

AUAS

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. VIII

NOVEMBER 1937

No. 11

THE PSYCHIC WORLDS

How have the different kingdoms of physical nature come into existence? Are there secrets of that nature beyond human consciousness as at present constituted? And still beyond our knowledge, our memory, our imagination, does all-containing Space hold inexhaustible potencies of creation, preservation, destruction and regeneration?

When one puts to himself, as each one must, such questions as these, something of true perspective is attained, the purely relative nature of human consciousness is seen, and the Soul is for the time freed from all conceptions of finality. Only in this way can such grandiose ideas as are represented by the words spiritualism and materialism be themselves regarded for what they are—the extremes in the limitations of human consciousness: the two poles of what the ancient psychologists called "the five modifications of the human mind". The mind itself they regarded as the sixth of

"the seven azure transparent spheres". And the seventh?

The seventh they denominated the *Atman*, the Self or real Being, whether of the individual unit or of that Unity of units which is, in the words of the *Upanishads*, "the Producer of this production". Perhaps no more graphic rendition exists in English of what is implicit in all *Vedic* literature than is contained in the late Professor Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*. This work, the first volume of which was published in 1867, when Müller was 44, contains a passage so foreign to all his prior and subsequent monumental erudition as to compel the inference that it came from intuition, not from reasoning.

We have in it [the "Veda"] a period in the intellectual life of man to which there is no parallel in any other part of the world. In the hymns of the Veda we see man left to himself to solve the riddle of this world. . . . He invokes them [the gods around him], he praises them,

he worships them. But still with all these gods... beneath him and above him, the early poet seems ill at rest within himself. There, too, in his own breast, he has discovered a power that is never mute when he prays, never absent when he fears and trembles. It seems to inspire his prayers and yet to listen to them; it seems to live in him, and yet to support him and all around him. The only name he can find for this mysterious power is "Brahman"; for brahman meant originally force, will, wish, and the propulsive power of creation. But this impersonal brahman, too, as soon as it is named, grows into something strange and divine. It ends by being one of many gods, one of the great triad, worshipped to the present day. And still the thought within him has no real name; that power which is nothing but itself, which supports the gods, the heavens, and every living being, floats before his mind, conceived but not expressed. At last he calls it "Atman" for atman, originally breath or spirit, comes to mean Self, and Self alone; Self, whether divine or human, Self whether creating or suffering, Self, whether one or all; but always Self, independent and free. "Who has seen the first born," says the poet, "when he who had no bones (i.e., form) bore him that had bones? Where was the life, the blood, the Self of the world? Who went to ask this from any that knew it?" This idea of a divine Self, once expressed, everything else must acknowledge its supremacy, "Self is the Lord of all things, Self is the King of all things. As all the spokes of a wheel are contained in the nave and the circumference, all things are contained in this Self. Brahman itself is but Self."

One may well turn from this noble transcription of the most enduring of all known spiritual ideas as preserved in classic Sanskrit Scriptures to the many fragmentary remains of the Hermetic wisdom of the Egyptians. A service somewhat similar to Professor Müller's life-labour was rendered by Dr. Anna

Bonus Kingsford in her several translations of some of those undated shards, on which are recorded primeval transmissions in the midst of later accretions already themselves dim with age long before the Christian era. We reproduce a few sentences from one and another "Hermes Trismegistus"—for there were as many Hermeses as there were Zoroasters and other legendary gods and demigods in human form.

That universal Being, which contains all, and is all, woke into activity the Soul and the World—all that Nature comprises. In the manifold unity of universal life, the innumerable units, distinguished by their variations, are, nevertheless, coherent in such manner that the whole is one. Everything issues from Unity.

The Deity is not a mind, but the cause that the Mind is; not a spirit, but the cause that the Spirit is; not a light, but the cause that the Light is.

The Ideal Light was before light, self-luminous Intelligence before intelligence. To speak of the Deity is impossible. The form cannot express the Formless. That which is no form, no appearance, which is no body, no matter, cannot be apprehended by sense. That which it is impossible to define—that is Deity.

Professor Müller was not omniscient; no more than any other conditioned being, however learned or inspired, could he see beyond his own sphere of vision and its containment. No religion, no philosophy, no science, no seer, whether ancient or modern, but embodies error as well as truth—for "these two, *light* and *darkness*, are the world's eternal ways", as the *Bhagavad-Gita* and all other Scriptures recite, and as every man knows by his own experiences. So, in what

is the youngest of all the great religions, Judaism, one finds the same ideas in *Genesis*, in *Ecclesiastes*, in St. John's *Gospel*, in St. Paul's Letters to the early Churches, in the closing Book of the Bible—"The Revelation of St. John the Divine". They are present and discernible in the pagan philosophers and among the great scholastic minds of the mediæval period as among the immortal Arabians of the same epoch. Nor are they lacking in the writings of the great figures since the Renaissance, nor absent from the consciousness of the foremost men of our own immediate times, Western or Eastern, whatever the degree of their spiritualism or materialism. The long ages of earliest Aryan civilization and civilizations wrestled with the same mysteries, the same problems, as ourselves. Under the theorem of Unity, of Continuity, of change and its consequences serial and cumulative, is it too much to suggest that these Ancients were ourselves, ourselves still more enmeshed, perchance, in materialism now than we then were in spiritualism—forgetful then, forgetful now, of the eternal Trinity, the Duality in the midst of Unity? This is the doctrine of Karma and Reincarnation, not as a creed, but as the mathematics of all conditioned, manifested existence and existences.

With this in mind, though as yet but an assumption, nothing can prevent and everything invites the discovery that within one's own self are implicit all the great spiritual ideas, all the accretions of relative truth and error, all the obscurities and darkness pictured in

the lights and shadows of human existence. Within each man is the Trinity : perceiver, creator, creature. As perceiver, each unit of the Unity is single and simple ; as creator, dual but relative ; as a triad, the experiencer of his own alternating roles—but as the *incarnated Self*, he is the quarternary, "the three in one". Because he does not yet know himself, even theoretically, while in "the *bonds of Karma*", he is ceaselessly at war with the elements of his own being, ceaselessly at war with others and with all nature. This is the man we are practically acquainted with, this the race—man the Thinker, irrespective of the basis, the character, the nature, the objective of his thinking, as of the quality of the conclusions presently held as "finalities".

On this, as on the whole gamut in the great octave of human existence, Madame Blavatsky has written, illuminatingly as inspiringly, to every searcher for Truth. In her *Secret Doctrine* she says :

Whatever plane our consciousness may be acting in, both we and the things belonging to that plane are, for the time being, our only realities. As we rise in the scale of development we perceive that during the stages through which we have passed we mistook shadows for realities, and the upward progress of the Ego is a series of progressive awakenings, each advance bringing with it the idea that now, at last, we have reached "reality ;" but only when we shall have reached the absolute Consciousness, and blended our own with it, shall we be free from the delusions produced by Maya.

One of the almost immediate fruits of this stance of the Soul is the direct recognition that Reality is

capable neither of addition, subtraction, multiplication nor division ; hence that all change is but an alternation of state, of form, of condition—Self-created, Self-maintained, Self-dissolved, Self-reformed, by the Unity and by the units, whether in full Consciousness, full unconsciousness, or in any of the intermediate zones of existence, the psychic world and worlds. These intermediate spheres of being are what is meant by *maya*, by “astral” life, light, and matter. This is the world or plane within which the material universe is holden, in which it is conceived, gestated, disintegrated, and recombined into new forms of physical existence. In itself it is the electric or magnetic state of polarization rather than the principle or power or property we name polarity. Some of the processes of polarization are known to us for what they are, some others are constantly being employed by us without recognition of the fact, and many others—the most part—are misconceived or are beyond our memory and imagination. Who dreams, for example, that these two—memory and imagination—are but poles or polarizations produced by us or induced in us, via our astral or psychic principles or elements ; and the same as to our thought, will and feeling ?

It may be helpful to some, in trying to picture to themselves these ideas of the whole ancient world as re-presented in the writings of H. P. Blavatsky, to “block in”, artist fashion, the relatively cardinal points, the rough dimensions, the *framework* of the secret doctrines which each must study and learn for

himself, if he would *realize* as well as *be*.

First, then, let us endeavour to gain clean and clear conceptions and perceptions of familiar terms, seeking to *identify*, not to define or describe—to mark our compass of thought instead of to “box” it before we are in possession of our own means of orientation.

Take the word spirit to represent the most transcendental state possible to be imagined, matter to signify the opposite, mind to include all intervening conditions—and the Trinity in man is recognizable even though not as yet understood. Identify spirit as the Seer, matter as the Seen, and mind as the alternating current between the two.

Next, as to the mind itself : what are the five modifications of which it is capable or to which it is subjectable ? These are called by Sanskrit terms of which “correct cognition”, “misconception”, “fancy”, “sleep” and “memory” are as good renditions as the English language permits. Each of these words, it should be noted, is cognate to many others, but none of them, nor all of them combined, are to be esteemed comprehensive, for the simple reason that our minds are not in the same “modification” as those who devised these original statements of the principles and elements of the psychic world, and the psychic nature. They may be rendered in familiar words, thought, will, feeling, memory, and imagination, *provided* one recognizes them as present, even if partly or “in abeyance”, whether he is awake or sleeping or dreaming, and whether he is on the planes of perception and

action of the embodied or those of the disembodied Souls called Man generically. The order and nature of the modifications change, from state to state, from plane to plane, from form to form, and these changes may be due to "Will and Yoga" or to the influence of external and internal conditions. In this latter event they are still due to "Yoga", but it is "Hatha" "induced" or "passive" Yoga, not the sole sovereignty of will and wisdom made one, as in the case of the Perfected Man. How far we are from such sovereignty each human being knows for himself, even as related merely to the five modifications.

For it must not be overlooked or ignored that they are but modifications, not the mind itself, any more than the five fingers can be said to be the hand, which also is but a member, or than the familiar five senses are to be confused with their astral counterparts. The psychology of the Mystery Schools deals with the senses, the modifications of the mind, the mind, and above all with the Soul itself, in a way of which only designed ideas are ever permitted to reach mankind at large. The reason must be apparent, even to the dullest wit, once it is stated. The Masters of Wisdom, their School and disciples, have no wish to gratify curiosity, encourage the propensity of the precocious, or instruct in Occult arts and sciences those, no matter whom, who neglect or misuse their present powers and possessions, great or small. They leave such policies to the charlatan and "the Brothers of the Shadow". True Occultism di-

vulges few of its most important vital mysteries. It drops them like precious pearls, one by one, far and wide apart, and only when forced to do so by the evolutionary tidal wave that carries on humanity slowly, silently, but steadily toward the dawn of a new state of consciousness, that of the Higher Mind. For once out of their safe-keeping these mysteries cease to be occult: they fall into the public domain and have to run the risk of becoming in the hands of the selfish, curses more often than blessings. Can any one who surveys world-conditions and the world-outlook doubt the Wisdom which prescribes such a course? Nevertheless, whenever *individuals*, men with peculiar psychic and mental capacities are born, they are generally and more frequently helped than allowed to go unassisted, groping on their way, very soon, if left to their own resources, falling victims to martyrdom and unscrupulous speculators. Only, they are helped on the condition that they should not become, whether consciously or unconsciously, an additional peril to their age: a danger to the poor, now offered in daily holocaust by the less wealthy to the very wealthy. One has but to use his own power of perception, retrospectively, in the present, or prospectively, to find the evidences of the verisimilitude of these statements.

There are four planes of perception and action in the cycle of a single personal or human existence of the Reincarnating Ego or Soul called Man. Mind is the instrumentality of the Self on all these four

planes, but in attempting to identify them it is needful to regard the dual nature of the mind itself, both from the ordinary and the Occult view-point. In his own experience and conception each man is aware that his mind is capable of receiving, storing, and discharging impressions from both a personal and an impersonal use by the inhabiting Soul. This is also the Occult teaching—that each man has a Higher and a Lower mind. But here the two conceptions part company. Not only that, but one is essentially antithetical to the other—the ancient to the modern theory.

To illustrate : In the Occult views of man and Nature, the physical body and senses, the astral body and *its* senses, the spiritual form and *its* senses, and their source counterparts in “ Nature ”,—each represents a distinct line of “ evolution ”, “ creation ”, or, to employ the Occult term, “ ever-becoming ”. In Man, the incarnate human being, these three separate schemes are inextricably interwoven and interblended at every point. In the *Mahatma*, the Great Soul or perfected Man, the Master of Wisdom, the three constituent and convergent lines of progression are unified, while in the ordinary man, even the greatest, wisest, best among us, they are still in process of development. All three lines are, from the standpoint of the absolute Consciousness, the finite aspects or the reflections on the field of Cosmic *maya* or illusion, of Atma, the seventh, the One Reality. Two

brief citations may be of assistance in grasping the outlines of this most important of all the Occult teachings accessible to any one who cares to search. The first is from *The Secret Doctrine*, and reads:

Nothing is created, but is only transformed. Nothing can manifest itself in this universe—from a globe down to a vague, rapid thought—that was not in the universe already ; everything on the subjective plane is an eternal IS ; as everything on the objective plane is an *ever-becoming*—because transitory.

The other statement is that of the great Vedanta teacher, Sankaracharya, whose actual date was almost contemporaneous with that of Pythagoras :

Atma alone remains after the *subtraction* (dissolution) of the sheaths. It is the *ONLY witness* or synthesized Unity.

Besides this, the Occult teachings regard the mind as a power as well as a product, and furthermore in speaking of it as a power, the mind is called the “ thinking principle ” on every plane, Monadic or spiritual, Intellectual or psychic, Astral or physical, or all of these combined as in the living human being. Nor do these Teachings regard the mind as *receiving* impressions, but as *reaching out* for them.

The nature of the mind as thus indicated, the four planes of its functioning, or the *four states of consciousness* thus lumped indiscriminately together in an amorphous sum-total—all this requires further consideration.

PATHS TO PERFECTION

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Indian political reformers and administrators will find in this essay some admirable hints. Is it too much to hope that they at least who look upon Gandhiji as their guide will "turn their attention for a while to the leading teachers of the historic past" and might we add especially of the pre-historic past? Our author also refers to the troubles between Capital and Labour and we may draw attention to an article in THE ARYAN PATH for September, 1935, on "Indian Ideas on the Relation of Labour to Capital".—EDS.]

World-wide conditions of mankind, in frantic endeavours that do not lead to satisfaction and that have little likelihood of advancing men to their true goal, are to-day a challenge to the thoughtful to consider carefully the fundamentals of human well-being. Communistic governments enslave individuals for economic ends; Fascists hold up the supreme notion of the State, for which all is to be done and for which the highest sacrifices are to be made; Nationalists in a large number of countries appear to think that with the achievement of self-government the peoples will be set on the road to a satisfactory existence. Even in the so-called Democratic countries the main efforts appear to be directed in large measure towards the economic adjustments of capital and labour. Countries are busily engaged in forging the weapons for warlike aggression or defence. In all this there is more concern for the methods of expediency than any profound attempt to realise the fundamental aims of human life.

So from the confusion of the present, the thoughtful might well

turn their attention for a while to the leading teachers of the historic past, as they have expressed themselves in the great and enduring religions and philosophies of the world. And they may discover that the essence of what these have taught is that there is ultimately no escape from dependence upon the attitudes of individuals. It is obvious to any who give the least thought to the matter that the success, within its scope, of any democratic form of society rests finally upon the electors adopting a definitely *moral* attitude in the disposition of their votes, and upon those elected legislating and governing with individual *moral* integrity. Similar ethical demands must also be faced, whether they are met or not, by the individual members of bureaucracies of Communism and Fascism. Usually they are not at the present time satisfactorily met: with results that are too well known to be described. Agreements between and legislation concerning the relations between employers and employed in the democratic countries can really be of little effect to achieve their aims, unless the employees honestly do the work for

which they are paid and the employers provide the conditions and reward which the workers deserve. View the whole realm of human activities and it is absolutely impossible to get away from the fact that human well-being, viewed socially, finally rests on the moral integrity of the individuals in the performance of their duties in the stations they at the time occupy. The medical doctor ministering to the sick, the teacher endeavouring to educate his pupils, the mother attending to her children these, and all others, have ultimately a challenge to their own moral nature. *Upon individual moral attitudes the whole social fabric rests.* That is the truth that the wisest of mankind have constantly re-iterated. The failure in our times to attend sufficiently to this fundamental principle has led men to all kinds of secondary methods ending largely in frustration.

If that is the truth concerning the ultimate roots of human conduct, its fruits have also to be similarly considered. For in the end social relations and all forms of so-called social organisation are associated with results, good or evil, for the individuals who form the social groups. It is by their effects as experienced by the individuals that the worth or lack of worth of social activities is judged. And the question cannot be escaped: *Can the individual really obtain through social organisation that which will bring him satisfaction, if his own inner attitude is morally wrong?* It is part of the delusion of temporary circumstances that so many think they can answer this question with

an affirmative. That appears to be implied, for example, by the attitudes of some of the dictators, capitalists, and demagogic exploiters in our day. But the greatest thinkers in human history have maintained, and the great religions have taught, and still teach, an emphatically negative answer to that question. There has been no uncertainty and no confusion in their contention that though experience for a while, sometimes a very long while, may delude men, ultimately each and all have to come to appreciate the fact that satisfaction is not primarily a concern of externals but of inner attitude. The distressing and lamentable extent of human failure to achieve satisfaction when this has not been recognised amply supports the belief that their contention is true.

The roots lie in the individual. That is the starting-point for all serious consideration of the problem with which we are faced. That admitted, two questions present themselves: What is the goal of human life? What is the path, or what are the paths, by which it may be reached?

Consideration of the first of these two questions leads at once to another which appears highly perplexing: Can we know the goal until we reach it? The position implied is, indeed, somewhat paradoxical. Nevertheless the difficulty has been met, under different forms of expression, by the great religions. Thus, the theistic religions have maintained that man can know the goal because God reveals it to him through his conscience and through the teachings and lives of the

prophets and saints. Hindu Advaitism puts it in another way : that the apparent finite self of the imperfect individual is somehow so within the infinite which he is explicitly to realise himself to be, that he learns within his spiritual being the nature of the goal. An essentially similar attitude is implied by Jainism and even by Buddhism, notwithstanding their differences of terminology. The "soul in bondage" of Jainism, in spite of the bondage, is *soul*, and as such can come to know, from within, the goal of its own pure spirituality. The universal principle, the *dharmakaya* of Buddhism, can be apprehended by the genuine adept. Further, Hindus may learn from the Mahātmās, the Jains from the Tīrthankaras, the Buddhists from the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, something of the paths they must take.

There are general expressions which in different countries have come to be used with significant meaning, in different ways emphasising the same fundamental idea. Thus, for example, Christian moralists have urged that "character" is the supreme value and have pointed to "the peace which the world cannot give"; Hindus have spoken of "God-realisation", of "*tat, sat, ānand*", reality, truth, and bliss; and Muslims have spoken of the peace that comes in complete submission to the Divine. All have implied the term perfection, and all have indicated fundamental virtues as states of mind and modes of

action that are involved in it. Except at the highest stage the goal may not be apprehended by any individual in all its detail, but at all stages he may have an impression of its general nature, and in the process of gradual attainment become increasingly aware of its details. And, as previously said, the individual may learn by the developing ideas of mankind, especially from those saints, those *jina*, who have in large measure attained.

There remains the second question as to the path or paths to perfection. The first contention of this paper needs here to be re-iterated: the path is, or the paths are, of individual personal effort. In other words, none can achieve perfection against his own will. To attain, the individual will must be turned in the direction of the goal. For, whatever the descriptions scientists or philosophers give of its nature, the fact of human choice, however limited, cannot be explained away. Choice may be very much restricted as regards activity directed to the affairs of the physical world, but it may be doubted whether there are such restrictions to the exercise of choice in the inner spiritual life. The attitudes of the religions on this may be indicated by two examples, as illustrative: the Christian exhortation "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect"; and the aim of *kevalī jñāna* of Jainism, both imply the principle of unlimited scope for the attainment of the ideal of spiritual life.* The truths of

* Similarly, Brahmanical Hinduism admits no restriction to the possibility of the ultimate attainment of *moksha*; Buddhism presents the supreme peace and bliss of *nirvāna* as attainable; Zoroastrianism involves faith in the final complete triumph of the Good; and Judaism in the advent of the "kingdom of righteousness" when "the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord".

human choice and of the possibility of ultimate attainment are expressed in traditional language in such phrases as that "one may go to God" or "go to the devil"; "go to heaven" or "go to hell".

No one has seriously maintained that spiritual or inner perfection can be reached without a definite, even prolonged effort. The more ignorant members of some Protestant Christian sects have sometimes talked as though salvation was an instantaneous affair, but that is a caricature of Christianity. The religions of the Orient have envisioned the possibility of a multiplicity of lives in order to reach the ideal. There are no short cuts to spiritual equanimity. There is the equanimity of apathy, but that is not enduring and a condition of discontent soon reappears. Thus man has been compelled to seek for a path or for paths to perfection. Is there only one path or are there various paths? It is one of the merits of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* that it has answered that question in a manner verified by experience. It teaches that there are various paths, all of which may be followed by all, though with differences of emphasis.

The recognition of the nature of these paths brings us back immediately to the realm of ordinary human conduct in its various forms. Perfection is not attained through some specific mode of procedure, but in and through the diverse functions of human living. Essentially, Hinduism, for example, does not recognise any ultimate distinction between the religious and the secular. The whole of life may be viewed from a standpoint from which all is sacred. The

contradictory of the sacred is not the secular, but profanity, all conduct that is in itself evil. The so-called secular is not in itself evil. There have been those in the history of human thought who have treated the physical as radically evil, but there is some significance in the fact that mankind has usually branded them as heretics. The general opinion of mankind may be wrong, but there does not appear to be any good reason why we should think it is so in this instance. We re-iterate, therefore, that *perfection is to be attained in and through the diverse functions of human life*. But one practical mistake arises, and it is a common one, of a limitation to some functions and the neglect of others. Many concern themselves predominantly, if not exclusively, with those functions related with physical well-being and social status, to the neglect of the activities that point beyond the physical and the social.

It is just with the recognition of the state of things mentioned in the previous sentence that he who would talk of the paths to perfection must begin. The *Bhagavad-Gītā* finely says: "Whatever be thy work, thine eating, thy sacrifice, thy gift, thy mortification, make thou of it an offering to Me, O Son of Kunti." The whole question concerns the attitudes with which even the lowliest actions are performed, the most elementary knowledge sought, or the simplest devotion shown. Most, at some stage, have to begin with the lowly. The gate of humility has to be passed through before the gate of honour is reached. The Christ, the Buddha, all the great saints have

presented themselves as the servants of mankind. Whatever the social level, whatever the functions, one may, according to his own attitudes be on the paths to perfection, or wandering from them.

But to be on the paths does not necessarily involve that one is progressing along them : *one may simply be marking time, or even slipping backward.* The spiritual being is not merely mechanical, but a conscious agent. Yet he cannot deliberately aim at perfection : all he can do is to aim at some improvement in his action, knowledge, or devotion, with regard to his attitudes and efforts for certain particular, more or less, immediate ends, that is, the purposes of his ordinary practical living. It is just in this connection that the great religions of the world have insisted on the need of self-examination and confession. Through the means of self-examination one is to discover how and to what extent in the ordinary affairs of living one is falling short of what is implied in the notion of following the paths to perfection. The advantage of the confession of faults

has been emphasised by Jains, Buddhists, and Roman Catholic Christians. Whatever may be said for confession, it is clear that one great defect, perhaps the greatest defect of our times, from the moral point of view, is the almost universal neglect of self-examination. With their attention centred on external achievements, men fail to ask themselves whether they are progressing spiritually, or wherein they are untrue to the demands of moral integrity. In that, they all too often simply mark time or degenerate. And this leads us back to our starting-point. As all depends ultimately upon the attitudes of individuals, spiritual progress along the paths to perfection is only possible by each individual *regularly* questioning himself as to his attitudes, and endeavouring to eliminate those that are in conflict with the general impression of the good life that he may have and the increasing knowledge of the details of that life which he may in the course of time acquire.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

THE SPIRIT OF GERMANY

[W. Van Ravesteyn, a well-known socialist of Holland, analyses the tendencies in modern Germany emerging out of her historical background.—Eds.]

When in 1858 Robert Fruin, the greatest of Dutch historians, was giving some illustrations of the crudity of sixteenth-century customs he mentioned the case of a Jew who in 1558 was tortured to death because he refused to be converted to Christianity. Whoever has read the excellent weekly of the present-day German emigrants, Schwarzschild's *Neues Tagebuch*, since it first appeared in 1933, will recall numerous descriptions in it of recent events which far surpass the simple sixteenth-century occurrence in grotesqueness of horror.

For the last twenty years we have been used to cruelty ; for longer even to that special kind of cruelty which is called anti-Semitism. And yet a closer inspection of the news that reaches us from Germany at the present day will reveal something that is peculiar, even in this special field. It seems to emit an odour of putrefaction like that given off by rotting fruit.

Let us go back a century, in order to get some distance away from this municipal garbage dump. The atmosphere has regained its purity. Marx, young Karl, destined to become the founder of a new world-religion, is sixteen years old. We are in 1834, the time of the *Burschenschaften* and the aftermath of German Romanticism, in one of those small towns, still exquisitely peaceful at the time. There, at

Treves, lived Marx's father, a Jewish lawyer who had become a Protestant, a characteristic "liberal" of his time, saturated with eighteenth-century philosophy. A man of culture, highly esteemed by his fellow-citizens and by the authorities, he was therefore chosen to deliver the festive oration on an official occasion when homage had to be rendered to the recently established Prussian régime. In this liberal circle no one took exception to the fact that it should be a Jewish lawyer who represented his fellow-citizens on such an occasion ; it was as little criticised, indeed, as such an occurrence would be even now in England or Holland.

One more glimpse of early nineteenth-century Germany, this time of Berlin, the centre of Prussia. Marx, the young genius, arrived there as an undergraduate in 1836. It was a poor city, whose population consisted mainly of small tradespeople and artisans, living in dull submission to a powerful bureaucracy and in servility to the court. The only modest centres of life were a few cafés and some Jewish salons, where liberal ideas were beginning to penetrate. And what of this highly gifted undergraduate himself? He might well be regarded as the ideal type of the young German intellectual of those days. He wrote a good deal of poetry—a matter of course at the time—and afterwards was to pass a very just opinion on these products

of his mind in words that characterise not only himself but a whole generation: "A reality infinitely blurred and scattered, indictments of the present times; vague and chaotic feelings; a complete lack of natural simplicity; castles in the air; an absolute contrast between the ideal and the real...."

And this youth plunged with a mad zeal into studying and almost lost himself in it. This too was characteristic of a whole generation and of the *élite* to which he belonged. For a terrible thirst for knowledge tormented the best Germans of those days, who were still living in such an oppressive, almost unendurable atmosphere. It was one in which philosophy ruled supreme. The University of Berlin was then the centre of Hegelianism, the doctrine which reduced the development of reality to that of the Idea, and thus in a sense allowed man to participate in the creation of the world. This doctrine exercised a tremendous influence in every sphere of knowledge. As late as 1857, when nothing was left of this supremacy, a distinguished scholar could write:

All faculties then lived on the rich repast of Hegelian wisdom; one was either a Hegelian or a barbarian, an idiot, a backward and despised empiricist; the State deemed itself secure chiefly because Hegel had recognised it as consistent with reason, and therefore to the authorities—the departments of Public Worship and Education—being a non-Hegelian was almost a crime.

Have we not the German "spirit", taken in *flagranti* here, so to speak? Note the religious fanaticism of this philosophy and of its disciples. Nowhere at that time is anything at

all comparable to be found. Notice the eschatological character of this "knowledge", this *Weltanschauung*, its pathos, its fervour and deep conviction,—its *Inbrunst*—for nothing short of the German word will fully convey my meaning. Consider the immeasurable distance between this philosophy and the miserable social reality. Who indeed, on beholding this mental attitude, is not of necessity reminded of what Germany is now trying to exalt into another autocratic *Weltanschauung*: the wisdom of a Rosenberg, the wisdom and "philosophy" of the "Third Realm"? Is there a German "spirit"? In other words, are we justified in considering that quality of German spiritual life which even in 1830 strikes us as peculiar and distinct from all the rest of the Western world as the result of a state of mind characteristic of the German, of Germans in general through the ages?

In a book on sixteenth-century German plastic art which appeared in 1927 the learned art historian Adolf Feulner of Munich wrote, characterising the late Gothic period as the most German in the history of his country: "The *bizarre* has always been a feature of German art", and: "This extreme consistency, this earnest zeal in the pursuance of an object is typically German", and further: "What we call *baroque* is more than a question of form...it is an indication of an essential quality of the German character, which appears in its purest form whenever in times of independent development the forces of emotion are allowed free scope.

We see that for this expert there is no doubt concerning the peculiarity, the secular idiosyncrasy of the German spirit which now more clearly, now more veiledly, manifests itself through the ages. The words of this connoisseur are valid for the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at a time of exceedingly violent religious emotions. Could this "national imagination", this extremism have suddenly vanished in the nineteenth century, when no longer religion but secular values held sway over Europe?

Let us now consider some French opinions. Max Hermant opened an essay in the *Revue de France* on the "natural inclination" of the German mind by expressing the view that **Hitlerism** must not be regarded as a sort of monster which suddenly arose in the *Reich* of 1930, but that it is only the more categorical and complete expression of the philosophy, the ethics, the politics, the religion of the Germans: that it is Germanism itself, the terminus of a long development.

Therefore this cultured Frenchman, too, discerns certain permanent characteristics of the German mind. In support of his opinion he quotes many examples, mostly from German literature. Germany's device seems to be: "Tranquillity inspires us with terror." Hermant quotes the well-known German scholar Curtius—by no means a Nazi, but an ardent admirer of France and the author of excellent studies of France and of great Frenchmen—who says: "Germany tends to become conscious of herself in the shape of a problem,

and never to affirm herself in the shape of a solution." Hermant resumes: "The whole of German literature from Luther to Stefan George reveals a nation always in search of something, in search of an ideal, of a style, of itself."

I believe that it is only from this angle that a deeper insight can be gained into the incredibly complex and excessive literature of Germany during the last fifty years. Hermant rightly observes that amazement is always the origin of any idolatry. "Germany in a sense became blinded by the new aspect which the world suddenly displayed in the middle of the nineteenth century." The steamer, the railway, the telegraph, the factory, suddenly introduced into a world the material customs of which had not changed since Pericles, in fact inspired the men of that time with a far greater amazement than we experience at the sight of the present technical progress. They felt amazement and...hesitation. Hermant could have shown these feelings in the work of two men that rank among the greatest poets of that time: Alfred de Vigny and Heinrich Heine. But if Heine and de Vigny felt this hesitation, as well as fear, doubt and a premonition of impending disaster, others, the majority, only admired enthusiastically.

Undoubtedly the love of machinery was born in the Germans at that time. They grew to love the machine—Hermant rightly says—for her own sake, for it was only through the machine that Man was completed and assisted in realising his nature. From this also arose, he continues, the passion and veneration for the

technical, for the professional man, which explains the formation of strictly separate castes of profession, each with its own customs and professional lingo. Thus shut up in "castes" of a sort, the various technicians can devote themselves undisturbed to all the errors and passions of their respective professions. And the people believe them. This accounts for the many abuses of technical science which Germany has known. They were rendered possible by this faith, which was apparently justified by the incredible success of German industry under Bismarck and Wilhelm II. The belief in action as a value in itself was strengthened by it. One should be active, do something, no matter what may be the result. Through action anything may be achieved. A general must attack. An industrialist must produce. Nature can be turned to any use. Technical science has unlimited power.

Who can deny that the Germans have brought all this to a head—all that is often termed the development of the capitalist mentality? Must one not, therefore, regard the Germans as a nation become abnormal in many respects through the sudden changes and the technical revolution of the nineteenth century?

As Germanism withdrew from the spiritual domain, where it had achieved such sublime creations in the eighteenth century and in the age of Romanticism, and turned its attention to material creation, it became more conscious of its different nature. The contrast to the rest of the world became ever more marked. How far this process had already

advanced at the beginning of this century appears very clearly from a volume by a Pacifist German scholar, Professor Nippold, entitled *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*. It contained an anthology of gleanings from the Pan-German press of those days which are surprisingly like the war-cries of the present Racialists.

So much is certain: it was from that growing contrast to the rest of the world that the idea of "Deutschtum" originated. At the beginning of the twentieth century this idea stood out finished and complete. Something different and more, something vaguer but also wider than Germany. "Deutschtum" is a spiritual community, the boundaries of which do not coincide, have never coincided with the frontiers of the "Reich", said R. Curtius in 1930. France was a state as early as the Middle Ages; it became a *patrie* in the fifteenth century, and a *nation* in the eighteenth. Germany on the contrary until far into the nineteenth century was nothing but . . . an ideal. In the eighteenth century not a trace was left of Germany as a unity.

Thus the first and greatest problem became, not: What is Germany? but: What is German? In 1870 at last a unified Germany was born. What an overflow of joy! After a thousand years of sorrow Germany was born, or regenerated! But—even then—Germany did not yet embrace the whole German people—it was not the incarnation of all "Deutschtum". What bitter complaints were uttered, many years before the war even, in Pan-German circles: not only imperialist grievances, no—the bitter complaint because of the millions of

Germans who were and remained excluded, outside the frontiers of the "Reich". Whoever will now take up Nippold's book once more will be astonished to see how similar the complaints already were at that time, to those which the present Nazi press is voicing so ferociously.

Then came the Great War, the "Imperialist" war, which for the German masses was a national war for the realization of a united "Deutschtum". And upon this stupendous mental and material tension followed defeat, capitulation, humiliation, prostration. In order to understand what all this meant to the high-strung expectations of this emotional nation with its tendency towards "extremism" one must keep in mind the German literature, so rich and many-sided, of the last forty years. From Naturalism to Expressionism this literature, in the forty years from 1880 till 1920, ran through all the stages of hopelessness, desperation, fierce joy and frenzy in such a measure of violence that French literature certainly seems moderate and placid in comparison.

In 1918 and 1919 it flashed upon the younger generation: Germany is still to be created. She does not exist yet! Again Germany had sunk deep into night. Again Heine's *Wintermärchen* held good. Once more a gulf, wider than ever, yawned between ideal and reality; once more a Germany had to be created from the

void. Once more Germans had to live for an idea. And how? In melancholy and sadness, a labour of Sisyphus awaiting them once more.

At that time those trained in history could sadly recall how the "Reich", the First Realm, from which Greater Germany might have risen, had been severed from its national basis when the first French Pope, Sylvester II, had persuaded a German Emperor, Otto III, to agree to the establishment of the archdiocese of Gnesen—the detachment of the Northern Churches from Magdeburg—and the organization of the Hungarian Church, through which Passau lost its missionary sphere—one and all detrimental factors to the growth of nascent Germany which it has never overcome.

The Frenchman Gerbert became Pope in April 999. Otto, the weak ruler without political insight, had even then toppled the First Realm from its foundations, just as Wilhelm, the weak Hohenzoller, did the Second Realm, after the Iron Chancellor had been sacked so ignominiously. What a history of humiliation, of decline, of indescribable and horrible misery, even sometimes of annihilation, those 900 years that have elapsed since Sylvester and Otto! Well might Germans have wondered if the opportunity of beginning a new ascent would ever come again after two such abysmal downfalls.

W. VAN RAVESTEYN

II. DHAMMA

Dhamma, the second of the Triad, signifies a doctrine which is well expounded, which bears fruit in this very life, which is not conditioned by time, which has 'come and see', for its motto, which leads to the destination or desired end and which is to be experienced by the wise individually.* The Dhamma embodying all the tenets of the Master was to take the place of the Master in his absence. After the demise of the Buddha, one of his disciples declared: *Mayam dhammapatisaranā*, "the doctrine is indeed our Refuge now."†

III. SAṄGHA

Saṅgha, the third of the Triad, includes *Bhikkhu-saṅgha* and *Bhikkhunī-saṅgha*. It really means *sāvaka saṅgha*; or a fraternity of disciples. *Saṅgha* literally means *samūha* or group. In early Pāli literature, some of the famous teachers of India are mentioned as *saṅghī* (founder of an

order), *gaṇi* (having a following), and *gaṇācariyo* (teacher of a group). At the time of the rise of Buddhism, the *Vrjīs*, *Mallas* and other *kṣatriya* tribes were known as *gaṇarājās* or republican chiefs. Even the Śākya had their Gaṇa form of administration. A *saṅgha* is a corporate body which is characterised by the uniformity of creed and conduct (*diṭṭhi sīla-saṅghātena saṅghāto ti saṅgho*).‡ *Samaggatā* or internal cohesion constitutes the real life of a *saṅgha* as such. The unity of action and commonness of goal characterise its external life. Thus the *saṅgha* stands essentially as a symbol of unity. The Buddha compares the *saṅgha* to an ocean into which all individual rivers ultimately fall, assuming the common name of the ocean. According to the Buddhist *Mirror of Faith*, *saṅgha par excellence* is composed of all Aryan disciples who fill eight exalted positions.

B. C. LAW

IF I BE LIFTED UP

"And I, if I be lifted up," Christ said,
 "Will draw all men to me."
 His was not utter lack of human dread
 Nor perfect certainty.

And yet he did not shun the path he trod
 On sombre Calvary.
 He knew if Truth were true, it led to God
 Despite Gethsemane.

JOHN A. OSOINACH

* *Digha*, II, p. 93.

† *Majjhima*, III, p. 9.

‡ *Saṃaṅgalavāsinī*, I, p. 230; *Paramatthajotikā*, I, p. 20.

ing and glorifying the Triad. In following the fourth mode the devotee must believe that the object of worship is the highest of its kind (*aggadakkhiṇeyya**).

I. BUDDHA

Buddha, the first member of the Triad, means the Enlightened or Awakened One. According to the *Upaniṣads*, Buddha in the sense of the Awakened occurs as a predicate of 'Soul'. *Suprabuddha* is the epithet of the *arhats*.† *Sammāsambuddha* and *Pacceka-Buddha* are self-made personalities. They are called self-made because they attain *mukti* by their own efforts, without the aid of any teacher. A *Śravaka* Buddha is one who has become a saint by following the teachings of a Master. A Buddha is also called a *Bhagavā*. According to the *Mahāniddeśa*‡ and the *Parmatthajotikā*,§ the epithet *Bhagavā*, was bestowed on the Buddha neither by his parents nor by his kin. It was acquired by him on his attainment of omniscience. *Bhagavā* = *bhagayutta*, one endowed with *bhaga*, which in its generally accepted sense, means the sixfold supreme possession of *issariya*, *dhamma*, *yasa*, *siri*, *kāma*, and *payatana*. *Issariya* comprehends the idea of such qualities as *animā* and the rest. *Dhamma* means the transcendental virtues. *Yasa* implies a pure fame of universal recognition. *Siri* connotes an all-round accom-

plishment. *Kāma* signifies all objects of desire. *Payatana* means the supreme effort to gain sovereignty over all. *Bhagavā-bhaji* or *bhattavā*, one who has recourse to, *i.e.*, has the experience of all things. *Bhagavā* = *bhāgī* means the participator of all acquisitions. *Bhagavā* = *vibhattayā* means one who explains things by apportionment or method of analytical distinction. *Bhagavā* = *bhagga-kārī*, *i.e.*, the destroyer of all evils. *Bhagavā* = *guru*, the master who is superior to all. *Bhagavā* = *bhāgyavā*, the fortunate or blessed one. *Bhagavā* = *bhavantaga*, *i.e.*, one who has gone beyond individual existence. *Bhagavā* = *subhāvitatta*, *i.e.*, one who has fully developed himself.**

The following attributes are ascribed to the Buddha in the tract called *Dhammādāsa* or *Mirror of Faith*. That he is the Blessed One, endowed with faculties and noble conduct, well-gone, perfect in his knowledge of the world, unsurpassed guide to persons coming in for training, a teacher to gods and men, the Enlightened One and the Master.††

A Buddha is also called a *Tathāgata* for the following reasons:—(1) he has come in the same way; (2) he has gone in the same way; (3) he is endowed with the sign of *tathā*; (4) he is supremely enlightened in the *tathādhamma*, (5) he has seen *tathā*, (6) he preaches *tathā* (7) he does *tathā* truthfully, and (8) he overcomes all.‡‡

* *Sumāṅgalavilāsini*, I, pp. 231 ff.

† *Dhammapāda*, vv. 296-301.

‡ pp. 142-143.

§ I, pp. 107-109.

** Barua and Sinha, *Barhut Inscriptions*, p. 42, f.n. 1.

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JOHN A. OSOINACH

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in a jelly-like substance, Lord Kelvin says it is vortex rings in a frictionless fluid, Maxwell says it is electromagnetic waves, Faraday says it is force, Dalton says it is atoms, Schopenhauer says it is an irrational will, Kant says it is a *Ding an sich*, Locke says it is "something I know not what"*etc.*, back through the ages to Thales who says it is water. There have been those who have said it is nothing—No Thing.

The truth is that this *thing* is no more a directly experienced object in our waking world than it is in our dream-world (except as a *word*), and the process of reasoning by which its existence is inferred in the one realm may with equal propriety be applied in the other realm. If the wide-awake man, for instance, feels impelled by the law of sufficient reason to conclude that the image of an apple of which he is aware was caused by something, and that this something exists independently of the image, the man who is dreaming of an apple, if he happens to think of the law of sufficient reason, has as much right to conclude that the image of which he is aware was caused by something independent of that image.

No, this suggestion of a basis for an ontological subordination of the dream to the waking fact must go the way of the others. In the end it, too, "begs the question".

"Despite your arguments", you

say, "it is *practical* to assume that the waking life is reality. The unfortunate visionary who believes life is a dream will come to grief."

This last stronghold of the wide-awake man is much the same as what William James called "pragmatism", and as what John Dewey calls "instrumentalism". Since pragmatism and instrumentalism have afforded solutions to many of the traditional problems of the waking philosopher one may hope that here also they will cast light. But alas! the pragmatist and the instrumentalist forget that their weapons are double-edged. There is a pragmatism and an instrumentalism of the dream-world. The practical dreamer, if his dream is pleasant, will not deem it common sense to assume that the day-time life is reality. In the dream that "idea" will have "cash value", or will be a good instrument for coping with the environment, which conduces to the continuance of the dream.

Perhaps those of us who wish to justify our waking confidence in the priority of the day-time life over the dream-world would do better if we relinquished our search, and remembered respectfully the words of the wise old Chinese philosopher, Chuang Tzu, who, after he had dreamt he was a butterfly could never decide whether he was a butterfly dreaming he was a man, or a man who had once dreamt he was a butterfly.

RUFUS SUTER

and that life is life."

The impersonal attitude, no doubt, is artificial, but only in the sense that our points of view are never naturally impartial. If you wish, however, you may leave this elevated vantage-ground, go forth into the midst of life, make yourself effective, have interests. But during the heat of these adventures seize upon a cool moment occasionally and ask yourself: "How fundamentally have I changed my environment from what it was before?" You have added nothing. You have detracted nothing. There are the same colours, the same feelings and emotions, the same *words*. Some are more vivid, but others are paler. The sole alteration you have made is to cast a spotlight in one corner while you have left another corner in a shadow.

"Even so", you continue, "the events of the waking life are connected in a reasonable, predictable manner. Men do not change into animals from *Alice in Wonderland*."

One should not forget, however, that dreams are not wholly irrational. One may behold a human being change into a beast, but one has never seen a square-circle in a dream (although one may have been aware of the *word* "square-circle", and mistaken it for the thing). In waking life, moreover, caterpillars become butterflies, acorns grow into oaks, giraffes and bats exist. Why suppose, furthermore, that predictability is a criterion of reality? The degree to which predictability holds in the waking life has been a puzzle to philosophers. There is something unexpected and inexplicable about it. We should disabuse ourselves

of much epistemological embarrassment if we regarded a certain degree of arbitrariness as the criterion of reality. Then the dream-world would be real.

You are not yet convinced. "The truth is", you say, "that the dream differs radically from the waking life, because the dream has nothing behind it, is a shadow in somebody's mind, whereas the real fact is not only an image in your and my eye, a stubborn resistance against your and my foot, but also a solid *thing* which backs up the visual and tactile impressions our senses give us of it. Otherwise the world would reduce itself to a substanceless play of nothings."

Here at last we should seem to have an adequate basis for belief in the reality of the waking world and the fancifulness of the dream-life. Here is common sense, and it forces itself upon us with such pungency that for a moment we wonder how we ever went askew. A doubt assails us, however, as soon as we begin to consider what this *thing* which backs up the sense phenomena of the waking life is. We cannot see it because it is that which by affecting our visual apparatus causes the images we see; we cannot feel it because it is that which by affecting our tactile apparatus causes the rigidity or the flimsiness or what-not which we feel: we cannot hear it, we cannot taste it, for parallel reasons. When we turn to our books to learn what the authorities have said it is we find no unanimity. Eddington says that it is a spiritual reality, Henry Norris Russell says it is a mathematically minded God, Larmor says it is twists

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of much epistemological embarrassment if we regarded a certain degree of arbitrariness as the criterion of reality. Then the dream-world would be real.

You are not yet convinced. "The truth is", you say, "that the dream differs radically from the waking life, because the dream has nothing behind it, is a shadow in somebody's mind, whereas the real fact is not only an image in your and my eye, a stubborn resistance against your and my foot, but also a solid *thing* which backs up the visual and tactile impressions our senses give us of it. Otherwise the world would reduce itself to a substanceless play of nothings."

Here at last we should seem to have an adequate basis for belief in the reality of the waking world and the fancifulness of the dream-life. Here is common sense, and it forces itself upon us with such pungency that for a moment we wonder how we ever went askew. A doubt assails us, however, as soon as we begin to consider what this *thing* which backs up the sense phenomena of the waking life is. We cannot see it because it is that which by affecting our visual apparatus causes the images we see; we cannot feel it because it is that which by affecting our tactile apparatus causes the rigidity or the flimsiness or what-not which we feel: we cannot hear it, we cannot taste it, for parallel reasons. When we turn to our books to learn what the authorities have said it is we find no unanimity. Eddington says that it is a spiritual reality, Henry Norris Russell says it is a mathematically minded God, Larmor says it is twists

sists in the giving up or dedicating to the One Life in all of the fruits which accrue from even right and desireless actions. In spite of the views of some teachers that all action should be abandoned as leading to bondage, He asserts most categorically that acts of sacrifice, discipline, and self-giving (the actions of the Path, as was pointed out at the end of the last chapter) should not be abandoned, for they are purifiers.

Even these actions, though, should be performed without attachment, without, that is, the feeling of doing them for one's own personal purity. The fruit, also, which accrues from such action is to be set free for the service of the One Life, in the spirit that prompted the *Mahāyāna* followers of the *Bodhisattva* Path to make over the merit of their actions to the welfare of all beings. Some there are who object that such helping of others is mere illusion and would involve an infringement of the law of *Karma*. It will be time to listen to that objection when the objectors themselves deny ever having received any help through the medium of books or living teachers. Others there are who are kept back from this Path by a false humility. It will be time enough, they say, to think of such service when we ourselves are liberated and it becomes a real possibility. But that is a mistake. It is only he, who from the very start, has accustomed himself to the idea of treading the Path for the sake of all, who will be able when face to face with the actual bliss of the *Brahma Nirvāṇa* to be certain of being steadfast in sacrifice and of giving up his bliss to serve his suffer-

ing brothers.

This is the luminous *sāttvik tyāga* as opposed to those other types of renunciation which spring from laziness, sense of inferiority or desire to avoid the pain and suffering of life. Such "sour grapes" renunciation is definitely inferior. It is a foul slander (whether ancient or modern) to represent the renunciation of the Buddha as having been of that sort. Truer insight was shown by the author of *The Light of Asia* when he made Him say when about to leave His home :

This will I do because the woful cry
Of life and all flesh living cometh up
Into my ears, and all my soul is full
Of pity for the sickness of this world ;
Which I will heal, if healing may be found
By uttermost renouncing and strong strife.

Love, not fear, is the mainspring of all true renunciation.

The doing of actions because they are in harmony with the Cosmic process as revealed by the *buddhi*, and so are "what ought to be done", but without the pride of agency and without the desire for personal fruit, is the highest renunciation. The abandonment of the actions themselves is impossible as long as the would-be renouncer has a body, and is unnecessary under any circumstances, for the actions that are performed without any desire for fruit can bring no bondage to the Soul at any time.

When desire has been renounced and also personal gain, there is nothing left in action which can bind. To show that this is no dogma but a plain fact, the *Gita* proceeds to give an analysis of the five factors that are involved in all action, whether bodily, verbal, or mental. These are the physical body, the "doer", that false

self which is produced by the union of the Light with the psycho-physical vehicle, the various sense organs, the vital energies (*cheshitā*) within the body, and lastly, the forces accumulated by the karma of one's past lives (*daiva*).

That being so, he who, through not having united himself with the *buddhi* (*akritabuddhi*), sees himself, the *Ātman*, as bound up in actions is quite deluded. If the Self does not project itself into the forms by the notion "I am the doer", it can no more be affected by actions than the moon can be entangled in the ripples of a lake. As a Chinese sage has expressed it :—

The moon is serenely reflected on the stream, the breeze passes softly through the pines... When this is understood, the *karma* bonds are by nature empty. When not understood, we all pay for the past debts we have contracted.*

To further elucidate the point, the *Gita* shows that, besides the nature of the action itself, we must consider the actor and his knowledge. All these factors are shown to be threefold according to the *guna* that is predominant. If the action is not to bind the Soul, all three of these must be *sāttvik*. The actor must be one who is unattached and free from the sense of 'I'; his knowledge must be that pure knowledge which sees one indestructible Essence pervading all, "undivided in the separate beings", and the action itself must be appropriate, sanctioned by the inner Ruler, and skilfully performed with regard to the actor's capacity and to the consequences for others.

This last statement is sufficient to show that, in advocating renunciation of the fruit of action, the *Gita* is not sanctioning irresponsible acts. The consequences of actions *upon others* must always be looked to; it is only the personal gains that are to be renounced. It is true that there are certain verses in the *Purānas* and elsewhere which represent liberated souls while still on earth as going about laughing and crying and behaving irresponsibly "like children or idiots". But these verses must not be taken literally. The man of Knowledge is not an idiot, nor does he manifest his liberation by childish behaviour. It is true that personal thinking will have come to an end in him, but in its place, the Cosmic Ideation manifests through him, and though his acts may not accord with established social conventions, they are in harmony with the great Cosmic Order.

It is not necessary to follow through in detail the threefold nature of reason (*buddhi*), firmness and pleasure, as the account given in verses 29-39, is perfectly straightforward and needs no comment, except to say that the word *buddhi* here signifies the ordinary intellect and not the higher *buddhi* of which so much mention has been made. The latter is *sāttvik* in nature and is beyond the mind, while the former comes under the influence of all of the *gunas* and is a mental function. It has, however, this in common with the higher *buddhi* that, when *sāttvik*, it is able to determine truth upon its own level, and, in so far as intellec-

* *Yoka Daishi*. Quoted in Suzuki's *Manual of Zen Buddhism*.

tual truth is one, it is the same in all.

With verse forty-one, as Shankara has pointed out, a new section begins. Up to this point the chapter has formed an integral part of the last block of six chapters, and has been concerned with setting forth in detail the principles underlying Sri Krishna's teaching in the earlier chapters. From the point of view of the disciple, they represent the effort to assimilate and express in intellectual terms the Divine Knowledge revealed in the Vision of the Cosmic Form. From verse forty-one onwards the *Gita* turns to the task of summing up the whole.

Reference has already been made (ch. IV, v. 13) to the fourfold order of society. The Divine foundation there claimed for the classification of men into *Brāhmanas*, *Kshatriyas*, *Vaishyas*, and *Shūdras* must not be interpreted as sanctioning the injustices and prejudices of the orthodox Hindu caste system. It is not necessary to point out that there is plenty of evidence that the caste system itself in ancient India was not always the rigid and lifeless institution that it now is.

In any case, what the *Gita* is concerned with is not any particular sociological system, however ancient, but something far more universal. It is expressly stated that the classification in question depends upon the *guṇas* manifested in the natures of the men concerned. Not only in India, but all over the world, there are four great types of men. There is the *Brāhman*, the teaching, priestly, legal or "professional" type; the *Kshatriya*, the ruling, warrior type,

the "hunting and shooting man" of the West; the *Vaishya* or banking, merchant, agricultural type, and lastly, the *Shūdra*, the servant, manual labourer type. Each of these great types has certain well-defined characteristics, sometimes, though not at all necessarily, inherited by their offspring; and though some overlapping undoubtedly occurs, they are at least as well-marked throughout the world and in all ages as, say, the modern psychological division into introverts and extroverts.

It must be noted that the qualities by which a man is classified under one of these types are, in the cases of the *Brāhman* and *Kshatriya* at least, of a moral and intellectual nature. A man is not a *Brāhman*, because he is the son of a *Brāhman*, nor even because he performs professional priestly functions. He is a *Brāhman* if he possesses certain qualities such as control of mind and senses, self-discipline, forgiveness, straightforwardness and wisdom. In this the *Gita* agrees with the Buddha who also said: "Not by matted hair, nor by lineage, nor by birth is one a *Brāhman*. He is a *Brāhman* in whom there are truth and righteousness."*

The four types have also an important symbolic significance for the inner life. The *Brāhman*, detached and pure, seeing the one in all, stands for the *sāttvik buddhi*. The *Kshatriya* ruler, fearless and much-enduring, is the pure *rājasik manas*, the higher mind. That is why Arjuna, the individual Self, is represented as a *Kshatriya*. The *Vaishya*, concerned with the getting of wealth, symbolises the desire-nature

* *Dhammapāda*, 393.

(*rajas* mixed with *tamas*) always flowing outwards, while the *Shūdra*, born to serve, stands for the *tāmasik* physical body, instrument of all.

The verses which follow describe how perfection is to be won by being intent on one's own duty (*dharma*). The word *dharma* signifies the quality or natural function of a thing or person. Thus, the *dharma* of fire is to burn, and the *dharma* of a *Kshatriya* is to manifest the qualities mentioned in verse 43. In these verses we must bear in mind the inner as well as the outer significance of the fourfold system.

Perfection is to be attained by using one's own characteristic functions in the service of That "from which this manifestation has proceeded". The attempt to perform the *dharma* of another is fraught with danger, since it will be an attempt to build one's life on the basis of an undeveloped, and so inferior function. It is like the successful comedian, who aspires to take a tragic part, the result being usually a tragic failure. The *dharma* to which one is called may seem by human standards a defective or inferior one, but, on deeper analysis, it will be found that the same is true of all *dharmas*, just because they are relative, and perfection is only in the Whole. Nevertheless, all are necessary to the working of the Cosmos, and one can "see Infinity within a grain of sand."

From the inner point of view an equally important meaning attaches to this performance of duty without regard for the fruits, this worship of the one through one's own natural function. Man is not a creature of

this physical plane alone, and perfection will be attained when the various levels of his being, as symbolised by the four types, fulfil their natural functions in perfection. Even the desire-nature, the most troublesome part of man, has its work to perform in the Cosmos, and once again, the *Gita* is teaching that instead of the Light's being withdrawn from the manifested universe in the manner of the *Sāṅkhyas*, it should function free and unattached on all the levels. The *tāmasik* inertia of the physical body and the fierce rush of the desire-mind are to be transmuted by non-attachment into stability and energy respectively. Thus controlled and mastered, they, no less than the luminous *buddhi*, are fit instruments for the service of the One.

This *yoga* by which all the levels are transmuted is the Path to mastery of the Cosmos. The disciple must be united to the One Life by the pure *buddhi* (xviii. 51), the wasteful *rush* of the mind (*ātmānam*) must be checked by firmness, so that it moves by its own power, and is no longer pulled and pushed by the blind forces of attraction and repulsion. The objects of the senses, no longer considered as objects of personal enjoyment, must be dedicated* to the service of the One Life. Studiously detaching himself (*vivikta sevi*) from the forms, constant in that inner meditation which needs no special time or place or posture, he will cut the knot of egoism, so that the distorted movements of lust, hate, violence, and greed, to which that knot gives birth, will cease and die.

* *Tyakta*. The sense of dedication is dominant here.

Then is the disciple ripe for becoming the Eternal *Brahman*. He who was human, has become the Cosmic Man, his feet—no more of clay—firm, based on earth, his head, high in the cloudless sky above. Of all the levels of the manifested world, he is the master. Nowhere is anything he need reject for all that is, is verily the *Brahman*. Himself the calm eternal *Atman* far beyond all sorrow (XVIII. 54), he now, if he has come along the Path of Love attains to that supreme devotion which consists in sacrificing his own immediate bliss to serve that same Eternal in the world of gloom and darkness.

By that great Love he knows the One in its essential nature. He is the true *advaiti* (non-dualist) for he knows that there is no need to flee from "this" into "That". He knows the meaning of the *Mahāyāna* phrase, "*Nirvāṇa* and *Sansāra* are the same", and thus through love he throws away salvation, to find it where he stands.* He may and does perform all actions freely, but all the time his heart is fixed on the Eternal and through Its grace,† Its calm enlightening power, wherever he may be, whatever he may do, he dwells eternally within the Great Abode.

At this point Sri Krishna drops the general exposition and speaks direct to His disciple's heart. He promises him that if he puts aside all selfish fear and clings to the Light within, Its power will carry him past all the

obstacles and dangers that confront him on the way. At the same time, He adds the warning that the treading of the Path, the fight against the embattled Powers of Darkness, is, in the end, inevitable. The disciple's egoistic desire for enjoyment and fear of suffering may hold him back from the fight for the time, but in the end, the remorseless pressure of cosmic evolution will force his feet along the Path he shrinks from now, and that same egoism that held him back, fattened like an ox for the sacrifice, will be remorselessly destroyed.

For that great Ruling Power which guides the Cosmos is seated in the heart of every being (XVIII. 61). Whirling as though upon a potter's wheel, none can escape "the Spirit's plastic stress". However much man may proclaim himself an independent ego, existing for and in himself, the Ruling Power of Spirit is within him, and will not let him rest. Man is, as it were, bound to the Centre of his being by an elastic cord; the more he strains at it, the greater will be the reaction. This is why an exaggerated movement of materialism is followed by an equally exaggerated religiosity, an age of license by an age of puritan restraint.

Sooner or later, all must tread the Path; but in the meanwhile, there is no compulsion. The will of man, a spark of the Divine willing, is ineluctably free and no true Teacher ever forces his disciple even for the

* This is the meaning underlying the *Vaishnava* rejection of *mukti* (liberation) in order to serve Krishna. It is obvious that it is also the *Bodhisattva* doctrine of the Buddhists.

† The word *prasād* means grace and also tranquil clarity. In using the former meaning, one must guard against the introduction of any of the theistic sentimentalities that cluster round the term. It is not in any way like the capricious favours of a Maharaja, but more like the power inherent in a magnet to make magnets of any bits of iron that adhere to it.

latter's good. Having revealed the Secret Path of Wisdom, all that He says is, "having reflected on it fully, do as thou wishest." The Path is free to all ; each has the right to enter, but none will ever compel him or trespass in the least upon his will.

But why await the age-long grinding of the cycles, when, all the while, the Middle Path exists, and may be trodden by whoever will ? Avoiding the lures of sensual desire on the one hand, and of reactionary asceticism on the other, let the disciple consecrate his *whole being* to the service of the Divine Power dwelling in his heart. Prefacing His words by the statement that what He is about to say is the ultimate Mystery, the supreme teaching, Krishna repeats the verse with which He had concluded the chapter IX :—

Fix thy mind on Me, give thy heart's love to Me, consecrate all thy actions to My service, hold thine own self as nothing before Me. To Me then shalt thou come ; truly I promise for thou art dear to Me.

Krishna stands here for the Eternal One manifesting as the boundless Life in all, but His words are also true as applied to the human Teacher. If the disciple consecrates his life, actions, feelings, and thoughts, without exception, to the loved Teacher, and if he meditates upon Him *as being within his heart*, His form will come to be a symbol of his own diviner Self and speak with that Self's voice to guide him through the fight.

This method is an easier one for most, because the human form draws most easily the love of man. Love is the easiest way to self-transcendence ; urged on by love, man holds himself as naught. The disciple must still undertake the actual fighting ; Krishna is charioteer and bears no arms. Nevertheless, his inexhaustible power will flow through the dedicated vehicles, and with Him as guide, the victory is sure.

As the disciple proceeds, the beloved Form becomes more and more the heart and focus of his life, until no thought or action is performed except in relationship to Him. Gradually as He becomes the Ruling Power of the disciple's life, and the latter's eye-vision turns increasingly inwards, the Form will recede and grow unimportant, leaving in its place that which is both in Teacher and disciple, "the Light that lighteth every man that cometh in the world", the one great Life that streams throughout all beings. This is the moment when the Teacher whispers in the ear of his disciple the mystic words of the *Upanishad*, "That art thou", and having whispered, retires for ever, leaving his pupil an Enlightened One, who is himself the Teacher and the Goal.

This is what is meant by that taking refuge in Krishna which, when accomplished, frees the disciple from all other duties (xviii. 66). The latter has no longer to think of any duties of his own to be fulfilled nor any mastery of his separate vehicles, for his whole life on all levels, is consecrated to Him. When, as described above, he reaches the level of union with the One Life, all "sins" drop from him in Its pure and stainless Light. The statement "I will liberate thee from all sins" is no cheap theological promise

but a plain statement of the fact, that in losing self, all sins are lost as well. Henceforth the free, Divine, pervading Life alone acts through what men in ignorance will still call him.

The *Gita* adds a warning against communicating this Mystery to any one who is undisciplined, without love, without desire to serve (*ashu-shrūshu*), or who speaks evil of the Teacher (xviii. 67). This prohibition is not prompted by any spirit of exclusiveness, but by the desire to prevent harm being done. The above-mentioned types would assuredly fail to understand its inner meaning and grasping at the letter of such promises as that in verse 66, would harm themselves and others.*

The next two verses make this entirely clear, for they set forth the praises of those who impart the mystic teaching to such as are ready to profit by it. They are the renouncers of personal salvation to whom the chapter title refers, they, who out of transcendent devotion (*parā bhakti* cf., v. 54) set aside their bliss till every living being can share it with them. It is for this great Sacrifice that Krishna says of them, that none either are or ever will be dearer to Him (xviii. 69). They are the calm Great Ones† spoken of by Shankaracharya, who having themselves crossed over the Ocean, devote themselves unselfishly to helping others to cross.

Little remains to say.‡ The

Path, the Goal, and the Great Sacrifice have been set forth and understood and the Soul breaks out in triumphant ecstacy :—

Destroyed is my delusion. Memory has been regained. By Thy Grace, O Unfallen One, my doubts are gone. Thy bidding I will do.

Once before,§ after the first inner perception of the spiritual Pervading Powers, Arjuna has proclaimed the vanishing of his delusion, but now the further steps have been accomplished. He is established in Reality ; he has regained his Memory of That Eternal One from which he came, to which he now returns. All Knowledge now is his, and with the alternatives before him of eternal changeless bliss, or of unwearying service of his suffering brother men, he chooses the latter and cries out to the Unfallen Changeless Being that he will do His bidding, and will serve Him to the end.

Thus ends the dialogue between the Soul and its eternal Source. It is the Soul itself that is enlightened, but the illumination is brought down to the level of the ordinary waking personality by the meditation of Sanjaya, the link between the two. "Remembering, remembering" the glories of that Divine Enlightenment, he floods the heart with joy, and proclaims the undying truth, that when the human Soul is united with the Divine, victory, welfare, and righteousness are eternally assured.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

* The use of the *Gita* to justify bomb outrages and the futilities of sentimental pietism are instances of what can result from a disregard of this prohibition.

† *Shānta Mahāntah*, i.e., those who, though realising their nature as the *Shānta Ātman*, beyond all manifestation, yet remain on the level of the *Mahān Ātman*, the Cosmic Ideation. *Viveka Chudānam*, verse 39.

‡ The reference to the results of simply hearing with faith (verse 71) must be understood in the light of what has been said about faith in the previous chapter.

§ *Gita* xi, 1.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

GUIDE TO MYSTICISM*

Dr. Mukerjee has written what I have no doubt is an exceedingly able, as it is certainly an exceedingly informative, book. Its range is extensive. The various forms of mysticism are first classified; some account is then given of the history of mysticism and its origins are traced in the magic and ritual of primitive religions. Mysticism is next considered in its bearing upon sex, personal relationships other than the sexual, and institutional religion. Dr. Mukerjee describes the various mystical attitudes, the stages in the mystical ascent, the culminating experiences of the mystic and the view of the universe which mystics have been led to adopt as the result of their experiences. How far, he asks, is such a view unified and self-consistent? How far do the accounts of their experiences given by mystics in different ages, nurtured in the bosoms of different creeds, tally? On all these subjects Dr. Mukerjee's book is a mine of information, and the fact that he gives the major share of his attention to the mystics of India is, from the point of view of the Western reader who is apt to believe that the great Christian mystics represent at once the richest tradition and the highest peak of the mystical experience, all to the good. Particularly valuable for the ignorant Westerner are the occasional tables which show how a particular conception, for example, that of the threefold nature of God, appears and reappears in different forms in all the great mystical religions.

Dr. Mukerjee's object throughout has been to separate the true from the false, and to winnow the wheat of the essential mystical experience from the mass of chaff in which it is all too often embedded. I suppose that on any reckoning the line which separates the profoundest mystical utterances from the pretentious babblings of spiritual mountebanks and

the drivellings of idiots is exceedingly difficult to draw, and we ought to be extremely grateful to Dr. Mukerjee for attempting this difficult task.

I express myself with this degree of diffidence because in the non-mystic endeavouring to review a book dealing with mystical experience, humility is the only appropriate attitude. Mysticism is defined by Dr. Mukerjee as "the art of inner adjustment by which man apprehends the universe as a whole, instead of its particular parts. As such, it is an experience which suggests a fulfilment of vital and mental processes; it is not the monopoly of gifted individuals, while its absence implies an impoverishment and even a warping of mind and personality." Mysticism, then, is essentially a kind of experience, if the word "experience" be interpreted in its widest sense. It is not—the point is repeatedly made—an exercise of the reason, at least it is never merely that. Like the mystics, monistic philosophers have also asserted as the conclusion of a chain of highly abstract reasoning that the universe is an absolute unity. It is the distinction of the mystics to aspire actually to experience the unity which monistic philosophers affirm. As Dr. Mukerjee puts it: "It is philosophy which first postulates the values; but it is religion which brings them home to the individual in the form of specific *emotional* reactions." (My italics.) Now feeling is by its very nature private in a sense in which reason is public. Granted that a proposition in geometry, say, or in logic is true, and granted that you possess a normal intelligence, then I can, as the result of a process called proof, undertake to make you see that it is true; I can, that is to say, cause you to have the same experience of conviction as I have myself. But how different is the case of feeling. If I have the toothache, I may convince you

* *Theory and Art of Mysticism*. By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. (Longmans. 15s.)

by my behaviour that I am in pain, and that the source of my pain is located in my jaw ; but by no method whatever can I communicate my pain to you. Nor, unless you have yourself experienced the toothache, can I find words to convey to you what sort of pain mine is. Herein lies one of the main differences between mysticism and science. Both, as Dr. Mukerjee rightly points out, are universal ; both are concerned with the cosmos as a whole ; both seek to extend the bounds of our experience, but—and this he omits to point out—while science can communicate its results even to non-scientists, mysticism can not. Now—and here is the ground for my diffidence—I personally have no tincture of mystical experience and it is, therefore, extremely difficult for me to understand the meaning of the communications which the mystics seek to make. Many of their utterances—their talk of “a delicious desert”, of “a dazzling darkness”, “of seeing the drop in the ocean and the ocean in the drop”—like the description of toothache to the man who has never had toothache, are, to the non-mystic, sheer nonsense. “The true knowledge”, says Dr. Mukerjee, “passes into a mystical darkness of ignorance, yet shining in the native clarity of the soul, unblemished by the limited urges of life and consciousness.” Very possibly ; but how shall one who has not that “true knowledge” penetrate the “mystical darkness of ignorance” ?

It is inevitable, then, that to the purely intellectual view, however deeply it may be informed by sympathy and the desire for understanding, a large part of mysticism should be meaningless. For me the difference between truth and error is as clear and as important as any difference can well be. I do not mean that I always know what the difference is ; merely that I know it to exist. Yet, I am told, for the mystic “the difference between truth and error does not exist” since the domain in which he lives “can manifest itself as well in error as in truth”. And what am I to make—the passage occurs in the course of a description of the physiology of the mystical “Arousal of

Sakti”—of an injunction to concentrate my mind on the “six great centres or circles of energy situated in my trunk” ? I am conscious of no such circles, nor is my endeavour to realize them assisted by the information that each is like a lotus and that, as it passes through the stages of the mystical consciousness the mind travels, ant-like, from one lotus to another.

These considerations are not adduced in a spirit of scepticism, and merely to indicate the mystic's difficulty of communication and the non-mystic's difficulty of comprehension. These difficulties are, I think, in the nature of things. The difficulty of communication arises in part from the limitations of language. Language was evolved in order to serve the practical needs of this world ; it cannot readily be enlisted to convey the meanings of another. Indeed one is almost tempted to say that, if mysticism could give an account of itself, it would cease to be mysticism. Not less important is the fact that, Dr. Mukerjee points out, mysticism is concerned with nothing less than the whole “beyond the reach of any relativity or reference”. Now all description entails some degree of relativity. It is a way of telling you about something that you do not know, or do not know very well, in terms of something else to which it is related which you happen to know better ; and it presupposes that the thing described is referable to and interpretable in the light of the thing in terms of which it is described. Now the whole is not referable to or interpretable in terms of anything, and although it no doubt possesses a fullness of meaning for the mystic who apprehends it, that meaning cannot, as Dr. Mukerjee rightly reminds us, be described in the ordinary language of “subjects and predicates”. That the more whole, the more concrete, that the more concrete, the more universal—these are truths upon which all the mystics have, it seems, insisted. But the philosophers have in this connection stated a difficulty which the mystics have no doubt resolved, but whose resolution has never yet been

conveyed in terms intelligible to the intellect. This difficulty, pointed out by F. H. Bradley, is discussed at length by Dr. Mukerjee. The mystic in the final stage of his illumination is one with God, but is never wholly one with God for God transcends the mystics' experience so that though they are at one with Him, they are nevertheless impelled to affirm that He is beyond both existence and knowledge. Let us put the point as a philosopher would put it. The world at first sight appears to be an unco-ordinated many; yet this, it is felt, cannot be its true or final nature since, if it were, the world would be a meaningless chaos. The many, it is insisted, must be the appearance of an underlying whole or unity. But how, in this event, are we to retain the integrity of its being as "many"? The choice seems to be between complete absorption in which separate identity is lost, and meaningless multiplicity in which no reconciling unity is discerned. The mystic, I make no doubt, sees beyond the dilemma presented by this choice, but he is totally unable to convey what he sees.

It is the failure in communication which is largely responsible for the suspicion of the whole mystical tradition which is common in the West to-day, a suspicion to which the theory and practice of psycho-analysis is thought to have lent confirmation. The purport of this suspicion is to consign all those experiences known as mystical to the realm of subjectivity. The mystic, in short, projects the whimsies bred of his own imagination on to the canvas of a meaningless universe, and then proceeds to report what he has projected as objective realities revealed to his quickened insight. Thus the mystic is a man who voyages into the heart of reality only to discover himself.

Nor is there want of evidence in Dr. Mukerjee's study to lend countenance to this suggestion. It is interesting, for example, to notice how the language with which the mystic clothes his vision takes shape within the framework of his own particular religion. Christ does not appear before the worshipper of Buddha,

or the Hindu World-Mother before the worshipper of the Virgin Mary. The Christian mystic meditating on the Cross is filled with pity, but the mystic condition of the Hindu, trained to revere Hanuman, is characterized by humility and self-surrender. "The gods", in short, "manifest themselves in the consciousness of the mystical religionist in the form and guise familiar to his religion and tradition". Again, the mystic's visions often bear all too plainly the stigmata of wish fulfilments. Mystics are often lonely men and, as Dr. Mukerjee points out, it is because "divine companionship satisfies gregariousness on the ideal plane" that "communion with God or with the angels in heaven is among the most familiar of religious phenomena". Again, it is because men are given to self-importance and self-assertion that the mystic so commonly insists that as "God's servant he is especially favoured with God's grace". Most significant of all for the wish-fulfilment hypothesis is the marked strain of sexual imagery that runs through so many mystical utterances. Male mystics find in God mother or wife; female mystics lover or son. Thus "Rabia, the Sufi woman, used to go to the house-top at night and to say: 'O God! Hushed is the day's noise; with his beloved is the lover. But Thee I have for my lover, and alone with Thee I joy.'" This sentiment could be paralleled from the utterances of almost any one of the major mystics, and not least from the great Christian mystics whose accounts of the union of the soul with God are couched in terms directly derived from the union of the sexes.

This question of the possible subjectivity of mysticism raises issues which cannot be discussed here. Too much stress, however, should not be laid upon the considerations which I have adduced. Not less impressive than their divergence is the unanimity of the testimonies of the mystics in respect of certain highly significant truths. All are agreed that the universe is One; that the One is spiritual; and that the appearance of many different things extended in space which it undoubtedly presents is illusory. They

are also agreed that it is possible to know the One; that this knowledge is not purely or even primarily intellectual; and that in it the subject-object relation may be transcended and the mind become one with what is known.

In a concluding chapter on Modern Thought and Eastern Mysticism, Dr. Mukerjee attempts a defence of the objectivity of mysticism in the light of modern scientific thought. He takes as a representative of modern thought Sir

James Jeans, and appears to be unduly impressed by the theories of some scientists. Since the theories to which he refers suggest that the universe is itself a thought in the mind of God, it is doubtful whether they afford to mysticism the support for which Dr. Mukerjee invokes them. However, they are in no sense new, and whether they are true or not, Dr. Mukerjee is wrong in thinking that they are justified by modern physics.

C. E. M. JOAD

A SYNTHESIS FOR LIFE*

November 24th 1859, the very day that *The Origin of Species* was published, Adam Sedgwick, Charles Darwin's first geological tutor and as such recipient of an advance copy, wrote to the author in these terms:

There is a moral or metaphysical part of nature as well as a physical. A man who denies this is deep in the mire of folly. 'Tis the crown and glory of organic science that it *does* through *final cause*, link material and moral; and yet *does not* allow us to mingle them in our first conception of laws, and our classification of such laws, whether we consider one side of nature or the other. You have ignored this link; and, if I do not mistake your meaning, you have done your best in one or two pregnant cases to break it. Were it possible (which, thank God, it is not) to break it, humanity, in my mind, would suffer a damage that might brutalise it, and sink the human race into a lower grade of degradation than any into which it has fallen since its written records tell us of its history.

Darwin himself clearly resented the criticism, and Sedgwick has been damned for it by commentator after commentator, yet I would venture to declare it the most interesting and perceptive short statement made regarding the *Origin* within ten or possibly even fifty years of its appearance, and it is, despite a short-sightedness on one or two counts, so apposite still that it might well have served as text for Mr. Gerald Heard's recently

published volume *The Third Morality*, a work in no way to be compared with the *Origin*, and yet in some respects possibly one of the potentially most important books to appear since it.

We scarcely need Mr. Heard to tell us in what peril we stand to-day of Sedgwick's words coming all too true. Every newspaper, any morning or evening, will cry out from its headlines what degree of brutalization and degradation has come upon the world like a shadowing cloud. And it lowers, not lifts. To-morrow looks darker, not lighter. It is the type-activity of our civilization to prepare frantically in every continent and almost every country for the supreme brutality of modern war. We all know that there is no depth of degradation into which another widespread international conflict may not plunge the world. These things are commonplaces, not prophecy, to-day. Sedgwick wrote in a period of anticipation of uninterrupted progress; his words *were* prophetic.

Some readers possibly will grant the fact of human degeneration, and yet wonder what it can have to do with either Sedgwick or Darwin. That exactly, despite the fact that he never mentions the former, is Mr. Heard's theme. Sedgwick believed that the link between material and moral, physical

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and metaphysical, could never be broken in organic science. His faith was blind in two respects—in its optimism and in its limitation, for by implication he evidently accepted, or did not object to, that link's severance in the field of *inorganic* science. Mr. Heard makes manifest the folly of that; how, one link gone, the others could not hold:

Newton banished God from nature, Darwin banished Him from life, Freud drove him from the last fastness, the soul. It was all latent in Newton, in Descartes, in Galileo: mechanism would conquer all, once it had conquered nature, for man's body was sprung from nature and his mind from his body.

Break the link, Mr. Heard would agree with Sedgwick, and degradation must follow as the night the day. Why? Because "as we think, in the end we must act," and because too—a conclusion I personally have long sought to resist, but can resist no longer—no ethic can endure long as a living morality lacking a more than material (ultimately a religious) sanction.

That is the crux of our situation to-day. The anthropomorphic religions which satisfied men's souls through long millenniums had their confining and eventually destructive limitations, but religions they authentically were and could establish true moralities. Mechanomorphism—the conception of the universe as a machine—came to take their place, to destroy them vitally if still by no means absolutely, but it could not of its nature fulfil their total function, for even more than anthropomorphism was this mechanomorphism a partial and inadequate rendering of ultimate reality, the abstraction made by Galileo when he divided primary and secondary characteristics, and set himself to study isolated mass and movement, being carried by his successors from realm to realm—inorganic, organic, human, spiritual—with dwindling rather than increasing sense of its devastating insufficiency. Denying the supra-material it could establish no morality; its only sanction must be that of

individual physical survival, the anarchy of unabated struggle to sustain existence. That is in fact the state of the world to-day—the struggle of individuals and of nations to survive at whatever price of brutality, since survival is everything. It is not new, but it has hitherto been concealed by the psychological "time-lag."

The degenerative process has been going on since Newton; it only became acute eighty years ago with Darwin, and it has not become critical till to-day. But to-day we are faced by collapse. Our reserves are used up.

This is only the opening, almost the preface, to Mr. Heard's real theme. But I have dwelt on it at length because I believe it not only a preliminary very necessary to grasp but one which will bring an essential understanding to many people. We have been apt to look at our world and find it, frankly, mad with a madness to which we had no key but which yet began to work upon ourselves, creating a corresponding disruptive, stultifying chaos within. Such is the desire of the human consciousness for order, that the very admission of madness is corrosive, sterilising and disintegrating. Mr. Heard's analysis, strictly in terms not of unreason but of reason gone astray, is in itself curative, at least for the individual reader and in that degree for the world generally. Chaos is dispelled, comprehensibility restored, and with that the sense of balance, freedom, purpose. That is one reason why the book is important, and one would have it read as widely as possible.

It would, however, be far less important than it is did it stop there instead of marching, as it does, very far forward. Here we are, and here we shall remain, bogged in disaster, until we can discover a new sanction and a new morality. We cannot return to dead anthropomorphisms; therefore we must go forward, and Mr. Heard's principal effort is to show us how and whither.

The first need is for a new synthesis of knowledge, a new "morphism" bas-

ed on the most comprehensive understanding of reality open to us. Science must not be rejected because of the fatally limited outlooks of certain, even the bulk of, scientists in the past; rather must the newest science be invoked to show their limitation as no longer, if ever, genuinely scientific. Accordingly four extraordinarily interesting chapters are devoted to an exposition of "post-mechanic" physics, biology, and psychology, each shown as denying their once absolute materialism, and turning to suggest if not unequivocally display mind as the final universal reality. (He also counters with some force—and with obvious importance in relation to current affairs—the whole "Darwinian" conception of organic evolution by brute force. The fittest survive, certainly, but biology now gives good reason for supposing fitness to be measured by awareness, sensitiveness, adaptability. Heavy armament has again and again shown itself the last defence of the beast already marked for extinction a dreadful thought for politicians in every country to consider to-day!)

Mind, too, he would assert, is not only the final but the most immediate reality. Many people will find nothing harder to grasp in his exposition yet to do so is vitally necessary—than the degree to which he would declare the "solid" world we see before our very eyes not an objective reality at all, but a subjective creation, shaped mainly by dominant emotion, out of an infinitely wider range of finally ungraspable being. To illustrate very crudely: of two artists facing a landscape one will select features to paint a scene of tranquil joy, the other to suggest intrinsic tragedy. Much more widely and deeply, that is what we all do. The anthropomorphist makes his "construct," the mechanomorphist makes his; both are true, both false, and while the truth in each will first release, the falsity in each will finally imprison. Both were overwhelmingly dominated—that is to say, their universes shaped—by greed and fear, inhibiting,

confining emotions. It is the fundamental aim of Mr. Heard's *Third Morality* to attain a fuller (though necessarily still incomplete) objectivity by substituting open interest and free curiosity for limiting fear and greed.

The new system—cosmology and morality in one—is freely admitted not yet to exist. It has still to be brought into being, to be more fully realised in the effort of living towards it, of acting in accordance with what it seems to be. Only the most tentative outline is offered here—the individual mind seen as the localised upcast of the universal mind, death as the former's return to the latter, evil as the blind-alley refusal to live more sensitively, more abundantly. Both reincarnation and Karma are viewed with a certain questioning, but, like the rather startling comments on Jesus, from so enlightened an angle as to be stimulating even if mistaken.

Life as continuous spiritual development linked to supra-individual aims that is the basic conception. To grow and again to grow, out of greeds, fears, desires, prides, possessivenesses, into a new dynamic creative attitude, accepting both the universe as it is (in the light of understanding) and one's responsibility to seek to mould it ever anew, knowing that it *can* be moulded in the subjective vision and the objective fact by one's own reshaping. That last is really the answer to those who will inevitably point to the desperate condition of the world to-day and ask what poor weapon is this to set against its violence. Poor weapon or not, it is the only one; a man can only change the world without as he changes himself within. But it will seem poor only to those who have failed to grasp the degree to which we tend to be dominated by the subjective illusion.

Later chapters suggest a suitable code of behaviour and methods of training—including exercises of evident Eastern inspiration of value towards attaining and sustaining such a projected attitude, but these last might have been still more useful if more specific. Though they must not be neglected,

but rather further attended to, it is the analysis and outlined synthesis and course of conduct which stand out as of primary importance, as understanding—shooting arrows of meaning into all aspects of contemporary life, gathering together the threads of a thousand diverse intimations—as release, and as building-afew. The scientific materialists will dismiss the book as contemptuously as they once did Sedgwick's words. Men of broader outlook, who do not resent but rather welcome Mr. Heard's bringing of Western thought into consonance with Eastern wisdom, will recognise its high and urgent value.

Science Front might be read as a footnote to *The Third Morality*, as

incidental supplement to his chapters there on the trends of contemporary science. It has, however, a more direct interest of its own as a straightforward account in simple language of the actual scientific achievements of the year 1936. This, as he says, is the knowledge, these the possibilities, which controlled will make, uncontrolled will shatter, the world we live in; we must at least seek to be aware of them. The survey covers all fields. Some of the material is sensational, but Mr. Heard has a sure sense of values. Those who scorn, and those who over-estimate, the fruits of scientific research will each find a suitable corrective here.

GEOFFREY WEST

The Legacy of India. Edited by G. T. GARRATT. (The Oxford University Press. 10s.)

This volume contains contributions on different subjects by eminent writers, both European and Indian. The introduction is provided by the Marquess of Zetland. There can be no question about the competence of the scholars who have collaborated in bringing it out and their generally sympathetic attitude towards India. Almost every aspect of Indian culture, past and present, has been considered, and the debt of the world to India, wherever it is due, has been fully recognised. It will go a long way toward a greater understanding of India by foreigners, and in particular by her rulers, which is essential if India is to grow to her normal stature. The writers are impartial in their presentation; they have given us an objective study of facts concerning Indian civilisation free from bias and political leanings. This, however, is not to say that there are no overstatements and understatements, and that the natural human bias has not operated in the presentation of disputed facts. But the writers have generally maintained the detached attitude of scholars, and no one of them has been out merely to eulogize or unnecessarily to underrate. The general

level of scholarship is high. Even a subject like the caste-system has been rationally tackled by R. P. Masani. He appreciates elements of good in it, and yet he is not blind to the pernicious character of some of its later forms. He says:—

It is not for us in this chapter to visualise or discuss the future of the Institution. We are concerned only with the legacy of the past. In spite of embarrassing encumbrances, that legacy has proved a precious social heritage. The organisation of society on a basis of caste has stood the test of centuries... So long as people adhered to the ancient ideal of *Dharma*, the caste system induced a moral cohesion of the different units and gave society a static form. It was only when that ideal was lost sight of that it developed fissiparous tendencies and evolved a code of inequalities and iniquities which have given it a bad name outside as well as inside India.

There is general consensus of opinion that Indian civilisation is one of the oldest. The prehistoric civilisation of the Indus Valley places this matter beyond doubt. There may be nothing strange in this. But it is really strange that this oldest civilisation is still a living one. As Prof. Radhakrishnan says in his article on Hindooism, "The noteworthy feature of this civilisation is its continuity, not as a political power but as a cultural influence."

Hinduism is not a spent force. It has seeds of vitality and growth. The result is that we have the strange phenomenon of cult after cult springing up from Hinduism and yet remaining within the parent-body. New creeds arise, and yet they are pervaded by the Hindu spirit. Time has made no ravages. It has only enriched the wealth of Hindu thought. The dissidents still call themselves Hindus. The reason is that there is no doctrinal rigidity in Hinduism. Creedal differences are tolerated, free thinking on religious matters is not suppressed, and an ideal is set up in Advaitic philosophy which it is difficult to supersede. We have thus every shade of religious thought, whether theistic or atheistic, gnostic or agnostic, represented in Hinduism.

Hindus have made a contribution to the civilisation of the world not only in philosophy and religion, but also in other respects, namely, literature, early development of grammar leading to great precision in the use of linguistic forms, the Ayurvedic system of medicine, music, architecture, sculpture, etc. But in any consideration of the legacy of India, we cannot confine ourselves to Hindu culture alone. Islam has played an important part. There are two articles, "Muslim Architecture in India" by M. S. Briggs, and "The Cultural

Influences of Islam" by Abdul Qadir. It cannot be denied that Islam has influenced Hindu thought to a certain extent. But this should not be exaggerated. The movements which Islam is supposed to have influenced were movements within the fold of Hinduism, and they have remained true to their type. Brahma Samaj, Arya Samaj, Sikhism, Vaishnavism of Sri Chaitanya, etc., were movements within Hinduism, and their essential beliefs cannot be traced to Islam. It would be particularly wrong to say as Abdul Qadir does that the attitude of the higher class Hindus to idol-worship has undergone a change owing to Islam. Idols have ever been regarded as symbols. The unity of God again is not a new doctrine for the Hindus who have worked out this unity to its ultimate consequences in the Advaitic system of thought. It is a regrettable thing, but it is a fact, that Hindu India and Muslim India run culturally on separate and distinct lines, notwithstanding a certain amount of interaction between them. The reason appears to be not so much a difference in religious practice or principle as the social barrier.

The book is altogether an interesting one. It can be read with profit by those who are in actual contact with India as well as by those who have no such contact but who yet want to understand this ancient civilisation.

G. R. MALKANI

Rights of Man. By THOMAS PAINE.
This Human Nature. By CHARLES DUFF. (Thinker's Library—Nos. 63 and 64. 1s. each. Watts and Co., London.)

The Publishers have rendered a distinct service to the cause of Free Thought in adding these two volumes to their Thinker's Library. The introduction to the

first by G. D. H. Cole is a valuable addition and all will agree with him when he states: "We sorely need a new Paine to hearten us, and unite us in the cause of decency and reason. But the old Paine, too, can help to give us courage, and to reinforce our faith in the cause of the common man".

The Life of Jesus. By CONRAD NOEL. (Dent, London. 12s. 6d.)

Had Conrad Noel wanted a provocative title for his book, he might well have called it "The Life and Hard Times of Jesus Carpenter." That would emphasise his appreciation of the usually neglected fact that Jesus belonged to a certain human context, and though he is for all time, it was his extreme fidelity to that context which gave him a practical immortality among generations who almost always fail in this loyalty. It gives his book a value. Yet there's no denying it is a view which, though essentially correct, can make for a certain descriptive pedestrianism, not everywhere avoided here. So you find the occasional dullnesses and argumentary stresses as well as the courage of a work which is a transition and obviously paves the way.

For a long time, now the tendency has been to rationalise the Son of God, to make him a sort of Super-Man of Genius with his miraculous powers rather tucked under the tail of his shirt as appendages to a Great Personality. The age of Barnum, Bernard Shaw and Marconi naturally tends to explain every development in terms of the individual person. It looked on Christ and saw the augmented image of its own great man, Tennyson, Carlyle and Pasteur fused into one. But it wouldn't do. The figure they made looked too uncomfortable in a nineteenth century halo. And we in reaction begin to see the man of genius not only as a rare sport thrown off from his fellows but as the glittering spear-point in which is caught up the thrust of their collective will. That is easily true in the abstract. But if you have to describe the actual life of one of these arisen men who are at once eccentric to the main run of mankind and yet their perfect objectification, you'll find it hard not to exaggerate one characteristic or the other. In the case of Jesus,

the difficulty becomes almost insurmountable.

Noel is well aware of it, perhaps too aware. And his efforts to portray Jesus as child of a seditious home, friend of the workers and people's leader, while at the same time holding on to the experience of the divine personality, sometimes result in an extraordinary tameness. You see, as every man in the street knows, Jesus must be miraculous or nothing. Perhaps what we thought to be the miracle was not the real one at all, but you must then show what is. It seems to me that the ascent of Christ from God-man to man in whom God most often was, cannot be described out of a fascination with the Jesus personality—it is more likely to come from some far-flung sympathy with the Roman slaves and workers whom Christ immediately wrought for. What was that natural miracle by which the legions of slaves whom Rome deprived of the stature of men, nevertheless kept a core of invincible humanity so rebelliously strong that it seemed divine to them, to have come from a God their masters did not know. Jesus declared their condition to them, or rather made them aware of what light they secretly lived by. But the thing pre-existed. There could not have been such a ready comprehension of his message had it not. There was a Christianity before Christ, just as there were Arabs who worshipped Allah in every village they touched before Mohammed came. How is it that the new God comes to simple people before the prophets have sought him?

That question naturally suggests itself as the starting-point of the next enquiry. But whoever begins it would owe thanks to Conrad Noel and some others like him who have freed us from a good deal of interested trash which had accumulated round the figure of Jesus.

JACK COMMON

Māndūkyopaniṣad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Sankara's Commentary. Translated and annotated by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA with a Foreword by V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER. (Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, Mysore. Rs. 2/8.)

Sankara was probably the greatest force on the side of Hindu revival which made for the downfall of Buddhism in India. We can well imagine how he must have waged a constant warfare with the Buddhist teachers, and can even understand how in the process his own ideas came to reflect some of the shades of his opponents' views. However unjustly, he came to be regarded by some orthodox people as a crypto-Buddhist (*pracchanna-buddha*). Gaudapāda, who was the teacher of Sankara's teacher Govinda, wrote a little over 200 verses in elucidation of the text of the *Māndūkyopaniṣad*, which, although probably the shortest among the Upanishads, gives the whole substance of Vedantic teaching. These verses are divided into four chapters, the first of which alone deals directly with the Upanishadic text, the rest being of the nature of an independent treatise; and the work as a whole is regarded in Advaitic circles nearly as highly as the Upanishad itself. But scholars tell us now that the verses contain many Buddhist ideas and expressions, and their author probably was, or had been, a Buddhist himself. It would be a great irony of fate if what is now regarded as an authoritative text of Advaitism were in fact only a manual of Buddhism.

Swami Nikhilananda in his preface has made a good attempt to refute Dr. Dasgupta's contention that Gaudapāda was probably a Buddhist, and also to answer Prof. Radhakrishnan's criticism of Gaudapāda's nihilistic views as against the "more balanced" of Sankara. I do not think that from an internal examination of the verses it can be definitely established that their author was a Buddhist. But it cannot also be denied that some of the expressions, especially in the last chapter, are definitely Buddhist. The fact is that there is a good deal of affinity between the metaphysical views of Buddhism and Advaitism. And as Bud-

dhism was historically earlier, we should not be far wrong to say that some of its ideas were assimilated in Advaitism.

Swami Nikhilananda contends that if Sankara's views were really different from those of Gaudapāda, he would not have written a commentary on these verses. It has not evidently occurred to the Swami that the writer of this commentary might be different from the great Sankara. It cannot at any rate be gainsaid that the more idealistic side of Advaitism has been emphasised in these verses. All Advaitists will agree that the external world, ultimately and from the absolute point of view, is nothing at all; but they will still differ in their interpretation of our ordinary experience. Some will say that it is not wholly subjective but grounded in something which cannot be explained either in positive or in negative terms (*anirvacanīya-vāda*); some will hold that the object of experience is entirely subjective, being really one with the act of knowing (*dr̥ṣṭi-sy̥ṣṭi-vāda*); others will even deny the object altogether and thus all individuated experience (*ajāta-vāda*). There is no doubt that Sankara often inclines to the first view which is more in keeping with ordinary experience than the latter ones which are favoured by Gaudapāda. His name is associated specially with the last view which is perhaps logically most consistent but is bound to appear rather absurd at the level of our ordinary moral and religious consciousness.

Whether we agree with him or not, Gaudapāda must be given due credit for boldly emphasising a point of view which, however repugnant to common sense, is logically entailed in the Advaitic position. His ideas certainly deserve our study and respect, and Swami Nikhilananda has earned our gratitude by making this valuable work available in English. I have compared the translation with the original and have always found it very faithful, although in places it is not strictly literal. The translation is eminently readable, and the copious notes which the author has subjoined to the translation have added greatly to the value of the book.

R. DAS

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

The doctrinal relation of Buddhism and Advaitism, and the spiritual kinship between Buddha and Sankara are frequently discussed in Indian philosophical circles. Only in a lesser degree is the question of the exact date of Sankara discussed, though it is, in our opinion, capable of throwing a good deal of light on the intimacy subsisting between the teachings of Buddha and of Sankara.

By the publication of this volume—not only valuable to scholars but of importance to practising mystics as well as to students of Eastern Psychology—Swami Nikhilananda has once again brought the question up for discussion.

Our able reviewer points out that there is a good deal of affinity between the metaphysical views of Buddhism and Advaitism. And, as Buddhism was historically earlier, we cannot be far wrong to say that some of its ideas were assimilated in Advaitism.

Go a step further, and instead of looking upon the title *pracchanna-buddha* (Buddha in Disguise) as opprobrious, value it as appropriate and more—approbatory, and further to deprive it of its sting call Buddha a great Advaiti in Disguise and we come nearer the truth. The Prince of Kapilavastu did not go to

the Bodhi Tree with a view to planning the ushering in of a new religion in the India of 600 B.C.; nor did He after His enlightenment try to establish a new creed, but only endeavoured to show a new Way of Life, which was the old, old Way. What the Buddha preached to the masses in their common tongue that Sankara taught using the Sanskrit. The only difference, as it were, was that Buddha as a reformer, labouring among the people, spoke to them straight in a simple manner avoiding, as much as possible, terms, names and forms of thought which had come to acquire corrupted meanings. Sankara, coming immediately after him, laboured to reform the orthodox Hindus who must have been looking out to purify and to elevate their own creedal teachings and rites. Look upon Buddha and Sankara as a pair of Great Spiritual Teachers and Reformers, each supplementing the work of the other and the prevailing confusion will vanish. To that end it is very necessary that the era of the first Sankara be fixed. Our esteemed contributor Dewan Bahadur K. S. Ramaswami Sastri has written an interesting article on the subject which we hope to publish in an early number of this magazine.—Eds.

The Psychology of a Suppressed People. By REV. J. C. HEINRICH, M.A. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s. cloth ; 3s. 6d. paper)

It is always interesting to study human psychology in connexion with some actual social subject. This book fills that condition very well. The writer is preoccupied with the problems arising from the clash of personalities in the Christian Mission work in which he was occupied in the north of India, which he ascribes mainly to our now familiar friend, the inferiority complex, and in particular to the concealment reaction or "curtain of silence" which arises from it.

The first half of the book contains a careful study of the reactions of any more or less suppressed people, with

many illustrations from the ways of the Negroes of the Southern States of America and many well-chosen quotations from noted psychological authorities. These should be interesting and informative to all students of human nature and workers in every social field, for the problems and the conditions are the same everywhere.

One admires the sincerity with which the author develops his conclusion that the Nationals should be given a dominant instead of as at present a subordinate position in the Mission work, for the sake of releasing their talents in its service, and substituting a creative spirit for the imitative tendencies which at present exist. He wants the white missionary from abroad to be freely criticised by the Nationals, so that all

resentment may be brought outside "the curtain of concealment", for he declares: "There is every reason to believe that the type of white Mission that is common on the fields, whose programmes and procedure often have been kept secret, and that has become more or less a symbol of oppression, in one aspect of its effect upon the Indian Church, is the greatest single contributing factor to the spiritual deadness in the churches."

While studying the psychological influences at work, the critical reader cannot help noticing that the Religion itself does not appear to be exercising any influence upon the reactions of the workers, as here depicted. They might

be an organization for the sale of soap for all the influence of Christ which appears in the matter. But the author has the right spirit in his denunciation of dominance. He announces that any form of organisation which is not open to effective criticism by responsible National leaders is a handicap to spiritual fellowship, and he quotes with approval Dr. Adler's remark with reference to cases in which external pressure is so strong that it removes all obstacles and is obeyed: "It is easy to show that this obedience is sterile of all social good." He has produced a book instructive for what it says, and even more so for what it implies.

ERNEST WOOD

Socrates. By NAOMI MITCHISON and R. H. S. CROSSMAN. (The Hogarth Press, London. 1s. 6d.)

Simple yet vivid. The book sketches the figure of Socrates, "the best, the wisest and most just man of his time". Though popularly reckoned a Sophist, the teacher of Plato neither wrote nor professed to teach, nor even to possess knowledge, but only to be a learner conscious of his ignorance. Ever seeking Wisdom through strong search and questioning, he encouraged others to break the moulds of crystallised thought, and seek the Truth likewise. Thus Socrates was one of those "real people", not famed for what they do, but for what they are. "They don't matter in a public sort of way, but everyone who knows them is changed by knowing them."

Throughout his career Socrates recognised and taught the fact that for right living, true knowledge, based on the immortality of the soul, is of paramount importance. This soul wisdom he obtained from "a strange secret society, the Pythagoreans, followers of a prophet who had lived in Asia Minor and Sicily fifty years before".

But the desire for spiritual truth exists in very few minds. The capacity to discern it in fewer. Then, as to-day, men always opposed those who went against the established order of things. The actions of his countrymen were interfered with by Socrates, who in all things insisted on truth and justice. This attitude, as strong as it was persistent, brought to him the Karma of the martyr—he was condemned to death.

Surrounded by friends, and cheerful to the end, his last words were typical of this "gayest and kindest of the Athenians". "I'll be cured when I wake from *this sleep*," he said. "You'll have to pay the doctor's fee!"

The body of Socrates was killed, but his mind lived and lives even to-day to influence our thoughts. "Although he has been dead for more than 2000 years, it is still directly, and as a person that he can, if our minds are open to him, stir us up to follow him, twisting ourselves free from power and money and pride on to the dangerous and exciting hunt for our own time's truth." Thus ends this short biography of one of the "world-makers and world-shakers".

N. F. K.

Two Leaves and a Bud. By MULK RAJ ANAND. (Lawrence and Wishart, London. 7s. 6d.)

The heart of the humanitarian will be touched by this pathetic story of Indian coolies working on a British tea plantation. Besides portraying admirably the characters and the everyday life of these poor people and contrasting it with that of their Sahibs, the author pleads against the injustice of human exploitation everywhere and makes an earnest appeal against the tyranny of British arrogance and ignorance. The real moral of this realistic novel will unfortunately be missed by the average European unacquainted with conditions in India; its implications will be violently denied by those who, although having lived in the country, consider it their duty to stand up for what they term the prestige of the white race. Those among them who are without race prejudice and who are not afraid to face facts, however unpleasant, will own that the author has not drawn an exaggerated picture. The details of this story are accurate. It has a message. Let not the reader close his ear to this living cry of pain. Let him not say with an indifferent shrug of the shoulder: "These things may have been true once, but conditions have been very much bettered." The present reviewer has "the privilege", to him very questionable, of having been born in the West, in a *pucca* white body, and he could relate out of personal experience incidents similar to those of Mulk Raj Anand's story. Take for instance that of the utter surprise and consternation into which are plunged the members of the British Club, upon the introduction in their midst of the Indian doctor brought by his superior officer, himself an Englishman.

"Do sit down, Doctor," de la Havre said to Chuni Lal, who stood aside uneasily, as if waiting for orders. And he himself rested back into a red leather sofa.

The music had ended and the members of the chorus now drifted about the room, crooning or calling to the bearer for more drink.

"I am afraid", said Reggie Hunt, walk-

ing shakily up to Chuni Lal, "niggers aren't allowed in this club."

"I say, Reggie, he's my guest", said de la Havre, and he got up and advanced towards Reggie Hunt. "You..."

But he could not find the words, drew back, afraid of himself, and stood livid with rage.

"Reggie! Reggie!" said Macara, getting up and trying to drag Hunt away. He shared Reggie's sentiment, as indeed did all orthodox Anglo-India, for as a general rule, Indians were not allowed to be members of English clubs, but this was not the way to go about it. It would have been better to talk to de la Havre later and ask him not to repeat his invitation to Chuni Lal.

"Bearer", bawled Reggie Hunt, at the top of his voice to the servant who had appeared at Macara's call. "Turn the Baby out."

The other men were dumb and stared into nothingness.

The ladies were breathless.

Chuni Lal began to walk away.

De la Havre stood trembling with rage.

"Never mind", said Tweetie, patting him on the back. "He has had a drop too much."

De la Havre shrugged his shoulders.

"Good-bye", he muttered and followed his assistant.

Only last April, in one of the large Indian cities, a similar incident took place in the dining room of a hotel mainly used by Europeans. Two French ladies, blissfully unaware of the conventionalities of "orthodox Anglo-India", gravely offended the diners by appearing, for their evening meal, in the company of a cultured Brahmin, "so uncivilized a fellow as to be wearing a dhoti. Fancy that!" So many Britishers in India to-day make a profession of friendship for the Indians. This will remain but a lip profession unless followed by the service and the defence of the teeming millions of the ignorant, of the poor and the despised, the lowly and the oppressed.

The white race has a very heavy debt to pay to the coloured people, in many places and especially in India. Therefore, it must be the first to stretch the hand of fellowship to the dark nations—to call the poor despised "nigger" brother. This prospect may not smile to all, but he is no true humanitarian who objects to this principle.

S. M.

Mr. Sludge, the Medium. By HORACE WYNDHAM. (Geoffrey Bles, London. 12s. 6d.)

It is to be questioned whether any class of persons—sceptics, believers or impartial inquirers—stood in need of another volume devoted to the life of Daniel Dunglas Home, though the publisher of the present undertaking ventures to affirm that it is still a “vexed question” whether the once famous medium was or was not an impostor. But there is no question whatever that—needed or not—Mr. Horace Wyndham is about the last *littérateur* imaginable for the office of Home’s biographer, though he has written not a few books already, as for example, on *Famous Trials Re-Told*, *Blotted Scutcheons*, *Crime on the Continent*, *Feminine Frailty*—so on and so forward. For all that one knows to the contrary these may be excellent productions after their own kind; but *Mr. Sludge, the Medium* is a negligible performance from every point of view. It is sloppy as criticism, cheap journalese in its ever recurring waggeries, while it contributes nothing to the alleged enigma which the publisher testifies that “Mr. Wyndham has set himself to answer”. At the end of all the expatiation, the author inquires whether Home was “High Priest or Humbug” and decides that “the solu-

tion can only be furnished by himself”. It happens, however, that on June 21st, 1886, the so-called “King of the Mediums” or alternatively “Colossal Impostor” passed on to where beyond this blather “there is peace”. For Mr. Wyndham, the case against him, so far as there is a case, resides in the fact that he “has never once come back from the Shades to attend a séance and confound the sceptics.” What kind of answer is this to an alleged “baffling problem”? What is the critical value of a study which throughout contrasts the views of those who investigated the Home phenomena with the judgments of those who never did? For myself it should be added—merely to clear the issues—that there is no question, vexed or otherwise, and no problem, baffling, solved or soluble. For the sake of the man himself I hope that Home’s prodigies were genuine, and so far as Mr. Wyndham’s survey is concerned I might be disposed to infer that they were; but as for the phenomena themselves it is utterly indifferent to me whether they came out of the conjuror’s bag or are examples of supernormal powers resident in a certain individual. They have never told me anything that I desire to know, and it is certain that they never will.

A. E. WAITE

Sakountala. By A. N. TAGORE. Adapted into French from Bengali by Andrée Karpelès, T. M. Chatterji and Amya Chandra Chakravarty. (Publications Chitra, Mouans-Sartoux, A. M. France. 9 francs.)

This is the fourth in the series “Feuilles de l’Inde” (Pages from India), a labour of love of the devoted friends of India, Andrée Karpelès and C. A. Högman. This volume contains two delightful stories, *Sakountala* and *Nalaka*, both by Abanindranath Tagore.

Sakountala of Kalidasa is a celebrated world classic. Abanindranath Tagore narrates it for the young and brings out exquisitely the original atmosphere of poetry and philosophy. The French

adaptation follows closely the Bengali version and preserves in a remarkable way its rhythm and music.

Nalaka, considered by many to be the masterpiece of Abanindranath Tagore, describes, through the visions of a young boy, the main incidents of Lord Buddha’s life. Here too, the beauty and harmony of the original have been retained.

Undoubtedly Andrée Karpelès has caught the true atmosphere of India and has known how to translate its colour and sound into her mother-tongue. Unlike so many foreign visitors to this ancient Land, who see only the outward form and fail utterly to be touched by the Soul of India, Andrée Karpelès and C. A. Högman belong to the

small class of foreigners who are true lovers and interpreters of the *real* India. Their sentiment is evinced in their introduction. They labour devotedly to make the living India known in France, and thus hasten the day which will witness the union of all races and peoples, East and West alike.

"In her Indian forest, Sakuntala, by her charm and her sorrows, is to us an affirmation that centuries vanish, that frontiers disappear before love and suffer-

ing."

They describe how they first heard *Nalaka* at Santiniketan on a peaceful evening in Spring, and how it assumed for them a pregnant application to the present. Is not the Great Fire a prophetic vision of the world war of 1914, and is not Santiniketan a veritable Refuge of Peace? To all French minds who wish to contact the Soul of our India and to all French-speaking Indians we strongly recommend this series.

Z.

Germany's New Religion: The German Faith Movement. By WILHELM HAUER, KARL HEIM AND KARL ADAM. Translated by T. S. K. SCOTT-CRAIG, and R. E. DAVIES. (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s.)

The translators have brought through well the emotional content of these five articles, three by Hauer, leader of the German Faith movement, one by Heim, prominent in the Lutheran Church, and a lecture by Adam, a noted Roman Catholic exponent.

Hauer's obsession with the "German", "Teuton" or "Nordic" and their derivatives—11 times on the first page of about 200 words is an example—and equally numerous ecstatic references to such phrases as "productive deeps of the German genius" or "the Primal Will of the German people", afford support for the diagnosis of a national inferiority complex in acute form. Part of Hauer's inspiration is drawn from Indian ideas, part from earlier German mystics, but what is of value in his struggle against "Churchianity" is marred by the abnormal race-consciousness with its sense of separateness and special made-to-measure God. Heim's contribution deals more with a specific point, moral responsibility versus the conception of destiny. He sees the falsity of blaming fate for one's guilt, but does not grasp, though he mentions, Karma—the doctrine of action as "free will" with the inevitable and equal reaction as "fate"—nor is he clear about Hauer's exposition of it, unfortunately not included. Adam,

again, stresses the virility, the full-bloodedness of the present-day German conception of Christianity, the "hot breath of the heroic", the "exalted sensuousness" that pervades the personality and teaching of Christ. Many readers will find the emotional heat oppressive but also there must be intense pity for the depths of unsatisfaction underlying that insistence on the very special character of the German nation. Its past history and present conditions show that it has not yet achieved national unity; the bitterest of strifes between its elements, the psychological reaction from the attitude of the conqueror nations, undernourishment and lowered vitality, a consequent emotional sensitivity; can one wonder at the present "over-compensation" and its resulting evils?

We of the other nations must condemn the evils, though not the doers, for they but mirror our own images. Only a difference of degree divides us. What best use, then, can be made of the book under review? The great mental hospitals, though they may have to restrain violent patients, will watch, study and gather data over a lengthy period before even attempting therapeutic measures for a case; otherwise more harm may be done than good. The book under review gives some essential data for the study of the German Zeitgeist. But just as it would be merely distressing for the layman, without constructive knowledge, to read the hospital records, in like manner, the reader of this book should have some

knowledge of the means of achieving true national and international relationships, a science which exists, but which has never yet been generally applied. And since thought is actually potent to affect others, even well-wishers with no

apparent contact with the souls now incarnated on German soil may find profit in understanding their need, and making the application of Universal Brotherhood.

WINIFRED WHITEMAN

A Popular History of Witchcraft.
By MONTAGUE SUMMERS. (Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner and Co., Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

We are already indebted to Mr. Summers for his studies in Witchcraft and Demonology, and here we have his work in this field brought up to date and designed for the general reader. He has ransacked the literature of the subject, from a MS. book on Black Magic, c. 1600 to twentieth-century newspaper reports! Those who want to know about necromancers will discover much that is interesting, if not particularly enlightening, in this volume. In Mr. Summers' opinion, "Witchcraft does not belong to the antiquarian past; it lives and energizes, a monstrous and fearful menace to-day, and it is perhaps only by a clear and understanding view of the history of black magic that we can be aware of the imminent dangers which surround us." It will be news, though, to those familiar with the peaceful countryside of England, to find that "up and down England there is hardly a village without a witch"; and we are not quite clear, from a perusal of these pages, what exactly Mr. Summers means by the phrase "The Black International of Satan". Possibly, he includes everything loosely called "occult" or "psychic" in this implied condemnation.

It is a pity that the author does not make clear the political animus at the back of much of the witchcraft persecution in Europe in the Middle Ages. Nor does he draw any distinction between white and black magic. The reader would do well to bear in mind that as H. P. Blavatsky pointed out in *Isis Unveiled* (a

volume of indispensable worth to students of this subject) we have the authority of Taylor's *Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries* for saying that "Any person accidentally guilty of homicide, or of any crime, or convicted of witchcraft, was excluded from the Eleusinian Mysteries." Even Socrates was not admitted to the Temple because of his mediumistic tendencies. H. P. Blavatsky defined Witchcraft as either conscious or unconscious. "Certain wicked and dangerous results", she tells us, "may be obtained through the mesmeric powers of a so-called sorcerer, who misuses his potential [magnetic] fluid; or, again, they may be achieved through an easy access of malicious tricky 'spirits' (so much the worse if human) to the atmosphere surrounding a medium." It is important also to remember the facts brought out by Mr. Sidney Hartland, LL.D., F.S.A. in his article on the subject in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (1920), when, referring to the evidence on which thousands of men and women were condemned in Europe to the most barbarous deaths, he makes it clear that not all witches so tortured were practitioners of the black art; they were merely heretics and unbelievers in the eyes of the Roman Church. Sorcery to-day is not confined to twilight rooms in remote suburbs or to obscure villages. We may find it in some of our medical consulting rooms, no less than in the sanctuaries of ecclesiastical dogma. All those who, "instead of crushing out the desires of the lower personal *ego* . . . send up waves of will-power for selfish or unholy purposes" fall into the category of those who practise black magic, abomination, and spiritual sorcery.

B. P. HOWELL.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

Every family radiates' its own magnetism, purifying or polluting the moral atmosphere of the community to which it belongs. Similarly every nation exerts its own influence, beneficent or maleficent, on humanity of which it is a part.

From time immemorial India has exerted her spiritual influence, and drawn to herself her spiritual affinities. In spite of the vicissitudes of foreign political domination, in spite of the bitter prejudice of the white towards the coloured races, in spite of the misunderstandings caused by religious sectarianism and exclusiveness, India, silently and quietly, continues to act to-day, as she has acted in the past, as a powerful spiritual magnet, exerting her influence to the farthest ends of the earth. She has friends and devotees in every land.

In France her admirers are many. Among them a small group of active workers deserves a special mention for its noble and practical efforts in behalf of India. Seeking no recognition for themselves, they sacrifice of their time, money and energy to bring recognition to India. They are staunch believers in the principle of *ahimsa* or non-violence. They labour for World Peace and Universal Brotherhood. And as their special task they have chosen to make contemporary India known to the West, and especially to the French-speaking public.

To this end they publish from time to time French editions of India's literary and cultural gems. The first

of this series, "Feuilles de l'Inde", dedicated to India, was published in 1928. The title of the book is suggestive of its contents, *India and Her Soul*. In 1931 was published a second volume, the *Lucioles* of Rabindranath Tagore. The third came out in 1933 and contains *La Poupée de Fromage* of A. N. Tagore. The fourth has just been published and is reviewed in this number.

The sponsors of this work are Andrée Karpelès, a painter and a writer, and her husband, C. A. Högman, the publisher of the series. Besides contributing to this series Andrée Karpelès has translated and illustrated several volumes belonging to the "Petite Collection Orientaliste", and she has several others in preparation.

We wish these friends of India the success which they richly deserve.

The London Vegetarian Society has issued a handy and very useful brochure *The Food Reformers' Year Book* containing lists of Health Food Stores, Hotels and Guest Houses where vegetarian catering is provided, Schools where vegetarian diet is supplied, Foreign Food Reform Societies and Magazines relating to Food Reform. Vegetarianism is no more considered a fad; an increasing number of intelligent people are adopting the habit of consuming food stuffs which are hygienically clean and more health building. Vegetarianism is morally superior to meat-eating which involves cruelty to animals and debases the butcher.