the hope of editor and publisher that this volume will make some of Luther's best writings so accessible that the remark may be at least less true. While the text here given is essentially that of the original manuscript or first edition, the capitalisation, the punctuation, and, in a conservative way, the orthography, have been modernised. While the stricter sort of philologist may find some fault with this proceeding, it will certainly be appreciated by the much larger number of students whose chief interest lies in the thought, the vocabulary, and the style, all of which are faithfully reproduced. The book may be used with pleasure and profit by the large number of Germans who have never read anything of Luther's in the original form except the Bible and a few hymns, and also by advanced college classes in German and in the history of the Reformation.

The editor has supplied the volume with a condensed account of Luther's language and of his entire literary output in German, as well as with some fifty pages of notes on the grammatical and historical difficulties.

The history of the origin of Christianity admits of being approached from a variety of points of view, each of which in its sphere is perfectly legitimate and productive of its own special illumination. In his *Preparation for Christianity in the Ancient World*,¹ written for a young peoples' organisation of the Church of Scotland, Dr. R. M. Wenley, the popular professor of philosophy in the University of Michigan, has followed the traditional lines, and based his development of his subject upon a consideration of the social, spiritual and intellectual conditions of three nations only—Greece, Judaea and Rome. He has written an eloquent book, marked by fine powers of description and by a breadth and sympathy which are uncommon in this field. Yet we could wish he had not limited his ken to the classical and Hebrew civilisations alone, but had extended it also to that seething cauldron of religious fermentation which bubbled for centuries in Western Asia and the subtle emanations of which in time saturated the entire spiritual fabric of the Roman Empire, and prepared the way for the absorption, and more than that, the transformation, of the new doctrines. Christianity did indeed enter, as Professor Wenley says, upon a "spiritually bankrupt heritage," "a spiritual impotence curable by Christianity alone" in the Roman Empire, but it is to be remembered that the same bankruptcy and impotence endured in a far greater measure contemporaneously with Christianity for ages,—ages which differed from those preceding

¹ *The Preparation for Christianity in the Ancient World. A Study in the History of Moral Development.* By R. M. Wenley, Sc. D. (Edin.), D. Phil. (Glas.) New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming, H. Revell Company. 1908. Pages, 194. Price, 75 cents.

only in that savagery and rapine replaced the softer and more artistic vices of civilisation. So also, that vast and homogeneous unity of peoples and organisation which was prepared, as Professor Wenley says, "for its reception under the very striking providence of God," Christianity did not owe to Providence, but to Rome. This may be only a different way of saying the same thing, but by the one way there hangs a tail and by the other none. Finally, Professor Wenley has supplied a very practical moral to the purely secular results to which his vivid and picturesque review of ancient history has led him, and he has thus made his book one which will find a devout echo in the heart of every believer. He says:

"The kingdom of Jesus bore the stamp of a universality which that of Rome served but to foreshadow, and this in a half-world; His doctrines find final justification in His life as the highest and best possible for a human being; His revelation left nothing still to be revealed. And when we tend to doubt Him as, pressed by unfamiliar circumstances, we still sometimes do, we have but to turn back to the Preparation to see there our own situation and its inevitable consequences. Sometimes, in access of knowledge, we would win salvation by reason; if so, the despair of the Greek awaits us. Sometimes, elated by sense of work well done, we deem ourselves of the elect; then let us con the fate of the Jew. Most often, in our newly-acquired dominion over the earth's forces, we tend to see in nature and mechanical cause adequate explanation of spiritual life; here we have the end of the old Roman world—power without insight—for our teacher. We may not, because we cannot, go beyond Christ's own statement of the meaning to be attached to past history and to present opportunity: 'All that which the Father giveth me shall come unto me; and him that cometh unto me I will in nowise cast out.'"

There are some really ingenious conceptions broached in Thorstein Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class*,¹ and the independent thinker will find in its pages no lack of stimulus to reflexion on social topics. In Mr. Veblen's theory, the institution of the leisure class began with war and hunting, and with the discrimination between worthy and unworthy employments, in which the elements of uselessness and exploit were largely determinative. At this stage, "aggression was the accredited form of action;" and the taking of life, human or animal, was *par excellence* the "honorific" profession. As civilisation advanced, pecuniary emulation, or the collection of dollars, took the place of the collection of scalps; and the unremitting demonstration of ability to pay superseded the unremitting demonstration of ability to kill. Conspicuous consumption was the concomitant of conspicuous leisure, and there followed retinues of useless servants, wardrobes of useless clothing, schemes of useless habits, the pursuit of useless studies, in short everything that makes for inefficiency and gives evidence of exemption from the necessity to labor and of one's ability to waste one's time and substance,—from the performance of the highest offices of State and Church down to the abolition of so harmless and primordial an adornment of the human person as whiskers. There is a grim humor percolating through the interstices of Mr. Veblen's book, of which the author himself is perhaps not fully aware, but which certainly enhances the intrinsic interest of the work. The chapters on The Conservation of Archaic Traits, Modern Survivals of Prowess, The Belief in Luck, Devout Observances, and Survivals of the Non-Invidious Interest, are excellent. The *motifs* of his arguments are sometimes too strongly and persistently emphasised, and many extenuating points of view are

¹*The Theory of the Leisure Class. An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions.* By Thorstein Veblen. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1899. Pp., vi+400. Price, \$2.00.

neglected. In his terminology Mr. Veblen has made some happy selections and inventions, and thus given consistency to his thought as well as to his expression. But there is at times a harshness and strangeness in his style that is quite striking, and incline us to believe that the cultivation of literary form and of purity of speech is not altogether a "honorific" pursuit or mere evidence of reputability, as Mr. Veblen would seem to think.

Dr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, the genial pastor of All Souls' Church, Chicago, has collected into a prepossessing volume called *Jess*¹ a number of his sermons—"sermons found out of doors during the occupied vacancies miscalled 'vacations,'" and penned "in the hope of quickening a love for Nature in her everyday and near aspects . . . and emphasising thereby the Religion which includes all those that love and serve." The opening sermon, from which the book derives its title, is a delightfully conceived apotheosis of a gentle and high-spirited mare, "Jess," who carried Mr. Jones on her back, both physically and intellectually, for four years, and inspired in him the noble and poetical thoughts contained in this volume. In Mr. Jones's gospel, to have known a good horse is a liberal education. This keynote of universal sympathy runs through the entire book, which does not contain an uninteresting page. The titles of the sermons are: "Jess"; "Realising Life"; "A Dinner of Herbs"; "A Quest for the Unattainable"; "The River of Life"; "Earth's Fulness"; "Spiritual Values of Country and City"; "The Religion of the Bird's Nest"; "Near to the Heart of Nature"; "The Peace of God"; and "The Uplands of the Spirit."

Persons of a mediæval cast of mind will be charmed by the announcement that Mr. Yarmo Vedra has recently published a *Heliocentric Astrology or Essentials of Astronomy and Solar Mentality. With Tables of Ephemeris to 1910*, containing sixty-four refulgent half-tone illustrations of planets, stars, charts and diagrams, thirty-five of which are actually original drawings by Holmes W. Merton, the distinguished author of *Descriptive Mentality*. The volume is packed with hieroglyphics and mysterious esoteric signs, the function of which is to unlock the secrets of one's entire individual, social, and industrial destiny merely from a knowledge of the date of one's birth. It should also be mentioned, *en passant*, and for the special benefit of the astronomic world, that the book contains the "Harmonies, Chords, and Contrasts of the Vital forces of the Solar System." A few illustrations from classical mythology are the one redeeming feature of the book, which will be consulted by no serious person except such as are righteously curious to know the complexion of a dark and defunct, but withal harmless, art. (Philadelphia: David McKay. Price, \$1.50.)

Under the title *Voices of Doubt and Trust*, Volney Streamer, who is the pseudonymic *alter ego* of Mr. George Iles, has collected all "such candid expressions of a Soul's search for Truth, ranging from the darkness of hopeless Doubt to that radiance that fills the heart in sublimest Trust" as have come within his wide and special range of reading on religious subjects. The selections are from the foremost poetical, belletrical and scientific authors of modern times, and certainly embrace a comprehensive sphere of thought. Not only are the pleadings of such great seekers for truth as Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, George Eliot, Emer-

¹ *Jess. Bits of Wayside Gospel.* By Jenkin Lloyd Jones. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1899. Pages, 312. Price, \$1.50.

son, Tennyson and Longfellow recorded, but the sometimes not less beautiful utterances of minor authors, which lie hidden in scores of scattered publications and are not as widely known as they deserve to be. (New York: Brentano's. 1897. Pages, xxi+215.)

The latest issue of the "Nuggets" Series, published by Fords, Howard, and Hulbert, New York, consists of selections from the writings of Carlyle, Amiel Ruskin, and Charles Kingsley. The nuggets have been "gathered" by Jeanne G Pennington. The title of this attractive little volume is *Philosophic Nuggets*; we should have preferred the title, *Wisdom Nuggets*, as the selections are not exactly philosophical in the technical sense. The selections have been well made, and are excellently adapted to perusal in odd moments. (Price, 40 cents).

Dr. Jerome A. Anderson has attacked the problem of after-life in a little volume on *The Evidence of Immortality*, which has been issued in San Francisco from the press of the Lotus Publishing Company. A book which begins with a chapter on "The Exaggerated Importance of Thought" is not, in our opinion, entitled to be regarded as an important contribution to the subject, as it implies a misunderstanding of the very nature of the problem. The soul, in Dr. Anderson's theory, is a unit of consciousness; and since the nature of unity, according to Dr. Anderson, is incomprehensible (!) it would follow that the soul also is unintelligible. That one divided by one gives one, not one half, is an inscrutable mystery to Dr. Anderson as is also the fact that once one is one, and not two. The argumentation, from a Boetian point of view, is excellent. (Price, \$1 00.)

Prof. Henri Lichtenberger, of the University of Nancy, is an indefatigable Nietzsche scholar and he has now added to his recent appreciative study of the German dreamer's philosophy a collection of *Aphorisms and Selected Fragments from Nietzsche*.¹ Professor Lichtenberger has written a critical and biographical introduction to the *Aphorisms*, in which he rates Nietzsche higher as a personality than as a thinker, and expresses the belief that one can enjoy the reading of Nietzsche without necessarily sharing his convictions. The little book, which is cheap, will serve many as a substitute for Nietzsche's voluminous Collected Works, and will be easier reading.

Roman Catholic students will hear with satisfaction of the completion of the fourth volume of a *Course of Philosophy* by Dr. D. Mercier, director of the department of advanced philosophy in the Catholic University of Louvain. The title of the volume is *Critériologie générale ou théorie générale de la Certitude*.² By "criteriology," Dr. Mercier understands epistemology, the analytics of Aristotle, and the transcendental analytics of Kant, i. e., *real* logic as distinguished from *formal* logic. The book is a learned one, and shows a wide acquaintance with the history of philosophy, especially ancient and mediæval, the author adhering in the main to the views of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The former volumes of the course were entitled respectively: Logic, Notions of Ontology, and Psychology. A fifth volume on the History of Philosophy, by M. De Wulf, a colleague of Dr. Mercier, is announced.

T. J. McC.

¹ *Friedrich Nietzsche: Aphorismes et fragments choisis*. By Henri Lichtenberger. Paris: Félix Alcan, 108 Boulevard Saint Germain. 1899. Pages, xxxii, 181. Price, 2 fr. 50.

² Paris: Félix Alcan, 108 Boulevard Saint-Germain. 1899. Pages, xii, 371. Price, 6 francs.