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BIBLIOTHECA PLATONICA

An Exponent of the Platonic Philosophy.

→EDITED BY←

THOS. M. JOHNSON.



Ex hoc igitur Platonis quasi quodam sancto, augustoque fonte, nostra omnis manabit oratio.—Cicero.

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ON SOME RECENT ATTEMPTS TOWARDS ASCERTAINING THE
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF THE COMPOSITION
OF PLATO'S DIALOGUES.

May I be permitted to begin this paper with a personal reminiscence? Some thirty years ago, when I had agreed to take part in a projected Oxford edition of the chief dialogues of Plato, I was struck by the remark of a friend that while it seemed antecedently probable that all the lesser dialogues were previous to the Republic, the Sophist in particular implied a philosophical point of view considerably in advance of the definition of knowledge and opinion at the end of Rep. B. V. I reflected, however, that this observation might be coloured by some metaphysical preconception, and in editing the Sophist I resolved to test the point in question without having recourse to "metaphysical aid." I was aware also of the objections which Socher had raised against the genuineness of this and the companion dialogue, and of the reply of W. H. Thompson, who had defended them as having the general characteristics of Plato's manner. It seemed to me that the inconsistencies pointed out by Socher were too manifest to be thus lightly waived aside, and, before I published—in 1867—his objections had been reinforced by the more minute observations of Schaarschmidt. Convinced as I was that the dialogues were Plato's, I felt that the discrepancies, both of style and substance, must have some

significance. And as cognate objections had been made to the authenticity of the Laws, it seemed a question worth raising whether any affinity could be established between these works as belonging to one and the same period of Plato's literary activity. In other words, assuming the Laws to be genuine, on the authority of Aristotle, the genuineness of these other dialogues would be rendered more probable, if their peculiarities could be shown to approximate to those of what is accepted as an unquestionably genuine dialogue. The objections raised against the Laws would also thus be obviated. For the authorities which attest their genuineness represent them as Plato's latest—even as his posthumous—work: this is confirmed by several remarks of the Athenian stranger: and any differences either of matter or manner between this dialogue and the Republic would be to some extent accounted for, by discovering the existence of an interval and a period of transition. An important step would also thus have been made towards the solution of the problem started by Schleiermacher—but not solved by him—the order of the dialogues. The *Timæus* and *Critias* are confessedly later than the Republic, which is presupposed in the terms of their design. The way to test my hypothesis, therefore, was to examine what points of style and language, as well as of opinion, were "common and peculiar" to the *Sophist* and *Politicus* with the *Timæus*, *Critias* and *Laws*: *i. e.* what special features are shared by the members of this group, which are absent from the other dialogues of Plato, or less marked in them. It was in short a method of concomitant variations. The result of a somewhat tedious inquiry was to confirm my anticipation, and to include the *Philebus* also amongst the dialogues which are to be regarded as intermediate between the Republic and the *Leges*.

The only support for these views which I could find in any previous writer, was the opinion expressed by Ueberweg, but afterwards abandoned by him, when he gave up the genuineness of this group of dialogues

in deference to the criticisms of Schaarschmidt. The following passage in his "*Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischen Schriften*,"* appeared to me then, and still appears to me, to have much soundness in it:—

"The form in which the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus are composed affords the fullest confirmation of this manner of regarding them. In all these dialogues the leader of the conversation, whether he be still called Socrates or not, maintains an abundance of philosophical propositions, and the play of question and answer is little more than a transparent vehicle for positive exposition. The interlocutors are mostly youths, who have a strong respect for the deep insight and knowledge of the leader, subordinate themselves voluntarily to him, and willingly answer in his sense, so long as it is not too hard for them. He does not torment them with abstractions; which, however, they by no means despise, but only would like to have more light of illustration ("their spirit is willing but their flesh is weak"), and for this purpose they rise now and again to a still true but school boyish freedom and playful menace, beneath which, however, there is always a firm basis of secure love and respect. Their elder meanwhile is amused withal. He sometimes upbraids the boys, half in earnest, half in jest, one while for their complaints at the long wire-drawn discussion of foregone conclusions—having only formal worth, but serving to impress on them the value of logical form: or again twitting them with their youthful enthusiasm, their capricious word-splitting, their precocious dialectic shrewdness. But he humors them too; enters on an easier way; and then for the sake of variety, before the logical argument is concluded, allows them to taste of the more succulent ethical problems: or, once more, relates to his dear fellow-enquirers, who have but just outgrown their boyish days, a pretty tale, pregnant with philosophy indeed, but also giving them repose and refreshment, and strengthening them

*Wien, 1861.

for the remaining journey through the logical desert.

We have thus collected the common traits which distinguish the *Philebus*, *Sophist* and *Politicus*, and believe ourselves to be justified in grouping these dialogues together because of their substantial homogeneity of form: although the *Philebus*, in accordance with its ethical subject, stands somewhat nearer to the original Socratic manner.

Now such a mode of expression is characteristic not of one who is seeking the truth for himself in solitary research or in union with his coevals or with older friends, but rather of the veteran teacher, the honoured elder amongst his young disciples, who is minded to represent in writing his oral discussions in their true reality, although not without a certain poetical freedom. Copies of the manner of the historical Socrates these dialogues certainly are not: . . . much rather we have here indicated the peculiar manner of Plato in intercourse with his pupils.*

For some reason unknown to me, very possibly through some fault of exposition on my part,† my statements on this subject did not attract the attention of scholars. Words of commendation, for which I was most grateful, were indeed spoken and written by W. H. Thompson, Prof. Jowett and others, but they were expressed in general terms. My claim to have established the genuineness of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* and to have assigned to them their place in the order of composition of Plato's dialogues was either held to be not important or not true. And yet if the fact was so, it surely was of some importance, as implying this—that the *Republic* and the *Laws* are separated by a period of great philosophical activity, an activity which renders more conceivable the discrepancies which have troubled critics in the *Laws*, and accounts for the supposed anomalies in the interven-

*pp. 207-9.

†An awkward misprint occurs in the tabular view on p. XXXIII of my General Introduction to the *Soph.* and *Polit.* For *Critias* there read *Crito*. I was also guilty of a serious omission in not adding the *Philebus*, as exceptional, to the *Phædrus* and *Parmenides*.

ing dialogues, whose genuineness had been undeserv- edly suspected. It happens that the same opinion is now being maintained in Germany, with a greater show of precision, and on wholly separate grounds. Relying largely on Ast's Lexicon, where the treat- ment of the particles is defective, I had left this part of the inquiry nearly untouched. An Index Platonicus is still a desideratum. But in 1881 W. Ditten- berger, in *Hermes* (XVI) called attention to the fact that that formula $\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\eta}\nu$; occurs only in one-third of the dialogues, and that with varying frequency. From that point onwards the statistics of Platonic formulae have been pursued by successive inquirers. Dr. M. Schanz, for example, also in *Hermes* (XXI), pointed out (in 1886) an equally curious variation in the comparative use of $\tau\omega\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\iota$ and $\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma$, the latter being found only in a fraction of the dialogues while in some of these it has completely supplanted $\tau\omega\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\iota$. The avoidance of hiatus (noticed by F. Blass in 1874—*Alt. Ber.* II. p. 426) is another feature in which striking variations are observable—tending to the same result. The outcome of seven years of this "statistical inquiry" has been recapitulated by C. Ritter (*Untersuchungen—Stuttgart 1888*) who has also added valuable observations of his own. He seems to me not alto- gether free from the tendency to aim at more precise results than the method justifies, a tendency of which Dittenberger's argument from $\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\nu$ in Epicharmus is an amusing example. But when minor differences and uncertainties are discarded, there remains a strong consent of evidence in favour of placing the *Soph.*, *Polit.*, *Phileb.*, *Tim.*, *Criti.*, *Leges*, in a separate group. Ritter also shows some grounds for grouping *Phaedr.*, *Theæt.* (*Parm.*), *Republic.* My object in this paper is not merely to call attention to the strength of this "statistical" evidence, but to examine the significance of the main phenomenon which is thus, to my own mind at least, abundantly demonstrated.

What we have really before us is an important movement in the development of Attic prose. It is in

fact no other than the gradual prevalence over Plato's style of the rhetorical artificiality which in the earlier periods he had alternately ridiculed and coquetted and played with. We are met on the threshold of the inquiry by one of those considerations by which the mere collection of instances has to be checked. Most of the features which we have learned to identify with Plato's later manner are already present in the Phædrus—the balanced cadences—*καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεσθαι τὸ σὴν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκούσαι*—the vocabulary enriched from the facts and the earlier literature; the compromise of new-fangled compounds and derivatives, the comparative rareness of hiatus—the use of ὄντως for τῶ ὄντι, of δῆλον ὡς for δῆλον ὅτι, of ὄντως &c.—even the Ionic dative plural—all are there. But the most casual reader cannot fail to see that in the Phædrus these are but the decorations of a sort of carnival dress that is worn for this occasion only. Plato is caught by a fascination at which he himself is laughing all the while. His Socrates is *νυμφόληπτος*, a strange fluency possesses him, for Phædrus' sake he is compelled to phrase his thoughts poetically—he speaks in dithyrambs.

(I may observe in passing that the lyric rhythms *ἔρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖς ἀγωγῇ*
ἔπωννυμίαν ἔρωσ ἐκλήθη

has been strangely overlooked by commentators.) F. Blass was therefore right in saying that the avoidance of hiatus was not in itself a sufficient reason for assigning a late date to the Phædrus "*indem gerade in diesem Dialog eine gewisse Anlehnung an den hier belobten und benutzten Isokrates natürlich war.*"—(Alt. Ber. II 426.) Yet on the other hand the Phædrus has a real bearing on the question in hand. For in spite of all his persiflage it is evident that the tricks of style which Plato there parodied were exercising a powerful charm upon his mind. In the *Politicus* and *Laws*, where under the grander name of *ῥητορεία* (Polit.) the once ridiculed *ῥητορικὴ* is admitted to have a legitimate function, the ornate manner is employed

not in humorous irony, but with solemn gravity. To bring together things so disparate on account of superficial resemblances is obviously an error. But it is more reasonable to take account of any differences of this sort that are observable between the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. Here a general principle comes in which is applicable to all this class of criticism. If two writings are on the same subject-matter their differences are chronologically more significant than their resemblances. If they are on different subject-matters their resemblances are of more importance than their differences. For example, take Shakespeare's *Tempest* and *Midsummer Night's Dream*—the obvious differences of style and versification acquire additional significance from the element of pure fancy in which both dramas move. Again, in comparing *Rich. II.* with *Rom. and Jul.*, the resemblances—of frequent rhyme, euphonic amplification, and the like, are the more striking because of the essential difference between Romantic Tragedy and Historical Drama. In touching on the *Phaedrus* it is proper to advert to Teichmüller's imaginary discovery that the preface to the *Theaetetus* marks the line of cleavage between the narrative and the dramatic form. All narrative dialogues (including the *Republic*) he places earlier, all dramatic dialogues, including the *Phaedrus*, later. Now it is true that the dialogues which are now placed last on other evidence happen to be all dramatic in form, (although far less dramatic in spirit than the *Protagoras* and *Symposium*). Plato in them has followed the plan which Euclides found convenient in recording the conversation of Socrates with *Theaetetus*. But this affords only the feeblest ground for assuming in the face of stronger reasons that Plato had never previously hit on the purely dramatic mode, or that having done so he had not afterwards reverted to the form of narrative.

I will now try to exhibit in some detail the peculiarities of language in which the *Sophistes*, *Politicus* and *Philebus* are found to approximate to the *Laws*:—

and so endeavor to trace the transition towards Plato's latest style. And I will take first the particles and formulae, to which Dittenberger and others have recently directed attention. Several of these, however, may be for the present ignored, as bearing only on the difference between the Republic (with Phædr. Theæt.) and the earlier dialogues. [I quote from Ritter's Summary.]

Τί μήν, for example, although absent from many dialogues, is not noticeably less frequent in Phædr. Theæt. Repub. than in Soph. Polit. Phil. Legg. *Γέ μήν*, on the other hand, which occurs only twice in the Rep. and once each in Euthyd. Symp. Theæt. Phædr., has become a sort of mannerism in the Laws, where it occurs twenty-five times, and appears with not less frequency (taking the no. of pp. into account), in the Timæus 7 times, in the Philebus 7, in the Politicus 8, and in the Sophistes 6.

The addition of *περ* to adverbs and pronominal words is a similar mannerism.

μέχριπερ occurs only in Legg. 16 times, in Tim. 4, in Criti. 1, in Phil. 1, in Polit. 3, in Soph. 1. *ὅπηπερ* Soph. Tim. Legg. *ὄσαχῆπερ* Tim. 43E., *ὅπουπερ* Legg. 11, 927 B., *ὀπόσοιπερ* Polit. Legg. 753 B 927 C. The combined formula *τάχ' ἰσως* is another mannerism. In Legg. 11 times, in Tim. 1, in Phil. 3, in Polit. 3, in Soph. 2—(*ἰσως* alone is frequent in all the dialogues except the Timæus, Critias and Laws 4 times: *τάχα* alone occurs in all except Crito, Euthyd. Critias and Laws). *σχεδόν τι* is of course frequent in all Greek, but by a curious mannerism, which is found also in Euripides, *σχεδόν* alone without *τι* comes to be increasingly frequent, in Soph. 26 times, in Polit. 13, in Phil. 14, in Tim 9, in Criti. 4, in Legg. 122. The use of *ὄντως* is one of many coincidences between Plato's later style and Tragic Greek. For according to Stephanus the word occurs first in Euripides. It is used also by Aristophanes (in burlesque of tragedy) and by Xenophon in the Banquet, which Dittenberger has shown to be, if genuine, one of the author's latest

writings. *ὄντως* occurs 9 times in the Republic, 50 times in the Laws, whereas *τῷ ὄντι* occurs 42 times in Rep., and hardly at all in Legg. *ὄντως* is found 6 times in Phaedr., once in Cratylus, and once in the Theaetetus (*ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις*). But it is observable that in several of the places both of the Phaedrus and the Republic, where it occurs, the adverb appears in combination with the participle of *εἰμί*,—so avoiding such a combination as *τὰ τῷ ὄντι ὄντα*. And this invalidates the attempt of Schanz to derive an argument from its greater frequency in Bb. V–VII. in favour of the late composition of these books. As Ritter has already observed the fact is sufficiently accounted for by the constant recurrence of *ὄν*, *ὄντα*, *οὐσίτα* etc., in these books. But what remains to state is clearly significant: 1. *ὄντως* is absent from Lach. Charm. Protag. Euthyd. Apol. Crito, Euthyphro, Gorg. Meno, Symp., while *τῷ ὄντι* is present in all of these except the Charm. Crito and Meno. 2. *τῷ ὄντι* occurs once in Soph. and is absent from Polit. Phileb. Tim. Criti. Legg., while *ὄντως* occurs in Soph. 21 times, in Polit. 11, in Phileb. 15, in Tim. 8, in Legg. 50. The use of *σχεδόν*—almost, without *τι* following, is also a Euripidean idiom (Soph. Trach. 43.: *σχεδόν δ' ἐπίσταμαί τι πῆμα ἔχοντά νιν* is accounted for by *τι πῆμα* absorbing *τι*). Scattered instances occur in Charm. (1), Apol. (2), Crito (1), Gorg. (3), Phaed. (2), Phaedr. (4), Rep. (7); but these bear no proportion to its frequency in Legg. (122), Soph. (26), Polit. (13), Phileb. (14) Tim. (9), Critias (4 in 15 pp. St.). *τὸ νῦν* or *τὰ νῦν* for *νῦν* is clearly a tragic form. Single instances of this appear in Charm. Protag. Phaed. Theact. Rep. as against Soph. (5), Polit. (5), Phileb. (9), Tim. (7), Criti. (3), Legg. (79). *μῶν* in questions (also tragic) occurs in Charm. (2), Euthyd (3), Phaed. (1), Meno (3), Theact. (4), Rep. (3); but more often in Soph. (12), Polit. (8), Phileb. (10), Legg. (29). *ἐρρήθη* instead of *ἔλεγον* is found in Rep. (1), Polit. (6), Legg. (8).—There are few opportunities for it in Tim. and Critias. *χρεῶν* for *χρη* is only found

in Soph. Polit. Tim. Criti. Legg. (57). Another idiom not tragic indeed but Ionic is the use of *καθάπερ* for *ὥσπερ*. *Καθάπερ* appears occasionally in Lach. (1), Euthyd. (1), Cratylus (2), Gorg. (1), Symp. (2), Theaet. (2), Phaedr. (4), Rep. (6); but in the Republic for instance it may generally be distinguished from *ὥσπερ*, of which in the Rep. there are 212 examples. Now in Legg. *ὥσπερ* only occurs 24 times and *καθάπερ* 148. The number of times these words are used in the Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Criti. is as follows:

	Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Criti.				
<i>ὥσπερ</i>	9	16	9	10	2
<i>καθάπερ</i>	14	34	27	18	5

Bonitz observes (*Index Aristotelicus sub voce καθάπερ*) "*καθάπερ* *vi et usu ab ὥσπερ non videtur discerni prope.*" Another Aristotelian use will I think be found to be anticipated in Plato's later style—that of which Bonitz says (*s. v. δε*) "*δέ post negationem ubi ἀλλά expectes.*" Legg. II. 666 E and Soph. 248 D. Another formula which shows a marked increase is *εἰς* or *κατὰ δύναμιν* in place of *εἰς* or *κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*; Euthyd. (1), Phaedr. (1), Rep. (6), Soph. (3), Polit. (11), Phileb. (4), Tim. (10), Criti. (1), Legg. (63). So much for the particles and connecting formulae.

The Ionic dative plural form was noticed by me as a point of resemblance between the Politicus and Laws, but I had failed to observe that in the best MSS. it appears also in the Phaedrus and Republic. The facts as stated by Ritter are as follows: The form is absent from all the Dialogues except Phaedr. (3), Rep. (6?), Polit. (4), Tim. (2), Legg. (85). Its absence from the Soph. and Phileb. marks the fact that it belongs to passages which have a rhetorical colouring. The number of places in the Rep. is reduced to 5 by the fact that *κνεναγυρίαισι* in B. X. is part of a question. The remaining instances are confined to *αὐτοῖσι* (bis) emphatic and not attributive, *μεγάλοισι* (*τέλεσι*) in a highly wrought passage, *σμηκροῖσι*, and *θεοῖσι*, the last two coming in a pas-

sage which is largely coloured by poetical quotations. The 3 instances in the Phaedrus are of a bolder kind and have a more obvious rhythmical intention: 240 Β ἡδίστασιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει, 276 Β ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτώ, 278 Β ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς (the penthemim avoiding the concurrence of three spondaic words). But in the Laws the introduction of such forms has become a confirmed trick of style, and is by no means confined to words in common use. (Vid. Stallb. Legg. Prolegom. p. LXVII). Of the four instances in the Politicus, one *τούτοισι* 279Ε is read by Bekker as *τουτοισι*; the other three are 262Α *διπλασίοισι*, 294 Ε *ταῖσιν ἀγέλαις*, 304Ε *ἐπομένοισιν*.* The same love of ear-filling, and rhythmically balanced expression has led to the more frequent use of the auxiliary verb, of which *πρέπον ἂν εἴη* (for the simpler *πρέποι ἂν*) quoted by Ritter from Tim. and Legg. is a good example. *χρεῶν ἔστι* for *χρη*, noted above, is of course another. For the increasing prevalence of such forms in the Soph. and Polit. see General Introduction, p. XXXIV. As there observed periphrases are altogether more frequent, and amongst other instances the periphrastic use of *φύσις*, also common in Aristotle, may be specially noted: *ε. γ. ἡ τοῦ θατέρου φύσις*; and the neuter article with a genitive, *ε. γ. τῷ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως*, in Polit.

II. *Diction*. In tabulating the dialogues so as to bring out the fact that many words were "common and peculiar" to a certain section of them, † I observed that the position of the Phaedrus and Parmenides in that list,—and I should have added "of the Philebus"—was accounted for by exceptional circumstances. I meant to say that both from subject-matter and treatment the vocabulary of the Phaedrus was exceptionally rich, while that of the Parmenides, and in a less degree of the Philebus, in consequence of the dry abstractedness of the discussions in them, is exceptionally poor. This being so, a somewhat closer analysis

*For MS. divergences on this point see Schneider's Rep. I. p. 222.

†Gen. Introd. p. XXXIII.

of the Phaedrus and Philebus becomes advisable, and the case has to be stated in a form which takes account of quality as well as amount. (The Parmenides is not immediately in question).—The Phaedrus has more than 170 words which occur in no other dialogue, *i. e.* more than 3 for every page of Stephanus. The Theaetetus, which may be taken as representing Plato's normal style, has 93 words not occurring in other dialogues, *i. e.* less than 1½ for every page. The peculiar words of the Phaedrus are borrowed from all literature especially poetic literature, whether Epic, Lyric, or Tragic. Such words as ἄπτερος, βιοτεύω, γάννυμαι, γλαυκόματος, γνάθος, ἐξάντης, ἔτυμος, ἥνιοχῶ, καθαιμάσσω, λιγυρός, μελίγηρυς, μετεωροπορῶ, μῆνιμα, ὀμόζυξ, περίφοβος, πολύπλοκος, *πτερόφοιτος (coined), *πτερώννυμος, τελεσίουργός, τερατολόγος, ὑποβρύχιος, ὑψαύχην, and others which the beauty of Phaedrus extracts from the full breast of Socrates, are foreign alike to the style of the Rep. and Legg. What then is the peculiar element of diction which the Phaedrus owns in common with the Timaeus and the Laws. If I mistake not it consists chiefly (1) of physiological words, *i. e.* denoting natural phenomena, especially physical states and processes, (2) of words borrowed from the dialect of tragedy, and (3) of words having a religious or mystical significance.—(1). Not Isokrates only, but also Hippocrates the Asclepiad, is mentioned with commendation in the Phaedrus (270 C). And, whatever may be the significance attaching to that circumstance, the following words occurring in Phaedr. and Tim. and in no other dialogue, may be noted as significant under the present heading: Βρέχω, γαργαλίζω, διαθερμαίνω, διαχωρέω, ἐπιμίγνυμι, ερείδω, ἴσχιον, καταχορής, κολλάω, πτερον, συμφράττω, φάτνη. If now we include the Laws, Tim. Criti. Phaedr. the following words peculiar to this small group belong to the same category: ἀκέφαλος Phaedr. Legg., ἀπορρέω Ph. Tim. Criti. Legg., ἀσήμαντος Ph. Legg., διατρέχω Phaedr. Legg., εἰφυσίς Phaedr.

Legg., ἐμπλέκω Ph. Legg., εὐροια Ph. Legg. (εὐρους Tim. Legg.), προσάντης Phaedr. Legg., σπάω Phaedr. Legg., συνορώ Phaedr. Legg., ὑπεραίρω Phaedr. Legg., ὑπερόρια Ph. Legg., ὕψος Ph. Tim. Criti. Legg.

(2). The Phaedrus borrows even more largely from Epic and Lyric sources than from tragedy: but the poetical words which it has in common with Tim. Criti. Legg. are mostly of the tragic or old Attic type, e. g.: ἀηδία Phaedr. Legg., αἰμύλος Phaedr. Legg., ἄκαρπος Ph. Tim., ἄνους Phaedr. Tim. Legg., ἄπαις Phaedr. Legg., ἄσιτος Phaedr. Legg., ἐκασταχοῦ Phaedr. Criti. Legg. (Thuc. i. c. old Attic), ἐμμανής Phaedr. Tim. Legg., ἐμπεδόω Phaedr. Legg., εὐπειθής Phaedr. Legg., θαλλός Phaedr. Legg., θήρειος Phaedr. Tim., νομή Phaedr. Tim. Criti. Legg., παμμέγας Phaedr. Tim., παράνοια Ph. Legg., πρόνοια Phaedr. Tim., συμμιγής Phaedr. Legg., τασεινός Phaedr. Legg., τύμβος Ph. Legg., ῥόδός Phaedr. Legg.

It is worth noticing in illustration of the divergence of the Phaedrus and Laws in this respect that while ἐντόπιος occurs in the Phaedrus and the Phaedrus only, there is a similar use of ἔντοπος, standing likewise alone, in the Laws. This small fact helps to make a characteristic difference of rhythm.

(3). Words having religious or mystical associations which are common and peculiar to Phaedr. Tim. Legg., are δαιμονίως (Tim.), ἐνθουσιαστικός (Tim.), ἐποπτεύω (Legg.), ὀρμάζω (Legg.), ὀρκωμοσία (Citi.), συνένχομαι (Legg.).

(4). The following words in the Phaedrus are of comparatively late formation: ἀνήκοος, ἀπειλητικός, ἀπειρόκαλος, ἀποπολεμείω, ἀχρώματος, δημωφελής, διακωλυτής, δικαιοτήριον, δοξόσοφος, ενθουσιασις, εὐπάτητος, ἰσομέτρητος, κακηγορία, λογοδαίδατος, μετεωρολογία, πολυήκοος, προσπαραγράφω, πτερορρῶ, συγχροβαντιάω, τερατόλογος, ὑπερουραίτος, ὑψηλόνοος, ψιλῶς, ψοφοδεής, ψυχαγωγία.

Leaving the Parmenides for the present, I pass

to the Philebus. I have admitted that the proportion of "late words" in the Philebus, *i. e.* of words common and peculiar to it with the Timaeus, Critias and Laws, is below that of the and Republic, even of the Phaedr. and Symposium, and this fact appears to contradict the evidence of the more recent statistical inquiry, as well as the other data which I myself adduced in 1867. But the anomaly is explained, as I have said, by the restricted vocabulary of a dialogue, which deals so exclusively, as the Philebus does, with metaphysical and psychological formulæ.—In 57 pp. St. the Philebus has only 55 peculiar words, *i. e.* less than 1 a page, as against 3 in the Phaedrus and 1½ in the Theaetetus. Of these, notwithstanding the prosaic cast of the dialogue, at least 8 are tragic, ἀναίνομαι, ἀναπολέω, ἄϊνος, μίσητός, περιβόητος, προχαίρω, χαρμονή, ψευδῶς, while three are Epic, ἄσπαστός, μισγάγκεια and θέρομαι, and one ἐπιπολή is more Ionic than Attic. The majority of the list are compounds with *ινα*, *δια*, *εν*, *επι*, *προς*, *ενν*, and *υπεξ*:—but the list also includes the following 18 late derivatives:

- 3 nouns in *μα*: ἀπόρημα, δυσχέρασμα, προσδοκημα.
 1 " " *μος*: στοχασμός.
 4 " " *σις*: ἀναχώρησις, θεώρησις, στοχασίς, φαρμαξίς.
 1 " " *της fem.*: διδυμότης.
 4 " " *ια*: δυσπαλλαξία, εὐδοκμία, δοξοκαλία, αὐτάρκεια.
 2 adj's. " *ης*: πνευματώδης, περαιοδής.
 2 " " *ικός*: νηφαντικός, ξυλοργικός.
 1 verb " *αίνω*: ἀνοηταίνω.

There are 4 vernacular words: κανών, προσαγωγών, τόρνος, ψωρά.

If we now examine the special vocabulary of the group consisting of the Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws, we find that while the contribution of the Philebus is not large it is notwithstanding significant:

1. Tragic words—20, including ἀμήχανος, ἄμικ-

τος, ἐνδίκως, κάρως, λῶν, πάθη, περιφανής, τέκνον, τέρψις.

2. New compounds—9, including ἀποσωζώ, διαμερίζω, ἐξάμα, συγκεφαλαιῶμαι.

3. Late derivatives—10, including ἀναισθησία, δοξοσφά, ἐπιχειρήσις, πῆξις, συστημα, σωμασαία.

4. Physiological words—10, including διάκρισις, σύγκρασις, σύγκρισις, σύμμιξις, ὑπομυγνυμι, ὑποδοχή.

The Phaedrus affects ornateness, novelty, and copiousness of diction, and in doing so naturally anticipates many of the peculiarities which have become fixed as characteristic of the special vocabulary of the latest dialogues: the Philebus on the other hand is below the average, in point of copiousness, and yet when its peculiarities are sifted, not according to number, but according to kind, it is found to partake in diction also of the special features which mark the Timaeus, Critias and Laws.

Having thus accounted for the anomalous position of these two dialogues in point of diction, I will now come back to the main point and try to bring into a general view the characteristics of the special vocabulary which has been shown to belong to the group consisting of Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Criti. Legg.

Leges. Every reader of the Laws must have been struck by the frequency of old Attic and Ionic words and forms. Stallbaum tries to account for this by the nature of the subject and the gravity of phrase belonging naturally to a book on legislation. But this feature is present more or less in all the six dialogues. Dionysius must have had them in mind when he coupled Plato and Thucydides as having written in the earlier Attic. The familiar remark that the later prose tends to run into Iambic and Paëonic rhythms might also be largely illustrated from these writings.

Such obvious facts as the use of τέκνον for παιδίον, πάθη for πάθος, βλάβος for βλαβή, of κλαυθμονή for ὀλοφρημός, of τέρψις and χαρμονή side by side with ἡδονή,—the preference of full-sounding words

like *φράζειν* and *φλαῦρος*, the fondness shown for *νᾶμα*, *ἐπιρροή*, *γεννήτωρ*, *ἀμαθαίνω* and the like, is apparent to the least observing student. *Ίσυχαιός* is preferred to *ησύχιος*, *εἰνεκα* to *ένεκα* (if we may trust the MSS.), *Ἀπόλλωνα* to *Ἀπόλλω*. The mannerism of the style is shown not only by the introduction of different forms, but by the frequent use of some which occur sparingly elsewhere. Thus MS. evidence favors *πτάσθαι*, *φευξέισθαι* (Schanz Vol. XII. p. XVIII.), in the Laws more than elsewhere in Plato. Sometimes a form occurs which, though true to analogy, is altogether new—such as *ἠπιστήθη* (from *ἐπίσταμαι*) 686D. A noticeable change is the substitution of *γυμναστίης* for *παιδοτριβίης*.

The following 40 examples are taken from a list of 150 tragic, Ionic and old Attic words which appear in the Laws and not elsewhere in Plato: *αἰστωρ*, *ἀκταίνω*, *ἄλυρος*, *ἄπολις*, *ἄρτιπους*, *ἀτυχής* (Antiphon), *ἄχόρευτος*, *βασιλις*, *γαμετή*, *γέννα*, *δολιχός*, *ἔκτοκος*, *ἔρεισμα*, *εὐβατος*, *ἐφέστιος*, *θράσος*, *κλαυθμονή*, *κλυδών*, *λύσιμος*, *μαργός*, *νεηλύς*, *οἰκισμός* (Solon), *ὀμίλημα*, *ὄττα*, *παίδοτος*, *παιδουργία*, *παπαί*, *πέλανος*, *πέυκη*, *πλησιόχωρος* (Her.) *ρέζω*, *σπορά*, *συνδικέω*, *σφριγάω*, *τημελέω*, *τητάσμαι*, *τόλμημα*, *επέρμετρος* *φορβάς*, *χόρευμα*, *χρόνιος*.

The following may be taken as a specimen of the words which appear in the Laws for the first time. Some of these also have an Ionic flavour; others are new derivatives and compounds: *ἀναθόλωσις*, *ἀπηγόρημα*, *γλυκυθυμία*, *γοώδης*, *διαθετήρ*, *διαφωνία*, *δυσκληρέω*, *ἐνρυσθμος*, *ἐξειλησις*, *ἐπιτηδειότης*, *έτεροφωνία*, *εὐθημονέομαι*, *θρασυξενία*, *καλλιφωνος*, *κηπεια*, *κλεμμάδιος*, *κόσμημα*, *λοιδόρησις*, *μακαρϊότης*, *μεγαλόνοια*, *μετακόσμησις*, *μοναυλία*, *ὄχεταγωγία*, *παιδοποιησις*, *πατρονομέομαι*, *σκάμμα*, *σωφρονιστώς*, *ταπεινώσις*, *τάφρευμα*, *φιλοστοργέω*, *φοίτησις*, *φωνασκέω*.

Timacus. It would be stupid to ignore the great differences of style which exist between the Laws and the Timaeus. The high-wrought concentration, the

sustained movement, the strong energy of the Timaeus might be effectively contrasted with the leisurely progress, the lengthy diatribes—even the wordiness of the Laws. Yet the two dialogues have large elements in common, and as compared with the Republic they exhibit alterations of manner, in the same direction. At present we are concerned with the vocabulary.

Of 81 words common and peculiar to the Timaeus and Critias considered as one dialogue (Tim. 68, Critias 13), about 40 are tragic, of which the following are specimens: ἀθλίω, ἀπειθής, διαπλέκω, δυσθυμία, εξαίσιος, ἐξερθῶ, εὐαγής, εὐψυχία, εὐψυχος, ισάζω, ισάριθμος, κύτος, κῶλον, μεταστασις, ξενων, παιδευμα, πημελῶς, σαλεύω, φράττω.

Of 348 words (nearly 4 to a page St.) which are peculiar to the Timaeus and Critias, *i. e.* not found elsewhere in Plato, some may be attributed to the special subject. But about $\frac{1}{3}$, more than 100, belong to the language of tragedy. Amongst them are ἄγένητος, αἰνιγμός, ἄλυτος, ἀντεριδῶ, ἀναρθρος, ἄση, αὐλών, βασιλείδης, δύσφορος, ἐδεστός, εὐβοτος, εὐήμερος, εὐκαρπος, εὐτροχος, Ολίβω, καθαγίζω, κάρτα, κατηρεφής, κεραυνός, κτήνος, κτυπός, μένος, νοτερός, οκέπη, οτενωποσι, πεδάω, πέραν, πειθύμως, συντόμως, σφυγγω, τιμαλφής, τραχηλός, ὑποστεγος, φλόξ, χειρουργέω, χλόη, ὠχρός.

I would call attention particularly to αἰνιγμός, ἄση, κάρτα, μένος, οκέπη, and also to φάντασις (with φαντασία); of late forms in the Timaeus some of the most remarkable are ἀδιάπλαστος, ἔγερσις, ἔγκουμα, ζύμωσις, Θερμαντικός, ἱμαντώδης, κηροειδής, ὄξυήκος, ὄργανοποιία, παραφροσύνη. The vocabulary of the Philebus has been already characterized, and has been shown to contain, if not a large, yet a marked and noticeable element of the same peculiar diction.

I proceed to show that the diction of the Sophist and Politicus, apart from the special subject-matter of either dialogue, has much in common with that which

has been shown to belong to the Philebus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws. I observe 54 coincidences of this kind between the Sophist (52 pp.) and the Laws, and 72 similar coincidences between the Politicus (54 pp.) and the Laws,—in all 126.

I have noted 36 coincidences of this kind between the Sophist and Timaeus and Critias, and 42 coincidences between the Politicus and Timaeus and Critias,—in all 78.

The number of tragic words in Soph. Polit. is 116. Of these the following are specially noticeable: *ἀγήρως* (Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.), *ἀνάστατος* (Soph. Legg.), *ἀντίσταθμος* (Soph.), *ἄπλετος* (Soph. Legg.), *αρχαιοπρέπης* (Soph.), *γενειῶ* (Polit.), *δεσπότις* (Polit. Tim. Legg.), *δῆθεν* (Polit.), *διωγμα* (Polit.), *δύσις* (Polit.), *ἐξανθέω* (Polit.), *εργαλείον* (Polit.), *εὐλαβής* (ὤς) (Soph. Polit. Legg.), *καλαρτήης* (Soph.), *καταγμα* (Polit.), *κρηπίς* (Polit. Legg.), *κρυφαῖος* (Soph. Tim.), *νωγής* (Polit. Tim.), *ὄαξι* (Polit.), *πάλη* (Soph. Polit. Legg.), *πάμπαν* (Polit. Tim. Legg.), *πλαστῶς* (Soph. Legg.), *ρύμη* (Soph.), *σέπασμα* (Polit. Legg.), *στέγασμα* (Polit. Tim. Criti.), *στέλλω* (Soph. Polit. Legg.), *συμφυής* (Soph. Tim. Legg.), *σύνδρομος* (Polit. Legg.), *σύννομος* (Polit. Criti. Legg.), *σύντροφος* (Polit. Legg.), *σωτήριος* (Polit.), *τολμηρός* (Soph. Legg.), *φράγμα* (Polit.), *χαυνός* (Soph. Polit. Legg.).

I have dwelt thus long on the subject of diction, because it presents so many points that are palpably appreciable. On the less tangible subject of structure and rhythm, I have not much to add to the remarks already made in my Introduction. But a word of reply is due to some friendly objector, who urges that the tone and colouring of these dialogues is dramatically adapted to suit the presence of Timaeus, or of the Eleatic Stranger. There is some truth in this; for each dialogue has its specific cast. But why should Timaeus, the Eleatic Friend, Socrates in the Philebus and the Athenian Stranger in the Laws talk so nearly in the same tone and style,—a style elaborately peri-

odlic, and yet grammatically inexact?

Legg. 644D. *θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῳῶν θείον, εἴτε ὡς παίγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινὶ ξυνεστηκός.*

Tim. 53B. *νῦν δ' οὖν τὴν διάταξιν αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρητέον ἕκαστων καὶ γένεσιν ἀήθει λόγῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς δηλοῦν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παιδευσιν ὁδῶν, δι' ὧν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα ἀνάγκη, ξυνέψεσθε.*

Phileb. 53BC. *σμικρὸν ἄρα καλαρὸν . . . καλλίων γίγνεται' ἄν. cf. 67 sub. fin.: οἷς πιστεύοντες . . . ἑκάστοτε λόγων.*

Soph. 258D. *τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν . . . τό μὴ ὄν.*
 Polit. 284E. 288E.

And why, within the limits of the same dialogue, should Socrates, Critias and Hermogenes adopt the tone of Timaeus; or Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus and the younger Socrates speak after the fashion of the new acquaintance from Magna Graecia? Why should Protarchus ape the nearly adopted manner of Socrates? Why should Kleinias and Megillus, although less instructed, catch so exactly the style of their Athenian companion for the day?

From the Timaeus:

Tim. *ἡμᾶς δὲ . . . ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν* 27CD.

Krit. *ἦν γὰρ δὴ . . . διαφερόντως* 23C.

Herm. *ὄν καὶ νῦν . . . ἂν ἐπιτήδειός ἐστιν.* 20D.

Socr. *τὸ μὲν οὖν προσήμιον . . . ἐφεξῆς πέραινε* 29D.

Philebus: 13 BC. (Protarchus).

Sophist: 217C. (Socr.), 265D (Theaet.).

Politicus: 257B. (Theodorus).—

Legg. VI. 761D. *Ἀθην. ἔ.ν. ἐπ' ὀνήσει καμνόντων τε νόσοις . . . βελτιοῦσα συχνῶ.*

Legg. VI. 769C. *Ἀ.ἔ. . . πρὸς γὰρ τέλοι . . . μακρῶ.*

Legg. VI. 752B *Κλεινίας. περιτί καὶ ποῖ βλέπων—τὰ νῦν.* Surely the resemblance between the Athenian and the Cretan is much closer than that between the several Athenians in the Symposium.

I have tried to show not only that these six dialogues are rightly grouped together at the end on

grounds of style and language, but also I have endeavored to indicate the nature of the change in Plato's manner of writing, which this fact invokes.

1. A measured and elaborately balanced gravity or even ponderosity of utterance—in which the rhetorical artifices which he once half affected, and half contemned, are passing into a settled habit of *ῥητορεία* and conscious impressiveness. The avoidance of hiatus, and increasing use of the Ionic dative plural, are amongst the symptoms of this change.

2. The growing prevalence of certain particles and formulae partly for euphony, and partly to suit with an antique and tragic colouring. This is brought out by Dittenberger, Schanz, and the other authorities summed up by C. Ritter.

3. A range of diction passing far beyond the limits of "Attic purity," and reverting in a striking degree to the use of Ionic and old Attic words, so forming a literary dialect of a peculiar stamp, having a large tragic or Ionic element. Macaulay speaks of Milton's prose as "stiff with cloth of gold." In like manner Plato's later style is stiffened while the tendency to adopt new derivatives, already active in the Republic, with a sort of *τραγικὸς λήρος* or antique embroidery, is here found at a more advanced stage.

4. The balancing and interlacing of phrases is carried in these dialogues to a degree of artificiality, far beyond what appears even in the Phaedrus, Republic and Theaetetus.

III. If we turn now from the form to the substance of these six dialogues (Soph. Polit. Phileb. Tim. Criti. Legg.) we shall find in them an increasing sense of the remoteness of the ideal, without any diminution of its importance. This tendency is noticed by Prof. Jowett in Rep. IX *s. f.* and there is a trace of it in Theact. (digression)*. They are pervaded

*But it is more distinctly present in Polit. Phileb. Tim. Criti. Legg.—in Polit. and Laws in the necessity for providing against human weakness, and imitating the divine good from afar off—in Tim. in the delegation to lower deities of the creation of man,—and in the Philebus in the wide gulf that is set between human and divine intellect, and between the good and pleasure.

with a deep feeling of the distance between man and God, and of the feebleness and dependence of mankind. There is also in all of them a strong determination to face and cope with the burden and the mystery of the actual world, to provide support for human weakness, alleviations of inevitable misery. The presence of Necessity in the universe and in life is acknowledged, in order that it may be partially conquered.

If this implies a change of any kind, it is a change not of creed, but of mental attitude, induced, as we may gather from indications that are not obscure, by a larger acquaintance with the contemporary world, and by the writer's own experience in wrestling with intellectual and practical difficulties.

Metaphysics.—In their metaphysical aspect (in considering which, the *Laws* are not immediately in question) these dialogues turn chiefly on a few highly abstract notions, the essential forms of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, motion, rest, limit, finite, infinite,—and these are no longer merely contemplated in their separate reality, but studied in their connexion with phenomena and with one another. The method becomes less ontological and more logical. 'The idea of good' is approached not merely through Socratic definitions, or figurative adumbration, but through the direct analysis and manipulation of primary conceptions, such as measure and symmetry. The five *γέννη* of the *Sophist*, the description of the ideas in the *Politicus* as *τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεία*, the metaphysical categories (as one may venture to call them) of the *Philebus*, belong to a more exact method of philosophizing than had been thought of when the *Phaedo* was written, and one which was only vaguely anticipated in the *Republic* as 'the longer road.' The *Θατίρων φύσις* and *μικτῆ οὐσία* of the *Soph.* and *Phileb.* are resumed and applied in the *Timæus*. In the *Laws*, as we have said, there are but few references to metaphysical problems. But this is in keeping with the remoteness of the actual from the ideal: and the at-

tentive student is aware of an ever-growing sense of the significance of measure and of number, and a fixed belief in the priority and supremacy of Mind.*

Logic.—The dialectical achievement in the Sophist is the pivot of the logical movement. Plato found that thought was being sacrificed to the instrument of thought. Zeno had jammed the weapon of Parmenides. The Sophistes brings for the first time into a clear light the nature of predication, of classification, and of proof, and places the science of logic on a rational footing. The effects of this discussion—which is incidentally continued in the Politicus,—are apparent in the method of that dialogue, and even in the elaborate distinctions of the Laws. As Mr. Paul Shorey has well said, the practical aim throughout has been 'to obtain a working logic.'

Psychology.—This dialectical advance accompanies, and indeed occasions, a corresponding progress in psychological analysis—especially in the Philebus. The results of this process—which is familiar to the readers of the two dialogues—may be observed in comparing Rep. VI. *sub. init.* with Legg. III. 644-6, VI. 770D. *ἐκ τίνος ἐπιτηδευμάτων . . . ἡ μάθημάτων ποσὶ τινῶν.* See also, for psychological statements, amongst other passages, Tim. 42A, 69D.

Physics.—In all these dialogues, and not in the Timaeus only, there is a growing interest in production (*γένεσις*) and a tendency to look at things from the point of view of the universe rather than of man. See especially the myth in the Politicus and the reference to prehistoric cataclysms in the Laws: also Soph. 265C, and Phileb. 59A compared with Tim. 59CD *τῆν τῶν εἰσότηων μύθων . . . φρόνημον ποιοῖτο.* The physical conditions of mental states, especially of sensation, pleasure and pain, and of moral evil, are much more dwelt upon than in earlier dialogues. The importance of health and of the care of the body generally, is more fully recognized. The allusion to medicine and gym-

*Measure is, indeed, the first and last word of Platonic metaphysics—the *μέτρον* of the Protagoras—the *μέτρον* of Phileb.

nastic in the Republic are often in strong contrast to those in the Timaeus and Laws, where the *παιδαγωγία* *ν* *σημάτων* is recommended, not condemned. A great advance in clearness of cosmological conception is implied in the discussion of *ἄνω* and *κάτω* in the Timaeus as compared with the use made of the same notion in the Phaedrus and Republic.

Politics.—In the Republic, Plato already acknowledges that it is hard to realize the ideal. Notwithstanding, he is obstinately bent on realizing it. He will not swerve aside in deference to opinion or circumstance, but will wait till circumstances favour, and till opinion comes round. He is sure that mankind are not unreasonable, if they could but hear the truth.—Before he wrote the Laws, a varied intercourse with men had dashed his confidence and lessened his hope, but had not impaired his zeal for the improvement of mankind. He is now ready to adapt himself to human infirmities, and the higher road having proved impracticable, to seek a *modus vivendi* that may embody as much of righteousness and wisdom as the race will bear. The work is full of the gentleness and consideration of an old age (*γῆρας γὰρ ἤβης ἥπιώ τ' ὀρον μακρῶ*—Aesch.) in which

Long experience doth attain

To something of prophetic strain.

Now the crisis of this transition from optimism to "meliorism," is reflected in a most interesting manner in the Politicus. Plato has evidently been made to feel that in conceiving his ideal Republic he has been grasping at the moon. He has been legislating for the age of Cronos, during the converse cycle which is said to be under the Government of Zeus. The dialogue is instinct with a suppressed bitterness, which time had mellowed when he wrote the Laws. But the author is not less keenly bent on finding a practicable way. The problem he now sets before him is how to bring scientific thought to bear upon the actual world. Despairing of spontaneous obedience to a perfect will, he has recourse to legislation, as a second best course.

by which men may imitate from afar off the free movement of Divine Reason. The art of legislation is compared to that of weaving (a metaphor repeated in the Laws), and the same stress is laid, as in many passages of the Laws, on the importance of combining, by breeding and by education, the energetic with the gentler elements of human nature. The provision of a *δ/αδοχ/α/ς* (Legg. VI.) to supplement the work of the legislator is in accordance with the hint given in the Politicus, and may be contrasted with the contempt showered on *ε/παν/ο/ρ/ω/σι/ς* in Rep. IV. The opening of the Timaeus makes a deeper plunge into actuality by raising this almost impossible demand: 'How did the citizens of the ideal state (in that far off time beyond our ken) comport themselves?' This belongs to the same determination to be practical, to realize abstractions in the concrete,—to make the step from *ο/υ/σι/α* to *γ/ε/ν/ε/ι/ς* which finds a different and less confident application in the Politicus and Laws. The same spirit shows itself in the admission of the actual (or approximate) square etc., in Phileb.,—which is necessary if a man is to find his way home.

Ethics and Religion.—In these last dialogues, more than elsewhere in Plato, as already said, we are made conscious of the distance between Man and God. The imitation of the Divine is still the highest duty, but it is an imitation from very far off. Although a theory of *μ/ε/τ/ε/μ/ε/ψ/ι/χ/ω/σι/ς* is retained, yet the proud claim to *α/π/α/θ/α/να/π/ι/σ/μ/ο/ς* the life which is a meditation of death, even the formation of the inward man after the pattern in the Heavens, are no longer the leading notes of the new strain. Nor is the philosopher singly bent on saving his own soul. The speakers rather strive after the partial overcoming of evil with good, the infusion of a spirit of generosity which may gradually leaven the inherent selfishness of men: the institution of a rule of life, which may prevent society from foundering in the weltering sea of politics. The human and Divine *νο/ι/ς* are kept apart in the Philebus, as they are not in Rep. VI.

the elements of soul which the Creator dispenses to the *δημιουργοί* in the *Timaeus* are not of pristine purity *ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα*. The faintness which still attends the trust in "the larger hope," could hardly appear more strikingly than in the *Politicus* myth.

History.—Lastly in these six dialogues, to which the *Menexenus* should perhaps be added, we find a more distinct anticipation, than elsewhere in Plato, of two essentially modern conceptions, those the History of philosophy and also of a philosophy of history.

In the *Sophist*, philosophical method is for the first time expressly based on criticism, (although this step had been partially anticipated in the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*). The same plan is carried out in parts of the *Philebus*. The *Hermocrates*, on the other hand, was to have been an ideal History. And in speculating on the nature and origin of legislation, the Athenian finds it advisable to preface his remarks with a recapitulation of the History of Hellas.

C. Ritter tries to show, not only that *Phileb.* and *Tim.* are later than *Polit.*, but also that *Phileb.* was written contemporaneously with *Legg. I-VI*, *Tim. Criti.* with *Legg. VII-XII*. This seems to me to be putting a strain upon the method which it will not bear, and to be as difficult to prove as the less probable suggestion that the *Timaeus* was written in the interval between *Rep. I-IV*, *VIII-X*, and *V-VII*, because of the slight reference to *μαθήματα*, and because infanticide is not formulated. He gives reasons for thinking that the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*, if genuine, are near to the *Republic* in point of date. This seems probable enough, but there is no means of determining their position more closely. I am myself disposed to regard the *Theaetetus* as somewhat later than *Rep.** because of

*Cf. Jowett's *Trans. of Rep.* p. LXXX.

NOTE.—The close coincidences of *substance* between *Politicus* and *Laws* supply a corroborative argument which may prevail with minds impervious to the argument from style. See for example the strong sympathy implied in both dialogues for the Orphic abstinence from animal food—the ordinary Greek custom being described as a sort of cannibalism—*ἀλλήλων ἐδωδή* (*Polit. Legg. III.*) See Jowett's *Translation of Rep. Introd.* p. CCXVI.

the maturity of the metaphysics and psychology. The Phaedrus as earlier. The Parmenides, if genuine, is of the same period. Of the remaining dialogues, the statistical evidence seems to point to the Lysis and Symposium as the nearest to the Republic in point of time. Beyond this all is still vague, except that the Symposium cannot have been written as we have it before 385 B. C., and that the Protagoras was written before the Gorgias. I should say also that the Meno was intermediate between the Protagoras and the Rep. Such arguments as those employed by Usner—who reasons from the crudeness of composition that the Phaedrus is a very early work, or by Gompery, who thinks the Meno later than the Gorgias, because of the nature of the allusion to Gorgias which it contains, are short of convincing. And I must own that even Zeller fails to convince me that the Theaetetus *must* have been composed *shortly* after the battle of Corinth in 394 B. C., or at a time when the saying about 25 generations from Hercules would seem to apply literally to Agesilaus. Still less do I see any force in his argument that the Philebus must have been written before Rep. VI.—There remains to consider the important theory of Krohn, who thinks that the first four books of the Republic are the earliest of Plato's writings, and that the whole work was written piecemeal at long intervals. In this, as we know, he has been "capped" by E. Pfeleiderer, who believes that many of the lesser dialogues were written in the intervals between the several parts. I shall have occasion to discuss these theories in connexion with the projected edition of the Republic. In the mean time I can only say that they have not convinced me.

The doubts which have from the first surrounded the chronological position of the Phaedrus, have not been dissipated by recent inquiries. If Teichmüller's test were accepted, the plausible fancy that the dialogue came with the rush of new life about the time of opening the Academy would of course be exploded. But this is to set a weak probability against a some-

what stronger probability, which derives additional weight from the comparison of Isocrates *περὶ σοφιστῶν*. But on the other hand the position of L. Spengel, that Plato cannot after early days have thought highly of Isocrates, is somewhat neutralized by the discovery that the philosopher's own later style is so largely influenced by the artificial method of composition of which Isocrates was the most prominent representative. For a coincidence even of thought see Legg. III. 786D. The suggestion of C. Ritter, however, that the praise of the young Isocrates put into Socrates' mouth, is in fact a veiled reproach addressed by Plato to the older man, is contradicted by the frank heartiness and manifest sincerity of the passage.

On the whole it seems to me that the *Phaedrus* must have been written 1) while the reputation of *Lysias* was still at its height, *i. e.* not long after his death. 2) while Isocrates was still comparatively young, and not yet acknowledged to have shown other writers to be children in comparison, and 3) before the *Republic* was planned. The passage about oral teaching could hardly be composed at a time when Plato was preparing his great work, intended by him to influence opinion throughout the Hellenic world. To speak of this as an *Ἀδωνίδος κήπος* would be too absurd.

I have said nothing of the *Parmenides*—not that I share the doubts of C. Ritter and others: but because the second part of it is so difficult to place. Like the *Philebus*, the dialogue is too abstract to give many indications of style—but unlike the *Philebus* it presents no distinct marks of Plato's latest style. I am contented to rank it, as C. Ritter would do, if he accepted it as genuine, together with the *Theaetetus* in the immediate neighborhood of the *Republic*.

Thus in comparing Plato with himself we are now permitted to assume three periods—one of inception, one of intellectual culmination, and one of closer insight and fuller realization. Interpreters will

doubtless still differ widely, but the ground for their inquiries is laid more firmly than heretofore.

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PLATONIC PSYCHICAL REFLECTIONS.

Plutarch remarks that the Soul is moulded and given form by the Superior Intelligence, and in turn itself moulds and gives form to the body. Hence although it is distinct both from the Mind and Body, it nevertheless retains the form and semblance of the former so as to constitute its image. The common opinion which most persons hold, is that man is composed only of soul and body, imagining the mind to be part of the soul; whereas the mind exceeds the soul to a degree as great and God-like as the soul surpasses the body. The conjunction of the soul with the superior mind produces the reason or understanding, which so many erringly esteem to be superior to the intuitive faculty itself. Hence Plato taught that that part of the soul which is pervaded by the mind is eternal—not God but of and from God; while the part not so pervaded perishes.

Accordingly, Plutarch, when writing to his wife to comfort her after the death of their daughter, says: "You are better grounded in the doctrines, delivered to us from our ancestors, as also in the Sacred Rites of Bacchus, than to believe that the Soul, when freed from the body, is not sensible at all; for the religious symbols are well known to us who belong to the Orphic Fraternity. Be assured, therefore, that the Soul

is incapable of dying, but is affected like birds that are kept in a cage. If she has been thus for a long time educated and cherished in the body, and by long custom made familiar mostly with the things of the present life, she will, though separable, return again and at length enter a body. Indeed, it does not cease, by new births now and then, to be entangled anew in the chances and events of this life."

Such, according to the Gospel ascribed to John, was the current belief of the Judeans—those at least who affected the teachings of the Pharisees, and certainly all who belonged to the Essenean Brotherhood. "Rabbi," the Disciples demanded, "who sinned—this man or his ancestors—that he should be born blind?" The doctrine of Karma had long been taught, and all the thinkers of note in Western Asia believed it.

The Great Master of the Akademeia voiced this belief in the processes of the soul in his famous recital of the Vision of Eros. It will not be amiss to give a brief synopsis of this. The Soul of the Seer made its way directly to the Judges or Assessors of the dead, who commanded him to observe them diligently because he was a chosen messenger to carry back the story to the earth. He saw good men rewarded and evil men punished, each as the consequence and complement of their acts. Fierce and fiery-looking men cast several into Tartaros. Those who had the fortune to arise from thence were presently conducted into the cycle of Necessity, and whirled upon the spindle of the Karma. Here the Three Fates—the Norns of the Northmen and the Witches of Macbeth, the Past, Present and Future—received them, and each received from his own interior choice his allotment to a new career. "The *cause* is in him who makes the choice, and there is no fault to be imputed to the Divinity." So each drew his lot and chose his career—always something different from the last one. Some took higher conditions; others, lower. Then each was assigned his guardian demon: and the Mysterious Sisters confirmed the matter and made it irrevocable. After-

ward they passed to the region of Forgetting, and drank the mystic beverage which laid them asleep, and made the preceding career of life as though it had not been.

It may be enquired why these things are necessary. The character of a man is made up of his experiences,—not of the memory of them, but of their influence, and effects. We are all of us the product of what we have thought and done. We drop these things out of conscious memory, or overlay them by new experiences; but this does not obliterate them. They are a part of our nature, all the same.

Some, perhaps, do not forget all that took place in former careers, or recall scenes when something occurs to quicken the consciousness of them. How many of us have seen some things, or passed through some experience, which we immediately become conscious of having witnessed or participated in at some former time. We may be unable to account for it, or to divine the matter; still it is not altogether a phantasy of the imagination.

The last chapter in the Vision suggests matter for careful exploration. The souls were asleep from their lethean draught, when there came a roar as of thunder, and they were hurled hither and thither as by a seismic convulsion of the earth. They were no more to rest peacefully in the world of spirits, for they had not yet the proper aptitude to remain there and live the supernal life. The philosophers used to represent this matter as by a physical transformation. The souls were grouped in the Galaxy, they said—a region beyond the Kosmic universe. Coming to the orbit of Saturn, they passed into the *genesis*,—the state and region of changeable life. Thence they came to Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, the Sun and finally the Moon, where they became invested with the psychic attributes that fitted them again to assume physical and corporeal conditions. They were now received into maternal bosoms, and in due course of

time brought forth upon the earth. "Which things are an allegory."

Plutarch so recites the old belief. Curiously, the Gnostic Fathers of the Christian world held the same—the names being changed, but not the sentiment. Ilda-Baoth, the Son of the Prinnal Void presided, at the orbit of Saturn, and invested souls with cosmic conditions. For, disguise the fact as we may, or even deny it as many ignorantly or willfully do, the ancient faith of metempsychosis and re-generation was generally believed by Christians and Jews, as by Hindus and Egyptians. The incarnation, death and *anastasis* of Jesus were but typical representations of the life-history of every human soul. Jesus might take the impaled robber with him into Paradise—"a certain mysterious hallowed place," but this was in "the lower parts of the earth." His *anastasis* or ascension was on high, beyond the region of Genesis and change, thus making all things of his career complete. We have no occasion to speculate upon an incarnate Son of God, a vicarious atonement, descent of holy spirit, or any other of these matters; but of our own part in the Eternal Drama.

Plato in the *Phaidros* depicts the true life as a divine mania, or entheasm, because the person is, to common perception, intoxicated with God. There was a madness or enthusiasm from an ancient *Karmez*, another from the Muses, and a more noble one proceeding from Divinity. Soul moves itself, and so is uncreated and immortal. It goes about the universal heaven in an infinite variety of forms and characters—perfect, winged, and dominant. It is nourished by intelligence and superior knowledge, and feasts upon the various virtues. So all pure souls move in the chorus of the Divinity. But in some way, not easy to divine or explain, many souls become unable to continue in the heavenly region, but fall into the domain of generation and change. To me this seems not unphilosophic or unreasonable. Every principle of energy requires to be complemented by the corre-

sponding one of dynamic force. If there is positive there must be negative, if male then also female, if good then also evil. Souls, though of and from the divine, are from necessity partial and imperfect in endowment and quality. This involves the necessity of experience as a means of discipline and perfection. But for evil, this perfective career could not be; and hence it is necessary to undergo the impure contact. The tree of knowledge of good and evil must be eaten of, in order that men may become as gods. As they come to the true enthusiasm, the apprehending of what is proper and fitting, and the contemplation of the good, they ascend upward again in the spiral stair-case, and attain the knowledge of the sacred things which they had once beheld.

The philosopher, in an inspired rhapsody, thus speaks of the beatific vision: "When we were members of that blessed Chorus,—we along with Zeus and others with other gods—we beheld the blessed spectacle and vision, and were inducted into what may be rightly called the most blessed of all arcane rites. We celebrated them when we were in the wholeness of being, and not affected by the evils that were awaiting us in the coming cycle. We were then perfected, and being ourselves pure we beheld perfect, calm, and blessed visions, in the Pure light—not having been masked with this investiture which we carry about with us and call *Body*, fastened to it like an oyster to the shell."

I do not always find it easy to express clearly to my satisfaction the exalted and cheerful view of the celestial life, and the more common gloomy concept which allies it to the tomb and sorrowful appurtenances of death. It is perhaps hard to remember that what we regard as living is but death to the immortal spirit, which indeed is compelled to infill and sustain the cumbrous body, instead of coursing at will through the superior world. To most persons discourse of a celestial state and of a life not corporeal is as talking over the bier and at the charnel-house. But as mod-

ern science has refined and clarified our perceptions, we may more cheerfully contemplate the laying aside of the conditions of this life, and an entering anew upon our life beyond. We are by no means colonists of the celestial regions, but sojourners preparing for a call home. Though fast to the body as the oyster to his shell, we shall not perish with the shell or by a separation from it.

An eloquent chapter of the *Arستا* illustrates the anastasis and glorification of the righteous soul upon the dissolution of its corporeal bondage. For three days and nights it waits, as if expectant of being called back to its earthly condition. It then sets out for the everlasting home. At its arrival at the Bridge of Judgment, it is divested of the external sensibilities and other qualities incident to its relations with the physical world. Immediately there appears to view a figure like a maiden in all the bloom of earlier youth, beautiful, radiant with celestial light, noble of mien, fair as the fairest upon the earth. The purified soul accosts her as a guardian, adding: "Never have I beheld one so charming." To which, the glorious one replies:

"I am thy immortal part, thy pure thought, speech and action. Thou seemest to me as my own likeness,—great, good, and beautiful, as I seem to thee. I was beloved before, and thou has made me more beloved: I was beautiful before and thou has rendered me more beautiful. Thou makest delight more delightful, the fair yet fairer, the desirable yet more desirable; and me, who sat on high, thou hast exalted yet higher by thy resistance to evil, thy goodness,—thy pure thought, speech and action."

Immortality is therefore no boon conferred upon us at birth or the inception of our mundane existence, but a quality having its foundation in the soul itself. We do not receive it, but have always possessed it as an essential of our spiritual nature. It pertains to our essential being in the Eternal region, rather than to our phenomenal existence in Time. We apprehend

our true relations as having our citizenship in the heavenly world. This perception enlightens us and impels us to live and act as immortal, and therefore as moral beings.

Our individuality, perhaps I should say our personality, as we exist in this sublunary life, does not constitute the whole of our being. Much that pertains to us essentially has never been developed in this life. We are differentiated rather than integral,—a grouping of qualities and characteristics rather than a complete essence. The traits peculiar to us are chiefly accidents of our individual mode of existence. What we regard as intuition and inspiration is a remembering, reproducing and bringing into personal consciousness of what we knew and possessed before coming into the region of limit and change.

The metempsychosis is no supposed journeying or transferring of the Soul through indefinable stages of existence. It is, instead, an exalting from mundane to higher conditions. Very analogous to this is the *metanoia* or mind-change of the *Gospels*. It is not a regret or sorrowing over real or supposed offenses, but the mind rising into a higher altitude of motive, perception and enlightenment,—from a grosser materialistic concept to a more refined spirituality; thus from death to life, and from the temporary to the permanent.

Eternity is in no essential sense a foreworld or future state, but a perpetual present, always being. In it the soul is native; whereas, when enthralled by the pains and affections of the body, it is in a crippled and impotent condition, and in a manner alienated from the celestial home. The interior rational principle is lost out of memory; yet it is not entirely forgotten. The noble essence—that which we really are—is beyond this region of sublunary existence, immortal and imperishable. We may realize the words of Schelling: "Such as you are you have been somewhere for ages."

The ancient Mysteries in their initiations or per-

fective rites, were intended to represent similar ideas. The drama of Persephoneia, carried into the world of the dead and again restored to the embrace of her mother, denoted a descent from the world of Life with the divine beings, into the region of death which mortals inhabit, and the return thence to the heavenly region. "Happy," says Pindaros, "is every one who has seen these things common to the under-world: he knows the perfective rite of life, he knows its divine origin." The Christian Apostle borrowed the same analogy: "We are buried in baptism, so that as Chrestos arose from the dead, we too exhibit a new life." The Egyptian Rite thus divides the ascent into seven degrees: 1. It loses the power of increase and decrease. 2. It escapes the dominion of evil and idleness. 3. It rises above the illusions of desire. 4. It is freed from insatiable ambition. 5. It is divested of arrogance, audacity and temerity. 6. It loses all passion and fondness for riches wrongly obtained. 7. It is emancipated from falsehood. Thus purified the spirit returns to bliss. It possesses virtue and excellence of its own, and dwells with those who adore the Divinity. Such are placed among the Supernal Powers, and partake of God.

Upon the Sixth Day of the Eleusinia, Bacchos crowned with ivy entered the temple of Eleusis in triumph, and from all the plain about there ascended chants and paeans to the risen one who had appeared in the Shrine of the Advent (*Eleusis* from *ερχομαι*). Such were supposed to be the glorifications sung in the Eternal Meadow where the souls had congregated at their release from the life of earth. Close upon the chariot wheels of the triumphant Iacchos followed Asklepios the Healer, and Herakles the Deliverer who had removed monsters and impurity from the world, and having conquered the Serpent-dog Kerberos, had removed from men the cause for fearing death.

Such is our life with the Gods. Their boons to the outward seeming may be material; to the true seer they are spiritual. Demeter at Eleusis gave corn

and bread: it was the bread of life. "She gave us two most excellent gifts," said Isokrates; "fruits, that we might not live like beasts; and that initiation, which imparts to its participants sweeter hope, both as regards the close of life, and for the everlasting period." Dionysos, too, gave wine—not merely to strengthen and enliven the heart, but to signify the higher joy awaiting the true soul in a happier world.

Such are the views of life as depicted to us by the Divine Sage of Attika. For man has a blissful future, because he comes from a greater past. "Whatever comes from God to us returns from us to God." Plato was indeed a prophet and apostle of the Second Sight. He saw the laws that rule the mundane earth identical with the will of heaven alone—not a natural law in the spiritual world, but spirit and Intelligence pervading and inspiring all that is knowable or worth the doing. He was himself entheast, but he never raved. He saw intelligently the Truth in Heaven and in Earth, and he uttered it so perfectly that the inspired men of all religions which have since come into existence, repeat him. To his memory, peace: to his name, honor.

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NOTE.—The foregoing valuable paper was read at a Symposium given on the 7th day of November, 1888, in celebration of the terrestrial descent of Plato, at the home of the Editor of the *BIBLIOTHECA PLATONICA*, in Osceola, Mo.

Mrs. Julia P. Stevens will give a similar Symposium at her residence in Bloomington, Ills., on the 7th day of November next.

PRAEFATIO IN DAMASCIUM.

[Prof. Ch. Emile Ruelle, the eminent French Hellenist, kindly sends us the Preface (as yet unpublished) to his forthcoming edition of the admirable treatise of *Damaskios on First Principles*, a work which is likewise an excellent commentary on the *Parmenides* of Plato. We print a few pages of this monograph believing that they will greatly interest our readers.]

Tres praecipuae sunt causae inter multas cur Damascii ἀπορίας καὶ λύσεις platonicae studiosi philosophiae graecae tanti aestimaverint et juris publici factas esse gavisuri sint; primo nempe illae ad platoniorum aureae quae dicitur catenae mysticas ac theurgicas opiniones memorandas excutiendasque multum conferunt; dein Orphicorum, Aegyptiorum, Assyriorum, Chaldaeorum dogmata referunt, adeo ut XXVIIum ante annum hac de re excerpta quaedam e Damascii libro eruere me hortatus est vir ille doctus qua est auctoritate Ern. Renan, isque fons libelli factus est illius quem id temporis edidi.* Postremo apud Damascium apparent per multa ejus commentarii vestigia quem Proclus in *Parmenidem* conscripsit, cujusque partem eam desideramus qua Platonici dialogi paginas 142

*Le philosophe Damascius. Etude sur sa vie et ses ouvrages suivie de neuf morceaux inédits, extraits du *Traité des premiers principes* et traduits en Latin, dans la *Revue Archeologique*, 1860 et 1861

ed. H. St. ad ultimam usque (p. 166) philosophus enarraverat.

Accedit quod in Damasciano opere servantur quam plurima ea carmina quae λόγια dicuntur, quaeque a Fr. Patritio collecta (videris novam ejus de Universis philosophiam 1591 et 1593 in folio editum), quum e nostri tum ex Procli scriptis, Hermiae, Simplicii, Synesii, Olympiodori, Michaelis Pselli, Nicephori Gregorae, Gemistiquae Plethonis, denuo, ni fallimur, curante et amplissimis commentariis ornante philologo Bernensi Alb. Jahnio in lucem brevi prodibunt. Sequitur codicum Damascii opus continentium elenchus ex quo tantum haec excerptimus.

Sciunt omnes qui Damasciani textus notitiam aliquam habent, hunc textum alii in libris manu exaratis in duas partes divisum esse ad exemplar prototypi codicis (Marciani Veneti 246 A littera notati) in quo eadem sex foliis vacuis separatae sunt, in aliis vero continue ita scriptum fuisse ut, post verba ἐπει κατὰ ἀλλήλειαν οὐδὲ (p. 390 ed. Kopp; codicis A f. 210 τ.), nullo hiatu indicato sic pergant: τὰς ἀμεθέκτους ταῖς μεθεκταῖς κ. τ. λ. (f. 216 τ). Unde factum est ut sic diversa conjungerentur? Rem Venetus 247 (B) me docuit, in quo folia modo perfecta, modo interrupta (quod evenit quoties librarii penso librarii alterius pensum successit) nullam usquam divisionem indicant, ita ut codicem B legenti vel describenti limes duarum partium in codice A disjunctarum non clarius hoc loco quam in aliis pateret. Propterea codicum eorum exaratores qui ex hoc fonte fluxerunt ne lacunam quidem manifestam curantes, vel potius ignorantes, textum non addito lacunae signo disposuerunt. Primus autem ipse, ni fallor haec expedio; sed satis hactenus

Nunc hac de re maxime controversa disceptandum esse mihi videtur, utrum in Damasciano textu qualem Venetus A praebet duo tractatus agnoscendi sint, quorum alter liber περὶ ἀρχῶν, alter in Platonis Parmenidem commentarius esse Procli commentario in eundem dialogum oppositus, an unus περὶ ἀρχῶν

ab initio usque ad ejus textus finem perducendus videatur. Quam rem eo brevius exponam quod a me bis antea discussa est.*

Aem. Heitz† et me ipsum et Jos. Kopp eodem ictu impugnat quod cum hic obiter asseruit, tum ego plane demonstrare tentavi unum idemque opus hunc textum esse; ac praecipuum ejus argumentum in eo ponitur quod Damascius raro in parte priori, saepissime in altera Procli sententias excutit, ne nomine quidem ejus addito. Quin hanc thesim eo comprobari censet quod parti alteri haec subscribuntur manu prima in codice Veneto 266: *Δαμασκίου διαδόχου εις τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην ἀπορίαὶ καὶ λύσεις ἀντιπαρτεινόμεναι τοῖς εις αὐτὸν ὑπομνήμασι τοῦ φιλοσόφου. τέλος.* Equidem non diffiteor τὸν φιλοσόφον (scil. Proclum ut putat Heitz) fere unoquoque hujus partis folio modo laudari, modo improbari; sed quid mirum si,—ut mihi dixit quis ex Academia inscriptio-num nostra, cui recens opinionem meam hac de re expomeram, Damascius operis sui rationem mutaverit aliquatenus, atque paulatim ad formam justioris commentarii in Parmenidem latius tractatum suum de primis principiis extenderit? Praesertim cum Proclus libro I de Platonis theologia (p. 19) ita locutus sit: *Ὅρθῶς ἄρα ἐλέγομεν τὴν προχειμένην συνουσίαν* (scil. dialogum cui Parmenides titulus est) *οὐκ εις λογικὴν γυμνασίαν ἀποτείνεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο ποιέσθαι τῶν λόγων ἀπάντων τέλος, ἀλλ' εἰς [τὴν] τῶν πρωτίστων ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμην.* Quid plura? Imo nonne ipse Damascius ea scripsit in operis fine (cod. Veneti A fol. 410 r.): *Ὁ διάλογός ἐστι περὶ ἀρχῶν?* Caeteroquin censor noster negare non potest primam et secundam suppositionem (*ὑπόθεσιν*), ut jam dixi (Melanges Graux), tum tertiam partim in parte *περὶ ἀρχῶν* inscripta esse tractatam, ac deinceps, lacunae ratione habita (cod. A f. 210-216) de caeteris vicissim esse disertum. Neque Argentoratensem philologum, qua

*Le Philosophe Damascius p. 21 sq.;—Melanges Graux, p. 549.

sq.

†Der Philosoph Damascius, p. 15 sq. in Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie, 1884.

est sagacitate, fugere potuit quaestionem eam de *μετέξει* inquam ingreditur Damascius, p. 386 ed. Kopp (cod. A f. 208 r.) et quam praenuntiaverat fol. 109 r. nonnisi post inceptam partem alteram absolvi, (fol. 217 r). In Veneti quidem A imo folio 210 r., post versus quatuor vacuos nota scripta erat, postea erasa quam A. Jordan* ita legendam esse putavit: *εὐδὲν λείπει*. Neque tamen hoc utar argumento; aliqua enim lacuna non dubium quin textus hic laboretur.

Omnia quae ad hoc problema volvendum valent me nunc et jampridem intulisse arbitror. Unum hoc mihi addendum est argumentum, idemque nondum allatum, ordines (*τάξεις*) non solum in parte altera quemque suo loco expositos esse sed et in priori, adeo ut operis integri series juncturaque non potest fieri quin manifesta videatur. Nempe folio 195 sub fine prioris partis *περὶ τάξεως τῶν τριάδων* disserere coepit, tum fol. 224, paulo post alterius initium, *περὶ τῆς δευτέρας τάξεως τῶν νοητῶν*, fol. 296, *περὶ τῆς μέσης τάξεως τῶν νοητῶν καὶ νοερῶν*, fol. 295, *περὶ τῆς τρίτης τῶν νοητῶν καὶ νοερῶν τάξεως*, fol. 301, *περὶ τῆς πρώτης νοεράς τάξεως*, ac denique f. 316, *περὶ τῆς μέσης τῶν νοερῶν τάξεως*. Nonne his ita dispositis colligere licet Damascium opus unum et idem tali contexta institutum conscripsisse ut ipsius variae sententiae de variis ordinibus passim inde ab initio usque ad finem pervagarentur?

A. Jordan qui non multum de codice Veneto A locus est (l. c.) non litem resolvere tentavit, sed partem utramque textus "erste" et "zweite Abhandlung" nominat, ut eis anentire videatur qui binos esse tractatus judicant.....

Opto equidem sub fine ejus mei laboris ut quam multas vigilias quantasque curas in eo perficiendo impendi, tantos inde fructus platonicae philosophiae labentis historia percipiat, tantamque voluptatem ipse lectoribus aut graeci melioris textus aut nondum editi cupidis afferre potuerim.

*Zur Kritik der spätern Platoniker. *Hermes* XIV., 1879, p. 266.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS,
AND THE ORDER OF HIS BOOKS:

BY PORPHYRIOS.

Translated from the Original Greek.

[This work was written by Porphyrios in A. D. 303, when he was in his seventieth year. In modern times it first appeared in a Latin translation by Marsilius Ficinus, prefixed to his version of the *Enneads* of Plotinos, Florence, 1492, fol.; Gr. et Lat., Basle, 1580, fol. Creuzer's magnificent edition of the *Enneads*, Oxford, 3 vols., 4to 1835, has the Greek text with the version (revised) of Ficinus. The Greek text alone is prefixed to the following editions: Plotini Opera Recognovit Adolphus Kirchhoff, 2 vols. 8vo., Leip., 1856; Plotini Enneades Recensuit Hermannus Fridericus Mueller 2 vols. 8vo., Berlin, 1880; and Plotini Enneades Edidit Ricardus Volkmanu, 2 vols. 8vo., Leip., 1884. A French version of this work by Levesque de Burigny was published at Paris in 1847. This forms the basis of the French translation, which precedes Bonillet's version of Plotinos, Paris, 1857.

A German version by Dr. J. G. V. Engelhardt appeared at Erlangen in 1820. A few chapters were translated into French by Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire in his History of the Alexandrian School; and Thomas Taylor, the celebrated English Platonist, to his translation of the *Select Works of Plotinos*, Lond., 1817, prefixed an Introduction "containing the Substance of Porphyry's *Life of Plotinos*." I have adopted Taylor's translation so far as it was available. To his notes is affixed the letter T. No English version of the whole work has ever been published.

I have had before me all the various editions of this work, and have carefully and critically examined them. The text given by Mueller has been generally followed.

My version simply aims to be a plain, intelligible transcript of the ideas of the original. In the subjoined notes is given all the obtainable information illustrative of the text.

Plotinos was one of the most sublime philosophers of any age, and his biography as portrayed by Porphyrios his faithful disciple and intimate friend possesses an intense interest for the philosophic mind. Porphyrios was peculiarly well qualified to depict the characteristics and actions of his wonderful master, and he has admirably

discharged his task. We have in this book a trustworthy record of the physical, ethical and intellectual life of this "resuscitated Plato," as St. Augustine aptly styles our philosopher.

Mr. F. W. H. Myers, in his valuable and remarkable paper on the *Greek Oracles*, thus eloquently and sympathetically refers to Plotinos: "For it was now that Porphyry was to encounter an influence, a doctrine, an aim, more enchanting than Homer's mythology, profounder than Apollo's oracles, more Christian, I had almost written, than Christianity itself. More Christian at least than such Christianity as had chiefly met Porphyry's eyes; more Christian than the violence of bishops, the wrangles of Heretics, the fanaticism of slaves, was that single-hearted and endless effort after the union of the soul with God which filled every moment of the life of Plotinos, and which gave to his living example a potency and a charm which his writings never can renew. "Without father, without mother, without descent," a figure appearing solitary as Melchizedek on the scene of history, charged with a single blessing and lost in the unknown, we may yet see in this chief of mystics the heir of Plato, and affirm that it is he who has completed the cycle of Greek civilisation by adding to that long gallery of types of artist and warrior, philosopher and poet, the stainless image of the saint.*"

In the vivid, truthful language of Thomas Taylor, Plotinos "was a philosopher preeminently distinguished for the strength and profundity of his intellect, and the purity and elevation of his life. He was a being wise without the usual mixture of human darkness, and great without the general combination of human weakness and imperfection. He seems to have left *the orb of light* solely for the benefit of mankind, that he might teach them how to repair the ruin contracted by their exile from good, and how to return to their true country, and legitimate kindred and allies. I do not mean that he descended into mortality for the purpose of unfolding the sublimest truths to the vulgar part of mankind—for this would have been a vain and ridiculous attempt; since the eyes of the multitude, as Plato justly observes, are not strong enough to look to truth. But he came as a guide to the few who are born with a divine destiny (*θεϊα μοίρα*) and are struggling to gain the lost region of light, but know not how to break the fetters by which they are detained—who are impatient to leave the obscure cavern of Sense, where all is delusion and shadow, and to ascend to the realms of Intellect, where all is substance and reality."]

I. Plotinos, a philosopher of our time, was ashamed that his soul was imprisoned in body.† In consequence of this peculiar feeling he did not permit himself to reveal anything concerning his birth, parents, or native country.‡ He held in such contempt a representation of the human form, that, when Amelios requested him to allow his picture to be painted, he replied: "Is it not sufficient to bear the

**Classical Essays*, London, 1883.

†According to Eunapios, Porphyrios himself despised the body. Most of the Platonists, if not all, entertained the same feeling with regard to the material prison-house of the spirit.

‡We learn from Eunapios that the birth-place of Plotinos was Lycopolis [now Syut], a city of the Thebaid in Egypt.

image* with which nature has invested us? Do you think that a more lasting representation of this image should be left to posterity as something worthy of inspection?" He having therefore denied the request, and refused to sit for his picture, Amelios directed his friend Carterius, the best painter of the age, to frequent the lectures of Plotinos, which were free to all, and delineate the more prominent features of his countenance by repeated and constant observation and study. Carterius in this way constructed from time to time, from memory, assisted by the advice and supervision of Amelios, a picture of Plotinos; and thus finally there was produced by the skill of the artist a comparatively excellent portrait of the philosopher, though he was entirely ignorant of the whole transaction.

II. He was afflicted with a chronic disease of the lower intestines, but refused to use enemata, saying that he would not preserve the life of an old man by such means. Nor would he use theriacal remedies, remarking that he did not derive his corporeal nourishment from even domestic animals.† He abstained from the bath, but used frictions daily at home. But when a plague, which was raging at that time,‡ killed those who were in the habit of rubbing him, he, neglecting such a precaution, was himself in a short time attacked by the pestilence. When I was with him there was no indication that he had been stricken by the disease. After my departure [from Rome] the disease affected him so violently that—as Eustochios, his intimate companion, who remained with him until his death, informed me—the clear and sonorous vigor of his voice was destroyed, his sight seriously impaired.

*Plotinos calls the body an *image*, because according to the Platonic doctrine it is the image of the soul which produces it.

†The ancients called a medicine "theriacal" in the composition of which entered not only simple herbs such as the poppy, myrrh, etc., but also the flesh of the viper, an animal which the Greeks called *therion* (*θῆριον*, venomous beast), *par excellence*.

‡This pestilence was in the time of the Emperor Gallienus, A. D., 262, and raged so vehemently, according to Trebellius Pollio, that five thousand men perished through the same disease in one day.—T.

and his hands and feet covered with ulcers; wherefore, being unable to receive his friends personally, as was his custom, he left the city (Rome) and went to Campania, to the estate of his old friend, Zethos, who had been dead for some time. He was here supplied with necessaries, which were also sent to him from the residence of Castricius* in Minturnæ. When he was on the point of making his exit from this sphere, Eustochios, who was then in Puteoli, was notified, but did not hasten to his bedside, as he did not think that Plotinos was on the verge of dissolution. As he entered his room the expiring philosopher exclaimed: "I still expected you. And now my divine nature is endeavoring to return to the Universal Divinity."† Immediately after his death a dragon, which had been concealed under his bed, wandered through a crevice in the wall and disappeared.‡

Plotinos died at the end of the second year of the reign of the Emperor Claudius [A. D. 279], and was, according to Eustochios, in his sixty-sixth year. At the time of his death I was visiting in Lilybaion, Ame-

*This is the Firmus Castricius, to whom Porphyrios dedicated his treatise *On Abstinence from Animal Food*. He wrote a *Commentary* on the *Parmenides* of Plato, which is lost. Castricius seems to have lacked philosophic courage. This is evidenced by the fact that, having abandoned the use of animal food, he again regularly partook of it. It is to be hoped that the admirable work of his friend Porphyrios on this subject caused him to abandon permanently the use of animal food, which is generally injurious.

†Such were the last words of this mighty man which, like those contained in his writings, are great and uncommon, admirable and sublime.—T.

‡The dying declaration of Plotinos is illustrated by the first sentence of *Liber V., Ennead VI.*: "That one and the same principle in number is everywhere totally present, common conception evinces, since all men spontaneously assert that the Divinity which dwells in each of us is in all one and the same."

§This species of serpents was regarded by the ancients as representative of good demons (*αγαθόδαιμονες*). The most trifling particulars relative to the life and death of so extraordinary a man merit our attention; and indeed we may presume, without being guilty of either superstition or enthusiasm, that scarcely anything trifling could mark the existence of such a powerful and celestial genius. There is nothing that, properly speaking, can be little which has any relation to a character truly great; for such is the power of uncommon genius that it confers consequence on everything within the sphere of its attraction and renders every surrounding circumstance significant and important.—T.

lios was at Apameia in Syria, and Castricius was in Rome. Eustochios alone was present. By computation we find that the time of his birth was the thirteenth year of the reign of the Emperor Severus [A. D. 204]. He always refused to reveal the date of his birth, or even the month in which he was born, since he did not think it proper that the period of his mundane birth should be celebrated with sacrifices or festivals. However, he assisted in celebrating the natal days of Plato and Sokrates, and invited his friends to a philosophic banquet, where each one was required to deliver an oration adapted to the occasion. Such are the facts concerning Plotinos, derived from my intercourse with him.

III. When he was eight years old, and even attending school, he used to visit his nurse and imbibe her milk. Being accused of troublesomeness and reprimanded, he became ashamed and abandoned the habit.* At the age of twenty-eight, being vehemently inflamed with the love of philosophy, he attended the lectures of the most famous teachers in Alexandria, but left their schools with sorrow and disappointment. Informing a friend of his disappointment, who was well acquainted with the character of his mind, the latter advised him to become a pupil of Ammonios, whom he had not yet heard. On hearing Ammonios lecture he exclaimed to his friend: "This is the man that I have been seeking." From that day he devotedly attached himself to Ammonios, and made such progress in his philosophy that he determined also to study the philosophy of the Persians and that of the Indian Sages. Wherefore, when the Emperor Gordianus marched against the Persians, Plotinos joined the expedition, being then in the nine and thirtieth year of his age; having heard Ammonios for

*This story, however trifling it may appear, indicates in my opinion the native innocence and genuine simplicity of manners which so evidently marked the character of Plotinos. It is a circumstance which does not merely point to something uncommon but it was the harbinger as it were of that purity and sanctity of life which so eminently formed the conduct, and adorned the writings of our philosopher.—T.

eleven years.* After the death of Gordianus in Mesopotamia, Plotinos, barely escaping with his life, fled to Antiocheia (Antioch).† In the reign of the Emperor Philippus, [A. D. 246], being then in his fortieth year, he went to Rome.

Herennios, Origenes, and Plotinos had entered into an agreement not to reveal the dogmas of Ammonios, but to preserve them safely in their memory alone. Plotinos faithfully observed the compact, and carefully concealed the esoteric dogmas of Ammonios. However, Herennios finally violated the agreement, and Origenes imitated him. Origenes wrote nothing except a treatise on *Dæmons*, and a work, written during the reign of Gallienus, entitled "*The Ruler of the Universe is Alone the Creator.*" Plotinos [though released from his compact by the action of his associates] wrote nothing for a long time, adhering to the custom he had acquired from Ammonios. And thus ten years passed away, he associating with certain philosophic friends but writing nothing. The conferences held by him with his companions were desultory

*Ammonios was born about A. D. 175, and died about 250. His parents were Christians, and he was educated in the Christian belief, but when he "embraced wisdom and philosophy," according to Porphyrios, he returned to the ancient faith of his philosophic ancestors, *i. e.*, the Wisdom-Religion. He was generally called Ammonios Sakkas, from the fact that his business was at first that of a porter or Sack-bearer (*βάκκα*). "But though he was not nobly-born his doctrines, as transmitted to us by his disciples, eminently evince his possessing in high perfection all the endowments of a true philosopher, viz., a penetrating genius, a docile sagacity, a tenacious memory, and every other ornament of the soul requisite, according to Plato, to form the philosophic character. The appellation of *θεοδιδάκτος* or *divinely-taught* was unanimously conferred on Ammonios by his contemporaries." It is most probable that Ammonios expounded his doctrines only orally. If he committed his thoughts to books they have not descended to us. Nemesios, in his work *On the Nature of Man*, gives two interesting philosophical fragments, taken from the lectures of Ammonios.

†Gordianus was killed near Kirkesion, in the month of March, A. D. 244, and a monument was erected to him by his soldiers near Zaitba. It seems, therefore, that Plotinos was disappointed in his purpose at that time of procuring the Persian and Indian Wisdom; it is, however, certain that he afterwards obtained his desire, and most probably without the inconvenience of a long and dangerous journey. This will be evident from perusing his works, and attending to the latent dogmata they contain.—T.

and unsystematic. So Amelios informed me. This philosopher attached himself to Plotinos, after the latter had been at Rome three years, in the third year of the reign of the Emperor Philippus [A. D. 246], and remained with him until the first year [A. D. 270] of the reign of Claudius; twenty-four years altogether. He was skilled in philosophy, having been an associate of Lysimachos. He surpassed all the other disciples of Plotinos in patient industry; committing to writing nearly all the dogmas of Numenius, and also retaining the greater part of them in his memory. He collected almost a hundred book of *Scholìa* from their conferences, which he gave to Hostilianos Hesychios, of Apameia, whom he adopted as his son.*

IV. In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus (263 A. D.), I, Porphyrios, came from Greece with

*But little is known of Origenes the Platonist—a different man from Origenes the Christian, though they have been confounded. Besides the works mentioned in the text he wrote nothing except a Commentary on the *Prooemium* of the *Timaios* of Plato. It is to be regretted that all of his writings have been lost. "That *The One*, therefore, is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to *The One*, is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpreters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency of *The One*, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder that this should have been the case with Origenes, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinos. For Origenes ends in Intellect and the First Being, but omits *The One* which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits it as something which is better than all knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things. But if he omits it because *The One* is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any subsistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot assent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and commemorate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innovation."—PROKLOS: *On the Theology of Plato*. Lib. II., Ch. iv.

Of Herennios, tradition says that he explained the term "*metaphysics*" as denoting what lies beyond the sphere of nature.—UEBERWEG'S *History of Philosophy*.

Gentilianos Amelios, a Tuscan by birth, was one of the earliest and most faithful of the disciples of Plotinos. He seems to have enjoyed the confidence and esteem of his master in an eminent degree. Amelios was a voluminous author, but unfortunately all of his valuable works have been lost. Fragments of his writings are found in the works of Proklos, Stobaios, Olympiodoros, Damaskios, and the Fathers of the Church.

Antonios of Rhodes. I found that Amelios, though he had attended the lectures and conferences of Plotinos for eighteen years, had ventured to write nothing except *Scholia*, which as yet did not amount to a hundred books. Plotinos was now in his fifty-ninth year; and at this time I became his disciple, being thirty-four years old. In the first year of the reign of Gallienus (A. D. 254) Plotinos began to write, and he continued to note such matters as occurred to him for the ten succeeding years.* When I met him he had composed twenty-one books, which were possessed by but few; for the edition was difficult to be procured. Moreover, Plotinos was neither hasty nor rash in publishing, but gave only those productions to the light which had been approved by a mature judgment. The twenty-one books referred to, after various inscriptions—not given them by Plotinos—at length obtained the following titles:

1. *On the Beautiful.*
2. *On the Immortality of the Soul.*
3. *On Fate.*
4. *On the Essence of the Soul.*
5. *On Intellect, Ideas and Being.*
6. *On the Descent of the Soul into Body.*
7. *How things after the First proceed from the First; and, on the One.*
8. *Whether all Souls are One?*
9. *On the Good, or The One.*
10. *On the Three Archial Hypostases.*
11. *On the Generation and Order of Things after the First.*
12. *On the Two Matters.*
13. *Various Considerations.*
14. *On the Circular Motion of the Heavens.*
15. *On the Demon Allotted to Each of Us.*
16. *On the Rational Exit from the Present Life.*
17. *On Quality.*
18. *Whether there are Ideas of Particulars?*
19. *On the Virtues.*
20. *On Dialectic.*
21. *How the Soul is said to be a Medium Between an Impartible and Partible Essence?*

*It was a long time before Plotinos committed his thoughts to writing, and gave the world a copy of his inimitable mind. That light which was shortly to illuminate mankind, as yet shone with solitary splendor, or at best beamed only on a beloved few. It was now, however, destined to emerge from its sanctuary, and to display its radiance with unbounded diffusion. . . . Amelios was not, though an excellent philosopher, calculated to urge Plotinos to write, or to assist him in writing; but this important task was reserved for Porphyrios who, in the words of Eunapios, "like a Mercurial chain let down for the benefit of mortals, by the assistance of universal erudition, explained everything with clearness and precision".—T.

These books I found completed at the time I first became acquainted with Plotinos, and when he was in his fifty-ninth year.

V. This year (A. D. 263) and the succeeding five I was with him. A short period prior to the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, when I was in Rome, Plotinos wrote little or nothing, but spent his time in conferences with his associates. During the six years that I was with him, many questions were discussed in our philosophical conversations which Plotinos, at the request of Amelios and myself, committed to writing, and produced two books: *On True Being: demonstrating that it is everywhere One and the Same Whole*. Subsequently he wrote two others, one of which shows: *That the Nature which is beyond Being is not Intellective, and what that is which is primarily, and also that which is secondarily, intellective*. The other is: *On that which is in Potentiati-ty, and that which is in Actuality*. He likewise wrote the following books:

- On the Impassivity of Immaterial Natures.*
- On the Soul*, two books.
- On the Soul*, a third book, or, *on the Manner in which we see.*
- On Contemplation.*
- On Intelligible Beauty.*
- That Intelligibles are not External to Intellect; and Concerning Intellect and the Good.*
- Against the [Christian] Gnostics, who Mant in that the World and its Demiourgos are evil.*
- On Numbers.*
- Why things Seen at a Distance appear to be Small.*
- Whether Felicity Increases with its Duration.*
- On Total Mixture.*
- How the Multitude of Ideas Subsists; and, Concerning The Good.*
- On the World.*
- On Sense-Perception and Memory.*
- On the Genera of Being*, three books.
- On Eternity and Time.*

Plotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the six years of my association with him. Their subjects, which are indicated by their titles, were suggested by the questions proposed and discussed in his school. These works, with the addition of those composed prior to my becoming his disciple, will make the number amount to forty-five.

VI. While I was in Sicily, where I went about

the fifteenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinos wrote the following works, which he sent to me for revision:

On Felicity; On Providence, two books; On the Gnostic Hypostases, and that which is beyond them; On Love.

These books were forwarded to me in the first year of the reign of Claudius [A. D. 269]. About the beginning of the second year, and a little before his death, he sent me the following, which were the last:

On What Things are Evil, and Whence Evils Originate.

Whether the Stars Effect Anything.

What Man is and What Animal (the Living Being itself) is.

On the First Good, and Other Goods.

The whole number, therefore, of the books written by Plotinos, connecting the preceding with those just enumerated, is fifty-four. They bear evident marks of the different periods at which they were composed. For the first one-and-twenty, which were written in the early part of his life, if compared with the next in order, seem to possess an inferior power, and to be deficient in strength. But those composed in the middle of his life exhibit the vigor of power and the acme of perfection. Such, with a few exceptions, are the four-and-twenty above mentioned. The last nine, however, which were written in the decline of life, bear the marks of remitted energy and drooping vigor. And these the four last exhibit more evidently than the preceding five.*

VII. Plotinos had many zealous disciples, and likewise a multitude of auditors whom the love of Philosophy attracted to his lectures. Among the former was Amelios the Tuscan, whose proper name was Gentilianos. He desired that the letter "r" should be substituted for the letter "l" in his name, and that it should thus be Amerios (from *'αμερία*, † integrity.

*It must however be observed that this difference is only visible when they are contrasted with one another. To an impartial observer, zealous of truth, and not deeply read in Plotinos, each of his books will appear to be what it really is, uncommonly profound, and inimitably sublime. Each is an oracle of wisdom, and a treasury of valuable knowledge; and the gradations of excellence consist in the power of composition, and not in the matter of which they are composed.—T.

† *Αυέρια* denotes the indivisibility which is characteristic of a divine nature, because division (separation) destroys all power.—*I'de PROKLOS: Inst. Theol.*

indivisibility), instead of Amelios (from ἀμελεία, negligence). Another of his companions was Paulinos the Scythopolitan,* a physician, who was full of bad, immature advice, and whom Amelios therefore called Mikkalos (the Little). There was also the physician Eustochios, of Alexandria, who enjoyed the intimate friendship of Plotinos to the last, was present at his death, and giving himself wholly to his teachings became a genuine philosopher. Besides these there was Zothikos, a critic and poet, who revised the works of Antimachos and rendered the Atlantic History very poetically in verse; but after this he became blind, and died a short time prior to Plotinos. Paulinos also died before Plotinos. Zethos was another of his intimate friends. He was an Arabian, and married the daughter of one Theodosios, the associate of Ammonios. This Zethos was profoundly versed in medicine, and very much beloved by Plotinos, who endeavored to dissuade him from engaging in the administration of public affairs. Our philosopher often visited him, and when he fell sick retired to his country-place—six miles from Minturnæ, [now] owned by Castricius. No person of our age apparently loved virtue more than Firmus Castricius; he greatly venerated Plotinos; assisted and served Amelios; and acted in all respects towards me as if he had been a genuine brother. He was strongly attached to Plotinos, though he engaged in a public life.

Not a few senators attended the lectures of Plotinos. Of these, Marcellus Orontius, Sabinillus, and Rogatianus especially applied themselves to the study of philosophy. The Senator Rogatianus despised the things of this ordinary sensuous life to such a degree that he abandoned his wealth, dismissed his servants and rejected the dignities of the State. Hence, when he was chosen Prætor, and the lictors waited for his appearance, he neither came into public, regarded the duties of his office, or resided in the house allotted

*Scythopolis, a city of Judea, formerly called Bethsana, or Bethshan, city of the Sun.

to him; but he ate and slept with certain of his friends and associates, and gave himself to absolute retirement during the day. From being so vehemently afflicted with gout that he was obliged to be carried in a chair, he regained his pristine strength and vigor by his philosophic habit of living. And from being so diseased in his hands that he could not even extend them when necessary, he so recovered their use that he could employ them with greater expedition than the mechanic. Plotinos greatly esteemed Rogatianus, and proposed him as an illustrious example for the pupils of Philosophy.* Serapion of Alexandria, another of his auditors, was at first a rhetorician, but afterward gave himself to philosophical discussions; though he remained addicted to usury and avarice. And, finally, Plotinos considered me, a Tyrian by birth, one of his most intimate friends, and entrusted to me the care and revision of his writings.

VIII. Plotinos could by no means endure to revise what he had written, nor even to read his composition, through the badness of his sight. But while he was writing he neither formed the letters with accuracy, nor exactly distinguished the syllables, nor bestowed any diligent attention on the orthography; but neglecting all these as trifles he was alone attentive to the intellection of his mind,—and, to the admiration of all his disciples, persevered in this custom to the end of his life.† Such, indeed, was the power of his intellect,

*Porphyrios refers to Rogatianus in his treatise *on Abstinence*, in the following passage: "There was once an instance where a negligence of terrene concerns, and a contemplation and intuition of such as are divine, expelled an articular disease, which had infested a certain person for the space of eight years. So that at the very same time that his soul was divested of a solicitous concern for riches, and corporeal affairs, his body was freed from a troublesome disease." What Porphyrios here says is perfectly conformable to the *Chaldean Oracle*: "By extending a fiery (divine) intellect to the work of piety, you will preserve the flowing body." Happy Rogatianus! who could relinquish power for knowledge, and prefer the perpetual inheritance of wisdom to the gaudy splendors of title, and the fleeting honors of command.—T.

†To the mere critic and philologist Plotinos will doubtless appear inexcusable for such *important* omissions; but to the sublime and contemplative genius his negligence will be considered as the result of vehement conception, and profound ratiocination.—T.

that when he had once conceived the whole disposition of his thoughts from the beginning to the end, and had afterward committed them to writing, his composition was so connected that he appeared to be merely transcribing from a book. Hence he would discuss his domestic matters without departing from the actual intention of his mind; and at one and the same time transact the necessary affairs of friendship, and preserve an uninterrupted survey of the things he had proposed to consider. In consequence of this uncommon power of intellection, when he returned to writing, after the departure of the person with whom he had been conversing, he did not review what he had written, owing, as I have already observed, to the defect in his sight; and yet he so connected the preceding with the subsequent conceptions, that it appeared as if his composition had never been interrupted. Hence he was simultaneously present with others and himself, so that the self-converted energy of his intellect was never remitted, except perhaps in sleep; which the paucity of his food, for he frequently abstained even from bread, and his incessant conversion to intellect, contributed in no small degree to expel.

IX. Several women, also, who were much attached to the study of Philosophy, were auditors and disciples of Plotinos.* Among these were Gemina, in whose house he resided, her daughter of the same name, and Amphikleia, the wife of Ariston, the son of Iamblichos. There were many noble persons of both sexes, who, when at the point of death, committed their children and all their property to Plotinos, as to a certain sacred and divine guardian; and hence his

*The Platonic Philosophy, indeed, as it necessarily combines truth with elegance, is naturally adapted to captivate and allure the female mind, in which the love of symmetry and gracefulness is generally predominant. Hence, in every age, except the present, many illustrious females have adorned the Platonic schools by the brilliancy of their genius, and an uncommon vigor and profundity of thought.—T.

This age is more fortunate. There are many women of superior spiritual attainments who, animated by supersensuous aspirations, are ardently pursuing the study of Philosophy. A modern Hypatia may yet appear. It is a noteworthy fact that the majority of the pupils at the Concord School of Philosophy were women.

house was filled with boys and girls. Among these was Polemon, whom he educated with great care. He also kindly heard the young man recite his poetical productions. Nor did he weary in hearing the procurators of his wards render an account of their administration, or in paying an accurate attention to the expenditure of their funds; affirming that as they did not yet philosophise they should possess their own property, and receive their full income. However, though he gave such attention to the necessary concerns of life so far as his wards were interested, yet the intellectual energy of his soul while he was awake never suffered any interruption from externals, nor any remission of vigor. He was likewise extremely mild in his manners, and was easy of access to his disciples and friends. Hence, though he resided at Rome twenty-six years and acted as arbitrator in many controversies, which he amicably adjusted, yet he had no enemy in that city.*

X. Of those addicted to the study of Philosophy was one Olympios, of Alexandria, who had been for a short time the pupil of Ammonios. On account of his arrogance and conceit he conducted himself basely towards Plotinos. So much was he incensed against the philosopher that he endeavored to injure him by drawing down on him, through magical arts, the deleterious influence of the stars. When he perceived that the attempt was vain, and reacted upon himself,

*—This circumstance reflects the highest honor on the philosophic character of Plotinos; but at the same time some merit is due the age in which he fortunately lived. Had he been destined to make his appearance in the present times, unsupported by fortune, and with no other recommendation than an uncommon greatness of mind and an unequalled depth of thought, from being despised, insulted, and distressed, he must surely have been indignant though not morose, and severe though not agitated with wrath. He would have been scornful without pride, contemptuous without weakness, patient without servility, and solitary without affectation. He would have lived without notice, wrote with success, and died without regret. But born to a happier fate, his genius was not doomed to languish in the shades of obscurity, but attained to the blossom of perfection in the sunshine of Philosophy.—T. These words may be considered as forming a part of Mr. Taylor's autobiography. He experienced contumely, insults and destitution. But some of the "sunshine of Philosophy" eventually illuminated his life, and posterity honors him according to his merits, which were great, and deserving of our highest admiration.

he said to his companions: "The soul of Plotinos possesses such a mighty power that it immediately repels malignant influences directed against his person on the authors of the evil."

Plotinos was conscious at the time of the attempt of Olympios, and remarked: "*Now* the body of Olympios is contracted like a purse, and his members are bruised together." After Olympios had frequently discovered that his attempts reacted on himself, he ceased his base attacks.

That Plotinos naturally possessed something greater than the rest of mankind is evident from the following incident: A certain Egyptian priest,* then visiting in Rome, and who became known to Plotinos through one of his friends, being desirous of exhibiting his wisdom, requested the philosopher to attend him in order that he might behold his familiar dæmon. The invocation was performed in the temple of Isis; for the Egyptian said that this was the only pure place that he could find in Rome. In answer to the invocation a divine being appeared, which was not in the genus of dæmons. The Egyptian exclaimed: "Happy Plotinos! who possesses a divinity for a dæmon,† which does not rank among the inferior kinds." It was not permitted to ask any question, or to enjoy the spectacle for any length of time, because a certain friend who was present suffocated some birds‡ which he held in his hands for the sake of safety, either impelled by envy or terrified through fear. As Plotinos was allotted a guardian belonging to the higher, more divine, order of dæmons, the divine eye

*Probably Anebo, to whom Porphyrios addressed his celebrated letter, which was answered by Iamblichos.

†"The most perfect souls who are conversant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding divinity, so they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence the Egyptian priest admired Plotinos since he was governed by a divine dæmon."—PROKLOS on *First Alkibiades*. Proklos also observes: "The first and highest dæmons are divine, and often appear as gods through their transcendent similitude to the divinities. For that which is first in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to it."

‡These birds were used in the magical operations.

of his soul was perpetually elevated to this guardian deity. Wherefore he composed a book, *On the Daemon Allotted to Each of Us*, in which he endeavored to assign the causes of the diversity existing among these attendants on mankind.

When Amelios, who loved to sacrifice, was celebrating the sacred rites in honor of the new moon, he requested Plotinos to assist him in the ceremonies. The philosopher replied: "It is necessary for the spirits to come to me, not I to go to them." Thus spoke the greatness of his soul! Neither were his companions able to understand, nor did they dare ask him the meaning of, his response *

XI. Plotinos had a profound insight into the characters and habits of men, as the following relation will evince: A lady named Chion, who with her children resided in his house and there lived happily and respectably, had a valuable necklace stolen. In consequence of the theft, all the servants were sum-

*We may presume that Plotinos meant to insinuate the high degree of purity and perfection of his intellectual part, which rendered him so superior to the use of corporeal sacrifices, and the cultivation of material deities, and demons, that he ought rather to be propitiated by others than to propitiate himself. For a soul like his was indeed, to use his own expression, *ἰστέρε εἰς θεὸς an inferior divinity*, ready winged for flight, and scarcely detained by the fetters of body. This I know will pass for great arrogance and presumption among the philosophers(?) of the present day, who consider *meekness and humility* as the highest ornaments of their nature, and the truest characteristics of genuine worth. But surely a sublime and godlike soul can never think *meanly* of its nature, or be willing to suppress and extinguish the inevitable consciousness of its own dignity and elevation. Humiliating conceptions flourish nowhere but in the breasts of the servile, or the base; and are the ornaments of no characters, but those of the impotent and the mean. Their influence is baneful to the advancement of science, and destructive of all genuine excellence and worth. They damp the flowing ardor of true theology, curb the celestial flight of philosophy, and blast the vigorous blossoms of genius. Let it, however, be remembered, that while we banish meekness we are by no means the advocates of arrogance and conceit; but are alone desirous of vindicating the proper dignity of the worthy soul, and of rescuing its generous and ardent confidence from the frigid embraces of humiliating opinion. It is one thing to be *modest* and another to be *meek*—for the former is the shadow attendant on genius, inseparable from its progress, and the symbol of its reality; but the latter is the demon of traffic, the inspirer of its projects, the support of its credit, and the harbinger of its appearance. It lies from the face of genius like the shadows of night before the beams of the morning and, terrified at the approach of the elevated mind, hides itself in the dark retreats of trembling pusillanimity. -T.

moned before Plotinos. Indicating a certain one, he said: "That man is the thief." The fellow was immediately seized and chastised, but for some time maintained his innocence. However, he finally confessed his guilt and restored the necklace.

Plotinos likewise predicted the destiny of the young men of his acquaintance; as of one Polemon, he foretold that he would be very much addicted to love, and would live but a short time, which predictions were verified. And when I had determined to depart from a corporeal life, he perceived my design and as I was walking home stood before me and said that my intention was not the dictate of a sound intellect, but the effect of a certain melancholic disease; wherefore he ordered me to depart from Rome. Persuaded by him I went to Sicily, mainly because I heard that the upright and accomplished Probos resided at that time near Lilybæum. Thus I was liberated from my [deadly] intention, but prevented from being present with him until his death.*

XII. The Emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina especially honored and esteemed Plotinos. Relying on the imperial friendship, he requested that a certain ruined city in Campania might be restored and made a suitable habitation for philosophers; that it might be governed by the laws of Plato, and called Platonopolis. It was his intention to retire to this city with his disciples and associates.† Plotinos would have easily accomplished his design, if some of the courtiers, actuated by envy or anger, or some other depraved cause, had not prevented its execution.‡

XIII. Plotinos was strenuous in discourse, and

*Eunapios relates this wonderful incident differently.

†Plotinos intended to have "realized the beautiful republic, conceived by the godlike genius of Plato." Every philosophic mind will sincerely regret that he was not permitted to carry out his sublime and philanthropic intentions.

‡Courtiers, a class of men very deficient in intellect, can always be depended on to frustrate any movement looking to the moral and spiritual regeneration and elevation of mankind. They are generally assisted by about nine-tenths of the people who are *not* courtiers.

most acute in discovering and conceiving what was appropriate; but his diction was not always correct. For example, he did not say *ἀναμνησεται* but *ἀναμνημίσκεται*; and similar errors were made in his writings. In speaking, however, the predominance of intellect in his conceptions was clearly evident; and the intellectual light diffused itself in his countenance, which was indeed always lovely but was then particularly beautiful. At this time a certain attenuated and dewy moisture appeared on his face, and a pleasing mildness beamed forth. Then he exhibited a placid gentleness in receiving questions, and demonstrated in their solution a vigor uncommonly powerful. On one occasion when I had interrogated him for three days on the manner in which the soul is present with the body, he persevered in demonstrating the mode of its conjunction. And when a certain Thaumasioi entered his school for the purpose of reporting the general arguments developed in the regular discussion, and also desired to hear Plotinos himself explain one of the books used in his school, but was prevented by the questions and answers of Porphyrios, Plotinos replied: "Unless we solve the doubts of Porphyrios we shall be unable to explain anything in the book which you wish to be made the subject of discussion."*

XIV. He wrote, as he spoke, vigorously and with abundance of intellect. His style is concise, and abounds with more profundity of conception than copiousness of words. He poured forth many things under the influence of inspiration; and was wonderfully affected with the subjects he discussed.

The latent dogmas of the Stoics and Peripatetics are mingled in his writings, and he has condensed in them the *Metaphysics* of Aristoteles. He was not ignorant of any geometrical, arithmetical, mechanical, optical, or musical theorem, though he never applied

*The custom of Plotinos might be profitably adopted by modern teachers of philosophy, or, in fact, of any science. Superficiality is one of the chief intellectual vices of the age. The average college-graduate has barely "touched" the sciences and languages which he is supposed to have mastered.

these sciences to practical purposes.* The commentaries of the Platonic philosophers, Severos, Kronios, Numenios, Gaios, Attikos,† etc., as also of the Peripatetics Aspasios, Alexandros, Adrastrós,‡ etc., were read in his school—but *he borrowed nothing whatever from these; his conceptions were entirely his own, and his theory was different from theirs.* In his investigations he exhibited the spirit of Ammonios. He rapidly comprehended what he read; and having in a few words given the meaning of a profound theory, he arose.

When the treatise of Longinos,§ a man studious

*“We are surprised to find a use in Geometry which at present it is by no means suspected to afford. For who would conceive that it is the genuine passage to true theology, and the vestibule of divinity? This, indeed, is by no means the case when it is studied for lucre, and applied to mechanical purposes; for then the soul is neither elevated nor enlightened, but degraded and filled with material darkness.”—TAYLOR: *Preface to Translation of Proklos on Euklides.*

†Severos wrote many works, among them a *Commentary on the Timaios.* Attikos flourished about 176, A. D. He opposed the combination of Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines, and disputed violently against Aristoteles. Among his writings were *Commentaries on the Timaios and Phaidros.*

Numenios, of Apamea in Syria, lived in the latter half of the second century of the Christian era. He was a profound philosopher, and his works—of which only fragments have been preserved—were considered as of high authority.

Kronios was a friend of Numenios, and seems to have shared with him in his opinions. He gave to the Homeric poems an allegorical and mythical interpretation.

Gaios was a Platonic commentator and teacher, and flourished in the latter half of the second century.

‡Aspasios commented on the *Interpretations, the Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, etc.,* of Aristoteles.

Alexandros (of Aphrodisias) the Exegete, expounded the Peripatetic philosophy at Athens, from the year 198 to 211, in the reign of Septimius Severus. He wrote many books, of which several have been preserved and published.

Adrastrós wrote on the order of the works of Aristoteles, expositions of the *Categories* and *Physics*, and of the *Timaios* of Plato, a work on *Harmonics*, and a *Treatise on the Sun.*

§Longinos (213-273) was one of the ablest critics of antiquity. Eumapios says he was a walking museum, and a living library. Though a learned man, and an excellent critic, he was not, as Plotinos rightly remarks, a philosopher. However, he was more entitled to that much-abused appellation than the large majority of modern thinkers to whom it has been unjustly given. “It is true that Longinos did not, like Plotinos, contribute to the positive development of Theosophy. But he participated, nevertheless, in the philosophical investigations connected with this subject, and really enriched the science of aesthetics by his work *On the Sublime*, which is full of fine and just observations.”—UEBERWEG.

of ancient wisdom, *On Principles*, was read to him, he remarked: "Longinos is indeed a philologist, but not a philosopher." When Origenes* once came into his school, Plotinos blushed and wished to rise, but being solicited by Origenes to continue his lecture he replied: "Discourse ought to cease when the speaker perceives that he addresses himself to those who are acquainted with his doctrine." Having thus spoken he dismissed his auditors.

XV. When at a celebration of Plato's nativity† I recited a poem on *The Sacred Marriage*,‡ and a certain person who was present observed that Porphyrios was mad, because many things were said mystically and latently, accompanied with a divine afflatus. Plotinos openly exclaimed: "You have shown yourself at the same time a poet, a philosopher, and a hiero-

*Origenes was a fellow-student of Plotinos in the school of Ammonios.—*Vide Ch. III.*

†The natal day of the Divine Plato was publicly celebrated with appropriate ceremonies for hundreds of years after his death; in fact until the suppression of the Platonic school by the barbarous edict of the intolerant Justinianus, issued in A. D. 529. It is probable that the Platonists privately continued the natal celebration of their great Master for some years longer, or until the last great expositors of the arcana of the Platonic Philosophy had passed into a higher sphere.

In modern times the Platonic birth-day celebration was revived by the Florentine Platonists, under the leadership of the great Marsilius Ficinus, the pupil of that ardent disciple of the Athenian Sage—George Pletho.

It is stated that during the eighteenth century Count Castiglione again revived the Platonic birth-day festival (*Vide SIEVEKING: History of the Platonic Academy*). The Platonists of this and future ages ought annually to celebrate the day on which one of the chief of Wisdom's high priests descended into this mundane sphere, for the benefit of all succeeding generations.

‡According to the Orphic theology, as we learn from Proklos, that divinity who is the cause of stable power and sameness, the supplier of being, and the first principle of conversion to all things, is of a male characteristic; but the divinity which emits from itself all various progressions, separations, measures of life, and prolific powers, is feminine. And a communication of energies between the two was denominated by this theology, *a sacred marriage*. Proklos adds: "that theologians at one time perceiving this communion in co-ordinate gods called it the marriage of Zeus and Hera, Ouranos and Gaia, Kronos and Rhea. But at another time surveying it in the conjunction of subordinate with superior gods they called it the marriage of Zeus and Demeter. And at another, perceiving it in the union of superior with inferior divinities, they denominated it the marriage of Zeus and Persphone."—*Vide Proklos on Timaios and on Parmenides.*—T.

phant." On one occasion an orator, named Diophanes, read an apology for the intoxicated Alkibiades in the *Symposium* of Plato, endeavoring to prove that it was proper, for the sake of learning virtue, that the lover should expose himself to the object of his attachment, and not even refuse amatorial association. While he was reading this licentious defense, Plotinos often arose from his seat as if he intended to leave the assembly; however, he finally remained until Diophanes had finished. Afterward he desired me to refute the oration. The orator refusing to furnish me a copy of his discourse, I answered it from memory, and delivered my refutation in the presence of the same auditors who had listened to Diophanes. Plotinos was so delighted with my refutation that he often repeated in the assembly:

"Thus write and you'll illuminate mankind!"*

Eubulos, the Platonic successor at Athens, wrote to Plotinos about certain Platonic questions, which questions he directed me to investigate and answer the inquiry. He applied himself to the Canons concerning the stars, but not according to a very mathematical mode † He more accurately investigated the doctrines of astrologers about the planetary influences, and not finding their predictions to be certain he frequently refuted them in his writings.

XVI. At this time there were many Christians

*The original is Βαλλ' οὐτως αἰκεν τι φῶς λαοτοῖσι γενῆαι. Π. lib. 8. v 282. Plotinos substituted ἀδρεῖσθαι for λαοτοῖσι.

†That is, we may presume, he very little regarded the calculation of eclipses, or measuring the distance of the sun and moon from the earth, or determining the magnitudes and velocities of the planets. For he considered employments of this kind as more the province of the mathematician than of the profound and intellectual philosopher. The mathematical sciences are indeed the proper means of acquiring wisdom, but they ought never to be considered as its end. They are the bridge as it were between sense and intellect by which we may safely pass through the night of oblivion, over the dark and stormy ocean of Matter, to the lucid regions of the intelligible world. And he who is desirous of returning to his true country will speedily pass over this bridge without making any needless delays in his passage.—T.

This is sound advice, but it will doubtless be wholly disregarded by the average mathematician, who would ridicule the idea that the mathematical science ought to be studied solely for its use in enabling one to pass from the sensuous to the supersensuous.

and others who, departing from the Ancient Philosophy, became heretics with respect to it, viz., the followers of Adelphios and Akylinos. These men, being in the possession of many of the writings of Alexander of Libya, Philokomos, Demostratos, and Lydos, and exhibiting spurious revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianos, Nikotheos, Allogenes, Mesos, and certain others, deceived many, and were themselves deceived. For they asserted that Plato had not penetrated the depth of an Intelligible Essence. Plotinos frequently refuted these heretical imposters in his lectures, and wrote a book concerning them which I have entitled *Against the Gnostics*; he leaving the matter of inscription to my judgment. Amelios wrote forty volumes against the treatise of Zostrianos; and I have demonstrated by many arguments that the book which they ascribe to Zoroaster is spurious and of modern date, and was forged by the originators of the heresy in order that their opinions might pass for the genuine dogmas of the ancient Zoroaster.

XVII. Some of the Greeks falsely accused Plotinos of being a plagiary of the doctrines of Numenios, which calumny Tryphon, a Stoic and Platonist, told to Amelios. In refutation of this ridiculous notion Amelios wrote a treatise, inscribed *On the Difference between the dogmas of Plotinos and Numenios*, which he dedicated to Basileus, *i. e.*, to me. For Basileus, as well as Porphyrios, is my name. In the language of my native country (Phœnicia) I am called Malchos,* which is the name of my father. Malchos in Greek is Basileus. Wherefore Longinos, when he dedicated his work *On Instinct* to Kleodamos and myself, inscribed it: "To Kleodamos and Malchos;" and Amelios, translating Malchos by Basileus, as Numenios changes Maximos into Megalos, wrote the following letter to me: "Amelios to Basileus, Greeting: Know well that I would not have pub-

*In the Semitic dialects, M'LECH; to take counsel, to reign; a king. *Malchos* is the Hellenic form; but *basileus* is the Greek equivalent. *Porphyrios* signifies purple. It is not a translation except in a tropical sense; purple being the color of regal garments.—A. W.

lished a word for the sake of those very worthy individuals, who you say are known to you by their empty cackling, who have ascribed the dogmas of our friend to the Apamaean Numenius. It is evident that this accusation has proceeded from the euphony and fluency of speech which characterize the sex. At one time they assert that his doctrines are broad nonsense; at another that they are spurious; and again that they are poor stuff. But since you think that we ought to avail ourselves of this occasion to recall the dogmas of the Platonic philosophy [of which we wholly approve], and also to honor so great and admirable a man as our friend Plotinos, by making his doctrines better known, though they were famous long ago, I fulfill my promise and send you this work, finished by me in three days, as you are aware. It behooves you to know, furthermore, that this work is not formed of original thoughts carefully set forth, but only reflections derived from the Plotinian Lectures, and arranged as they successively presented themselves. I crave your indulgence so much the more, as the ideas of our philosopher, which some individuals arraign before our common judgment, are not easy to apprehend; since he expresses in different ways the same thoughts [selecting the mode of expression that first occurs to him]. I know that you will kindly correct me if I have wandered from the line of thinking characteristic of Plotinos. Being a man fond of labor, as the tragic poet somewhere says, I am compelled to submit to criticism, and to correct my writing, if I have departed from the dogmas of our master. Such is my desire to please you! Farewell."

XVIII. I have inserted this letter by Amelios, not only for the sake of those who imagined that Plotinos had appropriated the dogmas of Numenius, but also for the benefit of the individuals who considered him a great trifler, and contemned him because they did not understand what he said,* and because he was free

*One of the chief characteristics of ignorant and stupid people is, that they ridicule what they do not understand.

from every *sophistical artifice and vanity*, and conducted himself in the company of disputants with the same ease as in his familiar discourses. Moreover, he did not hastily disclose to every one the syllogistic necessities which were latent in his lectures. The same misapprehension of the true character and genius of Plotinos happened to me when I first heard him. Wherefore I endeavored to excite him by writing against his doctrines, and attempting to show that intelligibles are external to intellect.* My treatises having been read to Plotinos by Amelios, smiling he said: "It must be your employment, Amelios, to solve those doubts occasioned by the writer's ignorance of our opinions." After Amelios had written no small work against my objections, and I had replied, and he had again answered me,—at length, having scarcely, after all these attempts, fathomed the depth† of Plotinos, I changed my opinion, and wrote a recantation, which I recited in his school.‡ Ever afterward I considered the books of Plotinos as most worthy of belief, and incited my master to the ambition of disclosing his opinions in a more particular and copious manner. I also advised and urged Amelios to commit his valuable thoughts to writing.

*The fifth book of the fifth *Ennead* proves that intelligibles are not external to intellect.

†If, therefore, a man of such great sagacity and penetration as Porphyrios, and who from the period in which he lived possessed advantages with respect to the attainment of philosophy which are denied to every modern, found so much difficulty in fathoming the profundity of Plotinos, there must necessarily be very few at present by whom this can be accomplished. Let no one, therefore, deceive himself by fancying that he can understand the writings of Plotinos by barely reading them. For as the subjects which he discusses are for the most part the objects of intellect alone, to understand them is to see them, and to see them is to come in contact with them. But this is only to be accomplished by long familiarity with and a life conformable to the things themselves. For then, as Plato says, "a light as if leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and will then itself nourish itself."—T. Golden words are these, and they should be perpetually present to the mind of every student of the Platonic Philosophy.

‡Porphyrios possessed intellectual honesty—something not generally found among the men of this age. He was neither afraid nor ashamed to publicly acknowledge that he had ignorantly held false opinions.

XIX. What opinion Longinos had of Plotinos will be evident from the general tenor of part of a letter which he wrote me while at this place (Lilybæum), requesting me to come from Sicily into Phœnicia where he lived, and to bring with me the works of Plotinos. He says: "And whenever it seems good to you send these works, though I would prefer that you bring them. I have not been able to refrain from frequently asking you to choose the road to me in preference to any other; if for no other reason—for what new wisdom do you expect from me?—than to enjoy our ancient friendship, and the salubrious air which would benefit the corporeal debility of which you speak.

"And whatever you may have thought otherwise you must not come expecting anything new from me—or any of the works of the ancient writers which you say are lost to you. For so great is the scarcity of transcribers here that, by the divinities, hardly during the whole time of my residence in this country have I been able to obtain a copy of the writings of Plotinos—though, diverting my secretary from his usual occupations, I ordered him to attend to this work alone. I have many of his books, and when those sent by you reach me, will probably have all. But what I have are imperfect, for the errors and mistakes of the transcribers are numerous. I presumed that our friend Amelios had corrected the errors; but probably more important matters occupied his time. Wherefore I can make no practical use of these books, though I desire exceedingly to inspect what Plotinos has written on the Soul, and on Being,—but these two books are especially full of faults. I wish very much indeed to receive an accurate edition of the books from you, which will be returned after my copies have been carefully collated with it and corrected accordingly.

"But I repeat what I said before. Do not send these books but bring them with you; and not these alone, but any others which may have escaped the

notice of Amelios. For why should I not inquire with the greatest diligence after the writings of this man, since they deserve the highest honor and veneration? This indeed I have always signified to you, both when present and absent, and when you resided at Tyre, that I could not understand many of the hypotheses of the books of Plotinos; but that I transcendently loved and revered the manner of his writings, the profundity of his conceptions, and the very philosophic disposition of his subjects. And indeed I judge that the investigators of truth ought only to compare the books of Plotinos with the most excellent works.

XX. In relating the facts set forth in the two previous chapters I was somewhat prolix, as I desired to show the opinion of Plotinos held by the greatest critic of our age—one who examined and criticized the works of nearly all the writers of his time. At first, deceived by the ignorant aspersions of others, Longinos regarded Plotinos with contempt.

He thought that the works which he had received from Amelios were incorrect through the fault of the transcribers,—because he was unacquainted with the usual diction of our philosopher. For if any the books in the possession of Amelios were accurate, since they were transcribed from the manuscripts of Plotinos himself.

Moreover, it is worth while to adduce what Longinos said in one of his works about Plotinos, Amelios and the other philosophers of his time, in order to fully show what this most celebrated and acute critic thought of them. The book referred to was written against Plotinos and Gentilianos Amelios, and is entitled *On the End*. The preface is as follows: "Many philosophers have flourished in our age, O Marcellus,* especially in the time of our youth. The present generation, to say the least, has but few. But when we were youths many noted philosophers lived, all of whom we chanced to see, since from our childhood we travelled through numerous countries with

*This is Marcellus Orontius, the well known disciple of Plotinos.

our parents. Indeed, wherever we sojourned amidst the inhabitants of the various lands and cities, we mingled with those who excelled in virtue and wisdom.

Of these philosophers, some committed their thoughts to writing for the sake of posterity; others were content to orally impart their wisdom to their disciples. In the first class, of the Platonists there were Euklides, Demokritos,* and Proklinos who lived near Troy. Also Plotinos, and Gentilianos Amelios, the friend of Plotinos, who now live and lecture at Rome. Of the Stoics were Themistokles and Phoibion, and Annios and Medios who lived until lately. And, finally, of the Peripatetics there was Heliodoros the Alexandrian.

In the second class, of the Platonists were Ammonios [Sakkas] and Origenes, with whom we associated for a long time—philosophers who far surpassed their contemporaries. Then there were the successors of the Athenian school, Theodotos and Eubulos. Some of these have written works, as Origenes a book on Dæmons; Eubulos, Commentaries on the Philebus and Gorgias, and On the Objections of Aristoteles to the Republic. These works are of small importance compared with their oral teachings, and were not written systematically, nor with the intent to explain their dogmas.

Moreover, of the Stoics were Herminos and Lysimachos, and Athenaios and Musonios who lectured in the city (Athens). Of the Peripatetics were Ammonios and Ptolemaios, both accomplished in all the learning of the age, especially Ammonios, for no one approached him in a knowledge of the arts and sciences.

These last wrote no philosophic treatises but merely poems and set orations, which I do not think they desire to be preserved for the inspection of pos-

*Author of a *Commentary on the Alkibiades*, cited by Proklos, a *Commentary on the Phædon*, and a *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristoteles*, all of which works are lost.

terity. I presume they do not wish to be known to men of after ages by such works alone; and they neglected to transmit their thoughts in more worthy writings.

Of these philosophers, therefore, who were authors, some produced nothing more than a collection and transcription of the remains of the Ancients, as Euklides, Demokritos, and Proklinos; others, recalling particular relations from ancient histories, compose books of these materials, as Annios, Medios, and Phoibion. Phoibion was noted more for the elegance of his style than the depth and value of his ideas. Heliodoros may also be classified with these writers; for he was content to reproduce what is contained in the writings of the Ancients, without adding any philosophical expositions.

Plotinos and Gentilianos Amelios are replete with a copiousness of propositions, which they studiously discuss, and have seriously chosen the employment of writing, using a mode of contemplation peculiarly their own. And Plotinos indeed, as it seems, has more perspicuously explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles than his predecessors. For the writings of Numenios, Kronios, Moderatos, and Thrasyllos, are not to be compared as regards accuracy with the books of Plotinos on the same subjects. Amelios pursued the investigations of Plotinos; he adopted many of his dogmas, but differed from him in the prolixity of his demonstrations, and the diffusiveness of his style.

And the writings of these men alone do I deem worthy of particular consideration. For why should any one think it necessary to examine the writings of the others in place of the original works which they copied, especially since they added nothing of their own: they not only extracted the essential parts of their books, but even the method of argumentation, and did not trouble themselves to collect better material [which could have been had]. I adopted this method in some of my writings, as when I answered

Gentilianos Amelios on the Platonic idea of Justice, and criticized the book of Plotinos on Ideas. For our common friend, Basileus (Porphyrios) of Tyre, who wrote many things according to the conceptions of Plotinos, and preferred his instruction and manner of life to ours,—endeavored to demonstrate in a certain book that the opinion of Plotinos on ideas was better than ours. This book we think that we refuted, and proved to him that his recantation [of erroneous notions about the dogmas of Plotinos] was not wisely made.

We have criticized many opinions of these philosophers, as for instance in our "Letter to Amelios," which is almost equivalent to a book in length. This was written in answer to an epistle which Amelios wrote to us from Rome, and which is entitled *On the Character of the Philosophy of Plotinos*. As regards the title of our treatise we were content with the simple inscription, *Letter to Amelios*.

XXI. In the above quotations, therefore, Longinos acknowledges that Plotinos and Amelios far surpassed all the philosophers of their age by the multitude of propositions and questions discussed, and by the mode of contemplation peculiar to themselves; that Plotinos did not appropriate the dogmas of Numenios, but that his own were more ancient than those of the latter; and that he followed the dogmas of the Pythagoreans [and Plato]. Moreover, that the works of Numenios, Kronios, Moderatos,* and Thrasyllos† were inferior in accuracy to those of Plotinos on the same subjects. When Longinos stated that Amelios pursued the investigations of Plotinos but was prolix and verbose in his expositions, and therefore his style differed from that of his master,—he also refers to me.

*Moderatos flourished during the first century of the Christian era. He wrote a valuable work on the Pythagorean Philosophy in eleven books, of which only fragments have been preserved.

†Thrasyllus, known as the arranger of the Platonic dialogues, was a grammarian, who lived in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and died A. D. 36, while holding the office of astrologer to the latter. He combined with Platonism a neo-Pythagorean numerical speculation and the practice of magic, according to the Chaldean mode.

the intimate friend of Plotinos, in this connection: "Our common friend, Basileus (Porphyrios) of Tyre, who has written many things in the manner of Plotinos." These words indicate that he perceived that I had avoided the verbosity of Amelios, and imitated the Plotinian style.

It suffices [for the purpose of showing the estimation in which Plotinos was held] to have cited the judgment of this illustrious man, the first critic of his age, on the merits of our philosopher. If I had been able to visit him, at the time he wrote for me, he would never have attempted the [so-called] refutation of the dogmas of Plotinos, which he composed before he had sufficiently investigated his system.*

XXII. But why should I speak about the oak and the rock, to use an Hesiodic phrase?† For if it is necessary to use the testimony of the wise [in respect to the transcendent merits of Plotinos] who is wiser than a Divinity? Than a Divinity who truly said of himself:

"The sands' amount, the measures of the Sea
Tho' vast the number, are well known to me.
I know the thoughts within the dumb conceal'd,
And words I hear by language unreveal'd."‡

This is Apollon, the same Divinity who proclaimed Sokrates to be the wisest of men, who being asked by Amelios whither the soul of Plotinos had migrated, responded as follows:

To strains immortal full of heav'nly fire,
My harp I tune well strung with vocal wire;
Dear to Divinity a friend I praise,
Who claims those notes a God alone can raise
For him a God in verse mellifluous sings,
And beats with golden rod the warbling strings.
Be present Muses, and with general voice
And all the powers of harmony rejoice;
Let all the measures of your art be try'd
In rapt'rous sounds, as when Achilles dy'd.
When Homer's melody the band inspired,

*Longinos did something very common in these days of superfluity and rash judgments, *i. e.*, he refuted dogmas before he had comprehended them.

†Hesiodos: *Theogonia*, V. 35. In other words: why should I cite the letter of Longinos, when I can adduce the oracle of Apollon?

‡This is part of the famous Delphic oracle given to Croesus. See Herodotos 1. 47.

And God-like furies every bosom fir'd,
 And lo! the sacred choir of Muses join,
 And in one general hymn their notes combine.
 I Phoebos in the midst, to whom belong
 The sacred pow'rs of verse, begin the song.
 Genius sublime! once bound in mortal ties,
 A daemon now and more than mortals wise.
 Freed from those members that with deadly weight
 And stormy whirl enchain'd thy soul of late;*
 O'er Life's rough ocean thou hast gain'd that shore,
 Where storms molest and change impairs no more;†
 And struggling thro' its deeps with vig'rous mind,
 Pass'd the dark stream, and left base souls behind.
 Plac'd where no darkness ever can obscure,
 Where nothing enters sensual and impure;
 Where shines eternal God's unclouded ray,
 And gilds the realms of intellectual day.
 Oft merg'd in matter, by strong leaps you try'd
 To bound aloft, and cast its folds aside;
 To shun the bitter stream of sanguine life,
 Its whirls of sorrow, and its storms of strife.
 While in the middle of its boist'rous waves
 Thy soul robust, the deep's deaf tumult braves;
 Oft beaming from the Gods thy piercing sight
 Beheld in paths oblique a sacred light:
 Whence rapt from sense with energy divine,
 Before thine eyes immortal splendors shine;
 Whose plenteous rays in darkness most profound,
 Thy steps directed and illumin'd round.
 Nor was the vision like the dreams of sleep,
 But seen while vigilant you brave the deep;
 While from your eyes you shake the gloom of night.¹
 The glorious prospects burst upon your sight;
 Prospects beheld but rarely by the wise,
 Tho' men divine and fav'rites of the skies.
 But now set free from the lethargic folds,
 By which th' indignant soul dark matter holds;
 The natal bonds deserted, now you soar,
 And rank with daemon forms, a man no more.
 In that blest realm where love and friendship reign,
 And pleasures ever dwell unmixed with pain;
 Where streams ambrosial in immortal course
 Irriguous flow, from deity their source.
 No dark'ning clouds those happy skies assail,
 And the calm aether knows no stormy gale.
 Supremely blest thy lofty soul abides,
 Where Minos and his brother judge presides;
 Just Aiakos, and Plato the divine,
 And fair Pythag'ras there exalted shine;
 With other souls who form the general choir
 Of love immortal, and of pure desire;
 And who one common station are assign'd

*The soul by its union with the body becomes subject to destiny, but regains its freedom when it has emancipated itself from the influences of this material sphere. It *can* do this temporarily, even while it is still connected with the body.

†The life of Plotinos was in many respects similar to that of Odysseus, whose struggles and vicissitudes are graphically described by Homeros.

With genii of the most exalted kind,
 Thrice happy thou! who, life's long labors past,
 With holy daemons dost reside at last;
 From body loosen'd and from cares at rest;
 Thy life most stable, and divine thy feast.
 Now ev'ry Muse who for Plotinos sings,
 Here cease with me to tune the vocal strings;
 For thus my golden harp, with art divine,
 Has told—Plotinos! endless bliss is thine.

XXIII. According to this oracle, therefore, Plotinos was worthy and mild, gentle and endearing, and such as we truly found him to be. It also asserts that he was vigilant, that he had a pure soul, and that he was always tending to Divinity, which he most ardently loved; and that he endeavored with all his power to emerge from the bitter waters of this sanguine life. Thus to this divine man, often striving to raise his soul by [anagogic] conceptions to the first and highest Deity, and faithfully pursuing the paths described by Plato in his Symposium, there came sometimes the vision of the SUPREME DIVINITY, who has neither form nor idea but is superior to intellect and every intelligible,—to whom also I say that I once approached and was united when I was sixty-eight years old. The mark therefore at which all his endeavors aimed appeared to Plotinos to be near. For the end and scope with him consisted in approximating and being united to the Divinity who is above all things. And he four times attained this end while I was with him, and this by an ineffable energy and not in capacity. The oracle also adds, that while Plotinos was wandering on the sea of life the deities frequently directed him into the right path, by benignantly extending to him abundant rays of divine light; so that he may be said to have written his works from the contemplation and intuition of Divinity. But by a vigilant internal and external contemplation, he is said by the oracle to have seen many beautiful spectacles, which no other philosopher has easily beheld. For merely human contemplation may indeed have various degrees of excellence, but when compared with divine knowledge—though it may be elegant and pleasing—yet cannot reach a depth such as can only be penetrat-

ed by the [divine assistance] of the Deities.

Hitherto the oracle has shown what were the energies of Plotinos, and what he obtained, while enveloped in body. But after his liberation from body it declares that he reached the divine society, where friendship, pure desire, joy and love, suspended from Deity, perpetually reign.* Moreover, it also says that the sons of God, Minos, Rhadamanthos, and Aiakos, are the judges of souls; and that Plotinos departed to these,—not for the purpose of receiving their decisions of his conduct, but to enjoy their society. With these judges other Gods of the most exalted kind associate. It further says that Plato and Pythagoras likewise reside here, together with such other souls as stably form the choir of immortal love; and that the most blessed daemons have here fixed their abode. And lastly the oracle adds, that the life of this divine society is ever flourishing and full of joy, and possesses

*The human mind, though immersed at first in matter, as well as that of every other animal here below, can emerge from it; and, by exerting its native power, can act without the assistance of the body, which it is so far from needing in these operations, that it is incumbered and obstructed by it. By this power it transports itself, as it were, into that ideal world which every man who believes in God must believe to be the archetype of this material world; and in this way may be said to converse with those eternal *forms* of things in the Divine Mind, of which all things we see here are but shadows. And not only does our mind thus open to itself a new world but, by the study of its own nature, it discovers *mind* itself, and rises as near as it is possible for us, under this load of flesh, to that Supreme Mind, the author of nature, and everything in nature, whether ideal or material. By studies of this kind we attain, in some degree, to what we conceive to be the divine, the chief perfection of mind, the ability to employ itself within itself, without the least dependence upon or connection with anything external. Nor is it possible to say, how far the human mind, by being constantly employed in such meditations, and abstracted almost entirely from the body, so disposed by a proper diet and manner of life as not to obstruct its operations, may go in this ascent toward *divinity*.

Plotinos was, I think, the greatest philosopher of later times, and a genius truly *divine*. Nor do I think that ever there was a mind, merely human, of more sublime speculation, or more abstracted from *matter* than his was. Porphyry, his scholar, who writes his life, says that while he was with him, he, Plotinos, was four times raised above humanity, and united by an energy ineffable to the Divinity that is above all. And he says, that he himself was once exalted in the same manner when he was sixty-eight years of age. This I know will be laughed at by our modern philosophers(?); but, as Hamlet says in the play, 'there are more things in heaven and earth than our philosophy dreams of.'—*Lord Monboddo*.

perpetual felicity through the beneficent communications of the Divinities.

XXIV. And such is the life of Plotinos, as narrated by me. As he entrusted to me the arrangement and revision of his books, I promised him while living, and also announced to others, that I would do this work. In the first place I did not deem it right to dispose his writings without system, chronologically, as they were published: I imitated Apollodoros the Athenian and Andronikos the Peripatetic; one of whom collected the works of Epicharmos, the comic writer, into ten volumes, and the other distributed the works of Aristoteles into systematic treatises, classifying together the writings which relate to the same subject. Thus I, delighting in perfect numbers, divided the books of Plotinos into six enneads of nine books each. I distributed to each ennead the books which discuss the same general subject; allotting to the first class those which treat of questions that, compared with others, are of inferior importance.

The first Ennead contains the writings which treat of Ethics. They are:

1. What Man is, and what Animal is.
2. On the Virtues.
3. On Dialectic.
4. On Happiness.
5. Whether Felicity consists in an extension of time.
6. On the Beautiful.
7. On the First Good, and other Goods.
8. Whence evils originate.
9. On the rational exit from the present life.

Such are the works contained in the first Ennead. They discuss ethical problems.

In the second Ennead are included the works which treat of nature, of the world, and those things which are comprehended in it. They are:

1. On the World.
2. On the Circular Motion of the Heavens.
3. Whether the stars effect anything.
4. On the two matters.
5. On that which is in capacity, and that which is in energy.
6. On Quality and Form.
7. On Total Mixture.
8. Why things seen at a distance appear to be small.
9. Against the Gnostics.

The third Ennead contains works which also relate to the world, and various speculations about it. They are:

1. On Fate.
2. On Providence, first book.
3. On Providence, second book.
4. On the Daemon allotted to each of us.
5. On Love.
6. On the Impassivity of Immaterial Natures.
7. On Eternity and Time.
8. On Nature, Contemplation, and the One.
9. Various Considerations.

These three enneads are arranged in one class. In the third Ennead we placed the work *On the Daemon Allotted to Each of Us*, because the subject is discussed from the universal standpoint, and the problems which relate to the conditions proper for the generation of man are examined. The work *On Nature, Contemplation, and The One*, was assigned to this Ennead by reason of its title.

The fourth Ennead comprehends the writings which treat of the Soul. They are:

1. On the Essence of the Soul, first book.
2. On the Essence of the Soul, second book.
3. On Doubts relative to the Soul, first book.
4. On Doubts relative to the Soul, second book.
5. On Doubts relative to the Soul, third book.
6. On Sense and Memory.
7. On the Immortality of the Soul.
8. On the Descent of the Soul into bodies.
9. Whether all souls are one?

The fourth Ennead contains all the hypotheses about the soul.

The fifth Ennead embraces the works which treat of Intuitive Reason (*Noûs*). Each treatise discusses the Principle superior to Intuitive Reason, and the connection of the Intuitive Reason with Soul, and Ideas. They are:

1. On the Three Archial Hypostases.
2. On the Generation and Order of things inferior to The First.
3. On Gnostic Hypostases, and that which is beyond them.
4. How things inferior to The First proceed from The First, and on The One.
5. That Intelligibles are not external to Intuitive Reason, and on The Good.
6. That the nature beyond being is not intellective, and what

that is which is primarily, and also that which is secondarily, intellectual.

7. Whether there are Ideas of Particulars.
8. On Intelligible Beauty.
9. On Intellect, Ideas, and Being.

The fourth and fifth Enneads we arranged in one class; the sixth and last Ennead was allotted another class. The writings of Plotinos were distributed into three general divisions: The first has three Enneads, the second two, and the third one.

The sixth Ennead has the following treatises:

1. On the Genera of Being, first book.
2. On the Genera of Being, second book.
3. On the Genera of Being, third book.
4. On True Being, demonstrating that it is everywhere one and the same whole, first book.
5. On True Being, demonstrating that it is everywhere one and the same whole, second book.
6. On Numbers.
7. How the Multitude of Ideas subsist, and on The Good.
8. On the Free-will and Volition of The One.
9. On the Good or The One.

We thus distributed the fifty-four books into six Enneads. We have added commentaries on some of them, not in any particular order, however, for the sake of our friends who desired certain points to be elucidated. We have also made summaries of all the books except the one *On the Beautiful*, which was lacking at the time the other works were published. And finally we drew up not only summaries for each book, but also arguments for each, which are numbered similarly with the summaries. And now to conclude, we have endeavored to give each of the works of Plotinos a careful examination, and to correct all faults of punctuation and diction. If we aimed at anything else, the work itself will indicate it.

MISCELLANEA.

THE ANCIENT ROAD FROM ATHENS TO THE ACADEMY.—Within the last few days the ancient road leading from Athens to the Academy of Plato has been discovered, during some excavations made near the silk-factory. Although not paved, the road is well preserved, presents a hard surface, and is quite intact. It is being laid bare on both sides. The excavation of the road has resulted further in the dis-

covery of several lekythoi with borders on a white ground, belonging to the archaic epoch; also a terracotta disc on which is represented a man with wings on both shoulders and feet, probably a Hermes — *Athenaeum*, March 17th, 1888.

AN UNEDITED PORTRAIT OF PLATO.—During the summer months of 1881, which I spent in Smyrna, I had the opportunity of purchasing a certain number of antiquities for the Louvre Museum, and of examining a great many more. Among the former is the fine marble head published here for the first time on PLATE I.

I safely conveyed my acquisitions to the Louvre, in the autumn of 1881, and a long time elapsed before I thought again about the bearded philosopher's head. Five years later, in the autumn of 1886, while going through the Old Museum in Berlin, I was struck by a head, quite similar in appearance, with a small pedestal bearing the inscription ΠΛΑΤΩΝ. I learned that Prof Helbig was on the point of publishing this bust of Plato in the *Jahrbuch d. deutschen archaeol. Instituts*. I must now give, together with a few supplements, a short analysis of Professor Helbig's learned paper in the *Jahrbuch*.

The Berlin bust, which is reproduced in *fig. 1* for the sake of comparison, first appeared at the sale of Alessandro Castellani's collection in Rome, in the latter days of March, 1884. The workmanship is rather dry, but points to a good original. As the inscription—which, to judge from the shape of the characters, is not anterior to the epoch of the Antonines— is undoubtedly genuine, and belongs to the same period as the sculpture itself, the Berlin bust deserves a high rank among the typical materials of Greek iconography, being the first authentic portrait of the great philosopher.* Previous to that discovery, Visconti had published a small bust in the Museum of Florence bearing the name of ΠΛΑΤΩΝ. † But the inscription is probably a forgery, the style of the sculpture belonging to the imperial period, when the letter Π with unequal branches was no longer used ‡ On the other hand, there exists in the Vatican Museum a bust very like the Castellani Plato, the pedestal of which bears the inscription ΖΕΝΩΝ. § M. Helbig, who has published a photograph of that bust under two aspects, ¶ believes the inscription to be modern, arguing from the suspicious appearance of the characters, which are scratched on the surface of the marble rather than engraved. The Vatican bust is, in fact, very puzzling. Judging from the photograph, the inscription bears no conclusive evidence of falsity, and we may perhaps admit that the confusion between Plato and Zeno originated in some

*A bust of Plato, with his name inscribed, was discovered in 1846 at Tivoli (*Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* No. 6103), but Prof. Helbig has been unable to find it at the Vatican, and it has never been published.

†Visconti, *Iconografia graeca*, pl. XVIII., p 219-21; Schuster, *Ueber die erhaltenen Portraits griechischer Philosophen* t. II., p. 12-13. Visconti believed that this head was the one which had been found in Athens in the XV century, and sold to Lorenzo de Medici by Girolamo da Pistoia; but this cannot be true, as Dutschke observes, and the bust purchased by Lorenzo, later in Gori's collection and in Pisa, must have been mislaid or have perished in some fire, as it has never reappeared since.

‡Cf. Dittenberger, in the *Archaeol. Zeitung*, 1876, p. 139, and my *Traité d'épigraphie grecque*, p. 205.

§Visconti, *Museo Pio Clementino*, t. VI., pl. 33.

¶*Jahrbuch*, 1886, pl. VI.

Græco-Roman workshop, where several busts of philosophers were being sculptured at the same time. The resemblance of the Vatican bust to those in Berlin and Paris is evident, and certain details even lead to the supposition that they are derived from the same original; but the head of the Vatican Plato is more slender, more delicate in appearance, than any of the other replicas. M. Helbig is inclined to think that the Roman bust, in which the pupils of the eyes are not marked with the chisel, is the best copy and the nearest to the original. It is the best, perhaps, from an æsthetic point of view, but the evidence of the bust from Smyrna seems to show that the true features of Plato, with their natural roughness and severity, are to be looked for in the Smyrna sculpture rather than in the somewhat idealized and edulcorated copy preserved in the Pio Clementino Museum.

Besides the copy in question, M. Helbig has enumerated five others: (1) a head in the Capitol, No. 58, which has not yet been correctly published;* (2) an inedited head in the Villa Borghese; (3) a head in the Casino di Pirro Ligorio, badly preserved, published along with M. Helbig's article; (4) a head in the Torlonia collection;† (5) another inedited head in the Vatican, No. 140. Upon the whole, we find eight replicas of the same type, the Berlin and the Paris busts included; a number certainly to be increased by fresh research in collections, but sufficing to prove that there existed some celebrated portrait of Plato, sculptured in his time, which remained, perhaps exclusively, the model from which all the later copies were derived. M. Helbig has justly remarked that the disposition of the hair and beard in the replicas can be paralleled by specimens of Attic sepulchral *stelai* belonging to the IV century B. C. We know from Olympiodoros (*Life of Plato*), that images of Plato were set up in many places, *πανεργῶν ἀνακείμεναι*, and Visconti‡ had already expressed the belief, which seems to be shared by M. Helbig, that the original of those portraits was the bronze statue made by Silanion§, which was perhaps afterwards transferred to Constantinople, where Christodoros describes a bronze statue of Plato|| in the public gymnasium of Zeuxippos.

The chief texts relating to Plato's physical appearance have been carefully collected by M. Helbig: I will only add one of Olympiodoros, which has already been quoted by Visconti. The name or rather the surname *Πλάτων*, involving the idea of breadth, had been differently explained in ancient times: Neanthes thought it alluded to the breadth of his forehead, while others explained it by his broad chest, or even by his broad eloquence.* Olympiodoros, adopting the first two explanations, writes: *Ἐλλήν δ' οὕτως διὰ τὸ δέο νόητα τοῦ σώματος ἰχθὺν πλατέστατα, τὸ τε δέρονος καὶ τὸ μέγανος, ὡς δηλοῦσθαι πανταχῶς αἱ ἀνακείμεναι αὐτοῦ εἰδόντες οὕτω φαινόμεναι*. This passage is important in so far as it is inspired by the knowledge of many authentic portraits of Plato that Olympiodoros had the opportunity of examining. Now, the breadth of the forehead, a characteristic of profound thought and sublime intelligence, is a remarkable feature of the Smyrna head, where it is perhaps more strikingly marked than in any other of the replicas.

*Bottari, *Museum Capitolinum* pl. 67.

†*monumenti del Museo Torlonia*, etc., Roma, 1881, pl. XI.

‡*Iconographie grecque*. p. 173.

§Diog. Laert., III. 25.

¶Christod. *Ἐκρημνά*, V. 97.

•Diog. Laert., III. 4.

Although the reverse of the Smyrna head is much injured, it seems certain that it belonged to a double hermes, and it was probably associated with a portrait of Sokrates. A double hermes of Sokrates and Plato was recently found at Chiusi,* but is still inedited. A hermes in the Polytechnikon at Athens, also inedited, is thought by M. Helbig to represent Plato and Pythagoras, a supposition which I am not able to control.

As the finder or the purchaser of a work of art is allowed a certain amount of partiality toward his discovery, I will finish this note by expressing the opinion that the Smyrna Plato, although of late workmanship, is perhaps the most characteristic specimen in the series of sculptures which may claim the noble label *PLATON*, and remind the reader that it is the first, and as yet only one, which has been undoubtedly discovered on Hellenic soil.—M. Salomon Reinach in the *American Journal of Archaeology* for March, 1888.

A LOST MS. OF PROKLOS.—For about a century a legend has been afloat concerning a valuable lost manuscript of the *Iliad* supposed to be, like the Venetus A, supplied with the marginal signs of Aristarchos. La Roche gives a brief account of it under No. 101 on page 474 of his *Homerische Textkritik*.....

The legend was started by Villoison in the long note on p. XIV. of his *Prolegomena*. He gives the following history: The MSS. originally in the library of Cardinal Seripandi passed by bequest into that of the Augustinian friars of San Giovanni di Carbonara at Naples. Towards the end of the 17th century, a young Dutchman, John de Witt, destined to become otherwise famous, came to Naples, and at the price of 300 scudi persuaded the friars to part with no less than forty of their most valuable MSS. These he carried off to Holland, and they were ultimately sold with his other books in 1701. Now Fabricius says that among the books then sold was 'Homerus MS. cum obelis Aristarchi, et scholiis MSS., quae marginibus adscripta bonam partem Porphyrium auctorem agnoscunt, adjecto Procli Commentario ad sex libros priores Iliados, ex bibliotheca Antonii Seripandi, cardinalis; tum Odyssea, cum antiquis scholiis copiosis'. The former MS. Villoison identifies with one used by Bergler and Lederlin in the preparation of Wetsten's edition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Amsterdam, 1707. Bergler's words in his preface are, 'paravit sibi (Wetstenius) utriusque operis codices MSS. tos praestantissimos, scholiis nondum editis insignes, sed alterum profundae antiquitatis nomine longe excellentissimum; alter in frontispicio etiam signa Aristarchi, et *Μυοβαρπαρχουχιαν*, uti ibi scriptum habet.' This, then, is what is known of the lost manuscript.

It is characteristic of La Roche that among the references which he gives to those who have discussed this subject he should not mention Heyne, whom he makes a point of ignoring when possible. But Heyne is the only man who has guessed at the truth. In his note on Vol. III p. XCVIII. he says, 'suborta quoque mihi est alia suspicio, an forte hic codex Harleianus 5674 cum altero 5693 ipsum illum codicem Wittianum cum obelis Aristarchi constituerint: in quo tantam jaeturam factam esse conqueruntur viri docti'. Unfortunately for the existence of the pleasant little mystery, his guess can be easily shown to be correct: the codex Wittianus is none other than the MS. Harl. 5693.

In the first place, we can identify it with the MS. described by Fabricius. It has abundant scholia, largely from Porphyrios, and a note at the beginning states that it was in the library of Antonio Seripandi—not the cardinal, by the way, but a near relation who died

*Helbig, *Bullettino dell' Inst.*, 1879, p. 232; *Jahrbuch*, 1886, p. 75.

in 1539..... It is true that it has not got the commentary of Proclus on the first six books of the *Iliad*, but this need not make us hesitate in the identification, for the table of contents says that the commentary is there, and no doubt Fabricius or the writer of the sale catalogue took the existence of it for granted among various fragments of grammatical and prosodical treatises which are bound in at the beginning. Whether the table of contents—which is older than Seripandi's time—was wrong from the beginning, or the commentary of Proclus was taken out at some time after the table was written, I do not see that we can determine.

There is only one small difficulty in the identification with Bergler's MS. Though the Harleianus does actually contain the *Batrachomyomachia*, it is written not as he says *Μυοβατραχομαχία* but, in the table of contents, *Batrachomachia* and, at the beginning of the poem itself, *Βατραχομυομαχία*. But that an error such as this is well within the ordinary limits of human fallibility will be doubted by no one who has the most superficial acquaintance with the collation of manuscripts.—Mr. Walter Leaf in the *Classical Review* for July, 1889.

There are reasons which induce us to believe that Mr. Leaf's ingenious identification of the codex Wittianus with the MS. Harl. 5693 is not conclusive. Fabricius says positively that the codex Wittianus was in the library of the Cardinal Antonius Seripandi, and that it contained the Commentary of Proklos on the first six books of the *Iliad*. It is extremely improbable that Fabricius, one of the most painstaking and cautious of all scholars, was mistaken as to these points. In this connection a Platonist naturally asks: What has become of the Commentary of Proklos? That it formed a part of the codex Wittianus at one time seems unquestionable. If the MS. Harl. 5693 is identical with this Codex, Proklos' work must have been taken out of it after it had passed from the Cardinal's library. MS. 5693 was purchased for the Harley library on Feb. 2d, 1727. Is there any contemporary evidence that the MS. was perfect at that time?

We suggest that scholars who are in a position to do so ought to carefully investigate this matter. It is at least probable that the Commentary of Proklos is still in existence, and that a diligent search will discover it. Proklos' knowledge of Homer's text was most critical and profound, and his interpretations would doubtless prove to be of great value.

Several very interesting and valuable papers by eminent scholars will appear in our next issue.

