THE ARYAN PATH

Canst thou destroy divine Compassion? Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of Laws—eternal Harmony, Alaya's Self; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal. The more thou dost become at one with it, thy being melted in its Being, the more thy soul unites with that which Is, the more thou wilt become Compassion Absolute. Such is the Arya Path, Path of the Buddhas of perfection. —*The Voice of the Silence*

VOLUME IV

January-December 1933

ULT LIBRARY
BANGALORE.
Accn. No 127

THEOSOPHY CO. (INDIA) LTD.
51, Esplanade Road
BOMBAY

127
140
ARG

INDEX

Index of Articles

About Ethical Supremacy—*By J. M. Kumarappa* 630
Absolute, The—*By Willam Kingsland* 403
According to Rabindranath Tagore —*By Humbert Wolfe* 484
Æsthetics in India (Bhava-Rasa-Dhvani)—*By M. A. Venkata Rao* 715
Anatomy of Portraiture, The—*By Robert H. Davis* 30
Architects of Ideals, The 441
Asiatic Element in Swinburne, The — *By Ranjee G. Shahani* ... 766
Asiatic Society of Bengal, The —*By Kalidas Nag* 668
Asceticism and Modern Civilization—*By H. M. Tomlinson* ... 449
Audacity: The Philosophy of a Russian Exile—*By R. Naga Raja Sarma* 334

Bio-chemistry and Ancient India —*By B. N. Sastri* 793
Become That Which Thou Art ... 73
Bernard Shaw—Bishop—*By J. S. Collis* 191
Bolshevism between East and West—*By Hans Kohn* ... 380

Can War Be Abolished? 369
Challenge to Modern Religion, A —*By Hadland Davis* 185
Christian Immortality and Hindu Reincarnation—*By M. A. Venkata Rao* 102
Christianity and Communism —*By Geoffrey West* 837
Christianity of the Churches, The —*By W. E. W.* 612
Church versus Christ (A Symposium) 837
Colour Question, The—*By Ethel Mannin* 114
Co-operative Commonwealth, The —*By Manu Subedar* 308
Correct and Incorrect Thinking —*By I. Shaw Maclaren* ... 398
Correspondence—70, 138, 208, 278, 356, 430, 502, 572, 644, 721, 793, 848

Decay of Church Christianity, The —*By J. P. W.* 841
Destructive Analysis, A—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset* 265
Determinism and Freewill in Sufism—*By Margaret Smith* ... 313
D. H. Lawrence: The Man of Kama-Manas—*By J. D. Beresford* 93
Discoverer of Oxygen, The—*By Dorothy Turner* 531
Doctrine of Reincarnation in Islamic Literature, The— *By Margaret Smith* 33
Doctrine of Will in Shakespeare, The—*By John Middleton Murry* 479
Does the Gita Support Orthodoxy? —*By G. V. Ketkar* ... 158, 250
Dream Experience, A—*By William Saunders* 322
Duration and Time—*By Mahendranath Sircar* 417

Economic Aspects of Hindu Thought, The—*By Eleanor M. Hough* 299
Economic Crisis and the Spiritual Life in America, The—*By Irwin Edman* 613
Emerson's Oriental Reading—*By Arthur Christy* 597
Ends and Sayings—71, 143, 215, 287, 366, 439, 511, 581, 653, 725, 798, 856

Epitaph on Mechanist Philosophy —*By A. Newsome* 685
Equality —*By J. D Beresford* 474
Ethical Value of the Doctrine of Reincarnation, The—*By Saroj Kumar Das* 180
Ethics of Vegetarianism—*By Rasvihari Das* 502
Evolution—*By J. D. Beresford* 22
Evolution and Redemption—*By J. D. Beresford* 689
Evolution of Public Opinion—*By J. B.* 356

Family, The—*By B. M.* 76
First Article of Belief, The—*By J. D. Beresford* 176
Flight from Ethics, The—*By Helen Bryant* 617
Flux of Spirituality, The—*By Helen Bryant* 252
From Religions to Religion (A Symposium) 572
From Paris—*By J. B.* ... 138, 356

Gita and Spiritual Freedom, The—*By D. S. Sarma* 523
Goethe's Philosophy of the Soul —*By William Harlan Hale* 246
Golden Mean, The 729
Gospel of Mass Production, The—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset* 375
Greater India—*By Kalidas Nag* 3

Harmony of Religions—*By Swami Jagadiswarananda* 572
Has Asia Anything for the West? —*By George E. Sokolsky* ... 664
Heritages in the Melting Pot—*By Kalidas Nag* 487
Holy Men of Hindustan, The—*By Paul Brunton* 536

Ideal Man, The—*By M. S. Modak* 758
Immortality 657
India—Whither?—*By Franklin Edgerton* 46
Indian Reaction to Japanese Poetry —*By J. S.* 625
India's Ambassador to the West —*By Ramananda Chatterjee* ... 589
India's Message in Colour—*By S. V. Venkateswara* 739
Infinite, The—*By Tobias Dantzig* 14
Is Buddhism a Religion?—*By Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids* 241

Khabardar, The Parsee Poet—*By J. C. Tavadia* 795
Knowledge and Action in China— *By J. W. T. Mason* 236
Koran of Persia, The—*By R. P. Masani* 493

Land of Psyche and of Nous, The —*By A. E. Waite.* 208, 430, 644, 848
Leave and Pension Rules in Old India—*By Sri Ram Sharma* ... 721
Letter from London, A 852
Liberation according to Sankara —*By J. N. Chubb* 833
Liberation and Liberated Souls: A Comparative Study in the Upanishads and Spinoza (A Symposium) 755
Light in Life—*By Mahendranath Sircar* 27
Limit of Responsibility, The ... 513
Limitations of Language, The— *By G. B. Harrison* 456
Limitations of Speculative Thought, The—*By Edmond Holmes.* 516, 607
Line of Indian Mystics, A—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset* 770
Line of Indian Mystics, A: A Note on the Above 775
Living Messengers Called Words (A Symposium) 456
Lotus—Flower of Power, The ... 289

Magic of Detachment, The—*By John Cowper Powys* 659

Mammon Called Opium, The—*By Ellen N. La Motte* 108
Man and His God—*By J. D. Beresford* 602
Mind of Youth, The—*By C. B. Purdom* and *G. D. H. Cole* ... 59
Modern Science and The Secret Doctrine—*By Ivor B. Hart.* 111, 171, 256, 319
Moksha—*By Mahendranath Sircar* 755
Mote and the Beam, The 801
Motion—*By Ivor B. Hart* ... 171
My Note Book—*By A. R. Orage* 711
Mystery of the Holy Grail, The *By A. E. Waite* 779
Mystical and the Occult, The—*By Lawrence Hyde*... 750
Mystic Andrews and the Rationalist Joad, The—*By Jagadisan M. Kumarappa*... 62
Mystic Brotherhood Through Islam —*By Robert Sencourt* 166
Mysticism of A. E., The—*By Humbert Wolfe* 9

Nature is Alive: Human Ego is Supreme—*By J. D. Beresford* ... 408
New Books and Old—46, 117, 185, 259, 330, 408, 484, 552, 625, 689, 770, 837
New Morality and Old—*By G. R. Malkani* 262
Next Step Forward, The—*By J. D. Beresford* 294
Note on Missionaries, A—*By Ph.D.* 226
Novelist with a Message, A (Claude Houghton)—*By Geoffrey West* 555

Occultism and Mysticism—*By H. P. Blavatsky* 744
On Amateur Living in India—*By Frank C. Bancroft* 508
On Benevolent Despots and Despotic Trustees—*By Franklin Edgerton* 304
On Hearing—*By B. M.* 291
On the Misuse and Abuse of Words —*By George Godwin* 459
One and Only Cure, The 217
Origin and Genesis of Speech—*By Thomas FitzHugh* 815
Origin of Indian Castes—*By R. A. V. Morris and others* 70, 278, 362
Orpheus and India—*By C. R. King* 820

Patriotism = Nationalism—*By J.B.* 138
Pattern for Statesmen, A—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset* 40
Philosophism—*By Max Plowman* 633
Philosophy and A Sense of Humour —*By T. V. Smith* 162
Pigment and Progress—*By C. E. Russell* 806
Plato the Religious Seer—*By D. L. Murray* 222
Political Science in Old India (A Symposium) 299
Polygyny in Practice—*By W. Addison* 682
Power of Poetry in the Struggle of Life, The—*By E. Merrill Root* 471
Prison and Prisoners—*By G. D. H. Cole* 413
Professor Jackson on Mani and Manichæism—*By Sir Jivanji J. Modi* 340
Professor Whitehead's Darshana— *By Rasvihari Das* 628
Project of International Education, A—*By C. R. King* 505
Proof of It, The—*By E. W.* ... 32
Psychic Phenomena—*By C. E. M. Joad* 96, 147
Psychological Considerations—*By Ivor B. Hart* 319
Psychology: Indian and Western— *By A. R. Orage* 527
Psychology of Odours, The—*By H. Stanley Redgrove* 153
Psychology of the Criminal Poisoner, The—*By C. J. S. Thompson* 393
Puzzle of Indian Philosophy, The —*By Saroj Kumar Das* ... 434

Raja Ram Mohan Rai (A Symposium) 588
Ram Mohun Roy (An Appreciation)—*By H. P. Blavatsky* ... 588
Real and the Rational, The—*By D. G. Vinod* 819
Reality and Sorrow—*By G. R. Malkani* 491
Reconstruction in America (A Symposium) 613
Red Philosophy and Red Politics—*By Hugh de Sélincourt* and *C. Delisle Burns* 560
Religion a Help and a Hindrance—*By Alban G. Widgery* ... 549
Religion as a Personal Affair—*By Charles W. Ferguson* 83
Religion of a Socialist, The—*By Jennie Lee* 173
Revival of Hedonism, The—*By C. E. M. Joad* 732
Revolution and Religion: Lenin or Gandhi?—*By John Middleton Murry* 330
Roman Script for India—*By V. S. Ganapathi Sarma* 437
Ruskin's Social Theory—*By C. Delisle Burns* 675

Seeing the Self—*By Pandit Bhavani Shankar* 82
Self-Shining—*By E. H.* 95
Shakespeare through Eastern Eyes (Correspondence) *By J. S. and others* 360, 578
Shelley: Karmayogi—*By J. S. Collis* 784
Sight of the Heart, The 1
Sin of Retaliation, The—*By J. D. Beresford* 802
Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir S. Radhakrishnan—*By B. K. Mallik* 648
Sleeping and Waking—*By Max Plowman* 444
Sociological Puritanism—*By William Seagle* 745
Soldier-Philosopher's Reflections on War, A—*By C. B. Purdom* 621
Some Actual Experiences—*By Mrs. Philip Champion de Crespigny* 232
Some Speculations about Sound in Sanskrit Literature—*By A. B. Gajendragadkar* 462
Space—*By Ivor B. Hart* 111
Spinoza and the Upanishads: A Comparison in Ethics—*By M.S. Modak* 540
Sufis and Reincarnation, The—*By R. A. L. Armstrong* 388
Sufis and Reincarnation, The—*By J. S.* 722
Sufism and Reincarnation—*By R. A. L. Armstrong* 796

Temptation—*By Claude Houghton* 467
Testimony of Faith and Creeds of Theology—*By Marmaduke Pickthall* 695
Theatre as Teacher, The—*By W. E. W.* 809
Theosophy: The Science of Religion and the Philosophy of Science—*By K. R. Srinivasiengar* ... 325
Thiruvalluvar—*By R. K. Narayan Swami* 810
Thoughts on Justice—*By Hugh de Sélincourt* 825
Thoughts on Kindness—*By Hugh de Sélincourt* 19
Thoughts on the Spring of 1933—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset* ... 828
Three Listeners, The—*G. V. Ketkar* 385
Time—*By Ivor B. Hart* 256
Time and Timelessness—*By Arthur E. Lloyd Maunsell* ... 764
Tolstoy's Belief and Practice—*By Aylmer Maude* 79
Towards the Universal Religion—*By D. L. Murray* 55
Two Anthologies—*By D. S. Sarma* 188
Two English Alchemists—*By E. J. Holmyard* 552

Unity of Philosophy and Religion—*By Max Plowman* 259

Untouchable Classes and their Assimilation in Hindu Society—*By G. S. Ghurye* 87

Vedanta and Psycho-analysis—*By R. Naga Raja Sarma* 490
Victorian and Post-Victorian—*By Geoffrey West* 50
Vivekananda—*By Clifford Bax* ... 693

Western View of Indian Politics, A—*By G. D. H. Cole* 117
What is God? 585
Which One Am I? 145
Whittier and the Brahmo Samaj—*By Arthur Christy* 372
Wisdom-Religion: The Solution of our Problems—*By Student* ... 575
Wise One, The—*By B. M.* ... 453
Wordsworth's Soul Struggle—*By J. P. W.* 421
Work of the Aspirant, The—*By B. M.* 679
World-Leadership in a Scientific Age—*By R. G. Collin Smith* ... 545

Youth and Crime—*By George W. Wickersham* 227

Index of Book Reviews

Absolution—*By E. Boyd Barrett* 134
Adventure of the Black Girl in Her Search for God, The—*By Bernard Shaw* 191
Adventures in Philosophy and Religion—*By James Bissett Pratt* 273
Adventures of Ideas—*Alfred North Whitehead* 628
Æschylus, The Prometheus Bound —*Ed. by George Thomson* ... 424
Alexandrine Teachings on the Universe—*By R. B. Tollington* ... 271
Anthology of Haiku, An—Ancient and Modern—*Trans. by Asataro Miyamori* 625
As I See Religion—*By H. E. Fosdick* 63
Aspasia, The Future of Amorality —*By R. E. Money-Kyrle* ... 202

Bewilderment and Faith—*By F. E. England* 841
Blavatsky Bibliography, The ... 638
Book of the Gradual Sayings, The: Vol. II ("The Book of the Fours")—*Trans. by F. L. Woodward* 710
Book of the Master of the Hidden Places—*By W. Marsham Adams, ed. by C. J. L. Garstin* ... 790
British Social Services: The Nation's Appeal to the Housewife and Her Response—*By the Rev. J. C. Pringle* 786
Broadcast Minds—*By Ronald Knox* 265
Buddha and The Christ, The—*By Canon B. H. Streeter* 275
Buddhist Bible, A—*Ed. by Dwight Goddard* 272

Calvin—*By R. N. Carew Hunt* ... 641
Can We Save Civilization?—*By Joseph McCabe* 501
Carlyle—*By Emery Neff* ... 201
Century of Emancipation, A.—*By Sir John Harris* 706
Challenge to Defeat—*By William Harlan Hale* 60
Child Psychology—*By Buford J. Johnson* 791
Chinese Idea of the Second Self, The— *By E. T. C. Werner* ... 350
Christianity and the Crisis—*Ed. by Dr. Percy Dearmer* ... 841
Christian Mysticism: With a New Preface—*By W. R. Inge* ... 642
Claude Houghton's Novels ... 555

Daughter of the Samurai, A—*By Etsu Inagaki Sugimoto* ... 571
Dead Towns and Living Men—*By C. Leonard Woolley* ... 127
Destiny of Europe, The—*By F. McEachran* 352
Doctors' Delusions Crude Criminology and Sham Education—*By Bernard Shaw* 195

Empty Victory—*By George Godwin* 65
English Treasury of Religious Prose, An—*Ed. by J. Lewis May* 207
Enquiries into Religion and Culture—*By Christopher Dawson* 792
Enquiry into the Authorship of the Ordinall of Alchimy—*By M. Nierenstein* and *P.F. Chapman* 552
Essay on the Civilizations of India, China and Japan, An—*By G. Lowes Dickinson* 46
Essays in Philosophy—*By Seventeen Doctors of Philosophy* ... 633
Ethics (Vols. I, II, III)—*By Nicolai Hartmann* 630
Everyman's Talmud—*By Rev. Dr. A. Cohen* 268
Evidence of Immortality, The—*By Don P. Halsey* 198
Evolution and Redemption—*By Dr. A. P. Newsholme* 689
Examination of the Mystic Tendencies in Islam, An—*M. M. Zuhuru'd-Din Ahmed* ... 636
Existence and Immortality of the Soul, The—*By H. T. Butler* ... 634

Facsimile of Ashmole's Ordinall, A—*Introd. by E. J. Holmyard* ... 552
Faiths and Heresies of a Poet, The—*By Ronald Campbell Macfie* 273
Festival of Adonis, The (XVth Idyll of Theocritus)—*Trans. by E. H. Blakeney* 632
Film in National Life, The ... 206
Freedom in the Modern World—*By John MacMurray* 67
From Faith to Faith: An Autobiography of Religious Development—*By W. E. Orchard* ... 564

Gita Explained by Dnyaneshwar Maharaj—*Trans. by Manu Subedar* 770
Golden Boat, The—*By Rabindranath Tagore* 351
Great Pyramid in Fact and in Theory, The—*By William Kingsland* 353
Great Victorians, The—*Ed. by H. J. Massingham and Hugh Massingham* 50
Guide to Modern Thought—*By C. E. M. Joad* 563

Heartless Land, The—*By James Stern* 130
Heart of Christ's Religion, The—*By Canon Raven* 704
Henry Vaughan and The Hermetic Philosophy—*By Elizabeth Holmes* 277
Heritage of Asia, The—*By Kenneth Saunders* 487
Hinduism To-day—*By D. S. Sarma* 487
Hindu Monism and Pluralism—*By Max Hunter Harrison* 267
History as a Science—*By Hugh Taylor* 496
History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. VII: Indian Mysticism: Mysticism in Maharashtra—*By R. D. Ranade* 770
House that Freud Built, The—*By Joseph Jastrow* 490
Humanity's Greatest Need—*By Hugh McCurdy Woodward* ... 570
Hypnotism, Suggestion, and Faith-Healing—*By Alexander Cannon* 200

Idealist View of Life, An—*By Sir S. Radhakrishnan* 185

Indian Culture Through the Ages: Vol. II. Public Life and Political Institutions—*By S. V. Venkateswara* 117
Indian Monk, An—*By Shri Purohit Swami* 196
Individual and the Community, The—*By Wen Kwei Liao* ... 789
In Job's Balances—*By Leo Chestov* 334
Intellectual Crime—*By Janet Chance* 495
Interpretation of Dreams, The—*By Sigmund Freud* 567
Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism, An—*By Benoytosh Bhattacharyya* 569
Introduction to Living Philosophy, An—*By D. S. Robinson* ... 491
Is Christianity True ? A Correspondence between Arnold Lunn and C. E. M. Joad 841
Islam and Modernism in Egypt—*By Charles C. Adams* ... 844
Issues of Immortality—*By Corliss Lamont* 426

Judgment on Birth Control—*By R. de Guchteneere* 845

Kathopanishad and The Gita, The—*By D. S. Sarma* 68
Konnersreuth : A Study of the Case of Theresa Neumann—*By R. W. Hynek* 205

Lankavatara, Sutra, The—*Trans. by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki* ... 429
Laughing Christ, The—*By Pearson Choate* 791
Leap-home and Gentle-brawn—*By Frieda Hauswirth Das* ... 268
Letters of D. H. Lawrence, The—*Ed. by Aldous Huxley* ... 50
Life and Experiences of a Bengali Chemist—*By P. C. Ray* ... 349
Life in Nature—*By James Hinton* 131
Life of Emerson, The—*By Van Wyck Brooks* 120
Life of Shelley, The—*Introduction by Humbert Wolfe* 784
Life of Sris Chandra Basu—*By Phanindranath Bose* 130
Life of Swami Vivekananda, The —*By his Eastern and Western Disciples* 693
Light : A Philosophy of Consciousness—*By Archibald Weir* ... 196
Light of Asia, The—*By Sir Edwin Arnold* 276
Living Issues in the New Testament—*By C. A. Anderson Scott* 704, 836
Lost Leader, The: A Study of Wordsworth—*By Hugh I'A. Fausset* 421
Lure and Romance of Alchemy, The—*By C. J. S. Thompson* ... 199
Lyra Mystica—*Ed. by C. C. Albertson* 188

Magic and Mind—*By E. J. D. Radclyffe* 277
Manual of Buddhism for Advanced Students, A—*By Mrs. Rhys Davids* 123
Martyrdom in Our Times—*By A. Mitchell Innes* 126
Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi, The, (Four Vols.)—*Trans. by Reynold A. Nicholson* 493
Meister Eckhart's Sermons—*Trans. by Claude Field* ... 274
Menace in our Midst, The—*By Christmas Humphreys* and *R. E. Dummett* 641
Moral Laws—*By Edgar Sheffield Brightman* 707
Moral Man and Immoral Society—*By Reinhold Niebuhr* 330
Moscow Dialogues—*By Julius F. Hecker* 560
Music of the Growth, The—*By Collum* 706
Music : Its Secret Influence throughout the Ages—*By Cyril Scott* ... 638
Muslim Creed, The—*By A. J. Wensinck* 695

Mystery of the Mahabharata, The —*By N. V. Thadani* 197

Nationalism in the Soviet Union—*By Hans Kohn* 562
Neo-Hinduism—*By D. V. Athalye* 487
New Background of Science, The —*By Sir James Jeans* 846
New Deal, A—*By Stuart Chase* ... 66
New Morality, The—*By G. E. Newsom* 262
Nogaku, Japanese Nō Plays—*Beatrice Lane Suzuki* 61

On the Meaning of Life—*Ed. by Will Durant* 428
Orient in American Transcendentalism, The—*By Arthur Christy* 699
Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius, The —*By John K. Shryock* ... 136
Origins of Sacrifice: A Study in Comparative Religion—*By E. O. James* 498
Outlines of Indian Philosophy—*By M. Hiriyanna* 259

Peace at Eventide—*By Helen Keller* 570
Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science—*By C. E. M. Joad* ... 121
Philosophy of the Present, The —*By George Herbert Mead* ... 417
Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought, The—*By Douglas Clyde Macintosh* ... 55
Place of Man, and Other Essays, The—*By Nagendranath Gupta* 500
Plan of Life, A—*By C. B. Purdom* 137
Plotinus on the Beautiful and on Intelligible Beauty 204
Political Philosophy of Confucius, The—*By Leonard S. Hsu* ... 136
Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine, The—*By James Morgan* 709
Psychology of Sex, The—*By Havelock Ellis* 635

Religious Foundations of Internationalism, The—*By Norman Bentwich* 700
Religious Philosophy of Baron Von Hügel, The—*By L. V. Lester Garland* 703
Researches in Manichæism—*By A. V. Williams Jackson* 340
Romance of the Inward Light, The —*By L. V. Holdsworth* ... 355

Sadhana—*By Rabindranath Tagore* 484
Scholar's Testament, A: Meditations of Adolf Von Harnack ... 708
Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy—*By Helen Zimmern* ... 68
Science and Religion: Broadcast Talks—*By Professor Huxley* 704
Scientific Theory and Religion (Gifford Lectures, 1927–29)—*By E. W. Barnes* 566
Secret Lore of India, The—*By W. M. Teape* 135
Secret of the West, The—*By Dmitri Merejkowski* 275
Sermon on the Mount, The: An Interpretation—*By Pekka Ervast* 708
Shakespeare through Eastern Eyes —*By Ranjee G. Shahani* ... 133
Shakespearian Tempest, The—*By G. Wilson Knight* 270
Some Aspects of Vayu Purana —*By V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar* 701
South American Meditations—*By Count Hermann Keyserling* ... 269
Spices and Condiments—*By H. S. Redgrove* 565
Spirit of Language in Civilization, The—*By Karl Vossler* ... 427
St. John of the Cross—*By Fr. Bruno O.D.C.* 698
Studies in the Birth of the Lord—*By Elwood Worcester* 498
Supernormal, The—*By G. C. Barnard* 788
Symposium of Plato, The—*By R. G. Bury* 568

Testament of Light, The—*Ed. by Gerald Bullett* 188
That Immortal Sea—*By Clifford Bax* 497
Things New and Old—*By W. R. Inge* 497
Through the Eyes of The Masters —*By David Anrias* 638
Tolstoi : The Man and His Work —*By Mrs. Roland Holst* ... 354
Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta. Vol. vii, 1931-32—*Ed. by Sir J. C. Bose* ... 408
Treasure House of the Living Religions, A—*Ed. by Robert Ernest Hume* 425
True Christian Religion, The— *By Emanuel Swedenborg* ... 499
Truth about Dreams, The—*By M. L. Cowdry* 702
Truth about Spiritualism, The— *By C. E. Bechofer Roberts* ... 128
Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing–*By Warden Lewis E. Lawes* 413
Twenty Years in Tibet—*By David Macdonald* 847
Under the Fifth Rib : A Belligerent Autobiography—*By C. E. M. Joad* 62
Universe of Light, The—*By Sir William Bragg* 846
Vision of Asia, The—*By L. Cranmer-Byng* 124
Vision of the Nazarene, The—*By the Author of "The Initiate"* ... 638
Visions of the Daughters of Albion —*By William Blake* 195
Youth Looks at Religion—*Ed. by Kenneth Ingram* 59
Watchers of the Seven Spheres— *By H. K. Challoner* 638
West-East—*By W. J. Stein* ... 640
What I Owe to Christ—*By C. F. Andrews* 62
Where Is Science Going ? —*By Prof. Max Planck* 408
Whom Do Men Say that I Am ? *Ed. by H. Osborne* 132
Wild Talents—*By Charles Fort* ... 203

Index of Correspondence

Bio-chemistry and Ancient India— *By B. N. Sastri* 793
Correction, (Roman Script for India)—By *V. S. Ganapathi Sarma* 724
Correction, (Youth Looks at Religion)—*By Peter Winckworth* 214
Discovery of Manichæan Works from Egyptian Sands, The—*By J. C. Tavadia* 141
Ethics of Vegetarianism—*By Rasvihari Das* 502
Explanation, An—*By A. R. Wadia* 142

From Paris—*By J. B.*
Evolution of Public Opinion ... 356
Patriotism = Nationalism 138
From Religions to Religion Harmony of Religions—*By Swami Jagadiswarananda* ... 572
Wisdom-Religion : The Solution of our Problems—*By Student* 575

Khabardar, The Parsee Poet—*By J. C. Tavadia* 795

Land of Psyche and of Nous, The —*By A. E. Waite.* 208, 430, 644, 848
Leave and Pension Rules in Old India—*By Sri Ram Sharma* 721
Letter from London, A 852

Modern Talismans—*By H. J.* ... 286
Mystical Materialism—*By Francis Engleheart* 286

On Amateur Living in India—*By Frank C. Bancroft* 508

Origin of Indian Castes, The
—*By R. A. V. Morris* 70
—*By Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya*... 362
—*By D. S. Sarma* 278
—*By R. Naga Raja Sarma* ... 281

Project of International Education, A—*By C. R. King* 505
Puzzle of Indian Philosophy, The —*By Saroj Kumar Das* ... 434

Roman Script for India—*By V. S. Ganapati Sarma* 437
Roman Script for India (A Correction)—*By V. S. Ganapati Sarma* 724

Shakespeare Through Eastern Eyes—*By Percy Allen*... ... 579
By A. Hugh Fisher 578
By J. S. 360, 580
Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir S. Radhakrishnan—*By B. K. Mallick* 648
Sufis and Reincarnation, The—*By J. S.* 722
Sufism and Reincarnation—*By R. A. L. Armstrong* 796

Thinking—A Faculty—*By Isabel Stradley* 282
Thoughts on the Indian Science Congress—*By Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya* 212

Value of the Ayurvedic System of Medicine, The—*By M. R. Samey* 577

Woodcraft Folk, The—*By Leslie Allen Paul* 284

Youth Looks at Religion (A Correction)—*By Peter Winckworth.* 214

Index of "Ends & Sayings" Paragraphs

Adelphi, The 584
Art and Culture: The Tagores and Gandhi 725
Aryan Culture 581
ARYAN PATH, THE 856

Bali Island and the Dutch Missionary Society 143
Bernard Shaw on the Medical Profession 215
British Association for the Advancement of Science, The (Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins's Address)... 798

Caste: Damodar K. Mavalankar on 71
China, Religion and Politics in: (Panchan Lama's Address) ... 72
"Consumer's Research" (New York): Its Aim and Purpose ... 511
Contraceptives, Dangers of: Dr. Duval Arnauld 727
Cosmic Christ, The—Article in *The Search* 512

Determinism and Free-Will (Prof. Max Planck) 439
Dhammapala, Death of Sri Devamitta 440
Dress, Importance of National ... 726
Dogmatism, Dangers of Scientific (Henry Pratt Fairchild) ... 215
Dweller on the Threhshold, The: "Mortimer's Ghost," by Allan Monkhouse 366

Egoism, The tempting devil: Mr. J. Middleton Murry's description 656
Evil, The Problem of, and *The Secret Doctrine* 653

Galsworthy and Confucius—Unconscious Blasphemy ... 584
Gandhi and Religion 71
God, What Is? 583
Golden Book Magazine, The ... 728

Haldane, Prof. J. B. S., on Biology and Statesmanship 727
Health, Chief Determinants of ... 216
Hitlerism and Aryan Culture ... 581

Indian Philosophical Congress 1932: Addresses of Maharaja of Mysore and Sir S. Radhakrishnan ... 144
Indian Society of Oriental Art—Journal of 725

Jazz and its Prototype in Ancient India 582

Machine Age, The: Indian and American Conditions ... 287
Man's Future on Earth: F. C. S. Schiller's Views 439
Mahabharata, The—A. R. Orage and T. R. Venkatarama on ... 288
Missionary Tactics: Bishop Fiske's View 799
Modi, Death of Sir Jivanji J. ... 368
MacLeish, Archibald, on the Modern Age 288

Noise 582

PATH, THE ARYAN 856
Planck, Professor Max on Determinacy and Free-Will ... 287, 439

Ray, Sir P. C. on the Machine Age 287

Samuel, Sir Herbert on the Problem of Evil 653
Seal Men—Mysterious Legends ... 367
Self-Expression, Lady Astor on ... 583
Sex Appeal in Literature, Allan Monkhouse on 728
Suicide: Reflections on two prominent cases of self-destruction ... 581

Vivisection 215

Wadia, Prof. A. R.—His creed as an Idealist 655

Index of Names and Pseudonyms of Writers of Articles, Reviews and Correspondence

A. de L. 354
Addison, W. 682
Allen, Percy 579
Anand, Mulk Raj 274
Armstrong, R. A. L. 134, 196, 268, 350, 388, 796

B. 638, 701
B. A. (Oxon) 638
Bancroft, Frank C. 508
Bax, Clifford 693
Beresford, J. D. 22, 93, 176, 294, 408 474, 602, 689, 802
Bhavani Shankar, Pandit ... 82
Blavatsky, H. P. 588, 744
B. M. 76, 291, 453, 679
Brunton, Paul 499, 536
Burns, C. Delisle 560, 675
Bryant, Helen ... 252, 617, 707

C. D. 277
Chatterjee, Ramananda 589
Christy, Arthur 372, 597
Chubb, J. N. 833
Cole, G. D. H. ... 60, 117, 413

Collis, J. S. 67, 131, 191, 269, 349, 497, 784
Crespigny, Mrs. Champion de 232
C. T. 195, 276

Dantzig, Tobias 14
Das, Rasvihari ... 502, 628, 792
Das, Saroj Kumar ... 180, 434
Davids, Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys ... 241
Davis, Hadland 61, 185, 497, 567, 571, 636
Davis, Robert H. 30
D. C. T. 120
Druce, Gerald 565

Edgerton Franklin 46, 304
Editorials:
Architects of Ideals, The ... 441
Become That Which Thou Art... 73
Can War Be Abolished? ... 369
Golden Mean, The 729
Immortality 657
Limit of Responsibility, The ... 513
Lotus—Flower of Power, The... 289
Mote and the Beam, The ... 801
One and Only Cure, The ... 217
Sight of the Heart, The ... 1
What is God? 585
Which One Am I? 145
Edman, Irwin 613
E. H. 95
Engleheart, Francis 286
E. W.... ... ... 32, 791

Fausset, Hugh I'A. 40, 124, 265, 375, 770, 828
Ferguson, Charles W. 83
Fisher, A. Hugh 578
FitzHugh, Thomas 815
F. K. 268

Gajendragadkar, A. B. 462
G. E. N. 426
Ghurye, G. S. 87
Godwin, George 459

Hale, William Harlan 246
Harrison, G. B. 456
Hart, Ivor B. ... 111, 171, 256, 319
Henderson, Philip... 351
H. J. 286
Holmes, Edmond 516, 607
Holmyard, E. J. 552
Hough, Eleanor M. ... 299, 699
Houghton, Claude... 467
Humphreys, Christmas 429, 569, 710
Hyde, Lawrence 68, 750

Jagadiswarananda, Swami, ... 275, 572, 641, 708
J. B. 138, 356
Joad, C. E. M. ... 96, 147, 732
J. P. W. ... 421, 570, 706, 788, 841
J. S. 360, 580, 625, 722

Ketkar, G. V. ... 65, 158, 250, 385
King, C. R. 505, 820
Kingsland, William 403
Knight, G. Wilson 133
Kohn, Hans 380, 700
Kumarappa, J. M.... 62, 136, 630

La Motte, Ellen N. 108
Lee Jennie 173

Maclaren, I. Shaw... 398
Majumdar, J. K. 273
Malkani, G. R. ... 262, 491, 703
Mallik, B. K. 648
Mannin, Ethel 114
Masani, R. P. 493
Mason, J. W. T. 236
Maude, Aylmer 79
Maunsell, Arthur E. Lloyd ... 764
McEachran, F. 568

M. F. 500
Modak, M. S. 540, 758
Modi, Sir Jivanji J. 340
Morris, R. A. V. 70, 128
Mukhopadhyaya, Pramathanath 212, 362
Murray, D. L. 55, 222
Murry, John Middleton 66, 330, 479

Narayan Swami, R. K. 810
Nag, Kalidas 3, 127, 487, 640, 668
Newsome, A. 685
N. K. 130, 137, 570

O. 632
Orage, A. R. 527, 711

Paul, Leslie Allen 284
Peacock, W. A. 704
Ph. D. 203, 226, 786, 847
Pickthall, Marmaduke ... 695, 844
Plowman, Max ... 259, 444, 633
Powys, John Cowper 659
Purdom, C. B. ... 59, 495, 621

Rama Swamy, S 846
R. A. V. M. 200, 205, 275, 353, 498, 564, 566, 634
Read, John 199
Redgrove, H. Stanley 153
Root, E. Merrill 471
Russell, C. E. 806

Samey, M. R. 577
Sarma, B. N. Krishnamurti ... 706
Sarma, D. S. ... 63, 188, 278, 523
Sarma, R. Naga Raja 123, 197, 281, 334, 490, 635, 698, 709
Sarma, V. S. Ganapati ... 437, 724
Sastri, B. N. 793
Saunders, William 322
S. B. 130
Seagle, William 745
Sélincourt, Hugh de 19, 560, 791, 825
Sencourt, Robert 166
Shahani, Ranjee G. ... 270, 766
Sharma, Diwan Chand ... 202, 501
Sharma, Sri Ram 721
Shelvankar, K. S. 68, 126, 196, 201, 267, 273, 352, 563
Sircar, Mahendranath 27, 135 198, 417, 642, 755
Smith, Margaret 33, 313
Smith, R. G. Collin 545
Smith, T. V. 162
Sokolsky, George E. 664
Srinivasiengar K. R. 325
Steer, W. H. 496
Stradley, Isabel 282
Student 575
Subedar, Manu 308
Sullivan, J. W. N. 121

Tavadia, J. C. 141, 795
T. C. 277
Thompson, C. J. S. 393
T. L C. 207
Tomlinson, H. M. 449
Turner, Dorothy... 531

Venkata Rao, M. A. 102, 204, 428, 715, 789
Venkatarama Sastri, T. R. ... 206
Venkateswara, S. V. 739
Vinod, D. G. 819
Viswanatha, S. V. ... 427, 790

Wadia, A. R. 142
Waite, A. E. 208, 430, 644, 779, 848
Watts, Alan 272, 425
West, Geoffrey ... 50, 555, 641, 837
W. E.W. ... 612, 702, 809, 845
Whiteman, G. W. 132, 271, 355
Whiteman, W. E. 424
Wickersham, George 227
Widgery, Alban G. 549
Winckworth, Peter 214
Wolfe, Humbert ... 9, 484

ॐ

हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम् ।
तत्त्वं पूषन्नपावृणु सत्यधर्माय दृष्टये ॥
—ईश, १५ (*Ishopanishad, 15*)

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV JANUARY 1933 No. 1

THE SIGHT OF THE HEART

To live and reap experience, the mind needs breadth and depth and points to draw it towards the Diamond Soul [*Vajrasattva*, a title of the supreme Buddha, the "Lord of all Mysteries"]. Seek not those points in Maya's realm ; but soar beyond illusions, search the eternal and the changeless SAT, mistrusting fancy's false suggestions.

For mind is like a mirror; it gathers dust while it reflects. It needs the gentle breezes of Soul-Wisdom to brush away the dust of our illusions. Seek, O Beginner, to blend thy Mind and Soul.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

The worth and power of the human mind are universally recognized. Events of to-day are compelling thinkers and educators to redefine the nature and function of mind. Beneath the economic revolution which is now taking place there is occurring a mental and a moral revolution. Only a few years ago, when the teaching of the esoteric philosophy was quoted that "mind is the great slayer of the real" the mystic-occultist was laughed at. Education and culture then meant, and to a great extent still mean, that of the mind alone. Idealists were unable to make any headway in giving shape to their own aspirations.

"The Mind is the great slayer of the real, let the disciple slay the slayer." This instruction can be understood in a variety of ways. What about its application to educational reform ? Books and periodicals, sermons and lectures aim to inform and entertain the human mind. Purifying it, freeing it from both delusion and illusion, elevating it through a process of simplification, unfolding it through meditation—these have not been seriously studied. There has been much talk about heart and love and brotherliness,

but how many recognize that mental training has overpowered, almost to a crushing point, heart-expression ?

The heart is universally identified with emotion and sentiment and its superior function is not understood. Which system of education recognizes the possibility of the heart as an active organ of perception ? Modern psychology confirms the dictum that love is blind, whereas Asiatic psychology asserts that love brings clear-sight. Heart is the vehicle of intuition as mind is that of reason. The psychological action of the heart is regarded as a metaphor and no more. Mystics who have experienced the quickening of their own consciousness by intuition have but rarely known how it happened; they describe the result of their experience rather than how it ensued. What about the praiseworthy work of the Boy Scouts and Path Finders and such movements ? Do not such efforts evolve the intuitive faculty ? No. In absence of scientific knowledge they have been able only to generate good fellow-feeling, as in old days the Sunday-school generated belief in one dogma or another. The *rationale* of love and sacrifice is absent. How Intuition can be developed, how that love which sees can be unfolded, is not taught, and people believe in charity as they once believed in the bearded man whose name was God. And believers in charity and good will fall from grace as before believers in an anthropomorphic god fell; and charity is practised compartmentally and compromisingly as religion was practised. People serve Brotherhood to-day as they worshipped God yesterday—in blind belief. The efficacy of heart-action suffers through lack of knowledge of the psychological heart, and all we know about is its physiological functions.

In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, in the *Yoga-Sutras* of Patanjali, in the Mahayana *Voice of the Silence* and in other old treatises, definite instruction is offered, for the development of Intuition, the Love that sees, the course of which doth ever run smooth. To understand such instruction even theoretically a key is required. The leaders and educators of to-day must become learners; for such, among others, does this journal exist; by provoking thought it tries to bring about enquiry so that seekers may go to the Source which is the Wisdom-Religion, practised by the greatest minds in every age and clime.

Unveil, O Thou who givest sustenance to the world, that face of the true Sun, which is now hidden by a vase of golden light ! so that we may see the truth and know our whole duty.

—ISHOPANISHAD, 15th

GREATER INDIA

[**Kalidas Nag** is the soul of the Greater India Society and editor of its monthly—*India and the World*. In a variety of ways he has served the cause of ancient culture and his knowledge and ability to present it has been recognized by Universities in three continents. He is the director of India Bureau, Calcutta, through which also he labours for the cause of International Cultural Federation.

His article forcefully brings to mind the views of H. P. Blavatsky about Greater India. In 1877 in her *Isis Unveiled* she wrote that "India was the *Alma-Mater*, not only of the civilization, arts, and sciences, but also of all the great religions of antiquity". (II. 30) "Egypt herself . . . had, received her laws, her social institutions, her arts and her sciences, from pre-Vedic India; and that therefore, it is in that old initiatrix of the priests—adepts of all the other countries—we must seek for the key to the great mysteries of humanity. And when we say, indiscriminately, 'India,' we do not mean the India of our modern days, but that of the archaic period.... There was an Upper, a Lower, and a Western India". (I. p. 589.).—EDS.]

India is just a country like any other country in this vast continent of Eur-Asia. Although acknowledged by philologists and ethnologists as the repository of the oldest specimens of Indo-European culture and the homeland of some of the earliest families of Mankind, India, as compared with ancient Greece and Rome, has received as yet scant and patronising attention from the universities and other high-brow institutions of the Occident, the dispensers of credentials of our age. India cannot boast of sending out regularly to important countries, her consuls of commerce and her ambassadors, political or cultural, who would cultivate systematically the foreign relations of India to her best advantage. She has not yet succeeded even in organising a news service worth her name and interest, to feed the various non-official, friendly institutions of the world. And although by some strange post-war miracle, India was taken into the august League of Nations even as an original signatory and an independent member, she is not treated as an independent nation and is forced to keep a discreet silence or play the second fiddle in that giant international orchestra.

In spite of these serious drawbacks, however, we find India slowly but surely gaining the attention and sympathy of innumerable men amd women all the world over. So much so, that expert publicists and professional ambassadors no less than chance tourists, roused by vicarious charity, have volunteered generously to warn the public (specially the American public) against the uncritical and premature enthusiasm for "Mother India". Nevertheless, the world opinion seems gradually and definitely in favour of learning more and more of India. This spontaneous interest of the outside world for India, coupled with the no less strange

and irresistible urge of India to embrace "the whole world as its kith and kin" (*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*) has brought into existence GREATER INDIA: or world-fellowship of India through the ages.

Far from developing, like so many other nations, within the narrow bounds of particularism in politics or economics, India appears already in the earliest pages of recorded history (not written books but archæological documents) as one of the few pioneers of ancient internationalism. The epoch-making discovery of the Indus Valley civilization by the great Indian Archæologist the late Mr. R. D. Bannerji has dealt the death-blow to the scholastic fabrication of the "Splendid Isolation" theory, and proved beyond doubt that India was in intimate contact with the whole ancient world through the Sumerians and other peoples of Mesopotamia, as early as the 4th millennium B. C. The three monumental volumes, recently published by Sir John Marshall, *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization* have demonstrated beyond doubt that the name "India" and the culture "Indian," are historically valid and are carrying the weight of at least six thousand years of continuous tradition and evolution. In town-planning, in elaborate use of writing on inscribed seals and in arts and crafts, the Indians of those dim antiquities appear already wonderfully advanced and "modern". Mr. E. Mackay, a colleague of Sir John Marshall, while acting as the Director of the Joint Oxford and Field Museum, Chicago Expedition at *Kish* discovered there, a seal whose Indian cognates discovered later on, in Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro, proved beyond doubt that that date of the Indus civilization must be pre-Gargonic (*i. e.* prior to *circa* 2,750 B.C.) So Mr. C. Woolley found two other seals of Indian origin at *Ur*, one of which carries, besides the name of the owner—probably an Indian merchant—in Indus valley script, its *cuneiform* counterpart which might be dated *circa* 3,000 B. C. Moreover minor objects, other than seals, learning traces of Babylonian or Indian influence, are being identified in the finds from the whole ancient world, stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Nile valley (Egypt). These material links apart, we find wonderful connections through the exchange of symbols and decorative *motifs*, cults and iconographic specimens, the worship of the Mother Goddess, and of the symbols of fecundity, of animal icons and possibly of *Siva* 'the lord of animals,' and last, though not the least, the prevalence of some form of primitive *yoga* practices.

The above furnishes a strangely cosmopolitan background for the drama of the *Aryan penetration* of India (*circa* 2000 B.C.). The Aryan Path was not certainly one along a *tabula rasa* but was marked at every step by the healthy gesture of 'give and take,' of creative compromise and

assimilation. This lends a special interest now to every fragment of the recently discovered "Pre-Aryan and Pre-Dravidian" (courtesies to my esteemed Professor, M. Sylvain Lévi) civilization, as also to the earliest documents of ancient India—the *Vedic* literature of the *Aryans*. Along with their cousins, the *Iranians* the Aryans of India represented the earliest and most audacious branch of the Indo-European family. Amidst the bewildering and often contradictory theorisings of the archæologist of the *Rigvedic* and *Avesta* texts, we find the welcome fact recorded in the *Boghaz Keui* inscription, that Indo-Iranian deities like *Mitra*, *Varuna*, *Indra*, *Nasatya* etc. were worshipped in far off Cappadoneia as late as the 14th century B.C., while innumerable hymns in their honour (*Rik* or *Gatha*) have already been composed and carefully compiled in India and Iran. The history of Indo-Iranian collaboration has yet to be written but it is striking that towards the end of the second millennium B.C. there arose, almost simultaneously in India and Iran two great reformers: *Yajnyavalkya* and *Zarathustra*, both starting a revolt against religious materialism, and arid ritualism, mostly legacies of a primitive past and faith in magic. Both asserted the noble principle of moral responsibility inherent in the doctrines of *Atman* (Soul-Self) in the Upanishads and *Rita* (Truth) of the cult of Ahura-Mazda. The work of these precursors was pushed farther by two other great Reformers Mahavira-Jina, founder of Jainism and Gautama Buddha, that of Buddhism (6th century, B.C.).

Towards the end of the sixth century B.C. our Iranian cousins under their great ruler Darius Acheminide, occupied that portion of the Indus valley which was the seat of the Mohenjo-Daro civilization. Sind was considered as one of the richest Satrapies of Darius who having masked the whole of Ionia, imparted the word *Yavana* indirectly to Sanskrit vocabulary and thus acted as the connecting link between the Hellenic and the *Hindu* world, long before Alexander swooped down the Hindukush to harass temporarily the Land of the five rivers—the Punjab. Some may doubt the influence of Iranian fire-cult on the early Greek speculations about Fire as the principle element in Creation, or may dispute the influence of the Hindu doctrine of Transmigration on Pythagoras; but none can disbelieve the transportation of Indian troops to far off Hellas fighting in the Persian ranks, against the Greek in the battle of Platara. From the age of Herodotus (5th century B.C.) to that of Ptolemy (2nd century A.D.), for over seven centuries India had been in vigorous contact with the Hellenic world. In Alexander, the decaying Hellas presented the last picture of Primitive imperialism and a century later, India introduced in Asoka the Great the first ruler of men who made *Kalyana*, Universal Well-

being, the basis of his Spiritual empire. By placing the best resources of his state, nay his own beloved son and daughter, at the service of the first great organization of Human Brotherhood, Asoka probably lost Maurya Empire but he gained the whole world on behalf of India and her deathless principles of *Ahimsa* (Non-Violence) and *Maitri* (fraternity) promulgated about three centuries ago by Mahavira and the Buddha. Realising the futility of war and physical conquest and the vanity of national megalomania, Asoka launched for himself and India, a new scheme of human relations based on *Good Will* and *Peace.* Hence his spiritual mission to Ceylon and Burma, to far off Syria, Egypt and Macedon. Hence also his initiation of treatment centres of dumb animals (*paśu-çikitsā*) the first of their kind in history. Within a century, the enemy, Greeks of *Gandhara* were participating eagerly in the worship of the *Avalokiteswara* of supreme compassion, developing the Græco-Buddhist Art. The Heliodorus inscription of Besnagar (150 B.C.) proves that some Greeks were taking also to the *Bhakti* cult of *Vaishnavism* which came to penetrate the world of primitive Christianity as Prof. Garbe and others have shown.

Thus bringing the noble doctrine of non-violence and fraternity, promulgated by Mahavira and the Buddha, in the plane of practical politics and by emphasising on the two great principles of tolerance and well-being, Asoka inaugurated a new chapter in the history of the world and sounded the key-note of Indian history, as the real pioneer of GREATER INDIA, and race after race, nation after nation, coming in contact with India benefited by participating in that cultural federation. China, Central Asia, Korea, Japan, Tibet, the trans-Gangetic peninsula gradually were welcomed in that spiritual confederacy which far outshone the glamour of the ephemeral confederacy of Delos or of Magna Græcia. Not mere dry doctrines and dead rituals but living sparks of creative spirituality: architecture, sculpture and painting, statecraft and law, myths and legends, dances and dramas, sciences and philosophies forming the great epics of this glorious millennium and a half, came to make the whole of the Orient as it were, a stage for a colossal Cosmodrama with India in the central rôle. Iranians and Greeks, Parthians and Scythians, Chinese and Hunas, Arabs and Afghans, Hindus and Buddhists, Christians and Moslems—What a gigantic procession from the initiation of Emperor Asoka to the reign of the last Mongol Buddhist Emperor Kubelai Khan (13th century A.D.). So many brilliant foreign observers also: Megasthenes and Chang Kien, Fa-hien and Hiuen-Tsang, Alberuni and Marco Polo leaving us invaluable pages of their "Travel Diaries," testifying to the phenomenal development of internationalism through commerce, colo-

nization and cultural fellowship.

Years of patient research and intensive collaboration between scholars of India and of abroad, could bring about a satisfactory reconstruction of this remarkable history, and here we Indians must gratefully acknowledge the selfless services rendered by some of the greatest lovers of Truth and Beauty from the Occident. Towards the middle of the 18th century while England and France were still fighting for the possession of the material body of India, her spiritual legacies treasured up in her scriptures, were the object of the quest of an intrepid Frenchman Auquitil du Perron, who attempted to bring to his country sacred literature of the *Hindus* and of the *Parsis*. There was a great controversy over the *Vedas*, roused by the exposition of the Jesuit forgery of the so-called "*Yazour-Veda*," by Voltaire; and du Perron had the satisfaction of bringing to Europe, if not original *Vedas*, at least the great manuals of the post-Vedic philosophy—the *Upanishads* as they were adopted by the Persian scholars of the court of Dara Shiko. He also brought for the first time the authentic texts of the *Zend-Avesta*. Then came the great English scholar Sir William Jones, prodigy of a linguist, equally at home with the ancient texts of the East and the West, of Persia and India. His translation of *Sakuntala* of Kalidasa which gained the enthusiastic applause of the Great Goethe, marks an epoch in the intellectual co-operation between India and Europe. It was followed by important translations of the *Bhagavad-Gita* (The Song Celestial), of the Code of *Manu*, and such other Classics while round about Jones, a galaxy of Orientalists like Wilkins, Colebrooke and others formed the first Indian Academy of research and publication —the Asiatic Society of Bengal founded towards the end of the governorship of Warren Hastings (1783). The credit of founding the first society of Oriental Research goes however to the Dutch who formed the Batavian Institute of Arts and Sciences as early as 1744. Neither the East India Company nor the British Parliament thought it necessary to provide for the education of the Indians on Western lines. Yet individual Britisher, missionaries, and laymen helped the cause of education and research leading to the discovery of the Ajanta frescoes and the Annals of Rajasthana (Todd) as early as the first quarter of the nineteenth century and to the deciphering of the Asokan inscriptions by James Princet just a century ago (1830-32).

But long before that the Spirit of India asserted again after years, through the personality of Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), the Father of Modern India and the Pioneer of a Grand Reformation *from within*. Seeing the light of day in the age of French Illumination, a contemporary of Colebrooke and Wilson, he has the rare gift of feeling intensely the suffering and the degradation of his people as a whole especially

of the women and of the common people—in that age of political and social disintegration. His whole life was dedicated to the cause of liberty and equality with reference to the different sections of the Indian people, whom he hoped to find unified some day before the sacred altar of Unity the corner-stone of the philosophy of the Upanishads and the Vedanta, which he rediscovered for the whole nation and published in so many editions during the early part of the nineteenth century. With that unshakable faith in the fundamental unity of mankind, Ram Mohan Roy combined a tolerance and an all-embracing sympathy which mark him as a continuator of the best traditions of the Greater India of yore and the fore-runner of the heroes of the Greater India of to-day. Even during the Mohammedan occupation through the awful clash between Hinduism and Islam, our great medieval saints Kabir and Nanak, Dadu and Chaitanya developed in theory and practice, the age-old principle of Reconciliation. Ram Mohan also struggled all his life for reconciling the universal elements of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. His spiritual descendants like Maharshi Debendranath Tagore and Keshab Chunder Sen, Dayananda and Ramkrishna, Vivekananda and Ranade, Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi—to mention only a few among the galaxy of great souls—worked and continue to work to-day for the building of GREATER INDIA for the future. And in this work they are, as is natural, supported throughout by the chosen spirits of the Occident: Burnouf and Maxmüller, Edwin Arnold and Madame Blavatsky, C. F. Andrews and Romain Roland, Sister Nivedita, Annie Besant, and Sister Mira Ben (Madeline Slade) among others to whom the whole 'Indian Nation' would ever be grateful. The history of this new and momentous *rapprochement* of the East and the West is too rich and important to be summarily treated here. So, in conclusion, I simply emphasise the fact that there is a remarkable continuity, so far as India is concerned, in the attitude of India towards her partners in the World Federation and that, in spite of temporary disturbances and deflections in the current of her material existence, India of Tagore and Gandhi, through the affirmation of the great spiritual principle (old yet new) of Non-Violence and World Fellowship has taken her own place in the future evolution of humanity.

KALIDAS NAG

THE MYSTICISM OF A. E.

[**Humbert Wolfe** like the hero of his article is poet as well as a practical man of affairs ; this essay also indicates that the mystic in him is not altogether voiceless ; but we cannot say, for we do not know, that like A. E. he derives his inspiration directly from Theosophy. Old time theosophists can never forget the fiery and uplifting writings of A. E. in the old theosophical journals.—EDS.]

There are two kinds of mysticism—one is the substitution of vague emotion for the rules of thought, the second is to follow thought to its limit and then to look beyond by some faculty, not akin to thought, rather using thought as a ladder, kicked away when the wings grow. Of the first kind of mystic and mysticism all metaphysicians are justly contemptuous. For in the very act of denying thought its despiser uses it. The second [illegible] the philosopher may wish to confute, though he can never dismiss him. No man, not even a Kant or a Spinoza can affirm beyond his own question that there is not a region inaccessible to the mind, as there are regions inaccessible to the ear and eye. He can at best say "non cogito, ergo non est," but in his secret heart he will still have to admit that "cogito" is in the first person singular. He dare not, unless he is arrogant as Lucifer, claim dominion for his single mind. He can at best say that direct apprehension of the inscrutable is denied to him and is not consistent with any logic that he can construe. He will not, if he is a good metaphysician, sneer at this type of mystic. He will remember that no less a thinker than Plato had so definite a mystical tinge that he engendered a whole school of mysticism. He is bound to take the doctrine into serious account, and, even as he disclaims it, he may well turn away with a faint sigh of envy for those who are—or believe themselves to be—illuminati.

A. E. belongs to the second order of mystics, those who proceed by reason to faith, and who, as they believe, by some quality possible to all contemplative men, can see the object of prayer by the act of praying. A.E., indeed, is the last of men to be liable to the accusation of an easy surrender to muzziness. His life on one side at least has been practical in the extreme. For years he was a conscientious and notably successful administrator. His work in the Co-operative Agricultural movement has left a permanent mark in Ireland. Nor was it only in this direction that he harnessed the tides of dream, and used them as a new and formidable source of power. In all the Celtic Renaissance he played the part of an innocent but no less creative Cosimo de Medici. In the foundation of the Abbey Theatre, as in the re-organisation of the Gaelic tongue he played a leading and orderly part. As the

editor of *The Irish Statesman* he helped not only to direct literature along its re-appointed path, but he strove mightily in the councils of Irish politicians. A.E. can therefore not be set on one side as a hopeless visionary, who took refuge from his failure in life in daydreams. On the contrary he has shown himself to be one of those rare and dangerous figures who can precipitate their dream in action. If he is not (and no mortal ever can be) the dreamer whose dream came true, he is most certainly a dreamer whose dream neither was nor became a lie.

In the preface to *The Candle of Vision*—the book in which he states his mystical faith—he writes: "When I meditate I feel in the images and thoughts which throng about me reflections of personality, but there are also windows in the soul through which can be seen images created not by human but by the divine imagination." In other words he claims a dual recording capacity for the spirit of man. If he were to use a metaphor from the wireless he would say that at different wave-lengths the same machine can tune in to different stations. There are other programmes than those dictated by Daventry in the waiting ether—if we are prepared to be patient and to listen both attentively and modestly. It may, of course, be objected that the *ex-hypothesi* inaccessible cannot be heard, and that to speak of listening on a wave-length to what is in its essence beyond both wave and length is simply an instance of that contradiction in terms which is the hall-mark of mysticism. Moreover, the objector will continue, stations accessible to one auditor alone are the stations of unreason and madness; to which A. E. may retort that there is no object of sense that can in fact be shared. The truth about the mind of man is rather its icebound and impenetrable loneliness than its superficial and fleeting communities.

Your primrose may faintly in form, colour, touch and scent resemble mine, but while yours may still be a modest yellow blossom on the river's brim mine may be a memory of something lost, an explanation or a reward. Therefore to have a solitary vision of ancient majestical House of the King does not impugn its reality but merely asserts the good fortune of the lonely witness.

It is true that A. E. begins by assuming a spiritual foundation of thought and of the world

> the Master of Angelic powers
> lightens the dusk within
> The Holy of Holies, be it thine to win
> rare vistas of white light,
> Half-parted lips through which the Infinite
> Murmurs its ancient story.

That is no doubt to beg the central question as between materialism and idealism. But in the long run every philosopher, whether consciously or unconsciously, begs that question. If we take no less eminent and absolute a thinker than Kant we find that he makes a leap, justified by no process of reason, from the a priori unity of apperception to that which is the

sanction of that mortal unity. Descartes, by asserting "I think therefore I am" unreasonably accepted the ego and thought. All metaphysicians, even the mathematical-realists, are in the presence of an unresolved surd, and it becomes a matter of temperament or taste whether the final conclusion is *credo or non credo quia incredibile.*

We may, therefore, grant A.E. his Universal Spirit without too much difficulty, but we are entitled to ask that, if so much is granted, he shall be logically consistent in the climate that he has chosen for his mind to inhabit. And that logic he resolutely pursues. To him revelation which is barred by the grave is false or lagging revelation. "The religion," he says, which does not cry out, 'I am to-day verifiable as that water wets or that fire burns. Test me that ye may become as gods!' "Mistrust it," or as he says it in verse:

> And the fire divine in all things burning
> seeks the mystic heart anew,
> From its wanderings far again returning
> Child, to you.

Seriously and simply A.E. asserts and believes that it is possible by meditation to behold, as William Blake also beheld, images not projected by the mind but imposed upon it from without. He speaks of mankind being "like frogs at the bottom of a marsh knowing nothing of that Many-Coloured land, which is superior to this we know, yet related to it as soul to body". He believes that he himself has visited the outlying countries of the Coloured Land and on occasion has even had a glimpse of the central and ineffable City. All that he has seen is of necessity beauty and splendour of mortal kind raised to a more than mortal height. He does not report the unthought in terms of the unthinkable, because to do that would be false in logic. The fact that images are impressed from without and beyond does not, and cannot, alter the receptive capacity of the mind. The instrument may record unexpected tidings but it can only record, however transcendent, in its own language. When he writes of central heaven "A golden air glowed in this place, and high between the pillars were thrones which faded, glow by glow, to the end of the vast hall. On them sat the Divine Kings. They were fire-crested" he is not suggesting that the elements of light have in themselves mortal shapes. He means only that for mortal revelation they must assume those shapes. The truth, as A.E. sees it, indeed is!

> For this, for this the lights innumerable
> As symbols shine that we the true light win:
> For every deep and every star they fill
> Are stars and deeps within.

We may admit, therefore, that if there is to be revelation at all it must have shape intelligible, even though the shapes be as strange or heraldic as those (as he claimed) vouchsafed to John of Patmos. But how are we to know, A.E. asks, that they are more than delusion, or at most a recapitulation of experience half-forgotten and re-clothed in fancy? Here A.E. uses what, as you may

prefer it, may be called either the *argumentum ad hominem* or the *argumentum ad angelum*. Those who deny the possibility of this over-sight he roundly denounces as persons who "see too feebly to make what they see a wonder to themselves". Basing himself in the slender (and by no means proved) facts of telepathy, he proceeds to argue that if mind can make impact on mind, how much more certainly can the over-mind impress itself on the infra-mind. But that is dangerous ground to take. If we assume that there is as much distance between God and the human mind as between that and a table, we are bound to ask what evidence we have that our mind can ever approach the dumb darkness of wood. It is much safer for A.E. to rely on his primal assumption, and to argue that, since none has measured or can measure the miracle of normal cognition, there is none who can with authority determine its boundaries. He might, and could, consider his own argument in his book *Song and Its Fountains*. He might justly say that to minds clarified by intense thought and stimulated by the blood of genius, nothing appears common and mean. To all things earthly, as Plato wrote, there corresponds an archetype laid up in heaven. This does not, and should not mean, that there are heavenly kettles and divine pots and pans. It means that we move through degrees of error to degrees of truth, and just as Einstein outstrips Copernicus, and Copernicus the Ptolemaic system, so the poet's and the metaphysician's mind outstrips that of the mind clogged by vacancy and custom.

> Far up the dim twilight fluttered
> Moth-wings of vapour and flame:
> The lights danced over the mountains
> Star after star they came.
>
> The lights grew thicker unheeded,
> For silent and still were we;
> Our hearts were drunk with a beauty
> Our eyes could never see.

Given this difference and ascendancy A. E. may say with truth and honour "Come with me and we will bathe in the Fountains of Youth. I can point you the way to El Dorado".

The apprehension of the released or concentrated mind is, or can be, logical and consistent, but it has also an ageless continuity. Here A. E. is on firm ground though he does not invoke the proofs of science. Certain it is that as matter is indestructible, so equally are indestructible the experiences endured by matter. Or if we choose to state this truism in the language of the seer we can say with A. E. "The beauty for which men perished is still shining: Helen is there in her Troy, and Deidre wears the beauty which blasted the Red Branch." Earth, in fact, preserves its memories of its children as it preserves the wisdom of its flowers and birds. The gull's stoop and flight were learned if not in Eden at least in inaccessible antiquity, and they will persist beyond our conjecture. By immemorial instruction the least *forget-me-not* expands its blue stars. So then in blood and bone will and must

continue the existence of those who, since the beginning of time, have been warmed with the one and built up on the other. It is of no specific pre-existence that it is spoken here, but of general pre-existence the known and provable fact of the unmortal in humanity, of the unchangeable in what changes always.

But A. E. does not stay with earth-memory, though this is the substance or, rather the prose, of thought. He goes further to imagination and dream and he writes, "I am convinced that all poetry is as Emerson said, first written in the heavens". But this need mean no more, and in fact means no more, than that as we speak clearer the dust of earth falls further from us. We have advanced one rung up Jacob's ladder, but beyond that are all the untrodden rungs of the Spirit.

Nevertheless A. E. is troubled by his own dictum. He is conscious not that—

> our sweetest songs are those
> that tell of saddest thought,

but rather our truest songs are those that leave the most unsaid. And, believing that direct intuition is in essence wordless, he inclines, like William Blake and others, to the perilous bypath of the symbol. He seeks to find in language or in the sound constituting language some ultimate assignation with unspoken truth. Here we cannot easily follow him, because symbols have to every man their private meaning. On the other hand in the mysterious beauty of words there is something inexplicable by ordinary means. Why is it, for example, that Shakespeare's

> Put up your bright swords or the dew shall rust them

has so sweet a power on the blood? How is it that some old phrase like "*ecce ancilla domini*" is a password to something wholly transcending its sound. Truly A. E. may urge that words are the dictionary of heaven, but we must all make our own vocabulary, and we are not necessarily aided by another's choice. What we learn from A. E. in the matter of words is but a part of his general teaching, and is that there is always the unexplored, the unknown, and that, if we faithfully attend, each of us can be admitted to a share of essential light

> Everywhere
> I saw the mystic vision glow
> And live in men and woods and streams,
> Until I could no longer know
> The dream of life from my own dreams.
> Sometimes it rose like fire in me
> Within the depths of my own mind,
> And speaking to infinity
> It took the voices of the wind.

But at the last the mystic vision is but the intensity with which the soul returns upon itself, and so returning is re-admitted to its general heritage. A.E., being specially endowed, has a greater share of that legacy, but being one of God's spendthrifts, he greatly shares it with the world. We shall only be worthy of his bounty if we do not accept his vision at secondhand, but ourselves seek our own along the path that he has prepared for us.

HUMBERT WOLFE

THE INFINITE

[**Dr. Tobias Dantzig** is the Professor of Mathematics at the University of Maryland and author of *Number, The Language of Science*. In this article he examines as a mathematician the concept of Infinity; its interest for the Theosophical student will even be greater if he compares the views of Dr. Dantzig with the teachings of H. P. Blavatsky. In her *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 94) she wrote:

"It is from this number 10, or creative nature, the Mother (the occult cipher, or 'nought,' ever procreating and multiplying in union with the Unit '1', one, or the Spirit of Life), that the whole universe proceeded."

And again, (Vol. I, 66) "As Balzac, the unconscious Occultist of French literature, says somewhere, the Number is to Mind the same as it is to matter: "an incomprehensible agent;" (perhaps so to the profane, never to the Initiated mind). Number is, as the great writer thought, an Entity, and, at the same time, a Breath emanating from what he called God and what we call the ALL; the breath which alone could organize the physical Kosmos, "where naught obtains its form but through the Deity, which is an effect of Number." It is instructive to quote Balzac's words upon this subject:—

'The smallest as the most immense creations, are they not to be distinguished from each other by their quantities, their qualities, their dimensions, their forces and attributes, all begotten by the NUMBER? The infinitude of the Numbers is a fact proven to our mind, but of which no proof can be physically given. The mathematician will tell us that the infinitude of the numbers exists but is not to be demonstrated. God is a Number endowed with motion, which is felt but not demonstrated. *As Unity, it begins the Numbers, with which it has nothing in common* . . . . . The existence of the Number depends on Unity, which, without a single Number, begets them all.'"]

There is a story, entitled "The Abyss," from the pen of the great Russian writer, Leonid Andreyev. The gruesome *dénouement* fits well the morbid genius of its author, but it is the beginning of this story that concerns us here, and this, as if by contrast, is quite idyllic. The two lovers—mere adolescents—are out on a walk in the woods. Their talk turns on the infinite, and he asks her, how she conceives it. She replies that she sees wagons, one wagon after another, and still another behind that one, and, another and yet another . . .

Many and sundry have been the definitions and the formulations which philosophers, mathematicians and near-mathematicians have given to this mysterious concept; yet, in the ultimate analysis, they add nothing to this naïve utterance, *another and yet another.* Any number, no matter how great, has a successor; the process of adding one to a number cannot be conceivably terminated—these and a dozen other statements may be quoted as attempts to introduce into mathematics the infinite, without using the term explicitly.

Be it an axiom, a disguised definition, the expression of man's impotence to exhaust Nature by number, or of his innate convic-

tion that what has been said or done once can ever be repeated,—the infinite permeates the whole elaborate edifice of mathematics. From this conception mathematics derives its power, its marvellous generality, its dominant position among other sciences; to this conception mathematics owes its greatest triumphs, and also, alas! its greatest perplexities. For the infinite has been the box of Pandora from which have sprung the many paradoxes, antinomies and logical difficulties that have vexed mathematicians since the days of the Greek Sophists.

"What is true for *one*, is true for *all*, provided that if true for *any* number, it is true for the *next*." In this form the conception of infinity is known as the principle of mathematical or *complete induction*. The qualification "complete" is indispensable. Indeed, there is another principle of induction which plays as fundamental a rôle in the experimental sciences as its namesake does in mathematics. This latter is known as incomplete induction, or induction by *inference*. In its essence, it consists in the assertion that the future will resemble the past. In more precise terms, if in the observation of any phenomenon a certain tendency towards permanence has been exhibited, then it may with reasonable safety be inferred that the same tendency will manifest itself in the future, the certainty of this inference being the greater, the more frequently the tendency has been observed in the past. I said that this principle is basic for the experimental sciences, but this is hardly putting it strongly enough, for inasmuch as inductive inference is our only rational clue to the future, it is the basis of all our planning and activity, nay, of all human experience.

The connection between the two principles of induction is not merely in name; in a certain sense, they complement each other. Mathematical induction, by sanctifying indefinite iteration, affirms the power of the human mind to conceive the endless repetition of any act that is at all possible; inductive inference, on the other hand, reassures us that this power is not an idle fancy on the part of man, or vain mania of grandeur, since Nature—of which, after all, man is but a part—is itself bent on such an indefinite repetition of similar events.

Both principles are intimately related to the number concept. Mathematical induction lends to number, and through number to all mathematics, that exceptionless generality which no other domain of human knowledge possesses. Induction by inference invests number with the dignity of supreme arbiter of judgment by maintaining that an event that has occurred a number of times cannot be classed as a sheer accident; that this recurrence points to a universal law, to a certainty; that this certainty could be established in full rigor experimentally were we not by our physical

and physiological limitations prevented from observing the phenomenon an infinite number of times. As a corollary to this argument we have the principle of *causality*.

I do not propose to undertake here a discussion of causality, nor to delve into the advanced principles of mathematical analysis with its intricate problems of aggregates, continua, and transfinite numbers. I take it that we all know what is meant by inference and how important is the rôle it plays in human judgment. The importance of mathematical induction is not, perhaps, so well realized; and so I would like to suggest that the next time you have occasion to add up your grocery bill, you should try to give yourself account as to the logical grounds of the operations which you so glibly perform. Indeed, strange as this may appear to you at first, the proof of the logical validity of even the most simple arithmetical operations already implies the infinite, inasmuch as the demonstration is based on complete induction.

Thus, we encounter the infinite on the very threshold of mathematics. As we progress further, we meet on every step more and more intensive applications of this concept, until we reach infinitesimal analysis, where the infinite process reigns undisputed. Here we begin to realize that there are infinities and infinities, that the natural sequence, for instance, which starts innocently enough with 1, 2, 3, while infinite, is not infinite in the same way as the totality of points on a line. One advances still further, and finally reaches the dizzy heights of the theory of transfinite numbers, where this distinction between various infinities has been taken as the point of departure for a new theory of numbers.

To be sure, as we compass the field of modern mathematics, the logical difficulties grow; and yet they increase in degree rather than in essence. Like counting itself, of which all the infinite processes used in mathematics are but extensions, they stand or fall according as we concede or refute the statement that what has been done or said once can ever be repeated. In the ultimate analysis, all of mathematics rests on the conception of infinity.

It is of the validity of this conception that I wish to speak here. Not, however, in terms of logic: it is not within my power to add or detract from the ancient dispute that began in the days of Plato—if not before—and will no doubt end when the last mathematical philosopher will have joined his predecessors. It is in the light of human values that I wish to discuss this concept: what place must it be assigned among the many other principles which have guided man on his long journey from primitive thought to the present-day integrated outlook on the universe ?

With this in view, I shall begin by recalling that man has not confined his speculations on the infinite, or on causation, for that mat-

ter, to the realm of science. Long before the days when science had an independent existence, in those remote ages when it was still but an insignificant appendix to religious cults, and when mathematics was confined to crude surveying and occult numerology,—the priest-philosophers of the Orient had meditated on the infinite. These meditations have left their indelible imprint on all our modern religions: the infinite as an attribute of the Deity is a feature common to all creeds, however they may differ otherwise. Closely related to such other ideas as omnipotence, omniscience, immortality, boundless vastness and eternity, the infinite permeates all monotheistic doctrines, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And not only monotheistic, for the Græco-Roman and other pagan mythologies exhibit the same ideas.

Is this resemblance between scientific and religious speculations on the infinite purely formal? Is it nothing more than the case of one and the same term used in two different and entirely unrelated senses? Or is it the portent of the common source from which religion and science have issued? I have dealt with these and analogous questions in a volume which is soon to appear under the title "Faith and Fate". This is no place to defend my thesis; so I shall merely offer the conclusions I have reached there for what they are worth.

That the infinite is an axiom, all will grant. Yet there are axioms and axioms: some are but canons of logic, others are vouchsafed by experience. The conception of infinity belongs to neither category. That it is not a consequence of formal logic is attested by the many logical paradoxes that it has engendered, while the essentially finite character of all human experience precludes the possibility of its deriving from this source.

There is still a third category of principles which have played a most fundamental part in the evolution of scientific thought. They bear a striking resemblance to religious credos and may, for this reason, be called *articles of faith*. To this category belongs our conviction in the absolute character of space and time, in the causal connection between events, in the rational pattern of the universe, and many other *irrefutable* notions and principles. Indeed, the more irrefutable a principle may appear to us, the better right we have to suspect it of belonging to this category of articles of faith.

Here, in my opinion, belongs the conception of infinity too. From the possibility of an act in a finite number of cases we infer its possibility in an indefinite and unlimited number of cases. That a physical or physiological execution of such an interminable series of operations is impossible, is readily recognized by us; but we cannot or will not subject to the same limitations the power of our mind. Indeed, when our mind contemplates the

future, it must needs flee its mortal shell, to find refuge within an infinite being of *limitless memory and eternal life*. To this Divine Being the infinite past had once been an infinite future; his inferences from the past to the future derive their validity from infinite experience; the infinite to him is not an article of faith, but a phase of reality, for he knows no fear of oblivion.

Why does man endow his mind with these divine attributes? What is the source of this irresistible will to permanence from which derive these articles of faith? What causes man to seek order and reason in this shifting chaos of his sensations, and, by projecting himself into the future, perpetuate his life, as it were? He who knows the answer to these questions holds the key to the problem of reality.

I make no such pretensions. But whatever its source, it is this will to permanence that inspires our faith that the future will be like the past; that even as the present derives from the past, so is the future foreshadowed by the present; that the universe is governed by immutable laws; that our recurring impressions can wrest from Nature the secret of these laws; that by willed acts we can foster these impressions and accelerate our knowledge of this universe; that no bound can be set to the reproduction of these willed acts, for what has been done or said once can ever be repeated.

To this will to permanence I trace the two fundamental principles on which, in turn, rest all our sciences, pure and applied. It is this will that, by sanctifying indefinite iteration, has created the exotic scheme of utmost generality and abstraction which we call mathematics; from it too derives its validity induction by inference, this corner stone of empirical knowledge. If we reflect, that the same will to permanence has ever been the source of all religious inspiration, we can but exclaim:

"It is a strange world, this only world we know!"

TOBIAS DANTZIG

THOUGHTS ON KINDNESS

[**Hugh de Selincourt** is a well-known novelist and dramatist, a lover of children, and a man of peace. Of him an intimate of his household is reported to have said: "We shouldn't want any League of Nations, if other people were like the Boss and our Missis." We extend a welcome to him among our contributors.—EDS.]

"Now tell me, dear, what is it you do want?" said the elder sister in the play to her thoroughly discontented younger sister and the girl burst out: "Oh! what we all want! A little kindness!"

I have forgotten everything else in Henry James's brilliant comedy except those lines and those lines I shall never forget. They continually come back to my mind. Kindness seems such a little thing; and yet it is so rare. We seem terrified of "mistaken kindness," as though no kindness at all were not far more harmful.

Indeed, any contact with another human being where kindness is left out leads to absurdity: the closer and more important the contact the greater and more tragic does the absurdity become. Kindness alone can let down the little bridge of imagination between one man and another, without which no communication is possible. Without kindness we meet our fellows as earthenware pots on a stream meet, at best to crack and splinter, at worst to break and sink.

Men are prone to sit back and look at others like problems to be coldly solved: especially are the young apt to be treated in this way on what is known as their entry into life, like the girl in the play. "Life is so important, dear. What are you going to do in life?" is the tenor of the perpetual cry. It is bad to be pushed in any direction: it is most horribly worst of all to be pushed in the direction you want to take. Such earnest pressure acts like a push before a jump—disastrously: making you stand more obstinately still in resistance or if you take off for the jump stumble.

Kindness in reality supplies the means of communication in the spiritual world as money does in the material world. They are strangely equivalent. That is why a very rich man so often seems isolated and remote from all humanity. Instances flock to my mind. Fear and suspicion sap initiative: only negative action, the preventive measure, can ever be taken, by man or nation, chiefly anxious to hold on to possessions. Goodwill and understanding alone are the springs of creative action.

An example forces itself upon my attention. It affords a perfect illustration in little of the Economic Crisis which affects the nations of the world to-day: and this Economic Crisis will never be solved by august assemblies in counsel but by a change of heart in individual men and women, of whom the nations of

the world are composed. It contains the same problem of want in the midst of abundance and shows to what tragic idiocy reason may lead when dissociated from kindness so that it comes to pass inevitably (so completely can cold reason unaided reverse the wheel of honest sense) that unkindness amounting to cruelty is held up, decked in the garb of justice and right living, to represent the greatest kindness.

My example involves a very rich father and one of his sons with talent as an artist. Now, the basis of the father's creed is the very sound idea (echoed of course with violence in the heart of every young man, passionately anxious to be independent and on his own feet) that a man must be self-supporting, must earn his own living. He gave his son every chance—prep. school, public school and so on—in which he can prove his ability: not consulting him as to these various steps—what child knows what's good for him? In each one, the son shows himself a failure. A position is found for him in business, and his associates, knowing him to be a very rich man's son, urge him to take his duties with becoming lightness. The very genuineness of his desire to become an artist makes him bashful of taking himself seriously in what to him is the highest calling a human being can tackle,—himself, the failure in far less important matters. Things, however, at length, become crucial. He breaks away and studies painting. "Prove you are not a waster" runs the parental edict, "And I will help you." In other words: "Earn money, and I'll give you some more." It goes from absurdity to *tragic* absurdity. "You have no affection for me; you only want my money"—And the father lives alone in vast houses—his son elsewhere, as he has no dress suit and might borrow money from the servants if allowed to be alone in the country house. A complete impasse is reached. They glare at each other over a pile of gold: the son, an insoluble problem.

And with a little kindness? No problem. Son's need would be father's chance; who might even see his own responsibility towards his son: might even say these three hardest words in the language to articulate to another, when their meaning is felt, "I am sorry". Sorry, of course, not to have discovered his son's bent sooner, and not to have encouraged him in it: sorry to have continually urged him in the wrong direction. His personal dignity might suffer in owning himself wrong: nothing else would. Ah! that stuck up mountebank of personal dignity. It is the chief enemy of kindness—the strutting self, shutting us into an ever narrower box of distorted loneliness.

Few of us have got beyond the stage, perfectly described in 'Tom: the History of a very Little Boy'. Poor Tom was coming to tea with Rich Tom, whose mother pointed out to him that whereas he had several horses, poor Tom had none. The suggestion was

obvious and Tom found it very awkward, and when poor Tom came, very silent-making. But at length he said most seriously: "I'd like to give you one of my horses but I can't, you see, because it's mine !"

It is the lack of kindness (without which understanding is impossible) that seduces men to ape the evil of military organization and band themselves together in a mass to achieve a purpose which they consider good for the community. Nazis are born on the one side ; Communists on the other, each banded together for freedom and the rights of man—which is never possible for either until the other is overcome or destroyed. The enemies of life are greed and selfishness, and the stuffiness of habit generated by the stiffness of age. They are most easily observed in others : but they can never be destroyed in others. They are less easily observed, where alone they can be effectually overcome, *in ourselves.*

Kindness which is the simplest form of creative good can never be organised ; and can never be generalised. It begins with those nearest to us, and as it grows develops a power of understanding whose influence may spread, quietly as light, who knows how far ?

Moreover, every baby born, rightly viewed, is Nature's perfect revolutionary—challenging by its pressure of new life the old order, cleaning us from the accretions of habit that stiffen and dull the perceptions—the baby allowed to grow !

There now and always lies both the rejuvenation of the present and the hope of the future : there and only there. Nature's simple process, which we need all our human intelligence to fathom and incorporate in our lives.

HUGH DE SELINCOURT

Never will I seek nor receive private, individual salvation ; never will I enter into final peace alone ; but forever, and everywhere, will I live and strive for the redemption of every creature throughout the world.

—THE PLEDGE OF KWAN-YIN

EVOLUTION

[**J. D. Beresford** recommends that thinking people should impartially view the drama of human evolution presented in the ancient Wisdom-Religion, and compare it with the Darwinian theory. The following extracts from H. P. Blavatsky's monumental work will enable the reader better to appreciate the position taken by thinkers like Mr. Beresford in the following article.

"Divergence among men of Science, their mutual, and often their *self*-contradictions, that gave the writer of the present volumes the courage to bring to light other and older teachings—if only as hypotheses for *future* scientific appreciation. Though not in any way very learned in modern sciences, so evident, even to the humble recorder of this archaic clearing, are the said scientific fallacies and gaps, that she determined to touch upon all these, in order to place the two teachings on parallel lines. For Occultism, it is a question of self-defence, and nothing more."—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 649

"The present writer, claiming no great scientific education, but only a tolerable acquaintance with modern theories, and a better one with Occult Sciences, picks up weapons against the detractors of the esoteric teaching in the very arsenal of modern Science. The glaring contradictions, the mutually-destructive hypotheses of world-renowned Scientists, their mutual accusations, denunciations and disputes, show plainly that, whether accepted or not, the Occult theories have as much right to a hearing as any of the so-called learned and academical hypotheses."—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 487

"Rough and up-hill is the path of true Science, and its days are full of vexation of Spirit. But in the face of its 'thousand' contradictory hypotheses to explain physical phenomena. . . . . Science will be as far from the solution of its difficulties as it is now, unless it comes to some compromise with Occultism and even with Alchemy—which supposition will be regarded as an impertinence, but remains a fact, nevertheless."—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 496.—EDS.]

The most interesting phase in the development of non-religious thought during the past sixty years is that illustrated by a consideration of the scientific and general opinion with regard to the subject of evolution. Its origins must be sought more than half a century earlier, in the first years of the nineteenth century, when Lamarck, the French naturalist originated the idea that animal species were not static, but that in certain cases at least, one might have been derived from another by the inheritance of acquired characteristics. That theory, however, though of in-

terest to the naturalists, made little appeal to the attention of the general public, and it remained for Charles Darwin to bring the subject into the newspaper and the pulpit. His first essay on the *Origin of Species*, (1859) was sufficient to do that, but it was not until after the publication of *The Descent of Man* in 1871, that the Christian conception of "special creation" was seriously challenged and a spirit of doubt as to its probability began to filter down very, very slowly through the diverse strata of the public intelligence.

Darwin's influence at that period was derived from the fact that he came forward with what looked like a reasonable and convincing explanation of certain biological phenomena. He had postulated a mechanism, that of what is still known as "natural selection," and the Western mind of that period was in a condition peculiarly ready to believe in it. On broad lines, the theory was astonishingly plausible and if there still remained one or two highly important gaps to be filled, there was a feeling abroad that further research would inevitably close them. It is true that some of the best intelligences of the time were not truly converted. Thomas Huxley although he publicly upheld Darwin's main thesis maintained a reservation, on scientific grounds, as to its full applicability. And Samuel Butler, whose writing it must be confessed had little or no influence on his own generation, steadily maintained his opposition to the theory as a whole. But by the closing years of the nineteenth century scientific thought, which was then at the height of its influence on the public mind generally conceded the Darwinian position, and the biologists although divided into two schools on the contentious question of "acquired characteristics," had come to assume the original postulate as an axiom.

Now where this exceedingly brief sketch of the early years of the Darwinian controversy is of interest to readers of THE ARYAN PATH, is in its illumination of one of the phases through which the Western mind has been passing in the last half-century. Personally, I believe that materialism as a recognisable influence on human philosophy reached its climax with the end of the last century. And I would even advance in support of that statement the fact that it is always in such periods of greatest degradation that the new prophet and herald comes to preach the doctrine that, neglected or openly scorned by his, or her, contemporaries in the mass, survives to become the testament of later generations.

Certainly no one in what we know as the scientific world paid any heed to the full explanation of all the outstanding criticisms of the Darwinian theory, as expounded by Madame Blavatsky in *The Secret Doctrine*, published seventeen years after *The Descent of Man*. Human intelligence in the mass is turgidly conservative, and neither the churches on the one

hand nor the materialists on the other, were in a condition to be stirred either by the evocation of the ancient wisdom or what, in this connection of evolution, amounted to nothing more nor less than rational common-sense. But, as has been indicated, the years immediately preceding and following 1888, were peculiarly unsuitable for the reception of any new teaching. War had been openly declared in certain quarters between science and religion, and the defenders, wisely enough from a theological point of view, dared not at that stage relinquish a single article of their traditional dogma. Wherefore, except among the very small but increasing numbers of the Theosophists, no heed was paid to Madame Blavatsky's teaching on this particular subject of man's origin.

Sixty years later we are in a position to examine the whole subject, not only with a freer mind but with all the added advantages offered by the record of biological research during the interval. It must, however, be fairly admitted in the first place, that the more academic biologists and their lay disciples still subscribe to the inclusive theory that man was evolved from the amœba in the course of, say, some five hundred million years, and that in time every stage of his development will be demonstrable. Different schools may dispute as to the instrument. Very few are now satisfied that Darwin's "survival of the fittest", is sufficient alone to account even for the differentiation of species over however long a period. But by some minds the original thesis is accepted as a dogma.

Now, as I submitted in an article to THE ARYAN PATH some eighteen months ago, I find that in my attitude towards such subjects as this one of evolution my own mental influences and development of opinion are very fairly representative of those of the average intelligent Western mind. I was, for instance, a willing convert in the nineties to the inclusive theory of natural selection, read much biology and even comparative anatomy, and spent a great deal of time in the effort to think out for myself the various processes and stages of evolutionary development. And now my final refusal in recent years to subscribe to the crucial doctrine of the theory, namely that man and the anthropoid ape are descended from some common ancestor, as yet unrepresented by any fossil remains, is, I believe, fairly typical of the modern thinker. I came to the verge of this refusal largely as a consequence of my own development, and it was not until I had read *The Secret Doctrine*, that I found the authority I needed. Then, as so often happens, I became aware of a definite satisfaction. My inner knowledge was suddenly objectified, and I recognised the truth I had been seeking.

My merely intelligent process, however, which presented an indication only of the deeper

process that manifests itself finally in such an act of recognition, had come to a reasoned criticism from purely objective data. It was so significant to the unprejudiced that while new discoveries of fossil remains might serve to illustrate minor changes in the evolutionary process, they came no nearer to providing us with any evidence of the "missing link" whose existence had been posited to relate primitive man and the higher apes. Neanderthal man was known to Madame Blavatsky, but there have been many new finds—the Piltdown skull, for example,—since her death, yet none of these relics has bridged the glaring gap she clearly indicated between the brain capacity of the lowest man and the highest ape. *Her argument founded on the data available up to 1888, remains unshaken by all the evidence unearthed in the course of the forty-four years that have since elapsed.*

This fact alone gives the reasonable mind cause for doubt. Scientific theory must conform to the definitions it has explicitly imposed upon itself. And the first of these is that it must cover all the facts, the second, that, other things being equal, the simpler theory is preferable to the more complicated. Wherefore since Darwin's theory of the descent of man fulfils neither definition after sixty years of trial, the layman whom I represent may well abandon it on purely logical grounds.

Moreover anyone who is aware of the trend of modern thought cannot fail to realise that all the influences, whether scientific or esoteric are steadily moving away from any purely material explanation of man's place in the universe. As regards the influence of recent science, and particularly some of the deductions of mathematical physics, I have already written in THE ARYAN PATH, and need not repeat my arguments under that head. It is sufficient to suggest that while science by its own hypotheses can never illuminate the greatest of all mysteries, the secret of life, its findings are no longer so incompatible with the teachings of the ancient Wisdom-Religion as they were when *The Secret Doctrine* was written. In the eighties of the last century the terms "scientist" and "atheist" were almost synonyms in so far as the first implied the second.

The influence that I somewhat vaguely referred to as "esoteric" is not so easily described, but in my personal experience I have found an increasing number of people who feel that neither materialism nor any dogmatic creed satisfies their logical or religious sense. Many minds have been deeply stirred, firstly by the war and secondly by all its consequent evils, the increase of crime and brutality, the immediately following years of reckless self-indulgence, and now the widespread miseries due to economic depression. It is well, I do not doubt, that these punishments should have descended

upon us. They were the inevitable result of that wave of materialism both philosophical and social, which reached its crest at the turn of the century. And though we have not yet reached, I believe, the darkest hour, the effects are slowly beginning to show themselves in this leaning towards mysticism, this tentative searching after a broader, freer and more acceptable belief.

It will be seen that I have passed beyond the confines of my immediate subject to the consideration of larger issues, but my text of "Evolution" was intended to serve mainly as an illustration. It is, indeed, a reasonably representative one. In this relation that sixty year old belief in the evolution of man from the lower animal has been a stumbling block to many intelligent minds. It has, without question, been the most important factor in the mechanistic argument which before some more or less acceptable explanation of man's appearance on earth could be offered, was fatally handicapped by the impossibility of finding any answer to the simple, inevitable question: "How and where did the human race begin", or, since it must have had a beginning, "Who or what was responsible for it?"

Wherefore, I feel that the sooner the Darwinian misconception of man's origin is finally rejected on all hands, the sooner will what is still quite a large number of thinking men and women be released from a restricting and injurious habit of thought. The explanation that Theosophy has to substitute will not be readily understood at first by those who have made no study of the ancient Wisdom-Religion. (The chief essentials will be found in Stanza IX of the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*, entitled "The Final Evolution of Man").* But those who are sufficiently developed to recognise the truth by the appeal it makes to their own inner knowledge, will soon master the preliminary difficulties.

I would add, in conclusion, that I am by no means alone in my belief that the general average of Western intelligence is ready to accept the teaching of the old Wisdom. And it is the duty of all readers of THE ARYAN PATH to familiarise themselves with that teaching and to pass it on to those who may be ready, to receive it.

J. D. BERESFORD

* See also *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 181, et seq. for Madame Blavatsky's account of the "Triple Evolutionary Scheme".

LIGHT IN LIFE

[**Professor Mahendranath Sircar** of Calcutta Sanskrit College is the author of *System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, Comparative Studies in the Vedanta* and *Mysticism in Bhagavad Gita.* In this article he makes his contribution to the discussion started by Mr. J. W. T. Mason on "India and Objective Reality," in our September number, and carried forward by Mr. T. Chitnavis, Professor A. R. Wadia, and Mr. Charles Dernier's in September, October and November issues.—EDS.]

A timely and vital discussion finds its place in THE ARYAN PATH regarding India and Objective Reality. The central theme appears to have been clouded in the dust of controversy. The problem raised by Mr. J. W. T. Mason affects the whole world and not India alone.

The civilisation in the West is dominated by the melioristic and pragmatic outlook of life. In its complexity life has need of pragmatic and vitalistic satisfaction. Led by the instinct of what Schopenhauer calls "will-to-live" the West has exhibited wonderful capacity of invention, organisation, speed, efficiency and adventure. Indeed they are assets and valuable assets in life. The western life is dominated by the scientific spirit and vitalistic outlook. Vitalism has its charm. Its appeal lies in the thrill psychosis. Its curse also lies there. It sets a high premium upon the realistic attitude of life and its promises. It may move with the high objective of an efficient society and state. Whatever value it can assimilate in it, it cannot outgrow the *ego*-centric move of life, and even where the great enthusiasm is exhibited for collective organisation and beneficence, it has at bottom an inspiration from the vital-mind which feels in terms of vital-sympathy.

Behind every civilisation, there is vision, sacrifice, effort which may be called spiritual if the superstructure that is raised does really help the finer outpourings of life in love, beauty and dignity. Life's greatest promise lies in creativeness, and the finest creations are a source of disinterested joy for ever. The value of existence, individual or national, lies in the capacity of inspiring disinterested activity and offering disinterested delight. Such creations become possible when life has its living touch with what Mr. Mason calls Ultimate Reality.

Indian civilisation is withdrawn into her inner self and suffers from an over-emphasis on the Ultimate Reality ignoring the free flow of life in creative activity. India suffers from an ebb-tide in vitalism. A deeper intuition, however, tells us that India has pinned her faith in the synthetic view of life. It has not denied life. It has taught us to read true value and significance in it. To the short-sighted the Ultimate Reality might not have any place in the

day-to-day adaptations of life. But the best and the most rational living can only come with wisdom and love, not with insistences and pulls. This wisdom not confined to sectional experience must cover the whole range of life. Now, vitalism cannot satisfy itself, and if it is not attuned to the higher string of life it must kill itself. It knows no rest. The rest must be found elsewhere. The teachers of vitalism in the West have not found satisfaction with it and have been forced to take up the higher tuning of life in spirituality. But this has been the teaching of India for centuries; this has been the foundation of the old Indian civilisation. The soul of India has felt the identity of Spirit that shines in the orb of the Sun with that which resides in the heart of man. In this joyous vision and exaltation, it has found full satisfaction.

The transvaluation of values in the light of Ultimate Reality enabled India to organise her institutions on a spiritual basis and to give her social system a firm footing. If the spirit of divisions has its voice heard at times, the spirit of integrity has worked on the whole most satisfactorily. The realistic claims and pragmatic values have not been ignored; they have been transformed and refined by the touch of higher spirituality. Life has been made the vehicle of spiritual expression and the humanistic services have got the touch of grace.

Science gives us power, it gives us affluence. They are values. They cannot be ignored. But they are to be subjected to the graces of the soul to add beauty and dignity to them. Life without light is blind. Light without life is ineffective. Evolution proceeds towards the assimilation of light in life; the more complete the assimilation, the better the life. Power loses its sting in the light of wisdom and becomes an instrument of spiritual expression. The reference of life to the Ultimate Reality has enabled India to free itself from the sectional views of life and to take its inspiration from the source divine. It has allowed her an elasticity and freedom from the *ego*-centripetal tendency. It has enabled her to enjoy the charm, the dignity and the joys of life. Life must leave its utilitarian basis to enjoy its own fullness and perfect concord and realise the divine in man and in society. This is the objective goal of civilisation.

Science has broken the barriers of space and time and the dawn of a cosmic humanity is visible on the horizon. If anything can be of true help in this formative period, it will not be life dominated by the sense of objectivity and hedged round by territorial limitation. Life requires this moment the intuition that can see the whole, and the love that can live for the whole. Life in the West running in excessive vitalism and indulging in partialities and surface joys can take its lesson even to-day from India. India is destined to play the higher rôle of exhibiting to the world how every form of

life can be spiritualised by the peace of the soul and the joyousness of the spirit.

The work of the moment is to free life from shibboleths and assimilate the rays of that higher light that never deceives and these forces of protecting power that cannot be conquered.

India has suffered from a defeatist consciousness, but to-day the "charm" of Western life and civilisation stands exposed.

Whatever ills India may suffer from she should not allow herself to cut adrift from the vivid consciousness of Ultimate Reality.

Drawing her inspiration from her ancient programme India must mould her institutions and suffuse them with the forces of spirituality using her power and wealth as instruments for her own self-expression.

India must play her part; she must exhibit that the splendours of life need not blind us to the graces of the soul. Let not the dazzling light of modernism overpower her and leave her weak. Her pressing necessity is the watchful consciousness, which can save her from the surface enchantment, and enable her to walk with silent faith and serene dignity. If in her hour of defeat she did not forsake the touch and the inspiration of life, let her not in the moment of victory forsake the erring humanity which needs the illumination that spreads out from her. India does not claim that spiritual life is her absolute possession, but that it is the dominant note of her civilisation, and the shaping force of her life. The soul of India must emerge with the wealth of powers at her feet but with the radiance of Spirit in her Face.

The world with all its forward movement and cultural progress is gasping for Peace and that Peace it can find by crying halt to the "abnormal craving for thrills" so often falsely passed for life.

In India spirituality is not a vision of the cloister, its voice is heard in the silence of the soul surrounded by the noise of life. If India is true to her spirit she cannot accept defeat in any sphere of activity and should organise her force to meet the diverse needs of existence. When spirituality is real it finds its expression through the dynamism of life with calmness ever present and the requirement of the moment is not the forsaking of spirituality but embracing its true inspiration, which will express itself through all kinds of creative formations and all phases of life and at the same time will find delight in serene detachment and dignified transcendency.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

THE ANATOMY OF PORTRAITURE

[**Robert H. Davis,** better known as "Bob Davis", *of the New York Sun,* already the writer of seven travel books, and with Arthur Bartlett Maurice, author of *The Caliph of Bagdad, being the Arabian Night's Flashes of the Life, Letters and Works of O. Henry,* recently brought out, under the title *Man Makes His Own Mask,* a limited edition of 120 selected photographic portraits of celebrities with whom Mr. Davis has come into personal contact during his 400,000 miles of world-touring. Although an amateur, disdaining all the tricks of the camera, making pictures that he declines to retouch in the slightest particular, and operating only in the natural daylight, Mr. Davis has produced a series of portraits so life-like and startling as to attract the attention of camera students througout the world. For this reason, the editors of THE ARYAN PATH requested him to set forth the principles of his art, and the impelling purpose behind his persistence.—EDS.]

Whatever may be said of the human countenance, it is indubitably a record, revealing in a greater or lesser degree certain characteristics that cannot be concealed. A man may hide in his eyes the cruelty he cannot erase from his mouth; or mask in profile what would be evident in a full-face portrait. By a single gesture of defiance it is quite possible to assume a bearing that in the last analysis would be little more than a manifestation of impudence. The mobile face, with its swiftly altering expressions, its physical interpretations of mood under the animating influence of conversation or the effect of thought, is a source of confusion to photographic perfection. Man's genius for dissembling is a constant barrier to penetration behind the drop curtain. A true portrait is possible only when the sitter is in repose, internal and external, a state of complete relaxation; composure, if you will.

In man's daily life, fraught with complexity, not the least of which is the uncertainty of to-morrow, it is inevitable that time must needs write the record upon his eyes, his lips, his mouth, and his cheeks. Even the nose is thrust into the auto-biography. The ear is the only feature that remains unchanged in its general shape, its convolutions and its lobes and its placement from the cradle to the grave. Bertillion established that fact in his elaborate analysis of human features. Through muscular control all the other features of the face may be momentarily altered at will, but the ear remains static; forever inert. Some people possess the simian gift of being able to move their ears slightly, a performance that greatly entertains others less acrobatic; but they cannot change the shape of them.

Among seven hundred odd sitters—most of them types—selected from all nations and over a wide range of territory and in all zones, I have found that ninety per cent attach unnecessary importance to the smiling face. The tendency to look cheerful is universal and the subtle influence

of a modified form of mirth, as expressed in the smile, is in consequence unavoidable. Except in remote instances, the slightest physical attempt to express merriment is fatal to portraiture. As a matter of fact, the eye-ball is utterly without expression, a fish-like, glazed object, powerless to convey the slightest indication of joy, sadness, ecstasy, pain or wonder. Only the muscles around the eye give the eye life. Every emotion conveyed through the eye is the product of this muscular activity. And yet the belief is general that the eye is the window of the soul. If they were not endowed with eyelids and lashes our eyes would have the appearance of moss agates in a setting of putty. In fine, a smile erroneously regarded as a product of the eye, is the most fictitious of all human expressions, the more so because it can be summoned at will, as is frequently the case when one desires to create the illusion that all is bright and fair, even though the heart bleeds and the soul is disturbed.

Assuming that there is anatomy to portraiture, which involves the structure of the face as a whole, it seems to be essential that the true art consists of reproducing the unit under the most advantageous circumstances with due regard for the component relations. And it is equally desirable to interpret, to the fullest possible extent, the finer traits and nobler qualities of the sitter, without sacrificing the physical definitions. To me the act of retouching out the blemishes in a face, or altering in the slightest particular the contours and lines that are evident, writ by man's Maker, and set down as incontrovertible records, is distasteful to the last degree. And it is equally repugnant to achieve, by the use of artificial lights and reflections, beneficial effects calculated to present the countenance in a favourable but unnatural glamour. It is preferable that posterity look upon my contemporaries as they appear under normal circumstances in whatever natural daylight is contributed by Nature. What the human eye sees so does the camera's lens see. More than that it penetrates deep into man's consciousness, revealing characteristics that the most discerning photographer knows not of when making the portrait.

Among my negatives are men of noble mien who disclose the taint of evil; giants who are pigmies at heart; saints who cannot hide the dual nature in their countenance; heavy-lidded, dull mortals who in a different environment would have been apostles; cheerful persons who are ingrates in deed; serene men who could lead an army in a Christian cause, and captains of industry, who should be carrying a lunch bucket; and there are faces of those who will live in the centuries to come and upon whom the next generation will look with favour and admiration, and see and know them as they were in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. For each sitter I have written a three

hundred word biography, striving with my pen as with my camera to present the better side. Perchance historians will have occasion to quote my notes, or to amend or even distort, a condition that is beyond my control.

But my pictures of those who made their own masks will be indestructible evidence, and will stand for better or for worse. I have willed the collection to a public library where students interested in twentieth century ethnology may examine—if I survive for another decade—at least two thousand life-sized portraits of good, bad and indifferent mortals whom I embalmed through the lens of my camera, and left behind that all may see.

ROBERT H. DAVIS

"THE PROOF OF IT"

In the days of Jesus men asked for a sign, and to-day, the question "Where is the proof?" is probably the first to arise upon contact with spiritual ideas that are strange to the hearer. The natural answer to such a question must be: "Could you recognize the proof if you had it? Proof is no hard-and-fast thing." Patanjali, in his Yoga Aphorisms, has defined it for us. "Correct Cognition," he says, "results from Perception, Inference, and Testimony." The independent evidence of others capable of verifying the proof must corroborate the result of one's own perception, and both must be checked up in the light of clear reason.

Dependance on perception alone, gives "the lunatic, the lover and the poet"; that is, the fanatic, the misguided mystic taking a partial experience for the whole truth, secondly, the so-called devotee and worshipper, scorning reason and following only the guidance of "the Inner Light," and lastly, the poet, whose intuition soars higher than the man himself can consciously reach. Dependance on inference and reason alone, leads to arid speculation, because of the tendency of the human mind to weave a maze of conclusions without sufficient data. And dependance on evidence alone, leads to inertia and blind faith in authorities and dogmas.

So that he who would prove the spiritual truths must study the accumulated testimony of the Great Ones, must test practically the hypotheses that can be inferred workable, until the perception of the *actuality* of those truths springs up spontaneously in the progress of time. Yet in some measure all three processes are simultaneous, the study of material records, the inner activity of the mind, the over-brooding working of the omniscient, omnipotent Spirit. "Proof" is his alone who holds the balance true between all aspects of his nature.

E. W.

THE DOCTRINE OF RE-INCARNATION IN ISLAMIC LITERATURE

[**Dr. Margaret Smith's** studies in Islamic mysticism have already appeared in our pages. In the following article she shows how Reincarnation was taught and accepted by numerous sects of Islam. Our author refers to the Sufis "rejecting" reincarnation and yet teaching that "the future destiny of the soul depended upon its own efforts towards spiritual perfection". The Sufis very probably taught Reincarnation, in some mystic form in their exoteric degree, reserving for their esotericists the details of the doctrine.—EDS.]

The doctrine of Re-incarnation, in the form of the belief in the passage of the human soul from one body to another, with the ethical implication that the lot of the soul on earth in each new incarnation is determined by its conduct in a former life, and that the progress of the soul onward and upward depends therefore on its own efforts here and now, is not to be found in orthodox Islam. It is, in fact, regarded as a heresy by the orthodox Muslim theologians. Muslim authors who deal with the subject from the standpoint of theology, such as Sharastānī (ob. 1153 A. D.), who considers it in his *Kitāb al-Milal wa'l-Nihal* (Book of Religions and Sects), attribute it to Indian rather than Pythagorean influence, but it is to be noted that those Islamic sects which adopted the doctrine were undoubtedly acquainted with the teaching of the Greek philosophers.

The doctrine was accepted at an early period in the history of Islam by certain of the Mu'tazilites, one of the oldest theological sects in Islam. The origin of the Mu'tazilites is said to have been due to the secession of a certain Persian named Wāṣil b. 'Ata al-Ghazzāl, from among the disciples of the famous ascetic Ḥasan of Basra (ob. A. D. 728), and if so, then the sect had its rise in Iraq, where Persian and Arab thought intermingled and Indian influence was possible. It is more probable, however, that their doctrines were developed under the influence of Byzantine theologians, and especially of John of Damascus, who lived in the eighth century, and his pupil Theodore Abū Qurra.

The Mu'tazilites were probably among the first to study the Arabic translations of the Greek naturalists and philosophers which appeared in the reigns of the Caliphs al-Manṣūr and al-Ma'mūn, and these turned their thoughts into new directions, and led them to seek to combine Greek culture with Islamic theology. They concerned themselves with the problem of pre-destination and freewill; they also sought to purge the Qur'ān of anthropomorphism, and regarded those who separated the Divine Attributes from the Divine Essence as being really

polytheists. They taught, further, that all the truths necessary for salvation could be acquired by the light of reason, so that man, at all times and in all places, ought to make himself acquainted with these truths. Some of the Muʿtazilites held the doctrine of re-incarnation, and notably certain of the disciples of Naẓẓām, a well-known Muʿtazilite who died in A.D. 845. The two most prominent in the teaching of the doctrine were Aḥmad b. Ḥābiṭ (or Hā'iṭ), and Faḍl al-Ḥudathī, who held that God created the souls of men free from defect, pure and rational, before their existence in this world, and gave them knowledge about Himself and the power to know Him directly, and bestowed upon them His Divine grace. Some, when they pass into this world, obey the Divine Law in all respects, while others disobey it in its entirety, while others again at times act rightly and at times sin. At the death of the body, they taught, the righteous are welcomed to the abode of the Blessed, those who have sinned incessantly are thrust into Hell, but those who are neither decisively bad nor decisively good pass into other bodies and are tested by misfortunes and hardships as well as by ease, and by pains and joys in different measure according to the degree of their sins. That one whose merits were greater than his sins is reborn to a higher state and suffers less than the one whose sins outweighed his good deeds. Such souls do not cease to pass from one re-incarnation to another, age after age, so long as they are not cleansed from their sins, but when perfected, they attain to salvation. Others, too, of the disciples of Naẓẓām followed these two in respect of this doctrine.

The Muʿtazilites proper came to an end with the fourth century of the Islamic era, but their doctrines were often combined with those of the Shīʿites, who were contemporary with them, but with a far-reaching influence which lasted to a much later period. The Shīʿites were in the first place a political section, the *Shīʿa* or partisans of ʿAlī, the fourth Caliph, whose wife Fāṭima was the daughter of the Prophet, whose children and their descendants, the Shīʿites held to have a Divine Right to the Imamate, *i.e.* the supreme authority in Islam, both temporal and spiritual. Certain of the extreme Shīʿites, known as the *Ghulāt*, held not only the doctrine of the incarnation of the Deity in a human form (that of the Imām), but also that of the re-incarnation of ordinary human souls. Among these were the Rawandiyya of Khurasān, of whom Tabarī the historian (ob. 923 A.D.) states that they were still in existence in his own time and that they held this doctrine, and the Khurramiya another Shīʿite sect of this same period, appear to have taught it.

The Shīʿites developed numerous sects and not a few of these taught the doctrine of re-incarnation. Chief among these were the

Ismāʿīlīs, who took their name from Ismāʿīl, son of the sixth Imām, who died during his father's life-time. His son Muhamad was regarded by the Ismāʿīlīs as the Seventh and Last Imām, and by some of them as a re-incarnation of his father. But the real founder of the Ismāʿīlī sect, who taught a distinctive religious doctrine, which had a far-reaching influence for the next four centuries, was ʿAbdallah b. Maymūn al-Qaddaḥ (ob. 874 A.D.), the son of a Persian oculist, who himself belonged to the *Ghulāt* sect. ʿAbdallah's object was to bind together the free-thinkers of the time into one secret society. The Ismāʿīlīs borrowed something of the doctrine from the Muʿtazilites, but ʿAbdallah really aimed at a synthesis of the leading ideas of his time, including Greek Philosophy, Christianity, Gnosticism, Judaism, and doctrines taken from the religion of ancient Persia, and the faiths of India. Elements from all of these were to form a secret doctrine, to be gradually revealed to the initiated by the Imām. The Ismāʿīlīs were known to their contemporaries as the *Bāṭiniyya* (Esoterics), since they held that there was an inner part to every external, a spirit to every form, a hidden meaning to every revelation, and to every similitude in this world a corresponding reality in the other world.

Their doctrine of the nature of God was Neo-Platonic: They taught that He was entirely without attributes and incomprehensible, since His Nature admits of no predication. This Absolute Godhead, the Primal Unity, manifested itself as Universal Reason, in which are contained all the Divine attributes, being God in His outward manifestation. Universal Reason (the Primal Intelligence) represents the real Divinity of the Ismāʿīlīs, and is called by them the "Veil," the "Antecedent," the "First," the "Spirit". Universal Reason produced Universal Soul, which in its turn created the heavens and the visible universe, manifesting itself in plurality, through which phase it passes in order to return again to its original Unity.

The individual soul is an epitome of the whole universe, and the latter exists only for the progressive education of the soul. Man cannot attain to the truth by unaided reason, but needs the teaching of Universal Reason, to be obtained only from the Imām of the time, for Universal Reason becomes incarnate from time to time in the form of a Leader or Teacher (*nāṭiq*) and teaches more fully and completely in each successive manifestation, illuminating souls according to their experience and understanding, and giving them the spiritual truths necessary for their guidance. The Ismāʿīlīs taught that six great Prophetic cycles, those of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, had already passed, and the last and seventh cycle had been inaugurated by Muhammad b. Ismāʿīl, the last of the Imāms, and in this cycle, for the

first time, the real esoteric doctrine, revealing the true inward teaching of the Law and the Prophets, was made clear.

This inner doctrine, reserved for the fully-initiated, was dominated by the mystic number seven. The principle of Seven Prophetic cycles corresponded with the Emanations of Being—Universal Reason, Universal Soul, Primal Matter, Space and Time, which, with the Absolute Godhead, and Man, made up the Sevenfold universe, and was typified by the Seven degrees of initiation through which the seeker advanced towards the innermost doctrine, according to his receptivity. In the first three of these the neophyte was bound to secrecy, and taught that the Law of Islam was but the outward symbol of the secret doctrine entrusted to the Imām, and he was instructed as to the nature and number of the Imāms. He was then taught the doctrine of the Prophetic cycles, and learnt that with the Seventh and last Leader, an end was put to the knowledge of those who went before (*ʿUlūm al-awwalīn*), and the Esoteric *bāṭinī* doctrine, together with the knowledge of symbolical interpretation (*taʾwīl*), was inaugurated. In succeeding degrees he was taught to ignore the outward observances of religion and to understand their inner significance. He then learnt that above all Before and After is a Being Who has neither name nor attribute, Who is not cognisable and Who cannot therefore be worshipped. In the final degree of initiation all dogmatic religion was cast aside and the initiate became a philosopher, free to adopt such system or admixture of systems as he might choose, for to him every religious ceremony and every natural object represented but a type or symbol of the esoteric mysteries, meaningless to the formalist, but, to the initiated, full of beauty and significance.

To gain salvation, then, the soul must attain to knowledge, and this could only be gained through the earthly incarnation of Universal Reason. Paradise was regarded as symbolising the state of the soul which had reached perfect knowledge and could be re-united with its Source. Hell symbolised ignorance, but no soul was condemned eternally to Hell, for it returned to earth by successive re-incarnations, until it had cleansed itself of its errors and was able to recognise the Imām of the time and from him to learn the true knowledge. Gradually, through many lives, the soul was guided, as its experience and understanding increased in successive incarnations, through the sphere of plurality, to its final abode in the world of eternal Unity. The Ismāʿīlīs held that evil had no real or lasting existence and would gradually disappear through the progressive assimilation of all creation to Universal Reason.

In the time of the Fāṭimide caliphs (A. D. 969 onwards) Ismāʿīlī doctrines were publicly taught in Cairo in schools well en-

dowed and provided with good libraries, and those who taught had large numbers of students, who crowded to their lectures. It was a principle with the sect that men should be converted by persuasion, so that they shewed the greatest tolerance to other sects. The Buwayhid dynasty, who reigned in Western Persia A. D. 932 to 1055, and were Shī'ites, were also favourable to the doctrine. There is an account in the annals of the historian Abū al-Maḥāsin for the year 952 A. D., telling how certain persons were arrested for heresy, among them being a youth who declared that the spirit of one of the caliphs had passed into his body, and a woman who declared that she was a re-incarnation of Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet. The Buwayhid ruler ordered that they should be released, because he himself accepted the doctrine of re-incarnation.

The Druses*, though not accepted by orthodox Muslims as belonging to Islam, yet call themselves Muslims when with Muslims, and their religion is also an esoteric doctrine, akin to that of the Ismā'īlīs, while of their founders Ḥamza and Darazī, the latter was in the service of the Fāṭimid ruler al-Ḥākim, himself an adherent of the Isma'īlī sect. Ḥamza, in a treatise setting forth the doctrines of the sect, states that the body is to be regarded simply as an envelope, and during his tenure of it a man may make progress or go backwards. The number of souls in existence neither increases nor diminishes, but these reappear in different human forms, according to what they have merited by their works, good or evil, in a previous incarnation, so that a man's body may be the means of doing him good or a means of punishment, but Ḥamza maintains that men are punished in such a way that they understand and know that it is punishment, and therefore it is able to serve them as instruction and lead them to repentance. The beauty or deformity of the body to which the soul is attached in its various re-incarnations has therefore a relation to its purity or corruption. The reward which a man receives in passing from body to body is the increase of knowledge, and advance in spiritual power until he attains to the rank of the Imamate. So that when souls have attained, by their knowledge and their comprehension of the Unity, to the final degree of perfection, they cease to experience re-incarnation and are definitely united to the Imām. Yet this will not happen until, having been subject to re-incarnation through all the cycles, they reach the last. Then the souls come to judgment, and those who have acquired perfection by union are separated from the body by death, and are no longer subject to re-birth, but are re-united, and

* "Lamas and Druses" by H. P. Blavatsky appeared in *The Theosophist* for June 1881 to which we draw the attention of interested readers. In that article important facts about the Druses are given and a significant comparison between them and the Tibetan Lamas is made. —EDS.

forever, with the Imām, that is," with the Divine Principle.

There are still many Ismā'īlīs, including the kindred sects of the Druses, to be found to-day, especially in Syria, but also in Persia, Afghanistan and India (where their hereditary head is the Agha Khan), and elsewhere, including Zanzibar and East Africa.

The doctrine found little acceptance among the Ṣūfīs generally, though his enemies accused the great mystic teacher Manṣūr al-Ḥāllaj, who died a martyr at Baghdad in A. D. 922, of teaching the doctrine that the soul could return to the world in another body, and of declaring that certain of his disciples were re-incarnations of the great prophets of the past. As al-Ḥāllaj was in close touch with Ismā'īlī sects, it is possible that he was influenced by their teaching in this respect. The doctrine was well-known however to the Ṣūfīs, and Hujwīrī, author of the *Kashf al-Mahjūb* (The Unveiling of the Veiled), who died in A. D. 1097, while himself refusing to accept it, speaks of those who assert that the spirit is eternal (*i. e.* uncreated), and aver that it passes from one body to another. The doctrine, he says, was widely accepted in his time, and he includes among those who held it the Christians "though they express it in terms that appear to conflict with it," and by all the Indians, Thibetans and Chinese, and by most of the Shī'ites the Qarmiṭites, Ismā'īlīs and kindred sects. At the same time, while nearly all the Ṣūfīs rejected re-incarnation, they did, of course, teach that the future destiny of the soul depended upon its own efforts towards spiritual perfection (together with the Divine help), and only those who had purified themselves from sin and error could attain to the goal of union with the One.

On the other hand, the doctrine found some acceptance among Islamic philosophers, including certain of them who were also mystics. Among these was al-Fārābī (ob. A.D. 950), of Turkish origin, who lived and taught in Baghdad, and was the greatest philosopher of Islam before Avicenna. al-Fārābī held that morality could reach perfection only in a State which was also a spiritual community, that is, guided by spiritual principles. The souls of those who had been born into an "ignorant" state must undergo re-incarnation, in order to gain the knowledge necessary for the attainment of perfection, and finally, of absorption in the All. Other philosopher-mystics who held the doctrine of re-incarnation were Avicenna (ob A.D. 1037) and Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī al-Ishrāqī (ob. A.D. 1191)* both of whom held that erring souls must return to this earth, and take up a body determined by the experiences of the previous life, in order to fit themselves to return ultimately to their Source.

* *Cf.* my articles on *Avicenna* and *Suhrawardi al-Ishradi* in THE ARYAN PATH for August 1932 and October 1193.

The doctrine of re-incarnation has re-appeared in modern times in the literature of the Bābīs and Bahāis, of Persia, the followers of Mirza ʿAli Muḥammad (ob. A. D. 1850) and his successor Bahāallah. They were originally a Shīʿite sect, but diverged more and more from Islam as time went on. They hold that the Absolute Reality is an eternal, living, impersonal Essence, manifesting itself through the Universe. In all forms of life there is an immortal part, the ray of Eternal Love, which survives the body. Salvation consists in the discovery of this ray of Love, which is the motive-power of all noble and unselfish action, within each conscious being. After the death of the body, the soul returns to this earth by re-incarnation, in order to continue the search and to make further progress until it is gradually perfected and realises its oneness with the Absolute Reality.

The doctrine of Re-incarnation, therefore has been well-known to Islamic writers from an early period, and though regarded as a heresy by orthodox Islam and rejected by most of the great Ṣūfī teachers, it has been widely accepted, and is still held to-day, by certain influential Islamic sects, mainly of Persian origin, who are to be found in most parts of the Islamic world.*

MARGARET SMITH

After allowing the Soul, escaped from the pangs of personal life, a sufficient, aye, a hundredfold compensation, Karma, with its army of Skandhas, waits at the threshold of Devachan, whence the *Ego* re-emerges to assume a new incarnation. . . . . The new "personality" is no better than a fresh suit of clothes with its specific characteristics, colour, form and qualities; but the *real* man who wears it is the same culprit as of old. It is the *individuality* who suffers through his "personality." And it is this, and this alone, that can account for the terrible, still only *apparent*, injustice in the distribution of lots in life to man . . . . . Shakespeare must have thought of it when writing on the worthlessness of Birth. Remember his words:

> Why should my birth keep down my mounting spirit?
> Are not all creatures subject unto time?
> There's legions now of beggars on the earth,
> That their original did spring from Kings,
> And many monarchs now, whose fathers were
> The riff-raff of their age . . . . . .

Alter the word "fathers" into "Egos"—and you will have the truth.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Key to Theosophy*, pp. 117, 118.

* The subject is discussed by the Arabic writers Shahrastānī in his *Kitāb al-Milal wa'l-Niha* and Tabarī in his *Annales* and by the Persian Hujwīrī int he *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*. Cf. also de Sacy *Exposé de la* Religion des Druzes (Paris 1838) and M. Iqbal *Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (London 1918).

A PATTERN FOR STATESMEN

[**Hugh I'A. Fausset's** article is both timely and useful. In the mad rush of holding conferences, debating issues, finding diplomatic words which evade and hide when they are supposed to enlighten and guide; of finding temporary means to postpone the impending doom in the vague hope of "something must happen"; of going round and round; modern financiers, politicians and administrators are seeking for some light. This article offers it. Will they take it? It was Marcus Aurelius who said that "neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules for others before thou shalt have learned to obey rules thyself."—EDS.]

One of the tragedies of human history is the want of collaboration in almost all ages between the idealist and the realist. Again and again the inspired man has flung the challenge of his absolute convictions in the face of the world, but he has been inevitably opposed not merely by the inertia of humanity in the mass but by the scepticism of the opportunist, of the man who believes in meeting every situation as it arises and who through his very respect for an actuality outside himself is reasonably suspicious of all who seem to override or disregard the contingent or who would govern conduct by visionary principles. And when we remember the ways of the idealists, whether religious or political, who have in the past been in a position to enforce their idealism upon their fellows, we cannot but regretfully admit the justification of the realist's suspicion. Very many of the worst cruelties under which man has groaned down the ages have been inflicted in the name of idealism. But apart from the fanatical perversities of egotists of genius we have the only less pitiful spectacle of the ineffectual idealist. An obvious example of this is the high-minded and humanitarian altruist whose appeal to self-sacrifice falls on deaf ears because he himself has failed to face the fact that the self-assertive principle is as deeply rooted in the nature of man as the co-operative. His altruism therefore springs rather out of weakness than strength. It lacks the tension of a true polarity and the selfish man instinctively rejects a gospel which fails to satisfy by really accepting and sublimating the self-centredness which he knows to be a determining factor in human nature. The few great religious teachers of mankind have of course never made this mistake. However extreme in their staggering simplicity their ultimate spiritual demands have been, they have never either evaded, or violated the conditions within which these demands must be satisfied. They have come not to deny the law of necessity but to fulfil it in a liberty grounded in the very nature of things. Nevertheless being primarily concerned with the eternal end rather than the temporal process, their demands have inevitably seemed so relentlessly absolute to man toiling in the council-chambers and the

market places of the world as to be almost irrelevant. And this is perhaps particularly true in this present age of rationality and relativity. Our modern rulers whether they be politicians or business-men, are therefore more likely to be persuaded by the example of successful administrators who were also idealists than by illuminated world-saviours. Compelled so often themselves to take the path of compromise they are always in danger of surrendering to mere expediency. And from this descent into uninspired realism they can only be recalled by a teacher who was also like themselves a man of affairs, an idealist who was

> not too bright or good
> For human nature's daily food.

Two figures suggest themselves as perhaps pre-eminently suitable to satisfy these requirements and provide example and an inspiration not only to those who may profoundly influence the political and social development of the modern world, but to that host of hard working men and women who really maintain its complex and creaking mechanism. These are Asoka, the Buddhist, and Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic. Of the two Asoka was the more successful in realizing his principles in the practice of kingship. But he was also the more fortunate in his times and circumstance, and although we know in bare outline the greatness of his achievement and can deduce from this the rare quality of his humanity, he remains inevitably a somewhat legendary and remote figure. Not so Marcus Aurelius. He can speak to us through his *Meditations* as intimately and persuasively to-day as when he wrote them eighteen hundred years ago. And although the mystic will always find something wanting in the creed by which this most gentle and dutiful of all the Roman Emperors lived, the very temperateness of his counsel, his inability to transcend limits which to the ordinary man are final, make of his *Meditations* an ideal hand-book of practical and moral wisdom for those who are engaged in the spade work of modern civilization. Here, if anywhere, we have the testament of one who deserved Plato's title of philosopher-king, one whose philosophy was rooted in his inner experience, nurtured by the best thought of his time, and tested in the rude commerce of the world. That it stood the test is proved not only by the calm integrity of Aurelius's inner life, but by his effectiveness as a statesman. It is one of fate's ironies that so peaceful and retiring a man should have been set at the head of the Roman Empire when it was threatened with great dangers both from without and within, and when the seeds of ultimate decline were already deeply rooted. But so far as any man could, he arrested their growth. Far from cultivating his mind in retirement, for several years he commanded his armies in the field establishing within himself an inner quiet which even the clangour

of arms could not disturb. And his wars, though slow were successful while he had the wisdom to foresee the danger to Rome from the Barbarians of the North and to meet it with measures which preserved the integrity of the Empire for two centuries.

That so peaceful and contemplative a man should have been involved in war and all the harassments of statesmanship and administration is, therefore, more instructive than ironic. For men of action cannot but respect and may be drawn to study a philosophy which proved its worth in circumstances kindred to their own. In what then did Marcus Aurelius's philosophy consist? Obviously we cannot answer such a question adequately in the small space at our disposal. We can at most suggest why it is so peculiarly relevant to an age which questions the absolutes of religion but needs so desperately the inspiration of a rational faith. To say that Marcus Aurelius was a Stoic is misleading. For to most men Stoicism suggests an attitude of grim resignation or heroic indifference. And although there was an element of what another writer has happily called 'strenuous weariness in Aurelius's attitude to life, it was a subordinate one. He combined in fact to a rare degree reason and aspiration, faith and doubt. At moments in his *Meditations* he can play with the theory of Epicurus that, "atoms be the cause of all things and that life be nothing else but a mere dispersion," but this clearly was not his own conviction. For he could write elsewhere of the Gods that "by the daily experience that I have of their power and providence towards myself and others, I know certainly that they are, and therefore worship them". Nevertheless although his life had this religious basis, his faith was never so certain or so transcendent as to deflect his gaze from the immediate and actual world of men and nature. "Without relation unto God," he wrote, "thou shall never speed in any worldly actions; nor on the other side in any divine, without some respect had to things human". And it was on the human that he concentrated. In human life there are two principles manifestly at work, reason and natural impulse. Ideally these two principles should work together in harmony—for man's reason, although it evolves later, is essentially a kindred faculty to his instinct. But in fact, as we know, a conflict between reason and natural impulse is a condition of man's development. It is not reason itself which creates the conflict but the will which, falling into selfishness, exploits both the rational and instinctive faculties, so perverting them and bringing them into opposition. Human history embodies the drama of this tragic but necessary conflict. For out of the self-will that generated it has grown the self-consciousness which may ultimately resolve it. Man has increasingly come to realize that human happiness depends upon satisfying the demands of nature

and of reason. But so long as these demands seem to conflict, he is wretchedly torn between them. Hence the rival or delusively associated states of nature and of reason to which the philosophers of the eighteenth century sought to transport their disciples. But to-day the armed frontiers between these two states are beginning to be broken down. There is at least some hopeful commerce and co-operation between them. Consequently we should be more than ordinarily receptive to the philosophy of a man who taught and experienced in his own person the truth that "to a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason".

Marcus Aurelius possessed so civilized and equable a temperament that he tended perhaps to underestimate the unruly forces which disputed the calm sway of reason in men less advanced and attuned than himself. For although "to understand and to be reasonable" was potentially "common unto all men," the difficulties in the way of realizing this common principle were formidable. To many even of our own time his contention for example that men are "allied one to another by a kindred not of blood, nor of seed, but of the same mind," may seem to contradict the facts of life. Yet there was never a time perhaps when the facts of life more clearly demonstrated its truth, if only in the spectacle of a world heading for bankruptcy through preferring the kinship of blood to that of reason. And if Marcus Aurelius's trust in the innate reasonableness of men was premature in an age and an Empire which were still near to the primitive and menaced by the barbarous, it is surely acceptable to-day when the acids of thought have eaten so far into the natural man, when even the barbarians amongst us have to submit to some education, and when economic fact as well as enlightened reason attest the truth that we are "partners in some one commonwealth" and that "the world is as it were a city".

We do not usually conceive of reason as an unifying principle because it has for so long been associated with rationalism. But the reason which Marcus Aurelius commended to all who would live the good life was so far from being an exclusive and separating faculty that he described it as "reason by which men are sociable," contrasting it with "opinion" or wilful selfish thought which blinded the eyes of true understanding. And if in some of his references to the material world he betrayed the disgusted recoil of the too fastidious man, there is never a suggestion in all his writings of the privileged aristocrat's disdain for the common people or of a false withdrawal from their needs and interests. No one to be sure could insist more persuasively than he upon the necessity of a true self-sufficiency, as when he wrote,—

> Wind up thyself into thyself. Such is the nature of thy reasonable commanding part, as that if it exercise

justice, and have by that means tranquillity within itself it doth rest fully satisfied with itself without any other thing.

But in the same breath he could remark—"Wipe off all opinion" and exhort men to "the continual habit and exercise both of reason and sociableness". Freedom of outer action, he knew, depended on the realization of the freedom within the self, and his *Meditations* are full of the most admirable counsel on how this state of inner harmony may be achieved and maintained. But although centred in the Self, it was no selfish harmony. A true inward harmony he insisted, was reflected in a perfect outward sympathy. "As proper is it," he wrote, "and natural to the soul of man to love her neighbour, to be true and modest; and to regard nothing so much as herself." And again,—"Fancy not anything else in the world any more to be of any weight and moment but this, to do that only which thine own nature doth require; and to conform thyself to that which the common nature doth afford." He knew, in short, that a true and completed self-love is the condition and complement of a disinterested love for humanity, just as a true self-respect necessitates respect for the natures and even the prejudices of each one of our fellow-men.

And by his repeated affirmations of the unity of mankind Marcus Aurelius proved himself to be not only a wise man and a great Emperor, but a citizen of the world. "He raises sedition in the city," he wrote, "who by irrational actions withdraws his own soul from that one and common soul of all rational creatures". Or again,—"A branch cut off from the continuity of that which was next unto it, must needs be cut off from the whole tree: so a man that is divided from another man, is divided from the whole society." Or again,—"Now that is ever best and most seasonable, which is for the good of whole."

In him, therefore, we have a very rare kind of teacher, one who combined a superior mind with a real feeling of his membership of a common society. And his teaching is peculiarly accessory and relevant to our times because we are more ready to listen to the pleadings of reason than to accept the challenges of faith, and because it is essential to the survival of civilization that we should substitute a reason that unites for a rationalism that divides. Certainly for those who are likely to influence or direct the political or social life of our disintegrated world there could hardly be a more helpful teacher. For if we have outgrown the naïve delusions of democratic liberalism, we have still to discover or recover the secret of true leadership. Democracy needs leaders who represent at once its best mind and its deepest instincts. Only through such leaders can the common man realize his inherent will to order and unity and be saved from the predatory individuals who would exploit his ignorance and his own lower pas-

sions. But hitherto such leadership has been abysmally lacking. And this is because those in positions of responsibility have been too conscious of their own divided motives to trust the response of the ordinary man to generous and high-minded action. Far from expressing and evoking the best will of those they are supposed to lead, they have too often timidly compromised with the worst. As a corrective to such leadership from behind Marcus Aurelius's teaching and example could hardly be bettered. For in him we have a man who combined as few in positions of authority have done the best qualities of the aristocrat and the democrat and combined them in a living whole. He was an aristocrat in his sensitiveness, his detachment, his cool intelligence, his sense of duty and responsibility and his self-control. But he was a democrat in his modesty, his sympathy, his simplicity, and his abiding sense of the interrelationship of all things and the interdependence of individual and common good. In him we have a man who was equally moulded by his inward thoughts and responsive to his fellow's needs, and who achieved a rare and fertile balance between the mind that would separate and the instinct that would unite. He conceived the true nature of man because he had realized his own true nature. And so he was qualified to be a leader both by his superiority to and his identity with the common man. And it is just such an integrity which is required of those who in this age would be alike enlightened and effective leaders of their own people and citizens of the world. For even more than in Marcus Aurelius's time is it true that they cannot be the one without the other. And in his *Meditations* they will find a spiritual philosophy which is also reasonable and practical and in which the self is neither falsely asserted nor denied, but reasonably fulfilled, just as the partial self of jealous nationalism must be fulfilled in the total self of a co-operating world. To the mystic, as we have said, the noble poise of Marcus Aurelius must always lack the final illumination of rebirth, although judged by ordinary human standards he had learnt and could teach how "thou thyself shalt become a new man and begin a new life". But for him, burdened with the responsibilities of an empire, the act of true living in this world was "more like a wrestler's than a dancer's practice". Since, however, the majority of us cannot pass like the saint beyond the press and conflict of mundane affairs into the pure dance of the creative spirit, we will do well to ponder and assimilate his teaching. For few can show us better in what conscious disinterestedness consists or help us more effectively to bridge the gulf, so fatal to the modern world, between the idealist and the realist, reason and life, the self and the common soul of mankind.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIA—WHITHER?*

[**Franklin Edgerton** is professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Yale University. He was Editor of *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* from 1918–1926. He is the author of *Panchatantra Reconstructed* (2 vols) and numerous other books. In this article he reviews an old volume published in 1914–15 in which Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson made some striking comments on the future progress of India. We had hopes of securing the opinions of Mr. Dickinson on the subject matter of this review when occurred his death, which the world of culture greatly mourns.—EDS.]

Mr. Lowes Dickinson's "Essay" is on the whole a keen, fair, and enlightened summary of the contrasts between the three Eastern cultures and that of the West. Most of the descriptive parts were true then and are true now. On one point, art and craftsmanship, he fails signally to do justice to India. It is amazing to read that "the art of India has, as art, little or no value," even with the concession that this is "a highly controversial opinion". I think it is a definitely false one. It is enough to refer to the paintings and carvings of Ajanta, Ellora, and Karle, the temples of Bhuvaneshwar and Konarak in Orissa, of Mahabalipuram, Somnathpur, and Halebid in the south, and of Mount Abu in the West; not to mention the older Buddhist art of such places as Sanchi. I do not see how any one with artistic sense could fail to be charmed by all of these. Perhaps Mr. Dickinson was so unfortunate as not to see the best products of Indian art. But even more surprisingly, he says that he "saw nowhere any modern products, whether in brasswork, wood-carving, embroidery, or enamel, which seemed to [him] to have any merit". Did he not see the exquisite brasswork of Jaipur, the fine wood-carving of Kashmir, the filmy silk scarfs of Benares, all of which certainly compare well with the best corresponding work of Western artisans? And these examples are not isolated. There is undoubtedly too much slavish imitation of the West in India; but taste in artisanry is still not dead there.

In general, however, he sees, and presents ably the reasons for his belief that "throughout the East there has been a development of culture in some respects more important and higher than that of the modern West." Life in the East, he finds, is at once simpler and finer. The material needs of men are satisfied more easily and they have more leisure for things which make life worth living. Even the peasants, he thinks, get "if not happiness, at least a certain dignity and breadth of outlook". The religious, literary and artistic productions of the East he regards as not "in them-

* *An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China and Japan* by G. LOWES DICKINSON.

selves the purpose of human life, but rather as signs that that purpose is being fulfilled".

The West, on the other hand, is far ahead of the East in "the machinery of life"—in science, particularly applied science. This makes life more practical, and also more intense. Some obvious advantages ensue from this; "but at the same time it has almost destroyed the beauty of life and the faculty of disinterested contemplation."

What interests Mr. Dickinson particularly is the clash between the two cultures, and the question whether any fusion between them is possible. He "used to think," he tells us, that each might adopt the best features of the other and so correct its own defects, "and that a synthesis might result which would be more comprehensively human". The East might become more practical without losing its depth and richness of living, the West might learn from the East the higher values of life. His observations in the East made him doubt this possibility. He came to believe that "civilization is a whole," and cannot be transferred in parts. It all hangs together, and if the East adopts our practicality, it must also adopt our excesses, it must "go right through, not round, all that we have been through". This, he thinks, will actually happen; "the East will lose what remains of its achievement in these directions and become as 'materialistic,' as the West," although he recognizes the possibility that both East and West may later, by internal development, "recover a new and genuine spiritual life".

The positive evidence looking in this direction is probably quite as strong as when he wrote. It is an observed fact that Orientals who adopt the practical or "material" advantages of Western culture seem, generally speaking, to adopt all the rest of it, and to lose contact with their own "higher" traditions. Of course there are exceptions, but they are rare. Whether Indian, Chinese, or Japanese, they tend indeed to become almost more "Western" and "materialistic" than Westerners; and that they lose something in the process will, perhaps, be granted even by those who think they gain enough to make the loss worth while. Moreover, in so far as the broader and more social aspects of Westernism penetrate the East, they manifest the same features through which the West passed a century or so ago. Indian and Japanese industrialism is primitive and inhuman, compared even with its not too humanized equivalent in the modern West. It seems, indeed, to be going "through, not round" our "excesses". It has not learned from our mistakes.

Mr. Dickinson's view is very interesting. I think it is too early to say whether it will prove true or not. There is, however, something to be said on the other side; more than when he wrote. Without claiming that the following remarks disprove his opinion, I shall point out certain counterac-

acting tendencies.

In the first place, the Westernization of Orientals is the direct result of their education. The Chinese revolutionary leaders were mostly educated in the United States; naturally they became practically Americans. Most Indian universities and colleges are built on British or American models. Their curricula show only a little fumbling adaptation to Indian conditions. Now a man's character is primarily, or at least very largely, determined by his education. If all the youth of a country (no matter what country) are trained to look at life from the Western view-point entirely, most of them will inevitably have that view-point. Even if they are Eastern by blood, they will grow up out of touch with the traditions and attitudes of their ancestors. If (as is actually the case in India) the foreign education is generally imperfect and second-rate, they will become half-baked unsuccessful Westerners. But a half-baked Occidental is not an Oriental—a truism which is often overlooked.

Now no one is satisfied with the products of the regular Government and missionary colleges in India. The graduates seem mostly to be good for nothing except clerkships, or teaching positions in just such institutions; and there are not enough of these to go round. They are out of touch with the historic civilization of the country, and have nothing to contribute to its cultural life. It is not their fault; nothing else could or should have been expected from such a system. If I could I should boldly abolish every Government and missionary school in India. I should prefer that Indian boys should attend the *pathashalas* of their own pandits. I respect those pandits highly. Their learning is circumscribed, but it is deep, and also indigenous. It is better that young people should learn something—anything—thoroughly, than that they should get a smattering of a larger assortment of subjects; and it is better that they should know even a little of their own country's culture than a larger sum of facts comparatively unrelated to the life of their own people. But it would be still better if they could all attend schools like that founded and run by Rabindranath Tagore at Santiniketan. This great Indian and citizen of the world is one of the few who have seen clearly that if an Indian is to be a useful citizen of India, his education must be based on Indian civilization in the first instance. There is nothing narrow or chauvinistic in Tagore's programme; he adopts and uses all the applied science of the West. But he remains, and keeps his educational system, rooted in Indian life and culture. If he and his followers should affect in any profound way the educational life of India, they would refute Mr. Dickinson's thesis. For there is no greater living exponent than Tagore of that beauty, spirituality, and dignity in life which Dickinson admires in the historic background

of the Orient; and yet he has adopted almost every valuable feature of Western civilization.

My other point concerns the future of religion in India. Religion, as Mr. Dickinson says, has always been a living, dominant force in that country—Indian religion in the past has been, he says, peculiarly unworldly and impractical; the ideal life has involved withdrawal from the world; all sentient existence has been regarded as worthless and evil. To Indians the most admirable man is the "saint," who renounces life and seeks truth solely within himself. This attitude he finds directly antagonistic to that of science, which recognizes observation and experience as the only sources of true knowledge, and accepts normal human life as a worthy end in itself. India is religious and mystical, the West is scientific; and the two attitudes cannot possibly be reconciled. He is rather too sweeping here; even in the West there are still many eminent men of science who do not find these two ways of seeking truth so irreconcilable; who think that some kinds of truth can be found by "unscientific," mystical methods. But let that pass; broadly speaking there is much truth in this contrast, and for the sake of argument let us grant it.

It is still not clear to me that India, in adopting science, must necessarily renounce its religion. For one thing, our author exaggerates the universality of anti-worldliness in Indian religion in the past. The *Bhagavad Gītā*, though thoroughly mystical, is nevertheless not anti-worldly. It strongly opposes withdrawal from the world; the "saint," by Dickinson's definition, is discountenanced in it. It enjoins man to remain in the world and do his duty in worldly activities. And no religious book has had greater influence or popularity in India.

Moreover, since Mr. Dickinson wrote there has arisen in India a pretty good living embodiment of the *Gītā's* doctrine. If it is true that "the persistence of Indian religion. . . will depend on the continuous appearance of the "saint," then Indian religion may still persist while a man like Mahatma Gandhi lives. For he is accepted as a "saint"; the masses of India practically worship him. But his sainthood is not of the world-renouncing type; it follows rather the line of the *Gītā* (which by the way is his favourite religious authority). He is not anti-scientific; he accepts all of Western science so far as it seems to him to be demonstrated, which is all that science itself does or can demand. And certainly, he agrees with the West that at least some features of "worldly" life are highly important, and worth striving for. He is called a consummate politician, and in a very deep sense this is true; but if he is troublesome to his political opponents, this is perhaps just because he takes religion into politics, which is contrary to the rules of the game as played in the West. His idea of the good

life is fundamentally Indian. To be generally acceptable it may need some modification; he himself claims no final authority, no definitive revelation of truth. But the main point is that he is striving for a true blend of all that is of "practical" value in Western culture with his own inherited mysticism. In other words he, like Tagore, though in a quite different way, is trying to disprove Mr. Dickinson's thesis that "civilization is a whole" and cannot be transferred by sections, with acceptance of some parts and rejection of others. It is doubtless too soon to predict either success or failure for his experiment. But no one will deny that he has a vast influence in his native land.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

VICTORIAN AND POST-VICTORIAN*

[**Geoffrey West** contrasts the Victorian era of missions with the Georgian era of jobs, and incidentally he puts his finger on the real weak spot in D. H. Lawrence, who found occultism a reality but " antipathetic " to him. He recommended to Nancy Henry—" Try and get hold of Madame Blavatsky's books . . . get from some library or other *Isis Unveiled* and better still the Two Volumes work whose name I forget . . . they are not *very* much good " (p. 476). This was after the war which had killed the soul of Lawrence. Compare the failure of Lawrence with that of Wordsworth as described by Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset in THE ARYAN PATH for October 1932. They make the teaching of *The Voice of the Silence* speak with a new emphasis—

" Do not belive that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart."]

Is it possible to sum up a generation, to say nothing of a century, in a generalisation? Probably not, and yet one can, it is inevitable that one should, draw distinctions. More, they exist, they really are there, whether defined or not. The spirit of the age continually changes, and one is made aware of such change in a thousand ways. One reads perhaps of Gladstone receiving the news of his first call to Premiership. He is cutting down a large tree in his garden, and for some moments he does not even pause. Then the blows cease, and, in the word sof an eye-witness, " Mr. Gladstone, resting on the handle of his axe, looked up and with deep earnestness in his voice and with great intensity in his face, exclaimed: 'My mission is to pacify Ireland.' He then resumed his task, and never said another word till the tree was down." A simple Victorian inci-

* *The Great Victorians*. Edited by H. J. MASSINGHAM and HUGH MASSINGHAM. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

The Letters of D. H. Lawrence. Edited with an Introduction by ALDOUS HUXLEY (Heinemann. 21*s*.)

dent, undoubtedly received by readers of that day with a sense of its unchallengeable fitness. And even we to-day, though the delayed pause, the earnestness, the intensity, the subsequent completion of the task in hand, are all so very much in character as to have a touch of caricature, can find it entirely appropriate. But what we do feel is that, were we to hear it reported to-day of a living politician, we shouldn't believe it, we should deem it smart publicity. " My *mission* !" What we lack to-day, that the Victorians so notably had, is exactly that sense of mission. They knew just where they wanted to go, and often (though never with Ireland) they got there with astonishing success. But we are at sea—socially, politically, morally, spiritually. A tree is a good thing to lay an axe to, but the sharpest blade will cut little ice on an ocean so restless, tossing, and uncharted as that whereon we are adrift. One can say : My mission is to reach the coast of Spain, or India. Or even the Golden Isles. But when the leadsman at the bows tells us that his *mission* is to take soundings our instinct is to tell him to get on with his *job*. The instance and the metaphors are simple, nevertheless they point to some of the profoundest differences between nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at any rate in Europe.

Those who would study the Victorian mind, both as it was in itself and as it appears to a number of living writers, cannot do better than turn to the pages of Messrs. Massinghams's bulky compilation, *The Great Victorians*, in which forty outstanding figures of that period are subjected to the scrutiny of forty varying intelligences of this. The selection of subjects may be disproportionate to the essential English achievements of the period—too many belong to literature and art, one-tenth only are specifically scientific ; there are seven politicians, and only two religious leaders (Booth and Newman)—and the essays themselves are uneven in quality, though the general standard is high, yet the book achieves its end. Here are Victorians seen by moderns of every point of view and every possible phase of post-Victorian development. Really, however, to understand the consciousness which we may say to-day has superseded the Victorian, one might better turn to another book altogether, *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*. Lawrence stands for many to-day in Britain and America—a portent, his very name a battle-cry—and, in a degree, rightly so. Even in our own time Lawrence has been abused without understanding, but Victorianism would certainly have stoned him out of hand, without a dissentient voice. Fortunately for him, perhaps, he was no more conceivable in than to the nineteenth century, for he is the incarnation of that new spiritual consciousness which has so completely shattered the shard of the Victorian mentality.

Every age has its consciousness, every consciousness is spiritual in its degree, and every spirit finds its form; but there are ages which stress the spirit, the inner being, and again ages to which the form, the outer being, is almost all. Form as such had perhaps its European apotheosis in the eighteenth century, but though the nineteenth, coloured a little by the spiritual perception of the early Romantic Movement, saw deeper, was more essentially serious, still it too gave precedence to Law before Spirit, held a discipline more formal than organic, valued the letter above the life. Even on the highest level it exalted the intellect, sheer reason, above the deepest knowledge of the soul. Few men more essentially shaped the Victorian mentality than Charles Darwin with his mechanist picture of nature; his intellectual offspring were Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Thomas Hardy, each of whom in his own way proclaimed a universe sterilized by the scientific vision. Beside them, the "sweetness and light" of Matthew Arnold, the humanism of William Morris, the literary esotericisms of Rossetti, Swinburne, Stevenson, and the like were little more than ineffectual evasions. Science was writ large across the Victorian firmament, and the great majority of those who did not directly bow to it still made implicit acknowledgment of their consequent unimportance. (Only Samuel Butler was really unrepentant in his irreverence.) The very Christian Churches, contesting the findings of science, interpreted their own doctrines (to the latters' discrediting!) with a scientific precision, almost to the degree of accepting evident parable as statement of fact. In every realm intellect established a goal that was never in doubt, the way to which lay plain to the vision. Thus the Victorians were narrow in their interests, bigoted in their general outlook; they ignored by-paths, the heights equally with the abysses. They would not admit their lapses even to the extent of confessing their sins; prudery, hypocrisy, were made automatic oubliettes down which to dispose of inevitable faults on the principle of least said, soonest mended. Convention was a power that ruthlessly crippled those who would not conform to it. Yet it was this very power of keeping to the path, to the point, that produced that effectiveness in action, force of concentration, and persistence which marks all their greatest figures—that ability to pursue a single scheme over decades of untiring effort which produced, for example, Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy" and (even more notably) Darwin's *Origin of Species*.

Victorian discovery indisputably opened great vistas of time and space, but it viewed them only from one, the intellectual, standpoint. It was a limiting, finally an imprisoning, vision. What Poe called "the mad pride of intellectuality" reared about itself

a cell spiritually as devoid of illumination as the deepest dungeons to be found in that same author's tales of horror. The spirit, if it was not to die, had to break those bonds. The modern consciousness seems at times simply dispersed, without shape or direction. It is in fact a released consciousness, seeking form yet fearing lest it find but another prison, desiring a plastic, organic form shaped from within, not without. It is a quest infinitely difficult, demanding a wisdom as wide as the world, as old as mankind itself, yet needing for the West a mode of definitism comprehensible to the West.

Here we touch the essential value of the life and work of D.H. Lawrence. He was one of "the *Grenzleute*"—"the border-line people"—"those who are on the verge of human understanding, and who widen the frontiers of human knowledge all the time—and the frontiers of life". As he said of another, one "reverences him the more according to the degree of purity of his genius, reverences him less according to the degree of his practicality". The tragedy of Lawrence was that his genius was less than pure. He once wrote of the artist Van Gogh that "if he could only have set the angel of himself clear in relation to the animal of himself, clear and distinct but always truly related, in harmony and union, he need not have cut his ear off and gone mad". How true not only of Van Gogh but of Lawrence! Those words were written early in 1915, when, "The Rainbow" that extraordinary exploration of the psychical life of three English generations, was written but still unpublished, when, that is, Lawrence was still going forward in positive development. The book blazes, even to-day, with nascent life, although in its last pages one may find a trace of that oppressive quality which makes its successor and sequel, *Women in Love*, a deathly volume. Some deny that the War disrupted Lawrence, and it is certainly possible to discern in these books the seeds of the conflict that shattered him. But if his letters make anything plain it is the effect of the War in making recovery, victory over that conflict, impossible. Many of his pre-War and early-War letters are simply magnificent in their intuitive understanding of, their tactile sensitiveness to, life. But from 1916 to 1918 we find exacerbation rising steadily almost to madness—a madness in which it seems only accidental that he did not cut off *his* ear! Relief follows with peace, but he never becomes the same man again. The later letters are interesting, but the deep perception of the earlier is gone; there has been not inward growth but disintegration. He travelled ceaselessly because in no one place could he find the peace his soul no longer held. To the end he remained what he called himself in 1914, "a passionately religious man," his novels written "from the depth of my religious experience," but the harmony

between angel and animal, at best glimpsed rather than attained, was destroyed for ever—progressively he denied the angel and proclaimed the animal. He had glimpses still. There is to the end wisdom in his letters as in his works.

Of occultism generally he wrote to a friend in 1918 that it was certainly a reality, and "very interesting and important, though antipathetic to me," and a few months later he was referring another friend to the works of Madame Blavatsky, again with reservations. More and more as time went on he derided modern science because he did not feel its findings "within," and turned back to the old pre-Christian gods and knowledge:

> The old dark religions understood. 'God enters from below,' said the Egyptians, and that's right. Why can't you darken your minds, and know that the great gods pulse in the dark, and enter you as darkness through the lower gates . . . . The god of gods is unknowable, unutterable, but all the more terrible; and from the unutterable god step forth the mysteries of our prompting in different mysterious forms: call it Thoth, or Hermes, or Bacchus, or Horus, or Apollo, different promptings, different mysterious forms. But why don't you leave off your old white festerings in silence, and let a light fall over your mind and heal you? And turn again to the dark gods, which are the dark promptings and passion-motions inside you, and have a reverence for life.

How perceptive—and how blind! What absolute stepping-forth from the tyranny, the limitation, the psychical castration of Victorian certainty and intellectualism—what total lack of education in the wider wisdom he feels his way towards! One should, perhaps, turn rather to such a book as his *Apocalypse* to find a statement of his creed:

> What man most passionately wants is his living wholeness and his living unison, not his own isolate salvation of his "soul". Man wants his physical fulfilment first and foremost, since now, once and once only, he is in the flesh and potent. For man, the vast marvel is to be alive . . . . We ought to dance with rapture that we should be alive and in the flesh, and part of the living, incarnate cosmos. I am part of the sun as my eye is part of me. That I am part of the earth my feet know perfectly, and my blood is part of the sea . . . . What we want is to destroy our false, inorganic connections, ... and re-establish the living organic connections, with the cosmos, the sun and earth, with mankind and nation and family. Start with the sun, and the rest will slowly, slowly happen.

But even in *Apocalypse* he looked no further than the flesh and a fleshly knowledge of "the elemental immediacy of the cosmos".

The Victorians paid lip-service to the spirit, in terms that denied it; Lawrence has denied it after a fashion that, so long as he is read with understanding of his limitations, gives it release. He cannot suffice, else we do but exchange one prison for another. But where *they* denied, *he* points to, a wisdom larger than their or his own.

GEOFFREY WEST

TOWARDS THE UNIVERSAL RELIGION*

[**D. L. Murray** is one of those silent moulders of the thoughts of men whose labour cannot be valued by only a reading of his numerous books and articles. In this review once again he pleads for a brotherhood of religions.—EDS.]

In these lectures, originally delivered at Calcutta, the Professor of Theology in Yale University, gives us a singularly lucid and comprehensive survey of the religious problem as it presents itself to the modern consciousness. No doubt, the aim of the work is constructive rather than critical; but those who cannot at all points accept Prof. Macintosh's scheme for the reconstruction of traditional theology in the form of a universal religion can at any rate admire and profit by his survey of the chief religious philosophies of the day.

After a brief criticism of the inadequacy of traditional religion regarded as a scheme of doctrines and values imposed by an authority not subject to rational examination, the author attacks the problem of the possibility of religious knowledge, and shows the unsatisfactoriness of the "empiricism" that would reduce human knowing to a mere flux of sensations and the agnosticism that admits the existence of an Absolute Reality but denies that any knowledge of its nature is possible. In the hands of Kant, however, agnosticism is made to yield a gleam of hope, for if we cannot know "things in themselves" we are yet able in virtue of our sense of moral obligation to postulate the necessary existence of God, free will and immortality as an act of the practical reason.

This leads us on to the enchanted land of Hegelianism or Absolute Idealism, where Prof. Macintosh lingers for a good many pages fascinated, as any religious mind must be, by the majesty and harmony of the great vision evoked by Hegel and his successors, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, the Cairds and Royce, the vision of the Universe as the thought of a single Absolute Mind of which all finite minds are somehow part, a Mind for which error and evil can be known merely as appearances, partial points of view transcended in the knowledge of the Whole which is rational throughout. One may fairly assume that the grand vision of Hegel, like the vision of Plato and the vision of Spinoza, is one that will draw to itself disciples so long as human beings philosophize; like all the greater philosophic intuitions it resists criticism in virtue of its sheer sweep and magnificence. Those who have once yielded to the spell are resigned to leave certain fundamental puzzles unsolved; they had rather admit a certain number of impenetrable riddles than abandon an interpretation of the universe so luminous and

* *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought.* Stephanos Nirmalendu Lectures. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. (University of Calcutta)

comprehensive. They feel too the relief, after so many troubled arguments for and against the existence of God on the grounds of science, history, and metaphysics, of reposing in the iron dialectic that offers to show the impossibility of making the simplest statement without implicitly admitting the existence of an absolute and all comprehensive spiritual Reality. For this philosophy God is truly all and in all. The oppositions of matter and spirit, subject and object are overcome; evil is subsumed in a higher Good, the Real is rational through and through, and the rational is the absolutely Real. There is no need to search out God or risk of losing Him, for it is impossible ever to escape from His Being. He is in every thought and every act, as the French poet has said: *Quelque chose en moi que soit plus moi-même que moi.* Prof. Macintosh's restatement of the Hegelian position, critical as it is, is so able and clear that it brings back all the fascination of that proud phase in German and British philosophy; and when he bids us pass on to views that he thinks give a better account of the ultimate problems of God and man we do so reluctantly, wondering whether, after all, we shall not be merely exchanging one set of difficulties for another, and whether we should not, like St. Peter on the Mount of Transfiguration, set up our tents here rather than seek possible disillusionment elsewhere.

Still, we cannot afford to disregard such pungent criticisms of Absolute Idealism as Prof. Macintosh enforces. Can the Ultimate Reality of the Universe be Thought and nothing else? Is not the struggle against moral evil deprived of its meaning if evil is already "somehow" overcome in the Absolute? What genuine freedom has the human will, what genuine reality have individual personalities if they are merely "moments" or "aspects" in the unfolding of a universal, irresistible Reason? Gravest difficulty of all. Is there any meaning whatever in saying that human minds can be "included" in an Absolute Mind? Would not the very inclusion obliterate their individual characteristics?

> "How can one of my experiences of ignorance or error, for example, be in and for a perfectly rational, all-comprehending and therefore all-knowing Absolute Mind exactly what it is for me? In the Absolute my ignorance or error would be accompanied by knowledge of that of which I am ignorant. But is it not psychologically inconceivable that contents of experience can be in full consciousness in the same rational mind with other relevant contents without being in the least modified by that fact? The Absolute's omniscience would make error no longer error and ignorance no longer ignorance, so that these contents of experience could not be in the Absolute as they are in us."

Dr. Macintosh goes on to quote the gibe of a well-known pragmatist that if the Absolute really include the multiplicity of human Minds with their errors, fantasies and incoherences, it must be regarded as "morbidly dissociated, or even as down right mad". There is, however, surely another possibility to be taken into account. The Absolute may be not "morbidly" but "functionally" dissociated. In the human organism a great many necessary actions are performed "automatically" or "unconsciously"—that is, it seems most reasonable to suppose, performed under the direction of conscious processes immanent in the organism which do not emerge into the central cerebral consciousness, which they would overcrowd and confuse by their presence. May not the Absolute Mind similarly have shut off from Itself the finite centres of consciousness to deal with particular problems—the unity of the whole subsisting at a deeper level than that of the functionally separated conscious parts ?

However this may be, Prof. Macintosh leads us into fresh fields in the pursuit of his aims, and proceeds next to examine the philosophy of Pragmatism, or the doctrine that theories are to be tested by their working, by the practical help they give in organizing and harmonizing our experiences. This seems to us the least satisfying part of his book. It is not possible to give any adequate account of the Pragmatic movement without keeping William James and F. C. S. Schiller in the foreground, but Prof. Macintosh only treats of the former very casually, and practically ignores the latter altogether. He concentrates exclusively upon Prof. John Dewey and his school; but, distinguished figure as Dewey must always remain, he cannot give the law to Pragmatism. If members of his school pragmatically evaluate the idea of "God" as merely a symbol of human and social values, they can only speak for a wing of the movement; neither James nor Schiller have so eviscerated the idea of God's existence. Still, Pragmatists, as a body, should not complain of Prof. Macintosh, since he avowedly accepts their central doctrine of the "Will" "(or "Right") to Believe", under due safeguards and without ignoring the controlling power of objective reality in testing the postulates of the religious consciousness. The principle of " Moral optimism" upon which Prof. Macintosh builds much of his own creed is just such a "Postulate," affirming on the basis of our sense of moral values that "the cosmos, ultimately considered, must be on the side of the spiritual. In other words, the God we imperatively need exists".

In his synthesis of modern modes of thought Prof. Macintosh seems to us to make a better use of Pragmatism than he does of the so-called New Realism, from which also he tries to draw elements for his construction.

Timeo Danaos . . . . From Berkeley to Hegel and Bradley the Idealistic argument that the existence of matter independently of mind is inconceivable has been one of the most cogent arguments for a spiritual interpretation of the Universe. Prof. Macintosh's revival of the old distinction between secondary and primary qualities of matter, as a basis for asserting the independent existence of the latter, apart from the perceiving subject does not carry more conviction to us than Locke's statement of the same case centuries ago. Nor are we clear in what sense Prof. Macintosh holds himself to have established a direct experience or intuition of the Deity comparable to the direct experience of material objects. The Idealistic inference from matter to mind still seems to us a much stronger argument, and Prof. Macintosh's ultimate Theism is far more firmly based on the modified doctrine of creative evolution which he adapts from Bergson than on the contribution of the New Realism. (It is a misfortune that his lectures went to Press before he could utilize Prof. Bergson's latest book *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion.*)

The last chapter should be of special interest to Theosophists since it contains suggestions for an attitude towards the historic religions which should allow those who have been brought up in particular faiths to remain loyal to the special revelations of the Divine Nature contained in them while at the same time uniting with adherents of other creeds in acknowledging the universal religious values which hold good for all humanity. This is an ideal that has for a long while appealed to the present writer. In a Catholic cathedral we see united in a whole the symbols of a number of different aspects of the Divine Reality. The High Altar stands for the Unity of the Godhead, and round it are grouped chapels and shrines dedicated to the Blessed Sacrament, the Madonna, the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a number of Saints. Why should there not arise some day a vaster cathedral in which the chief religions of the world, Judaism, Christianity, the Hindu and Buddhist faiths, Moslemism, should each have their appropriate shrine under a roof that symbolized the embracing unity of the Universal religion. Such a vision perhaps outruns the caution of Prof. Macintosh's well-weighed thought, but it is not out of consonance with the spirit of his book. If he has not defined the whole faith of future humanity, he has made the advance of a bold and a skilled pioneer.

D. L. MURRAY

THE MIND OF YOUTH

[In almost every country the young are dissecting the ways and outlooks of their elders. Meantime two well-known publicists take stock of the capacity of the modern youth in the following reviews.—EDS.]

I*

Why is Youth so vocal to-day? It has its say on every subject and nobody objects. The reason is the Age is silent. The void has to be filled. There is a pretence that we must listen to Youth; but it is only pretence, which it would be better to give up. What the age wants is wisdom, and wisdom comes only when youth is ended.

I approached this book, therefore, without expecting that it would contain guidance for the world, or even for the Youth of the world. I was not mistaken. There are five essays by young men and two by young women, in which the writers say what they think about religion. Two of them are Roman Catholics, one is an Anglo-Catholic, the other four have no professed religion. They all say what we should expect. The Churchmen expound their beliefs, the others explain their uncertainties. They all write modestly and without self-assertion. For those reasons the book has a certain charm. The writers are sincere and sincerity must be acknowledged.

Let me summarise what they say, as far as possible in their own words.

Susan Lowndes, whose father is a well-known London journalist and her mother a popular novelist, says:

> I am a Catholic because I had the good fortune to be born into the Church, and the good sense to remain in it; and I remain a Catholic because I prefer to have a philosophy of life which is based on reason, and not one that is based on sentiment or vague humanitarianism.

Peter Winckworth takes an interest in politics and is articled to a solicitor; he says:

> The worship of God, the worship of the Mass, the practice of religion, are joyful, and they alone can satisfy the soul.

Christopher Casson, a young actor, says:

> I am . . . an Anglo-Catholic. The Catholic form of worship is the same all the world over . . . But as an Anglican I can remain tolerant, I can remain free to think for myself, and to develop my mind and life, with a tradition behind me, and yet without fetters. And that, I think, is what I need.

Pamela Frankau, clever novelist, daughter of a clever novelist father, says:

> I am in a pretty good muddle about everything . . . Christianity . . . is, literally, too much of a good thing.

So she comes to this:

> The accepting of a moral code, an instinctive reverence for the Bible, the Church and the name of God—together with the gravest doubts of their significance.

E. L. B. Hawkin, whose mother is sister of the late General Louis Botha, works in a City office, says:

> I felt compelled to throw over my allegiance to organized religion some years ago . . . I have tried to form a personal philosophy which carries me along very well . . . I believe in moderation and a sense of balance in all ways. I believe that it pays to be honest . . . : I believe that a sense of humour is vitally important . . . I believe in never worrying until it happens . . . If I worship any God, it can best be expressed in one word—"Genuineness".

Giles Playfair, the actor son of a famous actor father, asks for:

> . . . a new Church suitable to modern conditions, a Church that appeals to energy and not to self-content, a Church unhampered by puritanical misgivings and Victorian traditions, a Church that may encourage and assist in all that the nation is striving for.

W. A. Fearnley-Whittingstall, who is a rising young barrister with political interests, says:

> Religion attracts . . . because all courage attracts . . . Religion demands courage and ideals. The Church does not repel but it disappoints.

The two Roman Catholics are positive, they have no doubts, they are educated in their faith. Miss Lowndes writes the best essay in the book, the clearest, the one that says most. The

* *Youth looks at Religion.* Edited By KENNETH INGRAM. (Philip Allan & Co. Ltd. 5s.)

Anglo-Catholic is nothing like so positive. He says, "My beliefs are far from static," and he writes of " . . . such ideas as I have tried to think out for myself". He is thoughtful and earnest, but he obviously has not gone very deep. The essays of the four non-believers are not on the same intellectual level as the others. Miss Frankau is superficial and confused; Mr. Hawkin has the every day philosophy of the business man; Mr. Playfair does not know what to think; and Mr. Fearnley Whittingstall, as a careful lawyer, refuses to commit himself.

What can we get from this book? That Youth is eager for religion and that outside the Church it has found no satisfaction. That is a remarkable fact. Does it mean that Youth must return to Church? If so, I think the future to be hopeless; for if there is one thing those who are outside the Church are unanimous about is that they will never go inside. So what is to be done? Those who can guide Youth must go where Youth is to lead it. Are there such guides? Ah, I have no doubt of that; but they are not at present guiding. Youth waits for them to lead it out of the age of Chaos.

Until the guides begin to lead what can Youth do? I shall be asked. Young men and women can start on the path for themselves. The first step is to be trustful, and the second to trust yourself, or to have courage. Those who take those steps can never go wrong.

C. B. PURDOM

II*

This is a first book, and the publisher tells us that the author is aged 21—a fact which the reader who has the misfortune to be twice his age has constantly to bear in mind. For Mr. Hale's work has certain of the essential qualities of youth. He is excited; he finds the universe and its problems tremendously important, and his sense of the urgency of the issues with which he deals often causes him to over-write. Consequently his language, eloquent and exceedingly expressive at times, loses much of its effect by keeping the reader at a perpetual strain. But Mr. Hale has something to say, and the reader who allows himself to be put off by the exceptionally strained atmosphere of the earlier pages will be making a mistake.

The "challenge to defeat" which Mr. Hale sets out to answer is the challenge presented in Spengler's *Decline of the West*. He regards Spengler as the spiritual descendant and at the same time in the last resort the antithesis of Goethe. He takes Spengler's vast generalisations and his marshalling of selected facts in support of a hypothesis which depends ultimately upon instinct and not on reason very seriously indeed, and a large part of his book is spent in the statement and rebutting of Spengler's fundamental contention. For a reader who is quite unable to take Spengler seriously this puts some obstacles in the way of an appreciation of Mr. Hale's thesis. But the thesis itself is none the less important. In Mr. Hale's view the world alike in art and science and in its way of life stands at a turning-point. The nineteenth century, or rather the period that ended with the Great War, was essentially a period of the dissolution of values of the disappearance of that 'totality' which is the key to the understanding of truth. During this century science, pursuing its path of material discovery, forgot subjectivity in its more and more intensive study of objective phenomena, while art, pursuing ever more intensively the paths of introspection, forgot objectivity in a development which has ended to-day in a purely barren individualism, or sometimes in a furious and unreasoning reversion to the primitive. In way of life, too, the nineteenth century forgot

* *Challenge to Defeat—Modern Man in Goethe's World and Spengler's Century*. By WILLIAM HARLAN HALE. (Harcourt Brace and Company, New York.)

the totality of things in the pursuit of individualism and ended up in an unworkable and rapidly dissolving chaos of *laisser faire*. The mark of the new age, Mr. Hale believes, will be the return from this individualism to a spirit of community—totality—in life, art and science. The scientists, having analysed matter until it has dissolved under their touch, will have to seek a reintegration with the subjective fact of life which they have hitherto ignored. The artists will have to come out of their introspection into a world of objective reality based on the community of men, and the way of living will have to be reorganised so as to discard the individualist motives of capitalist society in favour of a communal effort for the achievement of the good life. All this, Mr. Hale believes, is coming about, though we cannot see it clearly because a thing can be seen clearly only when it has happened and not while it is happening. He states his thesis and adorns it with the fruits of a reading and study astonishingly abundant in one of his years. If this is not in the fullest sense a good book, it is at any rate a very interesting and promising book. For more than any other which I have read it does express that turning away of the mind of youth from the weariness and disillusionment of the immediate post-war years to the attempt to find a fresh constructive synthesis of self with the outside world —a new subject-object relation keenly enough realised to give man back his self-confidence and his sense both of the reality of things outside himself and of the worthwhileness of purposeful endeavour.

G. D. H. COLE

Nogaku, Japanese N- Plays. By BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI (John Murray, London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

Mrs. Beatrice Lane Suzuki does not attempt an exhaustive study of the Japanese Nō plays. It would be an impossible task within the compass of the well-known *Wisdom of the East* series. Such plays faithfully reflect the spirit of the Japanese people from early dance, legend, Shinto worship to Buddhism, and such aesthetic refinement as the ability to taste the colour and perfume of a flower. Much might be written on such apparently simple expletives as "Ha" and "Ho," the movement of the sleeve, fan, foot, the strange significance of masks, the amazing impersonation of women characters by male actors. The detail is endless, intricate, hard to understand, but always of vital importance from a Japanese point of view. Every drum tap, every flute note, every inflexion of voice, every movement is contributory to the whole. No foreigner can expect to appreciate this particular form of drama with any completeness. Much must remain incomprehensible. "He can," writers Mrs. Suzuki, "only grasp a bit of its fleeting charm and attempt to give a glimpse of it to others". That is precisely what Mrs. Suzuki has succeeded in doing, and doing exceedingly well, in this book. She provides a useful key in explaining *Yūgen*, "the identification of thought and action". Seami described it as "the actor's flower," without which there could be no beauty in the play. Such a performance is not to be approached lightly. It is capable of giving much, but only to those whose mind and spirit are sufficiently attuned to what is seen and heard upon the stage; devotees rather than patrons who must forget the theatre, the leading actor, even the idea or spirit of the play if they would comprehend Nō. It is a solemn rite and not theatre-going as we understand it.

HADLAND DAVIS

THE MYSTIC ANDREWS AND THE RATIONALIST JOAD

What I Owe to Christ. By C. F. ANDREWS. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 5*s.*)

Under The Fifth Rib : A Belligerent Autobiography. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Faber & Faber, London. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Modern religious literature abounds in works about religion. But one rarely finds a book which *is* religion. Such a book is C. F. Andrews' *What I Owe to Christ*. This is, in fact, an autobiography, chiefly spiritual. The author narrates here with candour, yet with modesty, the beginnings and growth of his spiritual experience, which is as real to him,—if not more real,—as the events of his physical life. In an attractive manner the book's nineteen chapters deal with the way in which "Christ's power to heal and restore has changed the whole aspect of things, integrating character," giving new hope and urging forward to nobler action. It is a practical "plea for a return, in spirit and in truth, to that pure love of Christ". It is a moving story of the pilgrimage of a God-thirsty soul and the notable incidents in this eventful life is told with striking simplicity and literary grace.

All through the volume there occur insights into the spiritual experiences of many of the most interesting people now living,—students, Moslems, Hindus, Confucians, Buddhists, Jews and Christians of many lands and races. Such sharing of religious experiences led to the inevitable break, conscious and deliberate, with the conventionalities of Christianity which hitherto bound him hand and foot and made it impossible for him to grow to the fulness of his spiritual personality. This shaking off of authority and dogma has enabled the author to demonstrate with unconscious grace and utter freedom from cant the possibility of being, in the Pauline sense, all things to all men, and show how broad Christianity can be without losing its depth; how utterly much of the divisiveness of organized Church life denies the spirit of the Master; how much more convincing loving friendliness and faultless living are than argument: in short, how much more acceptable in form, richer in spirit and fuller in content the Christian religion can become if it is truly orientalized. Indeed, the author's way of life, as described in this book, is really a challenge which Western Christianity can ill afford to ignore without a considerable loss in her spiritual strength and usefulness.

Much as Mr. Andrews' book aims at freedom from the spirit of controversy, Prof. Joad's volume *Under the Fifth Rib: A Belligerent Autobiography*, seems to aim at arousing controversy and as much thought as controversy may engender. This author's book, much like that of C. F. Andrews, is unusual as an autobiography. In fact, it is no autobiography at all; if it is that it is in the sense of being "a series of personal grumbles". He makes fun of conventional morals and hey of conventional religion; he holds conventional politics to shame and classical education to ridicule, and thus gives us in this book an account of his own reactions to certain intellectual characteristics of his age which help the reader to understand the author's critical attitude to the whole field of life,—philosophy, politics, society sex, literature, art and all the pleasures of the mind and the body. Being convinced that a distinguishing feature of the present age is the cult of unreason,—which is inimical to the progress of mankind,—he directs a merciless onslaught against some of its concrete expressions, such as, unreason in modern psychology, unreason in politics, unreason in literature, unreason in the use of science, unreason in religion and politics. Hence a belligerent autobiography.

The pages of Mr. Joad's book thus come to be invested with a certain gloom; something or other is always put up as object of contempt. The book may therefore produce in the mind of the reader the impression that the author is a disgruntled person, out of touch with the trends and movements of the time, and impotently grumbling at a society in

which he has failed. But nothing can be further from the truth; a careful reading will reveal that the author is a philosopher and as such he seeks to understand the nature of the universe as a whole and the meaning and purpose underlying it. He looks for a clue to guide him through the labyrinth, for a system wherewith to classify, or a purpose in terms of which to make it meaningful. It is difficult to concede the purpose without feeling some obligation to further it. It is difficult to conclude that human life is designed without concluding also that society, as we know it, is not realizing the design; difficult to believe that the object of evolution is the achievement of truth, goodness and beauty, and not lament the ever rising tide of ugly industrialism. Our author, it must be pointed out to his credit, succeeds not only in discerning a purpose and recognizing an ideal but, unlike most of our modern philosophers feels an obligation to further the purpose or remove obvious impediments to the realization of the ideal. Driven by this sense of social duty and the conviction of the efficacy of Reason he has become so unsparing, pungent and satirical a critic of modern society.

It is interesting to note how the mystic Andrews and the rationalist Joad, though so different in so many ways, possess a similarity of aim in life,—service to fellowmen. While to Andrews faith is a faculty of mind transcending, if not over-riding, reason in the apprehension of religious truth, to Joad faith "is the power of believing what we know to be untrue" and reason "the power of kidding ourselves into believing what we think true is true". In this age of unreason, man's reason, he says, follows his likings as the feet of a hungry dog follows its nose. Nevertheless, we must struggle, he maintains, to be wise, since we are free, within limits, to make our lives what we will.

Self is a little pit of vanity and desire from which it is our duty, as far as possible, to avert our eyes. Hence he praises not self-knowledge, as did the Greeks, but self-forgetfulness. Happiness, he points out, results not from pre-occupation with oneself but from oblivion of oneself in concentration upon some external thing. It comes as bye-product of one's efforts to better society. This way of looking at life naturally raises the question whether a life dominated by the spirit of religion and a life controlled and guided only by reason need be poles asunder. To this a careful and sympathetic reading of these stimulating autobiographies leads one to reply in the negative, for, the one appears as divinely human as the other is humanly divine. These two views of life possess too much in common to be antagonistic to each other. Prof. Joad, like Mr. Andrews, seeks for harmony and unity and refuses to take a departmental view of life. Both of them find their happiness largely in their efforts to remove social maladjustment and improve human relationship. While Mr. Andrews seeks to serve humanity through religious inspiration, Prof. Joad comes to the ideal of service to fellowmen by way of rational persuasion. Though there are points in which a reader may violently differ with the authors, yet one cannot but acknowledge that they have given us two thought-provoking volumes which are as unusual as they are interesting and deserve to be widely read.

JAGADISAN M. KUMARAPPA

As I See Religion. By H. E. FOSDICK. (Harper & Bros., New York, 1932.)

This is a very stimulating book, for all who are baffled by the challenge of modern scientific thought. The most systematic treatment of the subject of modern challenge to religion is perhaps to be found in Professor Radhakrishnan's "An Idealist View of Life". Dr. Fosdick's book is less comprehensive and philosophical, but on that very account more vigorous and practical. It clearly points out that the Christian Churches in America ought not to wrangle over outworn creeds and dogmas. They ought not to worry about saving this or that brand of theology. A living and vigorous religion saves us.

We do not save it. The Christians of the first century did not go about saving Christianity. They went about saving souls. It is only when a movement grows senile that it begins to apologise for its existence.

We are glad to observe that progressive Christian writers have begun to realise what higher Hinduism has always taught that religion is primarily a matter of spiritual experience. What the churches have to do is to revitalize religion at its source, make it a stream of living water and not a stagnant pool with cement steps. They should dwell more on experience than on authority, insist more on spiritual life than on doctrinal belief and thus make religion an expansive force rather than a contractive one. We are sure that if preachers of all religions do this we shall soon have friendly contacts established between the various religious groups of the world which may go a great way in promoting world-peace and world-unity.

Dr. Fosdick's criticism of modern attempts at achieving a religion without God and a morality without religion is particularly opportune. He points out that non-theistic humanism of to-day is only a half-way house. It is right so far as it is humanism and looks upon human personality as something precious, but it is wrong when it plumes itself on being nontheistic and thinks that human personality can flourish without roots in God. Humanists, like all theists, want to cultivate the good life, but, unlike the theists, they try to cultivate it in a godless universe of their own, or of their friends'—the scientists'—imagining. The modern scientific view of the universe may be right so far as it goes. But obviously it is a partial view inasmuch as it does not give us the whole truth. It may be that the universe, as Sir James Jeans tells us, is an empty, finite, expanding, corrugated continuum of four dimensions—three of space and one of time. But to say that this is the whole truth about the universe is like saying that the whole of Shakespeare's *King Lear* is comprised within the twenty-six letters of the English alphabet. If there are protons and electrons in the universe, there are also beauty and goodness. The world we live in is both quantitative and qualitative. To measure the quantities and ignore the values is only to take a deliberately false view. And it is precisely on this false view that modern humanism bases its philosophy. It takes for granted that man is "an accidental ripple inadvertently blown up on the cosmic surface". No wonder therefore its philosophy is so thin and dry. If man is nothing more than this, then all his attempts at living the good life are nothing more than the whistling of a cow-boy to keep up his courage in the dark. But religion takes quite a different view of man. It looks upon him, in Dr. Fosdick's language, "as a spiritual adventurer in a spiritual world where all the best in him is response to the Eternal Best".

One of the modern heresies that Dr. Fosdick exposes in his brilliant book is that morals can flourish without religion. We often hear it said that atheists and agnostics are as moral as those who believe in religion. Well, first of all we do not know how many of those who pride themselves on their scepticism would be as moral as they are if they were not originally brought up in religious home and a religious society. And then morality is something higher than one's response to the ordinary decencies of life, ingrained social habits and personal affections. No great moral adventure, no martyrdom and no resurrection from a moral grave can ever be the result of a morality divorced from religious faith. Dr. Fosdick rightly points out that a man's morals may not suffer when he loses faith, but his *morale* does and he will soon cease to be a creative moral agent. When you lay the axe at the root of your tree your flowers may continue to laugh a while, but you will have no more flowers. Nor is it wisdom on your part to pluck your flowers and plant them in the ground to get more flowers. If you want the flowers you must cultivate the tree.

D. S. SARMA

Empty Victory. By GEORGE GODWIN. (John Long Ltd. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The expectation of a golden age of peace and happiness is common to all faiths. In *Shantiparva* of the *Mahabharat* we find the philosophic conception of Krita Yuga. That golden age will come when the world will be full of perfect men with Ahimsa, self-knowledge and good will to all beings. All human action will then be free from the taint of selfishness (*Mahabharat, Shantiparva* 348 : 62–63). Efforts of common people will, no doubt, help advent of that age. But the final touch will, it is believed, be given by the divine hand of an *Avatar.*

In modern thinkers that old remote hope has become more definite in form and more potent in its urge to present common effort. The golden age of modern thinkers is to come through a unifying world-state eliminating national and racial animosities, wars, armaments inequalities of wealth, etc. The ideal destination of human kind has become clearer in outline and detail by near approach. The way, however, is not yet clear. Amongst the many difficulties and dangers that beset the way the problem of disarmament is perhaps the toughest. And curiously enough exactly like the ancient mind the modern mind too seems to expect help from superphysical forces, acting through supermen.

What the ancient world put forth in its *Bhavishya Purana,* the modern world will express in Utopian novels. The inherent ideal and hope are the same.

George Godwin in his novel selects the most puzzling problem—the vicious circle of armaments and wars. In 1951 the unprovoked attack of France on England with the new "arsenic gas" destroyed all life in London in a few hours. The English king who fortunately escaped was taken captive to Paris. England was governed by the French army of occupation.

But England did not retaliate even though she could have. She was inspired by her saintly prime minister James Grant—a man who for the first time after centuries took the true Christian faith seriously, and with an undaunted firmness put it into action. The demonstration of the ultimate success of the policy of non-resistance on a national scale in face of an unprovoked invasion with all the novel means of scientific destruction, brought out a change in the world which any number of Peace Conferences would not have achieved. The evil unresisted, reacted on the evil doer. France was condemned by world opinion and economically boycotted by all nations. Her economic fabric shattered by a disastrous colonial war in the North African deserts, where the arsenic gas proved futile against the guerrilla warfare of the rebels. In order to save herself France has to take her hands off England unconditionally without England so much as raising a finger in opposition.

Fortified by this ultimate victory, James Grant inspires the nations in the League to effect general disarmament, which prepares the way for the establishment of a world-state. There is, of course, the usual love story tacked on to the texture of the international plot of the novel. The hero is an English youth fired with the ideals of the new age and the heroine a daughter of the old order is ultimately converted to the new faith. Their story gives us an idea of the impact on individuals of the changes which came over the world. But the couple pales in significance before the simple grandeur of the character of England's saintly premier. One can hardly think that either unique situation or its sequel would come so soon as 1951. But those who believe that the bright future of mankind will come through the real understanding of true religion and not by the destruction of all religion will welcome the novel. It prepares the popular mind for the reception of some of the ideas that will be the inevitable precursors of the Golden age.

G. V. KETKAR

A New Deal. By STUART CHASE. (Macmillan. 10s.)

I should call Mr. Stuart Chase an imaginative Communist. He accepts the communist ideal. He sees, with complete clarity, that the modern technique of industrial production is irreconcilable with economic individualism. The unhampered pursuit of private profit, which in one form or another is the motive of modern industrial society, stultifies and disrupts the proper functioning of the industrial machine. The contradiction, if unmitigated, will inevitably produce chaos. Somehow it must be removed. That is the economic doctrine of communism. Mr. Chase is also a communist though rightly he lays less stress on this in the simple ethical sense. He believes that the "capitalistic" system is unjust and ignoble as well as absurd and dangerous.

Since Mr. Chase is also imaginative enough to be a realist, he asks himself whether the Russian method of making the necessary change in society by violent revolution is possible in an already highly industrialised country, like the U. S. A., which now exists in a condition of what he calls "technological tenuousness": that is to say, a condition in which the vital economic connections are delicate and sensitive, so that revolutionary action, unless it were secured beforehand of the willing co-operation of the great majority of indispensable technicians, would lead to paralysis, privation and pestilence. Mr. Chase's answer to the question is implicit in his formulation of it. He does not believe that the application of the Russian method to an already highly industrialised country is feasible. Neither do I. It is possible only in an economically primitive country such as Russia was in 1917, where the economic organism is so rudimentary that it could survive the revolutionary shock without paralysis.

Russia staged her revolution in what was practically a handicraft society; the mass of the people, being still peasants, could eat. The thought of what would happen here, in a specialized and industrial society blanches the heart.

The question then, for Mr. Chase becomes one of the road by which we may advance to the revolutionary change. He frankly admits that, if the "capitalistic" system persists in its present blindness, violent revolution may be the only remedy; nor, in that case, will it be worse than the disease, because unmitigated economic individualism will inevitably produce its own chaos. The chaos of violent revolution will be preferable to that. It will at least be chaos pregnant with a hope and a purpose.

But can we advance to the revolutionary change without chaos? Mr. Chase believes we can. He will have nothing to do with the remedy that begins to allure Big Business the mere expansion of purchasing power among the poor who do consume. The final objective of the dictatorship of Big Business, says Mr. Chase very justly, "would be a subservient, inarticulate, but reasonably prosperous mass of consumers and workers, catering to a small group of Olympian spenders". He rejects the notion vehemently. "It will probably abolish poverty but it will think *only in terms of profitable consumers and never in terms of human beings.* There are two main charges against that ambiguous arrangement known as capitalism: that it is economically inefficient, and that it is an ignoble way of life. Critics frequently confuse the two."

Mr. Chase does not confuse them: and he rejects the dictatorship of Big Business primarily on ethical grounds, though he sees also that the unity of interest among the competitive which such a system postulates is hardly conceivable.

There remains what he calls "The Third Road"—a non-violent transition to a genuine collectivism. It is "an attempt to dissolve capitalism with a minimum of governmental interference." The main methods proposed are (1) the redistribution of the national income by heavy taxation (2) a managed currency (3) a huge programme of public works. These proposals are eminently sane. The problem is to mobilise a sufficient body of public opinion behind

them, for all three proposals are, in relation to the appalling backwardness of popular opinion, revolutionary. And in popular opinion I include the opinion of men in such commanding positions as the present Governor of the Bank of England. Such men, by their helpless ignorance of the modern economic reality, are no better than well-meaning barbarians.

Here then is our practical modern problem, clearly seen and rightly formulated by Mr. Chase. Direct revolution is probably impossible. But peaceful and gradual revolution makes no such simple and "religious" appeal as simple communism. On the other hand, it is not possible for an imaginative and intelligent man in a highly industrial nation to be a simple communist. Where is the dynamic necessary to imaginative communism to be found? My own belief, or hope, is that it will be found, in England at least, in a purified élite of the working-class movement, flexible and open-minded enough to attract the best elements intellectual and technical of the middle-class. Of such a movement the basic philosophy would be communist, in the Marxian sense. But it would be an imaginative Marxism, as indeed was the Marxism of Marx himself. Inspired by that mystical materialism, that sense of society as an organic and evolving whole, it would be strong enough to face its peculiar and complex problems realistically without any weakening of its fundamental conviction of the necessity of revolution, and of the inevitability of the coming of the (economically) classless society. To the eventual formation of such a movement, consisting as it must of an enlightened minority of devoted and selfless men, who have brought their awareness to the point of understanding and accepting the necessity of overcoming their own economic individualism, once for all, Mr. Stuart Chase has made a very noble contribution.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

Freedom in the Modern World. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (Faber. 6*s.*)

The book is encouraging and significant. It is really a collection of B. B. C. Talks. That is the significant thing. Publicly, to a large audience, the problem of Freedom is discussed. And what kind of Freedom? The usual chat concerning externalities? Not at all! Real Freedom is the subject, inner Freedom, the unbinding of the soul, the untying of the bonds of unreality that hold our spirits down. It might be thought that such a subject could not possibly be popular enough to appeal to the large Western audience that listens into the radio. Yet it is so; and it proves that Westerners are beginning to suspect that the solution of their problems is to be found, not in any action of politicians nor in any league of nations, but in a league of their own impulses. Take a sentence such as this—"There is no real problem in our economic or financial situation itself. Poverty cannot be the effect of an increase of wealth; nor can bankruptcy be the result of a surplus of goods. When such a situation as we are in produces problems of a magnitude that is scaring us out of our wits, then there is insanity about." Such sentences addressed to a popular audience symbolise the awakening that is taking place in the West.

And there is nothing in the least superficial in the exposition of this unacademic professor. His positions are fundamental. H. P. Blavatsky's description of faith as a quality endowed with a most potent creative power finds exact expression again in Dr. MacMurray's answer to his question why we are in this mess: "Because we have lost our faith, and when we lose faith we lose the power of action." Our only complaint we have to make with the author in this connection is that in discussing the conflict between religion and science, though he has thrown one facet of the problem into strong relief, showing how in practice religion and science do conflict, he fails to point out how between real Religion and science con-

flict cannot arise. Nevertheless his fundamental attitude is held courageously throughout. This is well illustrated by his dicta on morals. The man of pseudo-religion invariably gives himself away when discussing the moral life. But here without any mincing of words the author emphasises that to the religious man life is an art, and morality the result of personal Freedom and subordinate to the fundamental problem of obeying the Holy Ghost. This is a profitable book written by a born teacher. And those who can learn from him are by no means only simple and perhaps ignorant people. To all who understand the message of mysticism it should be strongly recommended. It will help them further in their daily life.

J. S. COLLIS

Schopenhauer. His Life and Philosophy. By HELEN ZIMMERN. (Allen and Unwin. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Two things give special significance to Schopenhauer in our own day: (1) his theory of the mutual relations between the Will and the Intellect; and (2) that he was the first considerable European thinker to recognise that Indian philosophy constitutes a heritage that cannot be ignored in any attempt to reconstruct the human ideal. Moreover, himself, in his own measure, he absorbed and re-shaped Eastern thought, and in that respect must be considered to be a forerunner of all those now engaged in seeking the terms of a cultural rapprochement between the East and the West. In Schopenhauer's theory of the Will, the term is understood in the widest sense, and signifies an universal impulse characteristic of man and the lower animals as well as the whole range of inanimate nature. "In all instances where we find any spontaneous movements or any primal forces, we must regard the innermost essence as Will." It is, in short, the very principle of existence, and denotes not only purposeful activity but instincts and tendencies of any and every kind. Reason is not an attribute of the Will. It is only one of the instruments fashioned by the primal impulse in the course of its development, and the development is not governed by any motive translatable into rational language. The affinities of such a doctrine with certain contemporary forms of anti-intellectualism are duly pointed out by the author.

In regard to Schopenhauer as an exponent of Indian thought, Mrs. Zimmern observes that he was "a precursor of the fusion of the European spirit of experimental research with the Eastern genius for abstract speculation. To state this somewhat differently, he continued that transition of the European mind from a predominantly monotheistic to a pantheistic view of the Universe which began with Bruno, and of which the end is not yet". It might perhaps be more accurate to say an "immanentist" rather than a pantheistic view.

As an introduction to the study of Schopenhauer, this book seems admirable. German metaphysics are apt to be abstruse to the point of incomprehensibility, but in these pages the reader will find the ideas of at least one German master summarised with encouraging lucidity. Of equal interest with the philosophy are the life and character of the philosopher, to which Mrs. Zimmern devotes the greater part of her book. At one period in his life, we are told, Schoponhauer invariably read ancient Vedic books before retiring; "he called them his Bible".

K. S. SHELVANKAR

The Kathopanishad and the Gita. By Prof. D. S. SARMA. (M. R. Seshan, Madras. Re. 1.)

This volume contains the text of the *Kathopanishad*, together with an English translation, notes, and an introduction in which Professor Sarma develops the view that the Upanishad was one of the sources of the *Gita*. The work gives one the impression of having been done

in a scholarly fashion, though of course it could only be effectively criticised from this point of view by a person familiar with Sanskrit.

The Kathopanishad consists only of six short chapters, but it is rightly regarded as containing the very kernel of the Vedantic philosophy. What it teaches is the central mystery of the relation between the lesser and the greater selves, that mystery which is embodied in the great saying, *Tat Twam Asi*. So subtle is this doctrine that an understanding of it cannot be obtained by any exertion of the intellectual powers alone; it must be imparted directly by one who has already attained to illumination: "This Atman cannot be gained by the study of the Veda, nor by intellect, nor by much learning." "Taught by an inferior man He is not easily grasped, for variously is He conceived. If He is taught by a man who has realised Him within himself, then there is no uncertainty. For He is inconceivable and subtler than the subtle." "Not by reasoning is this knowledge obtained. Only when it is imparted by another, O dearest, can it be easily grasped." And even if these conditions are fulfilled the revelation would seem to be contingent upon an act of grace: "He whom the self chooses, by him is it gained."

If this were all the reader—and particularly the Western reader—would be impelled to protest that a religion based upon such an elusive order of truth is completely unable to meet the needs of the great mass of humanity. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the Upanishad is definitely intended for the advanced student of spiritual philosophy. Whereas the *Gita* is written primarily for the layman and deals with the earlier and more practical aspect of the problem of emancipation, the *Kathopanishad* is addressed rather to the individual who is nearer the end of the road: "The *Gita*," says Professor Sarma, "was a message delivered to the man of the world, while the Upanishad was a message delivered to the recluse in the forest." For, as he points out in his most interesting introduction to the work, the Eastern thinker recognises two stages in the path towards emancipation, that of extraversion, called *Pravritti Marga* and that of introversion, called *Nivritti Marga*. The second is regarded, reasonably enough, as the higher. For by the fact of being born into the world a man's attention is directed outside himself, and only as the result of a great deal of thought and suffering does he come to perceive that it is the appearance of reality rather than reality itself.

But for all that it is not held that the person whose mind is turned outwards is in a state of complete illusion. As Professor Sarma is careful to insist, any activity which causes us to identify our own selves with the selves of others brings us into relation of the Real. But that relation cannot be realized in its fulness until we have also found the Real within by a mystical process of meditation. And what is finally attained to, it is to be noted, is a condition in which both asceticism and external activity are transcended; for the self which initiated them both has achieved unity with the "One Ruler," and thereby become emancipated: "Let a Brahman renounce learning and become as a child; and, after renouncing learning and a child-like mind, let him become an ascetic. And when he has made an end of the ascetic state as well as the non-ascetic state, he becomes a Brahman indeed." This last saying may well be pondered over by those Western thinkers who believe that the philosophy of the East teaches only a purely negative attitude. For its message is, not that activity in itself involves the soul in illusion, but that neither activity nor non-activity have any reality unless they are an expression of the One, rather than of the separated, Self.

LAWRENCE HYDE

CORRESPONDENCE

ORIGIN OF INDIAN CASTES

In the Introduction to his translation of the *Bhagavad Gita*, the late Mr. Charles Johnston makes some very interesting suggestions about the origins of Indian castes and Indian religion. He tells us that the four great castes were based on racial differences; that the Brahmans sprang from a white race that may have come into India by way of the Hindu Kush; the Kshatriyas from the red Rajputs, whose territory extended from the Indus to the Ganges; the Vaishyas from the yellow agricultural races, whose lands ran south of the Rajput territory; and the Shudras from the black, or near black, peoples, who occupied the whole of southern portion of the peninsula. Mr. Johnston writes:

> The great struggle between kindred branches of the Rajput race recorded there (in the *Mahabharata*), permanently weakened that race, and eclipsed its glory, thus making room for the long dominance of the sacerdotal Brahmans. The growth of the Brahman power forms, as it were, a measure of the passage of ages in ancient India. In the archaic days of the first Upanishads, we find the sacred wisdom wholly in the hands of the Rajputs, the royal races, akin, as it would seem, to the ancient Egyptians and Chaldeans. Two of the Upanishads record the first initiation of a Brahman into that wisdom. The initiator, a princely Rajput, marks the occasion by declaring that this wisdom had never before been given to a Brahman, but in every region was the hereditary teaching of the Kshatriya, the warrior, alone.

Mr. Johnston goes on to discuss the contribution made by each of the four great castes (races) to the complex fabric of Indian religion. The Rajputs, he tells us:

> had their ancient tradition, which is put forth in the greater Upanishads, and which held the twin doctrine of rebirth and liberation. This tradition.....was much later imparted to the Brahmans.

Of the Brahmans, Mr. Johnston says:

> In Indra and Agni, they adored certain great cosmic principles, and the Vedic hymns record the ritual of their worship. They believed in the soul's immortality, but did not hold the teaching of rebirth until the Rajputs disclosed it to them. They conceived the souls of the dead as still present in earthly life, making a united life with the living members of the family, and bound to them by close ties of moral and psychical kinship. Every year they offered sacrifices to them.....This ancient ancestor-worship runs through the whole of Brahmanical law. . . . . ,

Of the Vaishyas, we are told:

> The yellow race of central India held, and for the most part holds to-day, a somewhat similar belief (to that of the ancient Brahmans). To it is added a practical spiritualism, the priests being mediums, who obtain communications from the souls of the departed ancestors, in trances, and visions.

With regard to the Shudras, Mr. Johnston says:

> The black races had their beliefs, but they were wilder and more elemental. Fierce and grimly destructive gods, symbolised from the darker and more menacing powers of nature....were propitiated in wild emotional rites. . . . .The many-armed and fantastic Indian gods are, in all likelihood, the contribution of the darker races of the south to the common fund. . . . . .

Deeply suggestive as they are, I believe that Mr. Johnston's views would be considered heterodox by most scholars; and it would be exceedingly interesting if some of your learned Indian readers would comment on them.

London R. A. V. MORRIS

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS.

When India's great leader Gandhiji speaks on mystical and religious matters he very often strikes a true and Theosophical note. In his statements issued to the press on the subject of Hinduism and religion, castes and untouchability, he has expressed ideas which give the religious world at large some fundamentals to be observed in life. What are the Revealed Books or the Vedas or the Bible or the Koran, what Eternal Religion or Sanatana Dharma? He writes:

I claim myself to be a Sanatanist... For me, Sanatana Dharma is a vital faith, handed down from generations, belonging even to the prehistoric period and based upon the Vedas, and on the writings that followed them. . . . It would be only partially true to say that the Vedas are the four books which one finds in print. These books are themselves remnants of discourses left by unknown seers. Later generations added to these original treasures, according to their lights. There then arose a great and lofty-minded man, the composer of the Gita. He gave to the Hindu world a synthesis of the Hindu religion, at once deeply philosophical and yet easily to be understood by any unsophisticated seeker. . . . . I have been seeking literally to live upto the teachings of that book. Whatever is contrary to its main theme, I reject as non-Hindu. It excludes no faith and no teacher. It gives me great joy to be able to say that I have studied the Bible, the Koran, the Zend Avesta and other scriptures of the world with the same reverence that I have given to the Gita. This reverent reading has strengthened my faith in the Gita. . . . . I take pride in calling myself a Hindu because I find the term broad enough not merely to tolerate, but to assimilate the teachings of prophets from all the four corners of the earth. . . According to the Sanatana Dharma taught by that venerable author, life does not consist in outward rites and ceremonials, but it consists in the uttermost inward purification and merging oneself body, soul and mind in the Divine Essence.

This is the position of the true Theosophist who lives by the inner religion of purity and wisdom, and while outwardly respecting every creed and faith belongs to none, as H. P. Blavatsky once said.

Very reminiscent are these words of Gandhiji of some other words of a great Indian not known to fame—Damodar K. Mavalankar, a loyal and devoted pupil and colleague of H. P. Blavatsky. More than 50 years ago, in May 1880, when he abjured his own Brahmanical caste, writing of Theosophy, he said:

Thus this study makes every man respect his religion the more. It furnishes to him a sight that can pierce through the dead letter and see clearly the spirit. He can read all his religious books between the lines. If we view all the religions in their popular sense,

they appear strongly antagonistic to each other in various details. None agrees with the other. And yet the representatives of these faiths say that the study of Theosophy explains to them all that has been said in their religion and makes them feel a greater respect for it. There must, therefore, be one common ground on which all the religious systems are built. And this ground, which lies at the bottom of all, is truth. There can be but one absolute truth, but different persons have different perceptions of that truth. And this truth is morality. If we separate the dogmas that cling to the principles set forth in any religion, we shall find that morality is preached in any and every one of them. By religion I do not mean all the minor sects that prevail to an innumerable extent all over the world, but the principal ones from which have sprung up these different sects . . . If I, therefore, wish to place my humble services at the disposal of the world, I must first begin by working for my country. And this I could not do by remaining in my caste. I found that instead of a love for his countrymen the observance of caste distinctions leads one to hate even his neighbour, because he happens to be of another caste. I could not bear this injustice. What fault is it of any one that he is born in a particular caste? I respect a man for his qualities and not for his birth. That is to say, that man is superior in my eyes, whose *inner* man has been developed or is in a state of development. . . . . If it were not for this distinction [of castes] India would not have been so degraded. . . If such is the case, why should we still stick to that custom which we now find not only impracticable but injurious? . . . If I were to observe outwardly what I did not really believe inwardly, I was practising hypocrisy . . . . Theosophy had taught me that to enjoy peace of mind and self-respect, I must be honest, candid, peaceful and regard all men as equally my brothers, irrespective of caste, colour, race or creed. This, I see, is an essential part of religion.

As we are copying these words, comes the *Peiping Chronicle* of 30th October containing an address by Panchan Lama, who is regarded as the spiritual head of Tibet. In the course of an address delivered at a press reception he is reported to have said:

Why was China in such a chaos today? Because the people were unable to distinguish between right and wrong, and good and evil. It was, therefore, necessary that religious influence should be brought to bear on them so that their heart could be reformed. Religion should be enlisted in the task of regenerating China . . . the state could not make any progress, however perfect its political system might be, so long as the people were evil-minded. His own rôle in this country might be compared to that of the road maker. He wished to reform the heart of the people so as to make political progress possible.

Gandhiji is a road-maker in India as the Panchan Lama is in China.

These three Orientals give a message not only for India and China but also for the Occident. Untouchability, caste-prejudice, and irreligion flourish in the West as much as in the East, however different their manifestations. Often habits breed hypocrisy and beliefs blind us to truths. When the evils of caste in Hinduism are condemned by the Christian, he fails to see similar evils of class distinction in Christendom. The human consciousness must be exorcised of the demon of pride who lives in a citadel built of creedal dogmas.

ॐ

He who wishes to find his true Self, yet is engrossed with the feeding of his body, seeks to cross the river grasping a crocodile with the thought that it is a log.

—*Vivekachudamani*, 86.

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV OCTOBER 1933 No. 10

IMMORTALITY

Immortality, or everlastingness, must be distinguished from *survival*, for it is quite possible to conceive that some portion of our very complex spiritual and psychic make-up might survive the death of the physical body for a while, and yet itself be subject to gradual decay and death. It is probable indeed that this is what happens to the purely psychic elements in us—to the lower or personal part of the inner man; and that the "messages" of the séance-room, when they do not come from the subconscious minds of the medium or sitters, may be derived from the disintegrating psychic remains of the dead.

If any part of us be immortal and everlasting, it is clear that it cannot be the outer, personal being—the name, bodily form and memory of events which give that personality its shape, as it were, and which are regarded by most people in the West as constituting the real man. That personal, habitual self cannot be immortal, for it very obviously came into being in time; and Father Time, as the old Greek fable narrates, devours all his children. The theory, once so widely accepted, that the man who began at birth, will by some supernatural miracle continue to exist for ever, is at once contrary to reason and repugnant to our sense of fitness. Are any of us so pleased with our outer selves that we desire to be identified or associated with them for ever? To pass eternity as John Smith or Ram Gopal—what an appalling prospect! No. What is born must surely die; and, if we are to ascertain what in us will survive death, we must first find out what part of us antedated birth, for we may reasonably expect to take with us out of life what we brought with us into life.

Now what we brought with us into life was a collection of tendencies, aptitudes, affinities—in a word, character, which has been called " the memory of the soul". Our deeds and thoughts during life go to modify and develop that character either for good or ill; and, providing there be any survival at all, it is character as thus modified that we shall take with us through the portals of death.

But character itself, though permanent as compared with personality, is yet only relatively so: it is, as we have seen, subject to change and growth, and therefore, like personality, fated to become the prey of Time the Devourer. We must look deeper still into the innermost recesses of our being for an *immortal* principle.

Nothing that is liable to change can be immortal; but, when by introspective thought we analyse our inner nature, and one after another objectivise—or think about—the various elements of which we are compounded, we find that all of them are phenomenal, relative, subject to time and change, and therefore not immortal.

But this is not all. The very conception of ourselves and the universe as a flow of changes, a complex of relativity, would be impossible unless there were at the back of all change and relativity, an unchangeable noumenon. If we and the universe were nothing more than temporary compounds of matter or mind, for ever moving from one state or form into another, we could not be conscious of change any more than a man afloat on the current of a river, whose banks were out of sight, could be conscious of motion.

When in introspection we probe deeper and deeper into ourselves, we progressively discover that the body, the emotions, the mind, the will, and so on, with which we begin by identifying ourselves, can all be objectivised, and are therefore not the Self. But, however far we may carry this process, there is still an I that is making the analysis, a Self in the background, a subject to which all else is object. In the process of thus dis-identifying the real Self from all possible objects of thought, we have stripped away all the barriers and bounds that shut it in and seemed to separate it from other Selves and from the Universal. The Self is One. In the language of the West, the Spirit is one with God. Or, in the words of a very ancient Eastern scripture:—

> It (the Self) is the unchanging Eternal, it is the unchanging Supreme . . . It is the excellent foundation, the unchanging foundation; knowing that foundation, a man is mighty in the eternal world.
>
> Smaller than small, greater than great, this Self is hidden in the heart of man . . . . . Understanding this great lord, the Self, bodiless in bodies, stable among unstable, the wise man cannot grieve . . . . . He who has ceased not from evil, who stands not firm, whose emotions are not at rest, cannot obtain it by knowledge.

THE MAGIC OF DETACHMENT

[Everybody has been talking about **John Cowper Powys** because of his new book, an extraordinary novel—*A Glastonbury Romance.* Critics are much puzzled as to the meaning and the purpose of such a piece of writing. Perhaps one kind of clue may be found in this essay founded on Mr. Powys's ideals and his endeavour to practise them. He writes of the Buddhistic Paramita, the Great Virtue of Dispassion—Viraga. The *Voice of the Silence* defines the faculty, the method of its cultivation, and its importance :—

"Viraga [is] indifference to pleasure and to pain, illusion conquered, truth alone perceived."

"Stern and exacting is the virtue of Viraga. If thou its path would'st master, thou must keep thy mind and thy perceptions far freer than before from killing action."

"Mara's arrows ever smite the man who has not reached Viraga."

H. P. BLAVATSKY, in a foot-note explains that "Viraga is the feeling of absolute indifference to the objective universe, to pleasure and to pain. 'Disgust' does not express its meaning, yet it is akin to it."

In the essay on "Karma" in the other little priceless gem *Light on the Path* it is said :—

"Learn now that there is no cure for desire, no cure for the love of reward, no cure for the misery of longing, save in the fixing of the sight and hearing upon that which is invisible and soundless. Begin even now to practise it, and so a thousand serpents will be kept from your path."

The *Bhagavad-Gita*, however, is the book *par excellence* which gives instruction about all aspects of Vairagya or Desirelessness.—EDS.]

Real Detachment begins when we think of our soul as a wayfarer from a far-off country, lodged for a while, "hospes comesque corporis," "guest and companion of the body," among the tribes of men and upon this satellite of the voyaging sun.

In the spirit of a visitor to this whole Cosmos we thus think of the "I am I" within us, in large measure alien, though not unsympathetic to the traditions of this astronomical Hostelry of our temporary sojourn, in large measure alien, though not hostile, to the customs, ways, habits, mythologies, of the human race into which, by some cosmic chance or cosmic law, we have come to be born.

Scrutinizing its planetary surroundings it grows aware of the possibility of a certain illuminated happiness, of a certain ecstasy even, that it can reach, and help other sentiencies to reach, by various detached ways of handling all these things. It soon indeed arrives at the conclusion that one of the chief causes of personal unhappiness in this world is the soul's lack of the power of detachment.

At any given moment of night or day there are qualities, essences, emanations, adhering to the chemistry of the primordial ele-

ments around us, calculated to fill us with a thrilling ecstasy. But it is only by detaching ourselves from almost all of the idols of the market-place that we can be thus transported. These qualities, inherent in the various substances around us, need not reveal what is loosely and popularly known as *beauty*, unless you are prepared to take that word in a very comprehensive sense. It is enough that they are what they are, in a perfectly ordinary, natural, normal way.

Thus for instance it is not necessary that the section of road, or mountain, or desert over which we may chance to be travelling as we experience this mysterious ecstasy, should be in any particular fashion remarkable. If when we look down at our feet we see dust or sand or gravel or earth-mould, it is entirely unnecessary that it should be beautiful dust, beautiful sand, beautiful gravel, beautiful earth-mould! The "I am I," inhabiting its clothed-upon skeleton, in contact through its senses with dust, sand, gravel, earth-mould, air, fire, water, if it uses its mind in a certain particular way can feel from the mere touch of these primeval things an incredible vibration of mystical happiness.

It may indeed be said that the first step in our approach to the only secret of happiness that does not fail us as we get older, is not an ascending step, but a descending step. And Detachment is necessary from the very start in this descent which is also an ascent; yes! we have to detach our soul from everything that exists in order to learn the art of creating existence and of dispensing with existence. And we have to begin with our own body. Only by detaching ourselves from our bodies can the magnetic currents of life-to-life that reach us from these inanimate things be saved from troubling hindrances and gross impediments.

By detaching the soul from the body I do not mean leaving the body. The detachment I speak of consists in a motion of the mind by which the mind feels itself to be independent of the body even while, like a hand in a well-fitting glove, it is still intimately and inseparably wearing the body. And just as the mind, to get the full effluence of the life-to-life flowing into the soul from earth, air and water, must make the interior motion of freeing itself from the body while it still wears the body, so the particular phenomenon of earth and rock and sand and water and vapour and fire that we are contemplating at the moment must be detached from its claim to form part of any pattern of beauty and must be regarded in its integral texture, colour, smell, sound and taste as a unique essence, itself, *itself alone*, just as our own soul is a self alone!

To give a practical and concrete illustration of what I am hinting at, in this first step to the art of detachment, consider for the moment that you are sitting on a large stone by a rapid

stream, with your feet on the margin of a slope of smaller stones, past which the water flows. And now what are the present hindrances to any calm happiness of contemplation offered by your existing circumstances? Your body is a little uncomfortable. Well! if you have not acquired the trick of detaching your mind from a slight discomfort of your body, you are certainly handicapped at the start. Then you are teased by the fact that the water that flows before you where you are seated is not beautifully checkered by sun-splashes or sun-flakes falling through overhanging foliage as are the same river's waters a little way below.

In the other direction too—so you now begin teasing yourself with aggravating comparisons—there are much more comfortable stones to sit upon, and these smaller stones by the water's edge are sprinkled by exquisite moss or interspersed by delicate grass. The restless craving for beauty of the poet in us would be driving us on, up the stream, down the stream, ever in search of lovelier spots, of more perfect natural pictures. But a Being who is beginning to understand the secret of Detachment remains where the accident of his wayfaring has led him to rest. Enough for him is the mere primal fact that water—that miracle of miracles—flows by, at his feet, clear and fast, that the stones beneath it gleam with the broken lights, darken in the shadows, gather about them the mysterious suffusion of the aqueous twilight, have the impenetrable aloofness simply of being what they are, fragments of the substructure of our earthly home, parts and parcels of the primordial virginity of matter.

Suppose the sun to be setting as we sit alone by this flowing water and by these naked stones, the sensuous exigency of the poet would be fretting for the clouds to be touched with some especial glory; but the soul in us that is acquiring the secret of Detachment would find in the pure fire of the great orb itself a living fountain of that life-to-life, that breath of the "inanimate" going out to the "animate," and *vice versa*, which is the ultimate reciprocity of our present world.

The beginning of the art of Detachment is the isolation of the central identity within us. It matters not how you name this inner Self. Call it the soul; call it the breath of life; call it the mind, the consciousness, the "I am I" of our inmost being. The name is nothing.

"Feeling," as Goethe says, "is all in all. The name is sound and smoke, obscuring heaven's clear glow."

But once arrived at the feeling of the detached "I am I," it matters nothing whether you call this feeling "Soul," "Self," "Mind," "Consciousness". To use it, to practise with it, to train it, to discipline it is the essential thing. It grows more and more of an integral entity—whatever it is and wherever it comes from—as you concentrate upon it or as, if you

will, it concentrates upon itself. To use it, to work it, is the thing! It grows in the practice thereof. Its reality lies in its interior motion.

The grand advantage, from the viewpoint of personal happiness, of this art of Detachment, lies in the escape from restlessness and from unfulfilled desire which it offers. In the simple instance I have given above, of a living man crouching on a naked stone above flowing water, and detaching his mind from any fretting, chafing desire to change a position thus given him by the accident of the way, it can be seen how the soul can enjoy the material world around it by a process of austere simplification.

Let it not be supposed that I am advocating any self-punishing puritanism in all this, or any auto-cruelty, or asceticism for the sake of asceticism. The natural test of all these tricks of the mind is the test of great creative Nature herself—namely the simple feeling of happiness.

If the Detachment I am describing does not, very soon after the tension of the initial effort, bring you a flood of happiness, you may be sure that something is wrong and that you are on the wrong path. Such happiness cannot infallibly or invariably be procured; but by the art of Detachment and by a drastic simplification of the relations between the Self and the Not-Self it can be procured in a constantly increasing measure.

Returning for a moment to my imaginary man or woman seated on the stone by the water, suppose as you contemplate this water, feel this stone, and gaze at the great orb of flame going down in the West you are aware of no answering flood of happiness—what then? But are you at the end of your resources? That is the whole point. Not until you have exerted your *will*, or what used to be called "will," to the utmost of your strength, have you a right to cry out in the popular American slang, "Nothing Doing!"

All mortal creatures, men and women along with the lower animals, experience moods, under certain conditions, of exultant, flowing, luminous, thrilling happiness. Such happiness—what Wordsworth calls "the pleasure which there is in Life itself"—is surely the most wonderful and desirable thing in the world! Put anything else, out of all mortal experience, in the scales against it, and it will outweigh all. When such happiness flows through you, transforming, illuminating, inspiring your whole being, you feel at once that you are in touch with an "absolute," with something absolute any way, if not with *the* absolute.

Now the whole and sole purpose of the art of Detachment is to supply a practical technique for the attaining of this rare mood.

The great thing is to begin with the deliberate isolation of the soul without teasing ourselves to prove the soul's "existence". To "exist," to

be "real," to be "true" adhere like varying tones and colours and odours to the soul's creative life; but the soul's life has many aspects; and among those which are nearest the centre of its revolutions are certain magical powers that though they only "exist" in the imagination are more precious and more alive than "reality". All these logical conceptions of solid, outward, unmalleable, inflexible, unporous objects, "marching," as Walt Whitman says, "triumphantly onwards" are conceptions from which it is necessary for the soul to detach itself.

But it is in relation to individual human beings that Detachment is most necessary of all. The wise man spends his life running away. But luckily he can run away without moving a step. We are all—men and women alike—teased by the blue-bottle flies who want to lay their eggs. These are the people who have never learnt and never could learn the art of detachment. They are blue-bottle flies—as my sister Philippa says—and they want to lay their eggs; and they can only lay their eggs in carrion. Not one of us but has carrion in him, carrion in her; and the buzzing blue-bottles, among our fellows, smell this afar off, and fly towards it, and would fain settle upon it and lay their eggs.

Here indeed, here most of all is it necessary to exercise the very magic of Detachment, that magic that makes it possible for you to be in one place—like the man seated on the naked stone by the flowing water—and yet to be in the heart of the flaming sun and at the circumference of the divine ether. For if you fail to exercise the magic of Detachment upon the blue-bottle flies who infest your road they will really lay their eggs—the eggs of the maggots of civilization—in your soul. And then you will believe in the justifiability of vivisection; in the sacrosanct importance of private property; in the virtue of patriotic war; in slaughter-houses, in brothels, in slavery, and in the great, noble, scientific, gregarious, loving, human, undetached art of—Advertisement.

Rousseau was right. It is only by detaching yourself from human civilization that you can live a life worthy of a living soul.

JOHN COWPER POWYS

HAS ASIA ANYTHING FOR THE WEST?

[**George E. Sokolsky**, author of *The Tinder Box of Asia* left New York in 1917 to witness the Russian Revolution. After fourteen years he returned home. During the period he gathered experience as editor of an English daily in Petrograd; as a reporter in China, meeting Sun Yat Sen and other leaders; as Chinese correspondent to American, English and Japanese papers, and as an adviser to the chief of police on the one hand and organizer of a students' strike on the other. In Russia he was put on the famous "Express Get-a-way," and reached Harbin with only about one dollar of American money in his possession. Thus his contact with Asia began, and we may well see its culmination in his marriage to a Chinese lady who, in her turn, has assimilated the West sufficiently to gain a distinction at the Royal Academy of Music, London.—EDS.]

For the human race, there is no East, no West. Racial differences are crudely artificial, for during most of the centuries, the races of man have been merging, uniting, intermarrying, mixing, until racial "purity" has become altogether a myth. Who can ignore the passage of armies across continents? Alexander to Asia, Hannibal to Rome, Cæsar to Africa, Attila to the Rhone, the Huns to the Black Sea, the Magyars to Central Europe, the Golden Horde of Genghis Khan's descendants to Russia!

On these soldiers have marched—Hsiung-nu and Yueh Chi, Tatar and Mongol, Aryan and European. Equally aggressive, equally without regard to geographical divisions have marched ideas and aspirations, religions, and religious practices. Not only Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Manichæism and even Shinto have influenced and affected the personalities of distant peoples. That has curiously enough been Asia's contribution to the human race in the past. That perhaps will be Asia's contribution again.

I believe in the machine age. I believe that the materialistic civilization of Europe has been a boon to mankind. Too many years have I lived in the squalor of Chinese cities, in the disease infested fields of China to believe that a civilization which disregards the human body, the very skin of man, can be sound. Too long have I witnessed the callousness of the great at the sufferings of the miserable; the leper walking unprotected; the blind unaided; the sick uncared for; the mad laughed at; the dying left to drain their lives on the roadside. If I am to compare that with the hospitals and asylums, the social service, the fine roads and clean cities of the West, then I have no alternative but to hope that Western materialism may come to Asia, yes even the factory and the mill, even the high building and the hydro-electric dam.

But our materialistic civilization in the West, even in its finest aspects, has missed something. The individual human being is

lost; he has missed one of his good roads. He spends his life in hard work and fast play; he has hurled himself into a fierce *tempo* which not only moves but moves him. He stands erect and clean; his teeth are white and strong; he knows about vitamins and prophylaxis. But he has no peace. There is no peace for the individual man in the West.

After a long residence in China, I find this psychological chaos oppressive. Human relations seem to be utterly askew. What is a father or a wife? A sojourner in the house, a passing personality? What are the obligations of a son? What has become of marriage—is it merely a tryst with love, a legalized but temporary sexual arrangement, a joining of bodies without union of personalities?

Westerners, when they have achieved means or distinction, speak of their families or their ancestors, as though the possession of a genealogy is as adorning as a jewel. Yet, actually, the family is disappearing. Not only in Soviet Russia where, for political purposes, the family is being extirpated, but throughout the Western world, the family is disappearing. Lightly conceived marriages, trivially caused divorces, the utter disrespect for parents as the hindmost of a dull generation, have left the family without a core. Its place is being taken by insurance companies and social clubs, by loyalty to a corporation or a college fraternity.

Even loyalty to the state is no longer a virtue. Surely in every Western country, loyalty to the state ought to be a normal concomitant to Nationalism. But since the Great War, men have wearied of the cost in human life, of such loyalties. A generation is appearing which even questions the value of Nationalism. Without loyalty to the state, without loyalty to the family, with a resistance to religious formulæ, the Western mind finds itself engaged in absorbing knowledge, just as the Western person seeks to acquire multitudes of things. Yet his knowledge and his things do not bring him contentment.

Therein lies the crux of the problem. Man cannot eat money or even the machine. He cannot consume all that scientific agriculture produces. He cannot wear all the cloth that his machines make. He cannot house all the things that he can acquire. There comes a moment in the life of every individual when he wants to sit back at peace with himself and his neighbour, contented that he is living, that he has lived. Such contentment does not come to the life of a Western person. It is to be found nowhere in America or Europe. Women's faces harden young; men's hair is tinged with grey too early. Yet, they know no poverty such as is evident everywhere in Asia.

Religion when it is not a matter of form and ritual alone affords man contentment. But religion tends to grow static; reli-

gious teachers always look backward. They seek authority and encourage superstitions. They avoid cerebration and hope to acquire addicts rather than believers. Religious thought has hardly moved in the Western world in the past few centuries. Hocus-pocus sects have been founded to stupefy the incurably stupid, but there has been no religious thought, no synthesis of human knowledge, no broadening of the base of human experience.

Perhaps only out of Asia can such a new world come. Asia, curiously, has retained its sense of personality, its feeling for the sanctity of individual liberty. Even if only the intellectual aristocracies of Asiatic countries are free human beings, the fact remains that in countries like China and Japan, all men may rise and all men may remain themselves. The regimentation of human life in the West, the curious insistence upon the inviolability of laws promulgated by mere legislators, who are at the business a year or two and then are passed by at a general election, must appear to an Asiatic to be altogether without reason. For if Man is to be distinct from the chattering ape, his personality must be free to express itself unmolested by vaguely conceived prehibitions. I do not know India, but such impediments to the growth of personality do not exist in China or Japan.

Japan has conquered the secrets of the machine age. She has mastered all the methods of the Westerners. She has even defeated, by war, diplomacy and trade, great Western states. Yet, the individual Japanese has, in his private life, not succumbed either to the Western suppression of personality or to the chaos of a life without contentment. The Japanese dons his kimono, sits on his haunches on tatami and forgets the roar of the machine—which he can operate as well as any Westerner, who, however, never forgets his machine and is frightened when it ceases to roar. I have watched Japanese, in their country houses, sit motionlessly, contemplatively, utterly at peace. In Western countries, men dare not contemplate. Perhaps that explains the vogue of Bridge; when there are no calculations, play at calculations!

In China, freedom of personality has resulted in political and economic anarchy. The Chinese makes no sacrifice to the state because he lives within the family. He has lost his feeling for faith, because the rule of reason has made him so eclectic that he cannot easily distinguish between form and substance. Going through revolutions in every form of human activity, he moves compassless and often hopelessly. Yet, look at the individual Chinese, not the mass, but the man! He remains at peace with himself; he has found a reasonable basis for life, namely, that human exertion should be pursued only as long as personality is not being destroyed. He stops and contemplates the paths before him. He retains not only his personality but his free-

dom as a human being. Perhaps that is why all Westerners love the individual Chinese whom he knows. He loves men who have found contentment in spite of back-breaking labour and unbelievable physical suffering. There, in China, men know an inward peace in the midst of a chaos which no other people have ever known.

Asia, then, has this to contribute: that while the Western man is creating a new physical world, the Asiatic is holding tightly to the advances of the human race in the development of personality. The time will come, perhaps the time is here now, when the Westerner will pause to question his own wisdom, to discover that he is rapidly becoming a robot. He will seek peace. He will again turn to Asia, he will gaze Eastward, as Greece and Rome and the blond tribes of the North, gazed Eastward, to find that peace.

By peace I do not at all mean that states should cease to war. That to me is a trivial incident in much confusion. Economic wars are more disastrous than military wars; tariffs and barriers are more damaging than soldiers and cannons; racial and national hatreds are more poisonous than dum-dum bullets and gas. It is not that peace that Asia has to offer, for Asia can neither make wars nor end them.

By peace, I mean contentment for the individual man. I mean a way of life, a road, the Taoist would say, to peaceful existence. This involves a reconstitution of family relations, a revision of individual moralities, a re-emphasis on human loyalties. That peace to-day does not exist; that peace is no longer understood in Western countries. That peace will come from Asia—perhaps ultimately from China, for there is a people who do not swallow but who do assimilate; there is a people who do not adopt but who do recreate. Out of the chaos in China, a new world form will be born. In that form, not society but the individual, not organization but personality, will be paramount.

The redemption, then, of personality, the recreation of Man as an individual, seems to me, the task before the Asiatic. Historically, that has ever been his task. Perhaps that is why he has persisted during these centuries of apparent decay of his political and economic life.

GEORGE E. SOKOLSKI

THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL

A SURVEY OF 150 YEARS' WORK

[During this month of October in 1783 Sir William Jones landed in India and within three months succeeded in establishing The Asiatic Society of Bengal. Next January the Society will complete its remarkable career of 150 years.

Dr. Kalidas Nag, of the Greater India Society and the India Bureau takes the opportunity of presenting to our readers the following survey.—EDS.]

"When I was at sea last August, on my voyage to this country, which I had long desired to visit, I found one evening, on inspecting the observations of the day, that *India* lay before us, and *Persia* on our left, whilst a breeze from *Arabia* blew nearly on our stern. A situation so pleasing in itself, and to me so new, could not fail to awaken a train of reflections in a mind, which had early been accustomed to contemplate with delight the eventful histories and agreeable fictions of this eastern world. It gave me inexpressible pleasure to find myself in the midst of so noble an amphitheatre, almost encircled by the vast regions of *Asia*, which has ever been esteemed the nurse of sciences, the inventress of delightful and useful arts, the scene of glorious actions, fertile in the productions of human genius, abounding in natural wonders, and infinitely diversified in the forms of religion and government, in the laws, manners, customs, and languages, as well as in the features and complexions, of men. I could not help remarking, how important and extensive a field was yet unexplored, and how many solid advantages unimproved; and when I considered, with pain, that, in this fluctuating, imperfect, and limited condition of life, such inquiries and improvements could only be made by the united efforts of many, who are not easily brought, without some pressing inducement or strong impulse, to converge in a common point, I consoled myself with a hope, founded on opinions which it might have the appearance of flattery to mention, that if in any country or community, such an union could be effected, it was among my countrymen in *Bengal*, with some of whom I already had, and with most was desirous of having, the pleasure of being intimately acquainted."—SIR WILLIAM JONES

In October 1783 a distinguished English Scholar, Sir William Jones (1746-1794), landed in Calcutta to act as a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court at Fort William in Bengal. A worthy contemporary of Goethe, Rousseau and the French Encyclopædists Sir William brought an encyclopædic mind to bear upon the problem of intellectual co-operation between the East and the West. In sharp contrast to the pathetic pretension to omniscience about things Oriental displayed by our Western visitors of to-day, Sir William Jones showed an eagerness to learn and a humility that a genius such as he alone is capable of. Within the short span of ten years from his landing in Calcutta, he laid the foundation of a new science of *Indology*; and yet he ever sighed, with divine discontent, because of " the fluctuating, imperfect and limited erudition of life ". Through his exertions a meeting was held on the 15th of January 1784, attended by the

élite of the European community of Calcutta: Sir Robert Chambers, the Chief Justice, as Chairman; Henry Vansittart; Sir John Shore; Sir Charles Wilkins and others, who became the founders of the *Asiatick Society* and principal contributors to the pages of the Society's Transactions. On that occasion Sir William Jones had the honour of opening the proceedings with a learned "Discourse on the Institution of a Society for enquiring into the History, Civil and Natural, the Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences, and Literature of Asia."

> You will investigate whatever is rare in the stupendous fabric of nature; will correct the geography of Asia by new observations and discoveries; will trace the annals and even traditions of those nations who, from time to time, have peopled or desolated it; and will bring to light their various forms of government, with their institutions, civil and religious; you will examine their improvements and methods in arithmetic and geometry, in trigonometry, mensuration, mechanics, optics, astronomy and general physics; their systems of morality, grammar, rhetoric and dialectic; their skill in chirurgery and medicine; and their advancement, whatever it may be, in anatomy and chemistry. To this you will add researches into their agriculture, manufactures, trade; and whilst you enquire into their music, architecture, painting, and poetry, will not neglect those inferior arts, by which comforts, and even elegances of social life are supplied or improved.

An encyclopædia of Asiatic Arts and Sciences has not yet been undertaken but if it should ever be attempted it should carry as its emblem the noble words quoted above from the prophetic inaugural address of Sir William Jones.

At the second meeting of the Society, Warren Hastings, the then Governor-General, was requested to accept the office of President which honour he promptly refused with shrewd observations, agreeing, however, to be the patron of the Society, yielding his "pretensions to the gentleman whose genius planned the Institution and is most capable of conducting it to the attainment of the great and splendid purposes of its formation". Thus Sir William Jones was elected the First President of the Society on the 5th of February, 1784, and held that office till his death on the 27th April, 1794.* That was a decade of unique achievements followed by the development of a truly international study,—that of Indo-European linguistics and antiquities. Three centuries ago Vasco da Gama discovered the new geographical route to India and, on the celebration of the tricentenary as it were of that great discovery, the cultural route to the soul of India and the Orient was discovered by Sir William Jones and his learned colleagues.

The Sanskrit *Pañchatantra* had already reached Europe through Pehlavi, Hebrew, Arabic, Latin and German transla-

*Sir William Jones—(1746-1794), d. 1794, April 27, Buried in the "whitewashed pyramid" in the old South Park Street Cemetery. It bears the following noble epitaph written by himself: "Here was deposited the mortal part of a man who feared God, but not death, who thought none below him but the base and the unjust, none above him but the wise and virtuous."

tions. Two of the *Śatakas of Bhartrihari* had also been translated into the Dutch language by the Dutch missionary Abraham Roger who worked in Paliakatta (North of Madras) in 1630 and published a voluminous work: "Open door to the Hidden Paganism." In the early eighteenth century there were literary forgeries and aberrations like the so-called "Ezour-Veda"; but an intrepid explorer like the French Anquetil Duperron had already discovered *Avestan Texts*, which he started translating in 1772, and further published in 1805 a translation of the *Upanishads* from the Persian version of Prince Dara Sheko, the great grandson of Akbar. Sir Charles Wilkins (1750-1833) was the first Englishman to acquire proficiency in Sanskrit and to publish a grammar of that language in 1779; he completed a translation of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and published it in 1785 under the patronage of Warren Hastings. Sir William Jones had illustrious predecessors and successors. His translation of the ordinances of *Manu*, of the *Gita Govinda* and above all of *Sakuntalâ* marked an epoch in the history of Oriental studies. The second President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal was Sir John Shore, the real author of the Permanent Settlement. The next great scholar was H. T. Colebrooke (1765–1837) who by his many-sided genius enriched the science of Indology as a President of the Society, writing on Sanskrit grammar, Hindu law and philosophy, on the Vedas and on mathematical subjects, finally emerging as the founder of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1823).

A new turn to the activities of the Society was given by its illustrious Secretary Dr. H. H. Wilson (1784-1860). He reached Calcutta in 1808 as a Medical Officer of the East India Company and served the Asiatic Society for over twenty years (1811-1833) as the Secretary. He became famous by his beautiful translation of the *Megha Dûta* (1813) followed by his *Theatre of the Hindus* and his Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Just a century ago (1833) he was offered the newly founded Boden Chair of Sanskrit at Oxford and consequently left the Asiatic Society in the charge of another great antiquarian, James Prinsep (1799–1840), and his first time *Native Secretary*, Babu Ramkamal Sen, the grandfather of the great reformer and orator, Keshab Chandra Sen. In January 1829 Dr. Wilson proposed the name of some native scholars who were elected members without opposition and within fifty years of the foundation of the Society, with the election of Dewan Ramkamal Sen, the principle came to be accepted that persons of all nations shall be eligible as members of the Society; and very soon, two eminent scholars, Sir Radhakant Deb Bahadur and Professor Bapudeva Sastri were elected Honorary members along with other distinguished European savants.

Starting its career in 1784 as the "Asiatick Society" it was offered in 1829 the privilege of being affiliated to the newly founded Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland; and in that connection the name "Asiatick Society of Bengal" was first used, although the Society did not accept the change. When Mr. James Prinsep started the Journal in 1832 on his own account, he was not authorised either to use the title "Asiatick Society of Bengal," which came to be accepted only when the journal became the property of the Society in 1843.

That brings to our mind one of the most important services rendered by the Society through its publications which may be classified into: (1) Periodicals embodying the researches of the scholars; (2) original Hindu or Muhammadan texts; (3) translations of texts; and (4) separate research memoirs or monographs. Sir William Jones contemplated the publications of a volume every year entitled *Asiatick Miscellany* but, owing to unforeseen difficulties, regular publications of the Annual could not be guaranteed and the first volume appeared only in 1788 with the title *Asiatick Researches*.

In the very first volume we find papers by Charles Wilkins on the Mongyr Copperplate grant and on the Buddal Pillar with the remarks of Sir William Jones. There was also an account of the sculptures and ruins of the Pallava capital, *Mahavalipuram*, as well as translations of inscriptions on the Pillars of Firoz Shah, by Radhakant Sarman. Thus the scholars of the East and the West started the career of a most fruitful and friendly collaboration. Between 1788 to 1839 twenty volumes of Asiatick Researches were published and the popularity of some of the earlier volumes was so great that a "Pirated Edition" was published in England in 1798, and the demand for the volume from the Continent being very urgent a French translation with the necessary corrections was published in two volumes under the title of *Researches Asiatiques* (Paris, 1805). The French editor characterised the volume as "La plus riche collection de faits qui existe sur l'Inde, ce pays qui attire les premiers regards de ceux qui veulent étudier l'histoire des hommes."

That shows the great enthusiasm about things Indian prevailing in Paris at that epoch, and we remember that Mr. Alexander Hamilton, an English officer from India and a Sanskritist, was detained as a prisoner of war and was giving lessons in Sanskrit to cultured circles in Paris amongst whom we find the remarkable German writer F. Schlegel. The French people have always been deeply interested in the Orient; Anquetil Duperron published his translation of the *Upanishads* of Dara Sheko in 1805 and ten years after, in 1815, the first Chairs for Sanskrit and Chinese languages were established in the Collège de France. Chézy was the first

incumbent of the Chair of Sanskrit to whom Goethe, shortly before his death, communicated his prose rhapsody on *Sakuntala*. It was in Paris again that Bopp studied Sanskrit (1828) just as Max Müller did (1843) under Burnouf, completing the magic circle of Indo-European studies, starting from Calcutta with Sir William Jones, passing through Paris and Berlin back to Oxford where Dr. Wilson was welcomed as the first Boden Professor of Sanskrit in 1833 and where Max Müller would complete his monumental edition of the *Rig Veda Samhitâ*.

From 1829 Captain Herbert was publishing a Monthly under the name of *Gleanings of Science*, in his individual capacity, for the Society lost all its little savings by the failure in 1828 of Messrs. Palmer and Co., who were its agents. The King of Oudh made a munificent donation of Rs. 25,000 which was deposited with Messrs. Mackintosh and Co., but they in their turn failed in 1833, depriving the Society of its entire cash balance! Luckily in 1834 an old member of the Society, Mr. Bruce, left a bequest of £2,000 to the Society which was invested in Government Securities to which was added, in 1875, a big sum received as compensation from the Government in lieu of the claims the Society had for accommodation in the Indian Museum Buildings.

On the retirement of Dr. Wilson (1833), Mr. James Prinsep came to pilot the Society during its most difficult days. He came to India at the age of twenty as the assistant Assay-Master at the Calcutta Mint under Dr. Wilson, and after serving a few years in Benares returned to Calcutta in 1830. In March, 1832, he changed the *Gleanings of Science* into the monthly *Journal of the Asiatic Society*. In that journal he was on the one hand publishing scientific papers on the *Transit of Mercury*, on the expansion of Gold, Silver and Copper, and on a compensation barometer invented by him. On the other hand he was not only publishing valuable papers on Indology but soon gained immortality by deciphering the *Asokan Inscriptions* of the third century B. C. A new generation of workers came to co-operate with Mr. Prinsep to open new fields of Asiatic research: Dr. Buchanan writing on the statistical survey of Dinajpur, Mr. B. H. Hodgson communicating valuable papers on Nepal and on the hill tribes of the Himalayas and of the Burmese jungles, and lastly the great Hungarian explorer and linguist Mr. Csoma de Körös who was supported with an allowance of fifty rupees per month from 1830 to 1843 for the publication of his Tibetan Grammar and Dictionary. From this time the Society began to collect Tibetan and Chinese manuscripts (xylographs) of which the former numbered 256 and the latter 350 volumes. Moreover, the miscellaneous collection of about 125 Burmese, Siamese, Javanese and

Singalese manuscripts testify, if not to a constructive research programme for Asiatic Culture, at least to an attempt to prepare the ground for the same, with an intuitive appreciation of the value of the study of Indian antiquities with reference to the documents of GREATER INDIA and other cultural zones of the Orient. Every one must admire the Society's scheme of *Bibliotheca Asiatica*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, the collection of epigraphic, numismatic and archæological documents with a view to build up a great Asiatic Museum, no less than the valuable researches in the domain of history, literature, palæography, art and archæology, as well as in the domain of mathematical, physical and natural science: astronomy, geology, zoology, botany, geography, ethnology etc. Those varied and learned contributions were classified and presented to us by Dr. Rajendralala Mitra, by Dr. A. F. Hoernle and Baboo P. N. Bose, three distinguished savants of the East and the West, happily collaborating to produce a magnificent survey of the activities of the Society (1784-1883) as the best memento of its *first centenary*. This work was nobly carried further afield by great scholars of the next generation like MM. Pandit Haraprasad Sastri, Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur, Prof. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan and others, continuing the glorious tradition.

The half a century just completed, from 1883-1933, shows, however, a record not so much of bold excursions into " fresh fields and pastures new," as of an ordered march along the path of conservation and stock-taking of things already explored. While the Society had the privilege of publishing the valuable archæological reports and articles of General Alexander Cunningham, that work of recording and publishing the latest archæological finds was taken up by the Central Government through a separate *Department of Archæology*. So, while the Society published the earlier papers of Mr. George A. Grierson on *Maithili* and early *Bengali* texts, his main contributions came to be published, in the *Linguistic Survey of India*.

The Society was offered, in the early nineteenth century, a few original stones from Java and even a few Javanese manuscripts, but its interest did not grow that way and it was left far behind in *Indonesian studies* by the Dutch savants who had the honour of starting *the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, another Oriental Society in Batavia, a few years earlier than the Society in Bengal. The Dutch scholars opened a new chapter of Asiatic History through the publications from the Batavian Society and the Royal Institute of The Hague, of the great Dutch pioneers like Kern Brandes, Krom, Juynboll, Vogel, Bosch and others.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal had the privilege of aiding the publication of *Dictionarium An-*

namettico-Latinum by A. G. L. Tabara and to collect a few Siamese manuscripts; but it could not push farther afield, into the *Indo-Chinese* peninsula, the researches of one of its brilliant members, Mr. B. H. Hodgson. So the *Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*, founded in 1900, opened a new chapter in the study of ancient Hindu Colonial culture of Champa and Cambodge and in the history of Asiatic antiquities in general under MM. Finot, Coedès, Huber, Peri, Parmentier and others. The wonderfully comprehensive collection of manuscripts, documents, printed books etc., in the famous collection of Hanoi (French Indo-China) is a veritable epitome of Asiatic culture which few universities of India or any other Asiatic country except Japan can rival.

Lastly, to the credit of the Japanese people it must be said that they have explored thoroughly Asia and her problems from a practical point of view. Thanks to Buddhism connecting India, China, Japan and the Far East, and thanks to the exemplary devotion of great Japanese scholars like Count Otani, Prof. Nanjio, Dr. Takakusu, Prof. Anesaki and others, there are regular lectures on Sanskrit, Pali and Indian history and culture in about a dozen universities of Japan. Moreover, there have developed great collections of books and manuscripts on Buddhism in particular and Indology in general, under the auspices of the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto. India owes an immense debt of gratitude to the Japanese Buddhists, for the publications of the monumental *Taisho* edition of the *Tripitaka*. It is a veritable encyclopædia of Buddhaology and Asiatic Culture, comprising 2633 books bound in 55 thick volumes, all collected, edited and financed by our Japanese friends. It has reproduced not only the principal ancient Chinese editions of the *Sung* and *Yuang* dynasties but has incorporated over 700 new texts and commentaries found in course of the exploration of Central Asia, the Tun-Huang and Tempyo collections as well as those of the temple libraries of Japan.

Thus at least one Asiatic nation outside India has completely vindicated the claim of the Asiatics to interpret their own culture according to the most up-to-date scientific methods. For the less developed regions of Asia, the various branches of the Royal Asiatic Society (*e. g.*, of Ceylon, of the Straits, of Siam, of China etc.) have done valuable research work initiated 150 years ago by the Mother organization, the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*, to which we wish fresh honours and all success on its entering the second half of its second century of existence.

KALIDAS NAG

RUSKIN'S SOCIAL THEORY

[**C. Delisle Burns, D. Lit. (London), M. A. (Camb.)** is the author of numerous volumes, the earliest of which, we are told, is *The Growth of Modern Philosophy* published in 1909; his most recent publication is *Horizon of Experience*. In this article he writes about Ruskin's views and hopes of a social order which shine in spite of his limitations.—EDS.]

The material wealth of any country is the portion of its possessions which feeds and educates good men and women in it: the connected principle of national policy being that the strength and power of any country depends absolutely on the quantity of good men and women in the territory of it and not at all on the extent of the territory—still less upon the number of vile or stupid inhabitants. (*Fors Clavigera*, 2nd Series, p. 159.)

So Ruskin summarised his political economy, at the end of his life: and in many different ways he repeated the same general doctrine. His influence depended upon the appeal he made to the conscience of those who could be made aware of the evils caused by the industrial system; and it may be well, therefore, to explain the force of that appeal before criticising its limitations.

He began, as everyone knows, at the early age of twenty-three, by the publication of the first two volumes of *Modern Painters*; and then passed to the study of architecture. But even his earliest published work has in it the passion of a reformer who is urging men to see what is for their good. The influence of deeply religious but narrow-minded parents, who had hoped to see him become a bishop, and his frequent uncritical reading of the Bible certainly did not predispose Ruskin to the enjoyment of works of art. But his own sensitiveness to beauty in nature seems to have awakened him to the power of great painting. At this stage he was not concerned with social theory: and only when he found that architecture was unintelligible without some study of the social conditions in the midst of which it arose, did he turn his attention to the way of living in his own day. He had inherited a large fortune; and he came to feel that its sources might be contaminated by the pressure of capital-owners upon the poor. His social theory, therefore, is the result of an emotional reaction to the results of the industrial system in England in the 1860's, both in the vulgar uses of wealth by successful business men and in the sufferings and degradation of the manual workers. It is now nearly a century since he made his protest; but some of his teaching is still applicable.

To be moved emotionally by a situation and to try to understand it because one is so moved, is not indeed the normal approach of the economist. And in Ruskin's day, the recognised and influential economists claimed to be unemo-

tional and unprejudiced observers of fact. But emotion does not necessarily obscure; it may illuminate facts. And the attempt to "explain" the treatment of one man by another, without making any moral judgment on either, usually turns into an excuse for whatever happens to be done. Economists are still regarded as apologists for what they study; and sometimes they claim to give guidance in public policy, although by their own confession, they are competent only as observers, not as judges of the moral value of what is done. Ruskin urged that to "abstract away" all the effect of his work on a man's health and happiness or to disregard the difference between good food and bad, if each cost the same amount of money, was not "political economy" at all. The abstraction was misleading, because it left the fundamental reason for production and consumption unconsidered. No doubt he exaggerated the defects of the economists; and he should have admitted that abstraction may be necessary for certain purposes in studying money-values. But he was really contending against the influence of the economists on public policy: for what they did not discuss—the value of education, for example, or the insight due to fine art—seemed to those in power to be of no importance: and this was fatal to any policy for "the good life". As Ruskin put it in *Munera Pulveris*,—

> The essential work of the political economist is to determine what are in reality useful or life-giving things and by what degrees and kinds of labour they are attainable and distributable.

The economist may fairly reply that that is "ethics," not economics; but that reply does not meet Ruskin's main point, if economics is used in public policy as a substitute for ethics.

Ruskin enjoyed playing upon the different meanings of common words. And the economists unconsciously do the same; for they have taken from conversation such words as "value," "wealth" and "utility": and although these words are given strict definitions in economics, the other and vaguer meanings are not in fact excluded when the economist argues about public policy. Thus "utility" tends to be so narrowed in meaning as to exclude any reference to the immense difference between good food and bad. Consumption, as Ruskin points out, depends upon the nature of the consumer: what he uses affects his mental and moral, as well as his physical structure. But if all public policy is concerned only with money-values and if, under the competitive system, anyone may undersell another seller by any trick, however harmful to the buyer, then industry is merely barbarism. It is indeed more barbaric than mediæval robbery, because to cheat a man is more ignoble than to take his money by force.

A second point in which Ruskin is right concerns production. It was assumed in the early nine-

teenth century that work was essentially disagreeable and that therefore payment was mainly a bribe for doing what no one would otherwise do. But Ruskin knew from his study and experience of art that some work was desired for its own sake; and he rightly concluded that "production" was not all "cost"—as the economist would say, as "consumption" was not all "utility".* Thus a worker might enjoy and should enjoy his work: and that was no reason for refusing him good payment for doing it. Ruskin, like Morris and Tolstoi, saw the creative impulse finding its proper outlet in ordinary work for the service of other men; but he was not himself so close to the workers as those other reformers were. He remained obsessed with the conception of the Classical slave-civilization, whose literature dominated his education; and therefore he wrongly assumed that hard manual work was in some way degrading. He seems never to have grasped that monotony and compulsion are not necessary in mechanical work; and he was "sentimental" about the traditional labour of agriculture. Nevertheless it was a great advance in the 1860's to see that work in itself was not a curse.

A third principle of Ruskin's is valid; namely that any economic-political system ought to result in a community with fine perceptions for works of art and ability to create them. Ruskin's language is misleading. The modern understanding of the arts does not involve the Biblical moralising of Ruskin's phrases.

But his intuition was right. He was trying to explain in the 1860's that works of art were not mere ornaments of drawing-rooms, nor frivolities for spare time. He was trying to show that a larger world than that of breakfast and dinner could be perceived, if one knew how to look at works of art. He was strangely negligent of music; but in reference to the plastic arts, his argument was powerful and valid.

When, however, one comes to consider the ideal society which Ruskin advocated as an alternative to the system he condemned, then doubts as to the teaching of the prophet of 1860 begin to arise. He was opposed to the liberal movements for women's suffrage, for the advancement of physical science, for political equality and democratic institutions. He idealised feudalism. He desired an aristocracy which would control the majority for their good. But he was not blind to the facts of the past.

He says:—

> Money is now exactly what mountain promontories over public roads were in old times. The barons fought for them fairly: the strongest and cunningest got them: then fortified them and made everyone who passed pay toll. . . Once having got money, the fortified millionaire can make everyone who passes pay toll. The poor vagrants by the

* This is worked out more adequately by J. A. Hobson in *Work and Wealth*. J. A. Hobson's book *Ruskin as Social Reformer* (1898) contains the best account of Ruskin's position.

roadside suffer now quite as much from the bag-baron as ever they did from the crag-baron. (*Crown of Wild Olive*, p. 35.)

Thus he admits that the actual aristocracy of the past has been objectionable: but his proposal for improvement is not to abolish control of other people, but to make the controller benevolent! He seems to have had no understanding of concerted action exercised through public authorities. He reduces policy to terms of personal good feeling, which implies ignorance of actual facts in the State and in the art of government of his own day.

Similarly in the relation between organised groups of men, he sees the absurdity of war and indeed quotes with approval Carlyle's gibe at the slaughter of peasants in a quarrel not their own. But with respect to India, for example, he says that the British "possession of India" is good or bad in proportion as "our influence on the native race shall be benevolent and exalting" (*Crown of Wild Olive*, p. 188). He is even so simple-minded as to suggest that "aggressive war," as he calls it, should be undertaken by the powerful "whenever they are assured that their authority would be helpful and protective". So foreign despotism is justified, if the despot intends to be kind! And further he says that war itself is desirable, but not with modern weapons! "What war might yet be, if we could extinguish our science in darkness"—so he exclaims! But he does not explain whether bows and arrows are better than lances! Obviously he has not thought out the problem.

Ruskin's protest was valid against the oppression and ugliness which were the results of the industrial system. His writings contain many eloquent descriptions of what he saw and felt keenly and many noble exhortations to personal virtue. But they include also some absolutely false statements; and they are most misleading whenever he advocates a policy. He was not wrong in applying the principles of moral action to public policy; but his conceptions of morality were primitive. He seems to be concerned only with the "intention" or "motive" of the individual and to have no understanding at all of social institutions or social development. His social theory contains, therefore, some illuminating and valuable observations, but as a whole it is inconsistent with itself and in many parts positively misleading.

C. DELISLE BURNS

THE WORK OF THE ASPIRANT

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

> He who while living in the world and before the liberation of the Soul from the body, can resist the impulse arising from desire and anger he is a devotee (yukta) and and a happy man.
>
> He who is happy within himself, who is delighted within, who is illuminated within, is a yogi; partaking of the Nature of the Supreme he has attained to Brahma-Nirvana.
>
> —*Bhagavad-Gita*, V. 23–24

These two verses describe the condition of the aspirant-practitioner and of the master who has attained. They are strikingly straightforward. They strike us with their depth and simplicity, with their self-evident truth which study and thought reveal as profound. In them we are told what the source of difficulty for the aspirant is, how and where and when the yoke can be thrown off; and with what virtues the Divine Being and the Divine World shine.

The first verse contains the word yukta (युक्त:) and it is differently rendered, and it is necessary to render it differently to bring out the real meaning. This word is used in numerous places in the *Gita* and like the term dharma is understood appropriately in different places. But unless some meditation is done on the word, irrespective of its context, in every instance, we are apt to gain only partial understanding of the verses in which it appears.

First and foremost the aspirant must be resourceful, which implies both adaptability with existing circumstances and preparation for improving them; then he must have contrivance and expediency requiring simple trick or magical artifice. It further implies an inner steadiness in executing outer action and a condition of balance and harmony.

The street-conjurer and magician and his young assistant perform two phenomena with the rope: one, to show physical skill and control over bodily balance by walking on the rope; the other is the famous though rare rope-

trick, in which superphysical forces are used. To acquire that balance mere knowledge of the body and the bodily parts is not sought; a physiologist or an anatomist cannot walk the rope. To produce the other kind of phenomenon, more than one law of super-physics is used and often their manipulation is not acquired knowledge but is an inheritance.

Now, compare the Path of the Spiritual Life to the rope; the person must gain that balance; without it the very treading is not possible. The disappearance and reappearance of the boy in the second phenomenon may be compared to the visible climbing by the aspirant in the world, his disappearance from it during the period of his real training, and then his reappearance as the adept-servant of humanity, when he is acclaimed with shouts of wonder, and laughter, and curiosity and questioning, but rarely with the genuine desire to find out the facts and the truths.

Balance, harmony, is that inner equanimity which the aspirant must develop, and the task must be accomplished while living in the world, for it offers an excellent training ground. The Bāla-Yogi, the boy-yogi, is the rarest of occult phenomena; at the end of a long line of incarnations one can be born with the marks of a yogi, all ready and prepared to retire at once from the world and undertake the development of siddhis or divine powers. For most people the struggles of life, and especially the home (grihastha-ashrama) are most excellent. Therefore our verse refers to "living in the world".

Then the second clause: during incarnation, not after death, can this practice be undertaken. A preta or bhut cannot fight desire and anger, for it is nothing else but a bundle of passions and the Soul is absent; neither in Pitri Loka or Swarga can the exercise be done, for the force to be attacked and endured is absent when man reaches those states. Only here, in the incarnated existence, the complete assemblage takes place, making the spiritual life possible. After death conditions may be compared to the self-imposed truce observed by both the armies of Rama and of Ravana during the nights; only during the day combatants come to grips. In this, however, a very important idea is involved. Spiritual life is not for the man who is but a bhut, a shade, a moving-talking-living rupa but devoid of the qualities of manhood. Also, spiritual life is not possible for the deva, who has not yet left his child-state, who is happy but knows not that he is happy, nor what happiness is. The man of effort and balance (yukta) is called a happy man in this verse. There are forms of yoga (I do not mean hatha-yoga) which bring about the separation of the Soul from the body, before the Soul has learnt why he entered the body, and before he has done his duty by the body and the lower kingdoms in which it is

rooted. Happiness (Sukh) for the body is one thing, for the deva-god is another thing, and the happy-man (sukhi-nara) is neither a bhuta nor a deva, but nara—man. The duty and function of Nara-Man (remember it is one of the names of Arjuna, and every Name contains truth which can be learnt by meditation on that Name) is to experience through contact with good and evil that higher happiness which fears not matter and is free from limitations. People who run after inner peace and happiness often sleep while their bodies are awake, sometimes dream during such sleep and fancy that final liberation is obtained. Beware of such people and their fragile talk!

Krishna says, learn to resist and endure and bear with this force born of desire (kama) and anger (krodha). He who aspires to be a yogi must kill out this force which like smoke envelops the man. (*cf.* iii. 39). He must acknowledge its existence and not ignore it. He must face it and not run away from it. Above all, he must not give way to it saying it also is of the Lord, it also is of Mother Nature.

The conquest of this force with the help of the Soul within brings out the powers of that Soul. Numerous are those powers. A man who enjoys the objects of sense is fearful because in the past he has found out that pain follows, or satiation results. Then there is the creative intelligence which enjoys upliftment and while it feels, it does not know what happiness is or whence; it comes and goes. But the Soul who has fought the force of desire, who knows how to endure its presence, nay to bear with it, giving it time to gain transformation, that Soul knows what real happiness is. He knows that that happiness is not the desire-force, but is within himself; repose and light are its two expressions. The Soul's centripetal energy is peace and repose; the centrifugal is service and enlightenment of others. Peace of the Mahatmas and the Maharshis becomes visible to us through Their Light. When an aspirant has resisted the impulse of desires and successfully retained his balance he is ready by the help of the great Gurus to know the Light, Peace and Joy of his own divine nature, which is one with the world of Divinity. Such a man is Brahma-Bhuta—an apparition of Brahman, the Messenger of Brahman, the Sage who is devoted to the good of all.

B. M.

POLYGYNY IN PRACTICE

[**W. Addison**, formerly a Political Officer in the British Colonial service, writes from first hand knowledge of the "savages" in British West Africa. The Protectorate of Sierra Leone, about whose people he writes, brings to our mind an article published in THE ARYAN PATH in August, 1932 entitled "Primitive Religion," by Francis James, who wrote of the primitives of Nigeria. Both the writers speak favourably of the morality among the savages as compared with that of civilized Europe. Mr. James said: "The penalties of theft and adultery in a primitive tribe are so heavy, that primitive society is probably much freer from these two evils than European."—EDS.]

One of the problems facing the advance of Christianity in British West Africa is that of the prevailing marriage custom, namely, polygyny ; the beneficent system of several wives sharing one husband, the work of one household, the farm, and the production of raw products for export.

The question may arise, "What is the difference between polygyny and polygamy ?" Polygamy is the practice or condition of having several wives or husbands at the same time. It is against native law and custom for an African woman of British West Africa to be married to several husbands ; known, also, as polyandry.

Moral, social, economic, and political pressure gave birth to polygyny in British West Africa. Infantile mortality in male children, internecine warfare, and the infamous slave trade were among the factors contributing to the preponderance in women.

In the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, the marriage custom of several wives sharing one husband has the willing consent of the women, the practical result of countless generations of valuable experience. It is the one and only system which provides a house, protection, food, children, and a husband for every woman in the land ; clean, humane, and successful ; not drudgery.

Native law does not prescribe the number of wives a man may have, but it does definitely provide against marriages within the blood. For example, a man may not marry his wife's sister, his own sister, his mother, daughter, aunt, cousin, niece, and so forth. Away from civilization, there are few illegitimate children, no prostitutes as we know them, no homes for "fallen women," and "rescue" societies are unnecessary.

If a man and a woman within the prohibited degrees of kinship are intimate both commit the crime of "Simongama," a very serious breach of native law and custom involving heavy punishment for the delinquents and their respective families. Unfaithfulness in a wife is considered an offence, but it is not a disgrace. In certain circumstances, unfaithful conduct in the husband is allowable.

The first wife to be married is, as a rule, the head wife, and she

is sometimes older than the husband. She controls the household, and by virtue of that good sense which is born in the blood manages to do so without undue friction. Jealousy among the wives is not obvious to a stranger, and any untoward inquisitiveness would be strongly resented.

A humane and wise arrangement safeguards the health of an expectant mother and her baby until the child is weaned and, at the same time, acts as a natural, non-mechanical, non-chemical form of family limitation.

As a social unit, the wives and their husband will compare favourably with any other family unit in the monogamic world.

Contrary to popular belief, the bulk of the strenuous activities of life is the lot of the husband. He it is who "walks" up the oil palm tree to obtain the fruit which yields the palm oil and kernels of commerce; he fells the bush and prepares the farm for the next crop; he carries immensely heavy loads of produce to the trader; he hunts for the meat of the family, and he builds his own house with the assistance of the family and friends.

His wives help one another to keep the house clean, prepare and cook the meals, weed the farm, manufacture palm oil from the pericarp of the fruit the husband has gathered, and crack the nuts to obtain the palm kernel. They co-operate in harvesting the crops grown on their farm, clean, spin, and dye their own cotton with the most wonderful shades of blue, the husband, if he is a weaver, weaving the spun cotton into long strips which he sews together forming the "country cloth" for which the Protectorate of Sierra Leone is noted. There is no machinery; all the operations are done by hand. From this home-made cloth are made roomy and picturesque gowns for men, wraps for women, and bed coverings. What is known as the "Gallinas Cloth" is a work of art in colour, design, and lasting quality. It is a curious fact that the men are the seamsters, and not the women.

The men share with their wives every penny they receive as the result of the joint efforts of the family. The houses are their own property, the land is their own; the land houses, clothes, and feeds them; they pay one direct tax, namely, five shillings per dwellig-house per annum; there are no "rates and taxes," and the income tax is still unknown; every woman can have a child if she wants one, and the child will not be a bastard to carry the brand of shame through all its innocent young days; there is no unemployment, the "dole" is still a stranger, and women do not compete with men for men's work; in truth, in well-administered chiefdoms the drawbacks and hindrances of the vaunted civilization of the countries of the modern white man and woman are difficult to find.

On dark nights, early to bed is the rule. In fine weather, when the moon shines with all the

beautiful splendour of the tropics, the family joins in the village dance to the tune of segbulis, drums, and song; the pipe and palm wine creating in a very happy and pleasant scene an urbane, frictionless sociability difficult to imagine, and which must be seen through unprejudiced eyes to be believed.

For many years, the white missionary of various nationalities, foreign as well as our own, has tried to convince the African woman I know that she is a slave and a mere chattel, "living in sin". In the Protectorate of Sierra Leone there were women Paramount Chiefs, Sub-chiefs, and heads of villages long before the women of Britain obtained the vote. With such a vigorous mentality the people on whose behalf this is written will, one day, if led aright, realize which kind of life is best for them; that of the industrialised white man and woman, or their own.

Under the British Flag these people have no cause to be envious of any other nationality.

Morally, socially, economically, and politically, the artificial substitution of monogamy for polygyny must be accompanied by stupendous changes in the life of the people, inimical to their future welfare, and heavy with never-ending trouble for the people of Britain; not the fulfilment of a great ideal, but the slow, inevitable destruction of what might have been the greatest friendship the world has ever known, and of much of our trade with them.

Mohammedanism is increasing by leaps and bounds. In time, the bulk of the people of British West Africa will have entered the kindly fold of Islam provided that plural marriage has not been made illegal. Islam makes no distinction between the polygynist and the monogamist, neither is a convert divorced from his tribal life as is always the case with a Christian convert, if the conversion be genuine.

A polygynist and his wives can be just as good Christians as those who profess monogamy. Why not let them become Christian? Christianity is in chains in British West Africa. The white professors of the Faith will not let it march forward. The population is well over 20,000,000, of whom but a few thousands profess Christianity, and this, after several decades.

What is the stumbling block?

In the name of Christianity religious bodies are unwittingly endeavouring to undermine the very foundation on which the whole West African social structure rests: its marriage custom, polygyny. Can they not moderate the system of Christianity *with benefit to Christianity* and to our fellow citizens in the great Continent of Africa? What would Christ do?

W. ADDISON

EPITAPH ON MECHANIST PHILOSOPHY

[**A. Newsome** has been keenly interested in social matters for the last twenty years, during the early part of which he was engaged in practical trade union administration. His articles on sociological questions, and on the philosophical aspects of sociology are thoughtful and thought-provoking.

The following article uncovers the false position of nineteenth century scientists who tried " to explain the aspirations and affections, the love and hatred, the most private and sacred workings in the soul and mind of the living man, by an anatomical description of the chest and brain of his dead body." (*Secret Doctrine* I. 169–170) To these words of H. P. Blavatsky we will add her positive teaching, bearing on the subject, given in 1888.

" The Universe is worked and *guided* from *within outwards*. As above so it is below, as in heaven so on earth ; and man—the microcosm and miniature copy of the macrocosm—is the living witness to this Universal Law and to the mode of its action. We see that every *external* motion, act, gesture, whether voluntary or mechanical, organic or mental, is produced and preceded by *internal* feeling or emotion, will or volition, and thought or mind. As no outward motion or change, when normal, in man's external body can take place unless provoked by an inward impulse, given through one of the three functions named, so with the external or manifested Universe. The whole Kosmos is guided, controlled, and animated by almost endless series of Hierarchies of sentient Beings, each having a mission to perform, and who—whether we give to them one name or another, and call them Dhyan-Chohans or Angels—are 'messengers' in the sense only that they are the agents of Karmic and Cosmic Laws."—*S. D.* I. 274]

During the nineteenth century the philosophy of *Mechanism* took a very strong hold of the European and American mind. From politics to the existence of God, only the scientific view was respected, and no matter how cautiously expressed, was popularly interpreted to mean that at bottom everything would soon be proved to be mechanical and chemical, from the chemist's atom to the astronomer's heavens, and from the behaviour of microscopic worms in a pool to the brain of the scientist himself. Indeed, the notion actually began to take hold of people that all human feeling and emotion, including love itself, were merely unwanted heat generated as a result of the brain's mechanical inefficiency, and that if ever the brain became efficient, its reasoning would be as mechanical as the principles of the steam engine.

To see how it was possible for such a terrible misconception to arise, we have to examine, as briefly as possible, the relationship between the mechanical and the mind of man, and afterwards to look a little more closely into the general social conditions in which the misconception arose. Every mechanical thing in the world —definitely *known* to be mechanical and not merely *guessed* so —has proceeded from the inventive genius of man. It is really a part of the body of man given

a separate existence for the purpose of doing his routine work and setting him free. Consider, for example, a bicycle. It can be described as two running wheels to which force is conveyed from a driving wheel. That, however, merely describes the *physical* bicycle. Before it can run it has to be guided and directed to a goal by a rider; and, in addition, of course, the driving-force has to be applied at the pedals. Similarly, every machine serves a purpose imposed on it by its inventor. Bicycle, motor car, airship, none of these can be a satisfactory model for the mind of man or of the universe, for the single reason that each of them is merely a supplement to, or a substitute for, feet and wings. A mind is necessary to guide every machine, and to decide on the goal to which it shall be driven, as surely as to guide feet or wings. One of the mechanisms most resembling in function a human brain, is, for example, the calculating machine. Yet that merely performs a *process* in a manner to reduce fatigue in the human brain. What calculation it shall perform, to what end, when, with the power of fingers or of an electric current controllable by fingers through a switch, all this is decided by the human mind. Every machine, in brief, performs only a *process*. Its motive force and its purpose, essential as they are to complete it, reside never in itself, but always in the mind of the inventing, directing, and operating human being.

Every act of the mind of man requires all these three things to be combined. Every act, to be specific, depends, first, on an aim, that is, an objective which the act is to achieve when carried out. By our aims, our wisdom and goodness are known. Similarly, every act requires a process, that is, a technique accurately designed for carrying it out. By our technique our ability, our science, is known. Finally, every act depends on a dynamic, that is, sufficient force to carry it through. By our right co-ordination of force, technique and aims, our efficiency is known. No machine can ever effect more than the amplification of our technique and force, as we, by understanding Nature, make use, for those purposes, of Nature's forces and materials. Aim, however, remains for all time a prerogative monopolised by mind, and absolutely non-mechanical. The process of a watch, to give an instance, is carried out by cog-wheels and spindles of various sizes. Its dynamic consists of a spring, *regularly wound up by a man*, and replaced when worn-out. The purpose of a watch, the accurate recording of the passing of time is absolutely non-mechanical. It is an aim born in the mind of the inventor of the watch.

The Mechanist Philosophy, which, as we now see, mistakes a part for the whole, was able to grip the mind of man only because it was favoured by social

conditions which, although attributed to the development of science, were only partly thus caused. The nineteenth century mind, particularly in England, largely ceased to be aware of the danger of losing sight of Aim and Dynamic, and foolishly concentrated its attention on Process alone. Although we now recognise the machine as merely *embodied process*, extending the power of one aspect only of mind, the machine became the god of the nineteenth century; because for the nineteenth century Process seemed to be every thing.

Just as the physical atom was accepted as the fixed and final motive force of the chemist's universe, and the cell as the fixed and final dynamic of the biologists' universe, the will-to-self-preservation was accepted as the fixed and final dynamic of the evolutionists' universe; and finally, "human-nature," called in the text-books "the economic man," and readily allowed without censure all such vices as acquisitiveness, avarice and ambition, was accepted as the fixed dynamic of the sociologist's universe. Physical atoms, it was naïvely asserted and genuinely believed, had no aim in combining, yet all beauty, from snow-crystals to the jewels of the King's crown, had sprung automatically from their molecular combinations. The cells of the living organism, it was asserted, and just as confidently, could know nothing about the organism as a whole, and yet tigers and flowers and lovely women had arisen automatically from their will-to-live. Human nature, it was concluded,—and experience was alleged to confirm it,—need have no aim, no vision at all, because private greed so obviously led, by creating and accumulating wealth, to the public good. The economic man's worst behaviour, it was believed, nevertheless surely swept all mankind along the up-hill road of Inevitable Progress. So the chemist was merely interested in the investigation of chemical processes, the biologist and evolutionist in the process of Darwinian natural selection; and the sociologist in the processes of economics to the neglect of the social purpose of the economic system and, as a consequence, of how to make it serve for the realisation of any human vision whatsoever.

It was inevitable that so partial a philosophy should be followed by a crash of civilisation. Since the European War, however, it has been gradually dawning on the less insensitive, the less fixed in mental habit, that the affairs of mankind will never again come right of themselves; that purpose, will and co-ordination are indispensable to the achievement of civilisation, prosperity, or any other desirable estate. In consequence, philosophy begins to move towards the truth. Scientists, working out their philosophical principles as a background for their work, are ceasing to be Mechanist. Professor Haldane observes that the distinctive feature of the living organism is not its mere will-to-live, but its mysterious

power of internal co-ordination to accomplish a desired aim. There is no greater mystery than the *decision* of travelling blood cells that they must not merely repair normal wear but must build new tissues, in say, a simple cut-finger. Dr. Smuts was welcomed when he told the British Association for the Advancement of Science that an organism was not a mere fortuitous bundle of cells, but a co-ordinated whole. Dr. Whitehead, in immensely difficult language, is trying to prove that " experience does not consist of a bundle of perceptions," but of perceptions *co-ordinated from within* to serve the aims of the mind.

It is, of course, quite impossible to cling to a philosophy that contradicts experience, and when Dr. Johnson pronounced as the fact about determinism " that all logic is for it, and all experience against it," he wrote the epitaph on the philosophy of Mechanism; for logic is only *mind-process*, whereas experience is compact of the whole of mind, including dynamic, process, aim, and the mysterious power of co-ordinating these. Dr. Johnson could not, of course, foresee that nineteenth-century Europe would be deceived by easy success into limiting its experience to process alone, nor that the philosophy of Mechanism, the *reflection* of that limitation, would thus have its day. Our own experience, however, includes the historical fact that nineteenth-century Europe crashed as anything blindly driven must; and we ought, therefore, to permit the Mechanist philosophy, which was held to excuse blind driving, to rest in peace as a mere historical curiosity.

A. NEWSOME

The Secret Doctrine teaches that every one of the higher, as of the lower worlds, is interblended with our own objective world; that millions of things and beings are, in point of localization, around and *in* us, as we are around, with, and in them; it is no metaphysical figure of speech, but a sober fact in Nature, however incomprehensible to our senses.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* I. p. 604

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

EVOLUTION AND REDEMPTION*

[**J. D. Beresford** reviews a new presentation of the old problem of evil in evolution. Attention may be drawn to two pamphlets just published from the writings of Madame H. P. Blavatsky on this subject: *The Origin of Evil* and *The Fall of Ideals*, U. L. T. Pamphlets Nos. 26-27.—EDS.]

I have more than once defended the cause of Science in these pages, and propose to do so again in the course of this article; but only on certain grounds. The first of these is general. I believe that it is well for the human mind to avoid any form of bigotry. There is no doctrine more stultifying than that principle of the dogmatic religions which asserts that in them alone lies the truth, and that the refusal to believe this assertion constitutes an Evil, *ipso facto*. It is a principle that denies the innate virtue of the Immanent Will, and by its promotion of Evil to god-like powers lays such perpetual stress on the theory of Duality that the great ideal of Unity is lost sight of. It is equally dangerous, in my opinion, to reject dogmatically any method of thought, scientific or philosophical, because its conclusions do not appear compatible with our own. There must be truth in the method, since all mental activity, all human reason derives from the same source.

Nevertheless we must believe that certain trains of reasoning are unfruitful, and my second ground for defence is that this is not wholly true in the case of science. In 1933 by its own, as it may seem to us, devious methods, science is arriving at many of the conclusions first published in *The Secret Doctrine* in 1888. Modern physics has had the effect of breaking down many traditional habits of thought, and the result of that process is always favourable to progress. And although it is obvious that the methods and pronouncements of science can have no value for the student of the ancient Wisdom-Religion, they serve a valuable purpose in their effect upon the public mind which may often be stirred to wonder by a half-truth though it be incapable of understanding the whole. I use the word "incapable" with deliberate intention. The great truths can be fully comprehended only by those who have reached the necessary stage of initiation.

The book under review has inclined me to write again on this subject. The author is a Doctor of Medicine and is in the main a Christian. He accepts all the miracles of the New Testament, and, if I have rightly understood his final chapter, believes

* *Evolution and Redemption* by Dr. A. P. Newsholme (Williams and Norgate, London. 8s. 6d.)

that Christ's sacrifice was at least a powerful instrument for the redemption of mankind. Nevertheless he has by earnest thought, partly scientific in its nature, attained conclusions that accord reasonably well with Theosophical principles.

His opening chapters are almost entirely concerned with what is known theologically as the "origin of evil". He begins bravely by saying, "I shall apply boldly and in its fullest sense Prof. Arthur Thomson's phrase *that there is nothing inanimate*" (original italics); but seems to have had some difficulty in grasping the full implications of this statement as he refers in more than one place to "non-living matter"—at the best a loose term that tends to confuse his argument. From this he proceeds, a little tediously at times, to show that, (I quote one of his more definitive statements), "there is something in the inertia of matter itself which obstructs the emergence of the fundamental qualities of living substance and of man". And from this he goes on to assume that the overcoming of this fundamental inertia or resistance to the active force of the spirit presents the inner meaning of the struggle commonly described as that between Good and Evil.

This comes near enough to the truth for general purposes, and Dr. Newsholme, having admitted (p. 77) that it is difficult "to suggest any way of proving or disproving" the criticism that "the inertia of matter may be something quite other than that inertia in man which hinders evolution in him," proceeds to an argument by analogy which presents the similarity of inertia in the two cases.

Accepting that conclusion provisionally we find that Dr. Newsholme has arrived at what seems to him a sufficient explanation of many physical and psychical phenomena that he has no doubt encountered in his own practice. He has suggested in an earlier book* that "disease is associated immediately or remotely with a descent from the elasticity of living matter towards the inertia of non-living matter; a descent affecting the physical frame and initiated either there or at the higher levels of sense, intellect or conscience," and he has there, he tells us, related disease, even that described as "constitutional" with a "failure of the intellect or heart, and fundamentally of the soul to grapple with its problem".

So far we have no fault to find with his inferences, but his account of what he terms the "Nature Miracles" is less convincing. He has taken various examples from the New Testament, the story of the barren fig-tree, the rebuking of the tempest on the Lake of Gennesaret, Peter's attempt to walk on the water, the miracle of the loaves and fishes, but not the turning of water into wine. His explanation of these phenomena demands an

* *Health, Disease and Integration* (Allen & Unwin).

elaboration of his hypothesis of inertia as representing the force of evil. In his account of the stilling of the storm, for example, he has further to hypothecate "a sense implying moral responsibility in the elements of spirit within the matter" exhibiting such forces of nature as "earthquake, tornado, drought or miasma". But since this suggestion definitely demands the conception of evil spirits in active antagonism to good, it may be argued that they, too, would have to struggle against the inertia of matter; and this inference would lead us to an impasse by the inclusion of its third term. For if we divide the purely spirit force into two elements, say, good and bad, that resistance inherent in matter at once becomes ambiguous, for we cannot assume it to be of such a nature as would be more easily overcome by the evil spirits than by the good.

Such anomalies as these inevitably arise from theories based on those half-truths to which I referred earlier in this article. Just so did Newton's principles work admirably up to a point. They gave a practical basis for computation and led to such mathematical achievements as the calculation of the orbit and position of Neptune before that planet had been found by observation. But they were, in effect, only half-truths and contained a margin of error which needed a further and, in some sense, a different explanation.

The whole truth, in the present connection, it is impossible for me to state. It contains terms that I cannot yet understand. But I may suggest a closer approximation from a reference to certain passages in *The Secret Doctrine*. On page 258 of Vol. I, for example, will be found various quotations from the Book of Dzyan, which suggest at least one of Dr. Newsholme's omissions. Thus "Whatsoever quits the Laya State" (the Laya is the point of matter where every differentiation has ceased) "becomes active life; it is drawn into the vortex of motion (the alchemical solvent of Life); Spirit and Matter are the two States of the One, which is neither Spirit nor Matter, both being the absolute life, latent."

What Dr. Newsholme has failed to infer will be found by implication in this reference. He has not in the first instance gone far enough back to realise that there is something behind spirit, which he assumes as primary. In the sequel to the above quotation, however, we learn that "Spirit is the first differentiation of (and in) Space; and Matter the first differentiation of Spirit." This necessarily gives another aspect to the whole argument. It is true that we have grounds for the deduction that with each differentiation, the primal all pervading element becomes grosser and more resistant, presenting what is known to Science as inertia and is spoken of by Madame Blavatsky (*S. D.* I. 280) as the "irrational brute-energy

inherent in matter". But we can find no warrant here for any suggestion of "a sense implying moral responsibility in the elements of spirit within the matter," such elements appearing, as it were, wilfully rebellious in such forces of nature as a tempest.

Another of Dr. Newsholme's terms that seems to me to need further elucidation is that which he speaks of on p. 123 as "the force of Fear". I am ready to grant without any question the concept of "Fear" as an antithesis to faith, —it is spoken of in this connection with reference to Peter's failure to walk on the waters. I accept further the suggestion of many failures due to fear, physical as well as spiritual, in various other relations. But I would postulate that fear is not in itself a positive force but rather a failure of the active spirit to manifest itself. Physical fear is largely due to the instinct for self-preservation persisting from the more animal stages of the first years of life. Peter's fear of sinking was no doubt of this order; and if we can accept the whole story as a statement of fact, we must conclude that the resistances suddenly set up by the sudden emergence of this primitive instinct checked the power of the spirit that had until then upheld him. Indeed any secession to the lower impulses has this effect.

Dr. Newsholme, in fact, has gone almost as far as anyone can go by the inductive process of Science, and has fallen as short of the truth as we should expect him to fall. A fuller self-consciousness of the spirit is required before we can penetrate the deeper mysteries. Nevertheless, to return to my text, I believe that such sincere, unprejudiced books as these serve a valuable purpose. They awaken the curiosity of those who, lacking such stimulation, might slip into the rut of orthodox belief, and may encourage them to search still further; and at this time when the surface of public life presents to the newspaper public so many deplorable aspects of national egotism and self-seeking, we may gladly welcome any contribution to thought which has, at least, the right orientation.

Finally, Dr. Newsholme's concluding passage indicates that he has a full appreciation of at least one essential, for he writes:—

> If the path found and followed in these pages has been that of truth, may the Scanning of the track have helped and in no way hindered fellow-pilgrims in their own journey! If the way prove to be in part one of error, the conclusion just reached, that the law of the road is the Law of Love, implies at any rate that the error is not wholly astray from truth.

With that statement we could not possibly have any quarrel. But, alas, how great a difference there is between the acceptance of that Law and a realisation of its vast applications to the conduct of life!

J. D. BERESFORD

VIVEKANANDA*

[**Clifford Bax** is the author of *Twenty-five Chinese Poems, Twelve Short Plays,* and is the biographer-essayist who has created living pictures of such diverse figures as those of *Leonardo da Vinci* and *Socrates* on the one hand and of *Bianca Capello* and *Pretty Witty Nell* (Nell Gwyn) on the other.—EDS.]

These volumes form a revised and abridged edition of the biography in four volumes which appeared in 1912, and the probability that some of the anonymous authors are no longer alive makes it easier for a critic to discharge his duty in pointing out some of their shortcomings. The work was obviously a labour of love and reverence but this factor ought not to lower our literary standard. Unfortunately, most books that deal with the spiritual life are badly or poorly written, the reason being, no doubt, that many people at a certain stage of religious development assume that literary art is a mere plaything—just as others persuade themselves that "the body" is unimportant. People of this kind should realise that only skill enables a writer to convey a mood or a meaning, that earnestness alone cannot achieve its purpose, that, as Charles Lamb remarked, "easy writing makes damned hard reading". When, as in this book, several inexpert authors have collaborated, we are certain to find ourselves travelling over a very uneven road, and no one will be surprised to find that the writing in these volumes varies from the straightforward to the embarrassingly emotional, from plain prose to unlucky attempts at a poetic style. The opening writer, for example, not content with "Hushed in silence was the household, hushed in silence and rest," actually progresses to "Came the morning". Another writer observes of someone that "he shook the dust of his feet". Vivekananda's life and personality offer superb material for a biography and it is disappointing, therefore, that this memorial to him should be twice as long as it ought to be if it was to achieve its maximum effect, that it is put together without any sense of attractive presentation and that the authors had not skill enough to lure the reader effortlessly from paragraph to paragraph. An expert writer, in sympathy with the subject, might have made this "Life" a classic, and this does not mean, as many earnest people will suppose, merely that it might have been "better written". It means that it might have interested not only the few who are already attracted by Indian philosophy but also the whole literary world. It means, too, that it might have been certain of lasting for generations.

We all know that there are persons in Europe, and even more of them in America, who are ready to regard any Hindu with superstitious awe. We know also that several mountebanks have

* *The Life of Swami Vivekananda.* By his Eastern and Western Disciples. Two Vols. (Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora, Himalayas. Rs. 8, or 12*s.*)

taken advantage of this foolish attitude. Vivekananda, however, was probably the finest representative of any Eastern religion or philosophy who ever visited the West. His sincerity is beyond question. These volumes convincingly destroy the old rumours that in America he succumbed to the physical charm of women. They show too that his intellect must have been exceptionally powerful. We need not accept the story of how, having read straight through eleven volumes of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, he was capable of answering any question upon their contents, but we have here overwhelming evidence of his philosophical acumen. Indeed, whenever the authors quote from his letters, his conversation or his discourses, we recognise at once that we are listening to a man of intense aspiration, great beauty of life, tremendous energy and high mental voltage. The vitality of these *ipsissima verba*, even on the printed page, is astonishing. They come to us, across thirty years, with a stronger sense of his personality than any gramophone record could have captured.

The early part of the work, treating of Vivekananda's childhood and discipleship, conveys a rich impression of Indian life as it must feel to an Indian; and in the long concluding section any imaginative Westerner will find himself carried all but physically into the atmosphere of a vivid and unfamiliar world. He will realise, for instance, how in 1900 (and it may still be so) the arrival of a saint at an Indian town or village would draw the multitude toward him as spectacularly as the arrival of a champion prize-fighter at Newcastle or a film-star at Victoria Station. In the preface, however, we gather that the book was written with an eye to the occidental reader, and it was certainly a mistake to use so many Sanskrit words without any hint of their meaning. A novice might take some time to discover, for example, what is meant by "mahasamadhi".

Between these two accounts of Vivekananda's life in India, we read of his sensational debut as a public speaker at the Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893 and of his two sojourns in America and in London. It is always pleasant to find that saintliness and commonsense can go together as when, for example, he admitted that "the spirit of one of his relations had appeared to him now and then, bringing news of far-off places," adding the remark "On enquiry, I found that its words were not always true." Still more reassuring is the courageous statement, in later life, that "behind my work was ambition, behind my love was personality, behind my purity was fear, behind my guidance the thirst for power. Now they are vanishing, ..." And if we want to realise how engaging a person he was we need only read how, being asked "Have you seen God?", he replied "Do I look as though I had? A fat man like me?"

The profoundly reverent tone in which most of this Life is written may weary, if it does not alienate, most Western minds, but no unprejudiced reader could finish these volumes without feeling that he has been in touch with a really great man—great, no matter whether or not the world should soon forget him,—without a sense of that spiritual quickening which comes from physical nearness to such a personality, or without wondering whether it is not very much as though St. John or St. Paul, or a combination of both, had been living in the world between 1863 and 1902. Many Western readers will be startled to find that the virtue which this Hindu saint extolled above all others was energy.

CLIFFORD BAX

TESTIMONY OF FAITH AND CREEDS OF THEOLOGY*

[**Marmaduke Pickthall** is an English Muslim and the author of *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran.* His review shows his inclination towards the original teachings of Muhammad and away from theological accretions. The student of Theosophy will read with interest his remarks about the free-will of angels and of men; it is a teaching of the Esoteric Philosophy that man can rise superior to angels. Again the hierarchy of Jinn to which Satan belonged and who along with men possesses free-will, and not the angels, is another teaching of that philosophy. The interested reader will find a full explanation of the rebellious Satan-Lucifer, possessing free-will, in an article entitled "The History of a Planet" by H. P. Blavatsky in *Lucifer*, I. p. 15.—EDS.]

The title of this learned work is misleading. The documents here quoted and explained were never binding upon Muslims in the way that the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed became binding upon Christians. The only formula which has the value of a Creed in that sense for the Muslim is the *Shahâdah* (Testimony): "I testify that there is no God except Allah and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah."

The Fiqh Akbar and the Testament of Abû Hanîfah (so called) which the author has chosen to consider as the Muslim Creed are, as he justly remarks, statements of belief drawn up in face of certain heresies; they may possibly have been applied as tests to prove the orthodoxy of newcomers to the school or circle of their authors; but the great majority of Muslims were ignorant of their existence at the time, and to-day they are only of historical interest. The convert to Islâm from another religion was then, as now, called upon to recite the *Shahâdah* before witnesses, instructed in the duties of a Muslim (*Pillars of Islâm* by Prof. Wensinck, second chapter), and asked expressly to abjure the special error of his former faith. If he had been a Jew he had to affirm his belief in Jesus as a Messenger of God; if a Christian, to affirm his belief in Jesus as a Messenger of God and nothing more.

This last requirement probably accounts for Art. 8 in the Fiqh Akbar I, though Prof. Wensinck is inclined to reject this explanation (which is that of the Arab commentators) because he finds no other clause directed towards non-Muslims. The article, as quoted by him, runs:—

> Whoso believeth in all that he is bound to believe except that he says: I do not know whether Moses or Jesus (peace be upon them)

* *The Muslim Creed, Its Genesis and Historical Development.* By A. J. Wensinck, Professor of Arabic in the University of Leiden. (Cambridge University Press.).

do or do not belong to the Apostles, is an infidel.

Why Moses should be introduced at all is not clear unless it may have been to show the equality of the two revealed and tolerated religions in the opinion of the Muslim. Professor Wensinck's use of the word "Apostle" here and elsewhere to denote the great Prophets is a little irritating. It is true that the word means "Messenger" as does the Arabic word *Rasûl*; but "Apostle" has become appropriate to the messengers of Jesus Christ, who are called in Arabic *Hawâriyûn*, while Jesus himself is called *Rasûl* in the Qur'an.

Islâm, in the first period of zeal and conquest, was religion without theology, a religion of clear, one might say, honest, faith and practice without doubts, disputations or subtleties. When the Muslims had established themselves in Syria and Egypt they began to hear the arguments of subtle Christian theologians, though it may have been only from the mouth of converts to Islâm. Professor Wensinck rightly emphasises the point that the Christian influence was indirect and the growth of theology among Muslims quite indigenous. They began to arrange and formulate their own ideas, attempted to define the indefinable. But these attempts could never with them have the force which the Creeds of Christianity acquired so easily, because of the deep reverence of the Muslim community as a whole for everything that existed in the early days. Nothing of later date could win the same acceptance. As Professor Wensinck admits, the plain *Shahâdah* was never superseded or discarded. What he really depicts for us, and very ably, is the development of that theology up to the time of Al-Ghazzâli's magnificent repudiation of it, before it hardened into cold scholasticism. The devout, with notable exceptions, always disapproved of it. Says Al-Ghazzali :—

> It must be recognised, that Kalâm (theological discussion) by itself does not belong to what is prohibited or recommended. In one respect it is harmful; it usually leads to zealotism. As to its use, it is often thought that it reveals reality and lays bare the foundations of things. This, however, is far from being the truth. If this were said to you by an adherent of Tradition or of anthropomorphism, you might think that people usually hate what they do not understand. But I speak as one who has descended to the bottom of *Kalâm* (theology)and who has reached the highest rank of the *Mutakallimun* (theologians) and has been inspired with a hatred of it; as one who has dived into the depths of other cognate sciences and has come to the conviction that the way to the foundations of knowledge is blocked up on this side. Certainly, in some cases *Kalâm* is not void of all light and guidance. Nay, it may be said that its use is limited to a single case: *Kalâm* may serve to prevent the dogmatic belief of the masses from being disturbed by disputations with schismatics. For the masses are weak-minded and easily troubled by the disputes of schismatics, however weak they may be. So the weak may be combated by the weak. The masses may cling to the *'aqîdah* we have given them . . .

For the 'aqîdah (statement of belief) of Al-Ghazzâli, Prof. Wensinck refers us to the work of another well known Arabist, Prof. Macdonald. Yet it is more deserving to be called the Muslim Creed than the documents here quoted *in extenso*, and is (what these are not) undoubtedly authentic.

Anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'an (of which Prof. Wensinck, following the theologians, makes too much) are covered for the plain believer by Sûrah III, v. 7:—

> He it is who hath revealed unto thee (Muhammad) the Scripture wherein are clear revelations. They are the substance of the Book—and others which are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue, forsooth, that which is allegorical, seeking (to cause) dissension by seeking to explain it. None knoweth its explanation save Allah. And those who are of sound instruction say: We believe therein; the whole is from our Lord; but only men of understanding really heed.

The same verse disposes of much of the theological discussion and discredits it, in the opinion of the pious. Prof. Wensinck, in a reference to this verse, instead of "allegorical" has "doubtful," a mistranslation and decidedly misleading. Indeed often his translation seems unsympathetic, as for instance his choice of the word "infidel" where "disbeliever" would have been as true a rendering, giving a slightly wrong direction to the reader's thoughts.

He seems to regard the whole literature of the Traditions of the Prophet as of later, more or less deliberate, fabrication. Such a view is hardly tenable. After the Prophet's death people, faced with any difficulty, naturally sought to know what had been his opinion and example. They questioned his Companions and, if they could, wrote down the answers they received. These inquirers in their turn became authorities for the succeeding generation and so on. Written notes of *Ahâdîth* were of very early occurrence as the late Prof. Horovitz showed in "*The Earliest Biographies of the Prophet and their Authors*".* That there should be different versions of the same traditions is but natural; and that fabricated *Ahâdîth* exist is admitted by all Muslims; but great care was taken to weed them out, and the mass of the selected traditions is deserving of a great deal more respect than Prof. Wensinck seems inclined to pay to it. A tradition which happens to fall in aptly with the requirements of a later time is not therefore necessarily a fabrication. In one passage Prof. Wensinck seems to imply that Muslims believe free-will to be given to the angels as well as to mankind. That is not so. The usual explanation of the order to the angels to prostrate themselves before Adam is that Adam had been given a measure of free-will, by the right use of which some of his descendants would come to rank above the angels who have no choice but to obey their Lord's commands. Satan's choice of disobedience rather than bow down to anything except Allah is explained in Sûrah VIII v. 51, where it is stated: "He was of the Jinn; so he rebelled against his Lord's command." The Jinn, not the angels, share with mankind the responsibility of a measure of free-will. The theme is a favourite one with the *Ikhwân us-Safa*, and is illustrated in many folk-tales notably in the legend of Hârût and Mârût, the two angels who were given free-will at their request.

Prof. Wensinck follows other eminent Orientalists in stating that the Qu'rân disclaims for the Prophet the power to perform miracles. The statement is not quite correct. All that the Qu'rân really declares is that miracles were not at his command. They belonged to Allah and would come for him only when Allah willed. Muhammad could not perform them on demand as the soothsayers and conjurers did, nor as some of the Prophets before him were empowered to do.

On p. 241 "Muhammad relates" etc., referring to a passage in the Qur'ân, is the only sentence in the book offensive to the taste of Muslims.

The system of transliteration from the Arabic employed is foreign. The combination "Dj" is meaningless in English. It is used in countries where "j" is pronounced soft as in French or with the sound of "y" in order to suggest the sound of English "j" and Arabic *jîm*.

The work is rich in detail but appears to me defective in proportion and design, so much so as to convey, through overcrowded detail and in view of the title, the impression that Islam is difficult, complicated and irrational, which it certainly is not, as compared with other faiths. I have already indicated that the author lays excessive stress upon supposed analogies with Christianity. His book, however, is indeed a perfect mine of information on the early growth of dogmatism and scholasticism.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL

---

* *Islamic Culture*, Vol. I, No. 4, Oct. 1927.

St. John of the Cross. By FR. BRUNO, O.D.C. Edited By FR. BENEDICT ZIMMERMANN, O.D.C. with an Introduction by JACQUES MARITAIN. (Sheed and Ward, London. 18*s.*)

In strict obedience to the two categorical imperatives of history and the historical method that one should "not dare to tell a lie" and that one should "not fear to tell the truth" (p. xxix), Fr. Bruno has written what is perhaps the first full-length biography of St. John of the Cross, making profitable use of the Roman documents while not ignoring or minimising the value of those preserved at Madrid. It is a systematic study of the Doctor of the Universal Church and an authentic account of his life which will facilitate a better understanding of the spirit of his teachings. After a critical and careful exploration of the Carmelite archives, the author has narrated the details of the life of St. John of the Cross in an arresting manner so as to focus attention on charity and love which were the mainsprings of that life.

Perfection of charity and love or a Union with God constitute the goal of man's spiritual effort, according to St. John of the Cross. His doctrine is the pure catholic doctrine of the mystical life. But no man is a hero to his valet, and St. John encountered an opposition from amongst the members of his own Order. He was thrown into prison where he found inner spiritual freedom.

To students of Indian thought the following teachings of St. John will make a direct appeal. In the course of his letter to Juana de Pedraza, St. John is said to have exclaimed: "Nothing—nothing—nothing—even to strip oneself of one's very skin and all else for Christ." In this glorification of charity one hears resonant echoes of the spirit of *vairagya* (non-attachment) and readiness to sacrifice even the most precious possession of life including his own self (*Atmarpana*). Secondly, St. John's readiness to suffer and bear all things with rare patience and in profound silence will be appreciated by students of Indian philosophy who believe in inexorable "Karma" and who see in present suffering the outcome of one's own past deeds. Thirdly, St. John's Mysticism was not a quietistic swooning into the Absolute. It was activistic, with a dynamic programme of burning aspiration for union with God and loving service to God's creatures.

The Vedantic scheme with its emphasis on *Tyaga* (sacrifice), *Daya* (mercy), *Seva* (service), and other *Atmagunas* (spiritual characteristics) ending in *Sakshyatkara* or mystical realisation of Divine Immanence, advocates practical mysticism out of which indolence and spiritual lotus-eating have to be strictly eliminated. St. John observed, when musicians were summoned to cheer him up while he was suffering from a severe abscess, "If God has given me the great sufferings I am enduring, why wish to soothe and lessen them by music?" (p. 347.) Sri Madhva counsels suffering without a murmur, without a complaint, without even so much as a passing allusion to one's suffering. The Acharya says:—"*Vishnave-tapa-ityeva— . . Karyam-apadyapi— Brahma—tenayati-aparokshyatam*". All suffering is to be viewed as penance undergone in the hope of mystical union with the Supreme, or realisation of Divine Immanence. Even in the time of dangers and difficulties, acute crises, excruciating pain, etc., one should concentrate devotional attention on God.

Jacques Maritain, deeply touched by the only too obvious irresponsiveness of some of the modern Christians to the doctrines of St. John, asserts: "There are other souls, separated from God and tortured by those evil powers that are overwhelming modern life who find in him the instrument of their salvation" (p. xxv). The League of Nations has not yet prevented wars and exploitation. The World Economic Conference has adjourned *sine die.* Perfection of charity and love do not seem to have been made active determinants in the regulation of social and international concerns. The lives of saints such as St. John are a standing inspiration to some few at

least who may honestly endeavour to walk in their footsteps, and Fr. Bruno's biography, so attractively written, will make modern men and women search their hearts, will kindle introspection in them, and enable them to take stock of their spiritual achievements.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Orient in American Transcendentalism. By ARTHUR CHRISTY. (Columbia University, New York. $4.)

The burgeoning of American interest in the philosophy and literature of the East is traced, in this study, in the Orientation of three outstanding exponents of Transcendentalism in the United States—Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott. The book not only evidences a thoughtful survey of the writings, published and unpublished, of these men but it enumerates the books of or about India, China, and Persia which there is record of their having drawn from public libraries or which are known to have been in the private collections of their friends and so presumably available to them. To these three friends and neighbours in mid-century Concord, the Orient made a profound appeal, to which each gave characteristic response. Emerson, the chief spokesman of the group, drew freely on the Eastern literature for a refutation of the current rationalistic philosophy so distasteful to his native idealism. The *Bhagavad-Gita* had a great attraction for all three. In it Emerson found "nothing small or unworthy; but large, serene, consistent, the voice of an old intelligence which in another age and climate had pondered and thus disposed of the same questions which exercise us." One striking passage from Emerson's diary describes a dream of a Pundit instructing him in the Oriental doctrine of Emanations. "As a river flows," he told him as they walked, "and the plant flows (or emits odours), and the sun flows (or radiates), and the mind is a stream of thoughts, so was the universe the emanation of God."

The Yoga philosophy appealed especially to Thoreau, humanitarian and mystic, whose ideal it was to immerse himself completely in Nature. He wrote to a friend in 1849: "Depend upon it that rude and careless as I am, I would fain practice the *yoga* faithfully .....To some extent, and at rare intervals, even I am a Yogi." "Thoreau's sense of kinship with trees, his brotherhood with every living object, his identification of personal life with universal life, permeate all his work."

Alcott, who called himself a "propagator of the things of illuminated Mind," was inspired by the Oriental influence with a great zeal for disseminating a knowledge of the world's scriptures. "Very desirable it were since the gates of the East are now opening wide and giving the free commerce of mind with mind, to collect and compare the Bibles of the races for general circulation and careful reading."

The reciprocal interest in the East in the writings of Emerson and Thoreau, and especially the influence of the latter on M. K. Gandhi, are interestingly brought out.

Mr. Christy shows sincere appreciation of the beauties of Oriental literature and philosophy. It is the more regrettable that he shows a lack of more than a surface understanding of some of the fundamentals of Hindu philosophy. There is, for example, no hint as to the metaphysical basis of the doctrine of Transmigration, and we find the surprising inference that the Upanishads sanction moral laxity drawn from quotations the gist of which is that "for him who has attained the philosophical view the ethical is transcended". The author specifically disclaims any attempt at "propaganda for any modern theosophical movement," but his book, nevertheless, represents a definite contribution to the purposes with which the Theosophical Movement of our time was launched.

ELEANOR M. HOUGH

The Religious Foundations of Internationalism: A Study in International Relations through the Ages. By NORMAN BENTWICH. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

Norman Bentwich, well known as a scholar in international law and as an ardent Zionist and Jewish patriot, has published in this book the course of lectures he gave at the inauguration of the Chair of the International Law of Peace in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. This interesting book bears witness both to Mr. Bentwich's scholarship in international law and to his Jewish patriotism. It deals with the influence of the different religions of the world, mainly of Judaism and Christianity, on the furtherance of peace between nations and on the development of international law. The author has adopted the historical approach to the subject and traces the influence of religion through the ages to the present day when he thinks that there should be a League of Religions parallel to the League of Nations, and that it is a function of religions in the West and in the East to raise nationalism to the recognition of a single humanity and so to be the spiritual foundation of Internationalism.

Unfortunately we see religion to-day rather formed by nationalism and subservient to nationalistic and patriotic interests. Judaism has always known this entanglement of religion and nationalism; and although some of the prophets like Jeremiah rose to a universalistic conception they remained solitary and persecuted amidst their people; and it was the greatness of this unique race to cling ferociously to its nationality and to defend it as vehemently as they could and whenever they could. On the other hand Buddhism was a pacifist religion, and Christianity and Islam were, in their conception, universalistic and supra-national religions offering to men an inclusive world-wise fellowship.

Mr. Bentwich seems to us much too optimistic about the value of Universities, League of Nations and official religions and churches as instruments for genuine internationalism. If he proclaims Jerusalem a city of peace, that may be true of an ideal Jerusalem but the real Jerusalem on earth has always been a city of bitter and fanatical struggles, and even to-day Arabs and Jews are there engaged in a fierce struggle for what they consider their right to this city and its country. But even if we disagree with the author in some of his evaluations we shall learn much from his book. Mr. Bentwich does full justice also to all other religions and philosophies. He recognizes that Socrates and the Greek philosophers of the Stoa have considered themselves as the first citizens of the world and he quotes the Roman poet Claudius speaking of Rome as having received the conquered into her bosom like a mother and not as an empress, summoning those she defeated to share her citizenship, and drawing together the distant races with bonds of affection. With greatest fairness and a scholarly impartiality Mr. Bentwich shows us the lofty ideals and the shortcomings of Christianity and Islam; he shows us how Saladin, the Moslem hero, after his triumph over the Crusaders, spared most of their lives, and declared in his dying advice to his son: "Do the will of God, which is the way of peace. Beware of blood; trust not in that, for spilt blood never sleeps."

The want of a true internationalism, of a brotherly fellowship of men, was never as urgent as to-day, but unfortunately we seem far away from it. The national movement is everywhere, especially in Europe, taking an extreme and exclusive form, and it becomes clearer from day to day that any road to a higher communism of men, to a world unity of races and peoples can lead only through the complete discarding of nationalism which is the curse of present day humanity.

HANS KOHN

Some Aspects of Vayu Purana. By V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, M. A. (Bulletin No. I of the Department of Indian History and Archæology, University of Madras.)

The Puranic lore is less studied both by Western Orientalists and Hindu scholars than the Vedic or the Upanishadic. To those for whom myths and allegories of the Puranas are not worthless, because not meaningless, such a Bulletin as this is of significant value. We congratulate the General Editor of the Series, Mr. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, for beginning his task with such an interesting number. The author has done his work thoroughly and has given us a sound exposition of the contents of the *Vayu Purana* but he has also succeeded in raising some puzzles in the matter of *lokas* and *dvipas* and other items of the cosmogony of this Purana. We look to him and others like him for further and deeper research, especially in the department of anthropolgy-ethnology, as the Puranas treat of the evolution of not only historic, but also pre-historic human races.

The explaining of the Puranas is a most difficult task, for as H. P. Blavatsky points out "taken in their dead letter, the Purânas read as an absurd tissue of fairy tales and no better" (*Secret Doctrine* II. 320). What she wrote of the *Vishnu Purana* applies to the *Vayu* also—"the reader is likely to throw the book away and pronounce it a farrago of nonsense." She goes on to explain that "Purânas are written emblems" (*Secret Doctrine* I. 306), and that "an emblem is *usually a series of graphic pictures* viewed and explained allegorically, and unfolding an idea in panoramic views, one after the other." (*Ibid*) She further says that "in the days when the Purânas were written, the true meaning was clear only to the Initiated Brahmins, who wrote those works allegorically and would not give the *whole* truth to the masses." (*Secret Doctrine* II. 320.) In another place she gives an example: "Just as in old alchemical works the real meaning of the substances and elements meant are concealed under the most ridiculous metaphors, so are the physical, psychic, and spiritual natures of the Elements (say of fire) concealed in the Vedas, and especially in the Purânas, under allegories comprehensible only to the Initiates;" (*Secret Doctrine* I. 520), and she quotes *Vayu Purana* on the topic of "Personified Fires".

These quotations are from a work published in 1888. Then, and for many years after, only a literal and material interpretation of the Puranas had been attempted, with the result that little attention was paid to them. The author of this Bulletin, we are glad to note, is more inclined to take what he names "the philosophical view". He says: "The concept underlying the creation is according to unambiguous statement of the Purana, philosophical and not material." He takes this "philosophical view" (not a happy term; would not "symbolical interpretation" be better?) of the seven lokas, the seven dvipas, etc. Not content with doing this he makes a very important suggestion: "There is room for the belief that genuine tradition has been mixed up with the mythical, and an endeavour to separate fact from fiction may not prove unfruitful." But what is a myth? Who or what will determine "genuine tradition," and should not due precaution be taken not to simply throw away as "myth" something not understood? Is it not likely that Purânic statements and stories may have more than one meaning? H. P. Blavatsky was a great student and lover of the Puranas and she maintains that "there is not a statement in the Purânas . . . . which has not several meanings . . . Every name in the Purânas has to be examined at least under two aspects; geographically, and metaphysically, in its allegorical application." (*Secret Doctrine* II. 403).

The line of study, greatly neglected so far, is also indicated in *The Secret Doctrine*—comparative study of the ideas presented in the Puranas, and

their equivalents in other lands. For example the seven dvipas with which our author deals can well be compared to the seven *Karshvars* of the Avestic lore; often the very word Karshvar is rendered by Dvipa, *e.g.*, Dastur Darab, the translator of Dr. Wilhelm Geiger's work—*Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*—tells us in a foot-note that Neriosengh, the translator of the Yasna, describes Qaniratha-Karshvar as Jambu-dvipa. In that connection mention may also be made of the "coincidence" pointed out by Geiger—"The Dvipas form concentric rings, which, separated by the ocean, surround Jambu Dvipa, which is situated in the centre" (Vol. I, p. 130); "according to Iranian view the *Karshvar Qaniratha* is likewise situated in the centre of the rest.....each of them (the other six Karshvars) is a peculiar, individual space, and so they group themselves round Qaniratha" (*Ibid* I, p. 131). Or take the *Zohar* full of Puranic phraseology, or Midrashim,—old writings of the Jews, the very title "Ancient" corresponding with the title "Purâna." It is said that the Bible and the Puranas analysed and read in the same light afford cogent evidence that they are two copies of the same original—made at two periods far distant from each other.

We sincerely hope that Mr. V. R. Ramchandra Dikshitar will "exploit" the Puranas more, so that not only he but also his readers may "be introduced to the culture and civilization of Ancient India".

B.

The Truth About Dreams. By M. L. COWDRY. (The Houghton Publishing Co., London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

The author has recognized one truth about dreams, namely, that each dreamer creates his own particular symbols and analogies. Unfortunately her enthusiasm for that fact has made her overlook other more important ones, thus limiting her classification of dreams into wish-fulfilment and analogy dreams, both dealing with the activity of the ephemeral personal Consciousness. For Miss Cowdry's idea of the symbology of dreams is simply the translation into analogies of the personal thoughts, desires and feelings, conscious or sub-conscious. The true symbolical dream, the translation of the soul experiences into terms of personal consciousness, is never considered. The interpretation of the series of dreams described, all concerned with learning music—taken to mean learning to interpret dreams—is also ingenious rather than convincing, because of the arbitrary limitation of the viewpoint adopted. Investigators will never understand the subject until they study all the aspects of man's make-up and the various states, good and bad, of the "astral light," the memory of nature. In that invisible, interpenetrating matter is held the record of every thought, feeling and event, the images of which may impress the inner senses.

So much time and energy is spent in the West in the endeavour to discover what has already been known and systematically classified in the ancient Eastern psychology—the three planes of human consciousness, *jagrat*, waking; *svapna*, dreaming; and *sushupti*, deep sleep; and the correct methods of equilibrating the mind, so that real use may be made of those "dreams" that are soul experiences, when the remembrance of them is not obscured by the "dreaming" activity of the personal mind. The main difference between the ancient and the present day psychology is that the first considers the soul and its instrument in relation to one another, while the latter divorces the two. It tries to ignore the higher and has therefore only a disproportionate view of the lower. It is caught in its own ingenious speculation and dreaming. But some day the dreamer will have to awaken.

W. E. W.

The Religious Philosophy of Baron Von Hügel. By L. V. LESTER GARLAND. (J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London. 5*s*.)

The philosophy of religion is always a more interesting subject to the lay reader than philosophy proper or metaphysics. The subject matter of both may be said to be God or Ultimate Reality. While the former starts with God-consciousness, the latter starts only with ordinary human experience. The philosophy of religion has thus an initial advantage over metaphysics. Ultimate reality is already a datum for it. Metaphysics can only reach this, if at all, through devious reasoning. But this advantage of religious philosophy involves a certain limitation of outlook. It provides no answer to the question: Is religious consciousness the consciousness of something that actually exists or of a real God? Baron Von Hügel himself is aware of the difficulty of an answer. Therefore, faced with that question, he has to admit that our knowledge of God is not clear knowledge, and that it cannot have this clearness because of the very nature of the case. He distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, the intellectual knowledge of abstractions and the intuitive of ultimate reality. The latter, he says, is not capable of definition, because ultimate reality is indefinable. Though our knowledge of it lacks clarity, it is rich with suggestiveness. Ultimate reality in his opinion is on the one hand incomprehensible and on the other indefinitely apprehensible. It is however evident that a knowledge which admittedly lacks clearness of objective reference can never prove objective reality, or escape the charge of anthropomorphism.

Baron Von Hügel, it seems, is not afraid of this charge. He even admits a certain anthropomorphism in the apprehension of God. How could man, he asks, apprehend God if God were entirely unlike man? The image of God may therefore in a sense be said to be man-made. But that is only because "everything that is apprehended by an apprehending being is apprehended according to the manner of this being's apprehension." It does not mean that God is no more than this image. There is a clear suggestion in our knowledge of God of what cannot be fully grasped or apprehended; and therein God is transcendent and unlike man. The question that Baron Von Hügel fails to answer is the epistemological value of this seeming suggestiveness,—Does this suggestiveness amount to knowledge of objective reality in which man has no share, or is it simply a human conceit?

Systems of Indian thought rarely attempt a proof of the reality of God. A personal God is in fact incapable of being proved. It is also a contradiction in terms; for personality is nothing if it does not involve a certain limitation. Indeed according to Von Hügel true personality must be infinite and without limitations. Human personality is imperfect just because it is finite. But he unnecessarily restricts true personality to the perfection of moral nature or the incapacity to do wrong. He does not face the metaphysical issue. To think of personality, we must think of other persons or other things, and these cannot but limit the most perfect person in so far as they have any nature of their own. We cannot give personality to God, and take away all personality from man and reality from nature. But if that is so, the most perfect god will be a finite or a limited god, which is no god that any religious consciousness will accept. Here is a great inherent contradiction of religious philosophy.

The presence of evil in the world is another source of weakness in Von Hügel's theistic philosophy. He admits that evil is something positive, active and rebellious. It is not merely the absence of good. Can we say that certain forms of evil such as pain and suffering are necessary for the attainment of good? But evidently suffering is intrinsically an evil. "If its effects are good that is not because there is anything good in suffering but because there is a power which is able to transmute it." But if that is so, how can we

reconcile the fact of evil with the idea of God as all-good and all-powerful? Von Hügel's has no answer to offer.

The truth is that there can be no philosophy of religion as apart from pure philosophy or metaphysics, unless we accept a limitation of vision which will be found ultimately to be opposed to any rational presentation of the subject. *In Indian thought, philosophy of religion has never been separated as a distinct branch of thought from general philosophy or metaphysics.* Indeed there can be a theistic metaphysic. But it will be found to lead up to an idea of god very unlike the God of the religious man or the God that is accepted on blind faith. This book may be of use to the devout Christian for it supplies him with a scheme in conformity with his beliefs. But for the student of philosophy it clearly demonstrates the impossibility of a *philosophy* of religion based on the facts of religious life alone. What is wanted is an interpretation of the common human experience and the solution of problems it gives rise to. Religious consciousness may reinforce the conclusions thus arrived at, but it can never be itself the ground for solving ultimate questions.

G. R. MALKANI

Living Tissues in the New Testament. By C.A. ANDERSON SCOTT (Cambridge University Press.)

The Heart of Christ's Religion. By CANON RAVEN (Longmans, London.)

Science and Religion: Broadcast Talks. By PROFESSOR HUXLEY and others. (Howe, Ltd., London. 1*s.* 3*d.*)

Dr. Anderson Scott attempts in this book to deal with a number of vital questions which are ever engaging the minds of New Testament students.

Is there, he asks, any grounds for the theory that there is a difference between the teachings of Jesus as found within the Synoptic Gospels and those of the Apostle Paul?

Carefully he summarises the essential points in the propaganda of both Master and Apostle and comes to the view of Karl Holl: "If we lay the teaching of Paul as a whole alongside the teaching of Jesus we cannot but marvel at the firmness with which Paul has grasped what was distinctive in his gospel." Says Dr. Scott,

> Paul confirms the Gospel portrait of Jesus in his most essential features. He registers the experience of the living Christ as it was apprehended by the Primitive Church. He clarifies it, interprets it in the light of the Cross and the Resurrection, and confirms the reality of experience by the harvest of the spirit whether manifested in his own character or joyfully recognised by him in his fellow believers.

With this question considered and a conclusion come to, the author deals with the mystical factor in salvation which leads inevitably to the Fourth Gospel and the riddle ever associated with it. Dean Inge has said that to understand this Gospel, a knowledge of Hellenic philosophy and the teachings of Philo in particular, are necessary. There is much truth in this. Dr. Scott is apt to dismiss rather too readily the likelihood that John was influenced by Philo or that his teachings concerning rebirth indicate contact with the Orient or mystery cults of the time.

He makes a profoundly instructive comparison between the similarities, differences and divergencies of method, instruction and teaching as found within the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of St. John. The contention of Paul Feine is dealt with that "Paul stands on the shoulders of John," and the author finally proves there is little ground for the argument that Paul and Jesus are in conflict. John makes explicit the essential thought that inspires John's Gospel, "the oneness of the Son with the Father".

The importance of this doctrine is emphasised too by Canon Raven in his *The Heart of Christ's Religion*:—

> If man is created to be the counterpart of God, he must develop to the fullest degree along that twofold path, till all mankind too

becomes a perfect unity, bound together by the perfect power of love yet possessing still within that unity, a plurality of perfect personalities. No less than this can be the ultimate goal, for it is the faith of evolution: it is the path of love: it is the Path of the Holy Spirit.

Canon Raven writes to the ordinary man while Dr. Scott's work will appeal to the scholar and student. Both books, while their appeal is different, merit consideration for both reveal the welcome tendency to get down to a discussion on points of religious belief concerning which much bewilderment and disagreement prevails.

I admire the honesty of purpose behind this book. There is no attempt to try and hide the omissions and failings of the Church in the past. The Canon readily admits a measure of the criticism directed against the Church was justified. "The Gospel of Christ" he writes, "has not been proved false but our own interpretation of it has been shown to be too narrow, too much restricted by the purely personal limitations of our own predilections."

A significant admission—and a significant book. Read in conjunction with Professor Huxley's broadcast on "Science and Religion" it becomes the more interesting, for both reveal welcome tendencies. Listen to Canon Raven:—

Every fresh discovery must be examined and tested by its aid: it must reject what is false and accidental: it must sift out what is right and true, until at last new knowledge can be fitted into its proper place in the whole fabric of accepted truth. Religion is no exception to this rule, and in forcing religion to accept this searching test of human reason rationalism fulfilled a useful purpose.

Says Professor Huxley:—

What man shall do with the new facts, new ideas, the new opportunities of control which science is showering upon him does not depend upon science, but upon what man wants to do with them: and this in turn depends upon his scale of values. It is here that religion can become the dominant factor for what religion can do is to set up a scale of values for conduct and to provide emotional or spiritual driving force to help in getting them realised in practice.

It would seem that Professor Huxley realises the truth of Canon Raven's comments regarding the failure of agnosticism. Philosopher and priest are agreed that the bridge between science and religion is not as wide as once it seemed. The philosopher realises the purely negative attitude is not enough, the priest perceives that the dead hand of theology has hid much of the truth and beauty of religious idealism. The philosopher says the aim of mankind must be to make life more truly and more fully worth living. The priest labours to bring the Kingdom of God on earth.

They may differ regarding the way to go, but the ultimate quest and purpose is the same. To quote Professor Huxley once more:—

Religion has usually been slowly and grudgingly forced to admit new scientific ideas: if it will but accept the most vivifying of all the scientific ideas of the past century, that of the capacity of life, including human life and institutions, for progressive development, the conflict between science and religion will be over and both can join hands in advancing the great experiment of man—of assuring that he shall have life, and have it more abundantly.

It may be thought that I have quoted too freely but my keenness has been to indicate this new approach, to emphasise what leading minds of various schools of thought are saying.

These three books indicate a spirit of tolerance. Rationalist and Christian, Priest and Philosopher are perceiving the folly of the old claims that each had the only revelation of truth. They recognise now that Truth is their only revelation. Old attitudes are being abandoned. New influences are at work. Let us trust these may succeed in bringing all fields of religious idealism back to the teachings of the Primitive Church of the whole Human Race and that the truly religious spirit may become displayed more and more in the daily life of the world.

W. A. PEACOCK

A Century of Emancipation. By Sir JOHN HARRIS (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 5*s.*)

Sir John Harris is a recognised authority on the subject of slavery. He was one of the representatives of the British Government at the Versailles Conference in 1919, and took part in the deliberations on the subject of slavery prevailing in certain parts of the world. His book, therefore, is not only authoritative but also opportune in this centenary year of the abolition of slavery by Great Britain by legal enactment.

Lecky described this act as "among the three or four perfectly virtuous acts recorded in the history of nations". But what bitter opposition the very idea of abolition aroused from powerful vested interests and also the Churches in England! Sir John Harris points this out in the first few pages of his book. The fight in Parliament for the abolition of the slave trade lasted for 18 years, and that for the emancipation of slaves for another 26 years. It does one good to read Sir John Harris's graphic and inspiring narration of how Wilberforce, Buxton and their friends carried on this great fight for nearly 45 years, until it was crowned with success.

The great measure of emancipation of 1833 led the planters to turn wistful eyes towards India, and before long the question of Indian coolie labour, as slavery in another form, came into prominence, against which Buxton had to take up the cudgels. The author says:—

> Buxton began the struggle in 1837, but it took his successors in the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society nearly eighty years to reform it out of existence. Aided by the political consequences of the Great War its abolition was at last achieved.

But can it be said that this chapter, which Sir John describes as "a not very creditable or satisfactory chapter in our colonial history," has finally closed—to the satisfaction of all concerned?

The middle portion of the book describes England's efforts to put down slavery in various disguises in various parts of the world, *e.g.*, the terrible atrocities committed on the natives of the Congo Free State and of the Putumayo and on the African natives shipped by the Portuguese to their cocoa-producing Islands. There are lurid and heart-rending pictures showing what barbarities the "civilized" West is capable of perpetrating for the satisfaction of its greed.

One chapter deals with international efforts culminating in the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations. Sir John Harris points out that his book will fail in its purpose if it does not focus public attention on systems of oppression which are in operation to-day. There are at present 5,000,000 men and women living as slaves. In THE ARYAN PATH for May 1930, Sir John Harris wrote a trenchant article on "The Mui Tsai Slaves," about the dilatory policy pursued in regard to this abominable form of slavery. More than three years have elapsed since then, but it would appear that there has been no mitigation of that evil. It is pointed out that the League of Nations will succeed in its task of setting free the slaves of the world if only a real international conscience be brought into active being. There can be little doubt that Sir John Harris's admirable book will contribute materially towards that consummation.

J. P. W.

The Music of the Growth. By COLLUM, with a foreword by SIR ARTHUR KEITH. (Eric Partridge Ltd. London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

In the course of this sincere and thoughtful book, an attempt is made to indicate a guiding principle in life "for the plain man of action who is willing to think before he acts". The author who has lived in the Far East and searched for wisdom there, and is conversant with the latest scientific deve-

lopments of the West, considers himself competent to point out the flaw in the modern conception of life: the failure to consider life and culture as a unity still in the making, a growth towards a More. The unity of life must be grasped. The compartmental division of life into living and dead matter, into plants, minerals, animals and *homo sapiens* is both arbitrary and unsound and stands in the way of realising its unity, of having a mathematical approach to Reality. Recognition of a proper understanding of a rhythm in Nature of "alternance between the two phases of one unity, —between the positive and the negative, the male and the female, the active and the recreative element," is the need of the hour. Nearly half of the book is devoted to the maintenance of the thesis that life is a growth, is "Becoming"; copious illustrations covering three special sections clearly exhibit the author's familiarity with the latest discoveries.

The last part enunciates the author's philosophy of life: "To grow, to progress, to move on: to move in a rhythm of delicately poised activity: to move with a frank delight,—this is the kernel of the philosophy of life founded on growth." Growth must be attuned to a pattern. It should not be erratic and aimless. Subordination to some code, some pattern, and co-ordination of impulses toward this end are necessary; and this implies an ethical code. Subordination further implies sacrifice,—the sacrifice of individual aberrations to the common achievement of the ideal. Growth presupposes fitness of body and mind. The author says that in his philosophy of growth there can be but one motive for doing right and that is the desire to do right because it is right. It is not the journey's end that delights the adventuring heart of mankind; but the voyaging.

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI SARMA

Moral Laws. By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. (The Abingdon Press, New York. $2·50.)

There are all sorts of theories about morals. There is, for instance, the Aristotelian theory, holding the good life to be that in which man's powers come to the fullest and most harmonious development. There is the epicurean theory claiming pleasure as the supreme good, which is unsatisfying, as Dr. Brightman points out, not because pleasure is a low ideal, but because it is too vague a definition of value. There is the Christian theory which stresses love and sacrifice, and the Kantian theory, holding that morality is a matter of the will itself, not of the success of the will in attaining its ends. There are all sorts of theories, but there is little "law and order". The science of ethics, says Dr. Brightman, is in a very unsatisfactory state—not for lack of interest, but for lack of scientific approach:—

> We have plenty of practical application, without clear ideas of the principles that ought to be applied, . . . plenty of information about the *mores* of primitive man, but little light on the duties of civilised man, plenty of isolated studies about special problems of morality, united by no common laws into a genuine science.

There are two kinds of sciences, the purely descriptive, and the discriminating or "normative" sciences that try to determine standards. Since ethics tries to discover the *best types* of voluntary human behaviour it is "the normative science of morals—or of the principles or laws of the best types of human conduct". In this definition are embedded three basic concepts—law, value, and obligation. All human beings compare and choose and decide that at least some moments of life are worth living. Hence they can say: "I value." All have a sense of duty (though of greatly varying delicacy)—all say some times at least: "I ought." And from a sense of values and duties, all come to some generalizations—within them is born the germ of recognition of moral laws.

And what is a moral law? It is "a

universal principle to which the will of man ought to conform in its choices." Every code is subject to its criticism. It is underpinned by logical law, the base of all laws, without which "the mind would be in a perpetual whirling chaos". Dr. Brightman indeed holds that the good life is the only *rational* life, and stresses the importance of knowledge in morality, though careful to state that knowledge alone is not virtue. "Compulsory education," he says, "comes much nearer than does constitutional prohibition to a direct attempt on the part of the legislative power to control the moral life." His first and basic moral law is the "Logical Law"—that all persons ought to will logically, *i. e.* be consistent with their own intentions. Thence he proceeds to build—or rather, to reveal—a whole delicately interlocked structure of laws for leading the "best possible" life, and shows how the words "best possible" in themselves demand as much knowledge and judgment as a man may ever possess.

Here is a fresh and effective method of attack. Dr. Brightman turns the the X-ray of logic upon his dense and complex field of observation to good purpose, and describes the skeleton thus illumined in straightforward, vigorous prose. This is a significant contribution to a subject that will never cease to hold men in thrall.

HELEN BRYANT

A Scholar's Testament: Meditations of Adolf Von Harnack. Translated from the German. (Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd., London. 6*s*.)

The Sermon on the Mount: An Interpretation. By PEKKA ERVAST. Translated from the Finnish. (T. P. H. London.)

The first author, a reputed German scholar and religious leader of Europe, faces with orthodox fervour the problems that confront the modern interpretation of Christianity. The second, a Finn, gives a liberal exposition of the teaching of Christ by a comparative study of texts in different languages. The authors, especially the former, are predisposed to their professed creed, and therefore have not been able to bring out the latent universality of Christian doctrines. The light of the Upanishads and the Sermons of Buddha would deepen their understandings. The Christ was an Oriental, and his teachings would be better understood in the light of the wisdom of the East. Pekka Ervast has, however, shown in his interpretation, both historically and logically, that the Eastern doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation are implied in the Sermon on the Mount. He says that during the first centuries the doctrines were accepted by various Christian sects and that later they were condemned as "dangerous" heresy, specially by the Synod of Constantinople convened by the Emperor Justinian in 553 A.D.; they were also anathematised by the medieval clergy in their councils.

Von Harnack has very wrongly condemned pantheism and deism. In his opinion Christian Theism alone can "satisfy a soul with deep inward aspiration". It is a pity that a learned Divine like Harnack misunderstands the Indian doctrines. The strength of a religion lies not in its crude narrowness; Christ's teachings are in reality synthetic but they have not been so far interpreted in such an universal way; for the first time, it was H. P. Blavatsky who showed this; she was iconoclastic in her *Isis Unveiled*, but as logically constructive in her *Esoteric Character of the Gospels.* Christianity will shed unforeseen lustre when it will be explained in the light of Indian wisdom. This is perhaps the greatest task before the Christians in the new age.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine. By JAMES MORGAN, D. D. (Elliot Stock, London.)

In the belief that St. Augustine accomplished for Christian psychology what Athanasius achieved for Christian metaphysics, and that it is on psychological problems that St. Augustine has shed most light, (p. 21 Introduction), Dr. J. Morgan has reconstructed the psychological teachings of that saint. Tracing the influence on St. Augustine's mind of ancient writers, the teaching of St. Paul and of Manichæism, in the first three chapters, and indicating the substance of some of the important works and writings of his, in the fourth chapter, Dr. Morgan has summed up, in the fifth, St. Augustine's teaching "on the human soul". The *vexata quæstio* of the Freedom of Will, the Epistemology of St. Augustine, belief in and proofs for the existence of God are examined in the next three chapters. The concluding chapter is devoted to a record of the author's reflections on the psychological teachings of St. Augustine.

Dr. Morgan has done well in emphasizing that the most remarkable contribution of St. Augustine to Christian philosophy is the doctrine that the human soul is "spiritual in nature" (p. 142). St. Augustine was both a theologian and a philosopher. He championed the teaching of the Church as a theologian and systematised speculative concepts and theories and undertook a thinking consideration of men and things as a philosopher.

Though Dr. Morgan writes in the spirit of enthusiastic championship of the psychological teachings of St. Augustine, he has not succeeded in scientifically substantiating all the claims he makes on behalf of those teachings. I shall mention two crucial instances in support of my contention.

(1) When Dr. Morgan remarks that "The Western type of thought was superior in its psychological aspect, to that of the East" (p. 18), he shoots very obviously wide of the mark. The spiritual or non-corporeal character of the soul is a concept as old as the Vedas and the Upanishads. When St. Augustine struggles hard to explain the exact relation between the soul and the body and to solve the problem—"why has the soul a body?", and when he asserts that the soul "although it is created in time, will not perish in time" (p. 131), one must feel rather formidable difficulties in maintaining that his teachings contain anticipations of modern psychological doctrines. Creation, according to the Vedanta is not a *de novo* origination. It is just an encasement of the spirit within a nervous mechanism. When did the first encasement of the first spirit occur? It is *anādi*, beginningless in time.

(2) St. Augustine's doctrine of Free-will and the stress he lays on "divine direction of the will" (p. 163) have not been psychologically and philosophically dovetailed into a consistent system. If God directs our first thoughts, there is no reason why He does not direct subsequent movements of thought as well. The existence of Evil has to be accounted for. It is unphilosophical to dismiss it as an illusion or mere appearance. Modern scientific determinism which governs psychology will explain freedom of will and all willed activity or exercising of volitions as responses to environmental or situational demands. There could hardly be any anticipations of a view like this in St. Augustine's psychology.

When, however, Dr. Morgan asks one to believe that "St. Augustine anticipated modern thought so far as to formulate his ideas on the subject of psycho-analysis" (p. 177) he makes an extravagant demand, which in the light of actual and uncontroverted facts is impossible to grant. The psycho-analytic emphasis on unconscious urges, and the free-play allowed to them, and their inhibitions by considerations of social opinion *ad hoc*, could easily be seen to have as little in common with the doctrines of St. Augustine as Einsteinian Relativity with Cartesian Mathematics.

Whether or not one is able to detect in St. Augustine's works anticipations of modern methods and psycho-analysis, one can realise from a study of Dr. Mor-

gan's fine work that St. Augustine has his permanent place in the sun as a powerful personality living and advocating a life of love and peace, in whom there was a happy and harmonious combination of three constituent elements of rationalized Religion—" the personal, the institutional, and the intellectual". Christians and non-Christians owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Morgan for his illuminating exposition of the psychological teachings of St. Augustine who prayed—"Hear me, hear me, hear me, my God, my Lord, my King, my Father, my creator, my hope, my possession, my glory, my home, my country, my salvation, my light, my life."

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Book of the Gradual Sayings. Volume II (" The Book of the Fours "). Translated By F. L. WOODWARD M. A., with an Introduction by MRS. RHYS DAVIDS (Oxford University Press, for the Pali Society. 10*s.*)

This is the second volume of an entirely new translation of the *Anguttara Nikaya*, one of the oldest portions of the Pali Canon, and therefore valuable as providing the best record available of the Master's *ipsissima verba.*

In a scholarly and provocative Introduction, Mrs. Rhys Davids stresses the evidence of " editorial handling," and comments on the constantly recurring feature of parallel versions of certain passages, but her analysis of the process by which this comes about probably describes the way in which the great proportion of scriptural change occurs. She says :—

> If we bear in mind that the teaching was for centuries purely oral, and handed on by repeaters located at centres increasingly distant . . . , the inevitableness of differing versions becomes obvious. Let us now see in the teaching a system of a mantra or text in fixed wording, with exposition of it left to the more or less freely spoken comment of the teacher; the case is strengthened. Let us finally see creeping in . . . a partial forgetting of the episode which may have led to the mantra being uttered, with the making good, at some later date of revising under much changed conditions, and our meeting with inconsistencies and improbabilities is accounted for, if not explained.

The value of the present volume is that it represents a transition from the presumably purer teaching of the earliest period to the system, claimed by Mrs. Rhys Davids as purely monk-made, which later earned the name of Buddhism. All too soon " ideals are sought in negation, in riddance, in avoidance," instead of in that expansion of consciousness which is the measure of spiritual growth. In the early writings we hear much of the Self and little of the not-self; in later days we read of nothing but the evils of the not-self, and mention of the Self appears almost as an oversight from the erasing tendencies of later and misguided minds. Rightly does the writer say that " where your man is a vigorous growing sprig of the Divinely Real, you do well to weed the bed around him. But where there is no such slowly expanding long-lived plant, it follows that weeding becomes the chief, nay, the only task." As she points out later in this interesting Introduction, and her words cannot be repeated too loudly for modern Buddhist ears :—

> The *original anatta* teaching is only a denying of what a man might wrongly hold to be the self—surely a very different thing from denying his reality. Seeking the master among the staff you may say to each servant: "You are not he ! " without meaning : " You have no master ".

Long may this admirable combination of translator and introducer work together in the interests of an increased understanding of the Message of the All-Enlightened One.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

MY NOTE BOOK

[**A. R. Orage** has the advantages of one who has educated himself, and therefore is not hindered by old moulds of thought; he used his vision and imagination in the past in editing *The New Era*, and is doing so now as Editor of *The New English Weekly*. THE ARYAN PATH will publish every quarter a few pages of his "Note Book"; in this first instalment, Mr. Orage writes about the ancient culture of India and its influence in the modern world. This theme is very near to our own meditations; we are labouring to restore the use of the forgotten and the abandoned highway—the Aryan Path. Mr. Orage uses the term Aryan in a true sense and it must not be confused with ignominies of the Nazis in Germany who claim for their barbarities the backing of Aryan culture.—EDS.]

It is certainly not with any chauvinist intention that I would stress the Aryanism of India. But in matters of cultural values, words and their association are very nearly all important; and it is of great advantage that in their first presentation a set of values should be described by a name already in good repute. The auspices under which Indian culture has hitherto been presented to the world have not, on a candid examination, been particularly favourable. Forbid that I should underrate the labours of scholars, Indian and European, in the field of literary research, textual editing, and of painstaking translation. My criticism is that from the very start—with extremely rare exceptions—the scholars on both sides, Indian and European alike, have largely failed to *communicate* the spirit of the originals so as at once to be assimilable to the common understanding of both peoples. And the reason for this failure, I believe, is to be found in the fact that Indians failed to claim and assume common Aryan values, while Europeans in general paid only lip homage to the community of racial ancestry.

* * *

From this initial error of policy a number of misunderstandings have arisen, the chief being the colossally false assumption that a gulf, practically impassable to the ordinary intelligence, exists between the two cultures Indian and European. It has been allowed to be assumed that somehow or other Aryan India differs so profoundly from Aryan Europe that only the rarest circumstances could breed in either an intelligence that could perfectly understand the other. So totally different was their essence as well as their development and history that virtually the two cultures were as materially alien as the cultures of two different planets, differing from each other not in degree or colour or form only, but in kind and species. It is absolutely necessary, in my judgment, to protest in the name of our common race against this unwarranted assumption. I will allow that it is difficult for the modern mind of any race to ap-

preciate, say, ancient Egyptian culture as the Egyptians themselves lived and felt it. I will agree that even the cultures of the real Orient—China and further Asia—are less readily assimilable by the Aryan mind, Indian no less than European, than, say, the cultures of ancient Greece and ancient Rome. But I simply cannot admit that the Indian and European cultures are foreign to each other; or that, in essence, they radically differ. The difference that has been made to appear radical—to the infinite loss of both communities—is the work of bad translators, and, at bottom, of bad Aryans.

* * *

It has often been remarked that the influence of the Bible upon any given people depends upon the quality of the translation in which it is presented to them. Let it be imagined that the Greek and Roman literatures when they were revived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had been first selected, and then translated and presented to Europe, by pedants, with footnotes leagues long and with scholia heaped upon scholia. It is inconceivable that in these circumstances any Renaissance of Humanism would have sprung out of them. They would have been *there*, of course; and a few scholars would have made a profession of reading them; but their assimilation and fructification in the culture of Europe would have been completely frustrated. With the greatest possible respect to Max Müller, I suggest that that is precisely what he did for Indian culture when he introduced it to the European world some fifty or sixty years ago. In the first place, his selection of literature for translation was arbitrary and misleading; and, secondly, the *style* of his translations, their form and appearance, were calculated to give the impression that Indian culture is exotic to the European mind and, if not entirely without common roots, at least so different in development that virtually it was of another species. It is necessary, I repeat, to protest against this attitude and to change it for the correct attitude. *Except* in inessentials, which it is the work of humane scholarship to smooth down by *creative translation*, there is nothing in Indian culture beyond European understanding to appropriate any more than there is anything in European culture not assimilable by Indian understanding. The Aryan Indian has the advantage over the Aryan European in the exchange of cultures from the simple fact that, as a rule, the Aryan Indian reads European languages as well as his own. On the other hand, the Aryan European must, as a rule, depend upon translation for his contact with Aryan Indian culture. But this only strengthens the need for better translations and in no sense implies any other incommunicability than deficiency of language.

* * *

My own special fields are lite-

rature and psychology, and in each of these I can truthfully say that not only have I had, and still have, much to learn from Indian culture; but, after proper translation, I have encountered no *idea* in either field in Indian culture that is not completely intelligible to me. The frame of reference, so to say, of Indian culture in these two fields, is identical with their frame of reference in my European mind. Let it be granted that in respect of colour, in respect of attitude, in respect of the distribution of stresses and relative values, the differences between Indian and European literature and psychology are considerable. They are not much greater than the differences already bridged between, let us say, French and English or Russian and Spanish cultures; and in any case their standards are common. Given (once again) a common language in which to discuss, I should not find it the least more difficult to apprehend, if not to comprehend, the principles of literature and psychology as understood by the best representatives of Indian culture, than to apprehend or comprehend the principles of ancient Greek or contemporary Latin culture. And always, when I find any difficulty at all that is not due simply to my stupidity, it is due to the inadequacy of translation. Either I have failed to divine the meaning through the gloss of the translation, or the translator has himself failed to convey it. The fault is not in an essential of understanding, but in an inessential, and therefore remediable, misunderstanding.

* * *

In subsequent Notes I hope to have the opportunity of comparing the principles of literature as exemplified in the two cultures, using, as my main Indian exemplar, what I regard as the greatest literary creation this world has ever seen, the "Mahabharata". Europe, I assert, has not even got to the beginning of the realisation of the literary greatness of this astounding work of art. I hope also, in my other field of psychology, to make a comparison, in due course, and in simple European terms, between some at least of the most representative Indian theories of psychology and those of Europe, —including, for this purpose, America, and with particular reference to the work of my friend, Professor C. Daly King, whose *The Psychology of Consciousness*, was published in the "International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method" a few years ago. Here in this work, if I am not totally mistaken, Indian and European psychology meet on the common ground of reason and science. Without claiming for one moment that Sankara and Professor Daly King are of the same rank in respect of their attainments in psychology, it is nevertheless my opinion that in essence they are of the same school. And that

school, I contend, is our common Aryan school.

* * *

In the meantime I must remark that the misunderstanding already referred to has invaded every field of our common culture. All respect again to men like my friend, Coomaraswamy, Professor Havell, Mr. Laurence Binyon, and now the latest writer on the subject of "Hindu (why not Indian?) Art"—Mr. Mulk Rai Anand*—I cannot allow that the difference between Indian and European æsthetic is *radical*. Mr. Binyon, for example, says that " from the point of view of the Indian artist the religious import was everything—design, colour, composition, all the purely æsthetic elements of their work being left to the more intuitive activities of the mind". Mr. Coomaraswamy says, again, that the Indians never valued their works of art purely as works of art, and had, in fact, no intelligible philosophy of beauty. And Mr. Ananda, in his very able book, embroiders exclusively on the theme that Indian art is "sacred," "hieratic," and in no sense identical with the " art " of Europe. Is not the misunderstanding here the misunderstanding noted before of confusing subject with form and particularly of stressing inessential differences? I challenge the assertion that Indian æsthetic is or ever has been any more " religious " or "hieratic" than many schools of European art. Because in a considerable number of instances the religious *motif* has predominated in Indian works of art, it does not follow that art has been subordinated to religion, though used in its service, and, still less, that design, colour, composition and so forth were left to the merely intuitive activities of the mind. There may not exist, as Mr. Coomaraswamy alleges, any formal treatise in Indian literature on Æsthetic apart from the relation of Art to Religion—though I fancy even this statement is incorrect. But it is absolutely certain that a theory of Æsthetic was the common possession of Indian culture of the fifth century, from the single fact that Rasa, "the delight experienced through a work of art," was a term in common use. This "delight" or "rasa," it is obvious, was something different from the emotions evoked by the religious associations of the object. It was the purely æsthetic whether in or not in conjunction with the religious. Sri Krishna referred to it when he said "The splendour of splendid things am I"; and even if it was not invariably or even often cultivated for its own sake (that is to say, as a delight without other associations,) it was not because it was not understood as pure æsthetic, but simply because, as a rule, its association with religion was commissioned—as it was in early mediæval European art !

* * *

Nobody less than I would wish

* *The Hindu View of Art* by Mulk Rai Anand, with an introductory *Essay on Art and Reality* by Eric Gill. (George Allen and Unwin, London. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

to deny to Indian culture its religious richness. Exactly as elsewhere, all forms of culture developed in India originally under the patronage and from the trunk of the religious emotion. More powerfully than elsewhere the religious emotion in India persisted and remained predominant among its offspring for a thousand years and more. But to deny that side by side with and under the wing of religion, as it were, pure æsthetic remained either unknown or uncultivated, is not only to fall into the old misunderstanding of regarding India as a land of priests but to leave no possible explanation of the marvellous development of the secular forms of art in poetry, drama, the dance, music, architecture and sculpture. If it is possible for Europeans to separate the motive of the Gothic Cathedrals from the art that went to their building, it should be equally possible to separate Indian æsthetic from Indian religion. Writing with the privilege of a diarist I make the prediction that when Indian religion has resolved like a nebula into its various suns—philosophy, science, psychology—one of its most resplendent suns will prove to be Indian æsthetics.

A. R. ORAGE

[Mr. Orage closes the above with a prediction about Indian æsthetics; to him and to others of his way of thinking the following article will make a special appeal and it is opportune.—EDS.]

ÆSTHETICS IN INDIA

Bhava—Rasa—Dhvani
Emotion—Taste—Expression

[This article by **M. A. Venkata Rao, M. A.**, of the department of Philosophy in the Mysore University, shows that the statement current among western scholars that "æsthetics is a modern science" is not correct. Modern knowledge of several subjects could be advantageously amplified and substantiated by the aid of old Eastern culture, and among these is the science of Æsthetics. —EDS.]

There is a suggestive approach between the leading ideas of current æsthetic theories in the West and the central principles of Indian æsthetic speculation. Indian æsthetics took a definite and coherent shape about a thousand years ago with the great work of Anandavardhana (IXth. century A. D.) and his commentator Abhinavagupta (Xth. century A. D.), who may be called respectively the Plato and Aristotle of Indian Poetics. The ideas of

Bhāva, Rasa and Dhvani are the chief ingredients of the theory established by them.

Bhava: Psychological Foundation. From the days of Bharata, in the beginnings of the Christian era, the Indian theory of art has founded itself on a clear analysis of sentiment. विभावानुभावव्यभिचारि-संयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्ति: has been the *mahavakya* of Bharata, the seed-concept, which has inspired and guided all later thought. It lays down the proposition (*sutra*) that æsthetic experience (*rasa*) is born of the blend of *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhichāribhava*. Emotion (*bhāva*) is regarded as an active state of mind in which an innate psychical disposition (*vāsanā*) is called into play by a specific stimulus. Such specific stimulus is called *vibhāva*, and the physical manifestations it gives rise to are called *anubhāvas*. Stimuli (*vibhāvas*) are either central (*ālambana*) or accessory (*uddīpana*).

Let us take an example to understand these terms: A girl in a meadow:—the girl is the central stimulus (*ālambana vibhāva*); sex feeling (*rati*) is the emotion (*bhāva*) evoked; the surrounding atmosphere of the song of birds, the ripple of stream, the fragrance of flowers constitute the accessory factors (*uddīpana vibhavas*) which heighten the central feeling. Further, these emotions are distinguished into *sthayibhāvas* and *vyabhichāribhāvas*. *Sthayibhāva* is the major emotion co-present with the specific stimulus. *Vyabhicharibhāva* corresponds to what Dr. McDougall calls Derived Emotion. In the example, the hope of engaging the girl in conversation, pleasure if it is realised, disappointment if it is frustrated, and all the changing waves of feeling arising out of the same foundational emotion would constitute *vyabhichāri* or *sanchāribhāvas*. These are emotions within an emotion lasting just as long as the stimulus *vibhāva* lasts. *Anubhāvas* or physical expressions are distinguished into those amenable to our control such as facial movement, general posture of the body etc., and reflexes like tears, blushes, rigidity, palpitation etc., which are largely beyond our control.

The entire emotional life of man is explained on the basis of nine fundamental emotional dispositions (*sthāyibhāvas*):—

Rati	—	Sex
Hāsa	—	Laughter
Śôka	—	Sorrow
Krodha	—	Anger
Utsāha	—	Elation
Bhaya	—	Fear
Jugupsa	—	Disgust
Vismaya	—	Wonder
Śama	—	Peace

Dr. McDougall has expounded a similar classification though he has not utilised it for an æsthetic theory. Fear, anger, positive self-feeling, negative self-feeling, laughter, disgust, tender emotion, wonder and lust is his list. The only omission is peace (*śama*). Perhaps the West cannot think of peace as a fundamental ingredient of the human soul! It is obvious that this theory of emotion is substantially identical with the widely-accepted

views of McDougall. The close association of instinct (*vāsana*) with emotion, the ideas of major and derived emotions, the linking of specific emotions with specific types of stimuli and even the classification of the fundamental drives of human nature constitute remarkable parallels. In many respects, the Indian analysis is more comprehensive; for example, thirty three types of derived emotions are described. The Greek idea popularised by Matthew Arnold that poetry should deal with the permanent or essential feelings of mankind has been incorporated in this analysis from the beginnings of Indian *alankāra sāstra.*

Now in literature (*kāvya*), the poet evokes emotions in us by the skilful presentation of *vibhāva, vyabhichāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas.* In witnessing the drama of Shakuntala, we see the play and counterplay of emotion in Dushyanta and Shakuntala aroused by the presentation of appropriate situations and expressed by the skill of the actors, to which ensemble we respond with appreciation (*rasa*).

Rasa: *Æsthetic Experience.* Emotion, as such, is only the stuff or material of art. For, all expression of feeling is not art, else every pang of grief would be tragedy and every outburst of laughter would be comedy. The "magic" of art is necessary before emotion (*bhāva*) can be transformed to æsthetic appreciation (*rasa*). The word *rasa* has rich associations in Indian philosophy. Literally it means sap, and also any object which can be tasted. It has come to connote the essence of life. In the *Taittiriya Upanishad* it is identified with Brahman itself (रसो वै सः) Hence its significance as æsthetic emotion must be understood against this background if its full reach is to be realised.

In modern European philosophy, the principles of the æsthetic theory laid down by Kant have remained the framework of thought to the present day. He formulated four principles distinguishing æsthetic from other kinds of judgment. They are:—(1) the *moment of disinterestedness*; (2) the *moment of universality*; (3) the *moment of finality*, and (4) the *moment of necessity.* It is remarkable that all these ideas should be included in the Indian treatment of *rasa.* Disinterestedness refers to the detachment from personal pre-occupations brought about by all genuine art. We are lifted out of ourselves into a serene world. The cycle of ignorance, self-interest and activity (*avidya, kama* and *karma*) in which our ordinary life is lived is broken into for the time being and we are introduced into a *unique form* of experience different from the usual (*aloukika*). *Rasa* thus liberates us from self. Abhinavagupta brings out the essentially transcendental character of artistic experience by his demonstration that it is neither caused by the emotions depicted in poerty nor is it a product of memory. Rasa is neither effect (*kārya*) nor reminder (*jnyapya*).

The world of beauty is *sui generis*. As Mammata, a later systematiser, puts it, it is a form of experience which transcends the distinctions of friend, enemy and neutral and which presents objects for contemplation free from their usual effects of attraction and aversion—in a word, free from all personal reference. Passing on to the next "moment" of Kant, his universality is the exact equivalent of *sādharanīkarana*, a process which expresses the mysterious work of the poet (*kavikarmān*). Art embodies a principle of universalisation. *All things which arouse emotions are not things of beauty.* The skill (*chamatkāra*) of the poet is necessary before they can enter the world of art. Otherwise, as Bosanquet points out in criticism of Croce, an old travelling portmanteau should be considered a product of art because of the happy reminiscences it may evoke in its owner. It is not art because it has no power of arousing the same emotions in all people.

All great products of genius rise above local colour and appeal to all times and peoples. The *Shakuntala* of Kalidasa is as deeply universal as it is Indian. As S. Alexander points out, the idea of the concrete universal expresses the deepest truth in art, if not in philosophy. Universality does not mean only common attributes with the differences left out. It points to the innermost core of reality working outward into a whole world of quality and relation. Hence it is that the *deeper* a man goes into himself, the more *cosmic* becomes his vision. Hence it is that great art is universal in appeal. The recitation of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* holds spellbound the most miscellaneous of audiences, consisting of men, women and children, of all ages and all degrees of culture and education. The " moment " of necessity expounded by Kant adds no new principle but only gives a reason for universality by grounding it in the inward constitution of human nature. The appeal of beauty is not accidental but flows from the necessary basis of the human heart. Mammata refers to this aspect of the matter by his phrase *sakalahridaya samvāda*, the power of entering all hearts. The "moment" of finality is an important element of artistic experience. It is delineated with great fulness in the *dhvani* school of writers. It indicates the fact that art is an end itself, *svayamprayôjana, charvaniikasārah, rasyamānah* etc. It is not a means to anything else. It is a form of creative joy characterised by complete forgetfulness of self and absorption in what Abercrombie calls "pure experience". "We are laid asleep in body and become a living soul," in the words of Wordsworth. Just as in the tasting of soup (*panaka rasa*) the taste of individual ingredients is lost in one mass of homogeneous savour and relish, a myriad detail of image and circumstance gives rise to an undifferentiated experience of joy

ineffable, suggesting Joy Divine (*Brahmānanda*) itself. The integral character of the experience is brought out by the phrase *akhandabuddhigrāhya*, and its immediacy is compared to the self's awareness of itself, *svākāraiva abhinnopi gócharīkritah.* But lest we should mistake æsthetic emotion to be a form of mere blind feeling, it is pointed out that it is a form of perceiving, of knowing, *avabódharupiiva, svayambódharupiivajnanantarêbhyo, vilaxanaiva.* This is what Croce means by saying that intuition is a form of knowledge "having excellent eyes of her own". Thus *Rasa* becomes the soul and substance of poetry and all art—*Vākyam Rasātmakam Kāvyam.* Corresponding to the nine emotions or *sthayibhāvas* emerge nine *rasas* or types of æsthetic experience. Poetry strove to appeal to all these potent moods and came to be judged in the light of its success in realising this aim.

Dhvani: the Theory of Suggestion. The theory of *dhvani* explains the form of expression of art. If *rasa* corresponds to the intuition of Croce and the "pure experience" of Lascelles Abercrombie, *dhvani* recalls their theory of expression. It draws inspiration from the old grammatical philosophy of *sphota.* The *sphota* theory had held that every word is the echo or expression of a transcendental pattern of sound-significance. Every word has three kinds of meaning (*artha*). (1) *abhidhā* or denotative meaning, (2) *lakshana* or indicative or metaphorical, secondary significance, (3) *vyanjana* or suggested meaning in its widest sense through emotion and association of ideas. In the traditional example, "the hamlet in the Ganges" (*Gangāyām ghôshah*) the *abhidhā* is the literal meaning. But it is unlikely that a village should be situated *in the midst of a river.* Therefore the mind travels to the secondary meaning (*lakshyārtha*)—the *hamlet on the banks of the Ganges.* All figurative meaning is included under this head. But emotion cannot be directly expressed in words. These two meanings are too feeble to transfer or communicate the nuances and shades of emotional life. This function is fulfilled by power of suggestion (*vyangyartha*). In our example, the word *Gangāyām* suggests coolness and sanctity. This is *dhvani.* Forms of literature in which the wings of suggestive expression are the principal carriers of significance, are superior to those in which "realism" and literalness predominate.

Suggestion is of three kinds according to what it brings before the mind. If it brings a picture, it is substance-suggestion —*vastuvyangya*; if it draws attention to fancy or ornament, it is *alamkaravyangya ;* if it communicates an emotional mood by a kind of ineffable "induction," it is *rasa-dhvani.* Poetry includes all three types of *dhvani* though Abhinavagupta is inclined to insist that even description and fancy must induce some feeling before they can be called poetic

—*Rasa eva vastutah atmavastvalamkāra dhvanitu sarvatha rasam pratiparyavasete.* This theory of suggestion, ancient as it is, includes all the results of psychological analysis "of the meaning of meaning" by I. A. Richards and others, and its utilisation for literary criticism by Abercrombie and others. The approach between the two is clear in the following citations. " A statement may be used for the sake of the reference true or false, which it causes. This is the *scientific use of language* (*vachyārtha*). But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude. This is the *emotive* use of language"—(*vyangya*), *cf.* Richards' *Principles of Literary Criticism* p. 267. Abercrombie in his book of the same name in the the Outline Series almost hits upon the *sphota-dhvani* sense of meaning itself:—

As the medium of literary art, the communicative power of language is of four main kinds. 1. *The syntax of the sense,* 2. *the rhythm of the sound,* 3. *the imaginative value of the sound* and 4. *the syllabic quality of the sound*..... Literary art will always be in some degree *suggestion.* (39–42).

The *mode* of suggestion is the secret of the creative artist (*kavikarmān*). When Homer describes the anguish of the dying hero on the plains of Troy in the single sentence "He saw Argos and died," the suggested sense is overwhelming in its pathos, which would only have been weakened by direct description. This is the strength of the true classical style-economy and power. The romanticist's criticism of the eighteenth century poetry in England and the whole controversy regarding " poetic diction " turns round this suggestive function of poetic language. The matter had been settled on Indian soil centuries ago by the *dhvani* school of poetics. Thus the Indian school of *rasa-dhvani* has gone thoroughly into the delineation and analysis of æsthetic experience and has constructed a coherent theory without the subjectivist metaphysical implications of Kant and Croce, and free from the anti-philosophical prejudice of psychologists like I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

CORRESPONDENCE

LEAVE AND PENSION RULES IN OLD INDIA

[**Sri Ram Sharma** is Professor of History and Political Science in D. A. V. College, Lahore.—EDS.]

The Sukra Niti (Chapter II, Lines 819 to 835) lays down what may be described as civil service regulations—salary, leave, pension, provident fund and bonus. Many of these modern practices in these matters were anticipated by this author.

Casual Leave:—"The king should give the servant fifteen days a year respite from work." Now this fortnight of leave is certainly over and above the regular holidays, for fairs and festivals were celebrated by all, masters and servants, the king and his officials. This provision does not compare unfavourably with modern practice.

Sick Leave:—"He should pay a quarter less than the usual remuneration to the diseased servant, pay three months' wages to the servant who has served for five years, six months' wages to the servant who has long been ill. And if the diseased be highly qualified he should have half the wages. Nothing should be deducted from the full remuneration of a servant who has been ill for half a fortnight. And a substitute should be taken of one who has lived for even one year."

Analysis yields elaborate results. To take the case of one who has served for a year only and is obviously a temporary hand, the law lays down that he is to be given the option of providing a suitable substitute for his work. Naturally this would mean that he would be allowed his full pay for the period for which his substitute was accepted. Of course the royal servant had to pay the substitute himself. Thus he was assured of return to duty on getting well as also the difference between his pay and the allowance he paid to his substitute.

Then the case of one whose period of service was more than a year but less than five years. He was to be paid three fourths of his salary as sick leave allowance, for—as the following provision shows—not more than three months. But if his period of illness did not exceed "half a fortnight" he was to be paid his full salary. After five years' service a servant was entitled to more consideration. He was allowed three months' sick leave on full pay. This could be increased to six months, presumably according to the length of service.

It seems to have been felt that for a long illness, the State could not be expected to pay its servants' salaries. But even then an exception was made. An expert could be given sick leave for more than six months on "half the wages".

Was any provision made for retaining in service those who fell and remained ill for a period for which they were not entitled to full or even half pay? Our text is silent on the point. But reading between the lines we conclude that probably the provision for accepting substitutes was not confined to those alone who had served for a year. All servants, it seems, could get leave on providing acceptable substitutes. Of course this must have placed a good deal of power in the hands of those who had to pronounce on the acceptability of the substitutes.

Pension Rules:—"The king should grant half the wages without work to the man who has passed forty years in his service for life, and to the son, if minor or incapable, half the wages, or to the wife and well behaved daughters."

This means that the period of active service for a civil servant was forty years, after which he would retire on a pension equal to half his salary. Pre-

sumably when he died his minor son would receive the same pension till he came of age. If he had no son, his wife and daughters would be provided for in the same fashion.

Now this provision is more liberal than modern pension rules though it demanded a larger period of active service. But this is not all. While in service the employee received "one eighth of the salary by way of reward every year". Thus modern provident fund rules were anticipated in India centuries ago.

Another rule makes provision for those who had the ill fortune to die in harness. Their sons as long as they were minor received the same salary. But when the sons were of age, they were admitted to the service, salaries according to qualifications. Of course our author is silent as to what was to happen in the case of those servants who had no sons. But combining this with the provision for pension we may hazard the guess that probably the same benefit was extended to wife and daughters in this matter also.

It may be objected that there is nothing to prove that these rules of the text book were ever put into practice. But we must remember the writers on the Niti and other legal codes did not usually write for entertainment or instruction of their readers but with a view to guide particular administrators. Thus the maxims of these writers reflect the ideal if not the actual practice of their times, and further it is reasonable to suppose that in time these ideals were translated into practice. Even as ideals these rules come very near to modern practice, and the Hindus may well take pride in the fact that, some two thousand years ago, their writers on administration, if not the administrators themselves, laid down such liberal rules in the matter of leave, made provision for a provident fund to be contributed by the State, allowed pensions on a rather liberal scale and, last though not the least, made arrangements for the dependents of those who had the misfortune to die while on duty.

Lahore SRI RAM SHARMA

THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

Do the Sufis believe in reincarnation? This is the interesting question raised in two recent articles in THE ARYAN PATH. Dr. Margaret Smith says in the January number that Islam looks upon reincarnation as a heresy and that the Sufis reject the idea altogether. In the June number Mr. R. A. L. Armstrong cites this definite denial and then proceeds to qualify it on the authority of a "Sufi Sheikh of exceptional powers". This rather subtle qualification amounts to a paradox, at least in the eyes of the average reader who can lay no claim to inner illumination or spiritual insight. To put the Sheikh's considered opinion in Mr. Armstrong's own words: "The mass of men reincarnate; hence roughly, the doctrine of reincarnation is true." And yet, "the *soul itself*, according to the Sufis, can never reincarnate. The personality returns, perhaps: impressed on another soul. But the soul itself, in its journey from Heaven, through Earth to Heaven again, touches the earth-plane once and once only."

One cannot say if the Sheikh's doctrine of the return of the "personality," and not the soul, has anything to do with the doctrine of the mystical identity of the Sufi Master (Sheikh) with the Logos, as described in Professor R. A. Nicholson's study of a treatise on the "Perfect Man" by al-Jīlī, a Sufi doctor of the 14th century. It will be seen there that the doctrine is advanced in order to rationalise the esoteric Sufi (and also Shia', whether Ismaili or Fatimite,) belief that the living head of a Sufistic (or Shia) communion is the vicegerent, and in a mystic manner the very incarnation, of the "Perfect Man," the Logos. What is pertinent is to note that al-Jīlī hastens to add: "Do not imagine that my words contain any tincture of the doctrine of metempsychosis. God forbid!" (Nicholson's *Studies in Islam-*

ic Mysticism, p. 106.) This fervent and rather incontinent haste to deny even a "tincture" of the doctrine of reincarnation on the part of al-Jīlī, and the emphatic statement made by Professor Nicholson, in his lectures on "The Idea of Personality in Sufism," that such eminent masters of Sufism as Ibn Sīnā, Ibn-ul, Fārid and Jalaluddīn Rūmī also "reject the doctrine of transmigration of souls (tanāsukh)," ought to put us on our guard against the inference drawn by Mr. Armstrong, from what the Sheikh told him, that it is the Sufi doctrine that "the mass of men reincarnate". If a non-expert outsider may be permitted to draw conclusions for himself from the evidence presented by experts, then it seems positive that all the most eminent masters of Sufism have categorically denied the doctrine of metempsychosis or reincarnation of the human soul, as it is held in India. And this, it would seem, for the simple reason that any such belief would directly and hopelessly cut across the definite Islamic (*i.e.*, Korānic,) teaching on eschatology. There is no mistaking this teaching, and by no dialectic ingenuity can it be made to square with the doctrine of reincarnation of the human soul as we know it in India. How can the human soul return to the earth, in any shape, when it must await in the other world the angel Israfīl's trump of resurrection on the Day of Doom?

Whether these Sufi masters held secretly the doctrine of reincarnation, we have no means of knowing. But when we see how whole-heartedly the great mystic and poet Rūmī held, and how fearlessly he declared, the faith in transmigration up to the limit permitted by orthodox Korānic Islam, it becomes difficult for any intelligent outsider to believe that Rūmī *really* disbelieved in his heart of hearts in the further reincarnation of the soul of man. In a well-known Ghazal of Shams-i-Tabrīz (in whose name Rūmī wrote his Ghazals), we read in an address to the soul:

Awwal jamād būdī ākhir nabāt gashtī,
Āngah shudī tu haywān, īn bar tu chun nahānast?

i. e. "first you were mineral, later you turned to plant, then you became animal: how should this be a secret to you?" Passing on to higher levels reached by the evolving soul, the poet sings:—

Gashtī azān pas insān, bā'ilm o'aqlo īmān . . .

"afterwards you were made man, with knowledge, reason, faith"; and, finally:

Z'insān chu sayr kardī bīshak firishte gardī,
Bī in zamīn az ān pas jāyat bar āsman ast:

"when you have travelled on from man, you will doubtlesss become an angel; after that you are done with this earth: your station is in heaven." (Nicholson's *Divani Shams-i-Tabriz* pp. 46-49.) An exactly parallel passage is aptly quoted in his notes by Nicholson from Rūmī's "Masnavi," and in it too the mystic and poet expresses his firm belief that, having gone through the pre-human stages, when he will die as man he will become angel:—

Hamlaē dīgar bamīram az bashar, tā barāram az malāyak bāl-o-par.

We may grant, for argument's sake at any rate, that a Rūmī may die to be born immediately again in heaven as an angel with wings (*bāl-o-par*) complete. But surely an ordinary mortal might feel that not one in a million is a Rūmī; grim realist that Rūmī himself was, surely he must have known that myriads of his fellow mortals were too near the animal level—many of them even more brutish than the brutes—to grow angels' wings as soon as they would shuffle off their too gross mortal coils. For, anyone who believes in the evolution of the human soul through the mineral, vegetable and animal stages up to the level of mere humanity must in all honesty admit one of two contingencies for the vast mass of mankind: they must be born again and again in this world till all the dross is purged out of them, or they must be so born again and again in some other world if they must, for some unknown cosmic reason, "touch the earth-plane once and once only". To the uninitiated mind any suggestion that all human beings alive on the surface of the earth at any

given time are likely to jump directly to a state of angelhood after death, sounds like a ghastly mockery. If we had our deserts, how many—God help us—would have to come back as apes or hyenas, asses or swine!

To any person who considers dispassionately the evidence brought forward by experts from the existing works of the greatest Sufi doctors, there is no escape from the conclusion that either they believed in metempsychosis secretly in their heart of hearts; or by a tremendous act of faith in orthodox Islamic teaching, they put aside all logic and reason and denied the return to this earth of a soul that had once risen to the level of humanity, however often that soul might have visited the earth before as a mineral or a vegetable or an animal.

As for the interesting argument that laying too much stress on a belief in the doctrine, even for those who hold it, must lead to spiritual lethargy—Mr. Armstrong's Sheikh was on perfectly valid logical and spiritual ground when he posed the Hindu "Guru" with the question whether "Advaita" (the essential non-duality of the transmigrating and phenomenal "ego" with the only Reality, the "Oversoul,") " which is the principal teaching of the Vedanta, is better promulgated by thinking about the doctrine of reincarnation or by leaving it alone". Too much of emphasis on this belief, and incidentally on the doctrine of Karma, is generally believed to have had a deleterious effect, temporally as well as spiritually, on the Hindu race. Whether we ourselves believe so or not, there is little doubt that too much thinking and talking and cherishing of the individual ego ("atma," in Pali, "atta") was considered by Buddhism to be an undesirable thing, so that there came into existence the deprecatory term "atta-vada" (belief in soul or self) evidently coined to stigmatise this fond belief. And, perhaps, it was because of this soul-deadening effect of dwelling too much on the ego and its destiny that the Buddha often brushed aside the problem of the soul whenever it was too insistently pressed on him by his inquisitive disciples.

Bombay J. S.

A CORRECTION

On page 438 of the June issue of THE ARYAN PATH, I have in my article on "Roman Script for India," inadvertently referred to the ट-varga (the ṭa group) of the Devanagari consonants as the "palatals." The ट-varga consonants, of course, constitute the *linguals;* to which alone reference was made. The error is regretted.

V. S. GANAPATI SARMA

Kumbhakonam

Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian poet writes in the August *Visva-Bharati News* on "Can Science be Humanised?" and traces the social unrest of the world to the "Anarchy of Spirit".

To-day our homes have dissolved into hotels, community life is stifled in the dense and dusty atmosphere of the office, man and woman are afraid of love, people clamour for their rights and forget their obligations and they value comfort more than happiness and spirit of display more than that of beauty.

He says that great civilizations of the past were at last run to death by men of the type of our precocious schoolboys of modern times, smart and superficially critical, worshippers of self, shrewd bargainers in the market of profit and power, efficient in their handling of the ephemeral who presume to buy human souls with their money and throw them into their dustbins when they have been sucked dry, and who, eventually, driven by suicidal forces of passion, set their neighbours' houses on fire and are themselves enveloped by the flame.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

A quarter of a century has gone by since the Indian Society of Oriental Art was established in Calcutta. Like so many other cultural movements it also has its roots in the well-known Tagore family. Abanindranath Tagore, with gifted colleagues like Nanda Lal Bose, has already succeeded in showing that the glorious tradition of ancient Indian art is not dead, but that it, like other branches of Indian culture, is vital and viable. The Bengal School and the Indian Society of Oriental Art have not escaped private ridicule or public criticism. But their vigour has not diminished and their steadfastness has given one more proof of their zest. We have before us the first number of the new *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriential Art* edited by Abanindranath Tagore and Stella Kramrisch; we give it a most hearty welcome. The journal is to be published twice every year (Annual subscription Rs. 7 in India, Rs. 9. foreign; 11, Samavaya Mansions, Calcutta), and the issue before us, replete with excellent contributions, promises a good harvest. It however does not inform us about the present state of the Society whose organ it is. We presume that the advent of this new journal will mean the disappearance of *Rupam* ably edited by Mr. O. C. Gangoly, to whom we must tender thanks for the rich gifts of the past. It is but meet that the organ of the Society should bring a special message to the interested few; but we hope that it will not entirely overlook its propaganda mission for the larger public. Both the Society and the School have suffered in the past through a lack of adequate publicity. The regular feature of *The Modern Review* which offers every month a coloured picture by some Indian artist, mostly of the Bengal School, is keeping the public in touch with its work. But even that is not sufficient. Time seems ripe for a more systematic attempt by the Society itself to organize its work and make its influence felt particularly in India. Its journal and office should play their parts in spreading the message for which they exist.

It was Edmund Burke who said that "a spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors". The School and the Society have acted on principles implied in that statement; they have visioned

the future in terms of the past and it would not be wholly right to pass judgment on their actual achievements without taking into account their ideals. But in India art must begin to play a larger part in educating the public mind and taste. Special cultural work, in its several branches, may be said to have been focused in the personality of Rabindranath Tagore; on the other hand, there is all the labour whose soul is Gandhiji who has awakened the masses to a vision they cannot realize and a longing they cannot satisfy without the aid of that culture. To bring about a union between these two branches of present-day Indian effort is a highly important function and the Indian Society of Oriental Art may well plan to attend to at least one aspect of this work. The Society is potent—more potent than it gives itself credit for. The ideal of stern asceticism and self-imposed poverty which Gandhiji proclaims as a message from ancient India needs to be supplemented by a message from the same old Aryavarta—a message which would colour the drab routine of life, modulate the stern aspect of simple living and endow it with charm and beauty. Unless the Indian artist co-operates in the work of mass-education, to inspire at least the town people now under the influence of the ugly, he must fail in his real mission. In his apparel, furniture, utensils, etc., the westernized Indian murders the soul and mind of ancient India. A hybrid mentality expresses itself in a hundred ways—khadi wear of European style, for example. The Indian Society of Oriental Art, true to its own original impulse, should plan to remove that mongrel mentality, and it is better situated to accomplish the work than most social and religious institutions.

This question of dress is not unimportant. It is not only true that "the apparel oft proclaims the man," but further that it influences him, unconsciously to himself. When Japan resolved to copy western ways one of the things it did was a change in the style of clothes of its population. The celebrated Hungarian violinist Reményi narrating his visit to Japan in 1886 says:—

> On August 8th, 1886, I appeared before His Majesty, a day memorable, unfortunately, for the change of costume commanded by the Empress. She herself, abandoning the exquisite beauty of the feminine Japanese costume, appeared on that day for the first time and at my concert in European costume, and it made my heart ache to see her. I could have greeted her had I dared with a long wail of despair upon my travelled violin. Six ladies accompanied her, they themselves being clad in their native costume, and walking with infinite grace and charm. ... The Mikado himself was in the uniform of a European general.

A similar step was taken in Turkey only a few years ago, and a like movement is on foot in Persia. National dresses, and time-honoured customs, and everything beautiful and artistic and worth preservation, are fast disappearing from view in these lands,

In India too this danger has to be faced; to lip-enthusiasm for the ancient ideals and modes of thought must be added suitable action, and who is better fitted to instruct the lay man in the ways of that beauty than the Indian artist who has caught the notion of the old world-life and is fixing it in picture or story?

Addressing the sixth Annual Conference of La Ligue Internationale pour la Vie et la Famille in Paris, Dr. Duval Arnauld is reported to have said the following:—

> There is no need to speak at length of the injury that follows from contraceptive practices.... Gynæcologists of every country,—Professors Dalché, J. L. Faure, and Siredy, in France; Friedlander, in America; Kehrer, in Dresden; Bossi, in Basle; Schockaert, in Louvain —arrive at the same conclusion: congestion, injury, sterility, and often moral crisis..... Contraceptive devices involve all sorts of risk: of injury, of burning, or erosion, of congestion and other evils. Professor Labhardt, Director of the Gynæcological Clinic at the University of Basle, thinks that contraceptive practices are often a cause of extra-uterine conception as he has seen the number of such conceptions quadruple itself since the year 1900: he thinks the principal cause of this increase is the increasing use of contraceptive devices. In this opinion he has the support of Professor Suderkoff and Professor Scranbansky of Leningrad, who have ample opportunity in Soviet Russia to observe the consequences of these practices. Moreover, all such practices react, sooner or later, on the general health..... And so we have local injury, general disharmony and attenuation of personality; congestion, sterility, predisposition to fibroid growth, and to extra-uterine conception, risk of surgical operation with its attendant dangers, mutilation and failure..... And be it known and proclaimed that all the artificial means which are taken to secure women from the risk of pregnancy involve a great many more risks than the pregnancy they are calculated to avoid.

This is a picture, drawn by a medical authority, of our civilization in which individuals degrade themselves morally while ruining bodily health and disregarding rules of hygiene. Turn next to the words of a scientist on the attitude and action of organized governments of civilized states affecting human morality.

Prof. J. B. S. Haldane has done a real service by his article on "Biology and Statesmanship" in *The Listener*, reprinted in *The National Life*. He writes:—

> The programme of the party now in power in Germany includes, or included till lately, a number of so-called eugenic measures, intended to check the breeding of various types of defectives, and of persons who are not of German race. As they describe people who do not share their political opinions as defective—*minderwertig* is the word—it would seem that a large proportion of the German people are regarded as biologically undesirable. In England self-styled eugenists have attacked poor relief, and transitional benefit for the unemployed, on the ground that this class is, on the whole, congenitally inferior. Now, it seems to me that the danger of multiplication of the mentally defective is a real one; *but there is a much more pressing and immediate danger. And that is, that people of whom governments do not approve should, on eugenic grounds, be sterilised, segregated or starved. To my mind the attempt to justify such measures on biological grounds is a prostitution of science, far more serious than the manufacture*

of high explosives, bombing aeroplanes or poisonous gases. We biologists cannot prevent statesmen from doing these things, but we can most emphatically protest against their being done in the name of biology, and in countries where speech is still free we can warn the public against this misuse of our science. [Italics ours.—EDS.]

And now listen to a complaint about the modern novel on the same problem of sex.

Allan Monkhouse whose literary criticism graces the columns of The *Manchester Guardian* has put in debt a large number of readers for aught we know, certainly an increasing number, by a very timely "Revolt" against the tendency of the modern novelist to exaggeration of sex-appeal, and on every occasion to drag in "the cocktail, the latrine, the brothel"; "incest and sex perversion have been subjects for great writers and now they are not neglected by the smaller ones". While Mr. Monkhouse admits that "the standard of novel writing is far higher than it was a generation or two ago" and that old respectability "doubtless had its elements of hypocrisy," he raises a voice of warning—"We are getting sadly out of proportion again." He adds:—

The English novel is giving a false impression of English life. There may not be many geniuses at work upon it, but there are many admirable talents, and some of them may be praised without reserve. But vicious, hectic manifestations of life are getting far too much attention. So it seems to me as a constant novel reader. Perhaps this is a provincial view, but the sum of many provinces may equal a metropolis.

We sincerely trust that the "Revolt" worded by Mr. Monkhouse will be echoed from many sides: "We want to read our contemporaries if they will let us," says Mr. Monkhouse—exactly; and we join in his appeal "for less lechery in English novels".

And speaking of novels old and new, we should like to draw the attention, especially of our Indian readers, to *The Golden Book Magazine* (New York) which every month brings reprints of stories, classics of literature. It began its career in 1925, to gather for its readers "fiction and true stories that will live," and during these eight years has fulfilled its purpose in a very laudable manner. The last number before us—for August—brings us the first instalment of a new condensed version of Jerome's "Three Men in a Boat," "The Credo of Love" by Alphonse Daudet, "Tennessee's Partner" by Bret Harte, "Hunger" by James Stephens, "The Wendigo" by Algernon Blackwood, and other good things. Adventure, romance and all the sex-appeal that any decent reader would wish, not only charm away the hour of leisure but add profit to pleasure. The story and the novel influence the public morals to-day perhaps more than any other institution, and such a magazine as *The Golden Book* and such a critic as Allan Monkhouse contribute their share in keeping that institution pure and healthy.

ॐ

"Seek out the Rajah of the senses, the Thought-Producer, he who awakes illusion. The Mind is the great Slayer of the Real. Let the Disciple slay the Slayer."

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV NOVEMBER 1933 No. 11

THE GOLDEN MEAN

In this journal have appeared from time to time deliberate conclusions of thoughtful writers, both oriental and occidental, who have bemoaned the present moral state of the world, especially the western, who have recommended that we look once again to the ancient East whence the light ever comes, and who have appealed to modern India not to be beguiled by the decadence of a waning civilization. One such pronouncement appears in our present number from the well-known philosopher and educator, C. E. M. Joad. He writes about the weakened moral fibre of the moderns resulting from a shallow philosophy of life and conduct, and he prescribes a remedy—the Golden Mean. As a fundamental principle the Doctrine of the Mean is true, and its practice in life beneficent; but Mr. Joad's interpretation of it seems incomplete. Therefore in presenting his essay we supplement its ideas, lest its warning is twisted into a recommendation.

The Golden Mean in all things is taught in the *Gita*, by the Buddha, and perhaps there is no fuller treatment of the subject than in the records of Confucius. All agree that moderation is the only way to success, happiness and enlightenment, at every stage of evolution. But moderation in what? How is the Golden Mean to be practised?

Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school was the first in the western world who taught that the art of life is to crowd in as much enjoyment as possible, and to do so moment by moment. But even he was compelled to admit that certain actions which give pleasure entail more than their equivalent of pain in the future. He therefore insisted that real pleasure belongs only to him who is self-controlled and who

possesses prudence. Thus our modern young people are not even real hedonists; they are sensualists. That is the reason perhaps why Mr. Joad recommends moderation in its quantitative aspect, with his whole attention on the experience of happiness: drink a little; lose your temper on occasion; indulge your senses when you are minded, but not too much. And he adds—avoid satiety like the devil. But little of prussic acid kills; loss of temper, on a single occasion, by a weak-hearted man may prove fatal; by a full-blooded man may cause apoplexy; sense-indulgence colours and captivates the mind, so that more and more people are "minded to indulge". If Mr. Joad says to a voluptuary "Avoid satiety," he will be answered: "Quite, quite, but I am nowhere near the satiety line." The thirst for sense-life cannot be cheated into a permanent moderation by small doses of that which the Buddhist calls "the abomination inspired by Mara". The glutton, sick with his fill, presently is ready to eat some more. Sense-thirst like the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart expands and waxes strong every time it is fed.

At the other extremity there are the rigid ascetics, body torturing contortionists who call themselves yogis; they also suffer from excess due to the same quantitative interpretation of the Golden Mean. They too are after happiness; and one such explained to the seeking Gotama—

> 'Tis written if a man shall mortify
> His flesh, till pain be grown the life he lives
> And death voluptuous rest, such woes shall purge
> Sin's dross away, and the soul, purified,
> Soar from the furnace of its sorrow, winged
> For glorious spheres and splendour past all thought.

In the observance of the Golden Mean the quality of the things indulged in and not only the quantity of indulgence must be taken into account.

That which poisons life disturbs the balance and mars the harmony of Nature. The moral order of the universe is maintained by the law of the Golden Mean just as gravitation holds in form the ever-moving stellar universe. That law works in man, in his flesh, blood and brain, in his thought, will and feeling, in his corpus, psyche and nous. Man attains real happiness only when he establishes harmonious contact with Nature through the Golden Mean which operates within as without himself. Therefore the Chinese sage said that "the life of the moral man is an exemplification of the universal moral order. The life of the vulgar person is a contradiction of that order." Extremists at both ends, hedonists and ascetics, mostly unconsciously to themselves, want to defy Nature and are frustrated. They mistake the goal of evolution. It is not happiness, though Bliss (*Ananda*) is experienced in the reaching of Nirvana, in the realization of Tao, in the attaining of Perfection. That Bliss is one of a pair, creative Ideation (*Chit*)

being the other. Pure Existence (*Sat*) of supreme Peace (*Shanti*) is born of active creative Ideation whose passive aspect is Bliss. Nirvana is not a far away locality but the condition of self-consciousness in which life is creative *and* blissful.

Real happiness is never attained by those who neglect to look at the quality of what is eaten and drunk by body or mind. True philosophy deals with the quality of things in Nature; and numbers themselves which tell us of the quantitative aspect of Nature, have their quality, as Balzac, the unconscious Occultist of French literature, and all true Esotericists have tried to show.

When man's conceptions of Nature and its processes are false, his philosophy of action is false and his practice of the Golden Mean is defective. If it is true that man is a bundle of cells in the process of disintegration, that human consciousness, like a flame, will go out when the candle of brain is finished, then what more logical than that man should strive to enjoy all he can while the brain holds good, and commit suicide when he cannot have "a good time"? A different philosophy of life is necessary for the restoration of order in the present moral disorder. It must deal with the whole of man, and teach him to reintegrate himself. Mr. Joad also recommends development of every side of our nature, but from a different point of view; will not the result be anarchy if man gives "free and equal play" to all his members? In the sincere attempt at reintegration, named Yoga in India, and in developing the virtue of each of our constituents, we may —and do—slip into errors and "lose our temper on occasion," "indulge our senses," "boast," "abase ourselves in worship" and "fight a little". These must be recognized as evil, and not be compromised with as partial good. On the other hand, that sincere attempt may produce excesses of asceticism, the pride of sackcloth and ashes, the holier-than-thou attitude, but these too must not be compromised with. The Golden Mean must produce harmony among spirit, soul, mind and body of man. And that raises the question which modern culture has yet to answer —"What is Man?"

There is only one way for a man to be true to himself. If he does not know what is good, a man cannot be true to himself.

—CONFUCIUS

THE REVIVAL OF HEDONISM

[This is the article by **C. E. M. Joad** on which we comment in the preceding pages.—EDS.]

I.—THE GOSPEL OF "THE GOOD TIME"

The modern reaction from the restrictions and inhibitions of the Victorian age may, I think, be taken for granted. The Victorians made a fetish of self-restraint and were never at a loss for a good reason for refusing to enjoy themselves. Enjoyment, in fact, they viewed with distrust and would never call a pleasure a pleasure, when they could call it a sin.

The moderns claim, and rightly, to have freed themselves from this inhibited attitude to life. They do what they do because they want to do it, and are never at a loss for some principle of self-expression or self-development to justify their actions. Desire, they hold, should be indulged on principle, except the desire for self-control which is exempted on principle. As for conscience, she has been so battered, shocked and put out of countenance that she dare not raise a voice in protest, and we proceed unreproved to devote our lives to the service of the god of "having a good time," which means that *we have escaped from servitude to our consciences in order to enslave ourselves to our passions.*

The modern attitude I believe to be as mistaken as the restrictive Victorianism which it has replaced. Before, however, I proceed to criticize it I propose to consider in a little more detail the gospel of "the good time" in its most distinctively modern expressions. Its main characteristic is an unquestioning conviction that the only object of being alive is to have a good time. A good time means jazz, cocktails, sporadic love making, over-eating, under-sleeping, making a noise and being cheerful. Its most essential ingredient, however, is continual movement. It is incompatible with having a good time to stay in one place for more than an hour, and young people in general, and Americans in particular, seem always to be apprehensively escaping from something which they fear may be lying in wait for them, ready to make its spring, if only they would keep still. But this is precisely what they will not do. They must be always going somewhere, always on the move, always in and out of one another's houses, so that a man who thinks to have founded a home, discovers to his surprise that he has merely opened a tavern for his daughter's friends. As a consequence nerves give way, suicides abound, college girls turn bandits, and preachers rant about the licence of the age. Articles have recently appeared in a well-known American review, *The Forum*, on that most attractive

of subjects, the modern girl. One of these articles, by Miss Temple, makes a number of interesting assertions about what, she assures us, are representative young women of the day. The following quotation from her article will indicate what I have in mind:—

> At college during my first year, there were ten other girls in my section of the dormitory. Some were Seniors, some Juniors; two were Sophomores, and two Freshmen. Only five of the eleven girls there, on their own verdict, were 'pure and undefiled'. Of the six strayed ones, one was a post-debutante from New York City, and another, a girl from the West, with prodigious fortune and inclinations. Two others were doctors' daughters. Of the remaining two girls, one avowedly earned her pin-money by means of her easy-going virtue. The last girl was rather pathetic. Not attractive and not particularly pretty, she nevertheless set out in the most efficacious way she knew to win for herself a share of masculine attention. And she succeeded, in spite of the superior attractiveness of many of her friends.
>
> But college is not the only place where such conditions exist. They are everywhere, admittedly more widespread in cities than in suburbs and rural communities, but even there overwhelmingly prevalent. In the past ten months, for instance, I have made several fairly intimate acquaintances among girls. Some have been in cities, some in a small town. The experiences of five of these girls find counterpart only in Havelock Ellis's six books on "The Psychology of Sex". Concerning their relationships with men, the girls are quite impersonal. They are only too willing to answer any questions one cares to ask; they withhold nothing. I have sometimes even wondered if their most acute pleasure might not lie in their discussion of their adventures, rather than in the relationships themselves.

Miss Temple proceeds to point out that irregularities which twenty years ago would have been sufficient to secure ostracism for the culprit, are now cheerfully accepted as forming part of the normal development, we might almost say education, of young women.

I have given this quotation at length because it affords a vivid illustration of that departure from nineteenth century morals, which is one of the most striking features of the gospel of " having a good time ". The departure involves a complete abandonment of old standards and values, and the establishment, as the sole standard of value, of pleasurable experience. This attitude is, I maintain, particularly characteristic of our age; it dominates our lives and pervades our literature. The works of the two writers, at once the most typical of our times, and the most advanced, Marcel Proust and James Joyce, are characterised by the same ready acceptance of all that comes, an acceptance that refuses to discriminate, precisely because it refuses to assign values, that I have noticed in modern life. The great novels of the Victorian age were pervaded by a sense of big issues in relation to which the characters were ranged. Often the fundamental issue which dominated the book was that of doubt versus belief, and the first question that one asked in regard to a particular character was whether he or she

believed or doubted. To ask such a question of a character in a modern novel would be a patent irrelevance. A modern character is unable to conceive the importance of such an issue, not necessarily because he doubts, but because it never occurs to him to wonder whether he doubts or not; the matter is not sufficiently important. The question of belief or doubt is one that can only be raised in a world of values; but the world of Joyce and of Proust is a world not of values but of sensations, between which the only question that arises is as to their respective pleasurableness. The literature of to-day is conscious not of a world order, is inspired not by an irresistible urge, but is moved by a curiosity to handle and appreciate individual sensations, as a woman turns over parti-coloured stuffs on a tangled and much littered counter. The Victorians prided themselves on taking the world for their parish; we make a merit of taking our emotions for the world.

II.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEDONISM

It is one of the paradoxes of thought that the doctrine of psychological Hedonism in its extreme forms has usually been maintained by men of blameless lives, who, like Jeremy Bentham, insisted that it was quite impossible for them to conceive of anything as desirable, and hence impossible for them to desire anything but their own pleasure. The argument is by now sufficiently familiar. Everybody is fundamentally selfish; even the apparently unselfish man is only one who gets more pleasure from denying himself pleasure for the sake of others, than from directly indulging himself. The martyr who goes to the stake for his opinions is usually an obstinate and self-opinionated person; he prefers the enjoyment of having his own way to any other form of gratification; he also has, as a rule, a strong histrionic sense which is gratified by his appearance in the centre of the stage, and a conviction that by five minutes' agony in an earthly fire he will avoid an eternity of torment in an infernal one and win perpetual bliss into the bargain. All those who in the name of religion deny themselves and eschew earthly pleasures, are actuated by motives which are all the more selfish for being far-sighted. They are taking out a long term insurance policy; the premiums are paid in self-denial and mortification in the present, and the rewards are drawn in terms of divine approval and celestial happiness in the hereafter. And so on, and so on. There is no single action which cannot be shown to owe its origin to the individual's desire for his own pleasure; hence it is argued that it is not possible for him to desire anything else.

A variant of this view is the specifically modern doctrine already described which issues in the conclusion, that whether or

no pleasure is the only thing that *can be* desired, pleasure is, quite certainly, the only thing that *ought to be* desired. Pleasure alone, in short, is really desirable.

This attitude to life appears and reappears like a recurrent *motif* in the social history of all materially comfortable societies. It has been from time immemorial the practical working creed of most young men who have had enough money to indulge their instincts, and it has found expression in precepts and aphorisms in which such wisdom as it possesses has been distilled. "The palace of wisdom lies through the gateways of excess." "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it." "The only sin is to get found out." "Success in life consists in knowing where to stop and then going a little bit further." "It is an absurd attitude to adopt towards life to go about approving and disapproving of things; we were not sent into the world to air our moral prejudices." "The Failure in life is to form habits." Best of all perhaps, to quote Brandes from Ibsen's play, "To obey one's senses is to have character. He who allows himself to be guided by his passions has individuality." In these and a hundred other sayings the philosophy of self-development has been crystallised. As to the consequences, who cares? A man's first duty in this world is to himself; and as to the next God will forgive, since, as Heine remarks, "it is his *métier*."

The whole attitude to life finds perhaps its most perfect expression in that wonderful conclusion that Walter Pater wrote to his *Renaissance*, which he caused to be omitted from the second edition of the book lest "it might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall". The conclusion is a dissertation couched in the most exquisite language on the theme, "Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die." In life everything changes, fades and passes; make the most, therefore, of what you have, before it is too late.

> A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy? To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.

This is the doctrine that underlies the modern thirst for pleasure; jazz and cocktails being simply the best known modern devices for keeping life at a focus of intensity, and making the most of each moment as it comes.

III.—THE FLAW IN HEDONISM

I do not propose to subject the doctrine of Hedonism to logical analysis. It may, I think, be destructively criticised on logical grounds, so destructively in fact that it has been by most philosophers relegated to the category of definitely exploded theories. I

am here content to take its basis, the basis, namely, that pleasure is the only form of good, for granted, and to ask simply whether the practical effect of Hedonism is to produce pleasure.

In the first place, the tendency to regard our own existence, and as a consequence the universe in which we exist, as a means to our own pleasure, cannot but have the effect of robbing both the one and the other of colour and of interest. The man who subordinates everything to individual gratification will not only regard self as the centre of the universe, but will come to think of the universe as having for its sole function the placing of himself in the centre. Bringing all existence to the test of its ability to minister to his individual desires, he will fashion the universe upon the model of his needs, and devoid alike of the will to subordinate self to a moral ideal or the capacity to lose it in an external interest, will barter all the richness and variety of the world around him for a shade of feeling or a thrill of pleasure. A universe whose centre is a state of feeling and whose circumference is ringed round with a set of desires, is neither an exciting nor even an interesting place; nor are the attempts of those who define the object of existence in terms of self-satisfaction to attain the satisfaction they value, noticeably successful. A life devoted to the satisfaction of the self is a tired and a tiring life; the wretchedness of men and women who have found it intolerable from lack of occupation, far exceeds the misery of those who have been miserable from an overplus of tasks and duties. There have been more suicides from boredom than from overwork.

It is for this reason that the so-called hedonistic cults, so attractive on paper and eagerly embraced by the young, have in the past been abandoned in disillusionment and disgust when called to the bar of experience. An early acquaintance with ethical systems reveals to the student of philosophy the arbitrariness of moral standards and the baseless and divergent dogmatisms of ethical philosophers; a short training in argument enables him, by joining the ranks of the philosophers, to dispose of the standards of his predecessors. Having passed the rapier of his newly acquired dialectic through the ribs of a few lay systems and let out some bran and a little sawdust, having knocked the bottom out of moral obligation and dethroned the categorical imperative from its pedestal, the young philosopher proceeds to the business of enjoying himself without qualm or scruple.

Believing that the only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it, he surrenders his mind to every credo that may tickle the reason and his body to every pleasure that may enthral the sense; holding that not the fruits of experience but experience itself is the end of life, he withholds

himself from nothing that will afford a fresh measure of emotion, provoke a sensation hitherto unfelt, or cause him to thrill to the pulsing of a more exquisite excitement. Striving to "burn with that hard gemlike flame" recommended of Pater, he will seek in art and sensuality the means to keep his experience always at white hot intensity. Unimpeachable in theory, the doctrine fails somewhat unexpectedly to work in practice. The recipe for the production of pleasure does not produce pleasure, and servitude to the senses is found to be a more burdensome and exacting form of slavery than servitude to conscience.

THE REMEDY

Happiness may not be sought directly, a fact which all seekers after pleasure persistently ignore. The kingdom of happiness, like the kingdom of beauty, is not to be taken by storm, any more than it is to be purchased by dollars. Hence millionaires and society leaders range the world in vain and restless pursuit of that instinctive satisfaction which comes to artists, workers and some tramps unsought. *Set out to seek happiness and it will elude you; surrender all your energies to a task, throw yourself body and soul into your work, devote yourself to some cause, lift yourself up out of the selfish pit of vanity and desire, which is the self, by giving yourself to something which is greater than the self, and on looking back you will find that you have been happy.* Happiness, in short, is not a house that can be built by men's hands; it is a flower that surprises you, a song which you hear as you pass the hedge, rising suddenly and simply in the night and dying down again.

This result though important is negative; it tells us what we must not do rather than what we must, affirming that if we wish to be happy we must not seek pleasure directly. Can we not add something on the positive side? I am afraid very little. The plain fact is that the recipe for pleasure is not known. The nearer things are to us the less we know about them, less for example about the movements of the weather than about the movements of the stars, less about the composition of our blood than of beer, and least of all about our own psychology. We really know very little about happiness, much less, indeed, than we could wish to; we cannot get it quickly when we want it; we find that the price we have to pay for it outweighs the value of the happiness we have bought, while we find that the things for which we have longed do not, when obtained, bring the happiness we expected.

On the positive side the extent of our wisdom is fined down to a series of hints. The best account of pleasure that I am acquainted with is in the tenth book of Aristotle's *Ethics*. Pleasure, Aristotle points out, is like the bloom on the cheek of a youth in the

perfection of health at the height of his powers; it is a something added, an essence that is distilled only when a fine thing is functioning in the way appropriate to its nature.

We should seek, therefore, to cultivate our powers not for their own sake, but in order that we may increase our effectiveness as living beings, exerting ourselves to the full in those directions in which our natural gifts, improved by training, can be used to the greatest advantage. Not only should we work, but we should work at that which we can do best. To recognise his limitations is said to be the mark of genius; the recognition of his gifts is his distinction. Our *métier* once discovered, our pleasure will be found in its unremitting pursuit, but found only if it is not sought. To do things because you want to do them will bring pleasure; to do them because they will bring pleasure, will bring not pleasure but boredom.

Continuing with Aristotle we may find some guidance to a happy life in his characteristically Greek doctrine of the Mean. Do everything a little and nothing overmuch and you will be happy. Develop every side of your nature; give your mind, your body and your soul free and equal play; work, sleep, drink and eat, think, smoke and make love, lose your temper on occasion, but not too often, indulge your senses when you are minded, but not too much, worship God, but don't abase yourself before Him, help your neighbour, but don't prefer him to yourself, take every pleasure as it comes, but take care to desist before you have had enough, hold any belief that attracts you, but never to the point of being ready to die for it, gratify your tastes, but avoid satiety like the devil—and you will be happy. A good doctrine this, but meet for the middle-aged rather than for hot-headed youth.

Others have held that happiness is chiefly to be found in doing what our ancestors have done from time immemorial; for these activities, they say, there is an instinctive longing in our blood. Pray a little, hunt a little, fight a little, dig a little in the earth, boast, and sing together in chorus, make love and go on the sea in ships, be sometimes alone with Nature and never too far from her—and again you will be happy.

These are hints, nothing more, and they must of necessity be so, since, as I have tried to show, the identification of pleasure with this or that, followed by the direct pursuit of that with which it is identified, defeats its own end.

Knowledge of this truth, which wise men possess instinctively and most obtain only after years of boredom, has never been at so low an ebb as it is in the modern world. But until it has been learned, not all the wealth and leisure with which we have succeeded in over-endowing ourselves, will bring the happiness we seek.

C. E. M. JOAD

INDIA'S MESSAGE IN COLOUR

[**Professor S. V. Venkateswara, M. A.,** is the author of *Indian Culture through the Ages.*

In studying this article it must be remembered that various interpretations of colour-phenomenon are given in the different systems of old-world culture. Not only had different peoples like the Greeks, Egyptians and Indians, their own way of interpreting the colour-scale, but each of them, especially the Indians, had more than one. The magic of Sound (*Vach*) and of Light (*Aditi*) has ever remained esoteric; knowledge to be found in old books, such as is contained in this essay, is neither final nor complete, and above all, as our learned contributor points out, it is symbolic, given in allegory and metaphor, to understand which a key is required.—EDS.]

Vedic texts reveal a nice discrimination of colours. Various shades were observed in the heavens: ruddy, reddish, tawny, yellow, bright and blue. In a passage in the *Ṛg Veda* the tongues of fire are described as seven: swarthy, white, orange, blue, fern-bright, yellow and red. Four of these are associated with the sun,—those which appear at the red end of the rainbow and the solar spectrum. It is these colours that are mostly noticed in the early Vedic hymns. This is not wonderful, as Vedic religion is a bright, cheerful religion of prayers addressed to gods as presiding over the brilliant and friendly phenomena of Nature. The outline drawings of primitive man in India are in red ochre as described by Bruce-Foote in his Catalogue of Prehistoric Antiquities. Red and dark colours appear in the pre-historic pottery of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro. In the Jogimara cave, black and yellow alternate with red and crimson.

Colours were used symbolically, apart from their pictorial significance. It is interesting to note that Indra, in the *Ṛg Veda*, the god of the bounteous sky and father of vegetation, was always represented as azure-chinned, and Varuna, of the brilliant sky as golden-horned and golden-armed. In the Upanishads the colour scheme appears more clearly. The extension of space is symbolised by sky-blue; the eternity of time by golden-yellow. The Infinite is marked by a white radiance. We have analogues in ancient Egypt, where blue denoted the sky and yellow the woman in bliss. In the ideography of pre-historic Peru, red denoted the soldier and green the vegetable world. The blue of the sky which stood for the Infinite came in later times to denote also the passing of the finite. It was the colour of mourning, for instance, at the Mughal court in Mediæval India.

II

It was the glory of India to draw a comparison and frame a correspondence between the external world of phenomena and

the inner world of the Spirit in man. The colour-scheme is used to depict moods of the spirit and states of the feelings. In the Bharat Nātya Śāstra our earliest extant work on dramaturgy, Bharata explains that dark blue is the expression of enduring love, the mark of which is self-denying devotion and surrender to the bosom of the infinite. Yellow expresses wonder, which in its nature is of short duration. Indian literature teems with passages which compare the inconstancy of sexual love (*Śringāra*) to the impermanence of the yellow pigment, especially in its deepest shades. The shifting and changing goddess of Fortune has this complexion, and the matrimonial happiness of woman is indicated by golden bangles which are cast off at widowhood. India's yellow dyestuff was unsatisfactory and thus contrasted with her indigo which had a world-wide market and reputation. It suffered a sun-change into something strange, and the sentiment of wonderment (*Adbhuta*) was associated with the colour yellow. Similarly the pigeon's colour is used to denote sympathy or compassion (*Karuṇā*). White with a shade of yellow signifies heroism or chivalry (*Vīrya*), and the desire for achievement and action in a spirit free from selfish motive or petty vanity. Red excites anger or passion, as the red rag does the bull; and is made to represent brain-storms and tempests of the spirit. The mind dyed with indigo shows disgust and aloofness from the world and is on the path of retirement and renunciation. The dark hues betray fear or, when black or ugly, excite laughter. Thus each colour represents a dominant sentiment (*bhāva*).

It is stated in the *Sukranitisāra* that white or yellowish colour represents the *sāttvic* quality of the mind, red the *rājasic*, and the darker colours the *tāmasic*. The *sāttvic* quality shows itself in the pursuit of goodness and truth, at peace with oneself and with kindliness to all, in the subdued ecstasy of doing good for its own sake. The *rājasic* temperament shows itself in hot-headed passion, consuming greed and lustful desire. In its higher forms it is self-denying service and purposive sacrifice. It leads to winding, though well-intentioned, marches in the cyclic curves or a see-sawing of the forces of progress and retrogression. The *tāmasic* mind is full of delusive longings and vain illusions, based on the preference for that which is pleasant to that which is for the lasting good. It plunges the individual into distraction and leads to his downfall.

In Indian painting and chromosophy, white always denotes *sāttvic* purity and bliss. It is the colour of Umā, the goddess of unsullied purity, of Siva, the god who has given up all, and of Sarasvati, the immaculate goddess of learning. It is the colour of the heroes who have fought the battle of life from a sense of disinterested duty like

Arjuna, of the Pāṇḍavas. It is the colour of men who hold their heads high above the tossing waves of fortune, like Balarama, the brother of Krishna.

Ruddy and rajasic is the glow of the Sun, the Dawn, and of Fire; of Brahma who labours ceaselessly at the navel of creation, and of Skanda, the ever-watchful and all-encompassing god of the six heads (seasons) and the twelve hands (months) of time. Yellow is the symbol of humanity seen in the robes of the new-married couple, as of the drapery of the Vishnu images. The goddess of beauty and fortune (Śrī) has a complexion of molten gold. Blue is the colour of the firmament, of the god of space (Vishnu) and his incarnations Rama and Krishna, and of the goddess of Time, the myriad-handed Kāli. The last, as Durga, the mother of the Universe, of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, is painted green or draped in russet and green. Black symbolises the yawning depths of hell, the demons and powers of darkness which prey on the happiness of mankind. The demoniacal Rāvana, the monster Kāliyā whom Sri Krishṇa crushes under foot, and the cheat Śakuni, uncle of the Kauravas, are always painted black.

Our classical pictures illustrate these principles. The casual visitor to Ajanta is struck with the contrast in colours in cave 17, for instance. In the royal procession there, royal figures are always coloured red, and the pages and menials are dark or black. The heavenly nymphs and danseuses, the *apsarasas*, are painted ruddy, which has evoked surprise in some connoisseurs of art, who have expected here the charming green. But the green colour represents the vegetable creation of the earth, and the *apsarasas* are aerial beings having no contact with the earth. So also in the beautiful paintings at Sittaṇṇāvāsal in the Indian state of Pudukkottah. The white figure in the "Lotus Tank" there has yellow ear-rings on the large lobes, and lines of yellow armlet and wristlet encircle the arm. This is the goddess Gangā descending into waters that quicken this parched-up world, as shown by the floating figure of a crocodile sporting in the wavy curls on the forehead.

III

The significance of colour is at the basis of Astrosophy. It is believed that every colour has its peculiar influence on the physiological system. The Moon reflects the light of all the luminaries in the heavens, and it shapes the brain-mind and gives personality its versatility. The dark red fire of the Sun stimulates will-power. Mars is red, and incites to activity. Lack of stamina results if he be in the heavens at an angle where his light is lost for the individual. Jupiter is yellow or golden, and his light has a cheering effect on the nerves; while Saturn is blue-black and depresses alike the physique and the brain. The

beautiful blue of Venus turns one to thoughts of love, and the vegetable lustre of Mercury argues sympathy, flow of eloquence, and popularity. The influences of the Sun and the Moon are studied at particular points in the heavens, and in particular angles of vision with reference to the "moon" in the individual *i. e.*, his mental endowment at the moment of his birth. The mind is its own place, and makes for greatness or baseness, a heaven of earth or earth of heaven; hence this system of calculation expounded at length in the *Brihad Samhitā.*

The light of each constellation is considered to have its effect on the human frame, measured along similar lines. Bharani (Arietis) and Ardra (Orionis) pour forth a liquid fire and burn to death. Krittikas (Pleiades) and Magha (Regulus) give a golden excitement. The yellow light of Rohini (Aldebaran) is pleasing to the eye, and promotes social intercourse. Āślesha (Hydrae) and Jyeshtha (Antares) emit a feeble light which only makes darkness visible. The grey light from Mūla (Scorpionis) excites the sexual passion and that of Pūrvāshādha (Sagittari) invites to dalliance. Uttarā Phalgunī (Leonis) and Svāti (Boötes) promote domestic life, and Śravaṇa (Aquilae), and Dhanishṭha (Delphini) conduce to spiritual learning and progress. The beliefs in regard to this matter are worked into a system of medical relief of fevers, in the *Madanaratna.*

The lesser lights have a similar influence. The clusters in the bespangled heavens are arranged in 12 groups of 30° each, marked by the signs of the Zodiac. The first is deep-red and is followed in due order by white, green, reddish, grey, variegated, dark, golden, orange, spotted, brown and crystal. It is believed that the light falling from each group of the stars has its influence according to its colour, as well as the form of the constellation. Greek astronomers went a step further, and divided each sign of the Zodiac into three Decanates with distinctive forms and colours. The first sign Aries, for instance, was dominated respectively by a dark hunter, a ruddy active lady, and a reddish-hued man versed in the fine arts. Virgo looked like a dark accountant between two ladies, one entirely a worlding and the other jasmine-pure in her devotion to the gods. Pisces showed a Flora of sweet seventeen, sailing between one man ruling the waves and another wandering in the wilderness. All these are mentioned by Varāha Mihira.

But the greatest of our luminaries is the Sun. His seasonal hues in the heavens were the subject-matter of incessant observation and careful study. In Winter he was copper-coloured or reddish; parrot-hued or reddish-yellow in the Spring; yellowish-white in Summer, and glossy, white or pearlish in the rainy weather; lotus-hued in Autumn, and blood-red in the dewy season. His rays got soiled by contact with the salt and dust of the earth and the gases of its circum-

ambient atmosphere. When they got dull and grey, they failed to quicken the mental faculties; dark-red, they stirred up passion and military strife; pale and yellow rays indicated that the earth's minerals were scanty and that little trade was possible. Dark and dull rays indicated the poisonous fumes that hovered about the earth; the glossy hue indicated the influence of water vapour, and abundance and prosperity. The moon's light was ashy grey on the surface of dreary soil, and turned red on the russet rock. It seemed to flutter when the earth was quaking with internecine strife.

The most significant points of time in the day were sunrise and sunset. The Aryan bards observed them intently and prayed for the proper light. The first ray of the dawn, which with rosy fingers opens the gates of day, never escaped their attention. It develops a faint ruddyish glow. Then it becomes many-hued, yellow-grey or yellowish-green, and the sky looks spotted. When the colour is deep and sustained, whether a red or a dark-red, it means the dust of the earth is pervading the atmosphere and creating the germs of disease. The dust of the earth contains all ingredients. Those that are red incite to valour, the orange maintain health and stamina, the green sustain the vegetable creation, and the smoky the animal world. The yellowish keep the heat down and help to compose quarrels. A tinge of red is required to move the winds. The white conduce to peace and harmony, the red to valour. The colour of the dust as indicated by the apparent colour of the Sun's rays at sunrise and sunset was the mystic index to the moods of creatures and to the momentous changes impending in this world. Harmony and peace were induced by simultaneous prayer at this time of all, each individual setting his own thoughts on the best and the highest ends in life.

IV

Colour has played a prominent part in the daily life of the Indian people. The choice of a woman's *sari* depends not merely on the colour of her skin or that which happens to catch her fancy, but on the colour which is generally regarded as auspicious. The orange and the lotus-red are the most favoured, and are always insisted on at rites and ceremonies. They are the colours of the ripening fruit and the mellow corn in the field, and are believed to make one's life happy and prosperous. Life is most happy, indeed, when one's energies and efforts run in harmony with Nature's ways and laws. Orange robes are worn by ascetics, men who are free from the deadening love of self-interest, and who devote their lives to social service. Green comes next, but was never regarded as a fast colour, and was seldom patronised. Blue is considered the colour of the coquette, and shaded the elaborate drapery of

the danseuse or the hetaira (*abhisārikā*). The lowest strata of society are always described in Sanskrit literature as wearing clothes dyed in indigo, and there is a suggestion that it served as a cloak for dirty habits. White is pre-eminently the colour of spotless purity. It was worn by active men and by those women whose lives were dedicated to domestic or to social service.

The mark on the forehead, worn by men and women, is invested with a similar significance. The red denotes domestic and conjugal felicity; the black marks the levity of youth and gaiety of adolescence. The yellow is the mark of mature happiness, a life steeped in sandal-paste and perfume. The white spot and the ashy lines are said to illumine the dark corners and blind alleys, of which the spirit of man is so full. It is the colour of the sublimation of all grades of varying hues to the enduring radiance of the Infinite.

S. V. VENKATESWARA

OCCULTISM AND MYSTICISM

The situation which the European mystic does not realise is this:—The Eastern occult philosophy is the great block of solid truth from which the quaint, exoteric mysticism of the outer world has been casually thrown off from time to time, in veiled and symbolical shapes. These hints and suggestions of mystic philosophy may be likened to the grains of gold in rivers, which early explorers used to think betokened somewhere in the mountains from which the rivers sprang, vast beds of the precious metal. The occult philosophy with which some people in India are privileged to be in contact, may be likened to the parent deposits. Students will be altogether on a wrong track as long as they check the statements of Eastern philosophy by reference to the teachings and conceptions of any other systems. In saying this we are not imitating the various religionists who claim that salvation can only be had within the pale of their own small church. We are not saying that Eastern philosophy is right and everybody else is wrong, but that Eastern philosophy is the main stream of knowledge concerning things spiritual and eternal, which has come down in an unbroken flood through all the life of the world. That is the demonstrable position which we, occultists of the Theosophical Society, have firmly taken up, and all archæological and literary research in matters connected with the earliest religions and philosophies of historical ages helps to fortify it. The causal growths of mystic knowledge in this or that country and period, may or may not be *faithful* reflections of the actual, central doctrines; but, whenever they seem to bear some resemblance to these, it may be safely conjectured that at least they are reflections, which owe what merit they possess to the original light from which they derive their own.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Theosophist*, December 1881.

SOCIOLOGICAL PURITANISM

[**William Seagle** abandoned law for literature; he is the joint author of *To the Pure* which deals with the problem of censorship; on the same subject he contributed a volume to the "To-day and To-morrow" series, *Cato*. He is the assistant editor of *The Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*. In this article he criticises the method of outer control of masses of men by a few sociological experts. Indirectly he shows the weak plank in the social service platform and the collapse which follows. Sociological experts have not yet come to recognize that the right philosophy of conduct must teach what is good to practise and not merely point out the evils to be fought. The social servant labours for the masses and often neglects the individual; he fights ugliness and poverty without, and greatly neglects the divinity and the wealth hidden in human consciousness.—EDS.]

In the popular mind Puritanism is a bluenose dogma which flourished in its pristine glory in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and since then has at various times manifested itself in outbreaks of moral squeamishness of greater or lesser intensity directed towards such crucial objectives as the denunciation of some daring feminine fashion in conduct or dress, or the suppression of some salacious book or play. The last great period of Puritanism is supposed to have been the Victorian age. The present era of "freedom" gratefully remembers the champions who finally slew the Puritan dragon. The feat is usually attributed to such heroes as Mr. Bernard Shaw in England, and Mr. H. L. Mencken on the other side of the waters.

The popular caricature of Puritanism is one that is very prominent in literary histories. The more intelligent social historians, however, have better understood the nature and origin of Puritanism. They do not see it as a subtly peculiar trait of the Anglo-Saxon mind but as a system of social virtue which was inevitably the reflex of a new economic orientation in the life of the English people. Puritanism flowered in England largely because the country was economically and politically far more advanced than its European neighbours. The English Puritan elevated the virtues of sobriety because it was a necessary condition of industry, and industry was indispensable if he was to get on in a new world. The economic transformation of England could be accomplished only by a sober folk, rejecting such idle and frivolous pleasures as gambling, drinking and dancing. Thus Puritanism simply marked the beginning of the English Commercial Revolution.

The economic interpretation of Puritanism has come to be generally accepted by social histo-

rians. While they acknowledge the absurdities of Puritanism, they dwell rather upon its fundamental nature as a serious view of life. So regarded they see it as a phenomenon that has appeared at the propitious time in many civilizations. Long before English Puritanism there was Hebrew and Roman Puritanism. But it has often been observed that historians are more obtuse when it comes to recognizing the tendencies of their own times. Even while Puritanism was retreating on one front before the bludgeoning of its late Victorian foes it was advancing steadily upon another front where it was meeting with no opposition. This front was paradoxically the domain of sociological theory!

Sociology, the new "science of society," had been ushered into the world by its two apostles, Comte and Spencer, almost simultaneously with the Darwinian enunciation of the theory of evolution. Indeed evolution became also the guiding principle of social development. The newly discovered social "laws" revealed that mankind was progressing steadily towards higher goals. In this perfectionism, in this faith in material progress there was really nothing more than a reaffirmation of the Puritan ethic in a world which under the ægis of science was making ready for the final conquest of nature, and the millenial ordering of human society. The basic tenet of the new sociology was still the Puritan individualism, which for the very reason that it enthroned *laissez faire* had to demand a stern self-restraint. By a curious yet inevitable process Puritan individualism led to a moral tyranny. It is significant to recall that an uncle of Herbert Spencer once remarked: "A Spencer never dances." There spoke again the lugubrious Puritan view of life.

But at least the early sociologist, like the early Puritan, left some room for voluntarism. He was willing to rely upon the obscure societal processes to bring humanity to its happy destiny. The modern sociologist, however, who has abandoned societal evolution is all activist. His ideal of social sciences is pragmatic and empirical. The science of society is to be literally such. It is to proceed by a process of trial and error. Humanity is to be one vast laboratory for testing the sociologist's schemes of social advance. Only the primitive is a slave to custom. The scientific man of the twentieth century must master his social, no less than his physical environment. The most powerful sect in modern sociology is the group that believes in the magic of "social control". Prominent among the early social controllers were the American sociologists, Ross, who indeed invented the term, and Cooley, who studied the process of the social conditioning of the individual. The advancing science of anthropology contributed the necessary technique of objectivity. The complicated and civi-

lized denizens of the great cosmopolitan cities were to be studied by the sociologist with the cold impassivity with which the anthropologist treated the primitives of the African, Australian and South American jungles. The sociologist, as a superior man, freed from family, class and material prejudices, was to probe into the nature and tendencies of human institutions and habits. This became the governing passion of a whole group of institutional economists, of such men as Wood and Hobhouse, Veblen and Mitchell.

It is interesting that the most of the sociologists who have talked so much of "social control" have been Americans and Englishmen from whose souls, it may readily be surmised, the Puritan ideology had never really been eradicated. For what is " social control " but a more scientific term than the hated word "censorship" which has always been associated with Puritanism ? It was all very well for the sociologists to insist upon the importance of conscious direction in the attainment of social weal. Yet somehow humanity went along in its old, blind, stupid way, a slave to custom, living and dying in its haphazard manner, classes and nations arrayed one against the other, fighting wars, and engaging in bitter economic strife. Under such circumstances the mood of the sociologist is easy to perceive. It is one of growing impatience. If the fools will not see, they must be made to see the light. It is idle to speak of individual liberty, of the consent of the governed when the very survival of civilization is at stake. The human robots must be schooled and managed and directed for their own good. Life is real, life is earnest.

In most parts of the world sociological Puritanism has had little opportunity of putting its philosophy into practice. The world, fortunately or unfortunately, is still ruled not by sociologists but politicians who still make it their business to pay some attention to the whims and desires of the multitude. *Yet if one imagines a world revolution engineered by the united sociologists of the world, it is easy to see that censorship under the guise of social control will flourish far more vigorously than in the heyday of Calvinism.* Censorship is inevitable in any drive towards perfectionism. Moreover this censorship is bound to be far more thorough and relentless than ever before. It was Bernard Shaw who once pointed out that the worst possible kind of censorship would be an intelligent censorship. The sociologist as censor would allow little or nothing to escape him. He would recognize deleterious tendencies almost as soon as they made themselves manifest. Even more than the Puritan he would attempt to control not only the freedom of thought but the freedom of action.

While sociological Puritanism still bides its time in Western

democracies, there may already be discerned many significant intimations of the future. What the Puritans called "vice" is a favourite subject of study in sociological seminars. Sociological research surprisingly often results in the scientific rationalization of old Puritan fears. A flourishing branch of sociology is modern sexology. To be sure the modern sexologist's programme aims at a sane and rational sex life, but while he does not talk of the suppression of base impulses, he does lecture on the dangers of excess and the ever present threat of the social diseases. He *preaches* sublimation: a new term for an old-fashioned form of advice.

Perhaps the best test of a man's freedom from Puritanism is his attitude towards leisure. The old Puritan had properly speaking no conception of leisure. It meant to him simply the necessity for rest and recuperation after labour. It was thus only a preparation for more labour. The Puritan believed firmly that "the devil finds work for idle hands to do". He must engage in a ceaseless activity lest he think evil thoughts and be led into evil ways. Curiously there are many modern sociologists who have much the same fears and anxieties. Of course they do not regard leisure as evil in itself. It is, indeed, the ultimate goal of Utopian society. Nevertheless, at least in the present period of transition, leisure is a "problem". It must be "constructively filled". As activist, the sociologist, too, distrusts the possession of spare time. For one thing it may lead to introspection, or to use a term that is sociologically taboo, "soul-searching". In the "underprivileged" it may lead to crime, and in children to juvenile delinquency. In the period of economic boom after the World War or when wages were increasing and working hours were growing shorter, the sociological concern over the problem of leisure became intense. There actually appeared a book which bore the title *The Threat of Leisure.* To cap the climax there was actually held at Geneva an international conference on the problem of leisure.

The immediate future of sociological Puritanism can be glimpsed best in Soviet Russia. Many travellers have reported the almost religious zeal and piety of Communist party workers. The life of the good Communist is not one of gaiety and frivolity but of almost fanatical devotion to a cause. He is far more abstemious than the sternest Puritan of old. Looseness in sexual relations is discouraged; to be drunk is an even worse sin; and gambling, of course, constitutes the most serious crime of all. It can hardly be otherwise if a new economic order is to be built in a few decades. The austerity demanded of party members is greater than is expected of the general population but it, too, is encouraged to adhere to the more sober virtues. It is impossible here to go into the characteristics of Soviet social life. It is

enough to say that not only labour but leisure is organized in Soviet Russia.

The sociologist in the rôle of Puritan is a little disconcerting. Here is no long-faced, narrow-minded and bigoted zealot but a child of the Enlightenment and the apostle of modern science. Yet fundamentally he is not free of intolerance. Nothing dies quite so hard as Puritanism.

WILLIAM SEAGLE

In sociology, as in all branches of true science, the law of universal causation holds good. But this causation necessarily implies, as its logical outcome, that human solidarity on which Theosophy so strongly insists. If the action of one reacts on the lives of all, and this is the true scientific idea, then it is only by all men becoming brothers and all women sisters, and by all practising in their daily lives true brotherhood and true sisterhood, that the real human solidarity, which lies at the root of the elevation of the race, can ever be attained. It is this action and interaction, this true brotherhood and sisterhood, in which each shall live for all and all for each, which is one of the fundamental Theosophical principles that every Theosophist should be bound, not only to teach, but to carry out in his or her individual life.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Key to Theosophy*, pp. 196-197

The secular philanthropist is really at heart a socialist, and nothing else; he hopes to make men happy and good by bettering their physical position. No serious student of human nature can believe in this theory for a moment. There is no doubt that it is a very agreeable one, because if it is accepted there is immediate, straightforward work to undertake. "The poor ye have always with you." The causation which produced human nature itself produced poverty, misery, pain, degradation, at the same time that it produced wealth, and comfort, and joy and glory. Life-long philanthropists, who have started on their work with a joyous youthful conviction that it is possible to "do good," have, though never relaxing the habit of charity, confessed to the present writer that, as a matter of fact, misery cannot be relieved. It is a vital element in human nature, and is as necessary to some lives as pleasure is to others . . . . . The social question as it is called, the great deep waters of misery, the deadly apathy of those who have power and possessions—these things are hardly to be faced by a generous soul who has not reached to the great idea of evolution, and who has not guessed at the marvellous mystery of human development. The Theosophist is placed in a different position from any of these persons, because he has heard of the vast scope of life with which all mystic and occult writers and teachers deal, and he has been brought very near to the great mystery.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Lucifer*, November, 1887

THE MYSTICAL AND THE OCCULT

[**Lawrence Hyde** wrote an article "From Authority to Inspiration" in our January 1932 issue; in commenting on it we referred to "the arbitrary distinction between Occultism and Mysticism" made by some. Mr. Hyde returns to that subject. We do not agree with his contentions, but all the more reason why his views should appear in our journal.

The difficulty really arises because his knowledge of the writings of H. P. Blavatsky, whose point he is trying to explain, is not sufficient; she does not recognize the kind of distinction which our esteemed contributor is trying to make. It is true that in so-called theosophical books "the path of the mystic" and "the path of the occultist" are mapped out; but for the most part the writers of such theses are theoretical occultists and theoretical mystics. In interpreting Mme. Blavatsky's position on the subject Mr. Hyde's premise is defective. In her *Secret Doctrine* and other writings Madame Blavatsky distinguishes between Occultism and Occult Arts but no hard and fast distinction is made between Occultism and Mysticism. "Real Occultism had been prevalent among the Mystics," she says in one place. (*S. D.*, I. xl.) Again in her *Glossary* (under Occult Sciences) she clubs together "mysticism, magic and Yoga".

Every true Occultist is a Mystic and *vice versa*. These terms are synonymous, at least in the writings of Madame Blavatsky. Mr. Hyde mentions "the way of Bhakti," but the real Path of Devotion is that of the Occultist also. Confusion exists in the matter of the three and more Paths of the *Gita*, as about the Paths of Occultism and Mysticism. In the same place in the *Glossary* H.P.B. speaks of yoga as the *seventh* Darshana or school of philosophy. This is Gupta Vidya or Guhya Vidya—the hidden knowledge, *i. e.*, knowledge of the Hidden Self, call it Occultism or Mysticism. Of course clear-cut explanations of this branch of knowledge are not available, and the dual reason is also explained there.—EDS.]

In a very suggestive essay on "Occultism versus the Occult Arts" Madame Blavatsky lays great emphasis on the fact that, properly understood, the term "Occultism" signifies something very much more spiritual and fundamental than mere concern with what might be described as super-physical science. It stands, she would maintain, for what is known in the East as *Atma-vidya*, the knowledge of the true self. "This last is the only kind of Occultism that any theosophist . . . . ought to strive after." "*True Occultism or Theosophy* is the 'Great Renunciation of SELF,' unconditionally and absolutely, in thought as in action." And by such Occultism, again, she appears to mean what is known as Raja-Yoga; the title given by the publishers to the volume in which her essay is included is *Raja-Yoga or Occultism**.

But it is evident enough that there are other paths to emancipation besides that to which, according to Madame Blavatsky, every theosophist is committed. Amongst them is that known in the East as the way of Bhakti,

* Theosophy Company (India), Ltd., 51 Esplanade Road, Bombay. The essays were originally published in different periodicals between 1883 and 1891.

and in the West as that of Mysticism. Although she has nothing to say about it in the volume under discussion, one may assume that she recognises its validity. And so, one presumes, do her followers to-day. But one cannot, all the same, escape the impression that its significance is misinterpreted and undervalued by the majority of those who are following the more intellectual road.

I

The definitions of Mysticism are as numerous as they are conflicting. But they do most of them seem to express a recognition of the fact that in the mystical we have to do with a region of being in which the discursive mind is definitely not at home. The mystic is occupied not with those differences and divisions which are created by the analytical intelligence, but with that unity in which they are transcended. The central element in his creed is the affirmation that the Real is one and undivided. The realm of plurality and separateness is the realm of illusion; that which comes into existence through looking at the Universe through the eyes of the finite self. The mystic perceives the One as underlying the forms of the natural world, while he realises it within as the result of an act of introverted attention. In either case—a point which often escapes notice—he gives expression to the consciousness to which he has attained by going forth in action.

Here an important consideration. Because the mystic does not employ pre-eminently the weapon of *intellectus agens* it is not to be concluded that he is relying instead upon "emotion". It needs but a slight analysis of the process of spiritual cognition to elicit the fact that such emotion as is experienced by the individual who is truly seeking the light is of the order of a secondary manifestation, the outcome of a certain kind of vision. The primary factor is an experience of Reality, an experience which *incidentally* may occasion powerful feelings. Even the most extreme type of mystic is before anything else a seeker after knowledge—though of a type of knowledge which cannot be expressed in ordinary rational terms.

It is to be admitted that the untrained mystic's experience of the spiritual is often both precarious and intermittent. And it is true also that in respect of certain departments of esoteric knowledge what is to begin with a vague apprehension, which might possibly be described as mystical, can give place to clear and rational understanding. But we cannot accept the notion that true mystical realization is eventually superseded by reason.

There is a realm of "facts" and there is a realm of "values". The first is susceptible of treatment by the rational understanding. The second is responded to by the "soul". The person who is

expert in dealing with the first is the man of science. The person who is expert in dealing with the second is the poet. In the sphere of the esoteric the scientist develops into the occultist, the poet into the mystic. The occultist attains to a profound understanding of the laws according to which phenomena appear, of the way in which they are interrelated, of the conditions which determine different types of manifestation. He is able to explain the occurrence of a given situation, and knows how to bring it into existence again at will. He therefore very easily becomes persuaded that he has a more secure grasp on Reality than has the thinker of the other type.

Actually, however, he is just as one-sided as the " mystic" whom he is impelled to criticize. For a grasp of the mechanism of existence is not by any means the same thing as a capacity to enter imaginatively into its depths. Let it be granted that the occultist is able to explain with great completeness *how* this or that manifestation is produced. But in the face of the mainfestation itself he tends to be unresponsive and unimaginative. The temper of his mind is inevitably rationalistic. He lacks the contemplative faculty, and only rarely attains to spiritual, as opposed to merely rational, understanding.

Theoretically, of course, discipline of the type practised by the occultist should produce a character in which the mental and the spiritual components are perfectly balanced and unified. Actually, however, practically everybody whom we meet in this field is still developed in a marked fashion in one of these directions rather than the other. Coleridge has said somewhere that every individual is born either an Aristotelian or a Platonist. In the same fashion every student of the esoteric is born with a definite bias towards either the intellectualistic or the contemplative path. He is either for the most part an occultist, with a strong feeling for discipline, science, clarity, rationality and order. Or he is for the most part a mystic, with a strong feeling for the inspirational, the spiritual, the interior and the ineffable.

The occultist is more at home with the anatomy of experience than with its content. We find therefore that the literature of the movement is definitely more scientific than poetic. What we commonly meet with in the writings of the theosophical school is a combination of intellectual competency and emotional immaturity. There may be a great deal of force and a satisfying clarity and logicality. But there is rarely any real penetration to the spiritual. That gentle sweetness, graciousness and purity which we associate with the truly mystical is but rarely manifested. The knowledge of thinkers of this type is rational knowledge, not "soul knowledge". Hence there is very little efflorescence of beauty or mystical elevation. They excel in laying before us the sci-

entific and philosophical aspects of the religious problem. But they are markedly incapable of dealing with that which finally remains when, as Wittengenstein has said, "all scientific questions have been answered". For the capacity to respond to and interpret that revelation of reality which is afforded by pure, unanalysable experience is the fruit of nothing else but mystical unfoldment. The soul identifies itself imaginatively with that which is before it. And that which it apprehends can only be expressed by poetic statement.

Of such statement the great majority of theosophical writers are incapable—for the plain reason that the type of training to which they have submitted has given their minds a definitely intellectualistic bias. Their works instruct, clarify and organize, but rarely in any deep sense inspire. Any attempts they make to draw more sweet and delicate notes from their instruments usually leave one completely unmoved. The last thing one would say about that powerful and attractive personality, Annie Besant, for instance, is that she was an *artist*; her expeditions into the realm of the rhetorical were invariably disastrous. And true poetic feeling is equally beyond such writers as Mrs. Bailey, Dion Fortune, C. W. Leadbeater, or Rudolf Steiner.

In fine the followers of the occult path are just as limited and one-sided in their outlook as thinkers of any other school. The notion that they are offering us something which includes and transcends the knowledge of the true mystic is one which simply cannot be accepted.

Madame Blavatsky was, it is true, possessed of a notable imaginative power. But one cannot with justice say that in her writing she ever struck the more interior mystical note.

III

Perhaps the most important difference between the attitude of the mystical and the occult thinker is that which finds expression in respect to the problem of regeneration. The occultist is an intellectualist. With intellectualism is naturally associated the conscious use of the will. One defines the objective; the other realises it. As a consequence we find in all occult schools a tremendous emphasis on discipline. By using his will the individual must tame and subdue the lower nature until he is freed from bondage to the passions. Madame Blavatsky's book is full of the most uncompromising statements with regard to the "obedience" which is demanded of the aspirant to true adeptship, the high degree of self-control which is called for if the path is to be trodden in safety, the attitude of unflinching determination which is requisite if success is to be achieved. And she refers with approval to that widely read theosophical manual *Light on the Path*, in which the philosophy of the "kill-out" school is set

forth with great clarity and force.

In many respects this philosophy, for all the authority which it has behind it, invites criticism. Leaving aside the obvious point that the person who sets about character building in this self-conscious fashion may easily become an unsympathetic egoist, there is the fact to be reckoned with that the whole weight of the teachings of modern psychology are flatly against this mode of dealing with the baser inclinations. The technique which is advocated to-day by every experienced psychologist is that of suggestion—precisely the opposite of that on which the occult school lays stress. One does not press the point. But one would like to see it followed up.

The attitude of the mystic towards the problem is very much more consonant with the findings of modern science. For he emphasizes, not the "killing-out" of undesirable tendencies, but their "sublimation". By aspiration and devotion he raises himself to a plane on which temptation can no longer assail him. He transcends evil instead of fighting it. It is the old story of the "expulsive power of a new affection". And incidentally it makes for the development of a very much sweeter and more lovable type of character than is produced by ruthless self-assertion.

There will always be a resolute minority, possessed of strong wills and keen intelligences, who will be drawn to the intensive and strenuous path of the occult. But it is that of mystical unfoldment which is at once the most natural and the most safe for the great mass of humanity. The occultist is simply a type among others, excelling in certain attributes, palpably deficient in others. There may be a true Raja-Yoga, in which the mystical and the intellectual are perfectly reconciled. But one cannot fail to perceive that the discipline which is advocated by such thinkers as Madame Blavatsky involves a marked bias towards the second. There is no reason to deplore this fact; there must necessarily be many different roads to the Truth. The only important thing is that we should recognize the theosophical variety of esotericism for what it is.

LAWRENCE HYDE

This philosophy . . . regards Nature as one complete whole, and so the student of occultism may stand at either point of observation. He may from the standpoint of Nature's wholeness and completeness follow the process of segregation and differentiation to the minutest atom conditioned in space and time; or, from the phenomenal display of the atom, he may reach forward and upward till the atom becomes an integral part of cosmos, involved in the universal harmony of creation.

—W. Q. JUDGE, *U. L. T. Pamphlet* No. 3, p. 9

LIBERATION AND LIBERATED SOULS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE UPANISHADS AND SPINOZA

I

MOKSHA

[**Professor Mahendranth Sircar** of Calcutta Sanskrit College is the author of *System of Vedantic Thought and Culture* and *Mysticism in Bhagavat Gita*.—EDS.]

The greatest attraction of spiritual life lies in its promise. Spiritual life embraces and yet transcends moral and æsthetic life; it exhibits life in its fullness. Moral enthusiasm and æstheticism are of the fine fabric of our being, but spiritual experience has in it something which is unique, and which is its own. Holiness and æsthetic joyousness are invaluable possessions that should find a place in spiritual life, but to identify such life with them is to miss its significance. Spiritual life has in it something which is not probed by fine æsthetic feelings or dignified moral virility. Spiritual life presupposes all these since it is the fullest unfolding of life; and where it has its finest expressions, there the chords of life sound in finest harmony. It touches the very core of our being and therefore transcends all else. Its essence lies in numinous experience. It is neither intellectual, nor emotional. It includes them, but it transcends them.

The discovery of this "something" is the unique privilege of mysticism. This "something" is so near and intimate to us that it escapes our observation. The wealth of life hides its essence; and the intellectual, the moral and the æsthetic aspects of life become sometimes so dominant and overpowering that unless the seeker can resist them, the visit from the Living Soul does not take place.

Moksa, or release, has been the catchword of Indian mysticism to indicate the promise of the mystical life. Generally a certain amount of indifference to life and its achievements is associated with Moksa; and Indian systems, especially the one accepting the avowed ideal of Moksa, have been accused of denying life, its struggles, its defeats, its successes. In short they are accused of insisting upon fleeing from life and evading its responsibilities.

This torturing of life is no part of the teaching of the Upanishads. And rightly understood it has not been the ideal among the Upanishadic seers. The ideal of detachment and a forsaking of the claims of life have been used, not to deny and avoid life, but to invite a better and a fuller life. The delicate touch of spirit is felt in

the fine repose of being and not in the madding crowd. And the seeking of silence is uniform among the mystics, for the psychic being must recover itself from the claims of life before it can feel the rapturous music of life and the calm dignity of the soul.

The mystic is a solitary being, because solitariness gives him the most and the best of life. The mystic is anxious to enjoy the finest urge in life. He passes by, therefore, ordinary claims and duties. He moves in an atmosphere of complete freedom and serene silence. This is his divine privilege. He is brave enough to forego partial delights in order to enjoy the fullness of life.

The fullness of life suddenly dawns upon receptive souls. It can alone come to him who has the proper attitude; and this attitude is nothing but a silent watch of the soul. Constant watchfulness helps the soul to be receptive to the finest expression of life. This watchful silence unties the knots of our psychic being, and makes it responsive to the soul. It also makes it responsive to the currents of Life, revealing its divine orientation. The seeker is reborn. This is the great claim of mysticism.

Few indeed are the souls who can prove fine enough to be fit recipients of the direct currents from the spring of life. Fewer still are those who give themselves up completely to such a life of reception, transformation, transfiguration and continuous living in the divine. Mystical experience is the *amor intellectualis Dei*. It is vividly joyous, finely intellectual and fully divine. In it the soul is touched from within by the silent hand of spirit.

But even now the meaning of Moksa has not become clear. It may be claimed—and it has been claimed by some—that such contemplation of and impress from the divine life upon us do not only give us the positive enjoyment of the aroma of divine life, but induce us to forsake the wonted course of life which seeks joy in flesh and blood. This forsaking is natural, for the real touch of Spirit redeems the soul from flesh and blood. The adept is transferred from death to life. Even if he carries a tabernacle of flesh he does not feel its weight. The flesh can no longer torment the spirit.

But even such a life has its play (*lila*) and that divine play has also its stings. Spiritual drama cannot be free from the stings of life, otherwise it cannot be played. Even divine love has its stings; and the saintly lives bear witness to it. The plan of life in manifestation is based on contraries, and the spiritual life is not free from them. The spirit in essential being must be something different. It must transcend all contradictions. It enjoys its undivided nature—its impartiteness. The Upanishads hold out this promise as the summation of spiritual life. What is it?—The ideal of Moksa. That state is

not a paradise regained, for the soul realises that it was never lost.

When knowledge breaks all the spells of life, the ever-shining reality of Self becomes evident to us. The great asset that wisdom gives is the Love of Self or Truth and not the love of shadows of Self or expressions of life. To this, love at its highest, wisdom which even the gods envy and mortals fear, is at once vouchsafed. "The wise becomes free from forms and names and attains the effulgent, the supreme being—the being of beings." The *Mundaka* has it: "Behind the veil exists the ineffable Brahman without parts. It is transparently shining. It is the light of lights, the self-knower only knows it."

But Moksa should not pass for a state in which the whole existence is reflected and stands revealed. Such a state is, indeed, a blessed existence which allows the finest realisation of our being and the finest cosmic intuition. It is an ideal development of the human mind, which is then free from contraries and conflicts. It has vivid feeling and knowledge of the totality, and peace and tranquillity of the soul. Such a consummation approaches Spinoza's ideal of the free man. The free man realises his place in the scheme of things, and his whole being is interpenetrated with the love of God which arises from the clear knowledge of himself and all things. Spinoza's *scientia intuitiva* is a kind of cosmic intuition which presents the vision of God and His immanence. The Love of God fills his being, which rises to the highest point of seeing God in all things and all things in God. Spinoza's intuition has in it an exquisite feeling, the feeling and the blessedness that follow the removal of the limitation in knowledge and being. But the Upanishads soar beyond an immanent vision of the divine.

The Upanishads are not satisfied with Pantheistic exaltation which still keeps us confined to God, nature and man. The barrier is for the moment overshadowed. The immanent God becomes prominent before our vision. This vision is cosmic, but not acosmic. The Upanishads emphasise the acosmic intuition, and where Spinoza has laid emphasis upon it no difference exists between his acosmic intuition and the transcendent intuition of the Seers.

Spirituality is high knowledge and not only fine feeling. In the last stage it dispenses with all relativities of ethics, knowledge and experience. It gives us the blessed freedom in the transcendent. Knowledge is here intuitive, delight supernal, and life free from sub-conscient, conscient and superconscient ways. It is not the freedom associated with the silence of our being. This silence is the accomplished fact. It is not the silence of the urges. It is not even the silence of sleep. The former is artificial, the latter is natural. But this freedom is neither artificial nor natural. It is the silence permanently residing

in the Heart of Being.

The human soul can feel itself identified with this silence when it is freed from the psychic urges with possibilities to fascinate. Life is best enjoyed when there is a fall in the psychic dynamism, for it allows us to see and feel the dignity of silence. The constant agitation in our psychic being shuts out the Truth from us, and the greatest sacrifice is called for to realise the highest Truth. And this sacrifice is the sacrifice of life—for who can ever dream of the conquest of Truth with the claims of the little ego prominent before him. The finest realisations of mystical exaltation are still a play upon the fine psyche, but Truth transcends all psychic possibilities and delights. The supreme sacrifice gives the supreme Peace. Happily Truth is more forceful than error, and if once the supreme Truth has been realised in the heart of being, it never leaves us. "The conquest of truth is slow and laborious, but once the victory can be gained, it can never be wrested back again." (Schopenhauer)

Moksa is the state of Being which is beyond all real or ideal creative projections, and represents Being in its independence of the creative relativity. The human mind is so much engrossed with actualities of life that it cannot habitually rise to this height and go beyond the delights of creativeness to welcome the delight supernal of Silence. Moksa is the release from the sense of relativity in all its forms, ethical, spiritual or creative. It is, therefore, indicated by the negative term of release from bondage, but it is the presentation of the Absolute in its uniqueness, in its independence of all kinds of relativity.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

II

THE IDEAL MAN

[**M. S. Modak, M. A., Ph. D. (London)** is in the Educational Service in India and is the President of " The Plato Club " in Nagpur.—EDS.]

The ideal Upanishadic sage is one who represents in himself the "acme of moral perfection," connected with a realisation of the Absolute. He believes in the possibility of greater or less mystical realisation for every being, according to the worth of his character, belief and endeavour. We cannot do better than translate several relevant passages from the various Upanishads so that a composite view of an ideal Upanishadic sage might be presented.

For a man to whom all things have become the Ātman or the Self, what grief, what infatuation can there possibly be when he has seen the unity of all things ? (*Isopanishad*, 7).

He reaches the end of sorrow, tearing asunder the "ether-like skin" of desire

that had enveloped him till now in darkness and despair. (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* VI, 20.)

All his desires are at an end, because he has attained to the fulfilment of the highest desire, *viz.*, the realisation of the Atman, the Self. (*Mundaka Upanishad*, II, 9.)

As drops of water may not adhere to the leaf of a lotus even so may sin never contaminate him. (*Chandogya Upanishad*, IV, 14,3.)

There is no feeling of repentance for him; for he never is in need of justification for his actions. He never bethinks himself as to why it was that he did not do good actions, or why he did only evil ones. (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, II, 9.)

Having come to learn the nature of Reality, he has thus gone beyond the reach of these duals [good and bad etc.]. (*Taittiriya Upanishad*, II, 9.)

If ever anybody intends injury or persecution to him such an intention will be shattered; for the sage is an unpenetrable rock and anything dashing against this rock will shatter itself to pieces. (*Chandogya Upanishad* I, 2,8.)

He attains to eternal tranquillity or peace, for he has "collected the Godhead". (A literal translation of *Svetasvatara*, IV, 11.]

All his senses along with the mind and the intellect become steady owing to his contemplation of the Absolute and this is the process which goes by the name of Yoga. (*Katha Upanishad*, II, 6, 10, 11.)

His alone is the eternal happiness since he has realised the Atman—Self; none else can get it. (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* IV, 12.)

A pen-picture of the ideal sage of the *Bhagwad-Gita*, is to be found in the second discourse; Arjuna is anxious to learn from Krishna as to what constitutes an ideal man. The answer of Krishna may be compared with the above quotations.

According to Spinoza the first essential for an ideal man is that his ideas must be adequate. That is to say, all his desires and actions—practically all his life—are based on his adequate ideas. His is a rational and an intelligent life. In an ideal life man transcends good and evil. Good and bad have no meaning for him. Spinoza says in his *Ethics*:—

> Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the same form of eternity or necessity and it is affected by it with the same certitude.

This amounts to saying that the good of an ideal man is *an absolute good*—"a good which cannot be diminished by distance or lapse of time and which is the same for all minds." (p. 273, Caird's *Spinoza*). Good and bad in their ordinary relative connotation are inapplicable to him. Being perfectly rational, he is essentially and fully active and free. He has an unbroken consciousness of his own energy and as such he must be a stranger to pain. He has an adequate knowledge of all the passions of the mind and is hence free from their influence. He is entirely led by reason, which ensues in a perfect "equanimity of mind". Desire and aversion, hope and fear, pride and humility, timidity and daring, exultation and remorse, fail to influence him even to the slightest degree. He is a free man since he acts with full knowledge of the importance of things. He aims and acts with a view to making others lead a rational life. A perfectly wise man would

fully understand the passions and therefore be absolutely free. He "would hate no man, envy no man, be angry with no man," and for the same reason "would love and pity no man". In proposition 73 of the fourth part of *Ethics* we are told :—

The man led by reason is freer when he lives as member of a community under compact and bond of law, than when he lives in solitude, when he obeys himself alone.

An active social life is therefore preferred by the rational man to a life of solitude and renunciation. Spinoza writes :—

We are liable to be affected and influenced by external causes in a great variety of ways and that like the sea agitated by opposing winds and currents we are tossed about unconscious of our destiny and the issues of events Under such circumstances the rational man stands firm. Because he is rational, he is most useful to his fellowmen. (Prop. 37, Part IV, *Ethics.*)

His life is religion itself, for he only desires and acts in so far as he has an idea of Deity in his mind. He has abundance of piety, which is the desire of doing well, and this is engendered by a life in accordance with reason. He is the friend of all. He repays hatred, anger, contempt, with love and good will. Commiseration or pity which is in itself evil is useless to him, since reason and pity cannot go together. Ordinary men entertain the feeling of pity to the extent to which they lack reason, but the man who has neither reason nor pity is truly inhuman. Spinoza who has placed life in community, higher in the scale than the life of solitude, also advocates self-contemplation. Proposition 62, Part IV, says "Peace of mind" self-content or acquiescence may spring from reason ; and that that self-content alone is the highest that is possible.

Inward peace or acquiescence is indeed the sum of all we can look for in life. This acquiescence or peace of mind is indeed a logical result of reason. There does not arise any occasion for a rational man to practise humility, and so also haughtiness is impossible in him. They are to be classed in the same category as pity and shame so far as rational life is concerned. A rational man never gives a thought to death, his wisdom is meditation of life, not of death. His virtue appears as distinctly in shunning as in encountering and overcoming danger. (Prop. 69.)

(I) The goal and consummation of morality in both the philosophies is something mystical. In the Upanishads it is self-realisation, which means the realisa- of the identity of the individual self with the universal Self. In Spinoza it is intellectual love of God—which is realisation of God by man in and through his essence, which as postulated at the very start by Spinoza, is the affirmation of God in Man. Man's "intellectual love" towards God is that with which God loves himself.

(II) Mental equipoise is insisted on, in both philosophies. In Spinoza, knowledge based on adequate ideas is made possible by means of knowledge of the passions. When the passions are known adequately man attains equipoise of the mind. In the Upanishads, passions are to be

controlled by means of "Yoga" or by means of knowledge, or by disinterested action. Self-contemplation is the method advocated in both the cases.

(III) The completely free and rational man of Spinoza and the ideal sage of the Upanishads are both alike beyond good and evil and all other relative terms.

(IV) To master and harmonise the passions by means of an adequately rational view of things which alone gives a perfectly balanced understanding, has been taught by both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers.

(V) Eternity is made the standard of valuation in both.

(VI) Spinoza's completely rational man "endeavours himself to walk, and strives to lead others to walk, under the guidance of reason". The *Bhagwad-Gita* has also explicitly laid down that the ideal man even though he be a free man *i. e.*, a liberated soul, has to live and act in the world so that the masses would follow him. He is to be the guide of the masses. Active life therefore is preferred both by Spinoza and the *Bhagwad-Gita*.

There are several striking minor resemblances. The free and rational man has no need of the feeling of remorse or repentance. In identical terms the same is said of the ideal Upanishadic Sage.

SELF-REALISATION

Writers on the Upanishadic ethics have often misread the celebrated passage in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* (II, 42-5):

> It is not for the sake of the husband that the husband is dear, but for the sake of the self . . . it is not for the sake of the wealth that wealth is dear, but for the sake of the self; it is not for the sake of everything that everything is dear, but for the sake of the self. This self [the Sanskrit word is Ātman] ought to be seen, ought to be heard, ought to be thought about, ought to be meditated upon, for it is only when the (Ātman) self is seen and heard and thought about and meditated upon, does all this become verily known.

This passage must not be interpreted in the interest of an egoistic theory of morals. The meaning is not that the wife or the husband or the sons are loved for one's own sake. The Ātman or Self must be translated as *Self proper* or the ultimate reality, since it is in this sense that the word is used at the end of this passage —*Ātma va arė drashtavyo, i. e.*, the self ought to be seen etc. This forbids any egoistic interpretation of the word in the previous sentences. We have therefore to understand this passage to mean that the love that one bears to the wife or the husband or the sons is only an aspect of, or a reflection of, the love that one bears to the Self. It is in fact for the sake of this Self that all these things are endeared to us. This Self, the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* enjoins upon us to realise by means of contemplation. Self-realisation therefore is one of the theories of the moral ideal in the Upanishadic ethics. When it is said that the Self is to be realised, we are asked to take into account the whole ethical and mystical process by which

the allurements of the non-self, naturally ingrained in the human being, are to be gradually weaned away, and the Self to be made to stand in its native purity and grandeur. By self-realisation, is meant the unfoldment and the visualisation of the *Ātman—Self* —within us (*vide*, p. 302, Ranade's *Constructive Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy*). Since everything is dear to us not for our own sake, but for the Universal Self in us, then all our feelings of love and other pleasant emotions really emanate from this deep-laid source. And the Upanishads ask us to realise this fact by means of contemplation. A passage in the *Chandogya Upanishad* (VII, 22–25) concerns itself with an inquiry as to what it is that induces a man to perform actions. We are given the answer that it is the consideration of happiness which impels him to act. It is argued that had he encountered unhappiness in his pursuits he would not have gone in for the actions at all. He would have turned away from actions in that case. A desire for happiness therefore is at the root of human action. Happiness is the spring of human action. But the human being is easily misled. Man mistakes false happiness for true, the perishable for the everlasting or, to speak in the words of the *Chandogya Upanishad*, he mistakes the "small" for the "great". It goes on to tell us that the real happiness is that which one enjoys in the vision of the Infinite, and that every other kind of happiness is only so-called and of really no value as contrasted with it. These are two radically different kinds of happiness. A translation of the major part of this passage from the *Chandogya Upanishad* will make the idea more clear:—

> People say that cows, elephants, horses, gold, servants, wives, lands and houses—these constitute greatness. But no, these rest in something else but *the Infinite rests in itself*. Great happiness is experienced when the *Infinite* is seen above and below, before and behind, to the right and left and is regarded as identical with everything that exists, when the Being that calls itself the I within us, is realised above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left and is regarded as identical with everything that exists, when the Ātman is seen above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left, and is regarded as identical with everything that exists.

It is clear that the Infinite, the I and the Atman are to be realised as identical, when alone this great happiness could ensue.

In Spinoza too we find considerable emphasis laid on self-affirmation, and critics are not wanting who dub this theory as an egoistic one. But here, too, the same mistake is made. The self-maintaining impulse which is the ground for virtuous conduct is not interpreted in the proper sense. For Spinoza expressly asserts that the affirmation of self which constitutes this impulse is the affirmation of God in us. (p. 235. Caird's *Spinoza*). Proposition 45 in Part II of the *Ethics* has a scholium that says "the force by which each individual perseveres

in existence follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God". In demonstrating the fourth proposition in Part IV of the *Ethics*, Spinoza writes: "The power whereby each individual thing, and therefore man, preserves his being is the power of God or nature. Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence, is part of the infinite power of God—that is part of His essence." The affirmative element which in the self-maintaining impulse is ascribed to the nature of man is according to Spinoza a thing in and through which God realises Himself. To quote Caird :—

> The self of selfishness is not maintained but destroyed by the self-affirmation of reason. In other words, impure element vanishes from self-seeking when the self we seek is that whose essence is reason and the knowledge and love of God. That reason, or a purely rational nature should love others for its own sake rather than for theirs, means that we cannot truly love another if we do not "love honour more".

So the impulse to persevere in one's being is not the selfish affirmation, but the negation of the individual (selfish) self as such. Now according to the 9th proposition of Part III of the *Ethics* "the human mind consists of adequate and inadequate ideas". The power to think, therefore, is the essence of man. Even in its lower stage, that is, when inadequate ideas have the upper hand, the true essence of mind manifests itself "in the pain of repression," by this alien element. In the stage of reason, the mind is purely self-active. The good or happiness of the mind at this stage is an objective good common to all. And finally, in the stage of "intuitive knowledge," the mind views all things "in the light of that which is Universal and Absolute". The good or happiness at this stage of the mind is absolute. Therefore, "he who loves God cannot seek that God should love him in return." "Thus at last the Ego, disclosed at first in darkness and fear and ignorance in the growing babe, finds its true identity. For a long period it is baffled in trying to understand what it is. It goes through a vast experience. It is tormented by the sense of separation and alienation—alienation from other people and persecution by all the great powers and forces of the universe; and it is pursued by a sense of its own doom. Its doom truly is irrevocable. The hour of fulfilment approaches, the evil lifts, and the soul beholds at last *its own true being* (Edward Carpenter, *Teachings of the Upanishads*, p. 26).

The important point to be noticed here is that the theory of self-realisation taught by the Upanishads and the theory of self-affirmation in Spinoza lead to a remarkably similar ethics. Self-realisation is not selfishness.

M. S. MODAK

TIME AND TIMELESSNESS

[**Arthur E. Lloyd Maunsell, B. A., LL. B.,** is the author of *Between Two Worlds* and *Moods and Lyrics.* Those of our readers who are interested in this subject are referred to an article on "Time" in the series "Modern Science and *The Secret Doctrine*" by Dr. Ivor B. Hart published in this Journal last April.—EDS.]

What answer do we give if we ask ourselves "What is Time; and what are our relations to it?" We may say either that Time is a dominant factor of our existence —that it is money—that it is a definite ring of light in which, as it were, we exist, and depart from and are dead.

Or we can say "Time is nought."

Either view is, of course, only a partial expression of our reaction to our own nature and to the universe as a whole, and either view is false though it contains a truth, or rather part only of the truth.

If we take the first view, we are right in saying that Time is real in so far as it concerns our avocation and that part of us which lives physically and intellectually. Roughly Time *does* ring us round in those spheres of action and *qua* them is a *real* thing, though its value is of course dependent on our actions. It is what we put into a day's work which "is money," and not the mere passing of so many hours. It is the opportunity for value rather than a set value itself. But if we take the second view of time—that it is nought,—then we have also a partial truth. Emotionally—and by that we mean all which we apprehend more by other than a purely intellectual method—we transcend Time.

To say that a day does not exist as a day is as misleading as to say a day has no connection with the following day. Three hundred and sixty five we lump together knit as one year, and one hundred years we knit as one century and so on till all Time is knit to all eternity and merged in it. Time is that part of eternity which our senses—or some of them—observe and of which they are aware and serve. If the search-lights of a battle-ship illumine a minute part of the sea, that gleam does not in any way separate the waters though some we see and most are veiled by the darkness, and yet, since the bar of light *does* show some to our eyes and not others, since we must find a name to distinguish what we see and experience from what is hid, we have a right to divide what really is one.

If Time is only real because it is part of eternity, it is also real to us or to a different part of us to that other reality which eternity gives our spiritual self. If in one sense there is no Time, in another that focus of light concerns finite actions and controls them to a very considerable extent. Much of our life is held

within the ticking of the clock—we do not live here physically beyond a certain span—bodily we are only in one place at a given time—and so on. Yet if we measure life only by the clock, by an uncertain number of years, we disregard our relation with and our dependence on what is Timeless. If men were only finite and temporal, their diversity would be infinitely less varied. Roughly we should spiritually approximate much as we do physically—being more or less of a standard height and build—a matter of inches not yards, a matter of tint rather than structure. Our experience of days would be more even and uniform, our growth more steady and our decay assured. Yet all our experience of life shows us that no day of ours can be measured by our physical growth only, or even that of our intellectual. We know that emotionally we can develop more in one minute of time than in all our preceding years and we know that in such development Time is relegated to Eternity. We do not seek to weigh an act of heroism by the clock but by the intensity of self abrogation and, as we phrase it, "Such a man was carried out of himself, forgot himself." We instinctively feel that he has expanded—that neither Time nor fear of temporal things has weighed with him. He has, as it were, lived visibly for us on a plane which is not temporal but eternal, and yet if his heroism did not cost him his life he is alive in our sense of Time. Emotionally we live in eternity just as physically, and largely intellectually, we live in time and no man who has lived and known—as he must—love or hate, joy or fear can have felt no moment an hour, or no hour pass as a flash. And from this dual realization of influence of both Time and Eternity we grow—each part of us taking that nourishment most suited to its welfare, acting and reacting each on each, so that among others, one question suggests itself and its answer. It is this: What of those who by some accident or abnormality exist here in a condition which precludes their obtaining what "Time" gives and teaches us? The unconscious, the imbecile etc? Does the distortion of Time to them rob them of real life? We think the answer is contained in the vitality of the infinity of all life with its roots growing, not in Time but in Timelessness. Such a one is as a man whose arm is in a sling for a while but he is not dead. He is cut off from some occupations but not all. He is still master of eternity and slave of Time—perhaps even less a slave to it. If we had no emotional capacity should we be wise in being other than a miser of minutes—and what man is? Whatever part of us respects or fears Time it is not that of our spiritual self, for we stretch out eager hands and grasp it with a gesture that flings all Time from us.

ARTHUR E. LLOYD MAUNSELL

THE ASIATIC ELEMENT IN SWINBURNE

[**Ranjee G. Shahani, B.A., D. Litt. (Paris)**, is the author of *Towards the Stars*, and *Shakespeare Through Eastern Eyes*.—EDS.]

In literature, says Léon Shestov, we often act like the Fuegians, among whom it is a practice for the young and vigorous to replenish their larders from the mortal remains of their defunct elders. This is only too true, especially when we restrict our purview to artists of the Western world. In Asia this method of disposal is not in fashion: there, on the contrary, the tendency exists to appraise the artist in proportion to his antiquity, as though he were an egg matured for the Chinese palate. For example, Rabindranath Tagore is in no small danger of being transformed into a stone image even before he joins the choir of heaven. Thus, between dutiful cannibalism and apotheosis of the elders, the spirit of modern criticism fluctuates.

It is best to study the work of an artist objectively and impartially; to elucidate his spiritual adventure; and, whenever possible, to determine his reaction with the pulse of life.

Envisaged in this spirit, Swinburne appears far removed from the *trouvère* of an idle lay. Is it not incumbent on us to regard him as an intellectual force, perhaps one of the few English poets to whom the title metaphysical can properly be applied?

Coleridge undoubtedly was both scholar and thinker; but, unlike Swinburne, he was unable to infuse his poetry with thought. Wordsworth can scarcely be charged with speculative originality. Shelley is steeped in Platonism, but leads us nowhere, and merely cries and flies round us like a storm-tossed sea-bird. Keats shows a happy indifference to, almost a placid unconsciousness of, problems of deeper import. Did he not say?—

> All charms fly
> At the touch of cold philosophy.

But had the youthful poet been spared a little longer by the gods, not crabbed would have seemed to him divine philosophy, but musical as is Apollo's lute. Browning is credited with almost a plethora of intellectual penetration, but is his poetry really more than a palestra of academic gymnastics?

So that, as we look back, Swinburne stands out, from the philosophic point of view, as the only unchallenged English poet of the nineteenth century. Three or four of his pieces are amply sufficient to establish this. It is just these poems to which I would appeal, because they possess the ethos and aroma of Eastern thought.

The prevailing sentiment in the early work of Swinburne is Eastern rather than Greek. This

appears in the domination of life by fate. The first *Poems and Ballads* are coloured by this thought; but the resultant pessimism, natural in the circumstances, is more a form of rebellion than genuine despair. It is quite unlike Byron's—

> Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
> Count o'er thy days from anguish free;
> And know, whatever thou hast been,
> 'Tis something better—not to be.

It is, as we see in "Atalanta in Calydon," an arraignment of the gods, much in the spirit of Fitzgerald's Omar.

As the years pass, this attitude of revolt gives place to one of submissive acceptance. The conception of a malignant fate is transformed—by a sort of spiritual *tour de force*—into the callous indifference of Nature, of which man himself is part. This new *credo* finds utterance in "Tristram of Lyonesse":—

> How should the storms of heaven and kindled lights
> And all the depths of things and topless heights
> And air and earth and fire and water change
> Their likeness, and the natural world grow strange,
> And all the limits of their life undone
> Lose count of time and conscience of the sun,
> And that fall under which was fixed above
> That man might have a larger hour for love?

But even here we are far removed from the kismet-theory of the East. So far, we have found only a distant kinship between Swinburne and Asia. A closer affiliation—almost an interpenetration of thought—is discovered in three remarkable poems: two possibly showing the influence of Hinduism, and one that of Persia.

With the "Hymn of Man" Swinburne passed from temperamental disquietude to metaphysical speculation. Superb as is this poem, it is, as he himself asserted, but a pendant to the "Hymn to Proserpine"—a poem which, for our present purpose, is much more important.

This poem may be called the *threnos* of a departed faith. In its attitude towards the gods it is at one with Hinduism. In India, be it remembered, the incessant flux and change of religious ideas inevitably suggests a similarity between things human and things divine. The gods appear as ephemeral as mortals—though a Supreme Being is postulated throughout. The "Hymn to Proserpine" embodies in music the attitude of the Asiatic votary who declines to abandon the old gods despite their overthrow; feels assured that the reign of the new creed will be as transitory as that of its predecessors; rejects the new divinity, and regards all appearance of Truth as a shadow on the surface of *Samsara*. Such is the inmost spirit of philosophic Hinduism. And it is this attitude that we find in Swinburne. Thus he sings in the "Hymn to Proserpine":—

> O lips that live blood faints in, the leavings of racks and rods
> O ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted Gods!
> Though all men abase them before you in spirit, and all knees bend,
> I kneel not neither adore you, but standing, look to the end.

But Swinburne's central ideas are all crystallised in "Hertha"—a truly philosophic poem—a poem that might well have come from a Hindu bard. Swinburne himself set great store by this effort and even went so far as to claim for it "a great deal of clarified

thought." It is, however, seldom recognised that the English poet—here at least—was drawing directly from Hindu sources. He has confessed it himself in his essay on Blake. And we have further evidence of his debt to Hinduism in the Rossetti Papers. "Swinburne," we are told, "is excessively enthusiastic about the Mahabharata which he has been looking at in a French translation under the auspices of Bendyshe."

Now, what is the subject-matter of "Hertha"? Nothing less than the relation of man to the universe. This is a topic that, in its metaphysical aspect, is too seldom handled by Western poets, but in Eastern poetry is omnipresent, and nowhere more pervasive than in the *Bhagvadgita*. It was from this spring that Swinburne drank, not, be it noted, from the pools of Schopenhauer or Emerson. The following verses invite comparison with innumerable parallels in the Hindu masterpiece:

Though sore be my burden
And more than ye know,
And my growth have no guerdon
But only to grow,
Yet I fail not of growing for lightnings above
me or death-worms below.

These too have their part in me,
As I too in these;
Such fire is at heart in me,
Such sap is this tree's
Which hath in it all sounds and all secrets of infinite
lands and seas..

The pantheism of our poet is nearer to the spirit of the *Bhagvadgita* than is that of either Schopenhauer or Emerson. Can anyone doubt the source of Swinburne's inspiration?

The central thought of the poem is entirely Hindu: surely nothing less than Vedantic. It consists in the belief, expressed in a hundred places in the literature of India, that the inward principle of creation resolves ultimately into man. In the words of Swinburne himself—

Man, pulse of my centre, and fruit of my body, and
seed of my soul,
One birth of my bosom;
One beam of mine eye;
One topmost blossom
That scales the sky;
Man, equal and one with me, man that is made of me,
man that is I.

So speaks Hertha—"the vital principle of matter". This is a dialect of thought that is entirely familiar to the Hindus: it is the famed *Tat tvam asi* (That art thou) in a new garb. "Man," says Sankara, "is one with the creative principle." This is precisely what modern thinkers have come to say. Neutral monism is the name they give to this creative unity.

With "Genesis" we enter upon a new adventure of thought and feeling. Although the poem undoubtedly owes something to the marvellous "Hymn of Creation" in the *Rigveda*, yet it is, in essence, unmistakably Manichæan. The influence of the Vedic hymn in the opening stanza is beyond dispute.

In the outer world that was before this earth,
That was before all shape or space was born,
Before the blind first hour of time had birth,
Before night knew the moonlight or the morn;

Yea, before any world had any light,
Or anything called God or man drew breath,
Slowly the strong sides of the heaving night
Moved, and brought forth the strength of life and
death....

Are not Swinburne's words an echo of the words of Prajapati?

Here the Hindu influence ends. The rest of the poem draws from a different source—a source that no critic seems to have pointed out. Let me attempt to make this clear.

At first it would seem that there is an element of "Christian pessimism" in a portion of Swinburne's "Genesis"; but a closer scrutiny reveals that this portion is entirely Persian in its inspiration. There is nothing more characteristically Persian than the contrast between the two souls, of light and darkness, of which the germs exist in all. This was no doubt known to the Greeks, and Xenophon in his romance on the education of Cyrus—(Cyropaedia)—introduced it as a touch of "local colour". One of the early Greek philosophers, Parmenides, expresses a similar idea in his philosophy: "All is full at once of light and unapparent night, both equal." (This concerns the distribution of phenomena. In actual truth "Being is, and not-Being is not.")

The "pessimism" in "Genesis" consists in making a universal law of what has always presented itself as a paradox: the good fortune of the bad and the bad fortune of the good—

And he that of the black seed eateth fruit.
To him the savour as honey shall be sweet;
And he in whom the white seed hath struck root.
He shall have sorrow and trouble and tears for meat.

Swinburne was thinking of the particular cases of the mythical Jesus and the actual Mazzini. Plato, in his *Republic*, book ii., put the case—already probably a popular symbol, like the "suffering servant of God" in Isaiah—of the just man who is thought to be unjust and suffers evil accordingly; and argues afterwards that he is really much happier than the successful tyrant. Doubtless he had in mind the fate of Socrates.

Shakespeare probably held, with Ecclesiastes, that "Time and chance happen to all men," and that there is no universal law! Such seems Swinburne's persuasion also:—

And each man and each year that lives on earth
Turns hither and thither, and hence or thence is fed;
And as a man before was from his birth,
So shall a man be after among the dead.

The "pessimism" of Swinburne is unequivocal and, in type, is Persian.

Doubtless much could be said of the appeal that his other writings make to the more sensuous temperament of the East; but this is foreign to our present purpose.

I have concerned myself not with any sweeping charge of plagiarism but with the growth of a sensitive mind. And in the thought that no small part of this growth is traceable to the fertilising contact of alien cultures there can be nothing but interest. Swinburne became a free spirit under the influence of the East.

RANJEE G. SHAHANI

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A LINE OF INDIAN MYSTICS*

[Our readers are already familiar with the criticisms of **Hugh I'A. Fausset**—born of sympathy and insight—on Indian philosophical and mystical works. In printing this review, we append a Note which is bound to interest many, especially in India.—EDS.]

The "History of Indian Philosophy" of which *Indian Mysticism* is the penultimate volume is planned on comprehensive lines and, judging by this volume, has been placed in very competent hands, since Professors Belvalkar and Ranade are not only Sanskrit scholars but well versed in European philosophy. Their method will appeal particularly to Western readers because they subordinate both their criticism and exposition to copious quotation from the saints or sages whose works they are considering. At the same time they provide short biographical introductions to each and conclusions which sum up the chief characteristics of the period or of the outstanding personality under review.

The Maratha mystics, with whom Professor Ranade is here concerned, represent only a section of the great mystical community in India. But it is a richly significant section and it would be superfluous in such a history as this to study more than one in detail. For in the experience of every true mystic we find essentially the same drama enacted, the same path trodden, and the same revelation given. So much so that a reader might even complain of this volume that the constant reiteration of the same theme becomes after a time a little wearisome and that the man who has devoted his life to throwing off his egoism is in this way even more self-engrossed than the worldling. There is, of course, all the difference between a single-minded devotion to the Kingdom of Heaven within and the blind self-absorption of egoism. Yet, if we are to believe the testimony of these mystics, the unitive life of spirit can only be attained by the road of extreme introversion. It is not enough to refine or restrain the physical senses. They and the coloured, diverse world of forms which they reflect and at which they grasp must, at a certain point at least on the path, be wholly denied. For unless the sensible is sacrificed, the supersensible cannot be known.

Turning resolutely, therefore, from the transient surface of the outer world, these mystics sought the unseen principle of life within. And although, when they found

---

* *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. Seven: *Indian Mysticism: Mysticism in Maharashtra*. By R. D. Ranade (Poona, 4. Rs. 10.).

Gita Explained by Dnyaneshwar Maharaj. Rendered into Marathi by Pandit Govind Ramchandra Moghe. Translated into English by Manu Subedar. (Palli Hill, Bandra. Rs. 2.)

it, when the Atman and Brahman were at one, they could give forth spiritual virtue as no man still tied to the five physical senses could, many Westerners would doubtless consider that they had attained only to a characterless and ineffective bliss.

This view of the mystic and particularly of Eastern mysticism is so prevalent that all who know it to be essentially a false one must study Professor Ranade's volume with particular concern lest the lives and teaching of the mystics with whom he deals should lend support to it. For admittedly the man who is seeking to realise his true Self has often enough the appearance of cultivating a subtle kind of self-interest. The quest of the spiritual life is, indeed, hedged about with paradoxes. Take, for example, the quality of self-forgetfulness. Of all the virtues this is considered, and rightly, among the highest. Yet from one aspect it is a vice, fatal to true growth. For to forget the real Self, even in devotion to a Cause, is to abide in ignorance and to be the slave of illusion. This is only one of many examples which might be cited to demonstrate how dangerous it is to generalise even about apparent virtues. And where the East has, for the most part, been wiser and profounder than the West, is in its recognition that the religious life involves, not merely good will and the following of certain general precepts, but an exact and subtle science which must be mastered and applied. Its mystics discovered or rediscovered this science and practised it. They put the metaphysical ideas of the Vedanta to the test of actual experience and experiment. We may think that those ideas were too absolute to be applicable to the conditions of earthly existence. We may even feel that in some respects they were perverse. But we cannot withhold admiration from men and women who refused, in their pursuit of reality, to compromise.

The Maratha saints, whose lives and teachings Professor Ranade presents so fully, extended in a remarkable line from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. The line begins with Jñānadeva or Jñāneśvara and is continued through Nāmadeva, Ekanātha and Tukārāma, to end with Rāmadāsa. These are of course only the outstanding figures in each period, and although Professor Ranade devotes most of his attention to them, he summarises briefly but adequately the characteristics of their attendant satellites. Essentially, as I have said, each of these great mystics trod the same path and what is common to them is more impressive than what distinguishes them. Yet although the goal of the mystical life is to outgrow completely the limitations of personality, even the saint who has achieved that pure identity which is beyond all differences expresses it in the key of his own nature. The universal speaks to us through particular embodiments and not through charac-

terless abstractions. And so the reality which these Maratha saints affirm is coloured to some degree by the temperament of each. Professor Ranade classifies them as follows :—

Jñānesvara is the type of an intellectual mystic; Nāmadeva heralds the democratic age; Ekanātha synthesizes the claims of worldly and spiritual life; Tukārāma's mysticism is most personal; while Rāmadāsa is the type of an active saint.

In a very general way this classification suggests the mystical emphasis of each and of the groups which surrounded them. Yet the words "intellectual," "democratic," "personal," or "active" must be interpreted spiritually or they will be misleading. None of these saints were intellectual, democratic, personal or active in the sense commonly given to these words by the modern world. They lived and taught out of a deeper centre of being than intellectuals, democrats or active social workers, and their value to us to-day lies in the light they throw upon the nature of that real being and the path to its attainment. The foundation of this mystical edifice, to quote Professor Ranade, was laid by Jñāneśvara in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, entitled the *Jñāneśvarī*. This remarkable work which has been described as the "most mystic of all mystic books" and which, although grounded philosophically in the *Gītā*, is rather an original creation than a commentary, was composed at the age of nineteen. But if its poetic quality and the wealth of metaphors and similes in which it abounds, reflect the inspiration of youth, it reveals, too, an astonishing depth and maturity of spiritual insight. Professor Ranade quotes generously from it, but he remarks that the world will await the day when the whole of it may be translated into English. And this has now been in a measure accomplished. For by a happy coincidence the second book under review is an English rendering of Jñāneśvara's great work. It is not a translation of the original, but of a version in modern Marathi by Pandit Moghe and the portion dealing with practical Yoga in the sixth chapter has been omitted.* But although it may not completely satisfy scholars, and Mr. Subedar's style is in some ways rather too fluent, he has performed his task with skill and a real devotion.

Professor Ranade claims for the Maratha Saints in general and for Jñānadeva in particular, as the genius who laid the intellectual foundations of the Mahārāshtra school of Mysticism, that they succeeded in reconciling Advaitism with Bhakti, Wisdom with Love, Monism with Pluralism. Jñānadeva, he remarks, did not affirm "the utter unreality

* Curiously enough so far back as January 1854 an anonymous writer in *The Dublin University Magazine* gave a lengthy extract from this sixth chapter which was reprinted in January 1880 in *The Theosophist* (I. p. 86) conducted by H. P. Blavatsky. She also in *The Voice of the Silence* calls *Dnyaneshvari* "that superb mystic treatise," and "that king of mystic works". See Note following this review.—EDS.

of the world," but he "points out unmistakably the unreality of existence in this mortal world, and he calls the minds of the people back to the spiritual life which alone is the true reality".

The doctrine of Māyā is, indeed, that upon which all Western judgment of the East has turned and although it has been grossly misunderstood and misrepresented in the West, it is difficult at times not to feel, even in studying the teaching of these Maratha Mystics, that their conviction of the unreality of the world and the bodily senses led them to perverse extremes. Granted that true knowledge resides within the Self and that until the tree of unreality has been cut down by the sword of Self-knowledge, we are the slaves of false appetite and illusion, is it necessary to view the world of sense with such an extreme distaste or even horror as some of these mystics suggest? The acme of happiness, for example, Jñānadeva tells us in one place, is that of the man whose mind has become so full of the happiness of the Self that it does not dare to move out of itself to the world of sense; while Ekanātha who is claimed to have reconciled the claims of worldly and spiritual life and who was actually married tells us that—

> One should not sit among women, one should not look at women, one should not speak with women, one should not allow the company of women in solitude. . . . One should never have anything to do with these, and even where one's own wife is concerned, one should call, and touch, and speak to her only as much as is necessary.

It is such passages as these that provoke the suspicion of the Westerner and give substance to his argument that the mystic is as sense-enslaved in his denial of the senses as the hedonist in his indulgence of them, or that he is inhumanly "engrossed in the happiness of his own Self". Such quotations, taken alone, are of course very misleading, since they generally refer, not to the completely liberated man, but only to one stage in the path towards liberation. And if the Easterner has tended to overstress the conditions of dying to the body and the material world, that we may be reborn in the unity of the spirit, the Westerner has accepted far too easily a superficial compromise. Certainly Jñānadeva did not teach that the knowledge of Self culminated in a merely introverted bliss. For the liberated man, he wrote, "the whole world becomes a temple of happiness". For "the visible world and Brahman are inextricably mixed up". But only the God-realizer was in a condition to perceive Brahman in the visible world, to enter into it and yet to be physically unattached, to suffer and enlighten it, and yet to be unmoved. Jñānadeva wrote:—

> He is firmly fixed in the form of God internally, but behaves like an ordinary man externally. He does not command his senses, nor is he afraid of the objects of sense; and whatever is to be done, he does at the proper time. He does not feel any necessity for training up his sense-organs while doing actions, nor is

he affected by their influence. Desire has no power over him. He never becomes infatuated, and is as clean as a lotus-leaf when it is sprinkled with water. He lives in the midst of contacts, and looks like an ordinary man. But he is not affected by them, as the Sun's disc is not affected by the water in which it is reflected. If we look at him in an external way, he looks like an ordinary man; but if we try to determine his real nature, we cannot really know him. It is by these marks that one ought to know the man who has conquered the thraldom of Samsāra.

Doubtless many Westerners would deny that "there is nothing greater" than this sublime equanimity. They would commend in its place an active love. But in doing so they fail to realise that ultimately a beneficently active love must presuppose and flow from a perfect enlightenment. The basic condition of such enlightenment, as all these mystics emphasise, is an absolute devotion to and identity with God. But God must not only be served and worshipped. He must also be known. And He can only be known through the realisation of that true Self which the modern Westerner is generally too active and superficial to begin to discover. Of self-knowledge of the Socratic kind the West has, indeed, admitted the virtue and the necessity. But it has failed to recognise that true Self-knowledge involves a transformation of being, and that it is not merely a process of logical self-analysis but of spiritual reintegration, of growing in being as well as thought out of error into truth. And these two books are of immense value because they contain a wealth of exact information concerning both the sacrificial and psychological nature of this process. We may recoil from the demands which some of these mystics make upon us, and we may even think that they at times fall into perversely negative extremes. But their science is not lightly to be put aside. For they proved it by living it. And only those who have devoted themselves to the spiritual life with something approaching their intensity are really in a position to judge whether they were perverse in insisting that "the body is the ocean of evil". It may at least be necessary to pass through this complete disillusionment of the physical, before the body can be known as the "Temple of the Holy Ghost".

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

A NOTE ON THE PRECEDING ARTICLE

In the first volume of *The Theosophist*, conducted by H. P. BLAVATSKY, was published the following:—

YOGA PHILOSOPHY

(*By Truth seeker*)

[The following communication, from a European Theosophist, will be read with attention and interest by Hindu students of Yoga. The reference to 'Vital air,' 'wind,' 'tubular vessels,' 'moon-fluid of immortality,' 'chambers of the body,' and such like, may be incomprehensible to the materialist unfamiliar with the figurative nomenclature of mystics; but he who has advanced even a single pace along the road of self-development towards spirituality will comprehend easily enough what is meant by these terms.—ED. THEOS.]

In the *Dublin University Magazine* for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1853, and Jan. 1854, is a series of papers, entitled "The Dream of Ravan," containing much that is curious on this subject.

In the fourth paper, Jan. 1854, speaking of an ascetic it is said: 'Following his mystic bent he was full of internal visions and revelations. Sometimes according to the mystic school of Paithana, sitting crosslegged, meditating at midnight at the foot of a banyan tree, with his two thumbs closing his ears, and his little fingers pressed upon his eyelids, he saw rolling before him gigantic fiery wheels, masses of serpent shapes, clusters of brilliant jewels, quadrats of pearls, lamps blazing without oil, a white haze melting away into a sea of glittering moonlight, a solitary fixed swanlike fiery eye of intense ruddy glare, and, at length, *the splendour of an internal light more dazzling than the sun*. An internal, unproduced music (anahata) vibrated on his ear, and sometimes a sweet mouth, sometimes a whole face of exquisite beseeching beauty, would rise out of a cloud before his inward gnostic eye, look into his soul, and advance to embrace him.'

'At other times he followed the path laid down by the more ancient and profounder school of Alandi and strove to attain the condition of an illumined Yogi as described by Krishna to Arjuna in the sixth Adhyaya of that most mystic of all mystic books, the *Dnyaneshvari*,

'THE ILLUMINED.

'When this path is beheld, then hunger and thirst are forgotten, night and day are undistinguished in this path.

* * *

'Whether one would set out to the bloom of the east or come to the chambers of the west, *without moving*, oh holder of the bow, *is the travelling in this road*. In this path, to whatever place one would go *that place one's ownself becomes!* How shall I easily describe this? Thou thyself shalt experience it.

* * *

'The ways of the tubular vessel (nerves) are broken, the nine-fold property of wind (nervous ether) departs, on which account the functions of the body no longer exist.

* * *

'Then the moon and the sun, *or that supposition which is so imagined*, appears but like the wind upon a lamp, in such a manner as not to be laid hold of. The bud of understanding is dissolved, the sense of smell no longer remains in the nostrils, but, together with the *Power** retires into the middle chamber. Then with a discharge from above, the reservoir of moon fluid of immortality (contained in the brain) leaning over on one side, communicates into the mouth of the Power. Thereby the tubes (nerves) are filled with the fluid, it penetrates into all the members; and in every direction the vital breath dissolves thereinto.

**Note from 'Dublin U. M.':*—This extraordinary power who is termed elsewhere the World Mother—the casket of Supreme Spirit, is technically called Kundalini, serpentine or annular. Some things related of it would make one imagine it to be electricity personified.

'As from the heated crucible all the wax flows out, and it remains thoroughly filled with the molten metal poured in,

'Even so, that lustre (of the immortal moon-fluid) has become actually moulded into the shape of the body, on the outside it is wrapped up in the folds of the skin.

'As, wrapping himself in a mantle of clouds, the sun for a while remains and afterwards, casting it off, comes forth arrayed in light,

'Even so, above is this dry shell of the skin, which, like the husk of grain, of itself falls off.

'Afterwards, such is the splendour of the limbs, that one is perplexed whether it is a self-existent shaft of Kashmir porphyry or shoots that have sprouted up from jewel seed or a body moulded of tints caught from the glow of evening, or a pillar formed of the interior light.

'A vase filled with liquid saffron, or a statue cast of divine thaumaturgic perfection molten down. To me it appears Quietism itself, personified with limbs.

'Or is it the disc of the moon that, fed by the damps of autumn, has put forth luminous beams, or is it the embodied presence of light that is sitting on yonder seat?

'Such becomes the body; when the serpentine power drinks the moon (fluid of immortality, descending from the brain) then, O friend, death dreads the form of the body.

'Then disappears old age, the knots of youth are cut in pieces, and *The Lost State of Childhood reappears.* His age remains the same as before, but in other respects he exhibits the strength of childhood, his fortitude is beyond expression. As the golden tree from the extremity of its branches puts forth daily new jewel-buds, so new and beautiful nails sprout forth.

'He gets new teeth also, but these shine inexpressibly beautiful, like rows of diamonds set on either side. The palms of the hands and soles of the feet become like red lotus flowers, the eyes grow inexpressibly clear.

'As when, from the crammed state of its interior the pearls can no longer be held in by the double shell, then the seam of the pearl oyster rim bursts open, so, uncontainable within the clasp of the eyelids, the sight, expanding, seeks to go outwards; it is the same indeed as before but is now capable of embracing the heavens. *Then he beholds the things beyond the sea, he hears the language of paradise, he perceives what is passing in the mind of the ant.* He takes a turn with the wind, if he walk, his footsteps touch not the water.

'Finally,—

'When the light of the POWER disappears, then the form of the body is lost, he becomes hidden from the eyes of the world.

'In other respects, as before, he appears with the members of his body, but he is one *formed of the wind.*

'Or like the core of the plantain tree standing up divested of its mantle of outward leaves, or as a cloud from which limbs have sprouted out.

'Such becomes his body, then he is called Kechara, or Sky-goer, this step being attained is a wonder among people in the body.'

The process here described seems similar to that described in the *Ouphnekhat.* 'With your heel stop the fundament, then draw the lower air upwards by the right side, make it turn thrice round the second region of the body, thence bring it to the navel, thence to the middle of the heart, then to the throat, then to the sixth region, which is the interior of the nose, between the eyelids, there retain it, it is become the breath of the universal soul. Then meditate on the great Ome, the universal voice which fills all, the voice of God; it makes itself heard to the ecstatic in ten manners.

'The first is like the voice of a sparrow, the second is twice as loud as the first, the third like the sound of a cymbal, the fourth like the murmur of a great shell, the fifth like the chant of the *Vina*, the sixth like the sound of the "tal," the seventh like the sound of a

bamboo flute placed near the ear, the eighth the sound of the instrument *pahaoujd* struck with the hand, the ninth like the sound of a small trumpet, the tenth like the rumbling of a thunder cloud. At each of these sounds the ecstatic passes through various states until the tenth *when he becomes God.*

'At the first all the hairs on his body stand up.

'At the second his limbs are benumbed.

'At the third he feels in all his members the exhaustion of excess.

'At the fourth his head turns, he is as it were intoxicated.

'At the fifth, *the water of life* flows back into his brain.

'At the sixth this water descends into and nourishes him.

'At the seventh he becomes master of the vision, he sees into men's hearts, he hears the most distant voices.

'At the ninth he feels himself to be so subtle that he can transport himself where he will, and, like the Devas, see all without being seen.

'At the tenth he becomes the universal and indivisible voice, he is the creator, the eternal, exempt from change; and, become perfect repose, he distributes repose to the world.'

Compare this with Vaughan—*Anima Magica Abscondita.* 'This mystery is finished when the light in a sudden miraculous coruscation darts from the centre to the circumference, and the divine Spirit has so swallowed up the body that it is a glorious body shining like the sun and moon. In this rotation it doth pass, and no sooner, from the natural to the supernatural state, for it is no more fed with visibles, but with invisibles and the eye of the creator is perpetually upon it. After this the material parts are never more seen.'

Can any of the correspondents of the *Theosophist* give any account of this *Dnyaneshvari*? Who was Alandi? It would be a great boon to Theosophists if Dayánand Saraswati Swámi would give to the world a translation of this work, and also of Patanjali's *Yoga Shastra*, of which in English we know only the imperfect summaries of Ward and Thompson. Can, also, some competent Buddhist give an account of the *Kasina* of which I know only Spence Hardy's imperfect account? We Western Theosophists earnestly desire information as to all the best modes of soul-emancipation and will-culture, and turn to the East for Light.

[The attention of those interested in the above is drawn to Mr. Fausset's article "Spiritual Psychology," on *The Dream of Ravan* which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH for September 1931; also to "The Co-operative Commonwealth," by Manu Subedar (May 1933), whose translation of *Dnyaneshvari* is now reviewed. Again, in the second volume of *The Theosophist*, May 1881, p. 173, the following appeared.]

THE BOOK FROM A TOMB.

By the Hon. RAO BAHADUR GOPAL RAO HURREE DESHMUKH, *Vice-President, Theosophical Society.*

There is a Samadhi or tomb in the village of Alundi near Poona, of a celebrated saint and Yogi, named Dnyaneshwar or as Marathas pronounce it "Ganoba." The tomb is a sacred place of pilgrimage of the rising sect of Warkarees who follow the precepts of Dnyaneshwar and Tookaram. The latter is believed to have ascended to heaven in the presence of a crowd at Dehoo in 1649 as mentioned in the life of Tookaram attached to the *gatha* or poems edited under the patronage of the Bombay Government. Dnyaneshwar wrote his celebrated commentary on Bhagawat Gita in 1290. He is said to have gone alive with his book in the tomb, and was buried alive. Three centuries later he appeared in a vision

to another saint, Eknath of Pyton, and told him that his book of commentary was fully revised and directed him to publish it. So Eknath came to Alundi and dug up the tomb. He found Dnyaneshvar sitting with his book which he gave to Eknath. Such is the story of the book called Dnyaneshwari. It is written in "*onvi*" form of poetry. It is printed in Bombay and is extensively read in the Deccan.

The Warkarees in their Kirtans exclude all poetical authors, except those composed by five poets whom they regard as true Sadhoos. Even Ramdasa, the spiritual preceptor of Shivajee, is excluded. They make no account of Waman and Moro Pant. They consider them as attached to the world and patronized by Government. The great Sadhoos whom they respect are Namdewa, Dnyaneshwar, Kabir, Eknath, and Tookaram. The verse which gives their miracles is as follows :—

कलिमाजी संत, जाहाले अनंत
परि पटाईत, पांच जण ॥ १
रेडा बोलविला, धोंडा जेवविला
मरोनिया जाहाला, तुलसी फुले ॥ २
स्वर्गीचे पितर जेणें जेवविले
देहासहित गेले, वैकुंठाशी ॥ ३
ऐसा हा तुका त्याचें महिमान,
वर्णिल कोण, जगामाजी ॥ ४

TRANSLATION

In Kaliyuga, there appeared many saints, but among them, five are most revered. The first made a he-buffalo utter Vedas. The second made the Idol of Vitthal at Pandharpoor eat dinner. The third died, but his body became *tulsi* leaves and flowers. The fourth evoked the deceased ancestors of certain Brahmans, and gave them a feast at his house. The fifth ascended to heaven with his mortal body. This is Tookaram; who can describe his sanctity in this world!

Dnyaneshwar is said to have ordered a wall to walk, and it did so. This wall is shown now in Alundi. The tomb is endowed with the revenues of the village by Mahadajee Scindia.

In the sixth chapter of Dnyaneshwari, the author describes the Yoga as inculcated by Krishna who is regarded both as an *avatar* and Yogeshwar.

The following verses, extracted from Dnyaneshwar, will show the achievements of a Yogi. The language is the old Marathi of the thirteenth century.

आइके देह होय सोनियाचे ॥
परिधवधवे वायुचे ॥
जे आप आणि पृथ्वीचे अंश नाहीं ॥ ५८
मग समुद्रा पलिकडील देखे
स्वर्गीचे आलोच आइके ॥
मनोगत ओळखे मुंगीयाचे ॥ ६९
पवनाचा वारि कावलघे ॥
चाले तरि उदकी पाउल नलगे ॥
येणें येणे प्रसंगे ॥ येती बहुता सिद्धि ॥ ७०
तेथे सदैवा आणि पायाळा ॥
वरि दिव्यांजन होय डोळा ॥
मग देखे जैसि अवलिळा ॥ पाताळ धने ॥ ७१
इये अभ्यासि दृढ होति ॥
ते भरवसे निब्रह्मत्वा येति ॥
ते सांगति याची रिति ॥ कळलेमज

TRANSLATION

His body becomes a mass of light. Wind, water and earth are absent. He sees what is beyond the sea. He hears what passes in heaven. He knows the mind of an ant. He can ride upon the wind, and walk on water without touching it. He sees what is hidden in the earth. In short, by the study of Yoga, a man becomes Brahma.

The sixth chapter of the work is well worth the study of those who enquire into Yoga and its achievements.

THE MYSTERY OF THE HOLY GRAIL

[**Arthur Edward Waite** is a recognized authority on the subject of the Holy Grail. He has recently published a book entitled *The Holy Grail* (Rider and Co. 30*s.*). His quarterly letters on "The Land of Psyche and of Nous" are familiar to our readers.—EDS.]

There must be set aside in the first place the time-immemorial stories of eastern mythological Goblets, of Greek Cups for the wine of gods, of Waters of Life poured forth from Ewers and Basins set upon inaccessible mountains. These things are everywhere, and some are of deep significance. So also are Talismanic Stones: there is one at the centre of the universe, hallowed in the lore of Israel. They do not belong to the subject with which it is proposed to deal. Let us remember only that all the wide world over the human mind has created Myths concerning familiar things, the multiplicity of which does not mean that they have been borrowed from one another, except in occasional cases. Things conceived independently, wear each others' likeness because of the kinship between all minds. Thoughts which arise within me are not drawn of necessity from A and B of the past because they prove on comparison to be in their image, nor will C and D, who may produce their seeming reflection hereafter, be indubitably in debt to myself. We draw more often than not from a great well of images. The remarkable literature which arose in the late twelfth century about the Holy Grail, and developed subsequently, described it variously as a Dish, Chalice and Stone; but the object so denominated is differentiated from other Stones, Chalices and Dishes which are found in the lore of the past. Later on the growing Legend borrowed something from its immediate environment of Celtic Fable; but the derivations served only to confuse issues and cloud its real origin.

The texts which constitute the literature proper of the Holy Grail are in Northern French and German, the canon—so to speak—closing in the third quarter of the thirteenth century. It originated in French, and the French branches are divisible into three groups, being (1) that of the *Conte del Graal*; (2) the Cycle ascribed to Robert de Borron; and (3) the Vulgate Cycle, so called as the most widely diffused version of its own text series.

The *Conte del Graal* is a vast poem on Perceval le Gallois, constituting a Cycle in itself and the work of several hands, namely, (1) Chrétien de Troyes; (2) a first and anonymous successor called pseudo-Wauchier, having been long identified with (3) Wauchier de Denain, who followed him; (4) Manessier, who completed the work. To these must be added Gerbert de Montreuil, who either

interpolated 15,000 lines between the sequels of Wauchier and Manessier or produced an alternative completion, the end of which is wanting. The Borron Cycle comprises three texts: (1) a Metrical Romance of Joseph of Arimathæa, extant also in a prose version; (2) an Early History of the Prophet Merlin, originally metrical but represented by a transcript in prose, only 500 lines of the original verses remaining; (3) a prose Romance concerning Perceval le Gallois. The Vulgate Cycle is exceedingly large and comprises (1) a text entitled the *Grand Saint Graal,* extended from the Joseph poem of Borron, (2) a Romance of Merlin developed from the *Early Merlin*; (3) a Romance of Lancelot of the Lake; and (4) that of Galahad. A long prose History of Perceval —known as the *Perlesvaus*—alternative to and exclusive of that ascribed to Borron and to that of the *Conte del Graal,* connects with the Vulgate Cycle, because it claims to have been written by a son of "Arimathæan Joseph," who is unknown to the other groups.

The German Grail texts are (1) the *Parzival* of Wolfram von Eschenbach; (2) *Diu Crône* by Heinrich von dem Türlin; and (3) a *Titurel* by Albrecht which incorporates certain fragments of Wolfram, passing under the same title and left unfinished. It is the latest of all Grail texts. It is to be understood that, as time went on, the Grail of Northern France became known in other countries and is represented by versions or imitations in Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Dutch. They do not demand consideration in the present study.

From another point of view the Grail literature in Northern French falls into two broad groups, being (1) that of the texts containing the Legendary History of the Sacred Vessel and other Hallows connected therewith; (2) that of the Adventurous Quests undertaken in search of the Grail. It is not a good classification because Quest matter is found in the historical *Perlesvaus*, while historical matter is found in nearly all the tales of Quest. It ignores moreover the later *Merlin* and *Lancelot* which incorporate Grail matter but are neither Quests nor Histories.

The Grail is that Vessel in which Joseph of Arimathæa is said to have received the Precious Blood of Christ at the Crucifixion, and there is no real question that for Robert de Borron, the first Grail historian, it was the Cup used at the first Eucharist after the Last Supper on the eve of Good Friday. For this, however, the late *Grand Saint Graal* substitutes the Paschal Dish in which the Passover Lamb was eaten at the Supper itself. As the greatest of Christian Reliquaries, it stands alone in the Metrical Romance of *Joseph;* but in later texts it is associated with a Bleeding Lance, identified with the Spear of Longinus, which "pierced the King of Sacred Majesty". Other Passion Relics collected about

these, the Crown of Thorns, the Nails which pierced the limbs, the Shroud, the Reed of mock-Royalty, not to speak of accessory memorials like the Sword which beheaded the Baptist, and so forth. Of the Hallows "there was right great plenty," says one of the late texts. It might appear, therefore, that the Legend of the Holy Grail belongs to the cultus of Christian Relics and that its gradual development through a century is a literary event of that cultus. It is this on the surface and yet it would be the worst description possible of the Grail Books, having regard to all that was drawn into Romance therein. The Quests for the Sacred Vessel are Quests of High Adventure, and it was known that the object in view was a sacro-saintly thing; but why and after what manner no one in all the Chivalries could have told when his work began. No one went forth to find the Holy Grail because it was a Reliquary containing the Precious Blood. The purpose of the Perceval Quests was to know the Secret of the Grail, that which it was and how it had come from a great distance into the realm of Logres. The end of the Galahad Quest was to find the Grail in the most catholic sense of the words, alluding to the attained knowledge of its deep inward Mystery. Throughout it is a tale of many aspects, representing a most curious development from one symbolical object.

The historical side of the texts is of prime importance, outside Reliquary questions. Joseph of Arimathæa is imprisoned by the Jews, and the Master comes to him bearing the Holy Grail. He explains its correspondence with the Chalice of the Mass and communicates certain Secret Words of Power and Grace which must be transmitted only to the next Keeper of the Sacred Vessel, and so on in succession. Their application is not clear in the sole extant codex of the Metrical Romance; but in the prose version —which draws from another text —they are to be pronounced over the Elements on the Altar, and were therefore some peculiar form of Consecration, as if the Grail Mythos emanated from a Hidden Church. Joseph abode in his prison for forty years, contemplating the great Palladium, and was released ultimately by Vespasian. The Grail was a Divine Oracle as well as a Reliquary, and the Voice of the Holy Spirit spoke therefrom, instructing Joseph to proceed westward, with those whom his story had converted. In this way the Grail was brought into Britain, Joseph remaining, however, somewhere on the continent, presumably in *la bloie Bretagne*, and delivering the Reliquary by command into the keeping of his son-in-law Brons, to whom he entrusted also the Secret Words.

The Vulgate Cycle, as now arranged, opens with the late *Grand Saint Graal*, reciting the Joseph story with many variations and great extensions. It knows nothing of Secret Words; but in place of these it represents the

Blessed Master consecrating and enthroning a son of Joseph as first Bishop of Christendom, with power to appoint others, which he proceeds to exercise, creating in this manner an Ecclesiastical Hierarchy unknown to the Church at large. Joseph the father delivers the Grail to his son, who is also his namesake and may be called Joseph II. They proceed with a great Company to Britain and convert thousands. It is again like the claim of a Secret Church presented in the vestures of Romance, and the two Cycles suggest alternate versions of the same strange story. But it is to be noted, notwithstanding the Secret Words, that there is no Mass of the Grail in the Borron Cycle, whereas in the *Grand Saint Graal*, the *Lancelot*, the *Queste*—which is that of Galahad—and the *Perlesvaus*, the Grail Service exhibits Transubstantiation on its gross material side, as if the Romances were designed to introduce, maintain and promote the 1215 definition of the Council of Lateran on the Sacrament of the Body of the Lord. From this point of view the Borron Cycle looks like a remnant of Berengarian or Low Doctrine on the Presence in the Eucharist: it is a Guiding Voice. And when the Grail is placed on a Table in the *Joseph* because food is failing, that which it supplies to those in the grace of the Grail is a spiritual refection, which supports the body because it has refreshed the soul; while in the *Lancelot* and the *Queste* it provides a material feast of good things, such meats indeed as each who partakes loves best. It seems evident that these texts have drawn upon Celtic Fables concerning Cauldrons of Plenty.

The historical texts and the intermediaries by which they are followed lead up to the Grail Quests, which exist to carry on the story of the House and its Hallows by the appointment of a new Keeper, except in the case of *Diu Crône*, which is a Quest without meaning. The successor in most cases is a Son of the House, the heir-at-law and the one eligible person. In the Perceval Cycles the House is a place of sorrow, because the reigning Keeper is in sickness or has suffered some kind of maiming. He who would know the Mystery of the Grail must ask a certain Question—for example, Who is served of the Grail? It heals the King, and Perceval reigns after him. In the Galahad Quest he must heal a stricken Keeper of the past. The German *Parzival* is the story of a family heirloom which is never to pass therefrom, and its Quest is intelligible only as a preparation through years of the last Son of the House so that he may be made worthy to inherit the Grail. He also must ask a Question and heal him who preceded. But the Grail is a Stone, the explanation being that Wolfram misunderstood his source in Chrétien, who describes his Talisman so vaguely that it might be taken for a Radiant Stone, a Lamp, almost anything

except a Reliquary or a Mass Chalice. There is no Precious Blood in the *Parzival*, and no Joseph Legend. The Stone came down from Heaven at the Fall of Lucifer, and in a much later text it is said to have been detached from the crown of the rebellious Archangel.

The term of the Quest is always the removal of the Grail. It is taken into deeper concealment in the Borron Cycle; it ascends into Heaven in the *Conte* and the *Galahad*; it is carried to an unknown island in the *Perlesvaus* and to the far East in the *Titurel* of Albrecht, completing the *Parzival*. It is to be understood in most cases that the world was not worthy for the Sacred Palladium to continue longer therein.

Scholarship has proposed that the Grail Mythos is to be regarded in the light of Eleusis, the Mysteries of Adonis, Seed-Time and Harvest or the Cultus of Vegetation Gods. But it has nothing in analogy with the rape and restitution of Proserpine; there is no God who dies and rises, except the Christ of Nazareth at the back of the Legend; there is no failure of crops, though a state of enchantment in Logres—according to one text—causes waters to lose their course and a vague blight to fall on the land. It has sought alternatively to explain the literature by pre-Christian folk-lore; but folk-lore knows nothing of Masses. It has connected the Grail with the Order of Knights Templar; but one charge against it was that the Words of Institution or Consecration were left out of its Masses. It has turned for light on the subject to persecuted Sects of Southern France, Paulicians and Albigenses especially. But to assume that Romances which centre on advanced Transubstantiation Doctrine and the Veneration of Relics were put forward as veils of their radical opposites and came forth from a rival religion which denied the Latin Mass, which hated the Cross, rejected the orthodox Incarnation, and seems either to have practised a simple form of blessing its Bread and Wine or believed alternatively that the metaphysical change took place in the Minister and not in the Elements, is assuredly a frantic hypothesis. We must look therefore elsewhere.

The Galahad Quest is the crown of all the literature. The persecuting Roman Church destroyed the Sacramentaries of the proscribed Sects, but it did not destroy the *Queste*. And after all the marvels of miraculous Masses it takes Galahad through the Mass itself and shews the *haut prince* that which is called —but as if almost evasively— "the spiritual things": one would say rather, a deep well of being— beyond the seeking and the sought, beyond the world of images—and the end of soul therein. Galahad died in the body and his soul ascended—I must not say, beyond all separation of divided life into the state of unity, but into the Blessed Vision, from "the

gold bar of Heaven". St. Bonaventura knew something of this state, at or about the Grail period. And whether in Cistercian monasteries or otherwhere among cells and hermitages, there were some who had read strange things in John the Scot and his contemplation of the pseudo-Areopagite. They also knew. It is, I think, out of such knowledge that the great moment came at the end of all to the author of the great *Queste*. He saw behind the Symbols and the Sacraments a little way into the Secret Mystery; and he closed in simple words that which the beloved printer Caxton called in his rubric "a story chronicled for one of the truest and holiest that is in this world".

There is no more illuminating Quest "drawn into Romance" than to read over the Grail Cycles when the last message of the Galahad High Romance has been absorbed by mind and heart. It transmutes the old pages or brings out all the precious metals from their earth and ore. It suggests new codices, too sacred for any editing; and after the greatness of the written word there is glimpsed afar the infinite of the word unwritten.

ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE

SHELLEY: KARMAYOGI*

[**J. S. Collis's** review recalls some interesting comments made by H. P. Blavatsky on Shelley in *Lucifer* for May 1889 in an article on "Our Cycle and the Next." We reprint them here.—EDS.]

What biographies shall be written of the famous infidels of to-day, one can foresee in reading those of some of England's best poets; *e.g.*, the posthumous opinions passed on Percy Bysshe Shelley.

Yea, he is now accused of what he would have otherwise been praised for, because, forsooth, he wrote in his boyhood "A Defence of Atheism"! *Ergo*, his imagination is said to have carried him "beyond the bounds of reality," and his metaphysics are said to be "without a solid foundation of reason." This amounts to saying that his critics alone know *all* about the landmarks placed by nature between the real and the unreal. This kind of orthodox trigonometrical surveyors of the absolute, who claim to be the only specialists chosen by their God for the setting of boundaries and who are ever ready to sit in judgment over independent metaphysicians, are a feature of our century. In Shelley's case, the metaphysics of the young author of "Queen Mab," described in popular encyclopedias as a "violent and blasphemous attack on Christianity and the Bible," must, of course, have appeared to his infallible judges without "a solid foundation in reason." For them, that "foundation" is in the motto of Tertullian, "*Credo quia absurdum est.*"

Poor, great young Shelley! He who laboured so zealously for several years

* *The Life of Shelley* with an Introduction by HUMBERT WOLFE, 2 Vols. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London, 15*s*.)

of his too short life in relieving the poor and consoling the distressed, and who, according to Medwin, would have given his last sixpence to a stranger in want, he is called an *Atheist* for refusing to accept the Bible *literally!* We find, perhaps, a reason for this "Atheism" in the *Conversations Lexicon*, in which Shelley's immortal name is followed by that of Shem, "the eldest son of Noah . . . said in Scripture to have died at the age of 600 years." The writer of this encyclopedic information (quoted by us *verbatim*) had just indulged in saying that "the censure of extreme presumption can hardly be withheld from a writer who, in his youth, rejects all *established* opinions," such as Biblical chronology we suppose. But the same writer passes without a word of comment and in prudent, if not reverential, silence, the cyclic years of Shem, as indeed he may!

H. P. B.

A favourite device for disposing of poets is that of calling them dreamers. But in order to dream it is necessary to go to sleep. Real poets are more awake than other men. They are more intensely alive. They are continuously in touch with the reality of the world; and are therefore more astonished than other men at what they see. Hence, to those who have become subdued to what they work in, poets are mad or dreaming. Of these Shelley is the prototype.

We have here in these two fat volumes, amounting to some 800 pages, a necessary work. The books written by his three contemporaries, Hogg, Peacock, and Trelawny are brought together into a narrative which really covers the whole life of Shelley. Thus for the first time Hogg can be read with profit. His is far the longest and most important contribution, but if read by itself does harm to Shelley; for it was written by an exceedingly able novelist who did not like Shelley any more, and had a too great affection for Hogg. It cannot be trusted. It so displeased the Shelley family that Lady Shelley withdrew the materials she had put at the disposal of Hogg —the result is that the book ends in the middle of its course, which is very strange, for most of the materials were in Hogg's memory, and it is extraordinary that he did not carry on in spite of Lady Shelley. However in this volume Trelawny and Peacock provide sufficient correctives to make Hogg safer reading. The Editors of this edition have made doubly sure by getting Mr. Humbert Wolfe to write a summing-up Introduction. It is even more highly skilled and amusing than Hogg himself, and as just as a judge. The whole thing has been well worth doing.

After a perusal we feel that we know something about Shelley; we see him clearly. He was one of the greatest of mankind. In what way *greatest*? Not as a thinker, not as a poet, not as a whole man,—but owing to his intense response to reality. If we do not understand this about Shelley we do not see him at all. He read far too much to find time to think. He used to hold a loaf of bread in one hand and a book in the other, and devour them both at the same time; but whereas he soon finished his bread he never stopped reading, even when walking in the street or sailing in a boat. There was no question of his digesting what he had read, and a great deal of his poetry suffers from indigestion. He was always in a hurry, the victim of a great unease. He had no idea of accomplishing anything by a wise passiveness, for when he was not reading or writing he was *arguing* in a ferment of excess. He knew no repose.

Nevertheless he was not an idealistic bore. For to be with Shelley was to be in contact with reality. Other men (and great ones), are not always actively distressed at that which is distressing: the blind beggar, the lost child, the empty priest conducting a ghastly service in the name of Christ, the fagging master at school, the rich man's table, the words and demeanour of

politicians—to these things most of us become accustomed. We do not accept them, but we do not feel a fresh surge of pity or disgust when confronted with them. Shelley not only always reacted to the world with the truth of a first occasion, but *acted*. If he felt pity or disgust he took immediate steps to supply a remedy by some deliberate deed of charity or self-sacrifice.

It is always Shelley the realist, Shelley the sane man in a world of madmen, dreamers, and sleep-walkers, who emerges from these pages. And with it also there emerges the other great fact about Shelley—that he was without egoism. He did not care about himself as others do, as Byron or Wordsworth did. The letters of such a man are inclined to be unreadable, but he himself is a light to all who know him. Very likely Shelley was the only man whom Byron really respected.

No words can say how great is the need of Shelley's spirit to-day—for again we must insist that it was a practical spirit. Do not let us be mistaken about this. He meant what he said in the Mask of Anarchy :—

And if then the tyrants dare
Let them ride among you there,
Slash, and stab, and maim, and hew—
What they like, that let them do.
With folded arms and steady eyes,
And little fear, and less surprise,
Look upon them as they slay
Till their rage has died away.

Then they will return with shame
To the place from which they came,
And the blood thus shed will speak
In hot blushes on their cheek.

Such words are and have been dismissed as idealistic in the West. But as the century closed a young Indian, M. K. Gandhi, translated that verse into action in South Africa by a non-resistance campaign which was a unique event and one of the greatest battles in the history of the world. That victory and subsequent victories of the same nature prove decisively that the East can teach Action to the West as well as Contemplation. We can still take the hint. There is now only one way of swiftly altering the social injustice of starving men in the midst of plenty. That is by heroic self-sacrifice on the part of those who are weakest and worst off. A deliberate mass-movement of hunger-strikers for food would make such a psychic atmosphere that the present social order would be broken down. Such practical heroism would be inspired by Shelley in the West and Gandhi in the East.

J. S. COLLIS

British Social Services: The Nation's Appeal to the Housewife and Her Response. By the REV. J. C. PRINGLE. (Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, and Toronto, and Charity Organisation Society, London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

Launched with the ambitious programme of abolishing destitution and charity, the British social services are alleged to have developed within twenty-two years into a well-nigh intolerable burden, bearing most heavily upon the very masses they sought to succour. The problem is viewed from the angle of the long-suffering home maker—the effect of the situation upon her, who, as the ultimate consumer, cannot pass along the tax burden for maintaining these services ; and her reactions to them. Many are the evils for which Mr. Pringle holds them responsible, from the national financial crisis of 1931 to the serious demoralisation of large numbers of the poorer classes.

The thesis upon which they were founded sounded plausible enough : prevention of pauperism through social

insurance for the classes of the population most prone to drift into dependency—the aged, the sick, the widows and orphans, the mentally afflicted, the blind, the unemployed. The principle of voluntary insurance, as a business proposition, for which the beneficiaries pay and the benefits of which therefore involve no loss of self-respect, is sound. But universal and automatic compulsory insurance, even though nominally contributory, involves the state in a gigantic charitable enterprise which, in practice, encourages thriftlessness and worse.

Unfortunately, it proved impossible to legislate a sense of responsibility into the beneficiaries of the scheme. The lawmakers reckoned without the common human proclivity to lean when a good prop is provided, and there is no occasion for surprise that pauperism, instead of being diminished, has greatly increased. Removing the stigma from unnecessary dependency has weakened the morale of the working classes, while the lack of effective co-ordination among the politics-ridden public services has facilitated their exploitation by the unscrupulous. Hundreds of millions gathered in taxes to support the various state insurance schemes are reported to have gone to enrich a mushroom growth of "pleasure"-purveying industries.

Not the least interesting point made by Mr. Pringle is that "*the nation cannot finance itself without joint family liability and pooled income*". Must the tide soon turn, from the individualism so long rampant in the West, to the family group as the ultimate economic unit?

Mr. Pringle holds no brief against organised charity in general, but would not an impartial judgment bring under a like condemnation the Poor Law which he defends and many of the large-scale charitable projects supported from private funds but staffed by paid workers, hireling shepherds, "whose own the sheep are not"?

Much present-day social service springs from failure to heed the warning sounded by Krishna in ancient India: "The duty of another is full of danger!" To relieve individuals of responsibility for their own maintenance is to weaken moral integrity and self-respect; to relieve them of the duty of providing for their natural dependents is to strike a blow at family unity and the spiritual values of family life; to teach the people that the relief of misery is the function of the state and no concern of the individual is to encourage the most callous selfishness. How shall responsibility and compassion grow but by exercise?

Granting that the bettering of physical conditions alone can never make men good or happy, and that indiscriminate charity may do harm, what of the effect upon the beneficiaries of wholesale as compared with personal benevolence? Even receiving help, when it is necessary, may have its spiritual lessons. It is good for a man who needs help to feel gratitude to his benefactor, but what gratitude does the state poor law or great charity organisation society evoke?

It is individual and not collective action that is most needed—active application of the Christian command, "Love the neighbour as thyself," and of the Northern Buddhist precept, "Never let the shadow of thy neighbour (*a third person*) come between thyself and the object of thy bounty."

Can we doubt that if every man did his whole duty, that he could and ought to do, the sum of human misery would be greatly diminished, and that in no long time? Does not, therefore, the practical cure for suffering lie in the development of altruism, of the charity which of its own accord manifests itself in works, and of the wisdom which makes it possible to do good works without danger of doing harm.

Ph. D.

The Supernormal. By G. C. BARNARD, M.Sc. (Rider and Co., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

As so many other books on psychic phenomena, this volume contains a mass of facts and assumptions without any satisfactory explanation regarding what are called psychic phenomena—hypnotism, mediumship, materialization, telepathy, clairvoyance, etc. The author does not appear to be clear about his own theories. Take, for instance, the following clumsily expressed and not quite intelligible statement on p. 104:—

> The body is the instrument of the soul; in particular the brain is the instrument which is used by the mind. It is not the machine which creates mental phenomena, but the machine which is driven by psychological forces—

and put it side by side with the following on p. 237:—

> The mistake of the Spiritualists, as I understand it, is that they confuse the personality with the soul (assuming that there is a soul) and consequently they invest it with a value and significance which, *sub specie aeternitatis*, it simply does not possess.

In the first the author definitely recognizes the existence of "the soul"; in the second he appears to hold a different view. Besides, he has nowhere defined the terms "brain," "mind," "soul," "personality". An unfortunate thing about writers on mental and psychic phenomena is that they seem to forget that not only were these phenomena known to the ancient Eastern sages, but were also rationally explained by them. We cannot help remarking that our present-day experimenters in séances and writers on psychic phenomena would be saved from many a pitfall and would have their labours considerably lightened if before tackling psychic subjects they would carefully study, if not the original ancient texts, at least the synthesis to be found in the writings of Madame Blavatsky. We shall illustrate our meaning by a reference to Mr. Barnard's book. After laborious study, observation and reasoning, our author has reached the correct conclusion that "the popular spirit-theory is not by any means satisfactorily proved, and is usually based on quite insufficient grounds." (p. 19.) But is he aware that so far back as 1889 Madame Blavatsky in her *Key to Theosophy* clearly explained this? What use is there in reiterating negative knowledge that every student of the subject knows?

But if our author is right in rejecting the spiritualist explanation of the phenomena of the séance room, namely, that they are produced by the conscious spirits of the departed ones, he is quite illogical in disbelieving on that account any survival after death. On p. 19 he hints that such disbelief may be due to his own "sceptical or agnostic prejudices," but surely a writer who discourses on this vast subject of the supernormal is first expected to divest himself of such prejudices.

On several other points Mr. Barnard appears to be quite at sea. A careful study of Chapter XII of Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled* would bring home to him the necessity of revising several of his notions, *e. g.*, his dogmatic assertion on p. 244 that hypnotic trance, mediumistic trance, and mystical ecstasy are "essentially mere variants of one and the same state of four-dimensional consciousness". The ecstasy of a true Mystic or Adept is known as Samadhi, and the statement that there is no essential difference between this and the "trance" of an ordinary medium will provoke a smile from the merest tyro in occultism.

On p. 211, our author makes the following somewhat queer statement:—

> Nevertheless, in my opinion, there is no definite ground for supposing that an etheric (or ectoplasmic) double is a permanent constituent of our being—still less for the multiplication of such bodies, each one less material than the last, which seems to be the hobby of some theosophers.

Of course he means Theosophists—but let that pass. Picking this up from some manual of pseudo-theosophy, he has not taken the trouble to verify what is the true teaching on the subject.

In the last two chapters of Mr. Judge's excellent book, *The Ocean of Theosophy*, our author will find in very small compass the main teachings of Theosophy on psychic laws, forces and

phenomena, and a perusal of these chapters will serve to dispel many misconceptions from his mind, solve his puzzles and difficulties, and open up a new and more profitable field of study than the one which has resulted in his present very unsatisfactory book.

J. P. W.

The Individual and The Community. By WEN KWEI LIAO, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Nanking. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London. 15*s.*)

This volume is a historical survey of European and Chinese social philosophy, undertaken to focus attention on the relation between "legalism" and "moralism" as "motivating factors of social conduct". The substance of the book consists of brief but lucid sketches of leading thinkers from Plato to Karl Marx, and from the Confucian Classics to Dr. Sun Yat-San. The perusal of this learned book leaves one with a strong impression of human unity. There is not a single type of thought evolved and defended in the West for which a parallel cannot be found in the long course of Chinese speculation. Professor Liao might have brought out more prominently this approach in type after type, had he put them side by side or called attention to the fact in some suitable manner. Instead, he has contented himself with the mere juxtaposition of European and Chinese systems of culture. Hence he has not reaped the full benefits of his painstaking effort.

Further, the attention he has paid to Hinduism is inadequate. He gives a very brief account of it only as a background to Buddhism. The *Mahabharata* and the *Bhagavad-Gita* would have given him ample material to illustrate his central thesis of the relation between law and morality. The Hindu scheme of values is embodied in the key concepts of *dharma, artha, kāma,* and *moksha.* Dharma indicates a perfect synthesis of external law and internal freedom. The physical basis of life referred to by artha and kāma is to be sublimated in accordance with the principles of dharma. And dharma or social righteousness includes two aspects: *āsrama* or the duties flowing from the stage of life, youth, manhood or old age; and *varna* or the duties flowing from one's position in society as determined by *karma* (action) and *guna* (character). Dharma is the principle of synthesis linking the individual and society, time and eternity, for it is the bridge that leads to moksha or absolute freedom of self-realisation. The principle of dharma envisages the whole process of the education of the spirit from the "minimum" morality of bodily control to realisation of the Atman or *sarvātma bhāva*—(all-self-ness), mediated in the central phase by social contribution. The author refers to Roman piety as a species of paying debts to the gods. A comparison with the Indian conception of *Ṛna trayas* (the three debts) suggests itself—the dues to the gods or cosmic powers, to the *pitris* or ancestors of the race and to the *rishis*, the authors of our culture and civilisation.

A comparative study of the types of perfection indicated by Plato's philosopher-king, embodied in the lives of the Christ and the Buddha, the Stoic and the Chinese sages, and of the character of the Christian saint and the Hindu jivanmukta would be an alluring prospect. But where so much is given it would perhaps be ungracious to ask for more. The book is sure to be welcomed widely for the rich fare it offers, particularly for the striking account it gives of the landmarks of Chinese speculation set forth in the context of world culture. The last stage of national awakening inspired and organised by Dr. Sun Yat-San is full of poignant, interest, especially to Indian readers occupied as they are with problems of an equally fateful character.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

The Book of the Master of the Hidden Places. By W. MARSHAM ADAMS, edited by C. J. L. Garstin. (Search Publising Co., London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Even after a century of exploration and discovery in the land of the Pharaohs, the inner meaning of the monuments of Egypt remained buried in oblivion, until the veil was lifted in 1895 by the little brochure of Mr. Adams, *The House of the Hidden Places*, supplemented four years later by his *Book of the Master*. The compact volume under review is an amalgamation of these books into one continuous whole, ably edited by Mr. Garstin.

The author interprets that the Great Pyramid of Khufu represents the Light of the Unseen World, and contains in solid structure what the Scroll of the Secret House, commonly called the Book of the Dead, records in writing. They reveal the same doctrine, that after death the departed passes again into the Light of Immortality, the path taken being identical in both cases. Getting into the "Light" at the seventeenth course, which contains the "Gate of the Great God," the Postulant is led through innumerable gateways and passages, channels and chambers. Many are the trials and ordeals that await him. The Soul is then born into new life. These are analogous to the doctrines contained in Brahmanical texts. The Egyptians had faith in the Doctrine of Transmigration, the cornerstone of Hindu religious and philosophical belief. The difficulties and dangers that beset the Soul on his path recall those that, according to Brahmanical doctrine, are described in the *Garuda-Purāṇa*: and strangely enough, originally the *Purusha* of the Indian Sānkhya system is seen described as the seventeenth *tatva*.

Only a few more of the clues presented in this veritable storehouse of Egyptian symbolism can be indicated here. The Great Pyramid houses a tomb, not of a dead man but of a living God, the "Great Osiris". This symbolism seems similar to the Brahmanical conception of "Sacrifice of the Self within the Self," contained in the *Purusha Sūkta* hymn, for instance. "The political framework of Egypt is the envelope of its spiritual theosophy," the 42 divisions of the country, the flow of the Nile, the companions of the King are represented in the Pyramid and its contents. The temple of the Virgin Mother Hathor or Isis is the "starry universe of which she is the queen," and "there is no chamber in the Great House that does not reflect the path of the just in the mystery of the heavens". The unit of measurement used in the construction of Egyptian monuments is discovered by the author to be 25·025 inches, that of one of the casing stones in the base-circuit of the Pyramid. With this, the length of each side of the pyramidal base remains revised at about 761 ft.

It must be said this attractive and remarkable book shows a masterly grasp of the wand of science, both exoteric and esoteric, and the author's efforts have been crowned with the success that is possible for mortal intellect to achieve in a task so difficult as his. Two small printer's errors have crept into the work, one 'of' too many on p. 32, and '2' for '3' on p. 120, in the number of days of the Solar year.

Only as mysteries clear, do doubts arise. "If the whole country represented," as the author says, "the various stages in the Path of the Deceased," do the portions of the papyri found in different parts of Egypt correspond to these stages? To the Egyptian, the South is "the great quarter"; statues of the dead face southward and the holy dead are there in "blessed company". These are familiar ideas in Vedic religion. Could they be taken as pointing to a southern origin for Egyptian civilization?

S. V. VISWANATHA

Child Psychology. By BUFORD J. JOHNSON. (Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London.)

One is inclined to wonder how far the jargon in which experts in various branches of knowledge indulge and rejoice, is necessary, and how far it is the survival of the medicine man's methods, who employed quaint terms and practices to inspire the ignorant with awe. The language of Spinoza or Bergson or Nietzsche is simple compared with treatises written by experts to expound the meaning of their philosophies. The words of the Gospels are easy to understand; yet a special training is needed to follow the windings of theological commentary. The simplest and most practical of all sciences, namely psychology, has developed a jargon which is the most difficult of all to master: and every psychologist of note is continually inventing new terms for states of mind which are more or less common to all humanity. Some of these are doubtless necessary to differentiate various delicate reactions; but the vast majority are not. And very often a learned professor seems to delight in obscurity for its own sake (forgetting Voltaire's dictum that the first essential of all writing was *La Clarté*; the second also and the third), as when Professor Johnson allows himself to state:—

> The recognition of the fallacies of clear-cut differentiations of such processes as attention, perception, and thought, with allocation of specific neural patterns to each process has led to attempts to study the whole child by methods that omit analysis of behaviour into major components.

Why should a specialist (and no other) be permitted to write a sentence which so topples and so sprawls?

It is a great pity that the results of much careful and useful observation should be recorded in this unfortunate manner; for no subject so repays study as that of The Child, and in no field of enquiry are such valuable results being obtained. Slowly but surely mankind is learning how to allow the new life, born in every child, to develop to its own shape and make its contribution to society; and unlearning the bad superstition that a child must be moulded into a shape, dictated by society. The psychologist is laboriously, step by step, working out the vision of great poets and great teachers, so that the applications of their great truths may become a part of our everyday consciousness. He has taken a step in knowledge who knows for certain whether it is himself who is cross or the child who is naughty, and a further step, who realises that all fault-finding, every *don't* is a confession of lack-of-understanding. In reading such a book as Professor Johnson's one is made more aware than ever that the problem of the child rarely exists: the problem almost invariably is to be found in the elders in authority over it. They cling to the errors of acquired folly and refuse to be re-educated by the young rightness and honesty of the new life which challenges them. The book is illustrated by photographs of infants and children in movement which add greatly to its interest and value.

HUGH DE SÉLINCOURT

The Laughing Christ. By PEARSON CHOATE. (Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd, London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

The Laughing Christ! Such was the elusive image that sent the protagonist of this story searching through the paintings of the old masters, to find there only sentimental vacuous Christs, heavy listless Christs, or pale and effeminate weaklings; Italian shepherds, Spanish peasants, lay figures posed on crosses, putty corpses, spouting blood into be-jewelled cups, "the Jewish, the savage, the barbaric and pagan sacrifice idea: the spilled blood of the human sacrifice fetish". But he found no trace of the laughing Christ, that should encourage and inspire, for the Man of Sorrows was the only credibly human Christ depicted. Yet, in the end, this

portrait haunted him— "a weathered sunburnt bearded face, the shoulders squared... rather full human lips and good white teeth... a virile, valiant, manly man... the divine man. A man raised to the nth degree... a suggestion of tremendous power, latent, and in reserve..." A painting that "was to hang on the line at the Academy; and be bought for the nation; and slay all the dragons of depression and discontent and fear,"—this painting turns out to be an unconscious self portrait. As one of the characters says, "All of us are only too apt... to dress up Christ in the uniform we most admire."

Was there only one Christ, one Son of God, and he dead some nineteen hundred odd years ago? The Christian Scriptures themselves proclaim the Christ within, which is no man, indeed, to be portrayed with earthly features, but the Divine Principle in every human being. He who attempts to limit it to one form alone will inevitably fail, for, the laughing Christ, the sorrowing Christ or any other anthropomorphically qualified Christ will always, as in this story, be the mirror of one's own personality. Yet when man rises above that personality, opens his spiritual eyes, he finds the God, the Christ within himself. He needs no outside God, no dead sacrifice, no priest, no painting, contemporary or otherwise, to energise and sustain him.

E.W.

Enquiries into Religion and Culture. By CHRISTOPHER DAWSON. (Sheed & Ward, London. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

We have read with pleasure and profit the fifteen essays which Mr. Dawson has written during the last fifteen years. The essays, treating as they do of different topics, do not form an organic unity, but they all exhibit, in a more or less pronounced form, the moral outlook of the author. When the clamour for material goods is likely to make us deaf to the inner voice it is well to be told that economic values are not the only, or even the highest values in life; that mere material progress cannot satisfy human needs. When the world is frantically trying to save itself by economic adjustment, the author makes bold to say "There is little ground for supposing that the world can be saved by machinery or by any external reform" (p. 293). It is certainly well to recognise that science and economic organisation "are but instruments which may be used for death instead of for life, if the will that uses them is disordered" (p. 343). What we need is spiritual vitality and that can come only from a communion with Divine Life. The author has emphasised the fact that there is no real culture without a religious basis. Religion is not a pious sentiment but a dynamic force which should be made operative in all walks of life. A merely secular life is a life without substance.

There are appreciative references to Indian thought and culture. The oriental solution of the conflict between physical and spiritual life, however, is condemned as one-sided, inasmuch as it denies the body in the interest of the spirit (p. 307). But if the conflict is real, how else is it to be got rid of? And after all it is the soul that has to be saved. The body perishes here and cannot be saved. Moreover no one is asked to kill the body; we have to go through many bodily disciplines for the greater realisation of the spirit. We have only to realise the supremacy of the spirit and its difference from the body.

The author writes as a Catholic Christian, and is not free from Christian bias; for instance, when he says "The Christian faith alone offers man a perfection which is not relative and transitory, but absolute and eternal" (p. 345). But in spite of this bias most of the essays are distinguished by a high moral tone, and a sane outlook.

RASVIHARI DAS

CORRESPONDENCE

BIO-CHEMISTRY AND ANCIENT INDIA

[In the following article **B. N. Sastri, M. Sc., A. I. C.**, of the Department of Bio-chemistry, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, shows that knowledge of Bio-chemistry was not absent in ancient India.—EDS.]

Presiding over the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sir Frederick Hopkins chose "Some Chemical Aspects of Life" as the theme of his address. The subject has received great attention during recent years and Sir Frederick himself has contributed not a little to its development. His utterances therefore bear an authoritative character.

According to Sir Frederick, Biochemistry, which deals with the chemical aspects of life, is of very recent origin. The modern history of Biochemistry is short but glorious, and belongs exclusively to the present century. Its inheritance from the experimental physiologists of the past century has not been large and, thanks to the intensive interest focused on biological sciences, it has now been possible to interpret the processes of the living cell in physico-chemical terms.

It is refreshing to turn our attention to the books of the ancient Hindus, and examine the nature and extent of the knowledge they had acquired. There are several limitations to a correct assessment of the views held by them; in the first place many of the ancient records have been lost and the few that are extant are difficult to decipher and understand. No doubt some of them have been studied but it must be emphasized that their interpretation in modern terminology is difficult and sometimes may prove even misleading. For an intimate understanding one has to think in terms of the ancient Hindus, which is a feat almost impossible to perform. Be that as it may, at the time of Charaka and Susruta, several aspects of life had been studied with such attention to detail that, considering their antiquity, their works are a source of wonder and dismay to the present-day scientist. The patient attention and natural shrewdness of the ancient Hindus rendered them excellent observers and their scientific methods recognised rigorous experimentation assisted by a highly evolved system of logic.

The ineludible complexity of the biological system was recognised from the earliest times, and attempts have been made to interpret these factors in simple terms of known observations regarding the origin of life itself. Speculation has run riot among scientists and philosophers alike, and all that we know to-day is that we know very little about it. Regarding evolution, the theories of modern physiologists are but a return with new light to the evolution theory of Kapila who advanced the Sankhya system of philosophy.*

Speaking of vital activity, Vignana Bhikshu explains that, far from being independent, it is "originated and maintained by the combined operation and fusion of different sensory and motor reflexes of the living organism".† This shows that an attempt was made to interpret the vital activity in terms of recognisable factors. From Vyasa Bhashya written as early as the sixth century A.D., we read "inorganic matter, vegetable substances, and animal substances do not differ from one another, especially in respect of potential energies and ultimate constituents".‡

* *Indian Gazetteer*, p. 214.
† Sutra 32, Chap. II.
‡ *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, Brajendra Nath Seal, p. 55.

What this precisely conveys, it is not easy to say, but, evidently, an unsurmountable boundary between the inorganic and the organic, which was postulated by the scientists of Europe (and held sway until as recently as 1928) was not suspected. Matter had the inherent property of undergoing change either spontaneously or due to a combination and interaction of other substance and such changes occurred rapidly in all living matter.* A living organism could be viewed as a collection of different parts in each of which a definite and directed type of reaction proceeded. Thus, when food is taken it goes down the gullet by the action of a bio-motor force—*prāṇa vāyu*, and reaches the stomach where it gets acidulated and mixed up with the gastric juice. Then it undergoes change with chyme due to the chemical action of the gastric juice. The partially digested food enters the duodenum due to the biomotor force—*Samāna vāyu*, and then to the small intestines (*ama pakvasya*). In these the digestive substances contained in the bile act, and the food is converted into chyle—*rasa*, which is pungent. By now the food is decomposed and metamorphosed into organic substance essential to tissue building, heat and energy generation, etc.†

रसाद्रक्तं ततो मांसं मांसान्मेदः प्रजायते ।
मेदसोस्थि ततो मज्जा मज्जायाः शुक्रसंभवः ॥‡

[Chyle turns into blood, blood into flesh and flesh into fat; fat is transformed into bone; bone produces the brain tissue and this, in its turn, the semen.]

This serves to show that the ancient Hindus possessed a fair conception of metabolic processes and a knowledge of the function of the digestive juices. Modern Bio-chemistry recognises the ordered and directed chemical reactions in relation to life activities. The view of the ancient Hindus mentioned above, indicates that attempts to take cognisance of such conceptions were not lacking.

The chapter in *Amarakosha* on the human body and its diseases presupposes an advanced knowledge of medical science. The classification of foods into *Sattvik*, *Rajasik*, *Tamasik*, and their relation to the human activities show that the science of dietetics had advanced to a great extent. The nutrition of farm animals which has received attention only in recent years in Europe, had made vast advances in ancient India. The book *Kurrat-ul-mulk* (1381 A.D.?) pertaining to veterinary science, which is a translation from an ancient Sanskrit work, contains two chapters, one on food and diet, and another devoted to feeding for purposes of fattening.

Sir Frederick Hopkins has drawn attention to the elucidation of several vital functions such as muscle contraction, stimulation of vagus nerves etc. The specificity of enzymes has served to explain the ordered and directed course of chemical reactions in the living organism. The discovery of hormones and vitamins has clarified and expanded our knowledge of several physiological processes. As an outcome of nutritional research we now recognise that nurture can aid nature, a fact which was not conceded a few years ago. Chemistry has scored several triumphs in interpreting life activities.

It is a matter for sad reflection that the logical development of science in ancient India, which had made phenomenal advances hundreds of years ago, was arrested (after the glorious rule of Vikramaditya) due to the disturbed atmosphere created by warfare, foreign invasions and domination, etc. The decline of India's glory may also have been a natural reaction from her great eminence in sciences and arts, for as Goethe said :—

> The race of mortal man is far too weak.
> To grow not dizzy on unwonted heights.

B. N. SASTRI

* Nyayabodhini on Annambhatta's Tarksangraha.
† *The Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus*, Brajendra Nath Seal, pp. 205–207.
‡ *Sarngadhara Samhita*, Chapter V. Sloka, 13.

KHABARDAR, THE PARSEE POET

The object of this study is to acquaint readers with the latest work of Ardeshir Framji Khabardar, one of the great poets of Gujarat. He is not only a thorough master of the standard style and diction but he is also at home in Hindu religion and philosophy.

The poet's life and works are fully appreciated by his countrymen, as may best be seen from the Memorial Volume and Special Numbers issued in his honour on the occasion of his Golden Jubilee in 1932.

In July 1929, Mr. Khabardar suffered a heavy loss in the tragic death of his eldest daughter, and it was this sorrow which inspired him to write his great philosophical poem—*Darshanika*. It was begun on December 15th of that year and finished on March 31st, 1930. Thus in the very short time of three months and a half, some six thousand verses were composed by the poet, and that too in spite of his busy life and poor health. Most of the work was done during the quiet hours of the night. Religion, philosophy and science have all contributed to the poem.

Darshanika is divided into nine parts: The Instability of the World, the Dance of Death, the Song of Life, the Pain of Evolution, the Fog or Mist of Religious Creeds, the Chain of Eternity, the Unity of Universal Spirit, the Work or Duty of Life, and the Universal Religion of Love. These headings by themselves give a fair idea of the poet's views; but as he is a poet and not the writer of a scientific treatise, they are not in strict logical order of development. Wherever we happen to open the volume we can understand and enjoy it. It is written in the popular metre Jhulana Chhand. Simplicity of diction and clarity of thought—two general characteristics of the poet—are preserved in a wonderful degree even in this philosophical poem. His similes and metaphors are taken from every-day life and from nature, and this makes his lofty ideas easily and effectively comprehensible. Our regret is that we cannot reproduce all this in translation, which can only give the more or less literal meaning of the original without those other factors which constitute poetry—especially oriental poetry.

Let us begin with the exquisite lines in which the poet compares human efforts for higher knowledge with a child's endeavours to learn the alphabet.

Brahma (the Supreme Power) takes the man-child
and makes him write the higher (spiritual) letters;
He guides his hand a little and then
he leaves the child to his own fancy;
The hand would not be steady, the child is fearful and perplexed,
yet he tries to settle his hand in writing;
The hand slips off every moment, the Power wipes off again and again,
and the child at last fills his eyes with tears.
The child writes on, the Power keeps wiping off:
how will the fund of letters be finished?
When will he learn all the higher signs?
or will he keep on this labour of the slate for ever?
Will this writing and wiping go on forever?
Will this knowledge never be gained?
Will the man-child remain forever forgetful?
Will he end his life in the same sad effort? (39)

The poet later sings of Life and Death drawing an analogy from the river:—

Birth and Death in this life
are like the source and the mouth of a river;
The source of the river appears in the mountain,
but the sources of this source are quite different,
The path of Life begins with birth,
but birth is only its door this side;
The ultimate source of the river is in the great ocean,
so is the source of life in the Greater Life.
And like the mouth of the river is also death filled to the full,
having attained the accomplishment of the flow of Life:
Will not the tide of life be brimful
when the door of death opens into the Greater Life? (64)

The poet thus meditates upon former lives:—

Is this our first life on earth,
or have we lived many a life like this?
This world-cloth is being woven from before,
could not have Life done its sewing therein?

This light of life, did it start from birth,
or was it here forever ? (79)

Pantheistic ideas are very beautifully expressed in the section called the Unity of Spirit. As a natural corollary the poet also sings of our attaining that unity when the divine essence within us is developed and cultivated.

The universal spirit resides as soul within us,
we all should increase its supreme light;
It is like an invaluable pearl in the shell,
in the deep darkness at the bottom of the ocean.
When this wondrous inner eye will be opened in the heart,
nothing will remain then after.

At last our poet gives his message, of love:—

There will surely come a day at last,—
may be after millions of years, but it will,—
When the true empire of love
will spread over all the world.
Then human life will really shine,
and the glory of life will pour forth light.
Where the sun of love will shed forth beauty.
There will be heaven on earth below !

Hamburg, Germany

J. C. TAVADIA.

SUFISM AND REINCARNATION.

At the beginning of the year Dr. Margaret Smith, the Orientalist, who is an authority on the writings of the Sufi poets and philosophers, published in THE ARYAN PATH an article on Sufism and the doctrine of re-incarnation. To this the editors prefixed a note suggesting that though, ostensibly, Sufism denies the possibility of re-incarnation, very probably its esotericists had some teaching to give on the matter in private.

This suggestion impelled me to take up the question, and I endeavoured to discuss the Sufi attitude in full in the June number of the same journal. To my remarks, however, the editors added a statement to which I took exception, and they have now, most courteously, offered me an opportunity of replying to their criticism. At the same time they have allowed me to see an extremely able letter from one of their contributors, a Mr. J. S., dealing with various points in my article and to which I may now refer.

The editors found that the description I gave of the process of re-incarnation was not a happy one, which, of course, from a Theosophical standpoint, it was not. But Sufism and Theosophy are widely different in their conceptions of the nature of the individual, and, without drawing invidious distinctions, we may say simply that these two conceptions are hard to reconcile. Which brings me to the second point in the editors' criticism, a rock in the sea of argument whereon the ship of agreement between Sufi and Theosophist has many times foundered. The editors complain that I do not properly distinguish between *personality* and *individuality*, with consequently incorrect reactions to the mortality or immortality of both phases. The Sufi, however, uses the words in a sense entirely different from that intended by the Theosophist. *Personality*, according to Madame Blavatsky, embraces all the characteristics and memories of one physical life, while *individuality* is the imperishable *Ego* which re-incarnates and clothes itself in one personality after another. For the Sufi, there is no such thing as individuality except as an illusion fostered by the lower consciousness. To him, all is one and his separation illusory. *Personality*, nevertheless, an attribute of the Deity, is reflected in man and remains his possession so long as he exists. It acquires, moreover, in some sort, a new lease of life when it casts the mantle of its influence upon some in-coming and naked soul, contacted on the way out from this material plane. It is not, therefore, as the editors suggest, that I have failed to grasp the ordinary interpretations of Buddhist

teaching on this matter but that, quite simply, I do not accept them.

Mr. J. S. accuses me of paradox. Seeming paradox there is, but no doubt blame is due to me in that I have not made myself clear. Officially and actually Sufism rejects re-incarnation. It does not allow that the soul returns to earth. Moreover, for the reasons given in the article under discussion, the Sufis, searchers after Unity, consider occupation with such notions a waste of time. Esoterically, however, an explanation of the idea may be given in private by the *murshid* to his *murids*. He would say, I think, that men when they die are roughly divisible into two categories: those who, as the Chinese explain it, have identified themselves with their *yang* or spiritual selves, and those who are all *yin*, *i. e.* have no existence outside their perishable emotional individuality. The former continue life on higher and higher planes until absorbed again into the One, while the *yin* of them falls away. The latter, who have not conformed to the precepts of the Higher Self, lose their *yang* which goes back into the One alone, whilst they, living only in their *yin*, seek to return to earth with some new in-coming soul. In other words, the soul itself never returns, but the worldly personality of one who has never identified himself with his Higher Being impresses itself as a cloak upon an impressionable body and comes back to the interests it had been forced to leave behind. Now the mass of men are actually, whatever they pretend, identified with worldly interests. That is why I say: "the mass of men re-incarnate." I do not mean by that that the theory of re-incarnation is true, but that it *seems* to be true because most men think they are what they are not, *i. e.* they identify themselves with externals. They are not themselves; they are an illusory something which comes back while the soul goes on.

The ideal, no doubt, is to pass with growing consciousness to the true Self-consciousness, and not, as are most men, to be pulled, with back turned, to the Source, their eyes fixed outwards on the fading joys of *Máyâ*, missing the inward ecstasy of each step towards the Goal. But to those who set store by individuality Sufism will not appeal.

Geneva RONALD A. L. ARMSTRONG

[We gladly make room for the above explanation. It raises several points which we would like to see fully discussed. At present we shall only say this: the Sufistic exposition of Mr. Armstrong is not very different from that of the orthodox southern Buddhistic church. We have good reasons to contend that the real Sufi teaching and the real Buddhistic doctrine are identical with the esoteric instructions of H. P. Blavatsky. To-day one of the main difficulties about such systems of thought and practice as Sufism and Yoga, or such occult arts as astrology, is that real teachers who *know* are very rare. There are many so-called yogis, Sufis and astrologers who teach what they themselves have not thoroughly understood. We do not imply that all of them are insincere men; while some are only money-makers, there are those whose sincerity and earnestness cannot be questioned but whose knowledge of their subject is very partial and the understanding of what they have studied topsy-turvy.

One of the objects of THE ARYAN PATH is to encourage study and discussion of various doctrines comprising the Esoteric Philosophy and the Science of Occultism. The real Sufis taught that Science-Philosophy, and between them and other real Esotericists there is the bond of aim, purpose as well as of teaching.—EDS.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

This year's Presidential Address before the British Association for the Advancement of Science was on "Some Chemical Aspects of Life." It was given by Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins, the chief founder of vitamin chemistry and an authority on the dynamics of living matter. Much of the address is technical, containing information and comments for which many a scientist and research worker will be grateful. We shall confine ourselves here to considering some of Sir Frederick's more general remarks.

The ancient axiom of the Esoteric philosophy that "Nature unaided fails," finds an echo in Sir Frederick's reference to the evidence produced by recent nutritional research to show that "Nurture can assist Nature to an extent not freely admitted a few years ago". What is true in the field of human nutrition is no less true in other departments of life. Sir Frederick applies this idea of the possibility of assisting nature, in the reconstruction of society which the progressive replacement of human labour by machinery will entail. He sees the desirability of planning ahead for the coming social changes, and especially of providing education in the wise use of leisure.

Admittedly, science cannot accomodate its pace to the halting steps of humanity in the mass. Sir Frederick insists that the replacement of labour by machines must continue, even though

> no one can say what kind of equilibrium the distribution of leisure is fated to reach . . . . . Most of us have had a tendency in the past to fear the gift of leisure to the majority. To believe that it may be a great social benefit requires some mental adjustment, and a belief in the educability of the average man or woman.

He rightly contends that it is not the machine that is primarily responsible for our present-day difficulties, but the faulty adjustment of society to the problems which the machine has introduced. He puts it graphically:—

> I see more present danger in the case of "Money versus Man" than danger present or future in that of the "Machine versus Man"! . . . . I confess that if civilisation escapes its other perils, I should fear little the final reign of the machine.

Sir Frederick realizes the necessity for something more than statecraft and opportunism in dealing with immediate and pressing problems. He visualises, at admitted risk to his reputation as a realist, a reservoir of synthesised and clarified knowledge, upon which those who have to solve the problems of the future may be able to draw. It is a modern-

ization of Bacon's dream of Solomon's House—

> an organisation of the best intellects bent on gathering knowledge for future practical services . . . . a House devoid of politics, concerned rather with synthesising existing knowledge, with a sustained appraisement of the progress of knowledge, and continuous concern with its bearing upon social readjustments . . . . an intellectual exchange where thought would go ahead of immediate problems.

Is not this a faint adumbration of the fundamental tenet of Esotericism, that a body of wisdom exists in which are synthesized all branches of knowledge,—scientific, religious, and philosophical ?

Sir Frederick attempts to clear science from all responsibility which his immediate predecessor, Sir Alfred Ewing, put upon it (cf. THE ARYAN PATH, November, 1932, pp. 790-793), *viz.*, that the command over Nature's forces has been put in man's hands before he knows how to command himself. To call this an indictment of mankind but not of science is like blaming the child who plays with a stick of dynamite and excusing the man who put it within his reach. Must not such a group as Sir Frederick pictures have it as one of its functions to judge the suitability of giving out publicly or withholding the fruits of its research ?

The objective of the church missionary in heathendom is proselytizing; towards its attainment many devices are employed. The blatantly open preaching of the superiority of Christianity to all other religions has ceased; more subtle methods are now in vogue. Thus, for example, commenting on an article by P. K. Mok in the August *Atlantic*, Charles Fiske, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Western New York, writes :—

> I cannot conceive of myself, as a missionary to the peoples of the East, attempting to do my work without sympathetic appreciation of their ancient religions. I think it is a fairly good point to make of these ancient world religions that they are, for their races, what the Hebrew religion was to the Jews, a schoolmaster leading them to Christ. I know that that must be the way that the better type of missionaries present Christianity now.

This is a clear statement by a responsible ecclesiastical authority to which Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Persians and Arabians should pay attention. When philologists and orientalists interpret the religious, philosophical, or mystical texts of Asia there may creep in an indirect bias; but when the missionary of any church denomination interprets Taoistic, Buddhistic, Brahmanical, Zoroastrian, or Islamic doctrines, a direct play of the forces of bias and prejudice must be looked for, if what Bishop Fiske says is true,—and we do not see how it could be otherwise. His very conscience, education, and enterprise would lead the missionary to adopt that superior attitude. No longer can he say, "all heathen religions are of the devil"; more in con-

sonance with the spirit of this age is the view that there is truth and beauty in every religion, and for his own purpose the missionary has to assert, however diplomatically, that Christianity contains the final word of precept on, and the most sublime example of, the Life of spiritual significance. If Christian missionaries were to accord equal status to all religions, including Christianity, the very *raison d'être* of their own existence would cease. But this they cannot do. The monetary and other help they procure from their co-religionists is in the nature of munition to be used by the "soldier of Christ," who is out to demolish the idols of wood and stone which one class of the heathen is said to reverence in his blindness, or to drive another class from the fanaticism which cries the name of its prophet as the highest and the only true one. Those, like ourselves, who befriend the true in every creed and are not blind to the fact that each religion is overlaid with blemishes, can well ask Bishop Fiske a plain question: "In what is Christianity superior to any other religion?" For its one Sermon on the Mount, with its beauty and profound power to inspire, there are half a dozen sermons in the Buddhist Canon and another half a dozen passages from the texts of other religions equally inspiring. Christian theology, philosophy, and mysticism can be easily matched by non-Christian systems; even the life labours of great Christians from Jesus down, can be equalled and even excelled by those of non-Christian prophets, apostles and saints. One of the claims made on behalf of Christianity is that it preached the golden rule for the first time in the history of religious thought. It is only too little known that eras before the first century A. D. that teaching was given. Thus:—

"Cross the passes so difficult to cross; cross wrath with peace; cross untruth with truth."—*Sama Veda.*

"Hatred ceaseth not by hatred at any time; hatred ceaseth by love; this is an old rule."—*Buddhist Dhammapada.*

"Let a man overcome anger by love, evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth."—*Buddhist Dhammapada.*

"If a man attempts to do me wrong I will return to him the protection of my ungrudging love; the more evil comes from him the more good shall go from me."—*Buddhist Sutras.*

"To those who are good I am good and to those who are not good I am also good—and thus all get to be good. With the sincere I am sincere and with the insincere I am sincere—and thus all get to be sincere.—Lao Tzu's *Tao Teh King.*

No, Bishop Fiske's claim will not hold water; his device may encourage those who work for proselytising the "heathen," but it also makes it necessary for the latter to beware of the missionary and his subtle tactics.

卐

Verily if there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither true nor false, neither good nor bad, neither pleasant nor unpleasant.

—*Chhandogya Upanishad*, VII. 2, 1.

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV DECEMBER 1933 No. 12

THE MOTE AND THE BEAM

We have already entered our protest against the Nazi regime in Germany. Through it dangers to peace are gathering strength as described in a Letter from London appearing elsewhere. Bearing in mind that the THE ARYAN PATH has nought to do with the political situation, let the reader remember that it has on the other hand everything to do with its moral aspect. Not only are the Jews persecuted, not only are writers like Feuchtwanger, Ludwig, Mann, Remarque, Toller, Werfel, paying the penalty of their anti-Nazi views and convictions, but a cruel dictatorship in the name of culture is enslaving men and especially women in Germany.

The effect of the legislation, coming into force, on the mind and the morals of the people, is bound to be disastrous. But in condemning the forces of tyranny and the doings of the Nazis in Germany it is often overlooked that similar evils flourish in other countries. What is precipitating in Germany is but a legalized and systematised form of racial arrogance and exclusiveness which has existed in many countries. In weak and narrow minds communal pride, caste-tyranny and racial arrogance fructify. Which nation is free from the sin ?

" Withal man sees it not, will not perceive it, nor will he heed the word of wisdom for he knows it not," yet the beginning of the remedy lies within the reach of everyone. It is by way of the constant thought of loving-kindness alike towards our friends and those who are nominally our enemies. In the article immediately following this, Mr. J. D.

Beresford studies the whole subject in the light of some fundamental principles, and to this we invite our reader's attention.

Let us examine the exceedingly critical topic of the attitude towards Germany at the present time. English, French and other continental journals are making great play just now with their reports of the horrors and brutalities practised under the Hitler régime, such brutalities, to quote a recent instance, as that of the young girl who was exposed and ill-treated at Nuremberg, because,—as alleged on the placard she was compelled to wear,—she had offered herself to a Jew. The result of this publicity is to arouse a sense of anger against the culprit, followed inevitably by that pitiful human expression, the desire to administer punishment. We are so ready to play the rôles of judge, gaoler and executioner, all of which minister to our sense of power. We never seem to realise that the practice of cruelty is the same sin whether it be the act of the avenger or of the original culprit.

Now we would not seek to condone the Nazi method, which like every form of tyranny represents an evil form of Government and one that must finally defeat its own ends,—since tyranny connotes the exercise of forcible interference with individual speech, action and opinion; and no man is ever the better for, or in any way converted by, punishment unless he be truly convinced that he has deserved it. But if we are to understand the phenomenon of Hitlerism, we must seek its causes with an earnest mind, free from prejudice or any preconceived wish to condemn. The common attitude is that indicated by the opening paragraphs of this article, the desire to treat the symptoms in the belief that their forcible suppression must necessarily cure the disease,—as we did in 1919, with the results that now confront us.

Let us begin by regarding Germany for a moment as if that spirit which is most prominent at the present time represented a single human entity. Now the Germany of 1914 had a tendency, it is an exceedingly common one, to megalomania, to the illusion that she had a magnificent destiny. There were ample grounds for such a belief. Industry, concentration and thoroughness in all she undertook had brought great commercial and political success. She had a sincere belief in her own "Kultur," and looking about her she did not doubt that the imposition of her ideals upon her neighbours would ultimately raise them in the scale of civilisation. Indeed it is permissible to argue that if, say, France, Belgium and England had been willing to submit to German rule, the Europe of to-day would have been far happier than it actually is.

Now Germany's belief in herself was not destroyed by the miseries of the War nor by the humiliations that followed, but it

was most tortuously warped. If you severely punish a man for something which he, personally, believes to be a virtue, when he is released he will persist in his old opinions, but his subsequent endeavour to give effect to them will have a new element of resentment and anger which will react upon his ideals. And Germany to-day is seeking to revive the spirit that animated her twenty years ago by methods whose increased ruthlessness is due to the fact that she is still in bonds. The Nazi storm-troops represent the spirit of the aggressive young Germany, unpurged by suffering, intent upon reviving an ideal, from which the finer elements have been eliminated by the struggles of the older generation. But no war—for all wars are ultimately an expression of the will to punishment,—would convince Germany of error; and the adverse criticism that veils a threat will stiffen her pride and increase her anger and resentment.

Moreover her chief fault is, as we should naturally expect it to be, the fault of her enemies also. National pride, egotism, self-seeking, however various their expression, are the dominating motives in every country of Europe. When the World-Economic Conference met last summer in London, its efforts produced no result, simply because the delegates, although they may have visualised a common purpose, dared make no personal sacrifice to obtain world-security. America was the most flagrant offender in this respect, but if the outstanding monetary difficulty with regard to the gold-standard could have been settled, no enduring benefit to the world at large would have been effected by the Conference. The Congress as a whole met to cure symptoms not the generative disease; and each country, when it came to matters of detail, was primarily concerned to protect its own interests. There was never from the beginning any evidence that the Representatives at the Conference were prepared to regard themselves as "members of one body," with a common purpose which could be served only by an earnest desire to free that world-body from its evil humours.

Therefore before we condemn Germany, we must be prepared to put our own houses in order, to ask ourselves whether we, also, do not suffer from a national selfishness which in similar circumstances might be intensified till it appeared as a form of madness? And let us go still further than that and ask whether, if such a thing were conceivable, any nation that found itself, after a candid examination, to be without fault would even then be in a position to judge and condemn another? It is certain that unless this stainless nation happened to be our own, we should be exceedingly loath to entrust it with the functions of an arbitrary judge.

Yet, although these statements may be acceptable to those

readers of THE ARYAN PATH who are able to realise the full implications of all that is meant by such a phrase as the Brotherhood of Man, they would be scorned by the politicians of any country in the world. To make a particular application, let us consider for a moment the use and intention of a phrase, once prominent as a slogan, and one that may very probably be revived in the course of the next year or two. This phrase is "The Mad Dog of Europe".

The intention is admirably clear or it would never have been accepted as a rallying call to the people. The plain intimation is that when a dog goes mad, there is no time to consider side-issues of any sort or kind, the thing is a public danger and must be killed at the earliest posssible moment. But, like all such metaphors, it ignores every analogy except the obvious one.

In the first place it arrogates to the user the right of judgment. The madness in question appears so to us, it may be, solely because we are setting up a different standard of conduct as our criterion of sanity. To the German Nation of 1914, England's entry into the war appeared, also, as an act of madness? The description "a mad Englishman" is still current as an expression of European opinion on British mentality. Who, then, in International politics is to be trusted as a safe diagnostician of a nation's madness? It is obvious, in short, that the analogy is not a true one.

In the second place, must we not ask ourselves at the present time whether we may not have any responsibility for the state of mind which if aggravated may presently appear to us as madness? A bull, for example, may go mad when it is confined, and the confinement of Germany has been the prevailing policy of England and France since 1919. Yet those politicians of whom we spoke just now, would never dream of accepting any responsibility should the confined animal burst free and seek revenge on its gaolers. Once again the rallying call would go forth and we should be told that we have no time to consider who set fire to the house when our lives and property are in danger. Thus it is that the politicians and economists of Europe and America, concerned only with that shifting pattern which displays the immediate effects of their policies, plot their moves and counter-moves in the game that shall bring victory to one player at the expense of another. Incidentally that expense may include the suffering and desolation of many millions of people; but the cost is never counted until the end has been achieved.

Let us return, however, to this question of the world-sickness so many physicians are attempting to doctor, and try to understand something of the essential disease that is responsible for the symptoms. Politically and economically one primary cause of our

illness is the generally accepted principle of retaliation which rules world politics. Retaliation appears to be our single method of governing Europe. When Ireland throws off her last allegiance to England, we retaliate by over-taxing her imports. When Russia tries British subjects, we cancel our trade-agreement with her. Nations perpetually increase the heights of their Tariff "walls" one against the other. Bankrupted by the burden of armaments we increase it to have at hand the means of retaliation should occasion arise. Every nation is vain-gloriously certain of its own right to do this, that or other, and is prepared to uphold it by retaliating against, and thus punishing, those who challenge that right on any grounds whatsoever. Nations here and there in Europe may band themselves together to increase their potentiality for retaliation, but of any real amity between them, any indication of a truly informing spirit of generosity and loving-kindness, there is not a sign.

And it is the lack of those virtues that is the cause of our sickness. Jealousy, resentment and anger will poison the blood of an individual and are not less powerful influences in poisoning the mind of a nation. At the moment the interest of Europe is focussed on Germany, and Hitler's persecution of the Jews is providing, as the invasion of Belgium provided nineteen years ago, a cause for stirring up indignation. The Press, necessarily the voice of vested interests, does not neglect its opportunities. The Scandal has been documented, and should the opportunity occur the evils of the Nazi régime will be proclaimed as a sin against civilisation. We shall be told, and the overwhelming majority of newspaper readers will believe, that the mad dog is loose again, and that there can be neither security nor peace for the world until it is destroyed.

But there is no one with the authority or the far-reaching voice to point out to us that we are all suffering from the same disease, that these germs of jealousy, resentment, anger and self-seeking in our blood may at any moment quicken to a fever which will lead to those abuses of War by the side of which the abuses of Hitlerism will sink into insignificance. Is there, indeed, a nation in Europe which is so guiltless in intention that it can respond to the invitation "Let him that is without sin cast the first stone"? For the truth inherent in every important religion, and never put into practice by those who guide the destinies of nations, is that ultimately it will be the meek and not the self-seekers who shall inherit the earth. And so long as our rulers continue to practise their perpetual policy of aggression and retaliation, the peoples of the whole world must continue to suffer in the flesh and in the spirit.

J. D. BERESFORD

PIGMENT AND PROGRESS

[C. E. Russell, LL. D., journalist and author, was a member of the special Diplomatic Mission sent by the United States to Russia in 1917, and a member of the President's Industrial Commission in 1919. He is well known as a courageous champion of unpopular causes and is a friend of the coloured people.—EDS.]

I remember that when I was a boy my father had in his library a huge illustrated tome entitled "*Uncivilized Races, or Natural History of Man*," in which the author attempted to stratify mankind into high, lower, low and lowest. In the course of this genial task he came upon the native bushmen or aborigines of Australia, whom he classed, not really knowing anything about them, as among the lowest. So then, here is a good chance to test out the stratification theory and see how it actually works.

The first time I went to Australia I carried with me the full impression of the "Uncivilized Races" man and looked to find specimens of humanity so low that I, being Nordic, might reasonably, upon viewing them, refresh and renew a sense of superiority that other travel had left but frayed and frazzled.

I found a people with extremely dark skins, black hair, black piercing eyes, and ways of life different from my own, but when I came to the theory of superiority I had great difficulty to apply it and make it come out satisfactorily. It was true enough that I knew things the bushmen did not know. I knew the difference betwen the gerund and the supine. I could conjugate the verb *dico*, I remembered that nouns of the fourth declension take the genitive in *us*, I knew the precious truth about the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, all of which the bushman knew not at all. But on the other hand he knew many things of which I was as totally ignorant as he of Latin. He could stand and look over a field and discern upon it the tracks of a wild animal when for all my straining of eyeballs I could see no such matter. He could look at the bark of a tree and amid a million claw-scratches read whether the animal that lived in that tree was at home or abroad. He could take the leaf of a tree, fold it and blow upon it and discourse excellent music. He could manage the weet-weet and the nulla-nulla, and all my efforts, although an old base-ball player, merely covered me with ridicule and mortification. And finally I was forced to admit that of all the inhabitants of the earth he, alone, this poor benighted heathen, had been witty enough to invent an ammunition that would return to its user. How about that, blue eyes and white skin, proud of the rifle and all the rest? You with all your superiority have never paralleled that achievement.

Days I spent in trying to solve

its mystery. Under careful tutelage I arrived at a state of proficiency in which I could throw the boomerang and make it come back after a fashion, but never like my instructor. He stood and threw and picked up the weapon from between his feet, and all as if he had it under some spell or enchantment.

Suppose then I was moved to scorn him because he knew not of the genitive of the fourth declension or the delectable truth about the hypotenuse. Instantly he could retort upon me with equal scorn because I knew not the weet-weet, the nulla-nulla or the boomerang. And there was no possible escape from the fact that one scorning would be exactly as well based and as reasonable as the other.

Because, as to the things I knew and he knew not, and as to the things he knew and I knew not, one observation was clear and certain. I had learned about the genitive and the hypotenuse only to meet the demands of my economic environment. I had not learned them because of my innate superiority but because by learning them I could the better obtain my livelihood in the world wherein I must dwell. But my bushman friend for exactly the same reason had learned facility with the weet-weet, the nulla-nulla and the boomerang. Each was driven by economic needs to seek the equipment best suited for the struggle he must make to live. The equipment of one would have been useless in the environment of the other; the equipment of one was exactly as necessary and honourable as the equipment of the other. Where, then, was superiority?

And if I sought refuge in some other notion that because my grandfather had known about the gerund and the hypotenuse, and the Bushman's grandfather had been blessed with no such riches, I had inherited a greater capability, behold how foolish that became! For there in the bush stood a school with an Oxford honours man at its head and three or four hundred children of black Bushmen for pupils, and this Oxford honours man testified that the average mentality, receptivity and capability of these black-skinned descendants of boomerang throwers were at least as good as the average mentality, receptivity and capability of a similar number of children of the same age in his own country. And all the tests we made and all our investigations confirmed this statement.

Exactly the same thing I have seen in the South Sea islands, among Papuans as much as among Polynesians.

But if there is no essential difference in capability or potentiality, if pigment is not really fatal to intelligence or worth, if development takes the lines of economic need and has nothing to do with straight hair or kinky, if brains are not geographically distributed and you cannot ascertain a man's character by

finding the latitude and longitude of his birth-place, what is there left as a foundation for racial vauntings ?

Achievements, says Nordic. Yes ? What achievements ? We will take those of the people that boast most in this respect. Being Nordic myself, I can speak on the subject with candour and no offence. What are these achievements of which we are so proud as conferring title clear to the first place in the sun ? Well, looking judicially at the record, I should say they consisted chiefly in some form of ruffianism. In the ruthless grabbing and holding of other people's lands we have surpassed all competitors. Admitting this in itself to be of the order of merit, it is not the least demonstration of an innate superiority. When we pretend that it is we are merely showing an egotism as gross as ignorant. The ground upon which I sit while writing this piece, for instance, was wrested from its possessors by certain bandit ancestors of mine that happened to have the bigger weapons and the harder consciences. But their equipment in these regards was no reward of a peculiar deserving. Economic conditions and a terrible climate in their own land merely drove them forth to practise burglary in more favoured regions.

The history of my country affords the most cogent illustration of the fallacy of the whole racial theory. When human slavery existed here it was ardently defended (by those that made profits from it) on the ground that the slaves, being people of dark complexions, were necessarily inferior. Some argued earnestly to show that Negroes had no souls, and all held that they were so little above the level of brutes that they were to be viewed in the same light as horses and mules, for beyond question God had so created them that they might be the servitors of the superior white man. Clergymen proved this from the Scriptures, eloquently preached it in their pulpits, set it forth in innumerable books. Then to make sure that it was true and should remain true the slave owners passed laws that made the teaching of Negroes a crime. Readers in these days burst into laughter when they encounter this historic and sardonic jest, but it is in truth no more comical than the rest of the doctrine of superiority. In this instance, the fallacy was exhibited to the world in a way that should be memorable. The slaves were freed by a costly and terrible war, no other means appearing. In the seventy years that have since elapsed, the Americans of what is called African descent, although handicapped by a stupid and bestial hatred, and confronted with every conceivable obstacle, have made greater progress than has ever been recorded of any other people in a similar length of time. I mean progress in all the ways of civilization, in education, in all cultural relations, in material

well-being, in the owning of property, in the manifestation of character and worth. In seventy years they have utterly shattered and shredded the whole theory of inferior and backward races by making this marvellous record. With only one-fifth, or thereabouts, of the opportunity that should have been given to them they have done this, and in the light of this achievement, Nordic glory seems dim and the phrase "Inferior Peoples" something to be banished from human speech.

There are no inferior peoples, there are no superior peoples. There are only people.

CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL

THE THEATRE AS TEACHER

Most popular plays owe their success to their appeal to senses and desires. Those with thought behind them too often pose a problem and leave it unanswered; they purge men's hearts with pity, but do not strengthen them with wisdom. Occasionally, however is found a play such as "The Distaff Side" by John Van Druten, produced in London, September, 1933. Here is the portrait,—beautifully played by Sybil Thorndike—of a woman who has realized that in the giving up of personal claims lies the true fulfilment of life. The others profess to pity her for living only in and for those around her, without any "life of her own". Yet when troubles come, one after the other instinctively turns to lean on her strength, to beg alms of her wisdom. And, without any condemnation, any display of advice, she brings them to find the solution for themselves.

The serene dignity of her self-forgetfulness, her courage and her loving sympathy that is free from all emotionalism, shine out against the selfish ways of the bothersome old grandmamma,—a drastic example of the effects of "living one's own life" —against the grumbling, the irresponsibility and uncertainty of the other characters. Yet they are all credible living people, whom one may meet any day.

The purpose of the mystery dramas was to teach the nature of man, "with accompanying demonstrations," to those who could understand. The modern stage will have far to go before it can stand any comparison, but meanwhile such plays as this are a step forward. For they make manifest, by means of living example, the abstract ideas of unselfishness, impersonality, and all the others that are so difficult to grasp as abstractions. It is easier to feel the practical inspiration of the embodied ideal than to strain after the immaterial idea. Here may lie one line of right development of the theatre as teacher, since we know that example is of greater worth than exhortation.

W. E. W.

THIRUVALLUVAR

[**R. K. Narayan Swami** writes of the sage Thiruvalluvar, the creator of the famous Tamil classic the *Sacred Kural*.—EDS.]

Most of the facts concerning Thiruvalluvar's life are vague where they are not controversial, and tradition is our main source of information. He was born in Madura, lived in Mylapore, Madras, and was a weaver by profession. He belonged to the Valluva caste, a caste whose profession in the ancient days was to announce the commands of kings by the beating of drums tied to the backs of elephants. Thiruvalluvar's period is fixed by a series of chronological events. He had a friend, a rich merchant of the name of Elela Singan, the sixth descendant of a Chola prince who, as recorded in Mahavamsa, attacked Ceylon with a large army at the very end of the 30th century of the Kali Era. Reckoning 25 years for a generation this would give us the 32nd century of the same era (first century A.D.) as Elela Singan's date. And synchronizing with this is the fact that *Kural* was first presented before the great Tamil Sanga of Madura in the reign of the Pandya king, Uggeraperuvaludhi (*circa* 125 A.D.).

Thiruvalluvar on the death of his wife Vasuki renounced the world and became a sannyasin. Tradition has many tales of Vasuki's perfections as a wife. Thiruvalluvar once asked her to cook for him a handful of nails and other iron pieces. She did as she was told, without the slightest hesitation or surprise. At another time, when he was at his morning meal of cold rice and she was drawing water from a well, he suddenly called out to her and complained to her that the rice was hot. She immediately ran to his side, leaving the water-pot half drawn over the well, and fanned the rice. It is said that steam rose from the rice, and that the water-pot stood in mid-air just as she had left it! Once he demanded a lamp in broad daylight to look for something, and his wife lit a lamp and brought it. These tales have a touch of fancy and exaggeration; nevertheless, their significance is that in Vasuki he had a wife who conformed to the ideals of wifehood he sets forth in *Kural*, and as a result his home life was one of great felicity and happiness, the importance of which he so much emphasizes in his chapter on Home Life.

Though this is all that we are in a position to know about Thiruvalluvar's life, his great work, *Kural*, is available to us just as he wrote it (clarified and arranged some twelve centuries later by his ablest of commentators, Parimelalakar) and offers us an approach to something more valuable than biographical details —the personality of a great man.

It is a tribute to the universality

of the spirit of *Kural* that at various times different religions and sects, Jainism, Buddhism, Vaishnavaism, and Saivaism, have claimed the author as their own. And one or two Christian scholars who have studied and translated *Kural* find in it the echo of the Sermon on the Mount. It is difficult to determine any one religion that Thiruvalluvar specially favoured. In *Kural* there are echoes of the finest principles of various religions. We can only conclude that the book is a synthesis and that when he wrote it Thiruvalluvar's mind and vision had out-grown geographical and racial boundaries.

Kural is an immense work in 1330 couplets, touching all phases of human existence. It is conceived on a vast plan. The four great "Objectives of Life" are *Aram*, *Porul*, *Inbam*, and *Veedu*, corresponding respectively to the *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kama*, and *Moksha*, of Sanskrit. Thiruvalluvar has divided his book into three parts devoting one part for each of the first three. He says nothing about *Veedu* or *Moksha* since we know nothing definite about it, and since it is but the result of perfection in the first three.

The plan of the book reflects Truth in all its aspects and proportions. And the division into chapters and sections is based on a perfect logical sequence.

God is the First Cause. Hence his must be the first place in everything. The first section of the introductory chapter is on God. The book opens with the couplet :—

"A" is the starting-point of the world of sound :
Even so is the Ancient One Supreme the starting-point of all that exists.*

God created the world, but, for its well-being, rain is indispensable. The second section is in praise of rain. The third section is on the glory and greatness of those who have renounced the world. Rain makes life, the bare physical life, possible on this earth. But it is only the great seer who has no attachments that can make life fruitful by explaining to mankind *Aram*, *Porul*, etc.

Aram or *Dharma* is divided into *Illaram*, and *Thuravaram*, the former the qualities and duties of a man of the world, and the latter those of an ascetic. *Illaram* deals with the typical family man, who, having chosen a dutiful, loving wife, leads a life of service and goodness practising steadfastly high principles like Charity, honouring learned people and ascetics, and so on. Thiruvalluvar realizes the scope for the perfectibility of self in a well-ordered social existence with the family as the unit. *Thuravaram* deals with the ideals of one who realizes the impermanence of this life, and that birth only multiplies birth and misery, and that the greatest bliss is not being born, but this can be attained only by severing all attachment.

The central idea in all Thiruvalluvar's teachings is that there

* The stanzas marked with asterisks are V. V. S. Aiyar's translation.

is both Good and Evil, and that good always results in good, and evil brings a succession of evils. "Since evil begets evil, evil must be feared more than fire." Evil must be eschewed in thought, word, and deed. Since the slightest evil in thought results in evil in action, it is the purity of thought that must be striven for. The three basic evils that can take root in the mind are, Envy, Covetousness, and Anger. It is not enough if the mind alone is kept clean. Purity of word is insisted on. Thiruvalluvar analyses evil in word as: useless words, damaging words, words that hurt, and words that are untrue. Words that are of no avail to *Aram, Porul, Inbam*, or *Veedu*, are useless words. And he calls those who indulge in such words, the chaff among mankind. As regards back-biting, it is better to die than to talk ill of another behind his back. Words that hurt must not be uttered; the avoidance of them is the easiest of virtues to practise: for the performance of charity one needs money or other possessions, but to utter kind words one need have nothing. And the last category of words that are evil, the untrue words—Thiruvalluvar holds that no word is true or untrue by itself, but must be judged by its results; a word is good if its result is good. Evil deeds are: causing pain to another being, killing, etc. The creatures of this world are born and live according to the Supreme Will of God, and any kind of killing is a sin. Mostly, killing is for food. Thiruvalluvar shudders at the thought that any one should take the flesh of another being to nourish his own flesh. If the reign of love and kindness is to be established in this world, non-killing must become universal.

If Evil decreases, Good will grow and develop. If Virtue is to flourish, Love must be fostered. Love is something indefinably innate. Those who have love will live for others:

Those who love not live only for themselves;
As to those that love, they will give their very bones for helping others.*

Those who have love utter sweet words, and their greatest suffering is seeing others suffer; they possess humility, honour, balance, and forbearance. Even when they are harmed they will not do harm in return. Bearing patiently the evil that others do is good, but to forget it completely is better, and better still is returning good for evil. Just as love is indispensable to foster *Dharma*, to root out evil it is no less indispensable.

Thuravaram or asceticism is discussed in two divisions: (1) *Vrudham* and (2) *Gnanam*.

Vrudham is the process of cleansing our inner being and preparing for the dawn of *Gnanam* or Divine Wisdom. The subjects under *Vrudham* are:—

(1) *Arul*. *Arul* has no exact equivalent in English. It may be translated as some quality which is a combination of love, kindness, and mercy.

"This world is lost to those who have no *porul* (wealth)

The next is lost to those who have
no *arul*."

(2) Abstinence from meat.

(3) *Tavam* : Hardening and disciplining the body by rigour so that the mind may be the master of the senses.

(4) The sinfulness of the weak one who allows himself to be overcome by sensual desires even after renouncing the world :

"One who sins with the cloak of ascetic on
Is like a hunter trapping birds from behind bushes."

Other subjects are, non-covetousness, truth in speech, curbing and killing anger, guarding against causing harm to another being, and non-killing.

When all this is done the inner being is cleansed and *Gnanam* dawns on the mind spontaneously. In the next four sections Thiruvalluvar explains *Gnanam* : Realizing the Impermanence of Things, Renunciation, Realization of Truth ("To separate the true from the false in everything, whatever its nature may be, is the part of a wise understanding" *), and Non-Desire.

The second part of the book on *Porul* or *Artha* starts with the king. Just as God is at the head of *Aram*, the king is at the head of *Porul* or wealth. Thiruvalluvar sets forth in detail the mental equipment of a king, the virtues he must practise and vices he must avoid. A king who practises virtues without swerving even by a hair's-breadth may be likened to God himself. He must be of a strong mind, full of wisdom and enthusiasm. He must be easily accessible to all who wish to see him. He must be kind in speech, and rule without pomp, meanness, or conceit. He must gather around him good company. Like the rain dropping from the sky, which is colourless but takes colour of the land it falls upon, a king's intellectual and spiritual quality will be according to the worth of those that surround him.

Acquiring wealth and waging war are the lawful occupations of a king. But there are two kinds of war, the just and the unjust. A good king must always avoid the latter.

Even with all safeguards and equipment the king cannot earn victory if he is a tyrant. A king who identifies himself with his subjects will succeed in anything that he undertakes.

It is not the lance that bringeth victory unto the Prince : it is rather his sceptre, and that provided it is straight and leaneth not to either side.*

For a king to rule successfully wealth is indispensable. Custom duties, buried treasure, escheat, spoils of war, and subsidies, must go to the king.

The king must select a minister after careful deliberation. Ability to talk well is an important quality in a minister. He must be able to talk with a thorough understanding of the assembly he is addressing. He must have had a sound training in logic. A minister must not nod his head to everything that the king says. He must advise the king in such a way as to do good both to his master and to the people. He must study the king's moods and express clearly his own thoughts, and even if a deaf ear be turned to the advice, he must, with his

is both Good and Evil, and that good always results in good, and evil brings a succession of evils. "Since evil begets evil, evil must be feared more than fire." Evil must be eschewed in thought, word, and deed. Since the slightest evil in thought results in evil in action, it is the purity of thought that must be striven for. The three basic evils that can take root in the mind are, Envy, Covetousness, and Anger. It is not enough if the mind alone is kept clean. Purity of word is insisted on. Thiruvalluvar analyses evil in word as: useless words, damaging words, words that hurt, and words that are untrue. Words that are of no avail to *Aram, Porul, Inbam*, or *Veedu*, are useless words. And he calls those who indulge in such words, the chaff among mankind. As regards back-biting, it is better to die than to talk ill of another behind his back. Words that hurt must not be uttered; the avoidance of them is the easiest of virtues to practise: for the performance of charity one needs money or other possessions, but to utter kind words one need have nothing. And the last category of words that are evil, the untrue words—Thiruvalluvar holds that no word is true or untrue by itself, but must be judged by its results; a word is good if its result is good. Evil deeds are: causing pain to another being, killing, etc. The creatures of this world are born and live according to the Supreme Will of God, and any kind of killing is a sin. Mostly, killing is for food. Thiruvalluvar shudders at the thought that any one should take the flesh of another being to nourish his own flesh. If the reign of love and kindness is to be established in this world, non-killing must become universal.

If Evil decreases, Good will grow and develop. If Virtue is to flourish, Love must be fostered. Love is something indefinably innate. Those who have love will live for others:

Those who love not live only for themselves;
As to those that love, they will give their very bones for helping others.*

Those who have love utter sweet words, and their greatest suffering is seeing others suffer; they possess humility, honour, balance, and forbearance. Even when they are harmed they will not do harm in return. Bearing patiently the evil that others do is good, but to forget it completely is better, and better still is returning good for evil. Just as love is indispensable to foster *Dharma*, to root out evil it is no less indispensable.

Thuravaram or asceticism is discussed in two divisions: (1) *Vrudham* and (2) *Gnanam*.

Vrudham is the process of cleansing our inner being and preparing for the dawn of *Gnanam* or Divine Wisdom. The subjects under *Vrudham* are:—

(1) *Arul*. *Arul* has no exact equivalent in English. It may be translated as some quality which is a combination of love, kindness, and mercy.

"This world is lost to those who have no *porul* (wealth)

The next is lost to those who have no *arul*."

(2) Abstinence from meat.

(3) *Tavam* : Hardening and disciplining the body by rigour so that the mind may be the master of the senses.

(4) The sinfulness of the weak one who allows himself to be overcome by sensual desires even after renouncing the world :

"One who sins with the cloak of ascetic on
Is like a hunter trapping birds from behind bushes."

Other subjects are, non-covetousness, truth in speech, curbing and killing anger, guarding against causing harm to another being, and non-killing.

When all this is done the inner being is cleansed and *Gnanam* dawns on the mind spontaneously. In the next four sections Thiruvalluvar explains *Gnanam* : Realizing the Impermanence of Things, Renunciation, Realization of Truth ("To separate the true from the false in everything, whatever its nature may be, is the part of a wise understanding" *), and Non-Desire.

The second part of the book on *Porul* or *Artha* starts with the king. Just as God is at the head of *Aram*, the king is at the head of *Porul* or wealth. Thiruvalluvar sets forth in detail the mental equipment of a king, the virtues he must practise and vices he must avoid. A king who practises virtues without swerving even by a hair's-breadth may be likened to God himself. He must be of a strong mind, full of wisdom and enthusiasm. He must be easily accessible to all who wish to see him. He must be kind in speech, and rule without pomp, meanness, or conceit. He must gather around him good company. Like the rain dropping from the sky, which is colourless but takes colour of the land it falls upon, a king's intellectual and spiritual quality will be according to the worth of those that surround him.

Acquiring wealth and waging war are the lawful occupations of a king. But there are two kinds of war, the just and the unjust. A good king must always avoid the latter.

Even with all safeguards and equipment the king cannot earn victory if he is a tyrant. A king who identifies himself with his subjects will succeed in anything that he undertakes.

It is not the lance that bringeth victory unto the Prince : it is rather his sceptre, and that provided it is straight and leaneth not to either side.*

For a king to rule successfully wealth is indispensable. Custom duties, buried treasure, escheat, spoils of war, and subsidies, must go to the king.

The king must select a minister after careful deliberation. Ability to talk well is an important quality in a minister. He must be able to talk with a thorough understanding of the assembly he is addressing. He must have had a sound training in logic. A minister must not nod his head to everything that the king says. He must advise the king in such a way as to do good both to his master and to the people. He must study the king's moods and express clearly his own thoughts, and even if a deaf ear be turned to the advice, he must, with his

powers of argument, be able eventually to persuade. When the king is doing a good act, the minister must encourage him and when he turns to the path of evil, the minister must be able to prevent him from following it. In short, the minister must act as the custodian of the king's *dharma*.

The clerk who knows the auspicious and the inauspicious hours and days and advises the king before he undertakes any important work, the commander-in-chief, the ambassador (only a person of high birth, possessing wisdom, judgment, and shrewdness, must be chosen for this), and the chief Intelligence officer, are all important officers. Thiruvalluvar calls the Intelligence officer the eye of the king. He must be able to keep the king well-informed of all that is happening in his own and other countries. Thiruvalluvar enjoins upon the king the caution that any reward or remuneration given to the Intelligence officer must be done in secret.

Thiruvalluvar next explains what a country should be. For the people to live in safety the country must have the four fortifications of water, land, mountain, and forest. The people must possess the qualities of high birth, honesty, truthfulness, charity, and kindness.

> Love to all, sensitiveness to shame, complaisance, indulgence to the faults of others, and truthfulness, these Five are the pillars that support the edifice of a noble character.*

People must have wisdom and endeavour. Though the endeavours that men can make are several, Thiruvalluvar places agriculture above all the rest.

> They alone live who live by tilling the ground: all others but follow in their train and eat only the bread of dependence.*

Thiruvalluvar has the capacity to see life as a whole. It is especially in the second part of the book, *Porul*, that he shows it by his keen examination and analysis of even the most minute branches of our life. His words are for the king as well as for the lowliest of us. To him every one is an integral part of the social existence. Every one has his place in the general scheme, and every place offers infinite scope for perfection and growth. The perfection of the whole depends on the perfection of the parts, and it is into the nature and needs of these parts that he goes with a wonderful thoroughness, analysis, and comprehensiveness. In a couplet he defines *nadu* or country—

> A *nadu* is one where peasants, the wealthy, and the great, live together.

In every walk of life Thiruvalluvar sees the possibility of an ideal existence whether it is the king, or the peasant, or the ascetic, he is thinking about. *Kural* preaches an idealism that is intensely practical, and one that is both a means of attaining happiness in this world and a preparation for the next.

R. K. NARAYAN SWAMI

THE ORIGIN AND GENESIS OF SPEECH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ROMAN RELIGIOUS BELIEF


[**Professor Thomas FitzHugh** has headed the School of Latin of the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, U. S. A., since 1899. His researches in classical philology have taken him to Rome and Pompeii, Greece and the Orient. He is the author of numerous books, including *The Philosophy of the Humanities*, *Indoeuropean Rhythm*, and *Triumpus: The Indoeuropean or Pyrrhic Stress Accent in Antiquity: Its Rhythm, Meter, and Musical Tone.*

In connection with the Spear cryptograph presented in this article, a Hindu correspondence is of interest. The symbol of Mars was the Stayed Spear-Point (*Statum Verber*): one title of *Karttikeya*, the personification of the power of the Logos and the Hindu God of War, is *Saktidhara*, the "Spear-Holder." The Hindu counterpart of the Logos is Śabda-Brahman. The Words of Power are many in the Sanskrit tongue, called from the olden days, "language of the gods"; Mantras are well known in Hindu religious literature, and the Primary Sacred Word is AUM, which is said to represent the Nameless Name or the Ineffable Name.

"Kwan-Yin, or the '*Divine Voice*'...is a synonym of the *Verbum* or the Word: 'Speech,' as the expression of thought. Thus may be traced the connection with, and even the origin of the Hebrew *Bath-Kol*, the 'daughter of the Divine Voice,' or *Verbum*, or the male and female Logos, the 'Heavenly Man' or Adam Kadmon, who is at the same time Sephira. The latter was surely anticipated by the Hindu Vâch, the goddess of Speech, or of the Word. For Vâch—the daughter and the female portion, as is stated, of Brahmâ, one 'generated by the gods'—is, in company with Kwan-Yin, with Isis (also the *daughter*, wife and *sister* of Osiris) and other goddesses, the female *Logos*, so to speak, the goddess of the *active* forces in Nature, the Word, Voice or Sound, and Speech.....Vach and Kwan-Yin are both the magic potency of Occult sound in Nature and Ether—which 'Voice' calls forth Sien-Tchan, the illusive form of the Universe out of Chaos and the Seven Elements."—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 137]


Semitic belief deifies the breath of life, Aryan the breath of speech, or the voice of stress in Aryan utterance. It was called the count stress, or *Iambos*, and was early recognized as the creative breath of Aryan speech: *Ia. mia é phoné é bia* 'the One Breath, the Count Stress' (Suidas); *hé gar koiné ton anthropon phoné Ia kaleitai* 'the common breath of men is called Ia, or One-count' (Etymologus Magnus). Its sacred character appears in the ancient use of its etymon *omphé* as 'voice divine' and especially in the cult-words it has given rise to: *Thriambos* 'Three in One voice,' Tripudium 'Three in One stress,' *Dithyrambos* 'Double-Three in One voice,' and our Christian Trinity 'Three in One and One in Three,'—which was thus philological before it became theological and is Aryan in origin and not Semitic; Triumpus, like Tripudium, is the Latin form of our Aryan 'voice divine,' or sacred voice of stress, the Indoeuropean accent, glorious rhythmical, metrical, and musical breath of Aryan speech.

Thus it is our ancestral Aryan pyrrhic or tripudic accent that is glorified in sacred dance and song, in Hellenic *Pyrrhiché* and *Thriambos*, in Italic Tripudium and Triumpus, and its dynamic movement is everywhere 'One and the Same'.



We can therefore no longer be content with the derivation *iapto* > *iambos* and *reo* > *rhythmos*, but must prefer *Ia-omphé* 'One-Voice Divine' > Iambos, *Thriambos*, *Dithyrambos*, and *Tri-omphé* > Triumpus, and must therefore derive our concepts of number and rhythm from *Thriambos* > by metathesis and reduction, *arithmos* and duthriambos > by metathesis and reduction, dithyrambos > by further metathesis and reduction, *rhythmos* respectively. Thus we get behind the scene of Aristotle's philology, the indefeasible foundation of all Indoeuropean philology: his *phoné* is the old *omphê* or stress sound, his *arithmos* is the old *thriambos* or creative voice of stress, and his *rhythmos* is the old *dithyrambos* or double accent: the old concepts of religion are become in him the new concepts of science. Hence in Aristotle the *arithmos* or creative voice of stress is all in all, the old *Iambos*-Triumpus or Aryan accent, and rhythm is its double count, metre its measure or duration, and *prosodia*-accentus its tone; and the syllable itself is its creature, the mere compass of its phonetic grasp (*syllabê*), and not the otiose and utterly falsifying convention of *metrikoi egoun grammatikoi*, which was born of an unrighteous hate of the ancestral voice, and has stultified philology ever since.


Thus our summary inquiry into the origin and genesis of speech from the point of view of Roman religious belief reveals the primordial Aryan apotheosis of accent as the creative breath of speech in God and man, the Gospel of Indoeuropean linguistics and philology, the secret of St. John's 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God: the same was in the beginning with God,' and of the sacred Trinity or Triumph of Christ, the nameless *Ia* of Europe and *Aum* of India,—the mystery of stress: *Liber de Accentibus*, Keil III.519.22, Ad accentum qui in dictionibus necessarius est transeamus cuius mysterium, praebente deo vitam, latius tractemus: 'We have to come to the accent that is the basis of speech, and we must discuss its *sacred significance* more at large, if God vouchsafes us life'. The Aryan sacred voice of Stress is the key to the cryptograph of the Spear, the earliest Roman sacred dance, song, and prayer in one, the Carmen Fratrum Arvalium, or Chant of the Field Brethren: Omnes foris exierunt; ibi sacerdotes clusi succincti libellis acceptis carmen descindentes tripodaverunt in verba haec—


Enos Lases iuvate
Enos Lases iuvate
Enos Lases iuvate
Neve luem ruem Marmar sinas incurrere in pleores
Neve luem ruem Marmar sinas incurrere in pleores
Neve luem ruem Marmar sinas incurrere in pleores
Satur fu feri Mars limen sali sta verber
Satur fu feri Mars limen sali sta verber
Satur fu feri Mars limen sali sta verber
Semunis alternei advocabitis conctos
Semunis alternei advocabitis conctos
Semunis alternei advocabitis conctos
Enos Marmar iuvato
Enos Marmar iuvato
Enos Marmar iuvato
Triumpe Triumpe
Triumpe Triumpe
Triumpe.

The Aryan sacred voice of stress in the Sign of the Spear! "All attendants withdrew; then the priesthood shut in and girt up received the scrolls and chanting down the page danced to the rhythm of these words:—'Help us, ye Lares (thrice). Let not blight and ruin, dear Mars, rush upon the people (thrice). Have thy fill, strike, O Mars, leap over the border, plant the spear (thrice). The Semones all ye shall call in turn to our aid (thrice). Thou shalt help us, dear Mars (thrice). O Rhythmic Voice, O Rhythmic Voice (twice). O Rhythmic Voice of Stress (once).' "

The strange lesson of this our earliest Aryan monument of religion and science is nothing less than the cult of the stress breath of Aryan speech as the Rhythmical Voice Divine or Trinity of Stress,—of the Indo-european pyrrhic or tripudic rhythmical accent as a numen of worship, of prayer and praise, in the earliest tradition of our ethnic stock, of rhythmical stress as the generic creative breath of God and man. I have exploited the tremendous significance of this revelation for Aryan linguistics and philology in my Bulletin of the School of Latin, University of Virginia, 1908– , and I have been glad of the opportunity offered me by THE ARYAN PATH to communicate my results to the Indian half of our Indoeuropean world as I have been doing for a quarter of a century to the Western half. The results of my inquiry have been utterly radical and subversive of current doctrine and opinion, but they are being gradually understood and accepted, for, as Eduard Meyer remarks (Gesch.d. Alter. I. 1. 217), Vor einer richtig interpretierten Urkunde stürzen alle ihr widersprechenden Angaben einer Tradition, mochte sie noch so zuverlassig erscheinen, rettungslos zusammen.

The religious significance of the pyrrhic stress is sufficiently explained by its great strength, sameness, and ethnic universality: it is 'One and the Same', *Ia. mia é phoné é bia*, throughout the Aryan world:



Accent is the creative conscious breath of speech proceeding from lungs, larynx, and oral cavity, and not the formal syllabic fiction of our falsified tradition. It is a psychophysical, and not, as we have been taught, a philological activity. It is wholly outside of

and independent of syllables and words: the syllable is its creature, the mere scope of its dynamic reach, and not the conventional thing of the *metrikoi egoun grammatikoi*, who falsified it over the very ashes of Aristotle. *Perainetai de arithmo panta*, said he, 'Everything in speech is determined by the count-breath': syllable counting, musical accent, quantitative rhythm are unreal and fictitious constructions of misguided linguistics and philology: Stress is all in all, stress-syllable, stress-rhythm, stress-metre, stress-*prosodia*-accentus. The persistence of Old-Greek and Old-Indian sounds is evidence of a powerful, not of weak, accentuation in early Aryan times: not before St. Augustine's Psalmus Abecedarius had the pyrrhic accent abated its bisyllabic strength, and the Lautveranderungen in the history of the Indoeuropean dialects are evidence of the slow weakening of the Aryan sacred voice, and not of an impossible and unheard of generatio aequivoca of stress, as erroneously assumed by the Vergleichende Grammatik.

THOMAS FITZHUGH

THE REAL AND THE RATIONAL

The Real is rational because it is Self-conscious. That is why Shankara says "The Atman can be realized through refined Reason." This reason, however, is above mind which is "the great Slayer of the Real," and its unfoldment is a process which works out *pari passu* with the corresponding annihilation of the mind. It is something like light that replaces and transforms into itself whatever was dark before. The mind-slain Real shines in its pristine Immortal nature when a greater hero slays the slayer. The hero is the divine soul in us, the true Kshattriya, who vanquishes the lower mind, the lower self, and turns the human body into a sanctuary for holy deeds a veritable Kurukshetra. And what is his weapon? "The strong axe of dispassion." And here is another clue. Mind is passion. To free it from passion is to rebuild its nature which would make it an expressive instrument of the divinity within. Because of this fresh acquisition of higher nature the mind becomes newly born as true Reason which participates in the character of the Real. The Hegelian "reason" seems to include sense *as sense* even when comprehended in a higher synthesis. The Esoteric "Reason" includes sense but only as transmuted into super-sense. The comprehensive aspect of the Hegelian Reality is external; in the Esoteric philosophy the comprehension is intensive. The Real is Rational, but only in the Esoteric sense.

D. G. VINOD

ORPHEUS AND INDIA

[**C. R. King** formerly Boden Sanskrit Scholar in the University of Oxford is the translator of *The Cloud Messenger of Kalidas.* In this article he shows the identity of Orphic and Indian teachings and upholds the view that Orphic ideas came from India.—EDS.]

In an article in THE ARYAN PATH for June 1932, I set forth an argument for the historicity of Orpheus as a prophet of the Oneness of God. It may be well here to elaborate the outline then given of his doctrine, and to show what subsidiary tenets followed from what I hold, on the authority of Plato, to have been his main contribution to the theology of Greece.

The scholiast on the passage of Plato (Laws 715 D) previously quoted, says :—

> He speaks of the old tradition, which is as follows: "Zeus is the beginning, Zeus is the middle, and from Zeus all things have been fashioned."

Longer quotations of similar tendency are found in several authors, and a translation of a typical passage is given in H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, p. 263, though the text there seems to be made up from the version given in the tract "Concerning the Universe" attributed to Aristotle, and a longer one quoted by the Church Father Eusebius from the Neoplatonist Porphyry. The following is from Aristotle :—

> Zeus was born the first, and Zeus the last, he of the shining thunderbolt. Zeus is the head, and Zeus the middle, and from Zeus all things are fashioned. Zeus was born a male. Zeus is an immortal maiden. Zeus is the foundation of earth and the starry heaven. Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus the onrush of unwearied fire. Zeus is the root of the sun, Zeus the sun and the moon. Zeus is the King, Zeus himself the primal author of all things.

Some of the above lines are found in Eusebius' passage, which goes on :—

> One the body of the King, wherein all these things are rolled, fire and water and earth and air, both day and night and wisdom, first begetter and Love that is rich in Joy for all these things lie in the great body of Zeus, and his head for you to see and his fair face is the shimmering heaven, about which his golden hairs, the twinkling stars, hang in all their beauty, and two golden bulls' horns on both sides, the rising and the setting, the paths of the gods of heaven, and his eyes the sun and the moon that cometh to meet it: and his royal mind that knoweth not falsehood is the immortal air, wherewith he heareth and perceiveth all things, and there is no voice nor speech nor noise nor utterance which escapeth the ear of Zeus the son of Kronos excelling in might: such an immortal head he hath and perception: and such is his body fashioned, radiant, infinite, unshaken, that knoweth not trembling, stout-limbed, of might exceeding.

It is clear from such a passage why a late grammarian, Joannes Philoponus, says that Plato followed Orpheus in making the world a god. Plato in the *Timaeus* calls the world a "happy god," and in another dialogue "a living creature with understanding from him who fashioned it in the begin-

ning": whether Orpheus himself held such doctrine we cannot categorically determine, but there is something very like it in the "old tradition" of the Laws, and it is clearly developed by his followers in Eusebius' quotation. These passages illustrate very clearly the lack of distinction in the Greek mind between monotheism and pantheism.

In one of the more abstruse dialogues of Plato, the *Philebus*, mention is made of the utterance of those who "declared of old that Mind rules ever the All". This is not listed as Orphic by any of the patient German wielders of the philologic dragnet, but the words "of old" immediately suggest Orphism. Certainly there is ground for holding that in later days, at any rate, the Orphics believed in a "World-Soul". The forty-ninth Orphic hymn is addressed to a goddess Ipta, and tablets dedicated to her have been found in Asia Minor. Proclus the Neoplatonist says this goddess is the "Soul of the All," and though with that devoted man "the things spiritually perceived" and the "World-Soul" are a veritable mania, there is good reason for not doubting him here. The same interpretation of the true nature of Dionysus is elsewhere, more than once, attributed to the Orphics.

Pythagoras was undoubtedly a follower of Orpheus in some respects, and there is, in particular, a well-known passage from the "Life" of the former which deserves to be quoted here.

> This is the theology of Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus which he learnt thoroughly when he was initiated in Libethri in Thrace, Aglaophamus imparting the rites: that Orpheus the son of Calliope, enlightened by his mother, said that the essence of number was eternal, and the origin, most full of foresight, of the whole, of heaven and earth and intermediate nature.

There is also an "Orphic hymn"—"To Number". This idea that number is at the root of things is based on the monad. The wonderful number one explains the whole, and is the root of all numbers: hence numbers explain all things. I take it, however, that it was really Pythagoras who developed the idea of number as being of cosmic significance, and that the hymn "To Number" was strictly speaking Neopythagorean. But Pythagoras himself was doubtless brought up in an Orphic atmosphere; it is in his South Italian country that the famous gold plaques have been found, and the Orphic cult was probably of long standing there. It was from Orphism that he derived his strong sense of the oneness of things, and there is therefore a germ of truth in the quotation from his "Life."

As I said in the previous article Orpheus arrived at his monotheistic belief as a result of mystical experience. In this experience, it was felt, man became god, and the "deification of man" was undoubtedly, as Miss Harrison says, a doctrine of Orpheus. In one of the plaques found at Thurii the soul addresses the queen of the underworld:—

From the pure I come, pure queen of those below, Eukles and Eubouleus and other immortal gods: for I too boast myself to be of your blessed race.

There is in the British Museum a tablet found at Rome which begins similarly, and then gives the name of the dedicator,—"Caecilia Secundina, duly and well become a goddess."

It was in ecstasy that the Orphic came to feel that, in the words of a line quoted by a Roman astrologer, "the immortal and unaging soul is from Zeus".

We should know from the Isiac vision of Lucius in Apuleius' "Golden Ass" and from the well-known memorial of Pascal, if not otherwise, that one constant feature of such experience is the shining before the eyes of the soul such a light "as never was on sea or land". It is to this light that reference is made in the Orphic line:—"There is brightness before us, but nothing do we see." Of this light we take Phanes who in the Orphic cosmogony shone upon the world in the beginning, to be another expression. This conclusion we reach on general grounds, but it is amply confirmed in our texts. At the appearing of Phanes,

All the others wondered when they saw the unexpected light in the air; in such fashion did it gleam from the flesh of immortal Phanes.

Surely this wondrous startling light, enveloping all things in the beginning, is the light which the mystic saw in ecstasy, and which made all things new fashioned. This is stated as clearly as such things can be stated both by a Platonic commentator, who attributes divine light to Phanes, and by Proclus: the words of the latter are:—

For, causing the light of spiritual perception to shine from above on the transcendental world, Phanes makes it all to be seen, and displays it as visible instead of invisible.

The interpretation is confirmed by the Orphic Hymns, where in the hymn to Protogonos, which is another name of Phanes in particular, we hear of the "holy light where-from I call the Phanes."

The doctrine that the body is a prison, propounded by Plato in the etymological *Cratylus* and there attributed to the Orphics, and expounded further in the *Gorgias*, is also an expression of the same experience. The Orphics came to hold the body to be a prison house because of the glorious visions they had seen when they were out of the body.

We say that they had seen glorious visions: that is, some of them had, for the true ecstasy is a rare thing, and even when it is deliberately cultivated by a sect, it is only the elect who actually come "near the Throne". This of course is the meaning of the saying, "Many are the wand-bearers but the initiates are few."

From the glorious experiences of the true initiates were derived the beliefs in the immortality and the transmigration of souls. The doctrine of the after-life in the underworld may at first sight seem inconsistent with the idea

that the soul goes from body to body upon earth, but according to the second Pythian Ode of Pindar, who is here clearly giving Orphic doctrine, the happy life hereafter was promised to those who had kept themselves pure in three lives in this world. Pindar places the site of this life in the Western sea; there "Ocean breezes blow about the blessed isles, where blaze the flowers of gold". Usually of course it was imagined in the underworld. Plato laughs at the quack Orphic imitators who went about promising, to those who would pay for their initiation, "drink everlasting" in Hades. Some idea of the geography of Orphic Hades may be gained from the tablet found at Petelia:—

> Thou wilt find at the left of the halls of Hades a fountain, and by it a white cypress standing: to this fountain draw not nigh [this is the water of Forgetfulness] but thou wilt find another, cold water flowing forth from the lake of Memory: and there are guards before it: say "I am son of Earth and the starry heaven." They will give thee to drink from the divine fountain and then thou wilt rule among the other heroes.

Plato in his famous seventh Epistle writes:—

> We must believe the old and holy traditions which inform us that the soul is immortal, and has judges, and pays the greatest penalties whensoever one is freed from the body.

These old traditions are clearly Orphic. The Orphic idea of reward or retribution in the after-life for deeds done in the earthly life doubtless influenced Christianity. The early Greek Christians had very likely been Orphic first.

The best account of the doctrine of transmigration of souls is found in passages of the "Charms" of Empedocles, which are commonly regarded as Orphic. Empedocles tells how the dæmons to whose lot has fallen a life of long age, must when they have committed offence,

> wander twice ten thousand years from the abodes of the blessed, being borne throughout the time in all manner of mortal forms changing one toilsome path of life for another. For the mighty air drives him into the sea, and the sea spews him forth on the dry earth. Earth tosses him into the beams of blazing sun, and he flings him back to the eddies of air. One takes him from the other, and all reject him. One of these I now am, an exile and a wanderer from the gods, for that I put my trust in insensate strife.

I have little doubt that Alexander Wilder is right when in his "Eleusinian Mysteries" he says that the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus, who is torn to pieces and reunited, is an allegory of transmigration. Dionysus here stands for the soul of the world, which is continually being differentiated into individual souls and restored by their resumption into itself. This is definitely given as the Orphic interpretation of the myth by the fourth century Latin writer Macrobius, and on study of the fragments his statement is entirely credible.

Believing in the holiness of life, Orpheus taught his followers vegetarianism, and to abstain from killing, as Aristophanes says in the "Frogs". In particular he taught them to abstain from eggs, because eggs were round,

and the world was round, and divine: there is a "Cosmic Egg" in his account of creation. His general vegetarianism is based, like that of the Jains, on the religious duty not to kill souls (the woodcock may be one's grandam, as Shakespeare put it); all souls being ultimately one, and divine.

All these beliefs in the Oneness of God, in the world-soul, in the deification of man, in the immortality of the soul, in transmigration and vegetarianism, are found in India, as the *Theosophical Glossary* points out. It is notable that Dionysus, whose rites Orpheus purified and spiritualised, is said to have come from India, as Madame Blavatsky says (*Isis Unveiled*. II, footnote, p. 561). Some say that this is only stated after Alexander had made India known to the Greeks, but Professor Gilbert Murray, on page 140 of *Four Stages of Greek Religion* takes the opposite view. If we bow to his great authority, there is clearly greater weight for the view that Orphic ideas came from India. In any case there is the utmost sympathy between Orphism and the Indian philosophy.

C. R. KING

Orphic Mysteries or *Orphica* followed, but differed greatly from, the mysteries of Bacchus. The system of Orpheus is one of the purest morality and of severe asceticism. The theology taught by him is again purely Indian. With him the divine Essence is inseparable from whatever *is* in the infinite universe, all forms being concealed from all eternity in It. At determined periods these forms are manifested from the divine Essence or manifest themselves. Thus through this law of emanation (or evolution) all things participate in this Essence, and are parts and members *instinct* with divine nature, which is omnipresent. All things having proceeded from, must necessarily return into it; and therefore, innumerable transmigrations or reincarnations and purifications are needed before this final consummation can take place. This is pure Vedânta philosophy. Again, the Orphic Brotherhood ate no animal food and wore white linen garments, and had many ceremonies like those of the Brahmans.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Glossary*.

THOUGHTS ON JUSTICE

[**Hugh de Sélincourt** is well known both as a novelist and a dramatist. He is a great lover of children, and his study of them contributes largely, as this article shows, to his philosophy of life. Another article from his pen on " Learning from Children" will appear in a subsequent number.—EDS.]

At the outset a great difficulty presents itself with regard to the application of justice (not Public Justice—which is taken out of our hands and evaded or enforced by all the intricate machinery of the law).

For private or personal justice implies much: it implies rightness: it implies authority: it implies, more than all else, truth of thought and truth of feeling—in happy poise.

This sense of justice affects all the actions of our lives in relation to others and especially to those nearest to us. Indeed, so pervasive and important is justice in our lives that we prefer usually to cast our eye for its workings as far afield as possible from our own intimacies where justice begins and where we can make a definite contribution to its spread, out into the great world where the lack of justice is obvious.

For Justice affects our attitude towards every human being with whom we come in contact throughout the day: those—wife, children, servants,—with whom we live, those who employ us or those whom we employ, those with whom we work, and those whom we meet, conductors, ticket collectors, fellow passengers and so on, on the way to work. Two sets of rights come, as it were, into momentary collision, those of passenger and conductor, husband and wife, father and child, worker and worked for, and so on, as the case may be.

Now at first sight these contacts appear, and on the surface are, simple enough, but the more we penetrate the surface and see the human being under the conductor or the servant, or the child, the less simple do they become. The keener a man's sense of justice the less does he, standing on his own rights, apply it to others, and the more does he apply it to himself, not from weakness, but from strength.

Let me give a homely example. A father likes to have his daughter aged fifteen months down to breakfast with him. It happened to me before my sense of justice was sufficiently developed to reach the small world of a child. She was able to say a few words and had various little ways which I considered pretty, of shrugging her head to one side, for instance, and smiling when I tickled her neck. With elderly cunning I set about obtaining the results I wanted, varying the approach and method of tickling the neck until the smile and shrug which delighted me were forth-

coming, and with gentle persistence urging her to go through her small vocabulary, in which, as the child was amenable and happy, I was generally successful. So far, so good. The trouble was she liked to feed herself with a spoon, and to bang with the spoon on the table: the way to her mouth was seldom directly found, and the noise of the beating spoon was intolerable. Both activities had to be checked as kindly and firmly as possible; wholly, of course, for the child's sake, for if she began life by being noisy and dirty and ill-behaved, to what depths of depravity might she not later sink? My duty as a parent forced me to take the matter very seriously, and before starting work I would have a few kind words with her mother on the necessity of firmness in training and the beauty of immediate obedience. It is beside the point (and would take too long) to explain how my sense of justice became less rudimentary, and the relationship gradually became less lop-sided and inhuman. Suffice it to say that I view the little example now in a very different light. I no longer feel just in not having smacked her for being so annoying with the spoon, nor pride myself on the kindliness of my corrective speech. Far from it. I realise I showed no knowledge whatever of the young person's small world into which I cavalierly intruded for my pleasure. She was engaged in vast creative pursuits which so far from sharing and enjoying I thwarted: vast on the scale of her small world, and quite as important to her, as his work is to any artist. To convey the spoon full to her mouth was a feat requiring all her skill and intelligence: the various bangs she made with the spoon were signs of powers in herself which she had lately discovered and still rejoiced in. As soon as a grown person ceases the stupidity of measuring childish conduct by a standard applicable to himself, and looks with justice and understanding at the child's world, the child ceases to be a cross between a toy and an irritation, and becomes a human being, simple and honest with a devastating honesty, whose keenness on its various activities it is stimulating and pleasant to be allowed to share.

There are two things in which a grown person may help a person who is not grown—they are the two most important things in life—namely, initiative and a sense of the other fellow. In helping these qualities to thrive, a father may satisfy his sense of justice in having taken upon himself the responsibility of producing another human being without obtaining its consent.

I have purposely taken as homely and intimate an instance as possible. I do not think a man can be just in one relationship and unjust in another. The sense of justice is a most personal sense; it emerges from the happy poise, as I have said at the outset, between truth of thought and truth of feeling: a state of being com-

parable to condition in an athlete. Be as wholehearted and all out on your job as a child is wholehearted and "all out" on the job of learning, say, to walk or to talk and you will not get in its light, you will not be choking it with the elderly errors of acquired folly.

And who or what in the last resort is to say whether you are right? How can you know? How can you be certain you are not the mere absurdity so many people sigh or smile to think you? It would be so satisfactory to be quite sure, that I have every sympathy with those who have imagined a judgment day in which an omniscient person says distinctly:—"There and there and there you were right: here and here and here you were wrong," in dealings with those who are nearest to me and dearest to me. There is something to me so piteously forlorn about the well meaning blunderer. But I do not know. With profound apology to the scientist and his facts, I do not think any man *knows*. But we can acknowledge our ignorance and learn.

Naturally, this being my sense of justice, I do not spend much time in standing upon my rights, though like many others I am inclined to waste breath in airing the injustice of the way I have been treated in material matters—unwisely as I have treated these matters with the attention they deserve: with far less, that is to say, than is needed to "get on". I find that when that poise between truth of feeling and truth of thought occurs (from which alone the sense of justice can emerge) one is lifted automatically outside the realm where rights and claims and so on have force and being. To be imposed upon becomes a forgotten fear. One has a sense of life and freedom so strong during those moments of good emergence, that one's chief concern is that they should become less fitful and infrequent, and gradually spread their happy influence through all the waking hours of each working day.

HUGH DE SÉLINCOURT

Karma is both merciful and just. Mercy and Justice are only opposite poles of a single whole; and Mercy without Justice is not possible in the operations of Karma. That which man calls Mercy and Justice is defective, errant, and impure.

21st Aphorism on Karma—*U.L.T. Pamphlet*, No. 21.

THOUGHTS ON THE SPRING OF 1933

[**Hugh I'A. Fausset** adds a short chapter to his autobiography *A Modern Prelude* recently published; he feels that the year 1933 has seen the end of one cycle and the beginning of another. Whether that be so or not is of less importance than the principles underlying his belief—the existence and influence of the Astral Light on the individual and on the races of mankind. In enumerating the ten fundamental propositions of the Oriental Esoteric Philosophy in her *Isis Unveiled*, so far back as 1877, H. P. Blavatsky stated the following as the seventh :—

> All things that ever were, that are, or that will be, having their record upon the astral light, or tablet of the unseen universe, the initiated adept, by using the vision of his own spirit, can know all that has been known or can be known.

The connection of the Astral Light with cycles and yugas, major and minor, was also taught by Madame Blavatsky. A careful study of her writings will enable the reader to evaluate this article—EDS.]

Here in England the spring of 1933 was remarkable. Nature, it seemed, was quickened as never before. Weeks before the first green had begun to show in the hedges or the first buds on the chestnut's branches, there had been a promise in the air of what was to come. In late February and throughout March the sun had shone with an unwonted radiance; the palm-willows had been almost hidden in a cloud of gold, and from the time that the cherry was "hung with snow" every flowering bush and tree, in the lovely sequence of their unfolding, broke into blossom with an unexampled luxuriance. And it was the same with the flowers, with the daffodils and tulips in the garden-beds and the bluebells and oxlips in the woodland-rides. It was as if the

> Fire of heaven whose starry arrow
> Pierces the veil of timeless night,

had impregnated the earth and its atmosphere with a peculiar virtue. Spring is always miraculous. But this was a miracle of miracles. There was a something indefinable added, a degree of intensity, of creative purity and richness, such as I had never known before.

Nor was it only certain trees and plants, as in other springs, which were transfigured by an unusual glory of bloom. There was a universal florescence, and the high pitch struck by spring has been sustained through the months that followed. Each phase of seasonal change from spring to high-summer has sounded its note with a peculiar vibrancy and fulness. This is no fancy on my part. Even newspaper correspondents and meteorologists have been moved to comment upon Nature's divine excess. But what to them has been no more than a happy vagary of climate or a compensation for several sunless summers, has had for me a deeper meaning. In these radiant earth conditions I have seen reflected a new light from the celestial

planes of life. I have felt the inspiration of a new power to which the world of vegetation has been the first fully to respond because, being the humblest in the scale of creation, it is also the most immediately submissive to the influx of spiritual forces. But the exalted vibration which has quickened the soil and the sap, so that even the blameless beauty of the green earth has been magnified, is surely quickening, too, the heart and mind of man, even if the first symptoms of its coming in the political and social life of the nations would seem rather a spirit of destruction than of creation.

Nevertheless the Voice that proclaimed "Behold I make all things new," has, I am convinced, reaffirmed its message of late with a power to move men to respond to its will which has not been possible for many centuries. In short a new Cycle has begun. There shall be a new Earth, because there is in actual fact a new Heaven. I have not the space here to discuss when the last great Cycle began, but of the reality and the determining power of such Cycles the seers have always known. The whole of the Christian Era in Europe is clearly one of such Cycles and both the moribund condition of organised Christianity to-day and the fact that the really vital contemporary religious movement is under various forms and in different Orders, reincorporating the "secret doctrine" and organising itself along the truly catholic pattern of the Mysteries, are signs that the circle has come full round and that we are entering upon a new age in which what was most inspired in the pre-Christian world will be recovered and reaffirmed in a post-Christian spirit. But within this Christian cycle there are obvious sub-cycles. One of these clearly began at the time of the Renaissance and we in the twentieth century have witnessed and suffered its death-agonies.

The mystery of such cyclic change cannot be explained merely in terms of human history, which has its spiritual counterpart, and both reflects and is determined by the unseen. Really to understand, therefore, the evolution of man we need to be able to read the heavens as well as to study the outworkings of spiritual forces in the rise and fall of civilisations. And such an interpretation of human history as Spengler's, for example, is tainted with falsehood and sentimental pessimism because he cannot see, or sees but dimly, the ideal archetypal counterparts in the higher worlds of the forms of human life and culture of which he traces so brilliantly the integration and disintegration in the mundane world. Yet Spengler's writings have been of great value in emphasising anew the law of periodicity which inheres in the very nature of things, but which had been almost supplanted in men's minds, at least in relation to human development, by the pseudo-scientific conception of a

monotonous and mechanical "progress". It is difficult to understand to-day how so ingenuous and artificial an idea could ever have been generally accepted. And only an age which had lost touch with imaginative reality could have entertained it. Far, indeed, from the nineteenth century being a period of real progress, it was, if we look deeply into it and divine its quality, its rhythm and its meaning, a period of sick declension towards the death by which alone human life could be purged of the decaying ideas and the poison of acquisitiveness which were clogging the creative process.

A few, even of the Victorians, felt the sickness of the times in which they lived. Tennyson, for example, in his "Locksley Hall Sixty Years After," retracted as an old man the naïve expectations of his youth. And there were others, like Matthew Arnold, sensitive enough to feel in the life of their day a "strange disease," but who could only cherish a "nameless sadness" as they wandered between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born. For in fact the old world was not dead, nor could the new world be born until the old one had really died. And the deeper we look into the nineteenth century, the more clearly do we see it, beneath all its accumulations of material wealth, which were, indeed, a sign of fatty degeneration, as a diseased and dying age moving inexorably towards its death in the convulsions of War.

As surely as the Elizabethan age reflected the beginning of a creative cycle, the Victorian age reflected the end of one. And it is the characteristic of a period of decline that even its apparent virtues are deathly, while even the vices of an age of growth are vital. Few, indeed, have the inner spiritual strength or the requisite knowledge to counter the conditions governing such a period. For towards the end of any cycle the Astral Light in which men are enveloped becomes more and more contaminated with accumulations of evil and impure thoughts, so that its precipitation may even take the form of disastrous convulsions of Nature, of earthquakes, floods or plagues or of turmoil in the social life of man, such as wars and revolutions. It was of such a period and purgation that Jesus visioned, as he sat on the Mount of Olives:—

> Nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earthquakes in divers places . . . . The sun shall be darkened and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken.

These latter words, rightly understood, describe very precisely the occult, but no less actual, conditions governing the end of a cycle. And in the words that followed, Jesus defined with an equally objective truth the nature of the spiritual inspiration which should attend the birth of a new cycle.

As with most of Jesus's sayings the mystical truth of these words

has been perverted and provincialised by the Christian Churches. They have been interpreted as meaning that Jesus will come a second time in person to transfer to realms of happiness only those who have embraced the Christian faith. But by the "sign of the Son of Man" which should appear in heaven after the latter days of tribulation Jesus meant a reality which transcended altogether the limits of himself regarded as a personal saviour or the divinity of a particular creed. He meant by it the Heavenly Man of the Mysteries, the "Adam Kadmon" or eternal creative Self by union with whom earthly man might be linked with the eternal centres of Light and Life and realise in a transformed selfhood the harmony of the kingdom of Heaven. Such were the elect of whom Jesus spoke. They were not men and women who subscribed to a particular creed, but those who had achieved the Supreme Identity along whatever path of faith and love, of knowledge and suffering. But such an ascent by man towards the divine involves and is indeed inspired by a descent of the divine towards man. As after a thunderstorm the air is washed clean and the atmosphere wonderfully luminous, so after the precipitation of malefic forces in such a cataclysm as the late War, the spiritual atmosphere or Astral Light surrounding the earth is purified. The accumulated darkness which enshrouded it, stifling the spiritual impulses in man and making it difficult for the angelic hosts to approach near and inspire him to works of creation and redemption, is dispersed. The purgation may, of course, be far from complete, as it was in the War. For although the War was essentially an appalling sacrificial rite, an agonised atonement by the young for the sins of their fathers, the accumulated forces of pride and fear and greed, which exploded in it, continued to possess most of the older generation of civilians who conducted it. Inevitably, too, it seemed to sow a new crop of evil passions, although much of this vile passion was in reality the harvest of what had been sown in the past. For the War was not the avoidable consequence of faulty diplomacy or secret treaties. It was the inevitable outcome of centuries of sin, of an increasingly rabid possessive egoism. And although it might seem to have been no more than a ghastly demonstration of that sin, because no nation involved in it was really humbled to the point of repentance and conversion, yet the agony and death of millions of humble men who gave themselves to the sacrifice was not in vain. Each one of them helped to redeem the darkness which had come to enshroud the earth more thickly than at any time since the days of the decline of the Roman Empire, a darkness so impervious to light that for the majority of men in the West the real was almost entirely obscured by the material.

All of which may seem rather remote from the beauty of the

Spring of 1933, with a consideration of which I began this article. Yet the horror of the War and the radiance of Nature's renewal during this year are in reality related. The one proclaimed the approaching end of a Cycle, that awful cleansing of the Astral Light without which, as I have said, the Creative breath could not infuse man with new power, or the Creative Light descend to open his vision and inspire him to strive afresh to establish on earth the Kingdom of love and harmony that shall be. The other announced that the cleansing had in some real measure at least been accomplished. Obviously the New Cycle could not begin immediately the War ended. For after such a convulsion the conditions in the Astral Light must have been as disturbed as the surface of the sea in the wake of a hurricane. But the conditions, I am convinced, are now open to the influx of the divine light.

And beneath the depressing and illusory surface of political life and economic and disarmament conferences, there are many signs, for those with eyes to see, that this eternal spring is quickening again in the soul of man. Of these signs I have not space to speak here. I would only emphasise in conclusion two facts. One is that the Astral Light has always been regarded as dual in nature, having a higher and a lower aspect, and that its plastic substance is as susceptible, to good imaginative currents as to evil. Man's destiny, therefore, centuries hence will depend upon the beneficent or maleficent images which we inscribe upon it now and in the coming years. And the second fact is that the will of man is subject to cyclic conditions. In the times of darkness even those in whom the light shines cannot greatly prevail. But when the stupefying cloud is lifted, apparent miracles may be performed. The more necessary is it therefore to consider the times and the seasons, to co-operate with the supernatural as the husbandman does with the natural, and to "call on the Light while He is near."

It is my belief that "He" has in this year of grace drawn near and that those, who, with a faith that triumphs over the depressing outer circumstances of the world to-day, respond to His coming, will rediscover the universal truth within the ancient Messianic prophecy,

> Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee. For, behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people: but the Lord shall arise upon thee, and His glory shall be seen upon thee.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

LIBERATION ACCORDING TO SANKARA

[**J. N. Chubb** writes on a well-worn theme, but brings the freshness of a young and awakening mind viewing the ideas of the great Indian Adept.—EDS.]

The *Advaitism* of Sankara holds a unique place in Indian philosophy. For sheer dialectical skill it is unparalleled, while as a vision of life it comes as the culmination of centuries of experiments and struggles in the domain of the Spirit. Though in characterizing this world as a shadow it is anticipated by the *Sunya Vada* school of Buddhism, it corrects the purely negative attitude of the latter by affirming that a Reality lies concealed in the shadows, that beyond the darkness of the world shines the incorruptible and self-effulgent *Brahman*. Sankara lays his whole emphasis on the transcendence of Brahman which he regards as the sole reality constituting the inward self of all. This spiritual principle which is formless and characterless (*Nirguna*), and free from all taint of finiteness, permeates the entire universe. For Sankara the *Nirguna Brahman* is not a mere hypothesis, a pious belief, based on the authority of a revelation (*Sruti*). It is a logical necessity and its existence is postulated by every atom of our experience. As Bradley, Sankara indulges in a negative dialectic against all forms of concrete and relational experience and branding these as ultimately unintelligible (*anirvaçaniya*), and therefore illusory (*mithya*), he gradually works his way up to an abstract or non-relational Absolute. Sankara, however, appears to be more consistent than Bradley in denying that the contradictions of experience are *somehow* resolved in the Absolute and that therefore every item of experience enters as an element in a self-consistent whole. For Sankara the presence of contradiction in experience means that the experience transcends itself, and that *as such, i. e.*, as concrete and relational, it has to be negated as an illusion. Thus, while for Bradley the finite as such is taken up and transformed in the Absolute, for Sankara the finite is in its essence the Infinite itself, its distinction from the latter being ultimately false.

The identification of the finite self with the Absolute distinguishes Sankara's system from other forms of Absolutism. The goal of the finite, as Sankara defines it, is liberation (*moksa*) which consists in attaining identity with the Infinite through the negation of its finitude. Strictly speaking, there is no *attainment* in liberation. The Self's identity with the Absolute is the ultimate fact, only the ignorance (*avidya*) which conceals it from us has to be removed. For Sankara the root ignorance is that which creates the dream of finiteness, and hence liberation from ignorance consists in passing beyond

the concrete expressions of life into a Transcendence where all the conditions of relative existence disappear.

The philosophy of Sankara has been criticized from many points of view. I shall not consider here the objections that attempt to show his theory to be *logically* indefensible. The main reason why it can never become acceptable to the mass of mankind is that it seems to cause not merely a logiçal but a general dissatisfaction. Even if its logic is irresistible it carries no conviction to the heart. It is believed that in renouncing our familiar world in which we live and have our being, together with our felt individuality, we are forsaking that which to a great extent is intelligible to us and which ministers to our needs, for the doubtful pleasure of merging our individuality in a vast void, a transcendent emptiness, in which all that we know, feel and understand is blotted out of existence.

Sankara, however, recognizes *stages* of spiritual realization. The experience of complete non-dualism comes, not as a bolt from the blue, but at the *end* of the spiritual quest. It is only when the soul, passing through the various phases of religious experience, dares to take the final step, that it enters into the Peace of Silence. Sankara, therefore, does not deny the validity of any mystic experience that falls short of the ecstatic intuition of the Pure Self, but declares that there is a stage beyond in which the last vestige of finiteness is effaced. We have no means of judging *at this level* of our spiritual consciousness whether that exalted intuition is worth having or not. "The heresy of individuality" consists in the belief that this individual complex we call the self constitutes our true Being. Sankara declares individuality to be "a fiction of nescience" in transcending which alone the Self in its purity and unlimited freedom is cognized.

Liberation (*moksa*) is thus the disintegration of personality, the loss of the empirical self with its finite interests in a world of finite things. It is entering the vast desert of Silence, above the noise of words and beyond the disturbances of thought. To the flesh-bound vision of the ignorant the pure Self is but an unfilled void, a fathomless depth of Nothingness. Indeed, so it must necessarily appear until the soul renounces its individuality and enters into that tabernacle of "Nothingness". It may then find that it is a void only in relation to empirical determinations and that it is filled with its own Light and Glory, in comparison with which the light of this world is but darkness. The Absolute repels us because it does not respond to our purely finite needs, and remains supremely indifferent to our hopes and aspirations. But once we realize that our true being is rooted not in the concrete expressions of life but in transcendence, above joy and sorrow, achievement and failure, our cravings and limited desires drop off from us and we seek

peace and rest in the Absolute. We relinquish our hold on things finite, and place the supreme value of the soul, not in the dance of life, but in the silence of transcendence. We cannot say with James, "I am finite once and for all, and all the categories of my sympathy are knit up with the finite world as such and with things that have a history."* The Self is not in its essence finite and immersed in the stream of time. Its history through time it understands as a limitation which it has to overcome and not its essential nature. While, therefore, the Self seems to move about in the world of changing things, it has its being rooted in Eternity.

The finite, as such, is a dynamic existence. Its dynamism is the expression of a restlessness or discontent that pervades its being. The finite seeks satisfaction and peace. It finds itself hemmed in by limitations on all sides but it feels also the urge for freedom. It seeks to rise to a point of view from which the conflicts of existence disappear, and this means that it attempts to pass beyond its finitude. Nothing save the Infinite or unlimited can satisfy the finite. "The Infinite is bliss, there is no bliss in things finite."† The evanescent expressions of life may enthral us for a time, but they cannot have a permanent hold on the seeking soul which does not stop its upward flight until the last barrier in the way of its complete transcendence is overcome. Thus the *Aitareyya Upaniṣad* declares: "Whatever he reaches he wishes to go beyond. If he reaches the sky he wishes to go beyond." The fruits of realization drop one after another from the tree of life, but the soul is satisfied only when it has tasted the bliss of Transcendence. It continues to soar upward until the finite world drops from its vision and it finds itself breathing in the Expanse! The joys and sorrows of life are then blotted out in this expanse of *Ananda*, and all differences are replaced by the vision of Identity.

This, according to Sankara, is the final destiny of the human Soul. Not an immortal life after death in some region of happiness, not even a sharing in the eternal life of God, but a transcendent aloofness and isolation. The Self stands as a *witness* of, and not a participant in, the cosmic drama, and it has nothing to gain nor to lose by the changing fortunes of the world. So long, however, as the Self is under the sway of ignorance it has to stir itself into a life of activity to break through its initial limitations. Within the realm of illusion Sankara does not deny the dynamism of life and the need for a constant vigil against the temptations of the world. He does not upset the existing moral order or undermine our ethical values, but only seeks to go beyond them in the final realization.

Indeed, as I have pointed out, Sankara does not deny the

* *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 48.

† *Chhandogya Upanishad*.

varieties of religious experience in the proper place. He does not overlook the finer urges, the music and rhythm of life. There are in this universe hidden springs of harmony and joy which enthral and captivate the soul in its onward march. It hears the Divine Symphony and attunes itself with the moving spirit of the the universe. These rich spiritual experiences are perfectly valid so long as the soul does not awaken from the dream of finiteness. But Sankara points out that beyond the music of life there is the Silence of *Ananda*.

Sankara thus *in the last resort* denies the values of relative existence. He exhorts us to keep the Ideal of Transcendence constantly in the foreground, even while living the life of fellowship and service or testing the bliss of communion with God. To him the final awakening is the opening of a new dimension of being, beyond the touch of relativity. When the truth dawns, society with its institutions is swept away, nay this entire world of Name and Form with all that there is in it vanishes and leaves not a rack behind.

The undivided vision of Truth is *unique* in its simplicity, and nothing that we know can offer a parallel to it. The stillness of concentrated meditation, the ecstasy of æsthetic experiences, the silence of deep sleep, all these fail to reveal its nature and are but shadows of its splendour. Even those few illumined souls who have gained an access into it are not able to voice its Glory. Speech fails completely, the mind staggers and reels, and the only articulate words that the sage on the brink of realizing truth utters, is that it is *Neti, Neti*—not this, not this.

J. N. CHUBB

ERRATUM

On page 704 of the October ARYAN PATH there is a review of Dr. Anderson Scott's new book, the title of which is wrongly given as "Living *Tissues* in the New Testament". The correct title of the book is "Living Issues in the New Testament".

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

CHURCH VERSUS CHRIST

[Two contributors, one a Britisher, **Geoffrey West**, another an Indian, **J. P. W.**, review three important publications on the peculiar condition of the organised religion of Christendom.—EDS.]

I

CHRISTIANITY AND COMMUNISM*

The essential fact of the present "world crisis" is its nature as the mortal sickness of capitalism. Skilful doctoring may produce a temporary recovery, but the seeds of destruction lie deep in the system itself, and thus no remedy, no solution for its increasing troubles, can come from within. What then?—where may we look for cure? Some would say: to Communism. Others, and among them Dr. Percy Dearmer and the thirty-two contributors to his symposium prefer to propose the—apparently—less drastic alternative of an awakened Christianity. Throughout this volume the issue is regarded, as it is by many intelligent Christians to-day, as lying between these two; between, as they would have it, moral idealism or economic materialism, religion or secularism, theism or atheism, Christ or anti-Christ. Neither the aims nor the achievements of the Communists in Russia are underrated; the Bishop of Ripon sees Bolshevism as "winning converts not because of its economics, but because of its missionary enthusiasm, resourcefulness, and courage," and Christians are exhorted to display like qualities in as high degree. Communism is challenged not upon its economics but upon its philosophy—its rejection of God, its dependence upon force, its denial of the value of individual personality—three basic issues to which Christianity opposes, at least in theory, a cancelling denial no less vehement. The question of the attitude to the individual—for many the most vital and the most difficult to resolve—is ably dealt with in a chapter on "Communist Secularism" by Professor Nicolai Berdiaeff. His conclusion is that while Christianity places at its centre "the happiness, the value, and the dignity of every man," for Communism "the question of society completely replaces that of the individual". The unit is "the social collective," and "Communism permits a cruel, even merciless attitude towards the concrete, living individual for the sake of the social collective—the perfect society which is to come." The inner spiritual life—that essen-

* *Christianity and the Crisis.* Ed. by Dr. Percy Dearmer (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 5*s.*)

tially personal matter—is regarded as plain encumbrance. "Spiritual problems distract from social activity. The whole man belongs to social action; he must devote to it all his powers." Against this might be set, as the Christian political ideal, Thoreau's memorable dictum (quoted by another contributor): "There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognise the individual as a higher and independent power from which all its own power is derived, and treats him accordingly."

But Professor Berdiaeff goes further, admitting that in fact under capitalism the development of personality has been a restricted privilege, and even that Communism may within its limits evoke a wider such development. More, he declares specifically that "Christianity is nearer to the Communist economy than to that of Capitalism".

What then does Christianity, opposing Communism, propose to change or replace capitalism? A large question perhaps, but one which these writers set themselves and to which the Communists at least have an answer. The problem of the age, says the Bishop of Plymouth, is not political or economic but spiritual, and Mr. P. T. R. Kirk agrees that "the financial structure of Western civilisation is shaking because it is not founded on a moral basis." The essential need is to "moralize" our national and international life on Christian lines. But *how*? The Archbishop of York rightly warns us that "this kind of discussion may do more harm than good if it suggests to those who read it that the great need is for someone else to do something, or that the proclamation of Christian principles will alone make any real difference." What is the Christian man-in-the-street to *do*? Unfortunately these pages contain far more aspiration than direction, and even the latter is more towards amelioration than replacement of existing conditions, while in the practical matter of war and pacifism there is a divergence of opinion and, for authority, a sitting on the fence which leads exactly nowhere. In the view of Dr. Herbert Gray—

> Christ undermined the whole institution of war. He never spoke in the abstract about war. He merely led men into an attitude of mind and heart which made it impossible for them to serve as soldiers. For a man or a community imbued with the spirit of Jesus it would be impossible either to attempt to force a controversy to a decision by brute force, or to plan to kill others for any reason. Jesus and war belong to different worlds.

Yet bishops bless battleships and military tattoos, regiments have their chaplains, and the Archbishop of York deems pacifism an error! One or two writers call for public ownership or control of essential services, and again for a national classless education ("the same cultural discipline open to all"), but these are isolated voices. It must not be supposed that this symposium, with its many eminent contribu-

tors, does not contain much hard thinking and acute analysis, but of its effect as a whole the Archbishop of York's concluding exhortation is all too typical. He says:—

> Does anyone still ask what is the gospel or good news which the Church is commissioned to give to our world? It is the same which the Lord proclaimed: "The Kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe the good news." For to repent is to alter one's way of looking at life; it is to take God's point of view instead of one's own.

It is a characteristic pulpit utterance, completely valueless—for the very thing we want to know is *his* interpretation of "God's point of view" and how *he* proposes to *act* upon it!

This volume variously condemns, in the persons of its various contributors, the whole or parts of the present capitalist system. As has been said, it calls for "moralization," as though that had not been the Church's endeavour from the beginning. Here is at best a mild reformism; essentially it points to nothing new. Yet surely it must be evident, to those who do not shirk the issue, that the very nature of capitalism is as anti-Christian as war itself. For the root of capitalism *is* war, the war of foreign and domestic competition, growing of necessity with every development ever more ruthless and deadly, every man, every nation triumphing by his or its neighbour's loss, employment in one spot spelling unemployment in another, the fight between the demands of dividends and wages continuous. Capitalism, it is sometimes said, has been responsible for the economic and mechanical advance of the past century and more; in just the same way the Great War is credited with the rapid development of aviation—and the proportion of benefit to cost is probably about the same in each case. How can anyone alive to the individual suffering involved even in its lesser manifestations declare the system compatible with reverence to that Jesus who taught that God is Love, that evil is overcome only by forgiveness, that compulsion achieves nothing, that material possessions are not life, that one must love one's neighbour as oneself, and that "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise"? Does not Professor Berdiaeff proclaim what should be a self-evident truth when he sets the Communist economy nearer Christianity than the Capitalist? One co-operates with, one does not fight, the man one loves, and what is communism, rid of its inessential Marxist materialist limitations, but co-operation, not for the glory of that chimera the State but for mutual freedom and individual development? To reject communism not in its Russian but in every form is to declare fear and greed the only moving elements in life; and then indeed nothing remains but to know ourselves neither Christians nor followers of any ideal of the spirit, but brute beasts whose wits are

sharpened for nothing better than each other's destruction.

It is not only logical that we should do so, but necessary. For man lives for and by an inner harmony—discord, driven deep enough, kills him. It is killing our civilisation to-day. Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset, in his excellent lecture *The Modern Dilemma*, published a year or two ago, analyses the conflict of the individual divided by an institutional religion he can to-day only cling to "with mental reservations," and by a science which, excluding from its survey all that is specifically human, cuts the universe in two. But he overlooked a third and certainly not less powerful factor—that of a society torn between aspiration and actuality. Ours is not in any effective sense a Christian country—nor are Europe and America Christian continents. But they have not escaped the influence of Christian teaching; the wisdom and love of Jesus have shaped their *ideal* morality. Consciously or unconsciously men bear within their hearts a deep and genuine reverence for those teachers, before and since Jesus, who have not only preached the spirit of love but embodied it in their own lives. They recognise here something finer than that unmoral, competitive existence into which they feel themselves forced by the very nature of their environment. Something in man's being urges him towards the highest that he knows; frustrated, a real organic harmony becomes impossible. It is true that man changes society only by changing himself; it is also true that he himself is changed by changing society. No one who has ever heard the words of the great teachers of humanity as at an awakening can ever wholly forget them; it were—it *is*—the easier task to transform the world.

Throughout this present symposium the Christian point of view is, of course, continuous. Dr. Dearmer makes the somewhat large claim that "by Christianity we mean . . . the religion of all good men," but this is hardly supported by some others. We find a development of it, however, in a section on "The Crisis and the East," (one would like to mention, together with this, the chapters by Mr. Kirk, Dr. Gray, Mr. E. N. Porter Goff, Mr. Maurice Reckitt, Professor Berdiaeff, and Mr. F. R. Barry as perhaps the most interesting and vital), in which Professor J. B. Raju offers Christianity as holding "the key to the ultimate reconciliation of the rival points of view of the Hindu and Buddhist world on the one hand and of the Islamic world on the other". The conception is perhaps natural enough—to a Christian. But others must feel regarding it something of what they may feel concerning the implied claim for Christianity as the sole champion of individualism and its ultimate value. Individualism undoubtedly does owe an immense debt to Christianity—so does the child to its mother or nurse, but it grows,

for all that, out of the nursery. There comes a point, and Europe is some centuries past it now, when institutional religion becomes a prison for the spirit. Individualism proclaims its own autonomy. Though it may (or may not) acknowledge Christianity in many ways highest among such religions, still it views it from a point outside any of them. It sees that each religion has its truth and its falsehood, that none is absolute, that the revelation of God in the soul is ceaseless while the spirit lives. A synthesis we need indeed, but one which includes, not identifies itself with, Christianity—a higher synthesis, at once older and newer.

For all that, what welcome would we not give to a *genuinely* re-awakened Christianity, even to-day!

GEOFFREY WEST

II

THE DECAY OF CHURCH-CHRISTIANITY*

A fixed or formal order has no creative or transforming power. All organization tends towards rigidity and stands in the way of movement and life . . . The Christian Church has lost the support of many thoughtful and earnest people because they have become intolerant of the Church's conservatism in regard to progress. Many people who entertain high ideals of life, and who cherish a deep and solid faith in the possibility of happiness and fulfilment have become restless and bored by the apparent dullness of Church services and the wearisome reiteration of what strikes them as pious platitudes from the pulpit.—(pp. 57-68).

It is a very far cry from the elaborate ritual and theology of the Christian Church to the simple religion of Jesus and His group of friends . . . It can hardly be doubted that in many respects Christianity has fallen victim to precisely the same error as that which constantly beset the Hebrew religion, the error, namely, of building around the truth an elaborate structure of unreality. (p. 49).

The above extracts from *Bewilderment and Faith* by Dr. F. E. England, a clergyman, are but an echo of the statements made about half a century ago in a remarkable open letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury published by Madame H. P. Blavatsky in *Lucifer* for December, 1887:—

Any Christian can, if he will, compare the Sermon on the Mount with the dogmas of his church, and the spirit that breathes in it with the principles that animate this Christian civilisation and govern his own life: and then he will be able to judge for himself how far the religion of Jesus enters into his Christianity.

Late though they are, some among the clergy are coming round to the view held by H. P. Blavatsky fifty years ago.

Dr. England has singled out and emphasised what he considers

**Bewilderment and Faith.* By F.E. ENGLAND, Ph. D. (Williams & Norgate, London. 3*s.*)
Is Christianity True? A correspondence between Arnold Lunn and C. E. M. Joad (Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., London.)

the most valuable aspect of the Christian message, the message, namely, of reinforcement and power through fellowship with God. The author holds that the Christian religion has in its keeping a secret for this bewildered world, namely, what Paul described as a divine power making for salvation, and he says:—

> It is for the Church to understand this power, its method of operation, its laws, the conditions of its availability, and then to take it out into the world and let it do what all our boasted physical power is failing to do, namely, lift men's lives from anxiety to steadiness, from strife to peace, from weakness to strength. (p. 84)

In these words the author gives us a helpful message, but is it not rather grotesque to expect the Church as constituted at present to understand this power, its method of operation, its laws, etc. ? Emerson had a flash of such knowledge when he wrote his famous essay on the Over-soul, but the whole subject is a sealed book to the present Church authorities.

Elsewhere the author writes:—

> People are tremendously fascinated by the furniture of the external world ; they travel, explore, analyse, admire, subdue the world outside ; but they know little of the holy of holies of the inner life. (p. 14)

Dr. England pleads eloquently for the inner spiritual life undisturbed by what is happening in the external world, but does not suggest the definite laws for its development which are laid down in ancient esoteric philosophy. All men possess the divine power making for salvation referred to by Dr. England, but, owing to ignorance of true spiritual laws, the majority of men and women in the western world live and die without enriching their lives by its proper utilisation.

Bewilderment and Faith is an admirable little book, but it treats a vast subject in a sketchy manner and if, as Dr. England says in his preface, the book "is intended for people who have felt something of the bewilderment of the hour," we are afraid it will not give them appreciable light or guidance.

II

There will always be some men who find it difficult to divest themselves of the notions which have once taken deep root in their minds, and who would experience a severe wrench if the error of their beliefs were brought home to them. A classic instance is that of the monk, Serapion, who, when the absurdity of the idea of an anthropomorphic god was proved to him, cried out in all the agony of despair: "You have robbed me of my God!" In spite of the general reaction in England against the churches and doctrinal Christianity, there are still men and women who tenaciously cling to the exploded creeds and dogmas of the churches and to whom this reaction against orthodox Christianity is only the harbinger of a general breakdown of English civilisation.

Perhaps the most prominent

Englishman of this class is Mr. Arnold Lunn, whose correspondence with Mr. C. E. M. Joad on the question, *Is Christianity True?* makes a fascinating book —two powerful brains hammering away at each other, each combatant bringing into requisition a vast store of knowledge and learning to demolish his opponent.

We concede that on one or two points—notably on the part played in history by the monasteries —Mr. Lunn has brilliantly scored over Mr. Joad, but every fair-minded reader of the book will agree that on all major issues the latter has achieved a decisive victory. It is pathetic to find a man of immense erudition like Mr. Lunn seriously maintaining that the doctrine of the Resurrection is "one of the best attested facts in history" (p. 293), or making such statements as—

> When God created the world he foresaw all the prayers that would be prayed and took them into consideration. (p. 103)
>
> The Church of England prays for rain. Of course, and if more people attended those services in mackintoshes these prayers would be more successful. (p. 118)

We do not propose in the present article to discuss the diametrically opposed views of these two "antagonists" on a variety of topics, *e.g.*, God, the universe, prayer, progress, evolution, new morality, etc. So far as the central theme as to the truth of orthodox Christianity and the part played by the churches is concerned, Mr. Lunn has dismally failed in his attempts to dislodge Mr. Joad from his position as an inveterate opponent of the Christianity taught by the churches. In his final letter to Mr. Lunn, Mr. Joad says:—

> I still think, in spite of all you have said, that the record of the Church is bad in the past and its state bad in the present; I do not like clergymen, and on the whole I think their influence harmful. (p. 379)

It is also interesting to note that in this letter Mr. Joad, like Dr. England, differentiates between the Churchianity "taught and preached by its exponents to-day" and the Christianity "as its founder taught and preached it".

With regard to one aspect of this general decline of a belief in the Christianity of the churches, men with such divergent standpoints as Mr. Lunn and Mr. Joad appear to be in general agreement. Thus Mr. Lunn says:—

> The disintegration of belief always coincides with a rising tide of despair . . . The Utopian forecast is giving way to a resigned but cynical acceptance of life as a futile and pointless accident in a universe of lifeless matter. (p. 351)

And Mr. Joad is constrained to take a similar view:—

> I concede to you that the world is sick for want of a faith, and that a wistful agnosticism is one of the chief characteristics of the age. I concede that, lacking a faith, we have most of us lost our sense of values. (p. 378)

People have lost "faith" and with it also their "sense of values" as Mr. Joad says, and the question of prime importance is what philosophy, what religion should be furnished to the masses in lieu

of the orthodox Christianity that is disappearing. No positive solution is offered in the two books under consideration, but Mr. Joad in the very first issue of THE ARYAN PATH rightly pointed out that in the present religious *impasse* in England, people should turn for the satisfaction of their spiritual needs to the traditional wisdom of the East stripped of the religious dogmas which have accreted around it—and we may add that all the wisdom of the East is synthesised in the great works of Madame Blavatsky. It is only when the West will seriously turn its attention to this fountain-head of all knowledge and wisdom, that it will find the true solution of its present spiritual restlessness to which Dr. England, Mr. Lunn, and Mr. Joad refer in different places in these books.

J. P. W.

Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement inaugurated by Mahammad 'Abduh. By CHARLES C. ADAMS, Ph. D., D.D. of the American Mission, Egypt. (The American University of Cairo, Oriental Series, Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, London. *7s. 6d.*)

Beginning with a short account of Sayyid Jamâlu'd-dîn Al-Afghâni, at whose fire so many torches of reforms were lighted, Dr. Adams gives us the biography of the Egyptian reformer Sheykh Muhammad 'Abduh, describes his aims, opinions and beliefs, and shows the progress, his ideas have made in Egypt since his death in 1905. As Grand Mufti of Egypt, Muhammad 'Abduh proclaimed true Islam to be reconcilable with modern scientific thought and social developments; it was only some un-Islamic accretions which made it seem irreconcilable; and these he urged the people and the Government to put away. Islam was not a matter of unreasoning observance but of reasonable faith and righteous conduct.

This was no news to thoughtful Muslims; but the prevalent abuses had become identified with vested interests so powerful that to oppose them required reckless courage and seemed hopeless. Moreover, the position of Islamic peoples in the world had changed abysmally from domination to dependence; their mental attitude, their scale of values, even their legal system needed readjusting. In this bewilderment Muhammad 'Abduh turned to the Qur'ân for guidance. Dr. Adams seems a little sceptical of the practicality of such recourse; perhaps he thinks the mediæval system of Islam too rigid to admit of readjustment. Referring to the problem of the position of non-Muslim peoples in the modern Muslim State, he volunteers the opinion that non-Muslims can have no position in a Muslim State except as subject peoples, which is only true of those who come into the Muslim polity by conquest, not of those who come by invitation or agreement; wherefore the problem is not hopeless of solution as he thinks, since none are likely to come in by conquest for some time to come. Anyhow Muhammad 'Abduh was satisfied, from his recourse to the Qurân, that Muslims could find there all the guidance that they needed at this crisis of their fate, and he was able to inspire the same confidence in others. The victory is not yet won; but his work has been continued by his followers—men like Muhammad Rashid Riḍâ, and the Sheykh Mustafa Al-Marâghi who believe with him that "the world will not come to an end until the promise of God to make His light complete will have been fulfilled, and religion will take science by the hand and they will aid one

another in rectifying both the intellect and the heart": and a great change has been brought about in Egypt.

Dr. Adams' treatment of a highly controversial subject is admirably objective, cautious and impartial. Only the historical background strikes us as defective. The ideas of Jamâlu'd-dîn Al-Afghâni were not unprecedented, as they here appear. Long before that visionary came to manhood, European students and observers had formed similar ideas, declaring that Islam is capable of modern progress on Islamic lines, and advocating such progress for the Muslim peoples in preference to progress upon un-Islamic lines. David Urquhart is quite as strong on this point as Muhammad 'Abduh. The confidence which animated the Egyptian reformers was felt and commonly expressed by English people at the time of the Crimean War. The vision of the fiery Jamâlu'd-dîn is identical with that of the astute Disraeli who saw the justification of the British Empire in the East in a world-wide Islamic revival. The later anti-British sentiments of the reformers, observed by Dr. Adams, can be traced to disappointment of once cherished hopes.

The author's translation of texts from the Qur'ân is rather offhand, and does not always quite convey the meaning. For example, he has "Thou shalt not find any change in the custom of God," where the Arabic has "Thou shalt not find anything of power to change God's usage"; "The infidels resemble him who shouteth aloud to one who heareth no more than a call and a cry," when the meaning is: "The likeness of the (Prophet in relation to the) disbelievers is as one who" etc.; the passage here translated, "Or if thou fear treachery from any people, render them the like" is no injunction to forestall their treachery, but should rather be: "If thou fear treachery from any (allied) people, throw back (their treaty to them) flatly"; this is the accepted meaning which has passed into Islamic Law.

The book is a notable contribution to the literature of modern Egypt. It is furnished with an index and a bibliography.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL

Judgment on Birth Control. By R. DE GUCHTENEERE, M.D. (Sheed and Ward, London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

Much useful information has been marshalled by Dr. R. de Guchteneere in this book and the chief arguments, Malthusian, economic, eugenic, medical and moral, are shown to be contradicted by the facts. The evidence ably accumulated all proves that, compared with Nature's subtle, miraculous skill in holding the balance of Life, man's best efforts are simply bungling, meddlesome blunders, with usually a hidden core of selfishness.

The weakest part of this judgment is "the Catholic view of birth". The biggest problems are not mentioned; for example, the theological doctrine of the creation of the soul at birth. But the real question, when put on a scientific basis, admitting no outside creator, is that of the magnetic attraction between the parents and the reincarnating ego of the unborn child. What type of egos will be attracted by the blind activity of sex-appetite? What of those who deprive the incoming ego of its vehicle? Under Nature's laws no one can escape reaping the results of his own actions.

The most vital point unnoticed, however, is the real nature of the so-called sex instinct. To ignorance of this, no doubt, is due the Roman Catholic advice, "where pregnancy is contra-indicated on medical or economic grounds," of limiting conjugal relations to phases of the female cycle unfavourable to fecundation. Compare this with the Theosophical statement:—

> During the previous and the present races, at least at the beginning of this one, those who indulged in marital relations during certain

lunar phases that made those relations sterile were regarded as sorcerers and sinners. (*The Secret Doctrine*, I, 229)

The sex instinct is only a function of the *procreative* force, itself simply the material aspect, active at this stage of evolution, of the spiritual *creative* power.

The only legitimate use of the power of procreation, therefore, the only one producing no harmful effects, is the sacred task of "building the temple" for the ego seeking rebirth, of creating, by purity of thought, will, feeling and act, such bodies as will draw down again the wise ones, the *gnanis* who could find no fit instruments in the "defiled abodes" of to-day. That material force has eventually to be re-transformed into the spiritual power, but whether using or transmuting it, one thing is needed—self-control, the root of the problem. It is not repression, but the purificatory control of the animal self by the divine self, the self man has forgotten himself to be.

W. E. W.

The New Background of Science. By SIR JAMES JEANS. (Cambridge University Press. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The Universe of Light, By SIR WILLIAM BRAGG (Bell and Sons, London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The revolutionary character of some of the fundamental concepts of modern theoretical physics is exciting the curiosity of the ordinary man who has no knowledge of physics. A number of books have been written to allay such curiosity, of which Sir James Jeans's new book is one of the best. Very often the general reader would be in a much better position to understand the recent advances set forth in such a book, if he knew a little about the earlier work from which the present developments have originated. *The Universe of Light*, by Sir William Bragg, is to be recommended for the acquisition of some knowledge of such earlier work.

Sir James Jeans has depicted a very clear picture of the present situation of modern theoretical physics, against a background of philosophy. The first two chapters are introductory and set forth how modern theoretical physics is fast becoming more and more abstract and philosophical.

The theory of relativity, space, time and the theory of the expanding universe are discussed in the next two chapters. The new developments as to the wave nature of matter which we owe to de Broglie and Schrödinger and the work of Heissenberg and Dirac form the subject matter of chapters V and VI. A few mathematical symbols and formulae are used in these chapters where without them it would be impossible to attain the necessary precision of thought and statement. In the last two chapters are discussed the principle of indeterminacy and the law of causality, the latter of which has been the subject of much controversy of late. After a perusal of the book even a casual reader cannot help finding that the mechanical concepts of the earlier physics are continually being replaced by mental concepts. "If from the nature of things we can never discard them entirely, we may yet conjecture that the effect of doing so would be the total disappearance of matter and mechanism, mind reigning supreme and alone."

In *The Universe of Light* Sir William Bragg gives a very clear exposition of natural phenomena caused by light. The book is profusely illustrated with diagrams in the text, and plates in half tone and colour, most of the latter forming good substitutes for actual experiment. The classical work, in the domain of light, of such pioneers as the late Lord Rayleigh and Tyndall is fully discussed. But one cannot help noticing that the phenomenon of modified scattering of light by molecules discovered by Sir C. V. Raman and now called the Raman effect, is not mentioned at all.

S. RAMA SWAMY

Twenty Years in Tibet. By DAVID MACDONALD, with an Introduction by the Earl of Lytton (Seely, Service & Co., London. 18*s.*)

Inevitably, books of travel, descriptions of strange lands and peoples, exemplify the art of either the painter or the photographer, the latter calling for keen observation and skill in bringing out in words that which is seen, the former for sympathetic understanding of the subject and the power to interpret it, and to make the figures on the canvas live. The author's earlier work, *The Land of the Lamas*, should have prepared us to expect the photographic treatment in any work from his pen. The author's mind is perforce the lens of his camera, and what it catches is in terms of his own capacities and limitations. Therefore the baffled feeling with which one closes *Twenty Years in Tibet* is perhaps unreasonable.

Mr. Macdonald's matter-of-fact lens has caught many pictures of absorbing interest, but one misses the skilful retouching by which even the artist photographer throws into prominence the important and subordinates the trivial. Mr. Macdonald accepts, as simply and uncritically as a child, the life and conditions he found during his long stay in Tibet, and he describes them with but little attempt to assign relative values. For example, while he recognizes and describes contrasts between the rites and practices of the reformed or orthodox Lamaism and those of the surviving pre-Lamaist Bon worship, he essays no comparative evaluation.

It is significant that although he was brought up within sight of "the ever-glorious wonder of the Himalayan snow-peaks," and although he had spent years in Tibet at the time he entertained the members of the Second Everest Expedition, "they," he remarks, "made us realise a newly found beauty in the hills among which we had lived so many years."

Himself quite blind to the implications of much that he sees, Mr. Macdonald can as little guide us to the real treasures of the sacred land as a child can betray the secrets of a fortification through which he wanders. One looks to this account in vain for any clue to the Custodians of the primeval and once universal Wisdom Religion, of which Tibet is the last stronghold. Among Them were the revered Teachers who instructed H. P. Blavatsky in the comprehensive philosophy which she restated under the name of Theosophy. The proximity of Beings of such profundity of Wisdom, Beings of Compassion and of Power, impresses Mr. Macdonald as little as a glorious sunrise moves a blind man.

Twenty Years in Tibet has more in it of personal reminiscence than *The Land of the Lamas*, which it interestingly supplements. In spite of the author's Sikkimese inheritance from his mother, and the resulting natural sympathy with the Tibetan race, he is very much the Westerner in outlook, although his tolerance is noteworthy. Himself an orthodox Christian, he remarks of the Buddhist temple services that "one never fails to be impressed by the deep chanting of the monks, and the general atmosphere of devotion present on such occasions". He counts both the Dalai and Tashi Lamas among his friends, and apparently he was instrumental in saving the life of the former when he fled before the Chinese troops in 1910.

The author had almost unparalleled opportunities for observation of Tibetan manners and customs and if, without wasting regrets on what it might have been, one takes *Twenty Years in Tibet* for what it is, the book is exceedingly readable. The illustrations are interesting and the account is never monotonous—the subject would almost insure that, regardless of its treatment.

PH. D.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[**A. E. Waite** is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

Supposing for a moment that Spiritism, regarded symbolically, might deserve to be called a Sanctuary, then the cloud which has fallen upon it seems darker just now than that which dwelt upon the Mystical Sanctuary of Eckartshausen, for a little book of his making was expected to lift the latter. The vindication of Margery Crandon by the American S. P. R. was said to be on the eve of publication a full three months ago; but the event is delayed strangely and, speaking generally, there is silence in the psychic heaven on all that concerns the famous Boston medium. It is otherwise, however, in the case of Rudi Schneider, for the National Laboratory of Psychical Research announces that he will revisit London, and is due indeed forthwith.* Meanwhile, Mr. Harry Price replies to his own critics, in one way or another, and proceeds to expose further his once favoured medium by producing the experience of two Viennese Professors at Rudi's séances in that city, so far back as 1924. A little storm of protest has followed in the psychic press, on the part of believers; but the fact remains that on January 26th of the year in question Prof. Stefan Meyer "noticed the freeing of one hand during a 'telekinetic' sitting," and that such phenomena ceased "when Rudi's arms were made visible by luminous signs."† The critics of Mr. Harry Price have found it convenient to pass over this testimony in silence. But the significant points are (1) that much can be done by a medium with a free arm in a dark séance and (2) that Rudi, who is affirmed to have attained such freedom in 1924, secured it again in 1932, by the evidence of a photograph. The fact may not account in either case for all phenomena produced in the presence of the Viennese youth; but for an uncommitted observer, with no axe to grind, it classes Rudi with the great cohort of cheating mediums, whose names and acts are on record in the history of Spiritism. They had their defenders *abinitio*, full of faith and testimony, as they have now from time to time in leading psychic journals and continually in lesser periodicals,

* Bulletin V., p. 20.

† *Ib.*, p. 4.

which are making their bid for recognition. Otherwise it is a quiet moment among the Communities, Associations, Alliances and Missions, while the various representative organs fail to escape dullness, as their columns unroll "great argument about it and about"; but evermore are fruitful in begetting mental confusion rather than conviction.

The British Association has opened and closed its meeting at Leicester; and we have listened once again to the last word of scientists—for the time being—on a number of great issues. We may have read also a few of the comments thereon by lay writers and others in the public press. In his Presidential Address Sir Gowland Hopkins reminded the assembled experts that as regards the origin of life "all that we yet know about it is that we know nothing." One of our contemporaries added thereto, in a leading article, that "science, *qua* science, can tell us nothing whatever about the spirit of man,"* while it is not less blind than Cupid "where values are concerned". Both affirmations passed of course unchallenged: was it not confessed long since that evolution deals with "sequence in the form of a series" and has nothing to reveal on the problems of a beginning or an end? The position has not changed with years, and so might still remain if "creative evolution" itself were "speeded up under the influence of the mind of man" as Dr. C. C. Hurst of Cambridge dared to speculate.† He explained that "mind is gradually increasing at the expense of matter, which may be reduced and displaced thereby." Sir James Marchant answered that evidence is wanting if we look back on the last twenty thousand years, but added that if the regeneration of the human race can in any way be brought about it will be only by "the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ".‡

Some of us believe that this abiding Spirit is known by other and indeed by many names; that the witness concerning it is everywhere in the great religions; and that the experience of Reality is behind it. The affirmation therefore might have been the opening of a gate into an undiscovered country for the British Association at large; but it does not appear that even one traveller sought to enter thereby. It will be remembered that an official visit is paid to a Church at every Association Meeting, wheresoever held, and on this occasion the Bishop of Carlilse spoke at the Cathedral Church of Leicester. He had, unfortunately, no gate to open and no path to enter—above all, no path of experience in exploration of the Spirit that is within. All that he offered his hearers was a plea for tolerance, about which no one

* *The Morning Post*, September 9th, 1933.

† *The Daily Mail*, September 14th, 1933.

‡ *Ib.*, September 15th, 1933.

disputes at this day.* Is it surprising that those among us are growing from more to more who know the direction in which it is vain to look for aids to solutions on problems of life and time, the worlds within and without, and the soul in man? It is not to institutions that hold and preach a "faith," *ex hypothesi* "once delivered to the saints". Is it, *per contra*, to the hypotheses of science, working or not working? We do not need to answer when "the leading mathematical scientists" produce four individual speculations on the beginning of the universe and—however tolerant and however alive to the courtesies—prove to be at issue with each other. It was a liberal education to compare Prof. Milne and Sir Arthur Eddington on "the expanding universe," or both with the Abbé Lemaitre, who disposed of evolution by suggesting that "all the stars were born at the same time". We may contrast also Prof. de Sitter, who believes that "it is possible for stars to have existed before the universe, as it is now constituted."† Whither shall we turn, therefore, when the incompatibilities of science and the seeming bankruptcy of official religion are thus proclaimed before us? Sir Oliver Lodge offered to an inquirer a key of his own, which is also ours, when he suggested that humanity, to achieve its end, "will have to realise that the spiritual world is the only real world."‡ He implied doubtless the familiar distinction between things phenomenal and things noumenal, between *signum* and *signatum*, even the outward sign and the inward grace, *ergon* and *parergon*, and the other iridescent formulæ which are current coin of terms in the Land of Nous. Actuality is the salient characteristic of things without, but reality is of the world within. However this may be, it is not proposed that Sir Oliver was speaking as a sacramentalist to a reporter of a popular journal; and although he may be classed as a "Spiritualist" in the sense of Spiritism, he was not speaking from the standpoint of the séance-room, much less intimating that if the dead indeed return they come empowered to parley from a real world. Here is a notable point.

With apologies to those excellent people who find a dwelling place in one of the *maisons spirites*, at London, Paris and Los Angeles, there is nothing less like reality than the pictured homes of the departed in a so-called Summer Land; there is nothing in psychic revelations which savours more of illusion than the hither and further hereafters of Mr. Vale Owen; while it happens that of those who have ventured on "astral travellings," some have come back to testify that here also is a realm of seeming: witness

* *The Morning Post*, September 12th, 1933.
† *The Morning Post*, September 13th, 1933.
‡ *The Daily Mail*, September 15th, 1933.

Andrew Jackson Davis on his putative Diakka and their "earthly victims"; witness Eliphas Lévi, the French occultist, on "the Ghosts of Cahagnet" and the "wandering larvæ of Allan Kardec"; and in fine, witness the testimony of F. W. H. Myers on the next world as "a world of illusion".* The world of reality is assuredly a world of mind; the quest of reality can be only a mind-quest; if the Kingdom of Heaven is within, it is a Kingdom of the mind; while that which finds and knows and keeps reality —its standard, test and touchstone —is the mind of man. Beyond the logical understanding, though not denying this within its own province, in high uplifted regions of the grand concern, it may be called by other terms; but as to *ens et essentia*, it is always the same and one, itself the great reality explored for ever, at once the Divine Object and the God-Subject.

Turning now in another direction, Mr. Gerald Heard has written recently on a supposititious Apocalypse of H. G. Wells† and offers, as he draws to his close, a dictum which may be greatly deeper than he himself conceives: "the wider the mind expands, the more reality comes in," as if this also were an expanding universe. But his statement is left within the measures of material things. He proceeds to affirm (1) that physical speculation depends, for its advancement, on "exploring our minds"; (2) that the further we progress in self-knowledge, the profounder becomes our knowledge of "the universe of physics". But it happens that some of us—amidst the insistent welter of outward activities—have turned towards regions which are not those of physics; and when we hear of a future which shall "push its researches into completely new worlds," we remember once again that there is in very truth another world to conquer, and one about which we have heard of old. The quest thereof is not among the "four fundamental particles out of which the whole material universe is compacted." The negative electron, the positive proton, the unchanged elementary neutron and the positron‡ open no path thereto, because it is a kingdom which is not of this world, a *regnum Dei amantium*— again an inward kingdom, a world within us. One cannot help feeling that Mr. Heard has had intimations concerning it, for he also is looking towards "a superfield of which our individual consciousnesses are only waves on its deep". Fichte knew something about it and did not mix the images; Ruysbroeck brought us tidings of its *vastissimum pelagus*; Eckhart dwelt on the

* *Light*, 21st July, quoting Myers' "Road to Immortality".

† *The Nineteenth Century*, October, 1933, pp. 502-512.

‡ *The Nineteenth Century*, October, 1933, pp. 466-474, being a study on Science and where it stands, by Mr. Ivor Thomas.

borders, and so also a certain "man from Frankfort". Much later the Society of Friends, the Philadelphian Society and Spanish Molinists were lifting noticable voices.

We are told that "the starting point" of the Quaker George Fox was "the saving light of Christ within every human soul"; that he saw reality with an inward eye; that his appeal was therefore to a God of his own experience; and that for him the authority of a book—in other words, the Bible—was replaced by an inner Light, an Illumination of the soul itself.* Here again is a recurring testimony, and yet there is a counsel of caution, much as one believes that Fox himself was led truly by a guarded fire within. It is obvious, in a crowd of cases, that a criterion of validity respecting such inward light is a *sine qua non*, having regard to the clamorous concourse of private revelations, their vagaries and manias, of which the name is legion. One suggestion is that personal illuminations must be tried by "the Spirit of Christ as expressed in His work and His Word". † But this is a province of criticism which can be left to look after its own titles, while those who receive revelations are usually the last who are qualified to treat them with acid tests. It remains to say that the price of authentic personal inward light is the price of dedicated life, of that life which—late or early—comes to know the doctrine.

A. E. WAITE

A LETTER FROM LONDON

Looking back over the past nine months of this year of 1933, it seems to me that the single topic of prime importance has been the development of the Nazi movement in Germany, and writing in this second week of October I see very clearly that for the next few weeks that subject will be predominant in the European Journals. We are on the eve of a further sitting of the Disarmament Conference and no one who is not blinded by optimism can hope for any definitely favourable outcome.

In brief the present position is that Germany is surging forward on a wave of self-expression after fifteen years of inhibition, and the form that self-expression is taking is inevitably that of militarism. In the conditions of modern civilisation, there is no other form which a national lust for power can assume. To win predominance by the steady expansion of trade is at the best a slow process, the beginning of which at the present time is beset by every kind of handicap. Wherefore a nation moved by the sudden urgency that comes from a sense of release can hope to dominate only by a physical threat.

The danger of this spirit is temporarily lessened but not eliminated by the fact that at the present moment Germany stands alone in Europe with-

* *The Hibbert Journal*, October, 1933, pp. 117-128, an essay by Mr. E. B. Castle on Quakerism as Adventure.

† *Ib.*, p. 121.

out a single ally. She has alienated Austria, and the criminal attempt by an Austrian Nazi on the life of the popular Austrian Chancellor Herr Dollfuss is proving an admirable stick with which Germany's numerous enemies may belabour the ideals of Hitlerism. She has done nothing to conciliate Great Britain or Italy, although only a few months ago, it seemed that the two declaredly Fascist nations might come to a friendly understanding. The small nations about her borders, the Triple Entente, and even now, Denmark, Holland and the pacific Switzerland are pricking up their ears in alarm; while her two sworn enemies Poland and France are almost hysterical with hate. (As an instance of French feeling, I may quote the recent case brought by a Paris buffet proprietor against the representatives of a wedding-party who had broken up his restaurant because, as they alleged, they had found the name of Hindenburg on the biscuits served with the cheese. That the name was, in fact, not Hindenburg but Edinburgh, serves to underline the evidence of hysteria. The case was reported on the centre page of the London *Times* for Oct. 9.) Lastly, in this connection, Russia although still too pre-occupied with her own affairs to play any part in the Concert of Europe, has shown that she can have no sympathy with the methods of Nazi Government.

This, then, is the position in which the German representatives will come to the next sitting of the Disarmament Conference. It is a position that calls for humility, but we have evidence that none will be shown. Germany through the mouth of Herr Hitler declares that she has no military ambition, but she is training all her young men to arms, she is demanding the right to manufacture heavy arms, and if we may believe the report of the German communist, recently escaped from Berlin, who spoke at the Hastings Labour Conference (October), innumerable factories that turn out such goods as motor-cars and typewriters on their lower floors are devoting the upper floors to the secret production of aeroplanes and the munitions of war, while chemical factories are producing the deadliest poison gases in enormous quantities. In such circumstances, how can we hope for any practical or even reasonable outcome of the Disarmament Conference? At the best we can expect no more than a temporary compromise.

Behind these displayed elements of discord, we must not underrate the silent but horribly powerful element of the private armament firms such as Schneiders in France, Vickers among others in England, and the Thyssen Steel Trust, Hitler's chief source of support, in Germany. These three representative firms have immense financial backing; they have the power lent by the control of many brilliant and subtle intellects; and their sole interest is in the manufacture and sale of the munitions of war. Their almost complete control of the Paris press is a by-word, and there can be little doubt that when the need arises they will exercise hardly less influence on the English journals. In short these and other private armament firms are a continual menace to the peace of Europe.

It must not be inferred, however, that I have any fear of serious international complications within the next few months. Our obvious safeguard for some time to come is the fact of Germany's isolation and her present unpreparedness to fight, single-handed, the overwhelming forces that might combine against her. Moreover, strange as it may seem in this connection, some *moral* excuse will be necessary before any of the great nations of Europe can go to the extreme length of declaring war on another.

After all that I have been writing above, carrying as it does the direct implication that war is the result of nothing but national ambitions and the desire for private gain, this last statement may appear as a paradox; but it is susceptible of quite a simple explanation. Government, however democratic in theory, is carried on, openly or secret-

ly, by the few. But however considerable the influence and intelligence of the few, they become powerless if opposed by the combined resistance of the many. And in this matter of declaring war on another nation, it is essential that the prevailing moral spirit of the mass should not be openly flouted. Indeed so urgent is this need to seek a moral excuse that for the past fifteen years the apologists have been continually concerned to demonstrate that this, that, or the other nation, (including Austria and Germany) was not responsible for the calamity of July 1914. It is doubtful whether even Herr Hitler, with the majority of young Germany behind him, would dare to declare war, unless he could frame some excuse that would unite practically the whole nation, whether in a spirit of moral revolt or outraged resentment.

This increasing need for a moral excuse, almost trivial as it may appear when we reflect on the ease with which the public may be deceived, is almost the only encouraging indication of spiritual progress in Europe within the last generation. In England, at least, and there, I believe, predominantly, the distaste for the great crime of War has become recognisably more manifest during the past few years. There are many Societies, and Unions—unhappily not in common accord owing to the divergence of their political aims—which have an immense number of supporters in the aggregate, and are working actively for the abolition of War. Also, there is a perceptible leaven of boys and young men at our Schools and Universities, who although they did not suffer in the Great War are steadfast pacifists in principle and eager to bear witness to their faith.

I have put England first in this connection because the pacifist movement is more evident in this country than in France. Nevertheless there is there, also, a strong body of intelligent opinion unaffected by the emotional fear and hatred of Germany, a body of opinion that, since it is shown chiefly by the educationists may have a restraining effect upon the rising generation. And although it is not possible to speak of a pacifist movement as commonly understood in Italy, she has at the present time no inducement to make war. The same may be said, also, of all the smaller nations. Unless deliberately used as a catspaw none of them is likely to complicate the situation by aggressive action, though we must not forget that Poland, for example, might be ready to play some such part as Servia played in 1914, if she had the assurance that England, France and Italy would support her.

It would seem, therefore, that though the danger of a destructive war is not yet imminent, the shadow of such a possibility within, say, the next five years, lies heavily over the whole face of Europe. There is so much inflamable material and that leaven of right-thinking I have referred to above, works very slowly among the great mass of unintelligent opinion. Wherefore, should those able but misguided intellects which exercise such immense control over European finance, find or contrive a truly plausible reason for taking up arms, they will not fail to carry the body of public opinion with them. The result would be, in my opinion, the complete ruin of our present European civilisatian for half a century. It may be, perhaps, that such a downfall is inevitable sooner or later.

At the moment, this subject of international complications is so prominent that other matters seem of comparatively small importance, since with this ever-present threat hanging over us it is impossible to look into the future without giving expression to that vital contingent, "unless there is no war." But there are signs that we have passed the deepest trough of the economic depression and that trade is beginning, however feebly, to recover. Such a recovery when it comes will not solve any essential problem. Though Europe and America should rise again to financial prosperity, we should not thereby avert the probability of still another reaction. The whole system of

credit with its basis of public confidence is purely artificial and will not be less liable to fail in the future than it has been in the past. Yet if it were only for the sake of the suffering millions of unemployed throughout Europe, we must welcome the probability that we are emerging from the disastrous effects of the last war, however unstable may be the means of that emergence.

In Great Britain the number of the registered unemployed was 2,338,727 for the month ending Sep. 25, a decrease of 566,338 since last January. This maintains the steady fall in the number of the unemployed throughout every month of this year, despite the usual seasonal influences that tend to throw men and women out of work in the Autumn. We do not get such precise figures from other countries, but the general reports go to show that elsewhere in Europe and the United States, there are similar indications of an incipient trade revival. President Roosevelt's attempt to engineer an artificial rise in wages has not yet failed, and although we cannot doubt that it must have failed had it been attempted two years earlier, should it now happily coincide with the returning tide of trade prosperity, the experiment will doubtless be hailed as a contributory factor. President Roosevelt must, also, be credited with making a praiseworthy attempt to combat the crime and corruption which has earned the United States the unenviable distinction of being at the present time the least law-abiding country in the world. But a change of spirit is the only cure for these evils. *A surface morality imposed by legal restrictions, has no ethical value and the inherent evils will manifest themselves in some other form of expression.*

I cannot close this letter without a reference to Russia. I was talking a few days ago to a young English student of nineteen, who had just returned from three weeks' visit, with three companions, to Moscow and Leningrad, and the picture he gave me coincided so nearly with other reports I have had that I am inclined to give it a measure of credence. This somewhat tentative acceptance of his comments is not intended to disparage his intelligence or powers of observation, but it is so peculiarly true in this connection, that there are no facts, only human testimony. Those who visit Russia look for the signs that they hope to find. The Communist recognises the evidence of success, the Conservative that of failure.

With this qualification, however, and writing with as little prejudice as may be, I am of opinion that the great Bolshevik experiment is doomed ultimately to failure. It is no longer Marxian either in theory or practice. With the recognition of private property to the extent of graduated wages,—and there are even two classes, known as "hard" and "soft," on the State Railways,—the spirit of emulation, the desire for a less restricted race for wealth will return possibly with renewed force. The majority of the people in the public streets, my informant told me, looked depressed and spiritless. In the last two years, less care seems to have been taken of the children. The older people crowd such churches as are still open to them. The younger, those who have come under Bolshevik training during the past sixteen years, have no inspiration more elevating than a kind of sterile Positivism, in which the ideal is less that of a world republic than of a happy Russia.

And I do not find in these indications the promise of happiness for the Russian people. Communism imposed from without has the same weakness as any other form of restrictive government, such as Fascism. It works by repression and induces reaction. The recoil may be slow, but it is inevitable, if the history of the world, so far as it is known to us, has any value in providing us with precedents. One spirit alone has any true and lasting virtue, the spirit of universal goodwill towards men.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS.

With this issue THE ARYAN PATH completes its fourth volume. It has steadily gained in influence and is a welcome friend to many. Though its circulation is limited, as was anticipated from the beginning, the ideals it labours for, the programme it is faithful to, and especially the policy it pursues, have a large circle of admirers. The publication of even those views with which its editors and promoters do not agree has been recognized as generous. Free discussion, temperate, candid, untinged by personality and animosity, is, we think, the most efficacious means of getting rid of error and bringing out the underlying truth.

Our programme is to raise discussion and also to give instruction to those who desire not only to learn but also to apply—and without theoretical knowledge practice is not possible. THE ARYAN PATH indicates sound and healthy ways of practice for the self-conscious intelligence, generally named the soul. The danger of our cycle is not ignorance but wrong knowledge; not the absence of teachers but the presence of educators, themselves in need of Light.

Our plan is to gather together immemorial fragments of that Living Wisdom preached by the Sages, especially those of the Orient, but also by not a few proficients such as St. Germain and Paracelsus in Europe. Its latest exponent was the much decried H. P. Blavatsky, who named it Theosophy, a word in use in earlier centuries and especially among the Neoplatonists. The term Theosophy is now discredited, for which some of the colleagues and pupils of Madame Blavatsky themselves are to be blamed; similarly the term Aryan may presently be discredited because of its misappropriation by the German Nazis. The resuscitation of pure Theosophy and of the pure Aryan-ism which too has become corrupted even in India, the land of its origin, is among our tasks.

The mischievous segregation of cultures into Western and Eastern, the claims of superiority made now by one, now by the other, are rooted in prejudice. THE ARYAN PATH wants to show that a single line of force binds the continents; that there is neither East nor West, nor border, nor breed, nor birth, for the strong souls.

We hold before ourselves the ideal of a humanity grown wise enough to recognize the protection and guidance for itself which streams forth from the land of the Wise Immortals.

ओ३म्

सेतूंस्तर दुस्तरान् अक्रोधेन क्रोधं सत्येनानृतम् ।

"Cross the passes so difficult to cross.
(Conquer) wrath with peace; untruth with truth."

Sāma-Veda.

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV FEBRUARY 1933 No. 2

BECOME THAT WHICH THOU ART

The oneness of the soul with the Self is already a fact, and not a thing that requires a further effort to bring it about; therefore the recognition of the truth of the text "That thou Art" is sufficient to put an end to the personality of the soul, in the same way as the recognition of the piece of rope is sufficient to abolish the snake that fictitiously represents itself in place of the piece of rope. No sooner is the personality of the soul denied than the whole empirical habitual order of life disappears with it, to make up which the lower and plural manifestation of the self falsely presents itself.

Thus Shankara, the great sage of India presents in a veritable nutshell the kernel of his teachings. It contains not only a theory but also a practice to be daily carried out. Just as for the good health of the body physical exercise is necessary, so for the health of the man himself daily regular discipline is equally necessary. The theory, its practice and the result accruing, are all contained in the above-quoted terse exposition. To understand it better we should analyse it and note the following propositions:—

(*a*) Spirit and soul are not one, but two; yet an identity subsists between them; though two, they should never be separated.

(*b*) Soul and personality are two, not one; and the identification of the former with the latter leads to the death of the soul; they should ever be distinguished and separated.

(*c*) Spirit (That) and soul (thou) are indissolubly linked, and a constant remembrance of the fact will be achieved by the aid of the formula or mantra—That thou Art: *Tat tvam Asi.*

(*d*) Such daily practice puts an end to the personality—the *persona* or mask of the soul; the death of the personality frees the soul and enables it to know itself as the Spirit, as Omnipresent Life.

The early Christian philosophers distinguished between soul and Spirit; in their psychology

man was a triad of body, soul and Spirit. Christian theologians materialized the teaching, and the indissoluble link between soul and Spirit was forgotten. In place of the Spirit, omnipresent and therefore within man's heart, an anthropomorphic God without was instituted. From that corrupting influence Christendom is not yet freed. Other theologies have produced a similar corruption in other lands.

Prayer and praise are offered to an extra-cosmic Personal God, who acts cruelly in spite of his love, and who creates chaos and allows wickedness to flourish in spite of his omniscience. Propitiating such an idol, man has become intensely personal, superstitious and cruel. The physical results of psychical beliefs are even less recognized than are the physiological results of psychological opinions on the human corpus and bodily health. The moral weakness engendered by a belief in an anthropomorphic God is great indeed. Even the achievements of materialistic science have not freed the masses from this folly. Human hearts are empty, as churches are empty, of divinity. The efflorescence of such religious beliefs is to be noticed in our civilization which regards the human personality as sacrosanct. The personality has usurped the authority of the soul and in its borrowed robes rules with cunning and craft. The Spirit has become merely a metaphorical expression, applied for the most part to some undefined force which springs from the personality. Personality is considered to be the parent of the soul and Spirit.

Modern habits and thoughts have led men in a direction opposite from that which Shankara recommended. Personality of the soul is not denied, be it noted, while the Spirit behind and within the soul *is* denied. When people use the phrase "self-expression," they mean the creative activity of the personal self—the mask of the soul. People make ropes and call them serpents and either fear them like children or juggle with them like *madāris*.

Man is threefold: (1) animal man, (2) rational man, and (3) divine man. At present the animal man has conquered his rational being to such an extent that the divinity in him has retired into silence and darkness. The rational man must reclaim his lost position; and Shankara teaches that the first act in rational living is for man to deny the place of power to the personality or animal man. We must not, however, overlook the fact, as some false pietists of bewildered soul in India have done, that the animal man possesses power to create. Even the spiritually dead enjoy all their delights; they have intellectual power and attainments, and can be intensely active. As alcohol exhilarates, so animal-creativeness produces a sense of exaltation, strong though temporary, and thus people are glamoured and mistake the demoniac for the divine.

The soul of our civilization is *kama-manas*, animal-man. Our race has yet to learn that *a high development of the intellectual faculties does not imply spiritual and true life.*

The very act of denial which Shankara advocates, if rationally performed, produces a great change in one's attitude to the whole of life. Mere denial of evil or disease produces its own kind of glamour, as also the absolution pronounced on the penitent by a priest. In the rational denial man finds the light of the Father-Confessor within himself, and if he persists in his task he will soon know himself as one newly born.

What stands in the way of the intelligent modern man taking that rational position? Animal delights; to multitudes of men and women these constitute the highest ideal of human happiness. The tireless pursuit of riches, of the amusements and entertainments of social life; the cultivation of graces of manner, of taste in dress, of social preferment, of scientific distinction, intoxicate and enrapture these dead-alive.

People generally are not afflicted with maleficence; rarely does a man commit wickedness deliberately and of set purpose. For the most part man suffers from the defects of his quality, which shows itself remarkably in the depth of the sense of humour he possesses. Modern philosophers and psycho-physiologists are not agreed about the genesis of the sense of humour or about the manner of its expressions. According to the ancients and in the Esoteric philosophy, man's sense of humour is a constituent of his psychological nature and produces physiological effects. By his thoughts and feelings, by his will-full or will-less actions, each person attracts to himself elementals, which are forces of Nature, personified as gnomes, undines, sylphs and salamanders; these forces manufacture certain "fluids" named humours, one of which disproportionately predominating marks a man as phlegmatic or sanguine or choleric or melancholic. The quantity and quality of these elemental forces are attracted by men unconsciously to themselves, whereas they are servile agents of the trained occultist. Men and women under the sway of their personal self-centredness are obsessed by these forces which intoxicate them and goad them to chase the shadows of life.

Courage is required in abandoning this broad road of shades for the strait and narrow path of Life. Mortification and sacrifice are needed if a man is to give up his life, so that he may Live.

THE FAMILY

[**B. M.** is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it. We think our readers will find real inspiration in this *new* series.—EDS.]

> From the influence of impiety the females of a family grow vicious; and from women that are become vicious arises the confusion of castes.—*Bhagavad-Gita*, I, 41.

Such is the reason Arjuna advances to Krishna in the very first chapter; he explains his argument in subsequent verses. Not as an excuse for his timidity does Arjuna wear the mask of a philosopher. Hero of a thousand battles, not a trace of cowardice remained in his blood. What was his argument? He who disturbs the peace of the family precipitates the destruction of the family. Such disturbance of family life (*Kula-dharma*) culminates in the loss of virtue of the women of that family; this, in its turn, shakes the very foundations of society, because the vicious woman becomes the womb of the outcaste. Once the family dharma—laws which uphold and sustain the family—is disregarded, the larger unit, the society, is corrupted.

Arjuna reasons: If he and his brothers disturb the peace of the family even though their own relatives were evil, were over-throwing justice and torturing righteousness, they themselves would be responsible for the ultimate destruction of the whole kingdom. Where was the glory and what was the good of ruling over a people who would be casteless?

Now, the *Gita* is a book of many meanings and many messages: its metaphysics and philosophy tell the story of the macrocosm, its psychology that of the microcosm; it is history concerned with weak humans, and myth concerned with mighty gods; above all it teaches the Secret Science, *i.e.* the Science of the Soul; and how? As the hidden soul in man unfolds, it hears message after message hidden in this Song of Life.

Therefore *Kula-dharma*, family-life, and corruption of women, and the arising of caste confusion—all have different meanings. Thus, there is the psychological confusion of caste in most men of to-day, for their inner aspirations do not harmonize with their de

sires and cause confusion in body and brain. Each one of us is male-female. Just as in the body of every male the female exists in latency and *vice versa*, so also in our minds and morals, we may be male or female or both—generally both. There is a whole male line of evolution, and there is another, the female line; both these mix and mingle in the human being. Celibacy which chelas of real Gurus are called upon to practise extends to all states of consciousness; there is mental celibacy, there is emotional chastity, there is psychic virginity, there is noëtic continence, and so forth, and without these the legitimate and healthy birth of intuition cannot result. Each human being is a family in himself, and each one has to observe his own family-dharma within himself. Corruption of this particular family-dharma begets its own confusion; on the other hand, its correct observance begets the Deathless Race of Immortals. So there are different ways in which this as all other *Gita* doctrines can be interpreted. The soul, through its progressive awakenings, obtains one key and then another, which enables it to perceive these interpretations.

But let us consider the society around us in the light of this principle. Caste-destruction did take place and confusion ensued: India is said to be caste-ridden; it *is* with false castes. For 5000 years now the colours (*varna*) of our peoples have become mixed; for 5000 years on this sacred soil the confusion of castes has flourished, dragging India down and down. It is notable that Krishna did not answer, did not even consider, the specific objection Arjuna raised. He began with most lofty ideas, metaphysical and ethical; and when he came to speak of castes, He mentioned *Karma*-effects of *Gunas*-qualities, according to which the colours (*varna*) of men's characters and dispositions show themselves, life after life. Moreover, caste confusion prevails all over the world, and not only in our India.

Caste-confusion is the outstanding mark of the Kaliyuga, the cycle inaugurated by Krishna. It will persist among the masses of mankind who belong to Kali-yuga. That confusion will continue to disturb family life (*Kula-dharma*), will continue to corrupt the morals of womankind, and will ultimately compel people to doubt their own ways, their reasonings, themselves even, and then set them thinking. This is what is happening in our midst, but not on any large scale, because sex evil is almost universal, and more, it is not even looked upon as evil but is considered to be a natural phenomenon. Corrupt family life of this age is the direct outcome of sex evil.

Why did Krishna inaugurate such an era? To give direction to human evolution. Teachers and Revelations (*Rishis* and *Shastras*) help men in earlier cycles; through obedience and belief they grow; they are helped by Nature, as the infant is fed by

the mother; the impulse given by Divine Incarnations and Holy Books carries them along. When that is withdrawn good living becomes mechanical and would disappear producing a greater chaos than even now exists, if Krishna did not set into motion His own wheel. The aim of Krishna then was to help men to live by conviction and not by belief. Not to allow the complete obliteration of the work of the previous Incarnations did Krishna come, but to sustain Their labour in the only right way open to Him, *viz.*, to make men rely on the impacts within themselves, impacts received by them from Teachers and Revelations. That is why Krishna is considered the most important of the avataras of Vishnu. Living in bliss within themselves, living at peace with all, people did not know for themselves what Light was. Shadows became necessary; a dark-cycle, Kali-yuga, became due; and Krishna ushered in that new era.

The second outstanding mark of this Iron Age is individualism. The way of growth is individualistic. Why? Because each man has to make his own effort, unaided by any one, save by that which he has acquired and which is within himself. Each man, each woman must remove his or her own caste-confusion, by re-establishing his or her own family-dharma.

The way out of the darkness of this age for every individual is through the family-unit. Arjuna's fear was not unfounded; but Krishna did not come to destroy family-life, *Kula-dharma*, but to help men and women establish it on the rock of knowledge, so that it can never again become mechanical, never again become a matter of belief, of tradition, of form.

Manu-Smriti, the Tradition handed down by Manu, gives the necessary information, but we must practise it intelligently, after due study and understanding.

B. M.

Where women are honoured, there verily the Devas rejoice; where they are not honoured, there indeed all rites are fruitless.

—MANU-SMRITI (Laws of Manu) iii-56

TOLSTOY'S BELIEF AND PRACTICE

[There is perhaps no other Englishman more capable of doing justice to the subject of this article than **Aylmer Maude,** Honorary Organizing Secretary of the Tolstoy Society. In him flows good Quaker blood, and he incorporates in his education Russian experience. Educated partly at Moscow, he also taught there. Then he was Manager and later Director of the Russian Carpet Company. In 1898 he helped to arrange the Doukhobors' migration to Canada. He knew Tolstoy personally and is the author of several volumes about him as well as the translator of many of the works of the great Passive Resister.—EDS.]

Tolstóy's religious opinions evolved considerably from 1879 when he wrote his *Confession*, to 1902 when he wrote *What is Religion?* But to the end of his life he held tenaciously to the precept of non-resistance which he formulated when translating the Gospels into modern Russian in 1882, and during his last twenty-five years elaborated and persistently applied to his own affairs.

Starting from the text: "Resist not him that is evil, but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. . . . Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away,"—he arrived at the conclusion that it is morally indefensible to use physical force to punish or restrain any man, and that therefore the whole structure of our social life, involving as it does the employment of armies, navies, police, prisons, and compulsory legal proceedings to maintain property rights, is harmful and wrong. In fact he regarded all employment of physical force by man to man as injurious violence.

It is not necessary to discuss that belief here, for I have done so in my *Life of Tolstóy*. What concerns us at present is the influence of his belief on his own life and conduct.

It made him resolve to get rid of his estates, renounce any further copyright in his works, and accept no payment for anything he wrote.

His wish was to hand over his estates to the peasants of Yásnaya Polyána where he lived, but he was baulked in this by the strenuous opposition of his wife who rather than see her children deprived of the estates was ready to appeal to the Tsar to have her husband declared incompetent to manage his property. One understands her view of the case: she had eight children, and was bent on maintaining (or if possible improving) the social position the family enjoyed and which she considered to be their due. Be that as it may, the clash of opinion between husband and wife produced very painful results and it was only Tolstóy's firm conviction of the validity of his non-resistant principle that enabled him to withstand the pressure brought to bear on him by his

wife and by the relations and friends who sided with her. He was however resolved, if he might not give his lands to the peasants, at least not to own them himself, and he got his wife and children to divide up his estates in equal portions among themselves and formal transfers were signed accordingly.

Having done that, he wanted to leave home and live in poverty among the peasants, but again his wife strenuously insisted that he must not leave her ; and he had to choose between yielding to her demands or arousing anger and bitterness in her as a first step on the path which he had hoped would show the way to goodwill among men. Once again he felt it his duty to yield to his wife, and by so doing incurred much misrepresentation and misunderstanding among those who shared the views he had expressed and wished him to give outward proof of his consistence by abandoning his family and living among the peasants.

What he was able to do, and did do, in the teeth of much ridicule and opposition, was to abandon alcohol and tobacco, to become a strict vegetarian, and to dress in simple clothes like the peasants. All this was opposed by his wife, who ridiculed him in private and before visitors, and made things as unpleasant as possible, hoping to induce him to return to a conventional mode of life.

Early in the eighteen-nineties he wrote the short and simple stories now collected in the volume of *Twenty-Three Tales*. This he did from a feeling that because he ate the fruit of the peasants' toil it was incumbent on him to provide them with food as wholesome for them mentally as their bread was for him physically.

Whenever it came to publishing anything, however, he met with reproaches and unpleasantness, for he had announced that he would take no payment and that all who cared to were free to publish and republish his writings as they pleased. His wife, who was publishing a collected edition of his works, was most anxious, if she could not have the copyright, to secure at least the first publication of what he wrote. He however wished that no money from his writings should come to his family, and preferred to give such stories as were suitable for the purpose to the *Posrédnik*, a benevolent group devoted to publishing and distributing very cheap and wholesome literature for the people in place of the penny-dreadfuls and grossly superstitious church Lives of the Saints as were then usually sold at country fairs, and formed almost the sole literary sustenance of the mass of the population.

This cause of discord recurred continually, and Tolstóy once told me that from the time he renounced copyright the appearance of each new work of his had caused him distress, though previously it had been a pleasure to complete and publish a new

work. Apart from his wife's feeling in the matter, it might fairly be argued that to allow valuable literary property to be scrambled for naturally tends to occasion friction, strife, and ill-will. And in this case a chronic and most bitter strife grew up between the Countess and Tolstóy's chief friend V. G. Chertkóv, who had set his heart on obtaining control of Tolstóy's literary output and did eventually secure control of his literary inheritance. So bitter was this strife, and so jealous was the Countess of Chertkóv's influence over her husband, that her mind became unbalanced. She developed hysteria, suicidal mania and, the doctor said, paranoia. Be that as it may, though she suffered from delusions on certain subjects she remained quite sane and mentally alert on others. To Tolstóy this strife was so painful that eventually, after some twenty years of it, he found it impossible to remain at Yásnaya Polyána, and escaped secretly one dark winter night with no definite plan of where to go or what to do. After a short visit to his sister he fell ill, and died at the wayside station of Astápovo, little more than a hundred miles from home, a martyr to the rule of conduct he had adopted; and though it may be reasonable to question the validity of some of his opinions, the facts supply conclusive evidence of his complete sincerity and of his readiness to sacrifice all for what he believed to be right.

His posthumous play, *The Light Shines in Darkness*, gives a vivid and a close description of the conditions of his life at home, and of the suffering he endured there.

The great influence the rule of non-resistance exercised on his life has caused me to leave unmentioned many other religious motives that actuated him, and perhaps some readers may not quite perceive the connection between the rule "Resist not him that is evil" and the obligation Tolstóy felt to abandon his property. His view was that to hold property (literary or other) one has to be ready to defend it personally or by appeal to the law, and personal violence as well as the violence practised by the law, which if resisted leads on to the killing of the resister, are both, *ex hypothesi*, immoral.

In the years 1891-2 Tolstóy devoted himself whole-heartedly to the relief of sufferers in the famine district of Túla and Ryazán provinces, and rendered excellent service both by personally organizing the relief and attracting others to the work, as well as by publishing articles which made known the extent of the famine the government was trying to conceal. But this activity, useful and highly appreciated as it was, left him dissatisfied. He was oppressed by the anomaly of the peasants, who produced the food for everybody, having to be saved from starvation by contributions collected from those who lived by the peasant's toil—saved by "distributing the vomit of the rich" as he phrased it.

A means by which he hoped for the reform of society is indicated in his *Essays on Art*, a work the profundity and validity of which has even yet not been sufficiently realised. It occupied him off and on for fifteen years and was itself the result and the expression of his profoundest beliefs; and he published it knowing well that it would earn him the scorn and denunciation of those addicted to that opiate art which drugs both its producers and its devotees.

AYLMER MAUDE

SEEING THE SELF

To man, the world is a mirror to see the Self, and is hence the subject of his study. The scientist studies it by observation, while the philosopher does it by contemplation, and gets to know the nature of the Self. The man first observes the world around him, then recognises the relation between the sensations and the sense objects, and forms concepts by correspondences (sankalpa) and differentiation (vikalpa) and thus develops his faculties by analytical thinking. He separates himself from his senses, and listens to the teachings of scriptures (sravanam) through the Acharyas regarding the nature of the Self. He then studies these truths and ponders over them by cogitation (mananam) and when by mental abstraction and profound contemplation (nididhyasa) he grasps the abstract truths through his penetrative intellect, he becomes convinced of the highest truth, the one reality. Even then the scripture says to him "Atma (Paramatma) is not attainable by the study of the Vedas nor by keen intellect etc.; to reach Ishwara there must be the quenchless thirst for Him." Now Ishwara is Sabda-Brahman, the Word-manifest, the Nameless Name. He is transcendental (nirguna) but out of pure compassion for us and for the purpose of helping humanity, takes a human form (IX–11). So when after study and deep thinking, the devotee begins to concentrate his mind and fixes it on the image, he goes "from the circumference to the centre" so to say. By means of nama, rupa and mantra, he transcends his mind and gets within, and his centre of gravity is slowly shifted from the head to the heart which now flows towards Bhagawan, as a stream of oil, continuous and unbroken. For, Sri Krishna says in the sixth discourse that when the senses become insensitive, and the mind is serene and quiet, the antahkarana which is the bridge between the lower mind (head) and the higher mind (heart) becomes purified, atman is seen which is the supreme intelligence (chaitanya) and the all-resplendent Light of Ishwara" (VI–20).

PANDIT BHAVANI SHANKAR

RELIGION AS A PERSONAL AFFAIR

[**Charles W. Ferguson** is the author of *The Confusion of Tongues* and is interested in broadening the religious mind of the race. A few months ago he was busy forming in New York a new publishing house to be devoted exclusively to selected books in the field of religion and ethics. He writes: "We want to present various points of view on matters of general interest, and we shall later have a distinguished editorial council to advise on our policies." —EDS.]

It seems to me odd that a man's faith, which is certainly the most intimate thing he possesses, should be considered the business of anyone but himself. I say this in no spirit of bitterness; nor do I say it as a protest against the increasing encroachment upon privacy which forces all of us to live in glass houses. I am not thinking so much of free speech as I am of free silence. I do not contend that a man should be allowed to say what he believes, but that he ought to be allowed to believe what he wishes without saying anything at all. Religion should be granted some privacy.

These remarks would be more simple-minded than they sound if they did not serve to introduce certain observations I want to make about religion and the future. There is good reason why, up to now, a man's faith has been the property of the community. Historically, religion has been from the days of savagery tied up with social custom. It was an affair of the tribe, later of the state, and is now an affair of the *mores*. As a result, religion has been institutionalized and has demanded, with good reason, conformity and acceptance. A man was a Methodist if he believed in the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England and the sermons of the local pastor. He was a Christian Scientist if he accepted bodily the doctrines and revelations of Mary Baker Eddy. The area of mental reservation left him in either case was highly restricted. It was confined chiefly to fields of slight difference in interpretation; feats of sharp divergence were permitted only between various groups and then only if they were kept within the bounds of dogma and propriety. There consequently grew up and still exists a theory which ostracises not only independence but privacy. The term *free-thinker* thus came to signify a pariah who dwells outside the pale of all religious practices.

The result of all this has been twofold: it has incited proselytising on a world-wide scale and identified religion with missionary zest. In the second place, it has tended to give the negative assertions of apostasy and insurrection an amount of publicity out of all proportion to their deserts.

The missionary zest has taken various forms. It has performed deeds of real sacrifice and accomplished incidental good as well as caused incidental wars. It probably reached its highest pitch in the rural stretches of America, where

roving evangelists descended periodically upon villages and ferreted out with unfailing scent all sinners and rapscallions, snatching them into the fold of the Lord with threats of hell and promises of happiness and immortality. Its most conspicuous modern expression is undoubtedly to be found in a new cult, known in England as the Oxford Movement and in America both as the First Century Christian Fellowship and as Buchmanism. Its method is to seek and save the lost by insisting upon a smart confession of past errors. In manners, it is an aggressive, bumptious movement which storms with every weapon the citadel of a man's private life. It not only invades a man's private life but also requires that every convert shout abroad the news of his regeneration for the sheer joy of it.

The vast publicity and attention which irreligion and unbelief have received of late are due, of course, to the fact that religion is still looked upon as a community matter. The press delights in attaching high significance to the statement of some nitwit who says he believes less than someone else. This is as pernicious as proselytising. A man who believes differently from his fellows and yet makes a front-page story of it has no sense of religious privacy. He keeps religion in the class with politics, bonds, and social gossip.

It is a hopeful sign, however, that the publicity attending unbelief and lessened belief may ultimately help toward the goal of religious privacy. The best instance is to be seen in the influence which Modernism left in its wake in America. As a movement, and in spirit and purpose, the modernist effort sought only to reduce the area of the church's supervision over matters of belief and to enlarge the territory of a man's own convictions. In some instances, I confess, the Modernists became rampant and dogmatic. But, in the main, the resentment which the Fundamentalist and Institutionalist felt toward their liberal brethren was due wholly to the fact that the Modernists wanted to make religion a little more private, a little less an affair of the arena and the stage. They were willing, for example, to leave certain honoured doctrines to the judgment of the individual believer. Their dissent met with shouts of treason, but they fairly well established a principle. The era of the salesman in religion is passing and we are building up what is called consumer resistance. This does not mean necessarily that we will become irreligious, but only that we will not be taken in by every campaign organized to make us think and speak one way or the other.

A number of factors have helped to prepare the way for the kingdom of privacy in matters of faith. Not the least of these has been the growing popularity and knowledge in Western countries of Oriental religions and practices. Comparative religion, now widely

taught, has played its part. The Western mind has become hospitable to a knowledge of how people feel and act in other climes; its conceit lessens every time a popular book on world religions is published. Some will deny this. They will argue that such books only serve to heighten the already lofty conceptions Westerners have about their own superiority. This may be the first effect, but it is not the last. The attrition of circumstances wears down our sharpest attitudes. The increase of world intelligence and understanding through travel, reading, even lectures, motion pictures and other minor forms of education will have the ultimate effect of showing us that no creed or culture but only a man's heart contains what is true and final.

It should also be mentioned that the multiplicity of cults and unorthodox sects in America, and to a less extent in England, has softened the severity of established religion toward unconventional belief. This would be difficult to prove. Time was, though, when a person who was a Theosophist or a Christian Scientist or a devotee of the New Thought found himself commonly regarded as queer. But the presence of an increasing number of persons who mind their own business in religion has a decidedly moderating influence on the whole. It is true that orthodox religion has been greatly annoyed by the cults, yet the established churches have been compelled to recognize that the cults are occupying a field which they, the orthodox, cannot reach. This fact has made the orthodox faiths less certain that they hold the keys to the gates of heaven and hell. If it hasn't done this, it has at least convinced the average man of it, and that is more important.

Obviously, this loosening of institutional morale will vitally affect the religion of the future. It is entirely possible that men and women will continue to accept the church as an institution and perhaps support it, albeit philosophically. Or it may be that a growing number of persons will identify themselves with the unorthodox group which comes nearest to the expression of their beliefs. What is even more likely, I believe, is that men and women will not identify themselves with any church or form of religious organization. Whatever happens, the essential fact of which we may be confident is that religion will become increasingly private, a personal affair between a man and his universe.

Beyond the spread of cultures, there is a further reason why man's religious belief will not in the future be a public matter. Religion will become more difficult to talk about and less difficult to believe. The trend of faith is undoubtedly in the direction of mysticism, in the direction of forms of belief which are fairly incommunicable. That religion will deal with beliefs which are incredible, will help to induce a privacy of faith such as the world has not been blessed with. A clue

to possible developments is afforded by the recrudescence of astrology, numerology, and kindred practices, not to mention the experimental value of Christian Science, Spiritualism, the New Thought and other species of transcendental philosophies. It is a strong temptation to giggle at the excesses and crudities of these forms of belief and miss their ultimate significance in preparing the world for a religion which believes rather than talks. For the excesses and crudities are many. They revolve mostly about the blighting utilitarianism of the Western mind; this is true even when the more mystical types of Oriental faith are imported to the West. The practical bent of the Yankee mind, as I have pointed out in another place, tends to identify religion with magic; the West is hungry for results. But this fact need not obscure the larger fact that the Western mind is, in the strange morass of American and Hindu-American religious cults, searching anxiously for reality. In the course of another fifty years the absorptions which inevitably result from an interchange of cultures will bring Western faith nearer to art and remove it farther and farther from what Americans call the business of getting on.

So we may look forward to a day when a man's vain repetitions in public and his willingness to testify, to publicize, or to promote a special brand of faith will not be taken as the measuring rod of his religion. We have had far too much exhibitionism in matters of faith. Few of us are able to discuss convincingly our experiences with the unseen. Many of us do not have these experiences frequently and do not wish them. We should not feel obliged to be devout because it is the custom, or to scoff because it attracts attention. I should like to see religion respected for what it is—a private affair. A man ought to keep his beliefs to himself—not out of false pride, not out of modesty, but out of respect for his own personality, out of a realization that every person should have some cherished possession he does not share with the public. I daresay the time will come, assisted by the growth of mysticism, the opening up of the unseen world by science, and the spread of unconventional religious movements, when a man's faith will be something he can no more confess indiscriminately than he could tell casual acquaintances and bell-hops what his bank balance is. However great may be the compulsion of a deep experience, and however impelled we may be to share it, we must realize that we cannot share it by talking about it and that we are likely to make ourselves objectionable if we try.

CHARLES W. FERGUSON

UNTOUCHABLE CLASSES AND THEIR ASSIMILATION IN HINDU SOCIETY

[**G. S. Ghurye, Ph. D.,** Reader in Sociology at the Bombay University, is the author of *Caste and Race in India*.—EDS.]

The classes called untouchables comprise a number of distinct groups, membership in each of which is generally conferred by birth therein. Each one of these groups ordinarily follows a specific occupation, which is traditionally regarded by its members as its proper occupation. Sweeping and scavenging, curing and tanning hides and skins, preparing leather-articles, working in bamboo and cane and weaving coarse cloth are the most prominent amongst them. These various occupations have this feature in common that they are looked upon by other classes of Hindu society as either degrading or polluting. According to the orthodox theory of Hindu social organization these classes form the fifth and the outcast section. They are given the appellation of untouchables because they are believed to impart pollution to members of higher sections if they touch them. But in the orthodox theory on the subject this characteristic of imparting pollution by touch belongs really to the fourth section of the Hindu society. The fifth section—that now called untouchable—is supposed, both in theory and practice, to pollute members of other sections even if they stand at a certain distance. Thus it will be realised that the so-called untouchables are, in practice, really unapproachables. It is this unapproachability that creates the main difficulties in the path of their assimilation in the Hindu society. The groups comprising this large section in any linguistic region commonly look upon one another also as untouchable.

The fact that the untouchables form in the orthodox theory the fifth section of Hindu society, and also the tendency of the groups comprising this section to regard one another as untouchable, reveals an aspect of the problem of untouchability, which all interested in its solution must clearly realize in order to appreciate fully its gravity. It is nothing else than the inherent connection that exists between the spirit of caste and untouchability, which must properly be considered as only a flagrant manifestation of the spirit of caste. The principle, which runs through the whole caste system, breathes the spirit of exclusiveness, lays down barriers between group and group and culminates in the imposition of various social and religious disabilities on the lower sections. Viewed thus, untouchability registers the highest degree of the spirit of caste. Removal of untouchability, therefore, intimately depends on the disappearance of the spirit of caste. That the diminution of the caste spirit is an essential factor in the cam-

paign against untouchability is a view which cannot be too often repeated or too much emphasized.

Incidents from actual life illustrate this close connection of untouchability with caste-spirit. The tea-party given to the Hon. Minister for Education of the Government of Bombay by the primary teachers of Nasik, and the distinction made in the seating accommodation of teachers belonging to untouchable classes, with its sequel is too recent to need complete narration. What is not clearly perceived is that the distinction tried to be observed in that tea-party between members of the untouchable section and those of other sections, is only a public manifestation of similar treatment offered, and many times accepted with chagrin or inward resentment, in orthodox Brahmin homes and institutions managed by Brahmins, to highly educated and well-situated members of castes which are traditionally believed to be next to the Brahmins in social precedence. The present writer and two of his friends had the privilege of being given this differential treatment in an institution managed by orthodox Brahmins. At dinner they were seated in a row by themselves and away from the row formed by the Brahmin members of the institution. Another friend had similar experience in the home of a Brahmin friend of his, where his seat was cleverly arranged so as to be at right angles to his host's own seat. The only difference in these cases is that the treatment given by Brahmins to members of the next lower castes at dinner was meted out to members of the untouchable section at tea, which is an occasion considered to require less sanctimonious care. Refusal to treat members of the so-called untouchable section on terms of equality by members of other sections, even when belonging to the same profession and having a more or less similar economic status, is thus only a flagrant manifestation of the mental attitude that animates the caste system.

The untouchable classes as a whole are differentiated from the other sections of Hindu society in various ways. The orthodox members of the other sections —and they form the bulk—look upon them with dislike and even contempt and regard them as incapable of a more healthy, cleanly and moral life. They spurn to have any dealings with them, which savour of anything like social intercourse. Their children are generally shunned in common schools and so segregated that it is nearer practical truth to say that they do not get admission into these schools. The untouchable classes generally find great difficulty in getting an ample supply of fresh water, because where separate wells for their use do not exist—and they are I presume few and far between—there is always great trouble in getting water from the common wells, even when they are public.

The untouchables are not al-

lowed to enter the precincts of Hindu temples; nor are they served by regular priests. Thus they cannot practise the religion they believe in. They are further prevented from taking advantage of the only method the Hindus have devised for imparting discourses on the proper ideals of life, on the Hindu ideas of cleanliness and morality, *viz.* the *Bhajans*, *Kirtans* and *Pravachans* that are conducted in the temples. Thus we have the sorry spectacle of a large section of the population utterly depressed and stagnant.*

The problem is, therefore, fourfold. First, there is the immediate need of removing the disabilities that actually hamper the development of the individual by acting as hindrances in the way of better and cleaner living. Second, to enable these classes to appreciate a cleanlier and more moral mode of life. Third, to accustom the members of other sections to a freer social intercourse with these people. And lastly, to undermine and eradicate the exclusivist spirit of caste.

For this purpose the Central organization to fight untouchability must have a net of smaller committees all over the country. There must be the Provincial committees. Every Provincial committee should appoint a small number of persons, who are sympathetic and who sign a pledge that they will work for the removal of untouchability, at least in every Taluq-town, to carry on the programme outlined by the Central organization. The Taluq-town committee should be entrusted with the work of looking into any alleged grievance of the untouchables in their own town and whenever possible in the villages of their Taluq.† Cases of bad treatment of untouchables or of refusal to admit their children to common schools, differential treatment in Government or Municipal Dispensaries are some of the grievances which this committee should try amicably to settle by private and personal negotiation and persuasion. Failing such polite remedies, the committee should communicate with the civil authorities of the place and also inform the Provincial committee about the incidents. The Provincial committee may then decide upon legal action or may confer with the higher civil authorities. Every single case of grievance should thus be taken due notice of and such organized attempts be made to remedy it.

Wherever the untouchable classes find it impossible or very difficult to get an ample supply of fresh water the Taluq-town committee, after careful investigation, should be authorized to get wells sunk at suitable places at the expense of the Provincial committee. Access to the Hindu

* I think that there are a number of other castes wholly or partially engaged in agriculture, to which these remarks will also apply, excepting that they are not considered untouchable.

† The Taulq is a subdivision of a district.

temples is quite essential, but if the trustees of some of the temples find it impossible owing to some legal difficulty to throw open the temples under their charge to the untouchables, we need not waste our energy over such temples but leave them out for the present and ask the Taluq committee to concentrate their efforts on all those temples which are not bound by such legal restrictions. We must try to see the various items in the campaign against untouchability in their proper perspective and not exaggerate the importance of temple entry so as to divert our attention from other items. Free access to Hindu temples is only one of the rights to be won as a result of the admission by the orthodox section of the social equality of these classes, and it is not the most important means for the assimilation of these classes in the Hindu society. Other measures are far more important, and it should be our objective to realize them in practice as soon as possible. In the meantime persons, specially trained for the purpose, must be employed to create public opinion among the untouchable classes for cleaner and more moral living, the essentials of which may have to be conveyed to them through the medium of stories about Hindu epic characters and saints.

Institutions, imparting mixed instruction in the vernacular curriculum, in the English language and in technical arts and crafts such as are useful in the mofussil and even in the cities, to pupils, who have finished their fourth standard of the vernacular course leading them, through a training for four years, either to the vernacular final examination or to the examination for entrance to the English High school and to certificate-examination in at least one of the technical arts and crafts—are a crying educational need of this country. Arguments in favour of such an educational development need not be entered into here. From the viewpoint of the present problem, my main contention is that when such schools or departments are established they must have full equipment for imparting scientific training in all such crafts as have been the traditional occupations of the untouchable classes. Such training will offer an object lesson in the art of personal cleanliness even under the special conditions of these occupations and may help these classes, if they avail themselves of it, to enhance their earning capacity. The other sections of the Hindu society will realize that these occupations can be carried on by all without attaching to them their traditional ideas of impurity.

Lastly, in order to help the scavenging section of these classes to become cleanly the Provincial committee should try to persuade all units of Local Self-government, which employ them, to devise ways and means so as to enable them to carry on their work without bringing their bodies in direct contact with the dirty material that has to be handled.

Simultaneously with these ef-

forts we have to prepare the minds of the populace at large to look upon untouchability as both undesirable and impracticable. To achieve this twofold object we must start an intensive propaganda preaching against untouchability. While doing this we must not be drawn into a controversy over the existence or non-existence of the doctrine of untouchability in the Hindu Dharma Shastras. We should take up the rationalist and social attitude and argue that whatever the Shastras may say on this matter modern conditions of life and doctrines of morality make untouchability both impracticable and undesirable.

Side by side with this lecturing propaganda the Provincial committee and the Taluq-committees must enlist the co-operation of the Government and local-governing units to put into practice another part of the programme, which, I consider, will have the desired effect of accustoming the public to social intercourse with the so-called untouchables. In this connection it is well to remember that power and authority, however lowly, does count and that people are not ready to hurt those in authority light-heartedly. Most people have much to do with certain public offices and local government organizations. They have, without much choice, to negotiate with persons who are employed in such offices and institutions towards whom their attitude is generally one of awe. I submit that if members of the untouchable classes are employed in such offices in every Taluq-town, the town people, however orthodox they may be, will perforce have to enter into some social intercourse with them. Such constant intercourse in semi-public activities is bound to affect the basic attitude towards untouchability. By practice all the edge of sharpness will wear out.

Educative propaganda carried on simultaneously with this programme for accustoming the people to social intercourse with the untouchables in semi-public life, will strengthen the practice into an attitude of mind ready to ignore all public manifestation of the doctrine of this age-long principle. It is with this purpose in view that I suggest that efforts should be immediately made to employ at least one or two policemen, one postman, at least one peon, each, in the offices of the Mamlatdar, the sub-Judge and the sub-Registrar in every Taluq-town preferably from among the members of the untouchable classes resident in the particular Taluq. It should also be our aim to employ them as clerks in these offices as well as in the office of the town municipality, as soon as qualified persons are available. The leaders of the untouchable classes should persuade such persons with minimum qualifications to accept clerkship in such town-offices rather than seek service in the Secretariat or other City offices. The effect of such persons being employed in the town-offices on the status and prestige of these classes would be

far greater than their rise to even higher posts in the cities, where anti-untouchability propaganda does not need to be so intensive.

Last, but the most important in the long run, is that aspect of the problem which is inherently connected with the spirit of caste. If we succeed in the all-sided attack outlined above we shall be able to see that the flagrant and public manifestation of the doctrine of untouchability ceases. But the people, who are imbued with the spirit of caste—which requires for its satisfaction hierarchical arrangement of groups with its attendant differentia of higher and lower status—will put into practice the ready advice of double standard of treatment. While tolerating some sort of social intercourse with the erstwhile untouchables in public and semi-public activities of life, orthodox people will try to avoid all such situations where they have to treat these people as their equals in some of the more intimate aspects of social intercourse. The attempt at differential seating accommodation in a public tea-party will not be made but care will be taken to see that such mixed tea-parties are if possible not arranged or, if arranged, individuals will find excuses not to attend the same. We may not expect the untouchables of today to be invited to social functions by members of higher castes. Nor will the members of higher castes freely attend social functions in the homes of the members of the present untouchable classes. Surely this is not what we want. Such treatment of a group does not constitute its assimilation into the Hindu society. For such assimilation the exclusivist spirit of caste, which revels in some sort of differentiation between group and group and necessitates the recognition of some group as the lowest in the hierarchy, must be eradicated. I have dealt with the proper method of achieving this end in my book *Caste and Race in India* and do not propose to repeat here what I have already said. I should sound a note of warning that as long as this spirit of caste is abroad the present-day untouchables will remain the lowest group of Hindu society, somehow differentiated from others, and complete assimilation will not be achieved.

G. S. GHURYE

जन्मना जायते शूद्र : संस्काराद्द्विज उच्यते ।

By birth every one is a shudra ; by samskara (self-refinement) he becomes twice-born.

D. H. LAWRENCE

THE MAN OF KAMA-MANAS

[**J. D. Beresford** gives a Theosophical reading of the strange case of D. H. Lawrence, in some ways reminiscent of that other strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Last month we published a review of Lawrence's Letters by Geoffrey West.—EDS.]

The character and writings of D. H. Lawrence were so individual, so markedly different in certain particulars from those of his intellectual equals and contemporaries, that it is inevitable we should find a very wide divergence of opinion concerning him after his death. We are asked to choose between such absurd extremes as are suggested by a comparison with Christ on the one hand and on the other his dismissal as a depraved writer of pornographic novels. In a recent (Oct. 1932) broadcast recommendation to read his lately published Letters, the speaker, a person of standing and authority in the literary world, said that Lawrence had "a truly noble mind". Mr. Huxley in his deeply interesting Preface to these Letters gives us much material for thought, but although he insists that Lawrence was an "Artist," (a term that by some minds is held to account for any peculiarity), he does not commit himself to any definite pronouncement on his moral quality. Wherefore, with all this material before us, it may interest readers of THE ARYAN PATH to attempt some account of Lawrence as judged by a theosophical standard.

In the first place it is essential to state quite definitely that Lawrence was not a loose liver. His single devotion to a woman was given to her who was afterwards his wife, a woman some years older than himself,—in which connection it is interesting to remember that he followed the example of another man of genius, also a consumptive, R. L. Stevenson. Lawrence in fact, was not a lustful man. His novels, and one at least of his letters, demonstrate his extraordinary preoccupation with sex, but it was an intellectual and in some sense a psychic rather than a physical preoccupation.

In the second place we must take account of his attitude towards humanity. In his personal relations, I found him a gentle, kindly man. He had moments of anger when opposed. I have seen his wife in tears as the result of an unforgiveably insulting injunction to silence given in a company of ten people. Nevertheless, he had a great gift of understanding and sympathy for the troubles of his friends and even of his acquaintances. Yet in his letters he appears as a fierce hater of humanity as a whole and decides that Christianity is "based on the love of self, the love of property, one degree removed," that

it is " insufficient in me. I too believe that a man must fight." That attitude became an obsession with him in the course of the war. In two letters to myself not included in those here published, he wrote that he could not " face his hated fellow men," and that he wished the whole world would " go off like a bomb in space," because " we could not live and leave all these filthy vermin rampant".

Lastly, in this connection, we must accord him the virtue of courage. No man was ever less a time server. Although he was often at his wits' end for money, he wrote always not as if he would have a million men for audience, in Goethe's phrase, but solely to satisfy his own desire.

It is natural enough that in such a queer case, apparently full of irreconcilable qualities, so many diverse judgments should have been passed upon him; but the difficulties may disappear under a theosophical explanation of his being. For to me it seems almost certain that he was a very young soul, and that his animal centres dominated his unusually fine brain. When I say "Animal," however, the description conveys no intention of grossness. It was with the horse that he had a secret affinity. There is a very remarkable letter of more than three pages in this volume, given to an exultant identification of himself with the centaur, a metaphor that could not be bettered. "Oh! Horse, Horse, Horse," he writes, " when you kick your heels you shatter an enclosure every time. And over here, " (he writes for London), "the horse is dead . . . . I don't know whether it's the pale Galilean who has triumphed, or a paleness paler than the pallor even of Jesus . . . ."; and later: " But talking seriously, man must be Centaur. This two-legged forked radish is going flabby." Mr. Huxley writes that Lawrence " could get inside the skin of an animal and tell you in the most convincing detail how it felt and how dimly, inhumanly it thought". " He sees," Vernon Lee is reported to have said in the same connection, " more than a human being ought to see. Perhaps that's why he hates humanity so much." But, to me, the most convincing piece of self-revelation is in a letter from New Mexico, dated 1922, in which he shews himself as fiercely angry with an obscene book that had been sent to him. And all the force of his strictures is directed against those who have " got their sex in their head". " Why," he asks " don't you Jeunesse let all the pus of festering sex out of your heads, and try to act from the original centres ?" That, indeed, was his own problem, and he did not know it, which was why he so furiously resented the recognition of it in another. He was continually decrying intellectuality, even his own. "I don't feel it here," he says to Mr. Huxley, and lays his hands on his midriff.

I have no space to press the analogy further, but it seems probable that in Lawrence's case

there was an unusual reaction between the Manas and the Kama-rupa, by which the animal desires and passions found expression through the mind rather than through the body, despising their medium in the act. The inference we must draw is that D. H. Lawrence had not and could not have any spiritual message for his generation. He may have been a poet and a man of genuis by literary standards, but he had no remedy for the world's suffering nor for his own.

J. D. BERESFORD

SELF-SHINING

"*The One Self shines in all but not in all does it shine forth equally.*"

The flame of Spirit burns within each, steady and clear, whether the lamp be clay or chrysoprase, but how far it can rout the outer gloom depends upon the personality in which it shines.

Soul growth and unfoldment are in terms of the thinning of the veil between the Spirit in any man and a world in desperate need of its light.

The rank materialist offers an impassable barrier to the divine ray which shines into him. The consciousness wholly concerned with things of earth, pleasures of sense and laying up of wealth, is like an opaque globe which no gleam from within can penetrate.

The personality or mask of the ordinary man is more or less translucent. Fitful gleams bear intermittent witness to the fire that glows within, but mounting passions and selfish thoughts, sweeping across the soul, now and again becloud the radiance, as storm-clouds hide the sun.

Only the personality which has yielded itself utterly to the Divine, the lower nature which has become but the passive instrument for the higher, offers no obstacle to the immaculate light. The transparent purity of the Perfected Soul serves but to guard the flame of gold from every passing gust. It cannot veil the lambent glory of the Self of All, which pours its radiance forth undimmed, as through clear alabaster, to flood the Path with light for pilgrim feet.

E. H.

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

I.—PERSONAL EXPERIENCES

[**C. E. M. Joad** is a realist and a rationalist and for that reason alone, if not for others, the straightforward record of his abnormal experiences becomes valuable. Elsewhere (p. 121) we publish a review by Mr. J. W. N. Sullivan of Mr. Joad's *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science*, and we may suggest that readers refresh their memory by perusing that review as to the type of thinker who is the recorder of the following experiences. We invited Mr. Joad to record his own abnormal experiences in the hope that the attention of thinking men may be drawn to the study of the laws underlying these phenomena. Appropriately we may quote the instruction of one of the Great Masters of Theosophy on the relationship of phenomena to philosophy :—

> Try to break thro' that great *maya* against which occult students, the world over, have always been warned by their teachers—the hankering after phenomena. Like the thirst for drink and opium, it grows with gratification. The Spiritualists are drunken with it; they are thaumaturgic sots. If you cannot be happy without phenomena you will never learn our philosophy. If you want healthy, philosophic thought, and can be satisfied with such—let us correspond. I tell you a profound truth in saying that if you (like your fabled Shloma) but choose wisdom all other things will be added unto it—in time. It adds no force to our metaphysical truths that our letters are dropped from space on to your lap or come under your pillow. If our philosophy is wrong a *wonder* will not set it right. Put that conviction into your consciousness and let us talk like sensible men. Why should we play with Jack-in-the-box; are not *our* beards grown ?
>
> It is he alone who has the love of humanity at heart, who is capable of grasping thoroughly the idea of a regenerating practical Brotherhood who is entitled to the possession of our secrets. He alone, such a man—will never misuse his powers, as there will be no fear that he should turn them to selfish ends. A man who places not the good of mankind above his own good is not worthy of becoming our *chela*—he is not worthy of becoming higher in knowledge than his neighbour. If he craves for phenomena let him be satisfied with the pranks of spiritualism. —EDS.]

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH have asked me to describe my experiences of psychical or, as I should prefer to call them, supernormal phenomena. This article contains a brief account of some of the most noteworthy. In a subsequent article I shall venture to offer certain tentative explanations, explanations which, in the present state of our knowledge, can only be regarded in the light of hypotheses, of the phenomena described.

One or two preliminary observations may serve to indicate the nature of my interest in and attitude to the subject as a whole. My approach is scientific rather than religious or philosophical. I am not convinced of personal survival, and I think it on the whole unlikely that the phenomena studied by psychical research are

caused by the communicating spirits of those who are normally called dead. I do not wish to deny this hypothesis, but I do not think that it is established, and it seems to me to be antecedently improbable. For this reason my interest in the subject is not inspired by a desire to get into touch with the surviving spirits of those to whom I was attached in life, to obtain evidence for the immortality of the soul, or of the fundamentally spiritual character of the universe. On the other hand, I do not believe, as do many, that the phenomena in question are all faked, and I do not therefore regard the literature of the subject as a testimony to nothing but the quackery of mediums and the dupery of sitters. I hold, on the contrary, that many of the phenomena are genuine and that, although the mode of their causation is unknown, they are probably to be attributed to the existence of little known and rarely developed powers of the human mind and body, powers which occultists in all countries and ages have drawn upon and invoked. As a psychologist I am intensely interested in the existence and nature of these powers, and hold that they should be investigated by the methods of observation and experiment which have proved successful in the sciences. Thus psychical research is for me primarily a branch of science.

I do not, however, believe that any explanation in terms of little known human faculties and powers would be exhaustive; in fact, I believe that no single explanation covers or is likely to cover all the ground, in the sense of applying to all the heterogeneous phenomena which are roughly classed together as psychical.

I begin with phenomena which have struck me because of their triviality. By calling them trivial I wish to imply a repudiation of the view that the phenomena in question convey some special and secret knowledge which enlarges our understanding of the universe, that they are in some important sense "significant". Nevertheless they are, I hold, totally unexplained. Moreover this character of triviality which attaches to so many phenomena points, in my view, strongly in the direction of their genuineness. There is a motive for faking messages, consolation for the bereaved, money for the faker; there is an incentive to the expert illusionist to produce sensational effects with disappearing bodies, materialising and dematerialising limbs and so forth. But who would dream of investing with significance jumping coins, tugs at children's hair, broken crockery, overturned jugs of water and those other phenomena commonly attributed to poltergeists or earth spirits?

The most remarkable set of these phenomena I have witnessed occurred in connection with Eleanor Zugun, a Rumanian peasant girl, who visited London some years ago for observation by the National Laboratory of Psychical Research. Eleanor, who

was about twelve or thirteen years old, possessed the undeveloped mentality of a child of seven or eight, and believed herself to be possessed by the devil. Evidence of possession was of two kinds. Teeth marks, scratches and weals would suddenly appear upon her face and arms without visible agency, and small objects in Eleanor's neighbourhood would alter their position, fly through the air, disappear. The former were attributed to bitings and scratchings by "Draco," the latter to his invisible powers. Both types of phenomena occurred quite frequently while Eleanor was in London. The girl would sit on the floor of the Laboratory in broad daylight playing with her toys; the observers would sit about and converse, waiting for something to happen. Small metal objects, marked coins and so forth, would appear unexpectedly in people's pockets, in the drawers of desks, on a high ledge which ran round the wall of the room just below the ceiling. This ledge was bounded on the room side by a raised rim of wood—it was used for picture and curtain hanging—and nothing placed on it could by normal means fall off. Nevertheless marked coins did continually fall off, projecting themselves visibly into the middle of the room.

A friend of mine had a curious experience. Going to say good-bye to Eleanor on the last day of her visit, he found himself unable to approach her owing to the crowd of visitors. He waved to her across the room, and after staying for a few minutes, left to catch a train. In the train he began to read a newly published book, and, finding the pages uncut, searched in his pocket for his knife. The feel of the knife seemed to him unusual and on examination it was found to be encircled with a band of metal, a metal letter C, so tightly that a hammer and chisel were required to remove it. My friend had no explanation to offer, unless this too was the work of Draco.

My interest in the whole subject was first aroused by a series of so-called messages, which were invested with just that atmosphere of trivial irrelevance of which I have spoken, qualified in one or two instances by the barest suggestion of definite and purposive malice. I give in detail one of these latter cases, since it profoundly influenced me at the time.

As an Oxford undergraduate I spent one long summer vacation with four other men on an island off the coast of Brittany. Every evening we used to experiment with the tumbler. For the benefit of those who have not yet amused themselves in this way, I should explain that the letters of the alphabet are arranged in a circle on the top of a table or some other smooth surface. An upturned tumbler or wineglass is placed in the centre of the circle, and the "sitters" put their fingers on the bottom of the glass. In a minute or two the glass will begin to move, sometimes with great rapi-

dity, over the table top, and will touch various letters. Sometimes the letters will form words which, if you are so minded, you may interpret as messages from the "spirits".

Having practised the "tumbler" every evening for five weeks we were anxious to obtain a piece of information which could not conceivably have been within the knowledge of some one or other of those present. We were determined, if we could, to rule out the "unconscious" hypothesis as an explanation of our messages. There is always a temptation to turn "spirit" information to one's own advantage, and presently somebody thought of racing "tips". We had none of us the remotest connection with the racing world, but somebody did happen to know that there was a race known as the Cesarewitch, although we could not have said where or when it was run. Accordingly we asked the tumbler for the name of the horse which would win the Cesarewitch, and immediately it spelled out the word "Romola".

Several months elapsed, and I had forgotten all about the tumbler and its message, when one morning I received a letter from one of the men asking if I had seen the names of the horses running in the Cesarewitch. I looked up the list in the paper and was thrilled to find that one of the horses was called Romola. Considerably excited, all the tumbler users laid bets on the horse, in one case to a considerable amount. The beast was scratched three days before the race. The impression I received from this example was exactly that of some rather elementary intelligence taking a mischievous delight in discomfiting those who ventured to pry into mysteries, an impression which has since been confirmed.

Coming to the more orthodox occurrences of the séance room, I have been most impressed by the phenomenon known as ectoplasm. I have seen this only once and in that dim, red light which all professional mediums seem to regard as essential to the manifestation of phenomena, on the ground that in ordinary daylight the spirit "control" is disabled from producing effects. This red light, it is important to note, is exceedingly unfavourable to accurate observation. The rays which are at the lower end of the light spectrum tend to deprive the eye of the power of accurate definition. It is not so much that objects appear blurred and indistinct; on the contrary one believes oneself to be seeing them clearly and precisely, when in fact one has lost the power to discriminate detail: and, unless this fact is known to and kept constantly in mind by the observer, he will be under the illusion that, when he has made allowance for the dimness of the light, he is seeing almost as well as he does in light of ordinary wave length.

Ectoplasm, it should be explained, is a white pulpy substance of the consistency of congealed porridge, which obtrudes itself from under the cabinet or from

between the curtains behind which the medium is sitting, undulates and bellies about the room, almost as if it were alive, and is said on occasion to form itself into definite shapes. The official theory is that it is the stuff of the medium's body temporarily dematerialised, and used by spirit agencies, the medium's control or controls, to act upon physical objects on which it produces visible effects such as change of position. I witnessed this phenomenon by the courtesy of the late M. Geley, Director of the International Metapsychical Institute in Paris, the medium being the celebrated Eva C. The ectoplasm appeared as a gelatinous drab white substance—to the touch it was rather like the white of a hard boiled egg—and, as far as I could see, it issued from the nostrils and mouth of the medium. The photographs at the end of M. Geley's book, *From the Unconscious to the Conscious*, give a good idea of the phenomenon. It was said that at the Eva C. séances the ectoplasm frequently formed itself into the shape of a woman's face; but I did not myself see this. I understand that the genuineness of these experiments has since been challenged, but owing to the lack of strict control in the séance room, I am quite unable to say whether the phenomena were genuine or not.

The most fruitful medium with whom I have sat is Rudi Schneider, who has been fairly continually under investigation in England during recent years at the National Laboratory of Psychical Research, under the directorship of Mr. Harry Price. By the courtesy of Mr. Price I have attended a number of sittings with this medium, and, although the phenomena are produced, in the usual dim red light, I can vouch for the fact that the medium is rigidly controlled, his hands and arms being held by members of the circle, who have also placed their feet upon his. Moreover, flashlight photographs of the phenomena, effected by means of electrical current, have shown them to be taking place at a distance of several yards from the medium. A full account of the phenomena will be found in Mr. Price's book *Rudi Schneider.*

Under these conditions I have seen luminous objects placed in a closed cage move and jump, tambourines and rattles play, tables move across the floor, curtains sway and belly out into the room, luminous waste paper baskets leave the ground and fly through the air; and on one memorable occasion, the medium's control, "Olga," having first warned us in a hoarse whisper—using apparently the medium's vocal chords—to sit up and take notice of what she hoped would be a hitherto unprecedented effect, I saw a handkerchief lift itself from a table, tear itself in mid-air, and then tie one end of itself into a knot. At all these séances a thermometer chart showed a marked lowering of the temperature of the room during

the séance, a remarkable fact when one reflects upon the usual effects of six or seven people sitting in a small closed room for two or three hours.

What do these apparently trivial occurrences prove? In my view, nothing that we can affirm with certainty; certainly not that the human soul is immortal or even that it survives bodily death. At the same time I believe them to be genuine, to belong to the same type as the effects traditionally produced by occultists and seers, and to stand in urgent need of explanation.

I have said nothing about psychological as opposed to physical phenomena, for the reason that I have never witnessed or experienced any that seemed to me to possess significance. By psychological phenomena I mean messages purporting to come from the surviving spirits of dead persons and telepathic and similar communications. As regards the first, I have been present when such messages have been received, but no one of them has ever contained detailed or definite information which could not conceivably have been available to the medium or the sitters. For the most part they have been couched in the language of moral uplift, and conveyed vague and platitudinous sentiments which are the stock in trade of all the ethical codes and religious systems. Moreover, messages purporting to come from the surviving spirits of intelligent men have betrayed only the sentiments, beliefs and general ideological outlook of the age, country and social class of the medium, so that I have been driven to the conclusion that if the souls of great men survive, their brains do not. As regards telepathic powers, I in common with most Westerners have lived a busy life of action and intellectual effort; I have neither time to meditate, nor inclination to sit still and listen. Consequently my subliminal self which is regarded as the source and repository of these powers, has had little chance to outcrop and my experiences have been negligible.

C. E. M. JOAD

Those who devote themselves to the gods go to the gods; the worshippers of the pitris go to the pitris; those who worship bhutas (ghosts or the so called spirits of the dead) go to them, and my worshippers come to me.

BHAGAVAD-GITA, IX, 25

CHRISTIAN IMMORTALITY AND HINDU REINCARNATION

[**M. A. Venkata Rao, M. A.**, is a lecturer in logic and philosophy at Mysore University.

H. P. Blavatsky writes (*Glossary*) that Reincarnation "is derided by some, rejected by others, called absurd and inconsistent by the third: yet it is the oldest and the most universally accepted belief from an immemorial antiquity. And if this belief was universally accepted by the most subtle philosophical minds of the pre-Christian world, surely it is not amiss that some of our modern intellectual men should also believe in it, or at least give the doctrine the benefit of the doubt. Even the Bible hints at it more than once, St. John the Baptist being regarded as the reincarnation of Elijah, and the Disciples asking whether the blind man *was born blind because of his sins*, which is equal to saying that he had *lived* and *sinned before being born blind*." Attention of those interested may be drawn to U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 8 which contains (1) "Reincarnation in Judaism and the Bible," (2) "Reincarnation in the Bible," and (3) "Christian Fathers on Reincarnation," by W. Q. Judge.—EDS.]

McTaggart and James Ward are the only prominent philosophers in the West who favour the hypothesis of rebirth. Prof. Pringle-Pattison thinks it worth discussing, though he concludes in favour of immortality. Prof. A. E. Taylor expresses surprise that a philosopher of the distinction of Dr. McTaggart should afford it the dignity of a serious discussion. Adopting the words of Kant Dr. James Ward characterises this attitude of speculative philosophers of the West with regard to the doctrine of rebirth as an "arrogance of negation". (*Realm of Ends*, p. 404, 2nd ed.) Both rebirth and immortality, perhaps, stand on the same footing so far as scientific proof is concerned, but Karma is more comprehensive and includes the truth of immortality in a form more congruent with the scientific view of the universe as a system of self-acting law.

Immortality as a doctrine of Christian theology implies the survival of the soul after death. But as mere survival has no moral value, Christian theologians postulate not merely eternal duration but eternal fellowship with God. The theory implies (1) the arbitrary creation of souls for the present embodiment, (2) the final determination of the soul's destiny on the basis of one life, (3) and a total transformation of its nature at and after death. Theology tries to mitigate the difficulty of each of these assumptions separately, without revising the common basis, which would show the reasonableness of the rebirth hypothesis.

(1) To assume that souls are created "out of nothing" at the moment of birth is open to all the objections of the "*tabula rasa*" theory of mind. Souls present remarkable differences of endowment. Environment is powerless to account for them. If heredity is appealed to, we will

have further to assume that the work of creation respects the laws of heredity and proceeds in harmony with the laws of the physical universe. If that is so, the origination of each soul involves a separate miracle, an irruption of an extra-rational power into the scheme of things.

Another objection against this view is the unthinkable extent to which the universe will become populated with souls, if each birth connotes a separate soul. "We must remember that the universe is incapable of increase. And to suppose a supply of new souls, none of which ever perished, would clearly land us in an insoluble difficulty." (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 502.) To dismiss this difficulty lightly with Pringle-Pattison as merely a species of spiritual Malthusianism is not to furnish a solution.

(2) The view of one earthly life succeeded by endless continuance is most defective from the moral standpoint. Moral perfection is a demand that cannot be fulfilled in the course of one life. As Kant put it, perfect holiness of life is unattainable in this life. The Kantian postulate implies a profound insight into the infinite riches of the soul. Man's life is a tension between infinite potentiality and finite opportunity. That is why Carlyle's cowboy will not be satisfied with half the universe. That is why no *one* of the goods of life, beauty, truth, happiness, can satisfy if rendered absolute and exclusive. Further, the spiritual life is a continuous ascent, involving infinite acts of will in endless situations. No one act is decisive. The future is always free even if the past is beyond recall. To say that final judgment is passed on the basis of one life is to condemn the soul just when it has opened its eyes to its powers. Since the moral enterprise is bound to be incomplete at death the vast majority of souls must be condemned to eternal frustration. Rebirth opens up a vaster vista and reveals the soul midway in an infinite process of realisation, gradually rising on the stepping stones of its dead selves to an immortal destiny.

(3) The idea of such immortality necessitates a total transformation of the conditions of existence at death. The soul is freed from embodiment and is sent to heaven or hell by the mere fact of death, or, on the Catholic hypothesis, it is retained in purgatory till rendered "fit for grace". A separate purgatory renders the present life unmoral; but if purgatory is a continuation of the moral struggle, it may very well be located in the field of realisation we know. Human life may be a purgatorial process, the earth a vale of soul-making.

> I cannot conceive that most of us with our narrow range of understanding and sympathies, our senseless antipathies and indifferences, and our conventional moral outlook, could ever be fitted by the mere fact of escape from the physical limitations of the body to enter at once into the life of the simply loving souls . . . . . the process of purgation begun in this life in all who have made

> any progress in good, needs for all but the very few, to be continued and intensified, and . . . for most of us, this means severe discipline. (A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, I, p. 317)

Here is the reluctant evidence of Professor Taylor in favour of a plurality of lives. He does not draw this natural conclusion, but supposes that even in heaven the process of realisation will continue.

> . . . We may reasonably anticipate that the law of dying into life holds good for heaven itself as well as for earth and purgatory. (*Ibid.* p. 321)

This only means that heaven begins here and is a quality of the soul; and if the very few appear to need no purgation, they may very well have gone through it in earlier lives. Pringle-Pattison's solution of the difficulty cuts the Gordian knot and is a remedy worse than the disease. He argues for conditional immortality. Immortality is a matter of achievement; the unfit will be remorselessly weeded out. But this is a selection more drastic than the biological. Souls are created only to be destroyed. Such a crude remedy is unnecessary; on the hypothesis of rebirth, souls have endless chances both for improvement and for counteracting the past.

The hypothesis of rebirth is free from these difficulties, and includes the elements of truth contained in the idea of immortality. The destiny of the soul is the same on both views: eternal fellowship with Deity or *Sadhana*. The Christian tradition concentrates all human values into the present life and decides the eternal fate of the soul on the basis of one life. The Eastern tradition has a deeper appreciation of the magnitude of the process and demands eternal life for its fulfilment. But instead of awkwardly putting one little earthly life of three score years and ten in juxtaposition with eternal life after death, it envisages a plurality of lives for the same soul from "everlasting to everlasting". Man's soul becomes coeval with manifestation. The speculative difficulties of a temporal creation are avoided. Eternal life is thought of as the inspiring ground of the time process, instead of mere perpetuity after death. God is rendered congruent with the universe. He becomes a sharer in the life and destiny of souls from within. All problems of predestination and grace disappear. Grace is achieved in acts of right willing; every soul is in perpetual contact with the divine life. *Samsara* is a process of entering deeply into the life of the Spirit. No souls are lost beyond redemption. Eternal death is not offered as the wages of finite sin. Prof. A. G. Hogg's criticism that the hypothesis of karma and rebirth has no connection with grace and redemption cannot be accepted. In the Hindu view of life, *Samsara* is an educative process which necessarily leads to salvation. The journey is either long or short, pleasant or unpleasant in accordance with the will of the individual. In fact degrees of salvation are recognised. As the soul explores the depth and breadth in the life of the Spirit, it

enters into and appropriates more and more of the immanent life of Deity. The first stage is *Samipya* (सामीप्य) or nearness to God, *i.e.*, entry into the kingdom, getting a hold on the eternal values; the next is *Sarupya* (सारूप्य), *i.e.*, of the same form or nature as God. Finally *Sayujya* (सायुज्य) becoming one with God, or absorption in Him. All these stages are stages of activity, of realisation, though there are differences of interpretation with regard to the last.

Rebirth is denied consideration on certain familiar grounds :—

(1) The most common objection is lack of memory. If we had a past life we should remember it. But certain people do claim to remember the incidents of their earlier embodiments. This is a matter for patient investigation and not dogmatic denial. Further, memory is not essential to growth, forgetting does not necessarily mean dropping from consciousness. Dispositions, *Vasanas* in Hindu phraseology, remain. Just as psycho-analysis claims by a special process to revive memories buried in the unconscious, it may be possible for souls at a high stage of evolution to remember all their experiences acquired at earlier stages.

(2) Prof. Taylor objects to reincarnation as "senseless repetition," but goes on to postulate stages of growth in heaven. But the karma hypothesis does not admit of mere repetition. The present sums up the past and foreshadows the future.

(3) Prof. Hogg objects that karma leaves no room for history and progressive evolution. He does not take the extreme position that karma implies no freedom at all but argues that the freedom allowed by it is negligible in effect, in view of the overwhelming results of past karma in innumerable embodiments. But surely the spell of the past may be broken by the vision of the illimitable future. Hogg's difficulty arises from the aversion of the eye from future lives. Further, from the social standpoint, Hogg urges that karma leaves no room for an ultimate triumph of God's will on earth. If each individual is concerned with his own salvation and souls are to be found at all stages of evolution, it will be impossible to hope for the kingdom of God on earth, a historical period of righteousness. The social hope is removed from the eyes and minds of men. It is sufficient to point out in reply that salvation is a state of the soul characterised by the union of universal and individual spirit. No purely personal salvation is possible on the Hindu theory. Further, the historical hope remains potent, for the Enlightened come back again and again until there is universal salvation. Further, it may be urged that to look for a "far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves" is to make the moral point of view absolute. It is to forget the religious and spiritual point of view from which the universe is already perfect. In Green's words perfection is already realised in an eter-

nal consciousness. Again karma does not deny the historical significance of the particular movements of humanity, but it is certainly against the pre-eminent fitness for grace of any one people or race.

(4) Prof. Pringle-Pattison points out that rebirth implies the discredited idea of "soul substance"; inconsistently enough he advocates immortality. It is enough to point out that the idea of immortality is meaningless apart from the survival of "something" corresponding to the soul. To accept immortality and reject rebirth on the ground of an objection to "soul substance" is unconvincing.

(5) Miss Lily McDougall in the co-operative volume *Immortality* (edited by Canon Streeter) objects that the rebirth idea "makes childhood, which appears so beautiful and so holy as the beginning of a virgin soul, a gigantic lie. It is hard to conceive how any mother can look into the dawning intelligence of her child's eyes, and be satisfied to believe that in innumerable past lives that same soul has gone through experience savage and civilised, has probably been in turn harlot or rake, victim or tyrant, wife or warrior, layman or priest and perhaps all these a hundred times". (p. 301). Evidently, in the opinion of this writer, a blank soul is more beautiful than one which comes "trailing clouds of glory". Further it is open to the mother to realise the greatness of her opportunity. Her child has chosen her of all others, as its spiritual as well as physical nurse. The privilege of assisting it to get a hold on spiritual values, and if possible to build a future better than the past, is surely a sufficient recompense for the loss of a sentimental illusion.

(6) McTaggart points out that rebirth gives scope for the realisation of all our capacities, bad as well as good. "We cannot learn the lesson alike of Galahad and of Tristram and of Caradoc. And yet they are all so good to learn. Would it not be worth much to hope that what we missed in one life might come to us in another?" (*Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 138). Prof. Pringle-Pattison objects that there is no continuity between Galahad and Tristram and Caradoc. But we have already pointed out that there may be continuity without brain memory and that a higher memory may supervene. And Prof. Taylor objects that "it would be anything but apostasy and a return to the flesh pots of Egypt for one who had been a Galahad to lead the life of Tristram". (*Faith of a Moralist*, I, p. 320.) He draws the conclusion that the "kind of immortality contemplated is radically unethical". We may reply that there is no guarantee of continuous progress. McTaggart's idea expresses a profound truth that desire determines destiny. If Galahad desires to have the experience of Tristram, he will become Tristram in course of time. Not a wish of the heart goes to waste. This idea only renders

the moral life more strenuous. But there is the satisfaction that the range of good is also infinitely widened. Newton may desire to clothe himself with the attributes of St. Francis. Einstein may desire to contribute to eternal peace.

(7) It is objected that the *modus operandi* of reincarnation is inexplicable. But so is that of the first incarnation. As Dr. Ward points out, "what to us seems complicated or impossible may be really as simple as say, movement into a third dimension, which yet a being confined to two may fail to understand." (*Realm of Ends*, p. 405.) McTaggart hazards the speculation that souls find the parentage suited for them by a kind of chemical attraction.

(8) It is sometimes urged that heredity accounts sufficiently for the original differences in endowment and aptitude between individuals. But the moral question of justification still remains. Why should a person suffer for the misdeeds or physical defects of his ancestors? Qualities of mind and body are part of the stuff that the soul has to confront. Karma offers the hypothesis that the whole environment, physical, mental and social, into which a soul is placed is the reward or punishment accorded to it, not by any external law-giver but by the natural working of the inherent laws of the universe; so that souls may choose their heredity just as individuals may choose their hats. (McTaggart.) Thus destiny is forged by every act and attitude of the soul. In this light the objections urged by Pringle-Pattison and Hogg that karma postulates a judicial tribunal of external nemesis become meaningless.

(9) It is said that rebirth becomes a rational hypothesis only on the assumption of a personal God. But the passage from a moral universe to God is assured more logically than the passage from God (the unknown) to the moral universe. (The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH pointed out with reference to a correspondence that a personal God was unnecessary for a hypothesis of karma.—July 1931, p. 498.)

Thus the hypothesis of rebirth retains the infinite moral evolution postulated in the doctrine of immortality in a more natural form, free from *ad hoc* hypotheses such as those of special purgatory, progress in heaven, ultimate triumph in history, predestination and grace and so on. Both are moral postulates, but rebirth makes fewer assumptions and enables us "to reach even tentatively a completer and more satisfactory Weltanschauung". "From this point of view death becomes indeed but a longer sleep dividing life from life as sleep divides day from day; and as there is progress from day to day, so too there may be from life to life." (Dr. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, pp. 405 and 407).

M. A. VENKATA RAO

THE MAMMON CALLED OPIUM

[**Ellen N. La Motte** is the author of *The Opium Monopoly* (1920), *The Ethics of Opium* (1924), and other volumes. She served in the war as a nurse and was decorated with the medal of special membership of the Japanese Red Cross. Since the article was written a new report has been published—*Conference on the Suppression of Opium-Smoking* held at Bangkok 9th to 27th November 1931 (Allen and Unwin, 5s.)—but it does not change the arguments and contentions of our able contributor.—EDS.]

There are two social and economic problems which demand immediate solution—two halves of the same thing, namely, the opium and drug traffic. One arising out of the other. One, however, is legalized and flourishes with impunity, while the other is clandestine and has arrayed against it the force of public opinion. It is this legalized traffic, as it affects the Orient, which seems the more evil of the two—this callous and cynical policy which for years has been pursued in the Far East by the European rulers of Oriental peoples. Selling them as much opium as possible, for the sake of the revenues. Not selling opium to their own people in Europe, mind you. Far from it. But to people in their colonial possessions in the Far East, where they could get away with a traffic they did not dare introduce " at home". Yet it would have been equally profitable if introduced " at home," through the medium of licensed shops, licensed divans, and the ordered monopoly of sales as carried on in the Orient. France, in Indo-China, runs an opium trade ; Portugal in Macao, does the same ; so do the Dutch in the Dutch East Indies ; so do the British in India, and their colonies of the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. Tremendous money is being made through the licensed opium traffic in all these places, where self-government does not exist. But not one of these European powers has had the temerity to set up opium shops in Paris, Lisbon, The Hague or London. Why not, since there is money in it ? Why isn't sauce for the goose sauce for the gander ? Is the gander wiser than the goose ? In not one of these four great European countries would public opinion tolerate the idea for one moment. Opium is all very well for the Orient, but not for the dominant white race. Its dominant position collapses the moment its social structure becomes permeated with opium. Europeans know this fact and act accordingly—the blessings of opium, so loudly extolled as no more harmful than a cup of tea, are reserved for one set of people alone.

Recently the League of Nations sent a commission to the Far East, to report on opium smoking. While the general conclusions were

that the time was "not yet ripe" to put an end to it, and thus carry out the international obligations of The Hague Convention of 1914 which called for the gradual and effective suppression of smoking—still, some interesting facts found their way into the Commission's reports.

Physical Effects: Gradual weakening of the body, disorganization and ultimately ruin of the digestive system; chronic and eventually organic constipation, the general lowering of vitality, etc.

Mental Effects: Lethargic state of mind, dulling of mental processes, gradual loss of will power, neglect of work, subordination of every interest to craving, opium becoming the main object of life.

Moral Effects: The undermining of moral conceptions, increasing unreliability, dishonesty, (especially in order to secure opium) and the loss of the sense of right and wrong.

Effects on Economic Position: The expense of addiction being out of proportion to the smoker's income: insufficient funds left for the sustaining of the smoker and his family, resulting in impoverishment or impossibility of improving the standard of living . . . . . Opinions differ widely on the question of opium smoking on the smoker's earning capacity. Judging by evidence, the possible reduction of earning capacity would be, on the average, as high as 50 per cent.

Social Effects: . . . . In the case of wealthy people the harmful effects of opium smoking may not be so generally apparent, but they cannot be disregarded. The working classes and small merchants feel all the effects of addiction in a far more serious degree than the well-to-do, and contribute more to the retarding of economic and social progress. As for the opium smoker of the coolie class, he spends on opium from 40 to 70 per cent of his daily earnings. What little is left has to provide for food, housing and clothing of the smoker and his family.*

These conclusions could have been applied with equal force to the eating of opium in India. Only, for some reason, the Commission did not go to India.

But in view of these facts, is it any wonder that European governments refuse to introduce opium into Europe? To sanction "at home" a practice which reduces earning capacity by one half, and of that half, some 40 to 70 per cent must go to providing more opium for the victim's needs? Public opinion in Europe would throw out a government which dared propose such a thing—licensed shops for the sale of this devastating drug.

The revenues derived from opium vary in the different colonies—from 10 to 25 per cent or even higher. A good, fat sum, in any event. What matters destruction of health, moral and physical, if such sums can be obtained?

* Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East. League of Nations, November, 1930. pp. 26-27, Vol. I.

But these percentages are very misleading. For example: In Brunei, in 1924, the opium revenue constituted 22·31 per cent of the total; in 1928 it constituted 21·60 per cent. This looks like a drop in consumption, but not so—in 1928 the general revenue was higher. Opium sales in 1924 were 58,000 Straits dollars, and in 1928 were more than 79,000.*

Space does not permit further details of these opium revenues, but it is for the sake of them that the Orient is drugged. *The only way to stop this exploitation rests with the people themselves. Just so long as they are willing to purchase Government opium, just so long will they have the privilege of doing so.* Again we repeat, this privilege is denied to Europeans in Europe. Here is what happens in London, according to a newspaper of September, 1930. "Heavy Fines on Opium Charges. Magistrate Says a Chinese Should be Deported." Then follows an account of finding a Chinese in Silver Lion Court in possession of opium, and opium-smoking utensils. The man was fined £150, or three months' imprisonment. "Inspector Edwards raised the question of an order for deportation should the fine not be paid. The magistrate said in the interests of the country the man should be deported."

Yet deported to Singapore, this same Chinese may obtain from the Government a license to run an opium shop. But no nonsense like this in London. The fundamental iniquity of this licensed traffic is that one set of people feels that it has the right to drug, *i.e.* to destroy, another set.

Are not Orientals equally able to protect themselves, through the force of public opinion? Is Europe wiser than the Orient? Cannot the Orient see what is happening to it, and awaken to the danger of a society undermined by opium?

ELLEN N. LA MOTTE

"Shun drugs and drinks which work the wit abuse,
Clear minds, clean bodies, need no Soma juice."

GOTAMA, THE BUDDHA

* Ibid., Vol. II, page 146.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

I.—SPACE

[**Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E.**, was until recently an Honorary Research Assistant in the Department of the History of Medicine, University College, and an Extension Lecturer at the University of London. He is the author of *Makers of Science, The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci, The Great Engineers, The Great Physicists,* and numerous text-books of Physics. The following extracts from H. P. Blavatsky's monumental work will enable the reader better to appreciate the position taken by thinkers like Dr. Hart in the following article.

> The duty of the Occultist lies with the *Soul and Spirit* of Cosmic Space, not merely with its illusive appearance and behaviour. That of official physical science is to analyze and study its *shell*—the *Ultima Thule* of the Universe and man, in the opinion of Materialism.—*The Secret Doctrine,* Vol. I, p. 589.
>
> "What is that which was, is, and will be, whether there is a Universe or not; whether there be gods or none?" asks the esoteric Senzar Catechism. And the answer made is—SPACE.—*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 9.
>
> The "Parent Space" is the eternal, ever present cause of all—the incomprehensible DEITY, whose "invisible robes" are the mystic root of all matter, and of the Universe. Space is the *one eternal thing* that we can most easily imagine, immovable in its abstraction and uninfluenced by either the presence or absence in it of an objective Universe. It is without dimension, in every sense, and self-existent. Spirit is the first differentiation from THAT, the causeless cause of both Spirit and Matter. It is, as taught in the esoteric catechism, neither limitless void, nor conditioned fulness, but both. It was and ever will be.—*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 35.
>
> The first lesson taught in Esoteric philosophy is, that the incognizable Cause does not put forth evolution, whether consciously or unconsciously, but only exhibits periodically *different aspects of itself* to the perception of *finite* Minds. Now the collective Mind—the Universal—composed of various and numberless Hosts of Creative Powers, however infinite in manifested Time, is still finite when contrasted with the unborn and undecaying Space in its supreme essential aspect.—*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 487.
>
> Physical Science will find it more difficult than it now appears to refuse room in *the Spaces* of SPACE to Planetary Spirits (gods), Elementals, and even the *Elementary* Spooks or Ghosts, and others.—*Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 620 —EDS.]

"Of one thing we may be sure," wrote Prof. A. C. da N. Andrade of London University, recently, in referring to the problems confronting the modern physicist, "for every riddle solved, two new ones will present themselves."

This is merely another form of the well-worn tag among Western Philosophers that "the more we know, the more we realise our ignorance". How does this compare with the Eastern philosophy with which the general policy of THE ARYAN PATH is associated? It is none too easy for one who is trained in the traditions and the basic concepts of European Science to answer this question.

Differences of premises, of out-

look, of modes of thought, are not easy to bridge; but a careful and impartial study of that remarkable book, *The Secret Doctrine*, written over forty-five years ago by H. P. Blavatsky, does bring out rather strikingly two very significant points. One is that most of the problems that are confronting the modern physicist to-day were certainly discussed from the special angle of Eastern philosophy by Mme. Blavatsky half a century ago; and the second point is that the general trend of research and speculation on the part of our European savants is actually bringing them into line with the pronouncements of *The Secret Doctrine* on these topics.

We propose in the course of a series of short articles to illustrate these broad tendencies, and in order to focus our ideas upon specific examples, we will remind the reader that Western physics is to-day largely concerning itself with problems of *space*, *motion*, and *time*, and that Western psychology is dealing with *memory*. Eastern Science, with a greater wisdom and appreciation of the unification of Man and his Universe, makes no line of demarcation between the *memory* of man and the *space*, *motion* and *time* of his surroundings. Nevertheless it will be interesting to take these four concepts each in turn, and see how far the outlook in the West to-day links up (through the medium of Mme. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*), with the pronouncement of the East of fifty years ago.

We begin then with Space—a topic that is assuming an enormous importance nowadays. Einstein, need we remind the reader, has taught that space does not "go on" for ever, but bends back on itself, so that, by travelling in any one direction long enough, one ultimately returns to the starting point. The straight line, in fact, becomes the circle of infinite radius, except that the universe being on this hypothesis finite, the radius must in fact just fall short of being considered infinite. On p. 615 of Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine* we read:

> "Space is a substantial though (apparently) an absolutely unknowable living Entity". . . . Such is, nevertheless, the Kabalistic teaching, and it is that of Archaic philosophy. Space is the real world, while our world is an artificial one. It is the One Unity throughout its infinitude: in its bottomless depths as on its illusive surface; a surface studded with countless phenomenal Universes, systems and mirage-like worlds.

The language of *The Secret Doctrine* is, to the Western mind, as esoteric as are its teachings—and incidentally this is entirely as it should be. But whatever meaning the above quoted passage may have in other directions, it at least implies a *finite* universe—a limit to what we have been wont, in the past, to speak of as the depths of space—finite because it is "substantial," finite because it is a "unity," because of its "illusive surface" and because of the "countless universes studding its surface".

Of equal significance is Mme. Blavatsky's reference to a " finite

Kosmos" on p. 277, Vol. I, of *The Secret Doctrine.*

> There is but one indivisible and absolute Omniscience and Intelligence in the Universe, and this thrills throughout every atom and infinitesimal point of the whole finite Kosmos which hath no bounds, and which people call SPACE, considered independently of anything contained in it.

Here is, as we see it, a complete consonance between cosmological theories of twentieth-century mathematical physicists and the nineteenth-century classical exponent of Theosophical doctrines. The Kosmos remains limitless in that its depths are incalculable—but it is a finite Kosmos none the less.

Further, the bending back of space upon itself, that is responsible for the deduction of Western physicists of the finiteness of the universe, brings us directly to the "great circle" doctrine that has so repeatedly shown itself in the history of philosophy and that Mme. Blavatsky refers to so specifically on pp. 359-360 Vol. I, of *The Secret Doctrine* as the universal symbol of the Mundane Egg. "It typifies the great Circle, or O, itself a symbol for the universe and its spherical bodies," and quoting from the Vishnu Purâna (Book 1, Ch. 2), we read, "Intellect (Mahat) . . . . the (unmanifested) gross elements inclusive, formed an egg . . . . and the lord of the universe himself abided in it, in the character of Brahmâ. In that egg, O Brahman, were the continents, and seas, and mountains, the planets and divisions of the universe, the gods, the demons and mankind."

One other aspect of this subject calls finally for comment. As between mathematicians and the metaphysicians of the West, on both of whom has devolved the task of answering the query, "What is Space?", it may on the whole fairly be said that the major contribution has come from the former. Euclid, dare we say, in the brave days of old, and Gauss, Lobatchewsky, Riemann, Clifford and Einstein in more modern times, have undoubtedly dominated the field of enquiry. And they have shown that the geometrical approach as distinct from the physical approach could not fairly be ignored. For after all geometry relates to pure space, while physics is the science of matter. The theophilosophical view-point, however, also takes cognisance of this geometrical approach in no unmistakable fashion. So we read (and with this quotation we must perforce conclude) in Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine* p. 612:

> From the very beginning of Æons—in time and space in our Round and Globe—the Mysteries of Nature . . . . were recorded by the pupils of those same now invisible "heavenly men," in geometrical figures and symbols . . . . The latter figure [*i.e.* the Pythagorean triangle], along with the plane cube and circle, are more eloquent and scientific descriptions of the order of the evolution of the Universe, spiritual and psychic, as well as physical, than volumes of descriptive Cosmogonies and revealed "*Geneses*".

IVOR B. HART

THE COLOUR QUESTION

[**Ethel Mannin** left school at the age of 14, edited a magazine at 17, and published her first book at 22. The interesting story of her life is told in *Confessions and Impressions*. Of Irish origin, she has risen from the working-class with which she sympathises and for which she labours.—EDS.]

Intelligent people may agree to differ on political and religious issues, but the Colour question appears to touch something deep down in their blood, beyond the control of reasoning. A man may talk intelligently on education, sex, religion, politics, literature, the art of living, and you think, "Ah, here at last is an intelligent person as free of preconceived ideas and prejudices as a human being can be," and you feel quite safe in sounding him on his attitude towards the coloured races of mankind—and are shocked to find that here his intelligence gives out. As reason goes out by the intellectual window all the old clichés and platitudes and prejudices come in by the emotional door.

In vain do you urge that the Negro race represents one of the four main divisions of mankind; in vain do you quote statistics to show the millions by which the coloured peoples outnumber the white; and in vain point out that the primitive vocabulary of the early Aryans formed the foundation of most of the literary languages of Europe, Persia, India, —Keltic, Italic, Hellenic, Slavonic, Teutonic, etc.; in vain do you invoke the scientific facts of anthropology and prove a common origin for all humanity, whether it be black, white, yellow, or brown. In all save a very small minority there rises up an insurmountable barrier called the Colour Bar, and as easily convince the English "'huntin' counties" of the barbaric cruelty of blood-sports as dissolve it.

Coming up by the Continental boat-train from Dover the other day I shared a third-class compartment with a young Negro pastor and two American women —that is to say they were in the compartment for a few moments when I entered it, but an altercation between the two women concerning "niggers" resulted in one of the women getting up to leave—whereupon without comment the coloured man himself solved the problem by going quietly out.

The woman who had used the word "nigger" looked across at me, and remarked complacently, "I was brought up in the South—I know niggers."

I preferred to remain silent, knowing only too well the futility of argument; I have encountered that attitude too often before, particularly from Americans. Anti-colour prejudice is too deep-rooted in the majority of white people to permit of eradication through even the most unanswerable of arguments. Only the gradual dissolution of the white races through

inter-marriage with the coloured races will ever dissolve that prejudice, and this ultimate merging of races would seem to be inevitable, when you consider that on an estimation of 1,646 million people in the world, 190 million are Negro, 23 million Red Indians, 665 million Mongolian, 52 million Malayan, 645 Indo-European, and only 81 million Semitic using the word in its broadest sense.

The arrogance of white people, and their intolerance of coloured people, is based on the alleged inferiority of the latter, intellectually and morally, with superb disregard for the fact that the oldest civilisations in the history of mankind were yellow and brown and in existence when white people were living in caves and tree-tops. It may well be that an unconscious fear of the preponderance and power of the coloured peoples causes white people to develop a self-protective "superiority complex"—another term for inferiority—in relation to them. Nor can it be disputed that the ingrained Imperialism of white people, particularly in the case of English people, has a very great deal to do with the anti-colour attitude. For "the glory of Empire"—that Empire "upon which the sun never sets" in spite of slums and unemployment and an exploited proletariat—India must be ruled with a firm hand "for its own good" and for the sake of British prestige in the East . . . . . and lest the rising tide in the East flood over the West and submerge it once and for all . . . Only, of course, that sort of thing is not admitted in the Capitalist-controlled Imperialist press; it sounds so much better—so much more dignified, and re-assuring, to talk about India's inability to govern itself, and the glory of Empire.

A friend of mine, travelling 'deck' down to Penang after wanderings in Burma was severely reprimanded by the Captain of the ship for "lowering the white man's prestige" by travelling deck with the natives. He was told that as a public-school man he should have known better . . . . Which is true; he should have known better than to attempt to pit himself against Imperialism's prejudices and tyranny of shams.

White people have little to give to the coloured peoples of the world, little to teach them, either culturally or in the art of living, whereas the coloured peoples of all races have a very great deal to give to the white, a very great deal to teach them. General Smuts once said that the African natives were the only truly happy people in the world; they lie in the sun, work only when necessary in order to eat, and live sufficient unto the day. That is one path to happiness; another lies through the philosophy of the East, that all is illusion, Maya, and only what for want of a better word I must call "the life of the spirit," living and real. That is the path to something beyond physical happiness—the path to peace, and "Sunrise in the West". Both make for a simplification of

life of which white people know comparatively nothing, and of which they will continue to know comparatively nothing until the colour bar is broken in the fusion of all races in the one race—Mankind.

As Lord Olivier pointed out some time ago the "dangers" of interbreeding and inter-marriage between white people and coloured have been grossly exaggerated, through superstition and hypocrisy on the whole colour question. *As society is at present constituted* many evils confront those who have the courage to contract "mixed marriages," but they are evils imposed by society, and by no means endemic; and society, thank heaven, will not always be as at present constituted, with its sharp and unjust and illogical differentiations of class and race, differentiations which in the latter case are directly opposed to all ethnological laws.

I am one of those who believe that Eastern civilisation gains little by the absorption of Western culture, whereas Western civilisation has much to gain from Eastern culture. But then I have little faith in Western civilisation —which reaches its monstrous apex in the United States of America, where, significantly, the colour bar is stronger than anywhere in the world—and consider that if there is any hope for white civilisation we must look for it to Russia which, again significantly, fringes the East. Civilisation may be said to have begun in Russia with the early Aryan tribes, who finally split up, some going West into Europe, others East into Persia; it may well be that civilisation will revert to its cradle for re-birth, and the new civilisation acknowledge only one race—Mankind. Then it will be purely an incidental matter of geography as to whether a man be Negro, Hindu, Chinese, European etc., and the colour bar—with all its injustice and absurdity—be as undreamed of as a "bar" between Scotch or English, Northerners or Southerners, Parisians or Provençales.

In the meantime it is futile to attempt to convert people on the colour question; centuries of prejudices and superstition have caused the taboo to become too deeply implanted; the most that can be hoped for or achieved is for the minority who do not recognise any colour bar to reach out to each other without fear or prejudice, meeting each other on the common ground of humanity, taking what each has to give, and with a respect free of sentimentalising or romanticising, never losing sight of the fact that in the end the colour question must and will dissolve of itself.

ETHEL MANNIN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A WESTERN VIEW OF INDIAN POLITICS*

[**G. D. H. Cole** is well known for his political and economic writings. In this review-article he presents a point of view to British politicians, one which especially those who are trying to mould India's political future ought to consider seriously. To Indians also he has a definite suggestion to offer.—EDS.]

At the present moment, the very foundations of politics and government are more unsettled than they have been for centuries in Western Europe. We English, at any rate, were fully of opinion, half a century ago, that we had settled the fundamental principles of politics once and for all, and that the history of the coming generations would be no more than a working out, and extension to new countries, of basic ideas already accepted as valid in a universal sense. The Englishmen of Queen Victoria's time had arrived, by a series of revolutions and reforms and also by a long continuous development of political theories, at a set of ideas which seemed as firm and unquestioned as the parallel theory of economics worked out by the classical economists. There were, indeed, critics of the prevailing political philosophy—anarchists, who repudiated all government as the illegitimate exercise of force, Hegelians who based their teaching on the unity of the State and not on its supposed democratic sanction, and Marxian Socialists who challenged, in the name of the Materialist Conception of History, any static conception at all of the structure or government of the perfect Society. But these critics were little heeded: the common view was that the State, under the parliamentary system, was destined to work out more and more fully the implications of representative democracy, and that parliamentary institutions could be regarded with assurance as the last word in political wisdom. As democracy advanced, more and more nations would become thoroughly parliamentarised; and the goal for the subjected peoples outside Europe was to be a parliamentarisation which would arise as the completion of a long process of political education carried through under the auspices of their masters. In this sense, such ideas as the "progressive Indianisation" of the government of India implied the corresponding "westernisation" of those Indians who were to participate in the government.

To-day, all this magnificent certainty is dead. The Englishman can no longer set out with confidence to westernise India, because he feels no assurance of the stability of western institutions even

* *Indian Culture through the Ages*. Vol. II. Public Life and Political Institutions. By S. V. VENKATESWARA, M. A. (Longmans, Green, London. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

in his own country. His traditional conceptions alike of parliamentarism and of democracy are being challenged more and more menacingly on every hand. Where before he only wondered how long it would take the whole world to imitate the technique of the "Mother of Parliaments" and to join with him in working out the implications of parliamentary self-government to the full, he is now compelled to take stock of strange new currents of political doctrine flowing from East to West, and to consider whether he may not have to tear up the very foundations of his own political system in order to build a barricade strong enough to resist the invaders.

It is true that, in the last resort, the ideas which are challenging western parliamentarism are themselves western; for they arise out of the Materialist Conception of History and the doctrine of the Class Struggle formulated in Western Europe by a German Jew. But the ideas of Karl Marx have come to self-realisation first in Russia; and the territory of the Soviet Union, if it touches at one end the western world, reaches also to the borders of India and China, and is far closer in many respects—above all in the traditional ways of living of its millions of peasant households—to the East than to the West. That is why Communism is able to menace the world of western capitalism over so wide a front; for it appears to have devised a form of government capable of appealing not only to the industrial proletariat of Western Europe but also to the poor peasant populations of Eastern Europe, of India, and of China.

I do not suggest that this challenge has yet destroyed the faith of the West in its traditional institutions. But it is beyond doubt that this faith has been weakened, and that the Fascist movements which have arisen in one European country after another where Communism has grown strong, have been able to ward off Communism, or Socialism only at the cost of abandoning the old beliefs in parliamentary government.

In such a situation as this, the minds of thinking people become exceptionally open to new impressions; and it is natural that the weakening of faith in the West in its own traditional ideas about the foundations of politics should be accompanied by a rising interest in the political ideas and institutions of those great sections of humanity which have behind them radically different political histories and traditions. Above all, it is natural that those who are well aware of the fundamental clash of ideas between capitalist Western Europe and Russia to-day should seek for what enlightenment they can find in the long memories and vivid independent traditions of the East.

Yet—it has long been customary to regard the Eastern peoples as possessing least of all a talent for politics. Has not China served for centuries to the West as the symbol of political stagna-

tion? And has not India through the ages amply demonstrated her political incapacity by getting repeatedly conquered, pillaged and overrun? So we in the West have been told again and again; and, even apart from foreign conquest and intervention, India's history is full enough of internal conflict, and bears little enough the stamp of any collective capacity for political unity.

All this is true—on the assumption that political capacity is to be measured in terms of the gospel of power. But must it be always so? If it must, then indeed is India, as a political unit, probably destined for ever to be the sport of developments beyond her frontiers. If she achieves national unity, she will achieve it under the impulse of western ideas. If she takes to an international ideal, and goes Communist, she will do so under the impulse of Russian ideas. *In a world of wars, powers, contending Empires, India's rôle is likely to remain secondary and unhappy. Her chance will come only if the concepts of political thought can be changed in consequence of a shift in the necessary basis of political action—in other words, only if and when she can get the chance of developing what is in her peacefully and in a world at peace.*

This thought, above all others, is borne in upon me by a reading of Professor Venkateswara's second volume of his ambitious *Indian Culture through the Ages*. In this volume he deals with Public Life and Political Institutions, and also with the movements of political thought from the Vedic foundations to the coming of the European dominion. It is Professor Venkateswara's thesis that there exists in this field a peculiar Indian heritage, Vedic above all in its origins, and owing, I think, little to any conquerors or invaders later than those Aryans who have become in effect the cultural depositories of the Indian tradition. This Indian conception naturally bases itself on what we call "local autonomy". The idea of enlarged State power is really foreign to it; and it thinks and acts far more in terms of a code of law which is the regulated embodiment of a way of life for the village and its members than of such notions as patriotism, or nationality, or prestige. In certain of its aspects it seems to me highly individualist, as Mr. Gandhi sometimes seems when he is speaking about his own soul; and yet it is deeply communal, the creed and expression of a way of living together in communities and not in isolation. Though India was lost to Buddhism centuries ago, Buddhism seems, more than any other doctrine, to express what is fundamental in the Indian tradition.

This I get from reading Professor Venkateswara's book; but I do not think he has helped me as much as he might have done to get it. He contrives to present his picture of political institutions and ideas with no more than passing references to the underlying economic conditions which

brought them to maturity. Irrigation and public works are mentioned now and again; but their overmastering importance as unifying influences is never stressed. There is no sufficient notice of the more urban ways of life of the Mohammedan invaders, no account of the historical working out of the caste system, no sufficient discussion of the parts which mountains, rivers and seas have played in the evolution of Indian political ideas, as well as in the making of Indian history. Professor Venkateswara is learned, no doubt; but I for one, after reading his work, am still at a loss to discover any real conception of the making of political forces as present in his mind. Hence his closing insistence on India's need for strong central government, valid as it may be, strikes me as utterly unconnected with everything he has said before. Surely, in the light of all that he has said, strong central government will be for India never an end, but at most a means, and will come to her, never as an internal measure of nationalist unification, based on her own traditional ideas, but only as her part in an international movement of liberation, designed to clear the way for an era of peaceful world federation, in which at last she can settle down to develop herself freely in harmony with the great historical tradition of her Aryan culture.

G. D. H. COLE

The Life of Emerson. By VAN WYCK BROOKS (E. P. Dutton & Co. $3·00)

Van Wyck Brooks has given us a book on Emerson which, while it goes to the heart of Emerson's lovers, leaves that heart a little cold. Mr. Brooks's style and fluency seem too often to have been used to gloss over a failure to penetrate into the arcanum of Emerson's inner life and to understand the profound spiritual hunger and realization that were his. Vivid as is the picture of life in Concord and the men who congregated round Emerson, we look in vain for any appreciation of what makes Emerson stand out so conspicuously among the spiritual pioneers of his time, one whose benign influence is felt in an ever increasing measure as we emancipate ourselves from the shackles of vicarious thinking—religious and scientific—and learn to follow our own inner Light. Mr. Brooks shows him as a leader of men whose strength lay in the magnetism of his nature which all felt, but few appreciated or understood. How this came to be we are not told, though Emerson himself left a record of his indebtedness to the philosophy of the Ancients. Disgusted with church and dogmatic religion, Emerson turned Eastward and lit his lamp from the ever brilliant fire of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Upanishads* as well as the Greek philosophers. It is pre-eminently to India that we must turn to find the inspiration of the *Over-Soul*, and *Cycles*, of *Spiritual Laws*, and *Compensation*.

Mr. Brooks has cleverly adapted Emerson's writings to afford us a picture of his reactions to life. It is with regret and disappointment that we lay down the book, having failed to touch more than the hem of the garment of that great liberator of the minds of men.

D. C. T.

Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Allen and Unwin, London. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Joad's book falls naturally into two parts. In the first part he attempts a destructive analysis of the idealistic theories put forth by certain modern scientific men, and in the second part he gives his own answers to the questions raised in the first part. I may say at once that both enterprises are conducted with refreshing clarity. As a philosophical writer Mr. Joad possesses an altogether unusual degree of lucidity. His obscurities are genuine obscurities. That is to say they spring either from an inherent elusiveness in the subject, or, more rarely, from Mr. Joad's imperfect understanding of the subject. They are never due to mere clumsinesses of expression. For instance, his account of the process that Eddington calls "world-building" is, compared with Eddington's own account, very obscure. But he frankly explains this by saying, "I am a layman in mathematics, and I cannot pretend to understand this argument." This is a pity for, as I may have space to explain later, the argument is an important one. I think his failure to understand it somewhat interferes with Mr. Joad's understanding of Eddington's position.

But I admit that Mr. Joad's book has convinced me that a failure to understand Eddington is very largely Eddington's own fault. Until I read this analysis I had not realised what inconsistencies (Mr. Joad thoroughly backs them by quotations) can be discovered in Eddington's philosophy. In fact, this analysis makes me doubt whether the comparatively clear outlook I derived from Eddington really does represent Eddington. I would be willing to defend my interpretation of Eddington, but I would not care to assert that I am thereby defending Eddington. As regards the analysis of Jeans I feel no such confused reluctance. Like Mr. Joad, I see no necessity for supposing that, since the world possesses mathematical characteristics, it is a *thought* in the mind of a Pure Mathematician. It may be, of course, that such a world has a mathematical designer, but that is a very different matter. And if it be true, as some mathematical logicians assert, that a mathematical web can be woven round any universe containing several objects, then the mathematical characteristics of our world would seem to be a tribute more to the ingenuity of man than to the design of God. Also, we must remember that the mathematical web is by no means yet complete, and there is no real reason to suppose that it ever will be. The attempt to describe the world mathematically is still, what Newton called it, an adventure that may or may not be successful.

But besides objecting to the doctrines that may be said to be peculiar to Eddington and Jeans, Mr. Joad objects also to the whole philosophic trend of their work. Their philosophic affiliations are, it appears, with Subjective Idealism, and Mr. Joad entirely disbelieves in that particular philosophy. Eddington and Jeans, and a good many other mathematical physicists, seem to think that modern physics lends support to that philosophy. In doing so, Mr. Joad tells us, they show their philosophical *naïveté*. They are evidently unacquainted with the criticism to which that theory has been subjected by the Realist philosophers. This is probably true. It is probable that scientific men who have reached idealistic conclusions feel that they have become philosophically more or less orthodox, and we take Mr. Joad's word for it that they have, in fact, embraced a heresy. But the question is whether modern physics brings forward fresh support for Idealism. Mr. Joad says that it does not. Our mathematical physicists have not only accepted a discredited philosophy, but they have done so by misinterpreting their mathematical physics.

The establishment of this position occupies the second part of Mr. Joad's book. Here Mr. Joad gives us not only the arguments against Idealism, but also the arguments for Realism. Thus this second part has a more remote, purely

philosophic interest. It presents the case for a particular philosophic doctrine, and is therefore doubtless open to innumerable objections from a different school of philosophy. To the reader who is not a professional philosopher Mr. Joad's case may seem convincing enough but then, as one knows from experience, a totally different case can seem equally convincing. There are, nevertheless, some aspects of Mr. Joad's general outlook which are of quite peculiar interest. I refer, in particular, to his notions of the status of the arts and of mysticism. Mr. Joad believes that there are orders of reality, and that the realm of Value, of which truth, beauty and goodness are aspects, is one of the last orders to be apprehended by the developing human consciousness. The ultimate goal of the evolutionary process is, he thinks, the development of a consciousness which is directly and constantly aware of the realm of Value.

That some of the greatest art springs from an experience which is analogous to, or identical with, the mystic vision is, I think, true. And it may be, as Mr. Joad suggests, that the artist creates precisely because he cannot retain the mystic vision. His creation is an attempt to embody, and so perpetuate, an experience which is now reminiscent. The mystic who enjoys a less transitory vision has no such need to create. It is probable, indeed, that the order of reality he perceives cannot possibly be conveyed to other minds. It is only in very rare individuals that consciousness has advanced so far as to perceive this order of reality. As the mind of man has developed it has perceived more and more factors of the universe. All these factors are equally objective and equally real, whether they be physical objects, scientific objects, or the realm of Value of which the last term is Deity. They all exist independently of us; none of them are created by our minds. Indeed, Mr. Joad is so anxious to emphasize the complete objectivity of everything we perceive, to whatever order of reality it may belong, that he will not admit that any communion with Deity occurs, even in the highest order of mystical experience. He says:

> God, it is obvious, if He is to be an object worthy of our adoration, must be kept unspotted from the world that adores Him. To suppose that the mystic can enter into communion with Him is to suppose Him infected with the frailties and imperfections of the mystic; to suppose that the saint can become one with Him is to suppose that He can become one with the saint. But, I repeat, the permanent and perfect cannot be continuous with the imperfect and the changing; nor could it, without ceasing to be itself, enter into communion with the imperfect and the changing.

This is, of course, in flat contradiction to the testimony of some of the greatest mystics as to the nature of their experience. Here Mr. Joad invokes the stammering, incoherent character of the mystic utterance, and concludes that the mystics could not have meant what they appear to say. It is difficult to understand Mr. Joad's vehemence about this. I see nothing in his philosophy which forbids us to suppose that there is a divine element in man. His notion that Christ's conception of God as a Heavenly Father "degrades" God seems to me a purely personal reaction—startling and perhaps interesting, but wholly unwarranted. The thorough elaboration of this point, however, would be foreign to the purpose of this book as expressed in its title. To return to that title, I am not quite clear, as I have already hinted, that Mr. Joad's conception of modern scientific philosophy, particularly of Eddington's is correct. I am disposed to believe that it is much more in agreement with Mr. Joad's views than he imagines. Eddington's argument about "world-building," for example, is essentially concerned to show that science—mathematical physics, at any rate—is concerned wholly with structure. To use one of his own examples, the sort of information it gives us would consist, of the Big Four at Versailles, in saying that they numbered four. The evidence for this statement is to be found in the last part of his *Mathematical Theory of Relativity*, where he succeeds in deriving the laws of field physics from certain rudimentary postulates about structure. If the Quantum Laws are eventually in-

cluded in field physics, as Einstein and others think they will be, all physical laws will be accounted for in this way. Whether or not Eddington is correct in his interpretation is not here the question. But the fact that he holds that interpretation does, I think, make his philosophy somewhat less open to Mr. Joad's objections.

J. W. N. SULLIVAN

A Manual of Buddhism for Advanced Students. By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. (The Sheldon Press, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Dedicated to her husband and son, the present *Manual of Buddhism* contributed by Mrs. Rhys Davids to the stock of literature—voluminous, but, by no means luminous—in English on the metaphysical speculations and ethical doctrines of Buddhism, is sure to be welcomed. It is a systematic attempt to reconstruct from the original Pali sources the genuine teachings of Gautama Buddha, which, she rightly complains, have been either totally lost or obscured in subsequent writings bearing on that school. Not in any manner interested in the Vedantic repudiation of the tenets of Buddhism, but devoted only to a historical study of the natural evolution of ideas and doctrines of Buddhism, Mrs. Rhys Davids has endeavoured to exhibit that Monasticism, Pessimism, Monkishness were far removed from the heart of Buddha, and that his message is intended for those who evince a dynamic, real interest in life. What is the fundamental and foundational message of Buddhism to war-weary and yet war-welcoming humanity ?

Let me write down the message in Mrs. Rhys Davids' own words :—

> The man as (a) capable of *More* [italics mine], (b) as amenable to a teaching in the *More*, (c) as seeking and finding a *More*, here and hereafter, *not* through seclusion, but, in carrying out his duties in the life of the world, as (d) capable either directly or through the more gifted few, learning how to grow in the *More*, and to make his fellows grow in it—this is man as conceived and taught by the founders of Buddhism. (p. 310)

Mrs. Rhys Davids would surely consider the "chronic recluse" and the "cenobitic Monk" as marking a fall from the ideals advocated by the founders of Buddhism who laid emphasis on a life of dynamic activity lived according to the standards of Dharma, and were dedicated to the finding of the *More* in each and to the enabling of others to find It. Avoidance of the extremes of hilarious hedonism and an irrational mortification of desires, cultivation of the will to help one's fellowmen, and a progressive realisation of the *More* constitute the essential elements of Buddhism as taught by its founders. The call of Buddhism is to find the true self in man.

Mrs. Rhys Davids need not be reminded that it is the *More* that is appealed to when individuals, communities, and nations determine and regulate their behaviour or behavioristic responses in their careers of unmitigated exploitation and self-aggrandisement, and if Buddha came to India and if Christ came to Chicago, they would be confronted with monumental repudiations of Buddhism and Christianity. When at the present day "men read a little monk-formula here, a little verse there . . . . . and then—Heaven help them!—set to and write something on Buddhism" (p. 334), students and sympathetic admirers of Buddhism have every reason to feel grateful to Mrs. Rhys Davids for her endeavours to get at the heart of Buddhism embodied in the original Pali Texts. May she be spared long to continue her scholarly researches and investigations inspired by the ideals held dear by her late lamented husband.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Vision of Asia. An Interpretation of Chinese Art and Culture. By L. CRANMER-BYNG. (John Murray. 15*s.*)

Mr. Cranmer-Byng, as co-editor of the "Wisdom of the East" series, has done more than most Englishmen of his generation to foster that mutual understanding between the East and the West upon which the future development of mankind more and more depends. And in this book he distils very delightfully and persuasively the wisdom which he has derived not only from an imaginative study of Eastern art and literature, but from life itself as he has experienced it both through contemplation and action. For the charm and conviction of his book are due primarily to this, that it expresses both a rare sensibility and that mellow human insight which comes of a selfless acceptance of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. The artist is richly endowed with the former; the public servant and man of affairs may slowly acquire the latter. It is the distinction of Mr. Cranmer-Byng to have combined the two. And there is another reason why his book should prove of particular value to Western readers. "The discovery of spiritual bonds uniting East and West" is here, as it has always been, his adventure. But those who are acquainted with his contributions to the Series that he has edited will know that he has lavished his love and his understanding particularly on China. The roots of all religious life, he would probably admit, are in India with its "vision of Being, the power of Knowing that in the midst of change and impermanence we are in Life". And this religious basis he never forgets. It is the soil out of which the human spirit flowers in all the fair forms of beauty and of art. But true to his practical sense of citizenship in this world he is less concerned with the dark abyss or the eternal beyond than with the objective realisation of the creative purpose in human life. And in China he discovers and through its sages, poets and painters and its golden age he communicates "the art of living which comprehends all the arts in one". And this emphasis upon life as an art is of unusual value to-day both from a Western and an Eastern standpoint.

Art and science, grace and utility, have become disastrously divorced in the West, with the result that art separated from life has degenerated into æstheticism, while life divorced from art has become an ugly whirl of material forces. Similarly in the East, though in a different way, the art and the religion of life have tended to become separated. Liberation from, rather than a true and perfect expression of, life has been sought with social consequences that are only too apparent. A writer, therefore, who holds the balance so justly and sensitively between the reality which underlies and transcends all form and the organised harmony which embodies it, performs a real service both to East and West. He may at least do something to correct the Western view that a sensitiveness to Ultimate Reality is incompatible with Western ideals of active order and efficiency, and at the same time combat the materialist heresy that order can be technically imposed upon life by scientific or communistic autocrats. He may, too, persuade the Easterner through the example of one of his own cultures that the Ultimate Reality to which he is so profoundly drawn can only be fully realised through creative action and demands embodiment at every level of human and social life.

The appeal of China in its golden age to one who appreciates so well the reciprocal relations of the spiritual and the material is easy to understand. For the two teachers who inspired its culture, Lao Tzŭ and Confucius, combined perfectly to balance in men's minds the two aspects of life, the in-going and the out-going will, feminine surrender and masculine action, the timeless flow and the significant expression of that flow within the limits of time and space. As Mr. Cranmer-Byng writes:—

> Broadly speaking, we may say that the Taoism of Confucius and Lao Tzu has a common stem but that each branches off in a different direction. The Tao of Confucius is

principally concerned with the conduct of man in his relation to his fellow-men, through the Family, Society, and the Race. That of Lao Tzu seeks to co-ordinate the Tao of man with the Tao of Heaven and of Earth.

Separated or imperfectly co-ordinated, each leads to death, the one to that of static formalism and conservatism, the other to a fugitive self-absorption or a mild and fluid incapacity. And Mr. Cranmer-Byng shows in his short but vivid record of the T'ang and Sang Dynasties that the periods when decay set in were always those in which the balance between the idealistic and the practical impulses was not maintained. But a true Taoist philosophy combines them both in a vital equilibrium. Its very basis, as he remarks, is the "sameness of origin between the spiritual and the material," and its "inevitable goal" is "a Unity where the two are One".

Mr. Cranmer-Byng is so entranced by and so perfectly at home with the culture of China in its golden age that he tends perhaps to attribute to it a higher degree of spiritual significance than it really possessed. In his own philosophy he distinguishes indeed clearly and carefully between true art and æstheticism, the creator and the dilettante. But the picture he draws so delicately and delightfully of life in China in the days of her spring and autumn flowering, although it reveals how sensitively the pleasures of art and the duties of service were blended, suggests, too, that this culture, so fair and subtle in outward feature, failed quite to realise the deeper spiritual significance of life. Duty and pleasure were rather equitably balanced than resolved in a profounder unity. The prevailing impression left is of a people for whom life was a gracious holiday when the necessary tasks of citizenship had been performed. A rare sense of art informed, indeed, their leisure as a fine sense of discipline pervaded their social service. But the reality which transcends in a perfect service and expression of the spirit alike the exquisite cultivation of the senses and the conscious and high-minded exercise of the social faculties was in some degree lacking. And this was due as much perhaps to the quality of Lao Tzŭ's vision as to the native Chinese temperament. That he was to some degree one-sided is shown by the fact that his teaching needed to be balanced by that of Confucius. His quietism, his yielding surrender to the flow, his philosophy of inaction, although they meant something very different, as Mr. Cranmer-Byng shows, from indolent acquiescence, reflected too much the feminine mode to embody a perfect gospel. And although Taoism, through the addition of Confucius, combined the *Yin* and the *Yang*, the female and male principles, the marriage never seems to have been quite the creative unity which Mr. Cranmer-Byng suggests that it was. To Westerners, however, in whom the male principle of self-assertion has been so over-developed, Lao Tzŭ's inspired femininity may be safely commended. And Mr. Cranmer-Byng's appreciation of it is so finely balanced by his respect for "the outward Confucianist" that he preaches equally a "wise passiveness" and an enlightened activity. There is nothing relaxed in his belief in "the immense patience of Beauty," and his view of æsthetic perception and creation as the crystallisation in living forms of the religious impulse is of particular value to-day when, "with the coming of the four-hour day comes the essential education for leisure for which the world has waited overlong".

His book is richly educative in this essential sense. It unveils the secret of being because its author has discovered the secret in himself. Like the golden age of which it tells, it is "the mellow fruit of long experience and slow maturity" and utters a gentle and persuasive challenge "to the turbid and aimless powers of Doing". It constantly affirms directly or by suggestive implication the underlying unity of man with Nature and of both with their divine source. And it expresses this unity, this identification of the self with the not-self, in the living and gracious texture of its style, at once fine and flowing like the clear water of the Chinese poet "which both receives and

reflects, which is a source of life in itself and a giver of fertility to the lands it passes through". There is nothing, writes Mr. Cranmer-Byng elsewhere, "that is incapable of co-operating in the purpose of Creation. And the final test of every work of art lies in the appeal of its vitality to ours; not in the flower but in the flame that kindles it into beauty and ourselves into recognition and response. Thus the art of life consists not merely in the ability to see the flame but to bear the flame, to liberate and let it pass from us into a future beyond our day."

The flame that inspires his writing may lack at times an intense vitality, but it is always transmuted into light, the light of a humane understanding which sheds its rays of liberating wisdom equally in the golden age of China, the steel age of to-day, and the "Cosmopolis" of an ideal to-morrow.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Martyrdom in Our Times. Two Essays on Prisons and Punishments. By A. MITCHELL INNES. (Williams and Norgate Ltd., London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

A wise, generous, and humane sentiment pervades this little book. It is an arraignment of modern penal methods, and a defence of the practices of the East in this regard. The author, who has had long administrative experience in Egypt and Siam, and has acted as a visitor to one of the prisons in England, writes with an intimate knowledge of the subject. He has personally observed the conditions in which modern legal systems work, and the deplorable consequences to which they lead. It is indignation at those consequences which has prompted the two essays—written at different times—which are here brought together.

The reforms Mr. Innes suggests are sketched only in outline, but his main criticism is that the system of legal trial and punishment in force in the modern State is brutal, impersonal and mechanical. It takes no account of the infinitely varying circumstances of character, education and motive which are involved in every crime; and the punishment it inflicts—chiefly imprisonment—is calculated to aggravate the very defects, moral and physical, which produced the offence. The traditional system of judicial administration in Eastern lands is, on the contrary, local, personal and flexible. It allows for a full consideration of all the relevant facts of a case, and not merely whether the particular breach of law—or custom—did actually take place or no. And it enables a balance to be struck in every instance between the claims of the law and the claims of religion and morality.

Mr. Innes, I think, goes to the root of the matter when he declares that "poverty is at the bottom of nearly all crime". Every dominant aspect of contemporary social life is given over to a glorification of material possessions, and yet the vast world of the poor is "sordid, squalid, underpaid and underfed". Constantly before its eyes is dangled the picture of wealth, comfort, prosperity—everything they are denied and know they can never have—if they keep within our iron law. "What Justice is there," asks Mr. Innes, "in our punishing them when we have employed all our art to tempt them to their offence?" It must be said, however, in criticism of the whole argument, that the author does not consider how his treatment of the subject might be modified in the light of a theory which does not regard the individual life as a flash in the pan, so to speak, but a stage in a continuous process of gathering and liquidating *Karma*.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Dead Towns and Living Men. By C. LEONARD WOOLLEY. (Jonathan Cape, London. 4s. 6d.)

The book was originally published by the Oxford University Press in 1920, and it is reissued with two additional chapters twelve years after,—which alone is guarantee for the sustained interest in the volume, quite apart from the fascinating personality of the renowned archæologist who keeps us company through every page. From the early days of his apprenticeship (1911-12) in Egyptology when Mr. Woolley excavated some XIX Dynasty graves in Nubia, through desultory diggings in the ancient Sabine city of Teanum (near Naples), down to systematic explorations of the antique sites of Turkey-in-Asia, notably of Carchemish, we are conducted by the author with so much directness of appeal and such an irresistible humour that we are often at a loss to decide whether we should admire the solid qualities of an archæologist or challenge the delicious vagaries of a descendant of Robinson Crusoe.

The Kurd and Arab workers were fighting their German employers of the Bagdad Railway, and there turns up Mr. Woolley to stop, by magic as it were, a pitched battle! The British Museum takes up the systematic excavation of Carchemish, following up the work of Mr. Hogarth; and the Turkish political officer—Kaimmakam of Birijik—attempting to hamper the excavation by taking cover under red-tapeism was promptly brought to his senses at the point of Mr. Woolley's revolver. The village judge, Cadi, taxed the patience of the English archæologists by making them appear before his court which had no jurisdiction over the British, thanks to the Capitulation; a second revolver trick by Mr. Woolley and the Cadi capitulated! Even when, after the world war, the British forces had evacuated Syria and Mr. Woolley was resuming the British Museum excavations (1919-20) on the Carchemish site, he was not spared the trouble of playing the *Deus ex machina* while Colonel C. (commanding the French forces at Jerablus railway station) and his party were threatened by Kurdish tribes, backed by Arabs and Turks. For who else but Mr. Woolley could venture into the camp of those dangerous Orientals and produce that welcome division in the Moslem camp, giving a fresh lease of life, generously, to the condemned French garrison? All these adventures read like episodes from the pages of Pierre Loti and Conan Doyle and seem too good romance to be true history. Maybe Mr. Woolley overacted a little as he dramatised the life he lived in those sensational settings.

One fact becomes painfully obvious throughout the narrative—Mr. Woolley's total lack of humour (and charity, the twin sister of humour) while dealing with the Turks, Old or Young! The Old Turks (described above) were dealt with at the point of a revolver, the Young Turks were riddled with bullets of savage ridicule. Their civilisation is "skin-deep," their cry of "liberty and self-determination" sheer insincerity, their municipal administration execrable (*vide* chapter: Aleppo), and their general outlook so silly as to be summarised in the phrase: "Destruction of anything old is the truest progress." (page 244). If any one were to ask the author: How could such a people organise such an effective checkmating of a none too civilised or charitable plan of Christian Europe for the annihilation of Turkey, and inaugurate such a glorious regime of progressive policy under a leader of the type of Mustapha Kemal Pasha?—we do not know what would be the reply of Mr. Woolley. Good archæologist that he is, he has proved himself a bad historian, for he has allowed his judgment to be clouded (a pardonable human frailty) by war feelings, as he betrays himself in his introductory note.

> As a prisoner of war I have seen enough of Turkish brutality towards my countrymen to justify *any attack upon the Turks, however bitter.* [Italics mine.]

While we read such lines we almost pity Mr. Woolley the *writer* (however much we admire him as an archæologist) for having forgotten so naively

that there is such a thing as the "Other Side of the Medal" (courtesies to Edward Thompson and Yeats-Brown, author of *Caught by the Turks*). If any Turkish prisoner of war in any Christian environment ever writes his impressions, we are sure his reading of Western civilisation and Christian ethics would not tally with that of our author. War is a beastly game, a legacy of our brutal ancestors which we are still trying to justify on national grounds, while attempting to condemn it internationally. And, who knows, the Turks, recently welcomed to the civilised fold of the League of Nations, are perhaps enjoying a hearty laugh (may it be the last laugh) over the pious European protestations. We are sorry as we close the book, for the too palpable elements of party pamphleteering damaging such a piece of brilliant writing and we almost regret that the Warden of New College, Oxford, to whom the author dedicates the book, snatched Mr. Woolley away from the vocation of a "schoolmaster" and forced him to be an "archæologist". He should have resisted the temptation of charging the delightful "Pages from an Antiquary's Note Book" with the lurid colours of a mediocre war-pamphlet, and given us more of the illuminating pages describing the excavation sites of Carchemish the old Hittite capital, or modern bazaars of Aleppo, supplying "unending joy," or perfect pen pictures of his local friends like Haj Wahid, Hamoudi, or Busrawi of many wiles. We are glad that his sympathy at least for one section of his associates, "the gay, self-reliant Arabs" made the author look deeper into the problem of the meeting of the East and the West when he remarked:

> May a kindly Providence long postpone the day when the officious West shall impose on them the evils of an alien civilisation and to widen its commerce or to gratify the impertinence of its missionary spirit shall make hybrid degenerates of them.

KALIDAS NAG

The Truth About Spiritualism. By C. E. BECHOFER ROBERTS (Ephesian). (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

During the 84 years of its existence, the modern Spiritualist movement has given rise to an enormous mass of literature. The greater part of this is naturally of inferior value, and not to be taken as serious evidence for anything; but there is a residuum, which must run into scores of volumes, of works by educated—in many cases, by highly educated and intelligent—persons, who have described their own first hand experiences and investigations of the phenomena called Spiritualistic.

In the book under review, which comprises 274 pages of large type, Mr. Roberts sets out to sum up and assess this mighty mass of evidence. Such an attempt would be most useful, were it made by one who approached the task with a truly open, impartial and disinterested mind—attributes which Mr. Roberts, for all his skill as a compiler of books, appears most emphatically to lack. It is true that he makes a show of impartiality by setting out, in relation to each class of phenomena, what purports to be the evidence *pro* and *con*. By carefully selecting what facts to present and what to withhold, an advocate may prove or disprove anything. In selecting *his* facts, as regards the physical phenomena at least, Mr. Roberts has taken great pains to give us only such of the evidence in their favour as is weak and open to criticism, while he describes with gusto the exposures of fraudulent mediums and anything else tending to discredit the genuineness of the phenomena. Affecting the impartiality of a judge, his function is actually that of prosecuting counsel, who begins by choosing what evidence shall be produced for the defence, and then proceeds to demolish it.

A notable instance of this is to be observed in his treatment of Sir William Crookes, the great chemist, whose investigations into Spiritualism are so well known that it would be impossible to ignore them in any book on the subject. Mr. Roberts accordingly cannot

altogether omit references to Sir William's testimony for the reality of the phenomena. With his usual facility, however, he dismisses it as worthless, thus on p. 113 he quotes Sir William as saying:

> Three separate times did I carefully examine Miss Cook [the medium] crouching before me, to be assured that the hand I held was that of the living woman, and three separate times did I turn the lamp to Katie [the materialised form], and examine her with steadfast scrutiny until I had no doubt whatever of her objective reality.

On this, Mr. Roberts comments:

> But was not Crookes perhaps mistaken? There can be no reasonable doubt that he did on this occasion actually see two distinct figures, both having the attributes of human beings. But one fact of paramount importance has to be considered, though Spiritualists almost invariably ignore it: Crookes failed to get the proof he desired in his own house, and, when he finally succeeded, the sitting took place, not in his laboratory, *but in Florence Cook's own house*, where nothing was easier than for a confederate to be introduced in the guise of a materialized spirit.

Are we then to believe that an investigator of the calibre of Crookes failed to take elementary precautions to prevent the intrusion into the séance room of a confederate of the medium?

It must not be supposed, however, that Mr. Roberts has no respect for eminent chemists; for when he can put them in the witness-box to support his own views, he treats their testimony with the utmost deference. Faraday, for example, constructed an apparatus, by means of which he showed that "table-turning" might be, and doubtless often is, caused by the unconscious muscular action of the sitters. On the strength of this, Mr. Roberts writes (p. 103):

> Automatisms take many other forms, such as those muscular movements which (as Faraday proved) are responsible for table-turning, planchette-writing, the movements of the rod in water-divining, and automatic speech.

Quite possibly the immediate cause of the movement of the "dowser's" rod is the muscular action of the dowser's hand. Any one can hold a hazel twig and wriggle it about; but Mr. Roberts does not even pretend to explain how unconscious muscular action can account for the dowser's success in finding underground springs. Moreover, one cannot help wondering how Faraday's experiment in table-turning can be said to *prove* anything whatever with regard to water-divining or automatic speech.

Of the famous medium, D. D. Home, the plain truth is that, despite all the wonderful things which are stated by respectable witnesses to have occurred in his presence, fraud was never proved against him. Mr. Roberts admits this, but in language that conveys the impression that Home ought to have been exposed, even if he wasn't. He tells us that

> The materials for his [Home's] biography are abundant, but in the earlier stages they depend principally on his own statements and must be treated with reserve.

But in a previous work, Mr. Roberts did not hesitate to quote with approval Home's hostile allusions to H. P. Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott. On that subject he accepts Home as a perfectly reliable witness. It would appear therefore that Home is to be regarded as truthful, or untruthful, just as his evidence tends to support or controvert the particular case which Mr. Roberts is trying to prove.

When discussing the much investigated medium, Eusapia Palladino, Mr. Roberts admits that there is evidence both for and against her phenomena; but he throws all the stress on the latter, leaving the impression that she was a palpable fraud, and those who vouched for her, credulous dupes. He disregards the immense body of testimony (including that of Mr. Hereward Carrington, the well-known writer on psychical research and a practical conjuror), which seems to show that her mediumship was perfectly genuine, but that sometimes, when *bona fide* supernormal phenomena were not forthcoming, she attempted to supply by trickery what her sitters had paid her to produce.

Having ascribed all the physical phenomena of the séance room to fraud, Mr. Roberts goes on to consider the so-called mental phenomena, some of which

he admits to be genuine; but these, he thinks, are all explainable as the effect of telepathy or clairvoyance, those elusive faculties of the mind, about which Western psychologists know only that they exist. There can be but little doubt that a vast number of the phenomena which some people have attributed to "spirits," have really been the result of telepathic communication between the minds of living persons; but to make telepathy responsible for such phenomena as, for example, the Cross-Correspondence, which Mr. Roberts describes (pp. 240 *et seq*), is surely to strain the hypothesis to breaking point and beyond.

In his criticism of the "Spiritist Hypothesis," which ascribes all séance room phenomena to the "spirits" of the dead, Mr. Roberts is on firmer ground, for the evidence in its favour is at best weak and doubtful. Had he but deigned to give serious consideration to the explanations advanced by the Theosophists (for whom his contempt is so vitriolic), and especially to the theory of "shells," he might have realised that it is possible to approach the study of Spiritualistic phenomena without undue credulity, on the one hand, or, on the other, an unconvincible scepticism that is no less unscientific.

R. A. V. MORRIS

Life of Sris Chandra Basu. By PHANINDRANATH BOSE, M.A., Ph. D. (R. Chatterjee, Calcutta. Rs. 2-8 as.)

This is a biography full of interesting information. It is not a literary character-portrayal of the hero whose keen mentality tried to harmonize into a single Credo, the numerous and conflicting beliefs of a Brahmo, an Arya Samajist, a Neo-theosophist and a Theosophist. Sris Chandra Basu was the strange flower of his time: influenced by western education and the political enslavement of his people, his Aryan heart inspired him to revive the ancient tradition of his land, his Aryan mind energized him to learn about and labour for that tradition. It is difficult to evaluate his services to his country and religion from the mass of valuable facts impartially collected by Dr. Phanindranath Bose. And yet, the book is very much like Sris Chandra Basu himself—in giving unexpected news and unsuspected facts; personal and kindly in one place, strongly but shyly nationalistic in another. It does not bring the philosophical stir and mental uplift which his conversations often caused; however, in this, even, it is like its hero—one had to seek out the man of knowledge in Sris Chandra Basu, and even then humbly he referred to one publication or another; so for those who desire it, the last pages of the *Life* give a list of his works. But for such a volume an Index is very necessary and we miss it.

S. B.

The Heartless Land. By JAMES STERN. (Macmillan & Co., London. *7s. 6d.*)

Nature, stern and grim; a fitting background to and environment for its primitive black and barbaric white inhabitants. This, in a nutshell, is *The Heartless Land* which in eight short stories gives a vivid and unvarnished description of the settlers in South Africa, and their relations with the Negro population; showing how life, for both parties, becomes a veritable hell when the coloured race, in whom there is "so little viciousness, so few perverse lusts" contacts brutal Whites, in whom the animal nature is predominant. The author, however, evaluates things by viewing both sides of the shield. Excepting a few human touches, there is but little of the gentler and nobler aspect of life. Besides its descriptive merit, and the information afforded of Rhodesia, the book provides food for thought for those who disparage civilization, as well as for those who extol it.

N. K.

Life in Nature. By JAMES HINTON. Edited with an Introduction by HAVELOCK ELLIS. (Allen & Unwin. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

We find plenty of religiosity amongst scientists, but seldom the religious sense. This is not strange, for the faculty which makes the scientist what he is, is severe analytical scrutiny; and the faculty which serves the man of religion is imagination—the sense of unity, of relation, and of beauty. Rarely—and just as rarely to-day as ever—do we find both these faculties combined. That they can be, that they must be combined to produce the fullest man, is the lesson we learn from minds like Goethe and Havelock Ellis—and James Hinton.

Hinton in company with a very few other Victorians like Edward Carpenter is still a modern preacher. This book *Life in Nature* (not Life *and* Nature) is sorely needed to-day even more than when it was written in the nineteenth century. It is capable of extricating the modern mind from Dualism—the father of a thousand other -isms that corrupt our thought. Ever since the old theology was discarded owing to the advent of science there grew up a tendency to conceive life as being grafted on to Nature—a kind of alien substance. The unfertile desert, the inhuman sea, the cold mountains were Nature; and somewhere penetrating, somehow working its way, came Life a separate, unsupported, militant project. That is called Vitalism. It is not how Hinton saw the situation. To him all Nature was *alive* and all life was natural. Life was not separated from but part of the cosmos:

> The tender organic frame needs no self-preserving power within, because all the natural powers are its servants. The earth and air and distant orbs of heaven feed it with ceaseless care, and supply with unfailing constancy its wants. Life is in league with universal forces and subsists by universal law.

"What is life?" cried Shelley in the last line of his last poem just before he went to seek his answer in the halls of death. It is the smile on Nature's face, said Hinton. It is "the bright blossom wherein Nature's hidden force comes forth to display itself, the necessary outpouring of the universal life that circulates within her veins unseen." And we know that every day the modern findings of science make this view the more acceptable.

But may we not accept this description as true, and yet do so without joy? We may. Many have accepted the picture intellectually without responding with their hearts. The universe has appeared to them as it appeared to Havelock Ellis at the age of nineteen—"a sort of factory filled by an inextricable web of wheels and looms and flying shuttles in a deafening din." Everything seemed material and mechanical. It came as a great shock of joy to Havelock Ellis when Hinton in *Life in Nature* pointed out that there was nothing necessarily *low* about matter, and nothing derogatory in the beautiful machinery of life. "You are faced," he said in effect to the melancholy victim of 'materialistic' science, "by a small ingot you believe to be gold and a large mass you believe to be clay, and you are told they are both of the same nature. You jump to the conclusion that they are both clay. *But what I can prove to you is that they are both gold.*" The organic was not to be brought down to the level of the inorganic, but the inorganic, to be raised to the beauty of the organic.

It may be doubted whether this can be called an *argument.* It is an attitude, a new adjustment to the same facts, and Hinton did not *prove* anything. It is unlikely to mean much to those who, are content to hold another view, who like the interesting German philosopher Rudolph Otto, appear to look down without misgiving upon matter as something low. But it is a book which is capable of changing the lives of those who, owing to their mental adjustment to the facts, do not feel at home in the universe. And to feel at home in the universe is the essence of religion.

J. S. COLLIS

———

Whom Do Men Say That I Am? A Collection of Views of Modern Authors. Chosen and Edited by H. OSBORNE. (Faber and Faber, London. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

If some visitor to Earth from interstellar space were to read this remarkable book out of curiosity about the man Jesus Christ, he would be left in a fog of complete bewilderment. Did Jesus even exist? He would read H. L. Mencken's statement: "The historicity of Jesus is no longer seriously questioned by anyone, whether Christian or unbeliever." Then he would read Bertrand Russell: "Historically it is quite doubtful whether Christ ever existed at all." He would be told by Renan that Jesus was not sinless, and by Moulvi Muhammed Ali that the exclusive sinlessness of Jesus is the very basis of Christianity. Bishop Gore would inform him that Jesus never appears as betraying any sense of error, moral weakness or insufficiency; and Nietzsche would retort that in his knowledge of the human soul Jesus was not without many great deficiencies and prejudices.

But in pondering on this chaos of violently contradictory opinions some glimmer of truth might come to him, that the recorded life of Jesus has precisely the same effect on people as any other work of genius. It is just like a masterpiece of painting. One man will be lifted out of himself by emotional adoration. Another will ascribe the whole of its power to the influence of certain schools on the artist, to his teachers or his environment. Yet another will scrape off samples of the pigment, analysing them in his laboratory. One will assert that the picture is a mass of symbolism; another, perversely, that it is a bad fake and that So-and-So is far superior.

It is indeed curious in reading this symposium of the views of forty-five modern writers about Jesus, how each manages to extract from the Nazarene just those qualities that fortify his own philosophy. Few instances of this are better than the view of Jesus held by the three Jewish writers selected—C.G. Montefiore, Joseph Klausner, and E. R. Trattner. Renan sees Jesus as representing essentially the rupture with the Jewish spirit. But these Jewish writers regard Jesus as a Jew of Jews, laying great stress on his racial qualities, and placing him in the true succession of the prophets. "He was a friend rather than a foe of Judaism," says E. R. Trattner. The Mohammedans in their turn gladly appropriate Jesus as a prophet of Islam. "Jesus preached Islam in his Sermon on the Mount," says the Khwaja Kamal ud Din. Each commentator abstracts what he needs for himself; and as G. K. Chesterton rather cleverly points out, if the Christian Scientist is satisfied with him as a spiritual healer, and the Christian Socialist is satisfied with him as a social reformer, it looks as if Jesus really covered rather more ground than they could be expected to expect.

The publishers of this book say, "What common ground there may be in the separate answers or which of the answers prevail, is the readers' own problem." And, save in one important respect, Mr. Osborne has presented the evidence fairly and fully. He has given us much of the best opinion of the day from leading Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish and Mohammedan writers, and from scientists, philosophers, general thinkers and rationalists. But he leaves the presentation of the Buddhist point of view (as represented in modern thought) to a few inadequate phrases by Professor Whitehead, H. G. Wells, and Bertrand Russell. Yet the Rev. J. Oman's remark is quoted:—

> For the prophets, and still more for Jesus, Buddha's virtues were little more than respectabilities and negations, and the vices he condemned of small account compared with the inward hypocrisies he overlooked.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Osborne has selected no writer to give any effective rejoinder to this provocative comparison.

It is impossible in a brief review to weigh against one another the views of so many writers. All that can be said here is that such men as Tolstoi, Joseph

Klausner, and H. G. Wells appear to carry sanity and conviciton with them (despite their differing view-points) far more than Bernard Shaw, Bertrand Russell, Nietzsche, Haeckel, Strauss, and the orthodox Christian apologists. A challenging book, valuable both as a work of reference and as a test of religious insight.

G. W. WHITEMAN

Shakespeare through Eastern Eyes. By RANJEE G. SHAHANI. (Herbert Joseph, London. 6s.)

For long the Western World has been content to regard its poetry as a delicate enjoyment, a refining influence, a thing of "task" and "appreciation". The best modern criticism, however, would press further. In Shakespearian commentary, the issue is being fought out with vigour. Much depends on the result. If Shakespeare is a chaos, then poetry has little meaning. But if poetry has any message at all, that message is religious, and the authority of a poet of Shakespeare's stature is overwhelming.

With much of Mr. Shahani's book I cannot agree. To him, and to many other critics, Shakespeare's work is chaotic, not powerfully philosophic, with slight religious content, and no mysticism. Mr. Shahani sees a great poet skilled to depict the actual world, a master of characterization, a myriad-minded but dispassionate observer. Therefore, he tells us, the Indian, to whom actuality is merely a veil obscuring the mystic reality, finds Shakespeare beyond a certain point barren. The "mystic quality" the Indian desires is "utterly absent" (p. 142). "As judged by India," we are told, "Shakespeare cannot be called a thinker" (p. 176). And yet Mr. Shahani admits that he is "a creative thinker": that is, that he thinks through the act of "creating". Now this is true. Moreover, all good poetry is essentially "creation". It is, also, creative: creating life and power, and vision in the reader. It awakens, and directs. And whether the poet be American, English, Indian or Chinese, its final purpose and value is not in any particular form of belief or instruction, but in the power of its symbolisms to awaken us to life and recognition. "The quarrel," we are told, "of the Oriental with Shakespeare admits of no compromise or accommodation. It is fundamental." (p. 149) I do not believe it.

For Shakespeare is the great master of symbolic speech. A slight shift of perspective and he is rich in creative meanings. His creative vision necessarily speaks mainly of life and love, and their opposites, death and hate. We watch the drama played out, we see life victorious over death. Is this nothing? The creative process is justified by the poetic creation: so the tempests of *King Lear* and *Macbeth* dissolve in the music of *Pericles* and *The Winter's Tale*. *The Tempest* itself is, I believe, the grandest mystic document in our language. Why is it not so recognised? Simply because the poet has created so well, has so perfectly incarnated his vision in dramatic shapes and action that we fail to see any symbolic significance. Say a thing too well and it becomes poetry, and poetry is not allowed to mean anything. We think crookedly.

But Mr. Shahani's book is valuable. It attacks a vital issue, raises questions on every page of profound importance. His recent essay on *The Phoenix and the Turtle* was one of the finest pieces of Shakespearian commentary I have read. In much of this book he is illuminating. Every page is provocative at the least. He has a gift of phrase, and a wide knowledge, and, what is more important, a natural sympathy with the poetic world. If only he would turn again to prose interpretation, would bring the mystic insight of the East to elucidation, rather than criticism, of the creative visions of the West, he could do work of the very greatest importance in the service of poetry.

G. WILSON KNIGHT

Absolution. By E. BOYD BARRETT. (Geoffrey Bles, London. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

A year ago we reviewed in these columns Dr. Boyd Barrett's *Ex-Jesuit*, a book which caused a sensation owing to its revelations, from within, of Jesuit methods and psychology. Dr. Barrett, himself a famous Jesuit preacher, left the Order after many years and published his recollections based on a careful diary from an early age, adding his reasons for the step. He wrote without bitterness, not having then left the Church, but with rare discrimination. His work is a document of great and obvious value to the student of religious evolution in modern times. It is supplemented now by a book of equal interest. Dr. Barrett, fitted by the long Jesuit training for understanding the most abstruse psychological problems, became a psycho-analyst in New York. Success has followed his footsteps, his waiting-room is crowded, he has kept a record of his *cases*, he has a great facility for literary expression. The result is this study of "Absolution". He gave absolution as a priest; he gives it now as an analyst. For the need behind auricular confession is the same need as that which fills the analyst's consulting-room, the need for a release from man's universal sense of guilt.

The capacity for feeling guilty, together with the sense of guilt, is perhaps the strangest and the most interesting phenomenon of the human mind. It is there subtly, in some form or other, in every mind. It haunts the good man as well as the evil-doer. It cries for expression—and for forgiveness. It is mysterious in its origin and portentous in its results. It awakens very early in life as a general rule, and disappears only with one's last breath. The mistress of the kindergarten sees signs of it in the tiniest tot in her class, and the clergyman makes contacts with it on every death-bed. The sense of guilt makes some men feel themselves moral corpses. Its nature is to harrow and depress the mind. It represents self-condemnation—and the tragedy of life is that we so often condemn ourselves in the wrong.

Dr. Barrett gives us a number of curious cases from among his consultants in the last few years: gives them in full detail with all the penetrating acumen of an ex-priest. He suggests, as a result of his recent experience, that the psychological training of priests is at fault, although in some cases the human sympathy of an individual confessor will, of course, enable him to rise above the effects of his training.

Casuistry has gone far to ruin the work of the confessional. For the casuist sin (that is, the objectively considered violation of the law) is everything, and guilt (that is, the feeling of misery and depression in the human heart) is nothing. The casuistic spirit is the antithesis of the spirit that belongs to the true confessor. The former is shocked at sin, and uninterested in guilt; the latter is deeply moved over guilt and uninterested in sin. Unfortunately the Church trains her young priests in the spirit of casuistry, and not in the other, the enlightened spirit.

The psycho-analyst can take the place of these defaulting priests, he is free from the binding restrictions of old-fashioned rules and tradition. But he must not be a suave, well-trained specialist alone; he must bubble over with the sympathies that alone give a true insight into human problems. He must, in fact, be a "mystic". And here Dr. Barrett defends the mystics from the hackneyed charge that they lag behind, vague hangers-on of religion.

Mysticism in itself has no more to say to religion than mathematics. Just as the mediæval Church captured so many great painters, architects, and poets, she captured the mystics for the purpose of propaganda. But a mystic, no less than a poet or painter, can thrive without any religion in the strict sense of the word. He is *by nature* a creative artist, and not a worshipper or an ascete.

The creative tendencies of true mysticism are, according to Dr. Barrett, rarely studiously developed save among the Yogis of India. But there is nothing, he claims, "*supernatural* or *unnatural*" about them.

Not every horse is a steeplechaser, ready and willing to soar over stone walls and gates, though every horse can jump. Not every man is ready and willing to step off the everyday plane of thought and fly on the wings of his spirit though every man can do so to some degree.

Possessed of this mystical "creative" faculty, analyst and priest can recreate the wrecked souls who come to them for guidance. We could wish that in

writing this valuable book its author had laid more emphasis on the Eastern teaching of man's innate divinity and of the negative aspect of sin. The work of eliminating disease is necessary, absorption in Natural beauty is good, but the permanent way to banish darkness is by the introduction of light. The East has its lighthouses, set high on the rocks of Time, whose rays flood the recesses of the soul at night making obscurities of guilt impossible.

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

The Secret Lore of India and the One Perfect Life for All. By W. M. TEAPE (W. Heffer & Sons, Cambridge. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a book on the Upanishads. All the texts have not been reproduced in translation but the most important ones have been selected and most of them have been put into verse. The passages quoted are significant as they throw light on the mystery of Atman and the philosophical conceptions of the texts, but one of the most important Upanishads, the *Mandukya* has been omitted.

The author has traced a comparison between the teachings of the Upanishads and those of Christianity. He seems to have spared no pains to acquaint himself with the meaning and significance of the Upanishadic teachings, but he has failed in the purpose, for his vision has been clouded by the missionary spirit. This is clear from the preface. He writes that "as his studies went on, and the character of the forces to be met was more clearly discerned, Hinduism stood forth as the one power that must be grappled with. That conquered, he saw the Victory of the Cross secure." From this it is evident that the author has not been able to observe that spirit of detached receptivity which alone can reflect truth and help proper understanding.

He has taken up the three fundamental metaphysical concepts: (1) The individuality of self, (2) the universality of self, (3) the mutuality of self, and two ethical concepts of sinfulness and perfection as the grounds of comparison between Hinduism and Christianity. He finds that the Bible fulfils beautifully all these conditions, but the Upanishads fall short. There may be a clear indication of the universality of the self in the Upanishads but none of the mutuality. The author has underestimated the conception of the Upanishads. Though the final teaching in the Upanishads is the transcendence of self, the idea of individuality and mutuality in the progressive resolution of spiritual life has not been ignored. We refer the author to *Mandukya* iii (1), *Brihadaranyaka* ii (5). The idea of mutuality is clearly shown in the conception of correspondence between the Adhyatmic and the Adhidaivika forces.

Individuality, Mutuality and Universality are accepted in the life of spiritual immanence but not in transcendence, where Spirit shines forth beyond time and beyond understanding through time. This is unique in the teachings of the Upanishads.

Though the Upanishads have not produced any conception of the Son incarnated in flesh, still they have retained the possibility of every soul attaining perfect knowledge of and even identity with the One. The conception of the Son-hood centred in one person has limited the spiritual possibilities of the finite selves in Christianity.

The Upanishads have not rejected the redemptive power of grace (*vide Katha Upanishad*) and the restorative power of the Word (*vide Katha, Prasna, Mandukya,* etc.), but they maintain that the final calm and security can be brought by Wisdom. The former can give psychic fineness and receptivity of the fine influence scattered out of the Cosmic Person and the Divine perfections, the latter can give a new bent in spiritual life and reveal a phase in spiritual transcendence that is sealed to many.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius. By JOHN K. SHRYOCK, Ph.D. (The Century Co., London. 18*s.*)

Political Philosophy of Confucius. By LEONARD S. HSU. (George Routledge and Sons Ltd., New York and London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

It is not surprising if Western scholars deny that the Chinese people have any political philosophy, since there is a great scarcity of authentic books on their political science. Not only to meet this real need but even to make students understand properly the social and political evolution of the peoples of the Orient in the light of their psychology, a scientific study of the political theories of the East is indeed of the utmost importance. Therefore Prof. J. K. Shryock of the University of Pennsylvania and Dr. Leonard S. Hsu of the Yenching University deserve to be congratulated on their substantial contributions which, we feel sure, will be received by all those interested in Oriental learning with satisfaction. Prof. Shryock's book is published from a fund contributed to the American Historical Association by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In this volume, therefore, the author does not claim to treat with any degree of completeness such subjects as the life and work of Confucius, the growth of Confucianism as a school of thought, the worship of Confucius and the like. He concerns himself here mainly with an intensive historical study of the State cult of Confucius.

Since Chinese scholars have hitherto allowed the origin and rise of the cult of Confucius to rest upon uncritical traditions and fragmentary statements, Dr. Shryock has taken enormous trouble and pains to bring together a mass of valuable data from references to the State cult contained in the dynastic histories. Even these references, the majority of which are imperial edicts, have not been, the author tells us, collected and arranged with any thoroughness by the Chinese. As a background for a study of the State cult, Prof. Shryock outlines in the first few chapters the conditions under which the cult began; and then in connection with each period in the nation's life, such as, the Han Period, the Medieval Period, the T'ang Period, the Sung Period, the Mongol Period, the Manchu Period and the Republic,—to each of which a chapter is devoted,—he reviews and explains not only the history of the epoch and the position of the scholar class at the time but also the intellectual and social forces of the period which influenced the development of the State cult. And finally the author concludes that though Confucius will never again approach the status of a deity, he will, nevertheless, continue to be the human symbol of the Chinese people. By his studious research and sympathetic study, the author has certainly succeeded in presenting to the reading public not only a scientific exposition of an Oriental cult which has endured for about twenty-five centuries, but also one of the most comprehensive histories of the State cult of Confucius that has yet been published.

In reading books of the type under review, one must be careful not to identify "Confucian" political philosophy with "Chinese" political philosophy. China, we must bear in mind, has had a great number of schools of political thought besides the Confucian system. Indeed, in China there are about a dozen different schools of political speculation. Each has had its independent development and its own influence upon the political and social progress of the Chinese people. There are legalists such as Hsün Tŭ and Han Fei Tzŭ; ceremonialists such as Hsün Tzŭ; political economists such as Kuan Chung; progressive absolutists such as Shang Yang; co-operativists such as Hsü Hsin; practical socialists such as Wang Anshih, imperialists such as Wang Yang-ming; constitutional monarchists such as Tung Chung-shu, anarchists such as Lao Tzŭ and humanitarian socialists such as Mo Ti. In fact, most of these schools have at one time or another effectively condemned the Confucianists for confusing, as they thought they did, practical politics with

theoretical morality. Leaving out of consideration these non-Confucian schools, Prof. Hsu gives in his book, *Political Philosophy of Confucianism*, a somewhat systematic presentation not only of the widely scattered ideas of Confucius and of his early disciples in the Confucian Classics and other ancient books, but also of the political and social ideas of early thinkers of the Classical school.

Maintaining that Confucianism is more or less a misleading term for the so-called Chinese Classics upon cosmology, the social order, government, morals and ethics, the author arrives at the conclusion that Confucius is not the founder of the system but largely the transmitter of the teachings of antiquity. In his chapters on the Doctrine of Rectification, Political Unity and Organization, the Principle of Benevolent Government, the Functions of the State, Law and Justice, Democracy and Representation, Social Evolution, and Political Progress, Prof. Hsu makes an excellent analysis of the Confucian principles as contained in the Classics, and makes the reader wonder how those Chinese thinkers of some two thousand years ago held political ideas which seem so modern. A sympathetic perusal of this book cannot but make the reader join the author in his general thesis that Confucius's teaching is still relevant in many of its outstanding features, and that, not merely for China, but for the West also. The war-weary West, which is now suffering from the breakdown of its political philosophy, can certainly learn many lessons from the political philosophy of Confucianism which, laying down the true principles of good government, shows clearly the dangers of militarism, imperialism and mercantilism on the one hand, and those of anarchism, indiscriminating humanitarianism, extreme individualism and idealistic communalism on the other. At a time when the nations, after two centuries of suffering from industrial and political turmoil, are beginning to think that a mixture of politics and morality is not altogether an undesirable thing, a careful study of the political philosophy of Confucianism, made possible by such works as these under review, will, let us hope, supply that remedy which is most wanted for the social, political and moral paralysis of the present-day world.

J. M. KUMARAPPA

A Plan of Life: An Essay in the Technique of Living. By C. B. PURDOM. (J. M. Dent & Sons, London. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

The rare quality of common-sense pervades every page of this charmingly sincere little book. Great in its simplicity, earnest in its faith in Divinity and therefore in Humanity, its straightforward and definitely constructive outlook on life is sorely needed at this transition period of restlessness, dissatisfaction, scepticism, and destructive criticism. To a drifting crumbling world the author appeals :—Be constructive as well as destructive. Ring out falsehood, but ring in truth. Learn that "the secret of successful living is to know ourselves". Man, use that which makes you man—namely, your mind, and by its help know and develop your complex being.

Starting with morals which are "the beginning of conscious human life" and which "run through every activity of man" the steps of Work, Society, Art, Science, Reason and Nature end in the summit of Religion. Certain basic thoughts on these subjects are provided, by means of which each individual can for himself outline his plan of life. The book should be read by every person who aspires to make a real something of his life.

N. K.

CORRESPONDENCE

FROM PARIS

PATRIOTISM = NATIONALISM

[J. B.'s quarterly letter meant for our November issue reached us late and pressure on our space compelled us to hold it back. It does not lose its interest or its appropriateness by the delay.—EDS.]

Patriotism was going to be the subject of my "Letter from Paris" when the September issue of THE ARYAN PATH reached us with Mr. Vernon Bartlett's article on the very same question. It points out the evil but does not penetrate deep enough to expose it. With his denunciation of Nationalism no one will disagree, but his defence of Patriotism I cannot find quite so convincing. Nothing on earth can be wholly good or wholly bad, and I grant that the feeling your contributor calls Patriotism may in itself be tolerated or even commended. But as we tried to suggest in our August "Letter," what we need in our present difficulties is not so much to look out for the good points in any idea or religion as to estimate the balance of its merits and dangers; if the latter are found to be in excess, that idea, or religion (or feeling, or custom, or incentive of any sort) should be ruthlessly fought against and rooted out; the milk-and-water, half-and-half, "fair-to-everybody" attitude will not help us through. Now I strongly suspect that Patriotism and Nationalism (as defined by your contributor) stand in the same relation to each other as the caterpillar and the butterfly, with the difference that the patriotic feeling becomes uglier as it develops, and that its last state is far more noxious and repulsive than the first!

Mr. Vernon Bartlett draws a charming picture in illustration of the sentiment defined as Patriotism; it appeals to me all the more—to that extent I am willing to be a patriot!—that it seems to have been sketched "somewhere in France". But that feeling belongs to literature perhaps more than it does to ethics. As schoolboys we have been taught to admire Homer's "smoke rising from the roofs of Ithaca". It is a far cry from this human poetry of all ages to that modern Moloch of "patriotism" which but yesterday drove millions of men to such extremes of suffering and sacrifice. The concluding remark in Mr. V. Bartlett's article is very true: a man who is about to die for his country will visualize, not his country or his countrymen, but "the few streets or lanes, houses or fields that he knows best". But that same man *in articulo mortis* would hardly muse: "*That* is what I am giving up my life for." He would per-

ceive no reason at all for his sacrifice, and would simply feel that he is caught up in the wheels of some monstrous and incomprehensible machinery.

For my part, I have never been able to understand, still less experience, the so-called patriotic feeling. The imagination of a boy reading more English and foreign books than French ones will naturally dwell on life in other lands quite as much as on his own surroundings. Many a time I have asked my friends or my elders to explain to me what lay in their hearts and minds under the label of "*patrie*". I was never able to obtain a plain answer, and I should much like to hear if anybody who tries the experiment can meet with better success. If I examine my own heart, I shall find that a slight preference for living in this country proceeds perhaps from quite trivial or fanciful interests. For instance, it offers opportunity for conversation of a certain kind, for that exchange of "*idées générales*" which is the main zest in life for the average Frenchman: yet I know I have had many a pleasant and interesting talk with people from all over the world; I have friends, and very dear ones too, in many lands; and so my prejudice falls to the ground. Again I do like in France a certain *bonhomie* and *laisser-aller* which we find very reposing when we cross the frontier on the way home from other more formal countries; and the landscape likewise appeals to me because it is not so trim as that of England, Switzerland, or Germany. But when I travelled in Italy in 1912, I felt as if I were in my own country, "*only more so*". So that again cannot be the foundation of my love for France. What is there in France that I cannot get elsewhere and just as good? Must I be quite honest? Shall I have the impudence to confess it? Abroad I suffer for the want of French tobacco, or French-fried potatoes!

No, I do not mean to be flippant. But I am convinced that if people would only be perfectly frank in their self-examination, their high-flown patriotism would always collapse into insignificant partialities of the same sort. This has weighed on my mind ever since I was a boy; it is a relief to have said it out. A young German who has lived six years in France was telling me he had once believed in patriotism; now he too feels that there is nothing in it.

Now let us look at the darker side of that personal hoard of memories and habits that we have agreed to call patriotism. In the little town where I spend my holidays a certain illiterate and unintelligent old woman was telling us all her woes. She complained especially of her daughter-in-law, she imitated mockingly her ways of speech, and added, as it were, an aggravating circumstance: "For she is not even one of us; she comes from P—!" Now P— is the next village, only six miles down the road! Here, I suppose, we have Nationalism *in ovo*.

There is no getting away from it: patriotism and nationalism are one and the same thing, the one being a polite, the other a disparaging appellation for an old, primeval feeling which is sometimes inoffensive, more often very harmful, never in any way "moral".

Your contributor alludes to Patriotism in ancient Greece or ancient Rome—a sort of halfway stage between "*l'esprit de clocher*"—the narrow, exclusive love of the native village—and our modern State-centred and State-controlled collective madness. Of course it was an advance on the tribal feeling, and this again an advance on the family spirit, and this again on the strictly egoistic feeling (if indeed it ever existed in such a way as to preclude wider sympathies, which I cannot believe). But we have outgrown that stage; we are ready to widen the circle of our devotion. Every reader of this magazine, and millions of people besides, know full well in their hearts that "the world is their country," for a host of reasons which it would be quite superfluous to repeat here.

But a shocking aspect of modern patriotism is that it is allowed precedence over common morality. An instance that occurs to me is an incident of the famous Dreyfus case when a German officer could have saved this man from a false accusation and a terrible fate, but refrained from doing so out of patriotic reasons. Similar crimes are committed every day to the supposed advantage of one or another of the Great Powers, and nobody ventures to protest; patriotism is sacrosanct. It all derives, presumably, from the common assimilation of the Fatherland or Mother-country to a real parent; a comparison which is wrong, because our own country does little more for us than the other nations have done through their thinkers, their inventors, their artists, etc.

Another consequence which has a retarding effect on international peace and goodwill, is that no one can publicly discuss the errors or crimes of the Government of his country; yet the responsibility of the nation at large is, under the conditions prevailing in politics, a purely theoretical one. Also the peoples are much less obdurate in their errors than the speeches of their statesmen or the articles of the Press would lead one to think. Patriotism—or Nationalism—is to a large extent a conventional attitude.

Although the establishment of the United States of Europe, or better still, of the whole World, should not be delayed, it must be recognized that the various nations are not all equally ripe for this new step forward and for the breaking up of the pale within which they develop their individuality. France and Great Britain, for instance, have had an independent and unified existence for so long that the patriotic or nationalist feeling—call it as you will—may there run stale sooner than we think; not so Germany, not so Italy, still less India. The map of the world is full of new

States which must work up their nationalism for decades, perhaps for centuries, before it reaches a climax and begins to ebb. The general tendency of ethnic minorities to strive for "Home rule" is also very alarming. Before 1914 we used to be told that the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could never go on living together. A very interesting finding of the recent Stresa Conference is their inability to live apart!

We tried to show above that the patriotic-nationalist complex is a stuffed monster which it is easy to puncture and explode if we have the will. Unfortunately too many unprosecuted criminals thrive on the rivalry and hostility of nations. They pull the strings, and take good care to fan a resentment which, left alone, would change or die out quickly enough. The absurd teaching given in most schools is not, we think, very harmful, because children are more clear-sighted than grown-ups; in most cases, their reaction is exactly opposite to the effect desired. Most Frenchmen of my generation conceived an utter loathing for Alsace-Lorraine, because of the buncombe that was dinned into them through the pre-war schoolbooks, and because of the maps of France where *les provinces perdues* were outlined in a paler tone. From which the Germans understood "*la revanche*" to be the main preoccupation of young Frenchmen, whereas the latter desired nothing as much as a *rapprochement* with those neighbours whom their fathers had fought. When we were grown up, unfortunately, we fell into the trap laid for us by means of the Press, and our "enemies" did exactly the same. A World Conference for International Peace should begin by finding out a means of turning the daily papers into a harmless institution; otherwise its labours will probably be wasted.

J. B.

DISCOVERY OF MANICHEAN WORKS FROM EGYPTIAN SANDS

Until the beginning of the present century we only knew about Mani and his religion that which the opponents of this faith described and refuted as his heresy. Not only had the State and the Church of Persia to fight against the new religion, but the Christians also saw therein a formidable rival when it spread westwards, and—we may well surmise—the Buddhists when it spread eastwards; even much later the Muslims too had to work against it. Its real power and progress however came into fuller light when original documents and fragments in different languages were discovered in Chinese Turkistan. Middle Persian and Sogdian, Turkish and Chinese are the idioms employed in those fragments. The work of the decipherment etc. is still being carried on by a number of eminent authorities and now we have the happy tidings of a new discovery, this time from another continent and in another language.

Once again the honour of making this discovery falls to the lot of Germany. The Prussian Academy of Sciences has often sent Prof. Dr. Carl Schmidt on scientific expeditions to Egypt. On the last occasion, in 1930, he managed to procure a library of papyrus books found by Fellahs in the south-western Fayum

at Medinet Madi. With the help of a friend of science he was able to buy the half of them for his native country, whereas the other half has passed into the hands of a private English collector, Mr. Chester Beatty. Damp has naturally made a havoc in the pages, but the skill of the excellent curator of the Berlin Museum, Dr. Ibscher, is a guarantee that everything legible will be made available. Numerous pages are separated and preserved under glass. A preliminary report has already been prepared by Prof. Dr. Carl Schmidt with the assistance of Dr. Ibscher and Dr. Polotzky; and Prof. Lüders (who visited India some years ago) has just now presented it to the Berlin Academy.

There are seven works in the collection. The first work of more than 500 pages divided into 172 or more chapters contains the revelation-sermons of Mani to his disciples. Every chapter begins with: "Again spake the apostle to the disciples." The second work is a collection of Mani's epistles. The third work is historical. It too covers more than 500 pages, and relates among other things the imprisonment and martyrdom of Mani, and the persecution of his followers in Persia. These three works are preserved in Berlin. The following two are divided between London and Berlin—one contains the sermons from the circle of Mani's disciples, the other seems to be a commentary on the "living evangel or gospel" of Mani. The sixth work is wholly in London. It contains psalms and hymns, more than 230 in number. The last work is not yet examined.

All these works are in the Coptic language, which shows that the religion of Mani had a strong hold over the Egyptian population also. Some of the contents are sure to be found in the fragments from Chinese Turkistan, but for the rest the present Coptic version will remain our sole source till another discovery is made. Moreover, the historical work will throw many a side-light on the Sasanian period. We may quote here an interesting detail which Mani himself writes about his mission to India.

> Towards the end of the reign of King Ardeshir I went out to preach; I travelled by ship to the country of the Indians. I preached the hope of life to them, and selected the best of them from that place. In the year when King Ardeshir died (241) and his son Shahpur became king . . . . I travelled from the country of the Indians to the country of the Persians.

J. C. TAVADIA

[In a subsequent issue we will publish, from the scholarly pen of Sir Jivanji J. Modi, an article reviewing *Researches in Manichaeism*, with Special Reference to the Turfan Fragments, by Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson.]

AN EXPLANATION

I have read with great interest your editorial comment on my letter which you have been good enough to publish. I just beg to make one observation about an "inconsistency" which you have been pleased to detect in my letter. It is my misfortune that I fail to see where the inconsistency lies. I can entirely agree with Mr. Dernier because he has not written on Western civilisation, but on a particular narrow topic of the Thrill Psychosis. Any one can point out a particular defect in a society without thereby implying that there is nothing good in that society. I should have gladly agreed with Mr. Chitnavis if he had really focussed his attention on the good in Indian civilisation, as you are pleased to annotate. Unfortunately for your annotation any one who has read Mr. Chitnavis' article will easily be able to see that he was far more interested in the Miss-Mayo-method of finding out defects in others than in seeing the good in them.

A. R. WADIA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

An extremely interesting struggle for religious freedom and cultural independence generally is being waged in the island of Bali which lies east of Java. This beautiful island, "besung so oft and oft" of late, has remained, until recently, practically inviolate and unspoiled by Western or other foreign influence. An ancient Hindu civilization still flourishes there intact, the ancient temples are still the centres of village and national life, and the ancient gods are still prayed to and consulted on the eve of any new undertaking, whether individual or communal. In the course of the last few hundred years an occasional effort has been made to convert the Balinese from their ancestral religion, but without much success. The old traditions have always proved too powerful.

Another such effort is now about to be made, or rather, a Dutch Missionary Society has applied to the Dutch Colonial Government for permission to establish a mission on the Island. Without such permission work of this kind may not be started in the Dutch East Indies. In the past this fact has meant little more than a formality to be complied with. But in the present instance things are working out differently. The Government is being asked to pause and think twice before granting the desired charter, and the text of the statute regarding the establishment of missions is quoted in connection with conditions existing in Bali, as showing that in this particular case it would be inadmissible for the Government to approve.

The article in question provides that permission shall be withheld or withdrawn if the mission should prove detrimental to the people at large, if it should disturb the peaceful and orderly progress of affairs. This has generally been interpreted in a rather narrow, strictly political way. Not so on the present occasion. Protests are being registered in various quarters. Publicists, archæologists, Civil Servants even, of European blood, (all honour to them!) are pointing out how a fine thing will be ruined if a foreign religion is allowed to disturb the harmonious workings of Balinese society as it is at present, and on the 19th of October last the eight native representatives of the Dutch government on the Island sent a petition to the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies to withhold consent.

In the address they presented to His Excellency, these gentlemen pointed out, that they were bound

by their oath of office to see to it that the rights of the native communities to independence in the management of their own domestic affairs were in no way infringed; that they regarded the religion and the social polity of the Balinese as inseparable parts of one organic whole and that they therefore considered that the social equilibrium of Balinese life would be disturbed if members of the community were to embrace any form of Christianity. They evidently foresee that any such effort as the one contemplated will be detrimental to the orderly and peaceful progress of affairs. The Government's decision was, at the time of writing, still pending, and we sincerely hope it will be in favour of the Balinese and their friends; anyway the missionaries have plenty to do in Europe itself.

The Maharaja of Mysore in opening the eighth annual session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, held last December, drew attention to the fact of "an increasing recognition of the interrelation of the sciences not only with one another but with the coordinated consideration of them all which belongs to philosophy". He pointed out how scientists like Bergson and Eddington and mathematicians like Bertrand Russell and Poincaré are "impelled by the logic of facts to pass on from science to philosophy". As regards the relationship of philosophy to religious thought, he said:—

> Religions are apt to be too closely associated with particular territorial boundaries. Philosophy is free from such associations; but by its very nature it is confined to an aristocracy of learned men. But each can help the other. Philosophy can aid religion by inducing the clarity of thought which tends to purify it and to disperse the clouds that obscure the truth. Religion can aid philosophy by spreading abroad to the people at large the truths that philosophy has thus revealed. In the last resort the good and true will meet in the God of Religion, the Absolute of Philosophy.

In his Presidential Address, Sir S. Radhakrishnan described the morality that obtains to-day as "conventional," "mechanical respectability". In support of which view, as regards the West he said:—

> According to the Dean of St. Paul's, if anybody told a Bishop that he was not a Christian he would not take offence, but if he was told he was not a gentleman he took great offence. Christianity meant heroism and magnificent adventure. They were not capable of those passions. They were stifling themselves in order to keep well with the world. A gentleman was one who believed in the virtue of good form. A gentleman meant now one who had the outer appearance of virtue but a secret appearance of vice.

But despite this, Sir S. Radhakrishnan visioned a happier future in which "if philosophers were true to their mission they ought to be able to evolve a new form of philosophy and religion which would fulfil the intellectual conditions of their time and make them feel at home in this world".

ॐ

"The small errors of life are nothing,
but the general sum of thought is much."

—W. Q. JUDGE

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV MARCH 1933 No. 3

WHICH ONE AM I?

Monks, there are three persons found existing in the world. What three? The topsy-turvy-brained, the scatter-brained, and the man of comprehensive brain.

"The schoolmaster is abroad," said Lord Brougham in 1828. Now he is ubiquitous. Mind training is therefore supposed to take place. While psychologists are discussing what the mind is, whence it comes and how it functions, educationists are already kneading the child-mind as if it were dough to be made ready for the oven, and treating the adult mind as if it were a sensitive plate prepared to receive images. In the numerous theories of psychologists and educationists there is often a thread of reality by which the entire tangled pattern is held together. In this wise, then, the mind of the race is affected; and yet in spite of millions of pictures held before the mental vision, the whirling mind continues to wander, its selfishness persists in its greed, and its possessor, man himself, has to submit to disease, decay and disintegration on more than one plane. Education is supposed to free the mind, but it enslaves; to enlighten the mind, but it causes bewilderment; to give direction to life, but it begets doubt.

Gotama, the Buddha, in his wonderfully simple way once classified human mentality into three types, given in the above quotation, and he proceeded to explain them thus:—

And of what sort, monks, is the topsy-turvy-brained?

Herein a certain person frequents the meeting-place to hear Dhamma from the lips of the monks. The monks teach him

Dhamma that is lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely in the ending, both in spirit and in letter. They make plain the holy life perfectly fulfilled in all its purity.

But as he sits there he pays no heed to that talk in its beginning, pays no heed to its middle, pays no heed to its ending. Also when he has risen from his seat he pays no heed thereto . . . Just as when a pot is turned upside down, the water poured thereon runs off and does not stay in the pot, even so in this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . but pays no heed to that talk . . . also when he rises from his seat he pays no heed thereto . . . This one is called "the topsy-turvy-brained".

And of what sort, monks, is the scatter-brained ?

In this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . As he sits he pays heed to that talk in its beginning, its middle and its end, but when he has risen up from his seat he pays no heed thereto . . . Just as when in a man's lap divers kinds of food are piled together, such as sesamum, rice, sweetmeats and jujube fruits. When he rises from his seat he scatters all abroad through absent-mindedness,—even so, monks, in this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . but when he has risen from his seat he pays no heed thereto. This one is called "the scatter-brained".

And of what sort, monks, is the man of comprehensive mind ?

In this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place to hear Dhamma from the lips of the monks. They teach him Dhamma that is lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely in the ending, both in its spirit and its letter. They make plain the holy life perfectly fulfilled in all its purity. As he sits there he pays heed to that talk in its beginning, he pays heed to that talk in its middle, he pays heed to its ending. Also when he rises from his seat he still bears it in mind. Just as when a pot is set upright the water poured therein accumulates and does not run away, even so in this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . and pays heed to that talk . . . Also when he rises from his seat he bears it in mind, in its beginning, in its middle, in its ending. This one, monks, is called "the man of comprehensive mind".

Such, monks, are the three persons found existing in the world.

Is it not worth while, for reader and writer alike, to resort to self-examination and ask—Which one am I ?

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

II.—SUGGESTED EXPLANATIONS

[**C. E. M. Joad** here offers an explanation of his own supernormal experiences described in the first part of this article published in our last number.

Since the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, volumes of data of supernormal happenings are published, but a noteworthy fact is stated by Mr. W. H. Salter of that Society in his article on Psychical Research in the latest edition—the XIVth—of the *Encyclopædia Britannica:*

> But for the most part, the "debatable phenomena" of 1882 remain almost as debatable in 1929. This would be a surprising fact in view of the number of scientists and philosophers of the highest eminence, who have interested themselves in psychical research, if the study were not one of exceptional difficulty.

One of the greatest self-created difficulties that the psychical researchers have erected is due to the neglect of the explanations given in oriental psychology for the phenomena exhibited in the séance room. These are attributable to three main causes: (1) The astral eidola, or shells, of the dead; (2) Elementals, and (3) the astral double of the medium. Compare, in this connection, Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 596.—EDS.]

In this article I shall venture to offer a tentative explanation of some of the phenomena described in my last. I have already expressed the view that no single explanation covers the whole field, and what I shall have to say is, in the present state of our knowledge, in the nature of hypothesis only.

The explanation generally put forward is that many of the phenomena are caused by the discarnate spirits of those who have "passed over" and wish to communicate with their friends on earth. This view is usually held in conjunction with the belief that the human soul survives death and is immortal; it may be, and frequently is, associated with a belief in reincarnation. That something survives the break up of the individual's body is, I think, likely. I do not, however, believe that this something is an individual mind or personality. I am not denying this hypothesis; I content myself merely with asserting that it does not seem to me to be proven. I also think that it is antecedently improbable for the following reasons.

I have already pointed out that the communications received from "spirits" are often on a lower level of intelligence, knowledge and culture than that achieved by the alleged communicator during his life time. *If ghosts have souls, they would seem to be without brains.* The view that we survive as individuals bereft of that faculty of reason which is the distinction of our species, or that the faculty, if it persists for a time, suffers a continuous decline in quality, so that

we relapse to the level of savages or half wits, is to me morally repugnant.

A stronger argument against the survival of individual personality is derived from the close connection between mind and body. The closeness of this connection is an accepted fact and need not be stressed here. But if the personality is what it is, very largely because the body is what it is, in what sense can the same personality be said to persist when deprived of a body? An invalid, for example, has a different mentality from a healthy man, a hunchback from a straight man; character is bound up with the secretions of the ductless glands; an insufficiency of thyroid produces a half wit and an excess of adrenalin a coward. Change a man's body and you change the man.

If a man's nature is largely determined by his body, it is bound up no less with his memories. My knowledge, such as it is, is largely a memory of the things I have learned; my outlook on life the effect of the things I have experienced. If I had not fallen out of the window at the age of five, I should not be afraid of heights now. As one gets older, memories become more important; very aged people live almost entirely in their memories; in fact, *they are* their memories.

Again, a man is very largely the product of his environment. I, for example, am a child of the twentieth century, with the outlook, beliefs and attainments of my generation. Body, memories and environment—these go far to make a man what he is; his personality is, for the most part, their joint outcome.

Now nobody who believes in Reincarnation holds, so far as I know, that one inhabits the *same body* in different lives. Obviously not, since we know what happens to old bodies; they become worms.*

People do not normally have any memory of their past lives, so that one's memories in each life would be different; one's environment from life to life is also different. Given a different body, different memories and different environment, the difficulty is to see in what sense a man could be said to be the *same* person in different lives, just as it is difficult to see how he could be regarded as the same person when bereft of his body. If I may commit an Irishism, if it is really *I* who continues to live on without a body, or to live through a number of different lives, then I must be a different person each time I change my body or leave it.†

I turn, then, to an explanation on rather different lines, which is

* *Ashes*, in the more hygienic and civilized method, *viz.* Cremation,—to the benefit of the populace, and, says Theosophy, to the benefit of the defunct.—EDS.

† This is the Theosophical position only partially stated; but is there not a thread on which hang personalities like beads? Hypnotic experiments show that the nature of memory changes in the same personality. Theosophy makes a distinction between personality and individuality. Personality does not survive, but Individuality never dies. See *Key to Theosophy* pp. 111-114.—EDS.

the one which I myself consider to be open to the fewest objections. This explanation follows naturally from my general view of a living organism as being essentially a dualism, manifesting the operation of a non-material, vital principle in a material medium. A living organism is for me literally a lump of matter animated by the breath of life, and, in animating, life moulds and controls the medium it animates, using the organism thus created as an instrument for the fulfilment of its own instinctive purposes. I cannot here enlarge on this view* further than to point out that it constitutes a metaphysical background not only compatible with but even favourable to the view that some at least of the abnormal phenomena described in my last article are genuine.

Materialism, it is obvious, is incompatible with the occurrence of such phenomena, for materialism requires us to suppose that so-called mental events are always the effects, never the causes of physical events. But such phenomena as ectoplasm and the movements of small objects certainly *seem* to suggest that some mind is acting directly upon and altering the form or the position of pieces of matter. On the other hand, the religious hypothesis in the crude form in which it is usually put forward by the Christian Churches in Western countries, seems equally difficult to reconcile with the phenomena of the séance room. That we should be immortal is credible ; that God should permit us to know, or for reasons of His own to withhold knowledge of this fact, is also credible. But that He should allow us neither to know it nor not to know it, but to suspect it merely as a doubtful inference based upon equivocal happenings in the somewhat squalid atmosphere of the normal séance room, I find difficult to believe.

But, if the dualistic hypothesis suggested above be adopted, if a living organism is a manifestation of a vital force which uses and moulds matter for its end, then the phenomena studied by psychical research would afford only a particular and somewhat unusual case of what is a perfectly normal proceeding. If mind is always acting upon and producing movements in the body, it is not inconceivable that it should act upon and produce movements in a table or a tambourine ; it might even be able to affect and to manifest itself in a body other than that with which it is usually associated. Consider the nature of the miracle involved by the normal growth of a human body. The matter of which a living body is composed, beginning as a microscopic speck of protoplasm, ends as a many-millioned colony of cells. These cells are highly organised, and specialized for the performance of different functions. Some are marshalled to carry on the work of the nervous system ; others to form the engines we call muscles ; others,

* For a further account see my *Matter, Life and Value*, especially Ch. IV.

again, serve the comparatively lowly purpose of bone-levers. Instruments of incredible delicacy, the eye and the ear are evolved; yet the whole complex mechanism of a living human body is developed from a particle of living matter smaller than the finest pin-head.

Now it seems impossible to explain this process of development on purely mechanical lines. We are driven, on my view, to postulate the presence of a purposive drive present in the organism from the first which, acting upon and animating it, directs its growth along the lines appropriate to its species. Driesch's experiments on embryos afford an even more striking example of the operations of the activity I wish to suggest. Driesch found that, if an embryo which has developed as far as the blastula stage, in which it is a hollow sphere of cells without any top or bottom, right or left, is then divided into two or more parts with a sharp cut, each half develops into one entire embryo. Thus, since there are an infinite number of planes along which the cut might have gone, any one part of the embryo must know what the other parts are going to do, and, moreover, must be prepared to perform almost any function. In other words, until a very late stage in development each single cell must have the potentiality of turning into any other cell, according to the necessity of the whole body. Any one cell might become a liver-cell, a blood-corpuscle, or a constituent of bone tissue according to the demands made upon it; demands, too, incapable of being foreseen, for the plane of the experimentalist's cut is a matter of chance.

Now the suggestion I want to make is that the directing activity which is responsible for the facts of normal growth both in the embryo and the organism, may also be responsible for the abnormal manifestations witnessed in a séance room. Just as it may proliferate in a cancerous mass of superfluous cells, so it may manifest itself in ectoplasm; just as the informing life normally moulds and controls the growth of the embryo, so it may on occasion, acting abnormally, control and mould the disintegrated substance of the medium's body into the forms assumed by ectoplasm.

Nor does the movement of small objects, on this hypothesis, offer any insuperable difficulty. Certainly it appears to involve the action of force from a distance, but the notion of force acting from a distance has long been discredited in physics, and there is nothing more mysterious in a directive mind operating from its base in the medium's body to cause the movements of small objects without the interposition of a visible material agency, than there is in a magnet doing the same, or in the deflection of the needle of a galvanisator in a magnetic field. I cannot pursue this suggestion here, which I have

elaborated at length elsewhere,* but, since I have now introduced the words "directive mind," I will conclude by trying to say very briefly what I mean by them.

I hold, following Dr. Broad†, that an individual mind is probably to be regarded as an emergent. It is, that is to say, a compound in the sense in which water is a compound, the essential point being that water, which is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, possesses properties which are not the properties of either constituent. All the more highly developed products of evolution are, I think, emergent in this sense. Now the constituents on whose combination a mind emerges are, I hold, the immaterial stream or activity of life, or rather an individual current of this stream which I shall call the psychic factor, and the material stuff, the body, which individualises, and, as it were, insulates it from the main flow. A mind, then, is a temporary existent emerging on the combination of the body and a psychic factor (itself not a mind) and continuing for so long as the combination persists.

At death the body disintegrates, the combination is dissolved, and the mind goes out of existence; but the psychic factor may for a time at any rate survive. Moreover it may still possess its old property of being able to combine with a body to form a mind.

Now consider the case of a medium in a trance. The medium's body, we will suppose, is temporarily vacated by the medium's mind; at any rate the mind is in abeyance. It is with this temporarily vacated body that the surviving psychic factor combines and upon the combination there emerges a new temporary mind. This mind is not the mind either of the dead person or of the medium. This theory, of course, is sheer hypothesis, but there are, so far as I know, no facts which are incompatible with it, and there is one set of facts which it explains particularly well.

"Spirit" messages frequently bear traces which suggest an origin in the surviving mind of the dead person, although they are usually too childish and simple to be quite characteristic. Also they are faintly reminiscent of the personality of the medium; so much so as to suggest to many the hypothesis that they emanate from the medium's unconscious self. If we suppose that the mind that sends them is a temporary, rather elementary mind, owning as its ingredients the vital factor of the dead person and the body of the medium, this double reference of the messages which remind us partly of one and partly of the other would be explained. It is, I suggest, this temporary mind which may also be responsible for ectoplastic and other physical phenomena. It breaks

* See my *Matter, Life and Value*, Ch. IV (Oxford University Press) and *Movements in Modern Thought* (to be published this autumn by Faber), Ch. VII.

† See *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* by C. D. BROAD.

down the stuff of the medium's body into ectoplasm and then proceeds to give it temporary shape and form; it also amuses itself by causing tambourines to rattle, tables to jump and the other trivial occurrences of the séance room. I say "amuses itself" because that quality of rather pointless mischievousness, which I have already noticed as characteristic of psychical phenomena, is precisely what one would expect of a temporary intelligence possessing the childlike and elementary disposition appropriate to its casual origin and brief *ad hoc* existence.

I should like to offer one further suggestion in regard to telepathic and other supernormal, psychological powers. These I believe to be present in every individual. By a deliberate technique such as that perfected in the East, they may be evoked and brought under volitional control; but in most of us they remain latent because life withholds from the conscious control of the individual the use of its and his full powers. If the individual could foresee the future, remember all the past, live in the minds of his fellows, he would lose that incentive to effort and struggle which is born of limitation and by means of which his character and faculties are developed. It is only through such development that he becomes an adequate instrument of life's purpose, fitted to carry life to higher levels than it has hitherto reached. When he is approaching the end of his life as an individual, and the performance of his function as an instrument of life is about to be terminated, the reason for withholding the use of these hidden powers no longer obtains, and they become for a few moments accessible to consciousness. Thus the typical instance of telepathy is the message sent by the soldier in the trenches on the point of death to mother or wife at home. The process by which the drowning man remembers in a flash and apparently lives through all the details of his past life, is an example of the same sudden enlargement of powers.

C. E. M. JOAD

Before the Soul can see, the Harmony within must be attained, and fleshly eyes be rendered blind to all illusion. Before the Soul can hear, the image (man) has to become as deaf to roarings as to whispers, to cries of bellowing elephants as to the silvery buzzing of the golden firefly.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ODOURS

[**H. Stanley Redgrove, B. Sc., F. I. C.**, is a specialist in the subject on which he writes and has published an interesting volume on *Scent and All About It*. In this article he goes into the subject of the classification of smells, and in passing refers to the origin of smell itself—on which problem interested readers may consult THE ARYAN PATH for March and November 1931.—EDS.]

In his book, *The Flying Inn*, G. K. Chesterton puts into the mouth of a dog a song about the noselessness of man; and there is no doubt that, in comparison with dogs and many other animals, the human olfactory apparatus seems to be relatively little developed. It is, indeed, often assumed that, in mankind, the sense of smell is weak and unimportant; for which reason, perhaps, the phenomena of olfaction have received so little attention in comparison with those of hearing and sight.

As yet no perfectly satisfactory system of classifying and naming smells has been devised. We can only describe a new or little known odour by saying that it is "like" a well-known one. For example, the substances rhodinol, geraniol, phenyl, ethyl, alcohol, and many others which might be named, all have odours which can only be described by saying that they are like that of roses. The odours of these substances are, however, all quite distinct, even to the relatively untrained nose. We can, perhaps, achieve a better description by comparing the odour of each with that of a particular type of rose; but even this plan is not really satisfactory, for the odours of the flowers in question, though "like" those of the substances mentioned, are actually of a considerably more complex character.

In recent years, Crocker and Henderson have put forward the theory that all odours are made up of not more than four components, namely, fragrant or sweet, acid or sour, burnt or empyreumatic, and caprylic or œnanthic, which may be present in varying degrees of intensity from 0 to 8. On the basis of this theory, they have endeavoured to analyse a considerable number of odours, with results which, in my opinion, are quite unsatisfactory. The diversity of odours is far greater than can be accounted for in this manner.

Two older systems of classification, namely, those of Rimmel and Piesse, although marred by obvious defects, seem to be of more practical value. Rimmel's system is frankly empirical. It relates to pleasant odours only. Eighteen complex odours, namely those of bitter almonds, ambergris, aniseed, vanilla, camphor, cloves, lemons, pears, jasmine, lavender, peppermint, musk, orange-blossoms, roses, sandalwood, cinnamon, tuberoses and violets, are chosen as types, other odours being grouped along with these on the basis of "likeness".

In Piesse's system, 46 pleasant odours are arranged in a gamut, corresponding to an extended musical scale in C major. Odours which form octaves with each other are "like". Those which are distant at intervals corresponding to harmonious chords, give pleasing results in combination.

The possibility of establishing useful analogies between sounds and odours is one of great interest. Readers desirous of pursuing the matter further are referred to two articles by myself published in *The Perfumery and Essential Oil Record* ("Perfumes and Music," February, 1929, and "In Defence of Noses," May, 1930). It may be said, however, that interesting and suggestive though these analogies are, they do not provide a completely satisfactory means for classifying and naming odours.

A game is sometimes played in which the competitors are required to name, while blindfolded, the contents of a number of bottles which they are allowed to smell. In the bottles are placed various common products having characteristic odours. It is notorious how many curious and amusing mistakes are made in their identification.

The fact, however, remains that smell is the acutest of man's senses, and this is well known to perfumers. They are quite aware that the addition of a minute trace of a suitable odorous substance to a perfume may make quite a profound change in its odour, and that the quantity required may, in certain cases, be so small as to be quite impossible of detection by any other means.

Odours probably play a much larger part in our lives than we are aware. We are constantly breathing in odorous emanations; and, even if the sensations they produce do not arise above the subconscious level, they are quite capable of affecting our general states of mind.

Odours are well known to form extremely strong mental associations. Hence they are very able to recall memories to the mind. Why this should be the case is not known; but it is a fact, and to this fact, no doubt, are to be attributed the powerful effects which certain odours are capable of exercising on the emotions.

The action of odours as emotional stimulants is a subject of great psychological interest. But before considering further this aspect of the psychology of odours, it may be useful to mention some of the other ways in which odours play an important part in human lives.

A liking for sweet odours is common. Most of us enjoy the fragrance of flowers, deriving a pleasure therefrom analogous to that derived from looking at a fine painting or hearing a fine musical performance. The perfumer endeavours to capture, or by artificial means to recreate, the fragrance of flowers for our perpetual enjoyment. He aims, too, by the compounding of various aromatic bodies, to produce new and delicious combinations of odours. His

work is entirely analogous to that of the painter and the musician, yet it seems to have failed to have gained universal recognition as constituting one of the fine arts.

The task of creating harmonious combinations of odours is not restricted to the perfumer: it extends to the chef. We sniff food to judge of its goodness; and when we eat it, the sensations we experience are largely of an olfactory character. Tastes, commonly so-called, are made up of two distinct factors: tastes proper, and flavours. Tastes proper are very limited in number: probably there are only seven in all, namely, sweet, salt, sour, bitter, metallic, alkaline, and pungent. Flavours, however, are almost infinite in their variety. And just as odours are experienced in virtue of the entry into the upper part of the nose of particles of aromatic materials breathed in, so the sensation of flavour arises from similar particles reaching the olfactory apparatus from the mouth as the breath is exhaled.

In itself, an odour seems of so ethereal character, yet capable of so profoundly affecting the mind, that some have been led to think that odours must in some peculiar way belong to the spiritual realm. Now regarded from one point of view, every sensation is a spiritual phenomenon, since it exists only in mind; and, in the last analysis, the Universe itself may be reduced to minds and their experiences. The materialist hypothesis, however, is a useful tool for co-ordinating experiences. It is as foolish to neglect to use it, where it is useful, as it is to endeavour to regard it as affording an ultimate explanation of all things. The hypothesis is as useful in dealing with olfactory phenomena, as in the case of any other class of sensation. And every scientific study of the mechanism of olfaction confirms the view that olfactory sensations only arise when particles of aromatic materials gain access to the olfactory apparatus situated in the upper part of the nose.

To the trained nose, odours are extremely informative. We may witness this in the case of dogs and other animals; and as already intimated, the human olfactory apparatus is not quite as insensitive as is commonly supposed. The chemist is able to identify a very considerable number of substances by merely smelling them; and, subconsciously, we probably rely on our olfactory sensations more than we suppose.

Since actual entry of material particles into the nose must occur before a sensation of odour is experienced, it follows that all odorous materials are volatile or contain volatile constituents. The quantity necessary to produce the required stimulus is, in certain instances, very minute. Hence some materials whose volatility is quite low have very powerful odours. Natural musk provides a case in point.

There is a certain ambiguity in the expression "strength of odour". Some substances, such, for example, as ammonia, sulphuretted

hydrogen, and the fumes of burning sulphur, have very powerful, pungent and stupefying odours, whose powerfulness seems to reside in the fact that the substances are very volatile. Another and distinct class of materials have odours the strength of which manifests itself in an entirely different way. These substances, among which may be instanced some of the recent creations of aromatic chemistry, such as exaltone and ambrettolid, are only slightly volatile. The most minute quantities, however, are able to affect the olfactory nerves. Hence, while the substances in a pure state do not smell strong in the way that those of the former class do, even when most highly diluted and mixed with other odorous materials, their own odours may be smelt.

It is remarkable that, in the case of certain odorous materials, a change in the mere concentration of the stimulus, seems to alter the character of the odour entirely. In other words, the sensation produced differs from what is expected. Hawthorn, for example, contributes largely to the delicious fragrance of English country lanes in spring and early summer. Yet how disappointing is the result if we endeavour to make its closer acquaintance. The odour is changed in character and becomes repulsive. Pure civet has a most disgusting odour; but when highly diluted the odour becomes sweet and flower-like. Methyl-heptine carbonate, a chemical substance used in perfumery, is another material showing a similar phenomenon. The faintest trace suggests the leafy note in the fragrance of violets. The pure substance has an abominable odour.

The ancient Egyptians, prizing aromatic materials above all earthly things, considered them to constitute the most fitting gift that could be offered to the gods, and they burnt incense on their altars that the fragrant smoke might ascend to heaven. The practice of burning aromatic woods, spices and resins, as a religious rite, was not restricted to the Egyptians; and incense is used to-day by numerous religious bodies both Christian and non-Christian, in some cases, at any rate, frankly because of its effect on the minds of the worshippers. The action of incense, conducing to a religious frame of mind, is probably psychological, rather than physiological, and operates in virtue of association of ideas.

At the other extreme might be instanced the amazing and mostly evil-smelling concoctions, the burning of which formed an important part of the rites of necromancy and black magic, according to the records which remain of these practices. The effects of the fumes cannot, however, be attributed to odour alone, as these concoctions usually contained narcotics which act, even in minute traces, on the brain.

The remarkable power certain odours possess for heightening the sex-impulse seems inexplicable on a physiological basis, and calls

for a psychological explanation. The use of certain aromatic materials as aphrodisiacs has been long practised in the East, and is not unknown in the Western world. Perfumes are no doubt largely used because they heighten sex-appeal.

It is, indeed, remarkable that mankind should appreciate sweet odours at all, for unlike such odours as those of roast meat, onions and cheese (which as perfumes would be detested), they do not seem to answer to any of his biological needs. It is true that the substances to which the fragrance of flowers and the aroma of spices are due, are in nearly all cases, useful antiseptics. One might say, therefore, that a liking for these odours is healthy, and that, other things being equal, those races having a fondness for sweet odours would survive at the expense of those lacking this peculiarity.

Perhaps this factor has operated; but I think the true explanation lies deeper. Curious though it may seem, there is a connection between the fragrance of flowers and the odour of human sweat. The latter odour is usually considered offensive; nevertheless clean flesh has a very agreeable sweet smell, which can only be due to *minute* traces of perspiration. It is another case where intensification of the stimulus produces a complete alteration in the character of the odour as experienced. If we allow that the *expected* sensation from an intensification of the stimulus is a very floral odour, then it is easy to understand why sweet odours should be appreciated, and why, further, they should, in certain instances, have an aphrodisiac action.

Dr. Th. H. van de Velde, in his book *Ideal Marriage* (trans. by S. Browne, London, 1929) has considered the aphrodisiac action of odours in a most interesting way. He has attempted a classification of odours into four groups, namely those which intensify pleasant personal odours (two groups, masculine and feminine), and those which counteract unpleasant ones (another two groups, masculine and feminine).

The whole subject of the psychology of odours is both interesting and important; but, in spite of the recognition of the value of incense by religious bodies, and the common (if unconscious) use of perfumes as aphrodisiacs, the study of the subject has been very seriously neglected. It is hoped that the present article may stimulate enquiry in what promises to be a most profitable field of research.

H. STANLEY REDGROVE

DOES THE "GITA" SUPPORT ORTHODOXY?

[**G. V. Ketkar, B. A., LL. B.,** is one of the two founders of the *Gita* Dharma Mandala, started in Poona in 1924 for the study of the great text and the spread of its teachings. This interesting article together with its second part, to appear next month, was sent for perusal to Mr. Gandhi by the author, who received the following reply from the great Indian leader:

Yeravda Central Prison.
11th January, 1933

Dear Friend,

I have now carefully read both your articles on the Gita. I have found them to be interesting.

I observe that you have reached the same conclusion that I had by a different method. Yours is the learned way. Not so mine.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI.

The Sarda Act, referred to in the beginning of this article, was passed in 1929. Under it the marriage of girls below the age of 15 is forbidden.—EDS.]

The passing of the Sarda Act roused the orthodox section of Hindu society to organise itself under the All India "Varnashrama Swaraja Sangha". These supporters of the old order of things have curiously enough copied the modern methods of organisation and propaganda. There is no foundation for these methods in the Dharma-Shastra texts on which the orthodox people rely. The old way of doing these things was different. *Varnacracy* presumed the rule of a Kshatriya king acting with the guidance of Brahmin pandits. He was responsible for maintaining order in accordance with the Dharma-Shastra texts. There was no need of newspaper propaganda, meetings and resolutions, petitions and protests. The Shastras are silent about these. Modern democracy was beyond their contemplation. The orthodox people who rely on the Shastras for everything have now to face the misfortune of defending the Shastras by obviously non-Shastraic methods!

The orthodox organisation which owed its birth to the Sarda Act has now entered a second phase of intense activity since the fresh impetus given to Anti-untouchability propaganda by Mahatma Gandhi's fast. Unlike many other reformers Gandhi is a faithful follower of the *Bhagwat-Gīta*. In that book he finds a complete guide for moral conduct. To him the *Gīta* is the epitome of Hinduism as he understands and interprets it. Naturally, therefore, the orthodox section would be glad if they could turn Gandhi's own favourite text against him. And they have been trying to do so. The question has thus assumed special importance, whether and how far the *Gīta* supports the Hindu orthodoxy in its present form.

The orthodox or the *Sanatani* section maintains that Hindu society must abide by the rules laid down in the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*, in the *Smritis*, the *Puranas* and the accepted *Commentaries* on the *Smritis*. These sources of guidance are collectively called "Dharma-Shastra" or simply "Shastra". Any rule of conduct or injunction laid down in this "Shastra" is called a "Vidhi". These injunctions a Hindu must follow with almost blind faith. He can exercise his intellect to know what is the injunction. But he must not question why. Nor has he the right to say that, as times have changed, he can modify the injunction so as to suit his purpose. The verses at the end of the sixteenth chapter of the *Gīta* (*23 & 24*) seem to lend support to this orthodox view. They are therefore often quoted and relied upon in the present controversy. It is therefore desirable to examine this passage in the *Gīta* in order to ascertain how far it supports the orthodox view. A free translation of the verses mentioned above may be given here. "He who gives up the rule of the Shastra, and follows the promptings of his own sweet will does not attain perfection, nor happiness, nor the highest spiritual goal." Therefore, says the *Gīta* in the following verse, "In determining right and wrong the Shastra must be your guide or authority. In this world you should know the rule of the Shastra and act accordingly."

At first sight this passage seems to support the orthodox view unequivocally. No wonder therefore, that the *Sanatani* preacher and propagandist snatches at this portion of the *Bhagwat-Gīta* and uses it as a trump-card. The text accepted by the champion of reform is thereby neatly turned against him. But closer examination of this often quoted passage, and especially of the context in which it occurs in the *Gīta*, will make us doubt whether it can reasonably mean all that is attributed to it and whether it lends really the support which is sought from it. The sixteenth chapter of the *Gīta* is devoted to one theme, *viz.* the two kinds of human beings, godly and demoniacal—virtuous and vicious. The moral of the whole chapter is laid down in the 21st and 22nd verses. This twofold division of humanity is described in order to show that "lust, wrath and greed" lead us to Hell. When we abandon these three veritable inlets of Hell we can tread the path of salvation. That is the moral of the chapter. After this moral come the verses about Shastras. In the previous chapters the *Gīta* has more than once declared *Kāma* [lust] as the source of all evil action, and the avoidance of *Kāma* as the way to spiritual advancement. Good and evil actions are discriminated by this criterion. This same view is again stated with emphasis in the 21st and 22nd verses of the sixteenth chapter.

Then follows the passage in

question. The *Gīta* view of right and wrong obviously comes in conflict with the accepted orthodox view. According to the latter, what is ordained by the Shastras is right, what is not so ordained is wrong. How are the two views to be reconciled? The *Gīta* has here tried to reconcile them with its subtle method of reconcilement. It accepts the view with reservations and with a different meaning. In such cases of reconcilement with the accepted old view, the *Gīta* takes care to see that its difference with that view is expressed as unobtrusively as possible. The difference is pointed out by the word *Kāmakāratah* in the first line of the 23rd verse. Everybody who abandons the rules of Shastras is not sinful. Out of those who abandon the Shastras, those alone are sinful who follow the promptings of *Kāma*. The word *Kāmakāratah* indicates the *Gīta's* amendment of the old proposition.

It is this amendment that has suggested the following question of Arjuna in the opening of the seventeenth chapter. What will be our fate if we abandon the Shastraic rules, and yet with faith we perform the sacrifice? The answer of the *Gīta* to this question is clearly given at the end of the chapter. *Shraddhā* which is indifferently translated by the word "Faith" is the primary necessity. What is done without *Shraddhā* is bad even if it is done strictly in accordance with rules of the Shastras. One question here naturally suggests itself to the orthodox reader. To him *Shraddhā* itself means blind unquestioned acceptance of the rules in the Shastras. How can there be faithful action by disregarding the Shastras? Again, if the rules of the Shastras themselves enjoin what is good and what is bad, how can there be good action without following the Shastras? Arjuna's question at the beginning of the seventeenth chapter becomes meaningless if we take the accepted meanings of *Shraddhā* and *Shāstravidhi*. But the meanings of these two words in the *Gīta* must be determined by reference to the *Gīta* itself. On such reference we find that they are different from the commonly accepted meanings. The significance of the passage in question cannot be properly understood unless we determine the correct sense in which the *Gīta* uses the words *Shraddhā*, *Vidhi* and *Shāstra*. The commonly accepted sense of the word *Vidhi* is injunction or imperative order to do something. But there is also another and well-known sense in which it is sometimes used in Sanskrit. It means the accepted or traditional method of doing something. The *Gīta* uses *Vidhi* in this latter sense. This word occurs in the 23rd verse of the ninth chapter. There it is said: "Those who worship other deities with faith worship Me, though without *Vidhi*." Here the meaning of the word must be taken to be "method" or the "proper way of doing". In the seventeenth chapter the best kind of sacrifice is described in the 11th verse:

That sacrifice is regarded best which is done without desire of personal profit, with a firm belief that it is your duty and which is done according to *Vidhi*.

Here also you must take it to mean the accepted method or the traditional way of doing it. Both in xvi, 17 and in xvii, 5, wicked people are described as performing sacrifices and penances contrary to *Vidhi*. There too it means "proper method". In xvi, 24, the word *Vidhana* is used as a synonym for *Vidhi*; the same word *Vidhana* again occurs in xvii, 24. In both places the word means "method". The word *Niyama* is used as an equivalent to *Vidhi* in vii, 20. There worshippers of other gods are said to worship them with the respective *Niyama* prescribed in that behalf. *Niyama* there denotes the method or external observances of worship.

The meaning of the last two verses of the sixteenth chapter—the verses which form the subject of this discussion—is that in doing things we must follow the traditional method as laid down by experienced men in the past.

If there is still doubt in some minds about the real meaning of *Vidhi* in the *Gīta* it will be dissolved by reference to a concrete example mentioned at the end of the seventeenth chapter. The *Vidhi* or method which is discussed there is this: Every good action is to be commenced with pronouncing the word "*Aum-Tat-Sat*". This is the traditional threefold designation of the Eternal (*Brahma*). The pronunciation of this formula is a *Vidhi*. But what is the meaning of that formula? "*Aum*" means Brahma, "*Tat*" means without the desire of personal gain, and "*Sat*" means good feelings, kindness, good work and steadfastness in doing good things. By this interpretation of the formula the *Gīta* suggests that if we do really good actions without the aim of personal profit we follow the formula in sense. A bad thing done with the pronunciation "*Aum-Tat-Sat*" will not be transformed into good by that formula. It is better if we follow the *Vidhi* of pronouncing that formula. But even without the formula if the act is sincerely done and in good faith it will do. Everything done in bad faith is *Asat* and it will not be helpful to you even if you recite the "*Aum-Tat-Sat*" mantra.

G. V. KETKAR

PHILOSOPHY AND A SENSE OF HUMOUR

[**T. V. Smith** is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago, and is Editor of the *International Journal of Ethics*. We wonder whether Mr. Denis Mackail will find in this article an exception to prove the rule he has enunciated in the extract from his writing printed on p. 165.—EDS.]

Philosophy never shone with brighter lustre than at the immortalized banquet which Agathon gave in celebration of his prize tragedy. Aristophanes, renowned for his comedies, was there to greet the rising tragedian. Alcibiades arrived drunken to shame all paradoxes with the master paradox of a strange love at once earthen and divine. And Socrates, paradox himself incarnate, was there still sober at daybreak to match the strange logic of stranger events with a logic of discourse which was veritably the cream of the jest. For just before Aristophanes, master of comedies, dropped off, and just before Agathon, master of tragedies, toppled over, Socrates had welcomed the dawn by extorting from both alike confirmation of his paradoxical thesis that "the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also". In truth, as Socrates departed for his bath at the Lyceum and his day as usual in Athenian streets, the Grecian sun looked down that morning upon the spirit of pure philosophy dying while it lived and living through its death.

I

The philosopher as philosopher works with words. In this he differs from the common man, who works with things; from the scientist, who works with instruments; from the politician, who works with people. From the littérateur, who also works with words, the philosopher differs in seeking directly through words to tell the plain unvarnished truth. Precisely therein lies the heart of philosophy—a heart which appears, as you will, tragic, or comic, or humorous. For words, though things in their own right, are not the things intended by the philosopher; they remain even for him symbols. Now yearn as one may for reality, the symbol is not the thing symbolized; and so the philosopher is doomed always to occupy himself with something other than his true vocation. Plato is not the only philosopher who in recognition of this fact and fate has resorted to heroic measures to prevent, as he puts it, seeing himself at last altogether nothing but words. Fate followed him, however, to Syracuse—and back again. If in honest recognition of our fate we say, with George Santayana, that "knowing is not eating," it remains by that very fact that knowledge cannot fill the hungry human spirit. In seeing, however, what the philosopher is doomed to miss, one should not fail to remark what he gains

by his choice of media. Verbal symbols, while not enabling one fully to appropriate anything, not even the words themselves, do enable one in a fashion to know everything. What has not been named may be named; and whatever has a name may have its name called by the philosopher and be thus introduced by him to all things else with names. Acquiring through such potent ceremony a station, all named things acquire duties; and there arises easily out of the matrix of nescience by means of this philosophic roll-call not only a logical cosmos but a moral universe as well. It is, however, an airy universe built on air, flanked by chaos. Symbols not only are not the things symbolized, but verbal symbols at least are not even from the same realm of being as the things for which they stand. How, then, can they stand for them? They cannot, save with a dash of the tragic, or the comic, or the humorous.

II

The philosopher who takes with complete seriousness what he is doing seasons his performance with a touch of the tragic. Though it requires an outside view to see this, some succeeding generation, if not contemporaries themselves, may be depended upon to unveil the completely serious as tinted with the tragic. Remember Hegel. And, in general, mark well how immodest is the philosopher's field. "It is the function of the philosopher," says Aristotle, " to be able to investigate all things." Indeed, the philosopher thinks to display nakedly the morphology of being; he thinks to pluck out the heart of the mystery of existence. Now, beyond all doubt Reality was made one size too large to be completely captured by any net of words. To see the word-weaver weaving his 'glossamer' net to catch Being, when the net will not hold even the breeze generated by its own enunciation—is not this tragedy unless converted into humour by a smile? To paraphrase a witticism of Voltaire, philosophy is only a pack of tricks we play on reality. But since, as Carl Becker says in his *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, "it is unlikely that these tricks do the dead any harm, and it's certain that they do us much good," better philosophy with a tincture of the tragic than no philosophy at all.

III

Philosophy without this tint of the tragic is difficult to achieve. For the way to escape from the serious is to cease to be serious; and a philosophy that does not believe itself to be the truth is comic whether it appears to be so or not. Consciously not to aim to tell the truth while manipulating language forms of truth-telling is, if human at all, perversely so. Even the contemporary proponents of Essence, while distinguishing essences from things, claim nevertheless that they represent the *essences of things*. A philosopher who, in strict behavioristic fashion, talked literally to find out

what he was going to say rather than to disclose the truth would suggest, though hardly illustrate, the attitude here in question. But such is the profundity in Socrates's ancient thesis that tragic overseriousness usually appears to one who sees it for what it is as comic, and a philosopher who acknowledged in the telling of his truth that it was comic would himself appear not unmarked by the tragic. When, moreover, our net of words fits reality like a metaphysical Mother-Hubbard, covering everything but touching nothing, the onlooker detects comedy, however serious the performance. This is indeed, in Bergson's theory, the very essence of the comic.

IV

Only the greatest philosophers have discovered and exemplified a middle course between laughing at themselves as consciously comic and having others laugh at them as unconsciously tragic. Indeed, to discover this golden mean between the tragic and the comic is the surest mark of philosophic, not to say also of human, greatness. This discovery constitutes a sense of humour. In practice the first fruit of such a sense is golden reticence about the heart of life and things. "He who knows does not speak," said Lao Tse; "he who speaks does not know." Though Carlyle praised silence in many eloquent volumes, Plato chided his royal student who had essayed to talk about the incommunicable: "I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in future . . . I do not think the attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing . . . no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language those things which his reason has contemplated." The second fruit is a modesty of claim about the truth of what one does essay to tell. Plato is again our best model. In myth, in farce, in repartee, in raillery, in bluster, in eloquence he attempts to communicate the communicable; but in moments of the highest seriousness he is capable of interrupting his truth-claim with the acknowledgment of his best as "a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth".

The final characteristic indeed of a sense of humour is to discount both one's serious and unserious claims while making them, without impairing the dominant quality of either. And the final fruit of such a sense is the reward of being taken at the value one puts upon himself. Such an one can tell the truth he meant to tell in language, and communicate otherwise what mother-wit tells him is beyond the power of speech. Let it be remembered that even Plato who disavowed effort to tell the final truth in words, spent his life nevertheless in revealing to others the first things. On that margin of meaning, where gestures supplement words and the symbolized gently pushes the symbol aside, in the fecundity of what Plato calls "close companionship . . . suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, insight is gener-

ated in the soul . . . . and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light".

But just here the genius of abstract philosophy fades into the form of a robust philosopher, and we are once more in the presence of Plato's Socrates fusing the genius of tragedy and comedy, which are one and the same, into a living sense of humour. Such a sense enjoins the dead to bury their dead and seasons the weight and woe of thought with the upspringing of joy.

That I grow sick and curse my being's source
If haply one day passes lacking mirth.

T. V. SMITH

The mysterious law of compensation which arranges that millionaires shall be dyspeptic, and that beautiful women shall be stupid, and that prima donnas shall be fat, and that bachelors shall have holes in their socks, has also ordained that the great sages and philosophers shall be entirely deprived of a sense of humour. This being the case, it is remarkable—or at any rate curious—how many great sages and philosophers have been impelled to write long books, and to deliver long lectures, in which they have the gosh-darned impudence to tell us how and why we laugh.

Absolutely undeterred by the fact that they never laugh themselves or at the best produce an occasional, dry, wheezy cackle when they find that a colleague has misplaced a Greek accent, they have the all-fired nerve and consummate gall to analyze these bubbles on the champagne of life, and to explain to us the formula which has created them. Professor Gumm has done this. So has Dr. McOstrich. So has Herr Doktor-Professor Rumpelbach, who informs us that the laughter of man owes its origin to a synchronized co-ordination of neurophysiological reflexes with the semi-automatic impulse of mass-inherited suggestivism.

"All right," we feel inclined to reply, in the never-to-be-forgotten words of the manager to the high-salaried comedian, "Now make us laugh."

But they can't do that, of course—or certainly not in the way that we mean. So we leave them to their dull and dismal work, and turn back to the enjoyment of all the fun that they are missing.

For can it really matter how the champagne is made, so long as the bouquet tickles our palate, and the bubbles go foaming up to the top of the glass? Can it really matter why we laugh, so long as there are things to laugh at? Can it—But if we're not careful, we shall be turning into philosophers and sages ourselves. Away with all this profundity, then.

—DENIS MACKAIL in *The Golden Book Magazine*

MYSTIC BROTHERHOOD THROUGH ISLAM

[**Robert Sencourt** is the author of *The Life of Empress Eugénie*, *The Life of George Meredith*, and *India in English Literature*. In perusing this article the reader should bear in mind that Occultism makes a distinction between "psychic exaltation and union" and "spiritual exaltation and union," the former is devilish, the latter divine. The pivotal idea of esoteric philosophy is that Divine Love is Compassion, which being impersonal is felt by the ascetic's heart impersonally. Says the *Voice of the Silence*—" Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of LAWS—eternal Harmony, Alaya's SELF; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal. The more thou dost become at one with it, thy being melted in its BEING, the more thy Soul unites with that which Is, the more thou wilt become COMPASSION ABSOLUTE. Such is the Arya Path, Path of the Buddhas of Perfection."—EDS.]

The relationship between peoples, between religions, between cultures, partakes of the natures of both brotherly comradeship, sympathy and variety in development from a common origin and also of that passionate creative impulse by which separate natures are drawn together in a magic unity to create a new life within reality, a new reality within life. Their relation has the double nature of both brother and lover. This in the Divine Wisdom is finally to bind together East and West, to enrich Western culture with the secret doctrines of the Wise of India, to give India a new creative impulse through impact with the *philosophia perennis* which Europe has developed through the sages of Athens from Heraclitus, and developed through all those schools of spiritual wisdom which were the nucleus of Western culture. But the relationship of brother and lover is perfected by the fact that between the East and the West is the spiritual mediation as there is the geographical interposition of Islam.

The Sufi mystics have devoted themselves with a peculiar ardour to the passion for Unity; final Unity is the overmastering instinct of their religion and their theology. To the students of religions Islam appears as a compromise between primitive Christianity and the warlike and uncompromising tradition of the tribes of a desert steeped in intense sunlight; so Protestantism appears as a compromise between medieval Catholicism and strong popular institutions as well as the organization of physical comfort against inclemencies of climate. But whereas Protestantism in its conflict with certain phases of religious materialism swept away all the subtleties of mystical tradition and the specialities of occult activity, Islam actually opened the door of Attic philosophy, and with it of mystic discipline to the Catholic Church.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the Moslem culture of Spain.

The very landscapes of Spain have the dryness of the African desert. They are bathed in the same intense light. The influence of the Moorish Invasions, and with them of Arabic traditions, is integral to Spanish culture: it marks the very pronunciation of the language: it inspires impressive monuments like the Giralda of Seville: it leaves its own memorials in the Mosque at Cordoba and the Alhambra: and it shares the ardour of virile passion with the Soul of Spain.

No example of Moslem culture in Spain, however, is more eminent, or more stimulating than Abenarabi (Ibn 'Arabi) the Sufi of Murcia, who was born there in 1164 and died in Damascus in 1234. His marriage brought him under the influence of religion, and he received his initiation during an illness about the year 1184. From that time on he lived as an ascetic. Soon afterwards, he met the great Aristotelian Averroes and before many years he was known to be advanced in esoteric knowledge, so that authorities came from afar to consult him. He then withdrew to a life of solitude, and was seen to converse in low and enraptured tones with disembodied companions. He sought wisdom of other ascetics. "I know of no grade of mystic life," he wrote, "neither of any sect of religion, but that I have seen some person who professed it."

This search for the secret wisdom made him a traveller, and he passed—now famous—into Africa, and made inquiries of several advanced Sufis. Two years later he went to Fez. Finally he made pilgrimages to Mecca and Mosul and settled at Damascus. There in the centre of a Madrasah and Mosque at the outskirts of the city, his beautiful tomb may still be admired. His two most important works, the *Fotuhat* and the *Fosus*, have been ranked by Moslems from his own time up to now with the *Diwan* of Abenalgarid and the books of Al Gazzali as classics of esoteric knowledge. They have been republished recently in Arabic not only in Cairo and Constantinople but also in Bombay, and they have recently been made the central study of the great Spanish scholar, Professor Asin Palacios, of the University of Madrid, who with M. Louis Massignon is since the death of Sir Thomas Arnold the greatest Arabic scholar of the Western World.* This then is the Sufi who in his mystic philosophy shows most clearly how the Moslem unites the part of both brother and lover in joining East and West.

For love, he tells us, is union: the union in the higher spiritual planes of soul with soul, as in the subtle life of the physical senses it is the union of body with body. For even physical love has its spiritual quality. A being possessed with natural life, of that double life which the spirit breathes into those minglings of energies which

* See *El Islam Cristianizado*. By MIGUEL ASIN PALACIOS. (Editorial Plutarco, Madrid. 25 pesetas.)

beholds it . . . . . Moreover it would be difficult to find two thinkers whose poetical and religious temperaments are so alike as those of Dante and Abenarabi.*

For what is the central poignant relationship of the *Divine Comedy?* It is the Platonic passion of Dante for Beatrice. She on whom his eyes had rested as a child, and who had inspired him with passionate longing and ideal fervour, is seen to be the guide and loadstone of his soul, so that gradually her ideal qualities become absorbed into those of the Blessed Virgin (the Mother of Jesus is venerated as a Virgin alike by Catholic and Moslem) and finally are identified with that mystical theology which bathed the soul of the poet in heavenly light. So as he last sees her in the Rose of Paradise Dante cries out:

O Lady, in whom my living hope is teeming
And who didst once endure to leave the trace
Of thy dear feet in Hell for my redeeming,
In all the worth and beauty finding place
In things thou hast enabled me to see
I recognize thy virtue and thy grace.

Thou leddest me along from slave to free
By all those ways, by all expedients
Whereby the power to do so lay in thee.
Preserve me in thy own magnificence
So that thy spirit through thy healing, may
Content thee as it slips the coil of sense.—
Far as she seemed on hearing me so pray,
She smiled and lookt: then to the Fountainhead
Eternal turned her smiling eyes away. †

It was long thought that Dante, who shared this romantic exaltation of Platonic passion with the Provençal troubadours, owed to Germany this doctrine of human love made transcendent. As Professor Asin has shown, that was not so. Romantic love in all its intense importance for not only Dante but for Shakespearean literature in England may be traced back rather to the Spanish Sufis and most of all to Abenarabi Mohidin, the Moslem Saint of Murcia and Damascus.

Here then, beginning with a common kinship to the East and West, and so making a link of brotherhood, this enlightened seer, who so subtly showed how the analysis of romantic passion in human love leads us to understand the qualities of mystic at-one-ment, joins the East to the West in the way peculiar to the geographical place and to the functions of Islam. And surely it is peculiarly promising that a Sufi so widely venerated in the East should have learnt in the first place so much from the disciples of Plato, of Aristotle, and of Jesus, and then in turn should have influenced the greatest masterpiece of Christian literature, and touched so deeply the inspiration of the universal genius of Shakespeare.

ROBERT SENCOURT

* *Islam and the Divine Comedy*, p. 276.
† Paradiso XXXI, 79–90. Anderson's translation.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

II.—MOTION

[**Ivor B. Hart** contributes the second article of his series, the first of which appeared last month.—EDS.]

In a previous article we showed that one of the main concepts of modern science, namely, that of Space, is leading the physicists of Europe and America to broad conclusions that were in fact developed half a century ago by H. P. Blavatsky, in *The Secret Doctrine.* We now proceed to another of the dominant concepts of modern physics, that of " Motion ".

We cannot, of course, divorce the concept of motion from that of space, and a moment's consideration will show that this is inevitable. The common factor between the two is "matter".

Not only for the student of physics, but also for the average person, the notion of space could have but little meaning until we put matter, or at least radiant energy (regarding this, in accordance with modern views, as a modification of matter) into it. Until recently, too, it was not possible to consider motion except in terms of matter. "Movement of what ? " one naturally asked. What a puzzle there must have been for Science when Römer, with the aid of eclipse phenomena in connection with Jupiter's satellites, first provided us with the new phrase "the velocity of light," the reality of which Fizeau subsequently brought to the level of the laboratory. Something that was not matter was in incredibly swift motion ! 186,000 miles per second ! And what a relief when the subsequent years showed that light, as a form of radiant energy, is sufficiently related to the concept of matter to bring consistency to what had appeared inconsistency.

Yet now the latest trend in modern physics brings us back once more to the apparent inconsistency of former times. We referred in our previous article to Einstein's gift to the world of a space that is curved and not flat—a space in fact that Jeans likens to a gigantic soap-bubble. Lemaitre, the Belgian mathematician, has carried the story further. He has shown that this gigantic soap-bubble universe of space is unstable. To preserve itself as an entity it must conform to the requirements of the forces of its instability. It is incapable of standing still under the conditions of its creation, and so it expands ; and indeed it must go on expanding and expanding to the end of time. Once again it is not matter, but space itself, with which we associate the idea of *motion*, and this time it is *eternal motion.*

And now let us see what Mme. Blavatsky has to tell us on this same subject. On p. 55 Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine*, we read :

> The " Breath " of the One Existence is used in its application only to the spiritual aspect of Cosmogony by Archaic esotericism ; otherwise, it is

replaced by its equivalent in the material plane—Motion. The One Eternal Element, or element-containing Vehicle, is *Space*, dimensionless in every sense; co-existent with which are—endless *duration*, primordial (hence indestructible) *matter*, and *motion*—absolute "perpetual motion" which is the "breath" of the "One" Element. This breath, as seen, can never cease, not even during the Pralayic eternities.

One has, of course, to interpret this passage with due regard to the distinction between the inevitable esotericism of the language of Eastern theosophy and the exoteric phraseology that is characteristic of Western Science. But here we have unmistakably the doctrine of eternal ceaseless motion in the universe of space. The Blavatsky of fifty years ago pronounces as definitely for the fundamental motion of the universe as do the mathematical physicists of to-day. We meet it again on p. 455 of the same volume when, referring to the particular stage of evolution according to the doctrines of theosophy (corresponding to the "Creation" of exoteric phraseology), she speaks of "the *absolutely eternal* universal motion, or vibration, that which is called in esoteric language 'the GREAT BREATH'."

Later, on p. 633 of Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine*, we meet with a passage of special interest, because it shows that the vehicle of this eternal movement in and of space is of the form we speak of as wave motion in orthodox physics, although of course this is all placed in its appropriate theosophical setting.

The passage makes reference to Professor Tyndall's researches on sound vibrations (Tyndall being, it should be noted, a contemporary of Mme. Blavatsky) and reads thus:

He [*i. e.* Tyndall] traced . . . . the whole course of the *atmospheric vibrations*—and this constitutes the *objective* part of the process in nature. He has traced and recorded the rapidity of their motion and transmission; the force of their impact; their setting up vibrations in the tympanum and their transmission of these to the stolithes, etc., etc., till the vibration of the auditory nerve commences—and a new phenomenon now takes place: the *subjective side* of the process, or the *sensation of Sound*. Does he perceive or see it? No; for his speciality is to discover the behaviour of matter. But why should not a psychic see it, a spiritual seer, whose inner Eye is opened, and who can see through the veil of matter? The waves and undulations of Science are all produced by atoms propelling their molecules into activity *from within*. Atoms fill the immensity of Space, and by their continuous vibration *are* that MOTION which keeps the wheels of Life perpetually going. It is that inner work that produces the natural phenomena called the correlation of Forces. Only, at the origin of every such "force," there stands the *conscious* guiding noumenon thereof—Angel or God, Spirit or Demon—ruling powers, yet the same.

It may fairly be claimed, then, of the authoress of *The Secret Doctrine*, that in the enunciation of those principles which have made for her a supreme place as the greatest of all exponents of modern Theosophy, there was blended a leaven of cosmology and physics that certainly find their broad counterpart in the accepted views and theories of Western Europe of to-day.

IVOR B. HART

THE RELIGION OF A SOCIALIST

[**Miss Jennie Lee** is well qualified to write on Socialism, for it is her birthright. She comes of a mining family, and her grandfather Michael Lee was a pioneer of the Scottish miners' trade union movement, and was associated with Keir Hardie in founding the independent working class representation in politics. Miss Lee entered Parliament at the early age of 24, and although she was defeated last election, will stand again as Socialist candidate for North Lanark. She is a graduate of Arts and Law of Edinburgh University.—EDS.]

Many socialists who talk of socialism as their religion are not socialists at all. They are splendid people with a strong sense of pity for the poor, but they are just not socialists. For them the be-all and end-all of political agitation is the provision of good houses, adequate health services, and considerate treatment for working class people. But all the social reforms in the world do not sum up into socialism nor touch the most vital element in the religion of the socialist.

So long as society is divided into classes, so long as land and industry, banking and commerce are owned and controlled by private holders, there are problems of status, of personal and class pride left unsolved, which account for as much of the dynamic force behind real socialist activity, as the more obvious struggle for improved material conditions.

To the non-socialist it is sometimes puzzling why so much emphasis should be placed on who shall own and control. Are the results, it is argued, not of greater importance than the methods taken to achieve them? If a scientifically organised Capitalism could succeed in abolishing poverty and unemployment, and in providing adequate health and educational services for all, would the demand for socialism not then lose all meaning?

There is only one possible answer to that question. It is a most emphatic "NO". Unless the sentiments and emotions as well as the economic theories that give passion and force to that "NO" are understood, the religion of the socialist must remain completely unintelligible.

That religion could never have become the power it is in the world to-day if it were merely a rational calculation of the economic structure of society most likely to provide bread and security for the poor. Men and women do not spend their entire energies and resources on a movement for material reasons alone. Indeed if growing rich or rising in the social scale is what a man most desires, then the further he remains from socialist organisations, the more chance he has of success. The lot of the worker who has chosen to toil for the creation of a socialist movement has been, for the most part, ridicule and victimisation. Yet fear of becoming social outcasts, of being made an object of

ridicule in the eyes of the orthodox, of losing even badly paid employment, has not deterred thousands of men and women from throwing themselves unreservedly into socialist activities.

What vision, what sense of present wrong, compels them to behave so? Instead of attempting to answer in abstract and general terms, I had better begin where my faith itself had its beginnings, for nowhere is the choice between accepting or fighting the established order of society put in more cruel and sombre terms than in the mining villages.

Two young miners, Peter and Paul, attend mining school until they qualify as underground firemen. For the ambitious this is the first rung on the ladder of promotion. They now cease working at the coal face and take their place among the lowest grade of mining officials. But Peter and Paul soon learn that in order to climb any further they must be prepared to do many things that honest men do not do of their own free will. Colliery company profits must now count for more than even the safety of the men whose lives are entrusted to their care. Then the supreme test comes when the colliery goes on strike. Peter sees his father and brothers and neighbours standing loyally together in an effort to protect themselves against tyranny. But he is ambitious, so no matter what the merits of the dispute may be he must crawl back to the pit and blackleg. In this way he earns the contempt of his former workmates but may reasonably hope to have gained the favour of the colliery directors. In time, no doubt, he will be pointed to as an example of the liberality and benevolence of British Capitalism in permitting the deserving children of the poor to rise to positions of wealth and importance.

Paul, on the other hand, cannot stand against other workers when he knows their grievance is justified. He refuses to blackleg. He is repelled by the senseless greed and bullying with which business is conducted. He has learned that knowledge and industrious habits are not in themselves sufficient to lead to success. In addition he is expected to surrender all integrity of mind and purpose and to do whatever his master bids, however mean or unscrupulous that bidding may be. Paul cannot bring himself to earn promotion at such a price. He has a vision of something quite different. His first loyalties are given to his workmates. He is more eager to vindicate the character and capacity of the stock he belongs to, than to build up a private banking account at their expense. Nothing can reconcile him to a society divided into classes in which an inferior and servile status is imposed on himself and his people. In the resources of the world around him he sees the means of giving sufficiency and security to all, and he is determined to insist that it shall be so. In short, he has become a socialist.

Paul probably fights shy of the word religion. His socialism is the very breath of life to him. He is prepared to work for it and will not shirk suffering for it, but it is not easy for him to explain the why and wherefor of his feelings. It springs partly from a sense of fair play and contempt of false privilege; partly from a belief that humanity if given a better material and cultural environment would respond generously to new opportunities; it also springs from a strong sense of pride. Paul has too much dignity to climb the social ladder on hands and knees. But he has also too much energy and imagination to lie quietly at the foot of the ladder. He has found something better than either of those things. He has found the religion of socialism.

There is no country and few forms of employment where similar experiences to those of the workers in the mining villages do not recur. The setting, the language, the degree of harshness and servility demanded by those who control Capitalist society may vary, but the essence of the conflict remains the same. The ambitious must either conform or lose their place in the struggle for personal promotion. In time most men and women, however disinterested the ideals with which they start out on life, are broken in to the acceptance of economic cannibalism. But some remain who can know no peace unless struggling for status and justice as well as for bread. It is those who form the iron core of the socialist working class movement in every part of the world. In their religion there are no barriers of race, colour or creed. They are seeking to build a solid international front against Capitalist methods and Capitalist values. They are in revolt against venal competition between man and man and nation and nation in a world clamouring for co-operation instead of conflict, unless war and squalor are never to cease. They believe that with sane economic planning and just distribution of material resources, the adventure of living could rise to an immeasurably more exciting and satisfying level. They are seeking bread but also something still more precious than bread; they want to vindicate the dignity and worth of the ordinary people in every land and to justify the faith of the ploughman and genius who prophesied that

> For a' that, and a' that,
> It's coming yet for a' that,
> That man to man the world o'er,
> Shall brothers be for a' that.

JENNIE LEE

THE FIRST ARTICLE OF BELIEF

[**J. D. Beresford's** article is most appropriate for the Great Festival of Nature on the 21st of March, the Navroz, the New Day celebrated by Asiatic peoples—Persians and others—and in Christendom as Easter.—EDS.]

I have a friend, a mystic and follower of that universal religion which has no name, who has a perfect confidence that a new spirit of goodness is beginning to work in the world consciousness. We shall find no evidence of it in the political history of the moment; and little enough perhaps in the various religious revivals that are affecting the thought of many young men in England at the present time. But my friend foresees, with a simple, exalted faith, that the world having passed the lowest point of the curve will in the comparatively near future, in one, two or three generations it may be, reach the spiritual stage of what he calls "The Great Awakening".

For him the faith begotten by his mystical consciousness is sufficient guide. For us, who however we may long for the coming of the new spirit, still lack the inner certainty of any secret wisdom, it may be well to examine briefly what it is that the world and ourselves are doing to aid the coming of the new order.

I will take the world first, since it affords the less debatable material for a conspectus, and begin by asking what the dominant religions are doing to raise the spiritual tone of their congregations. The most influential religion in this connection is undoubtedly Christianity in its various forms. There are, according to statistics, only 682 million Christians against 1,165 million "non-Christians" to be considered, but the numerical minority is almost completely in command of the essential resources of civilisation,—including the munitions of war. The majority on the other hand is represented almost entirely by the population of one continent, Asia, and of these peoples an overwhelming number are either completely unaware of the modern movement in history or untouched by its developments.

For our present purpose, therefore, we may confine our enquiry to asking what effect the Christian religion is having on the temper of civilisation generally, and how far it offers itself as a vehicle for the coming of the New Spirit. The answer in both cases is, unhappily, that its influence is so small as to be negligible. Of all Christianity's many sects only one, and that the smallest, the Society of Friends, boldly set its face against the awful evil of War in 1914. In international politics, religion plays no part as a unifying, idealistic element; its single function in this relation being rather to provide new causes for dispute. And the reason for these failures may explain our belief that it will

not be by any revival of the Churches that we shall come to the Great Awakening.

Let us consider in the first place the influence of the modern Christian Church,—Roman, Orthodox, Anglican or Nonconformist,—on conduct. It is certainly true that its ethic is unimpeachable in so far as the example held up is that of the *Imitatio Christi.* Yet how many of those 682 millions of nominal Christians even attempt to live up to that ideal ? How many just persons could be found in any of our contemporary Cities of the Plain, to show good cause for the Saving of the Community ? Must we not find some good reason, therefore, for the fact that, after nearly two thousand years, the beliefs of the Christian religion have had so little influence in raising the standard of personal ethics ?

My own explanation starts from the assertion that the principle of vicarious sacrifice, taken over from older and still more primitive religions, has been the great debilitating factor in Christianity. It has no part in Christ's own gospel. His " Because I live, ye shall live also " does not mean, as the following verses clearly show, that the profession of faith is sufficient, that by Christ's death in the character of the transcendent Scapegoat, the sins of the whole world should be remitted. Nevertheless that principle in some form or another became and still is the most powerful doctrine in all forms of the Christian religion.

The inevitable consequence of this has been to relieve the individual of responsibility in this matter of conduct that we are considering. If men are taught to believe that any weakness, any crime, even the whole of the evil resulting from a debauched and selfish life, can be forgiven and its consequences blotted out by the act of repentance and subsequent submission to the Church, what stimulus remains for self-development ? It is not by such beliefs as these that we shall reform the world, nor fit ourselves to become instruments of the informing spirit that comes to the inauguration of a new age.

And something of what I have said of Christianity applies, though it may be for different reasons, to such other prevailing religions in the East as are practised by the majority of Buddhists, Confucians, Hindus, Taoists, Mahommadans or Zoroastrians. Any of them, with the possible exception of the Mahommadans, may develop a great spirit, perhaps a new teacher, but they have become formalised, degenerating into a body of dogmatic beliefs that offer no susceptible vehicle as an instrument for a great world regeneration.

What then do I demand as the principal articles of creed that shall be susceptible to the new influence, to this coming of the spirit that shall turn the minds of men from materialism, selfishness and brutality into which they have fallen ?

In the first place and predominantly, I demand the principle of good-will towards men, *without any distinction or exception.* As a principle nothing could be simpler or more inclusive. If it could be put into universal practice, nothing more would be necessary. Within a generation the world would renew itself, and we should be living in a golden age. Unfortunately neither reason nor appeal to the emotions, however convincing or eloquent, can effect that transformation. And the explanation of this is to be found in the second article of our creed.

Briefly this may be stated as saying that the law of cause and effect rules in the spiritual world, with even greater certainty than in the world of matter, in other words that every wish, thought and act of humanity is followed by its ineluctable consequence. Wherefore humanity to-day is suffering and must continue to suffer for the sins and failings of the past until such time as it shall earn its release by the will towards universal compassion.

I do not, indeed, require any further articles than these for a religion that should release the new world-spirit. Between them they form a complete guide to conduct. They may be elaborated and explained for those who are unable to grasp them in their simple entirety, but in effect these two primary articles of Theosophy contain all the essentials of a world-religion.

Let us, for example, consider for a moment the tremendous import of the second article which we speak of as the law of Karma. In doing this, however, it is essential to avoid as far as possible the sense of nemesis or retribution, which has unfortunate associations with the Christian hell,—a false image, since it conveys an idea of eternal punishment, which is on the face of it unjust and ridiculous. Nor is there any need, in this connection, to consider the person of any God or supernal ruler deliberately meting out rewards and punishments according to his personal inclination and judgment. The laws of Karma must be regarded as inherent in the nature of the Universe, and they cannot be evaded by any appeal to the Court of Heaven,—a lesson that Christ pointed very clearly in the parable of Dives and Lazarus.

The doctrine of Karma, then, is of prime importance because it teaches that each individual must shoulder his or her own responsibility in the conduct of life. No excuse will avoid the consequences of wrong thinking and ill-living or palliate a lapse into sin. Circumscribed as we may be by influences that affect our earthly destiny,—many of them influences that we ourselves have helped to shape in the forgotten past,—we still have a vital element of choice and self-determination. And for every wrong choice, for every violation of the article of universal brotherhood, we must pay a penalty here or hereafter. Repentance if followed by a renewal of effort may mitigate that penalty,

since all goodness is vindicated as infallibly as evil is requited. But throughout life we are casting our own account. And every debt must be paid in some form, sooner or later, in this life or the next; for every man or woman has the power and the onus of self-determination, a power that cannot be delegated to any other authority.

In these things it is evident that I do not speak out of my own authority, nor do these indications of the essentials of belief and conduct even represent an intellectual eclecticism. They are, in fact, to be found as the simple bases of the teaching of all the great mystics and adepts. They have been grossly misrepresented by subsequent generations, perverted and disguised to serve the worldly needs of the Churches. But the command to love one's neighbour as oneself, and the warning that every man is responsible for his own destiny, stand out as naked, eternal truths in the body of all inspired teaching.

It must not be imagined, however, that this simple plan of the great world-religion which alone can prepare the way for the coming of the new spirit is in itself sufficient for those who have already reached a higher stage of development and consciousness. From them more will be demanded according to their powers. "To live to benefit mankind is the first step. To practise the six glorious virtues is the second."* And the world-religion is for those who are taking this first step; it is a means of spiritual renewal for the great body of humanity, the essential influence in aiding our slow upward movement on the gradient of that vast cycle which, according to my friend, has already passed its lowest point.

And as I see it, the great duty of all Theosophists throughout the world is to hasten the "Great Awakening" by the stricter observance of the first article. We have to find the golden keys to the seven portals, and the first of them is "The Key of Charity". We have to "bear love to men as though they were our brother-pupils, disciples of one Teacher, the sons of one sweet mother."† And until we have passed that first gate, we shall stultify our own efforts if we seek to press further. That way lies the snare of spiritual pride, and if we fall into it we shall presently have to retrace our footsteps in shame and sorrow. But "armed with the key of Charity, of love and tender mercy, we are secure before the gate of Dana, the gate that standeth at the entrance of the PATH,"‡ and shall so become the early messengers of peace and happiness to this dark and suffering world of men.

J. D. BERESFORD

* *The Voice of the Silence*, p. 36 (Indian Edition).
† *Ibid.* p. 54.
‡ *Ibid.* p. 57.

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION

[**Saroj Kumar Das** is the author of *Towards a Systematic Study of Vedanta*, and among his addresses and articles the one on "The Spirit of Indian Philosophy" contains many good things. It was his Presidential Address to the Indian Philosophy Section of the Philosophical Congress held at Patna in 1931. In this article he answers some major objections to the teaching of Reincarnation, and points out that linked with the doctrine of Karma it enables us to understand and explain the present as the unfolding past. We must not, however, overlook that the practical application of the twin-doctrine of Reincarnation-Karma as a reformative and educative force to create the future in and through the present, is even of greater value.—EDS.]

It is undoubtedly a commonplace of critical scholarship that in evaluating the true import of a doctrine of pre-historic antiquity, one has to cultivate that mental alertness which refuses to be persuaded by its traditional sense or popular appeal without examining *de novo* its credentials. It is all the more urgently needed in those cases where clusters of associations, incidental or accidental, precipitated by long standing prejudices, spring up, overshadowing the main theme, and the result is that one cannot see the wood for the trees. But, then, on closer inspection it is sure to appear that the fault originally lay with our defective vision.

The doctrine of reincarnation calls for just this circumspection and level-headedness that alone can ensure the best interests of a critical study as contemplated here. Now, much of the odium incurred by the doctrine of reincarnation is traceable to its association with the doctrine of transmigration with which it would be invariably hyphenated in primitive thought. As a matter of fact transmigration of human beings into animal forms was part and parcel of the Orphic and the Pythagorean tradition in ancient Greece. Such was the popularity enjoyed by these twin doctrines that a catechism bearing on this theme is, with no loss of dramatic propriety, put into the mouth of ordinary unsophisticated people by Shakespeare in his "Twelfth Night". To the clown's query, "What is the opinion of Pythagoras concerning wild fowl ?"—is given a ready retort by Malvolio. "That the soul of our grandam might haply inhabit a bird." The reply in question is symptomatic of the reaction the doctrine makes upon the popular mind. Whatever may be the reasons for or against the reception thus accorded to the doctrine, this much is unquestionably true, that in primitive thought no ethical significance is attached to transmigration, or for the matter of that, to reincarnation. In Pythagoreanism, however, the idea of retribution comes to be superadded while in the Eastern, or the far Eastern version, it acquires a moral

colouring and figures as the principle of retributive justice. Thus construed, it is hardly distinguishable from the far-famed doctrine of *Karma* in Indian thought, to which it naturally affiliates itself and by which it is constantly reinforced.

Thus it is that the doctrine of Reincarnation in the keeping of the doctrine of Karma acquires for the first time a philosophical status, in so far as the doctrine of Karma as a vindication of cosmic justice figures as one of the recognised postulates common to the six systems of Indian philosophy. Although a full-fledged doctrine of Karma is not to be found in the Hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, we have nevertheless in the concept of *Ṛta* its immediate philosophic ancestor. Without initiating a scholarly discussion on the diverse shades of meaning connoted by this word, one may safely take it to mean an impersonal order or law, pervading the physical or natural realm. Now, beginning with this concept of *Ṛta* as the natural order of things, we notice a steady and continuous advance through the interpretation of it as social law or customary conduct, till it reaches its culminating point in a cosmic justice or equity, a moral order of the world. *Ṛta* thus stands as much for a physical as for a moral order—the former standing in an instrumental or subordinate relation to the latter. It provides, strictly speaking, an ethic in accordance with the highest human ideal, which was destined later to realise all its ethical implications in the doctrine of Karma. Of this there is no room for misgivings.

Now, Karma is no other than the moral counterpart of the scientific Law of *Causation*. Or, to put it simply, it gives us the Law of Ethical Causation. As you sow, so will you reap—that is how it is usually understood in popular parlance. Academically speaking, the doctrine of Karma illustrates the inviolability of the cause-and-effect relation in the moral life of man. On closer inspection it will be found that it serves as a double-edged weapon—implying, on its positive side, what is known as the rejection of *kṛta-praṇāśa* or annihilation of what has been realised or done, and on the negative, the rejection of *akṛtā-bhyupagama* or appropriation of what has not been realised or done. In and through these twin correlated aspects, the law of Karma vindicates itself as the law of moral causation and retributive justice. To borrow the technique of modern thought, it stands for the conservation of the moral values. Whatever is sown must be reaped: no moral effort or aspiration, nothing of spiritual energy is ever lost in this "vale of soul-making". Contrariwise, what has not been sown cannot be reaped: there can be no spontaneous or unconditioned origin of moral deserts. It is as much prospective as it is retrospective in significance. But attempting, as it does, more often to account

for what is happening in one's present life rather than what would happen in the life to come, its appeal usually is to the past rather than the future. Anyway, on the argumentative side, there is perfect parity.

Now, rebirth or reincarnation follows as a logical sequel to the *modus operandi* of the law of Karma. The *raison d'être* of every form of earthly existence is fruition of Karmic potentialities, these being mainly two varieties of Karma, initiated (*prārabdha*) and accumulated (*sañchita*). With regard to both, the rule of procedure is the attainment of release from the grip of Karma. This is generally posited as the moral ideal for every individual, and realisation of this ideal state is not in any way contingent upon the cessation of bodily existence. As a matter of fact salvation (*Mukti* or *Moksha*), in the sense of release from the domination of Karma, may be achieved *here* and *now*, and the released soul is made a partaker of the Life Eternal. This favoured state of existence—of which the inviolable pledge is held out by Indian thought and culture—is known as redemption even in an embodied state of existence (*Jīvanmukti*). For such a soul embodiment is no ensnarement in the meshes of the flesh. When, however, the unspent potentiality of the fund of Karma, already initiated, (for whose maturescence this earthly existence has started on its career) is fully exhausted, the *Jīvanmukta* shuffles off this mortal coil and attains unto that fullest stature of spiritual development which is called, in the technical language of Indian philosophy, redemption with disembodiment (*Videhakaivalyam*). To such a soul alone applies the prophetic assurance of the Upanishadic seers—"Verily he does not retrace the cycle of existence" (*Na sa punarāvarttate*). For, he relapses into that perfected state of beatific bliss which is impervious to all sense of imperfection or pain or want, and, as such, has no need to be reborn.

But to return to our main theme, and concentrate on the restricted nature of our enquiry. Our chief concern in broaching this subject of reincarnation consists in vindicating, if we can, an ethical foundation for it. The best way to achieve that end would be to meet the stock criticisms urged against the doctrine. In the first place, what seems to be a formidable difficulty in the way of its acceptance is the absence of a felt continuity between the successive incarnations, a continuity which is made possible only by memory of previous births. And without memory the point of retributive justice is nullified, and therewith the penal purpose of incarnation is rendered abortive. It is further contended that in the absence of memory, notwithstanding the identity of a soul-substance, the different incarnations would be nothing short of different persons, and the juridical motive of incarnation would stand abrogated thereby. For, there is no point in punish-

ment unless the victim is made to realise the head and front of his offence and that the punishment is deserved by him. And it would be extravagant to assume that this individualisation of punishment is best secured by the individualising force which is a mere word, signifying no reality. Now, what one would like to suggest, in the first instance, in meeting this charge, is that the juridical point of view has been pressed rather too far, and too high a premium has been imposed upon the penal purpose of incarnation. But, then, it would not do to forget that reincarnation is primarily and essentially an ethical postulate, and in such an ethical rendering of the theory of reincarnation, the juridical demand for a conscious continuity and reciprocity between wrong-doing and suffering which is only made possible by memory of past lives —must necessarily be of subsidiary and secondary importance. Accordingly the time and energy that have been so far devoted to an empirical verification of the theory, in and through memory of a soul's past lives, seem to be rather misdirected. Even if it were possible to collect such evidences, they would have no evidentiary value, or probative force. An ethical postulate or its validity is in no way staked upon or conditioned by empirical evidences. If the whole creation subserves, as the Hindu thinkers are accustomed to believe, a moral end, if this earthly abode is, in literalness of fact, "the vale of soul-making," then what this accumulation and fruition of Karma in and through a series of incarnations does, and what it signifies, is the formation of character. Indeed, one might remark in the words of Browning, adapted to the needs of this theory, that a series of reincarnations is the

> Machinery just meant
> To give thy soul its bent,
> Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed.

In such a context, memory is not an indispensable necessity, in the sense that without it belief in reincarnation would be an utter absurdity. If it is to be admitted in any capacity, it is only as an extra belief (*aberglaube*). What is of supreme importance in the interest of soul-making is the creation and conservation of the moral values, in and through a succession of lives, so that men "may rise on stepping-stones of their dead selves to higher things".

It has been further contended that the doctrine of Karma, and therefore the pendant doctrine of reincarnation, is not based on the real facts of moral causation. For punishment of moral evil by natural evil can neither claim a moral justification nor a rational vindication, payment in kind being the law of spiritual harvest. Assuming, however, that the doctrine in question rests upon the ethical postulate of absolute justice, the real nerve of such justice is no other than the primitive *lex talionis*, or what is the same thing, the spirit of crude vindictiveness or revengefulness. But, "re-

venge," as even Lord Bacon reminds us, "is a kind of wild justice which the more a man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out." And if it has no legal justification, far less can it claim a moral sanction. Indeed, no moral justification can be extended to a theory that regards punishment as an end in itself and earthly existence as a penal measure. But it is no use labouring the point that the universe, though subserving a moral end, is neither a moral reformatory nor a glorified police-court.

In countering the force of this last argument, all that is necessary for us to recognise is that the punishment of moral evil by natural evil does neither lack an *a priori* justification nor an *a posteriori* confirmation. To take the latter first, one need not go a-hunting for empirical evidences of this accredited theory. It is a matter of every day experience that persistent wrong-doing or sinfulness brings inevitably in its train some physical ailment or disability, *i.e.*, natural evil in some shape or other. The *a priori* justification proceeds from the simple but categorical demand of our moral reason that the natural and the moral, the physical and the spiritual, must on no account be represented as two non-communicating spheres, administered by exclusive laws of their own, and antagonised to each other by the whole diameter of being. The law of Karma affords the necessary guarantee of a constant co-ordination and interdependence of the natural and the moral order both being grounded in the nature of a Being that is the uniting principle of both. By being so grounded in the nature of a Being that is essentially moral, the ethical order remains no longer parochial in its nature but acquires a cosmic or ontological significance. The "immense expansion" which the moral realm thus acquires can with no loss of meaning be described in Martineau's well-known words:

> The rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet: they are known among the stars: they reign beyond Orion and the Southern Cross: they are wherever the Universal Spirit is.

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A CHALLENGE TO MODERN RELIGION*

[**Hadland Davis** is the author of *The Land of Yellow Spring, Myths and Legends of Japan, The Persian Mystics : Rumi and Jami.*—EDS.]

Sir S. Radhakrishnan has written several important books dealing with Indian philosophy, and his latest, *An Idealist View of Life*, contains the Hibbert Lectures for 1929 delivered in London and Manchester. In addition he has used material in the Principal Miller Lectures of Madras University and the Third Krishnarajendra Silver Jubilee Lecture of Mysore University. The First Lecture deals with the modern challenge to religion, scientific and social. The Second is entitled "Substitutes for Religion". The Third is concerned with religious consciousness, and the Fourth attempts to show "that scientific certainty is not the only kind of certainty available to us". The Fifth outlines the spirit in man, and the Sixth and Seventh Lectures are devoted to a scientific or empirical view of the universe. In the concluding Lecture the author sets forth his case in regard to ultimate reality, an attempt "to restate a point of view which is nothing new but constitutes the very essence of the great philosophic tradition of idealism". It is a learned, courageous and helpful book, an honest attempt to reveal, clearly and forcibly, a spiritual philosophy which is opposed to the dogmas of religion and scientific naturalism.

The post-war years have not contributed to an idealist view of life. On the contrary, they have added to the clouds of pessimism. Crime, poverty, misery, unrest and uncertainty, seem to be on the increase. The Dope Press continues to shout all is well when the more thoughtful among us realise that the world is sick because it has lost touch with the things that matter. Established religion has failed, and those who have discovered its failure run after some new cult, some new substitute for their old gods. A considerable number of people have thrown up the religious sponge, having found it dry and unprofitable, and have sought the conquest of happiness by living as near the earth as possible. "The qualities which make for happiness," said Bertrand Russell, "vary inversely in proportion to the amount of a man's religious belief." Religion, according to that philosopher, is a disease born of fear, "a source of untold misery to the human race". Give up the idea of God and a spirit world, indulge your sexual passions when and where

* *An Idealist View of Life.* By Sir S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 12s. 6d.)

you will, and joy will be your reward.

In the author's modern challenge to religion he brings to bear the big guns of criticism. He stresses the tyranny of religion, the fanatics who insist on a one way to God, and heartily damn those who differ from them: the priestcraft, idolatry and heresy-hunting, the so-called holy wars that have been perpetrated in the name of religion. In one of Strindberg's plays a captain who is an atheist says to a nurse who is a Christian: "It is a strange thing that you no sooner speak of God and love than your voice becomes hard and your eyes fill with hate." Religion so often engenders anger against other religions, so often creates lack of moral sanity that many free spirits believe that "the world would be a much more religious place if all the religions were removed from it". Their strident cry is for freedom to face the truth, however unpleasant it may be, rather than turn to God who, in their opinion, is no more than a figment of the imagination. The universe, they say, is already running down. A time will come when it will be utterly destroyed. That, they claim, is sufficient proof that there is no Supreme Deity directing and controlling life: no divine purpose, no divine love. Two points of existence for these people, the cradle and the grave, and between the two they think it well to live as fully and freely as they may.

It is not religion that is at fault, whether expounded by Christ or Buddha or any other great initiate, but our misinterpretation of it. That there are fallacies in the Sacred Books is of no importance compared with the germ of truth common to them all. There is an unmistakable unity in divine revelation, and modern science is by no means opposed to some directing power which is beyond human understanding. Determinism has gone for ever and the universe is not so much matter hung in space and human beings meaningless flotsam and jetsam. Life is not chaos but unity. When we renounce religion and fly to humanism, it is to discover a cold stone that yields no sustenance.

> When the foundations of life are shaken, when the ultimate issues face us demanding an answer, humanism does not suffice. Life is a great gift, and we have to bring to it a great mood; only humanism does not induce it. (p. 69)

"Men think," said Amiel, "they can do without religion; they do not know that religion is indestructible, and that the question simply is, which will you have?" In *Back to Methuselah* Shaw definitely states that "Civilisation needs a religion as a matter of life and death".

Keyserling and Spengler tell us what is wrong with us, but their criticism is destructive rather than constructive. Sir S. Radhakrishnan goes much further when he asserts that

> Notwithstanding the transformation of life, the shifting of moral values and the preoccupations of the time, the primal craving for the eternal and the abid-

ing remains inextinguishable. Unbelief is impossible. (p. 82)

He thinks "we are waiting for a vital religion, a live philosophy, which will reconstruct the bases of conviction and devise a scheme of life which men can follow with self-respect and creative joy". What is that rallying centre? Is it to be Plato's synoptic vision, a *samanvaya*, as Hindu thinkers describe it? Our author seems to suggest a philosophy, universal in its application, "which will free the spirit of religion from the disintegrations of doubt and make the warfare of creeds and sects a thing of the past". Although Sir S. Radhakrishnan does not stress the importance of any one religion, he finds in the Vedas "seers who were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their life-spirit to the plane of the universal spirit". We awake to spiritual truth when we realise that the privacy of the self has been broken down, "invaded by a universal self which the individual feels as his own". William James writes in *Varieties of Religious Experience:*

> In mystic states we become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and triumphant mystic tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime and creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we have the same recurring note, so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystic classics have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man and God, their speech antedates language, nor do they grow old.

Was George Fox deluding himself when he asked us to "learn to see all things in the universal spirit"? He was not, but he attained that knowledge through intuition and not through reason. Reason will not explain religious experience. We get some flash of wisdom that transcends the human intellect. It is not an illusion but an awareness of the unity of life, the world a lamp for the inpouring of the Light of God. "Intuition," observes the author of this book, "is the extension of perception to regions beyond sense." All the deeper things in life are known in this way. Theophrastus said: "They who seek reason for all things do utterly overthrow reason." Virgil was Dante's guide in the realm of reason. It was from Beatrice he learnt "that which lies beyond". In the spirit world it was "faith not reason's task".

When we study the lives of those who have been spiritually reborn we are not aware that they have less joy in life than those who are frankly and freely concerned with the ways of the flesh and nothing else. On the contrary, we discover they rejoice in a state of harmony which is proof against life's misfortunes. They speak with the voice of the spirit which can only be comprehended by those who are similarly enlightened. They are neither fools nor hypocrites. This rising from animal desire to something

better, this tireless search for God, is innate in man. But the quest is not only on his side. Because of the unity of life, which in some way beyond our comprehension is bound up with love itself, the Being we seek is also in search of us. "Hindu Mythology looks upon God as an eternal beggar waiting for the opening of the door that he may enter into the darkness and illumine the whole horizon of our being as with a lightning flash." A similar conception is expressed in Tagore's *Gitanjali* and Francis Thompson's *The Hound of Heaven.*

In the opinion of Sir S. Radhakrishnan our world to-day is overrun with Moseses and Messiahs. He does not profess to be a prophet and propound some new message that shall heal a troubled world. He simply relates profound truths and interprets what he believes to be ultimate reality. The book is rich in wisdom and spiritual insight. It contains many passages which the discerning reader will know how to appreciate. He has no axe to grind, no fads to display. He discusses the intricate problem of space and time. He sets the stage for a combat between spiritual and worldly wisdom. Without forcing the issue, without weighting the dice of argument, he succeeds in making good his claim to an idealist view of life. He writes :—

> Each must tread the weary path up the steep mountain from the top of which alone the vision can be seen in all its splendour. The teacher may put us on the way, speak to us of the hazards and hardships, but grasping the final mystery is an individual achievement. (p. 121)

HADLAND DAVIS

TWO ANTHOLOGIES *

[**Professor D. S. Sarma** is the author of a *A Primer of Hinduism, The Kathopanishad and the Gita,* etc., and is well known to our readers as a contributor of numerous instructive essays to this journal. Next month we will publish his considered opinion on "The Origin and Growth of Indian Castes."—EDS.]

Lyra Mystica, which is an anthology of mystical verse, inevitably invites comparison with the *Oxford Book of English Mystical Verse.* The latter confines itself to the mystical poetry written in the English language except for a few Gaelic poems written in the British Isles and subsequently translated into English. The Oxford editors, even while thus restricting themselves, say modestly, "We cannot, therefore, pretend to have made an exhaustive collection of the mystical poetry of the English language or of any poet." Whereas the publishers of *Lyra Mystica* raise great expectations not only by the fact that they have been able to get the Dean of St. Paul's to write the Introduction to their anthology but also by the following announcement on the cover :—

* *Lyra Mystica.* Edited by C. C. ALBERTSON. (Macmillan & Co., London, 7*s.* 6*d.*)
The Testament of Light. Edited by GERALD BULLETT. (J. M. Dent & Co., 5*s.*)

This anthology is intended to contain all the finest mystical poems to be found in the literature of the world, those written in other languages being given in an English translation.

Lured by this astounding "puff," if any Indian reader should hope to find in this book translations of passages from the *Upanishads* or the *Bhagavad-Gita*, which undoubtedly belong to the front rank of the world's mystical poetry, he would be sadly disappointed. Curiously enough, the first poem from Indian sources to be admitted here is the anonymous so-called Hymn of the Sivaite Puritans—an iconoclastic piece of the tenth century. The poem that immediately precedes it belongs to the fifth century, and the poem that follows it belongs to the eleventh century. Thus the Hymn of the Sivaite Puritans is the sole representative of "all the finest mystical poems to be found in the literature of the world" during a period of six centuries. Indeed the lack of sense of proportion displayed in this collection is remarkable. The anthology which begins with an Egyptian piece dated 3000 B. C. and comes down to living American poets, consists of about 460 pages. Of these less than a hundred pages are devoted to the "finest mystical poems" that the world produced in about 47 centuries, and more than 350 pages, or more than three-fourths of the book, to what it produced in the last century and a quarter. And reading some of the modern poems we are at a loss to understand why they are admitted at all into an anthology of mystical verse. Mystical verse does not mean merely religious verse, much less theological verse. In mysticism, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says in a passage quoted by Dean Inge in his introduction, "God ceases to be an object and becomes an experience." So any poem based on a church dogma or on sentimental piety can hardly be called mystical. The genuine accents of mysticism are heard not in

> It is the sorrow of the Son of Man who has voluntarily tasted and redressed our sins. (p. 303)
>
> Father of all! In every age,
> In every clime adored. (p. 95)

but in

> No tapers of sense may shine
> On those heights of Eternity. (p. 30)
>
> The massy earth and sphered skies are riven!
> I am borne, darkly, fearfully, afar—(p. 104)
>
> That Voice is round me like a bursting sea (p. 258)

But the objection to a great majority of the contemporary poems included in the latter part of the book is not simply that they are not sufficiently mystical, but that they are not sufficiently poetical. The underlying experience is rather vague and thin, and the expression is correspondingly frail and trivial. We do not mean to say that there are no first class mystical poems in the book. There are a good many of them which are a thrill and a joy to the reader. But on the whole we regret to say that the collection is unequal—and that from more than one point of view.

Mr. Bullett's anthology is one

of spiritual knowledge rather than of spiritual experience. So he has chosen sparingly from the literature of mysticism. Nor is literary excellence his chief criterion. The editor has a certain philosophy of life to convey and he conveys it through these short extracts, three-fourths of which are in prose and one-fourth in verse, taken from about thirty authors ancient and modern. In one of the notes in the Index he says :—

In this very personal anthology, I have been glad to borrow other men's voices with which to express convictions of my own. But where I have failed to find some particular part of my thought stated by another, I have resorted to the unusual expedient of writing, as best I could, the passage I was in search of.

Mr. Bullett's aim is to testify to the divinity in man, the inwardness of authority and the redemptive power of love. He is against all asceticism, institutionalism and the tyranny of rules. The three passages which are written by himself in this anthology give us the clue to his philosophy. He says :—

There is a positive danger, as well as falsehood, in attempting to conform to an ideal of virtue that is alien to the deepest impulses of one's own spirit.

Without spontaneity man's life is mechanical and unmeaning and his morality a dead letter.

Self-sacrifice has neither spiritual beauty nor any other human value if it is not, at the same time, genuine self-expression.

This is the spirit of romanticism in religion craving for freedom and self-expression and chafing at bonds which are not of its own making. It is also the essence of *Svadharma* which the *Bhagavad-Gita* teaches us—a rule of life which makes our actions shine ultimately like the flowers on a tree. *Svadharma*, in which a man acts according to his own nature (*Svabhāva*), connotes not only freedom, ease and spontaneity, but also perfect beauty; whereas *Paradharma* in which a man acts according to another's nature connotes repression, discomfort, pose and insincerity.

But this is a gospel for the spiritual adult and not the spiritual child. And in the kingdom of the spirit at the present stage of the evolution of our species the number of children far outweighs the number of adults. So it would not do for us to belittle or despise, as Mr. Bullett seems to do, the rigid rules of discipline of the school from which we have emerged on coming of age. Artificial conscience may be a false god, but free love may prove a falser god. That is why the highest spiritual wisdom embodied in the great historical religions has always insisted on a graded discipline to be used as a ladder by every soul that aspires to freedom. It is obedience to mechanical rules laid down by the wisdom of others that leads one ultimately to the discovery of the law of one's own being. *Svadharma* is in the first place the law of the group, and then the law of spontaneous action. Mr. Bullett's philosophy seems therefore to be rather one-sided and not well-balanced.

D. S. SARMA

BERNARD SHAW—BISHOP!

[**J. S. Collis** is the author of *Forward to Nature* and *Modern Prophets*. His *Bernard Shaw* was hailed by critics as provocative, clever, stimulating bold and illuminating—EDS.]

In his Preface (written at the end this time) to his latest volume,* Bernard Shaw drops the remark that he is now considered "the unofficial Bishop of Everywhere". If this is so we are entitled to enquire what the Bishop has to say concerning Religion. At no time has he been reticent on the subject. *Blanco Posnet*, *Man and Superman*, *Back to Methuselah*, *Saint Joan*, are all primarily religious plays. We should therefore be able to answer the question—What is the religion of Mr. Shaw?

But that is not really what we wish to ask. For there is only one Religion. Either you possess it or you do not possess it—you cannot choose between two, three, or four kinds. We may enquire as to which formulation of religious experience he prefers—Roman Catholicism, Mahomedanism, Buddhism or some other. But that is hardly an interesting question, since it is the experience itself that is important. Our question should not be, What is Mr. Shaw's religion? but, How deep has been his religious experience?

In answering this question we get little help from our Bishop. There are may religious minded people who do not understand the meaning and essence of Religion just as there are many artistic people who do not understand the meaning and essence of Art. Bernard Shaw is one of these. He is under the impression that when there has been a discussion concerning the Bible, the purpose of existence, the geographical position of God, and the good life, Religion has been discussed. He thinks that in order to know God it is enough to determine where He is. But God cannot be known by any method of intellectual search. Religion consists of intimations, presages, divinations, intuitions, promptings which, when they come, convince us that though God may not be in his heaven, all is right with the world. From this feeling has sprung all the religions of man; building upon this foundation the various Churches have been erected to appease our intellectual needs; banking upon this certainty man has ordered his experience into various "beliefs"; and going still further he has joined rules of conduct to the body of the doctrines. But there has come a time in the life of every religion when the intellectual beliefs are treasured more than the experience that begot them, and men clinging desperately to these beliefs without possessing the experience, have been at the mercy of those who denied them. This has happened so often that

* *The Adventure of the Black Girl in Her Search for God* (Constable. 2s. 6d.)

at last it is beginning to be understood that the business of the priest is to emphasise the experience before the creed and to acknowledge that ethics arise spontaneously from Religion but that Religion owes nothing to ethics.

In *Blanco Posnet* written in 1909 it had seemed as if Bernard Shaw was prepared to conduct his enquiry into the true centre of the problem. Blanco experiences God as a still, small voice within him, and surrenders to it. That is Religion pure and simple. But very soon he begins to hold forth on the problem of evil. *Already we get the suspicion that the author is more concerned with setting up a new creed than in experiencing God.*

Our suspicion is confirmed when we come to *Man and Superman.* In that play God is again experienced and again surrendered to under the sign of the Life Force. But the whole discussion revolves round the new creed, the new absurd intellectual concept of God as an unfulfilled purpose working on a basis of trial and error. It is another lengthy attempt to answer the problem of evil—a problem, which all who really experience Purpose, dismiss.

In *Back to Methuselah* there is more talk concerning religion but no Religion itself. In reading this play we come to understand why the religious Shaw can never possess Religion, however passionately he may desire to. For he does not love anything. He hates the world. So do many men of Religion. But they also love it. And that love does not spring from idealism, from any hope of what life may one day be, but from the contemplation of what it is. The man of Religion does not seek to solve the riddle of the universe by thought; he is content to look at it, at any given object, until he is filled with awe, perhaps with joy, and finally with love. "There is no answer to the riddle of the world save to be able to see the world," wrote Middleton Murry in one of his inspired moments.

This is outside the Shavian ideology. What does Shaw mean by contemplation—a word most freely used in *Back to Methuselah?* Here we come to his great weakness. He is in love with nothing—save Thought. Yet there are only two kinds of contemplation and both mean victory over thought. There is the contemplation which comes under the heading of Yoga—abstraction from thought in order to surrender to the deepest Self : and there is the contemplation of immediate reality as described above—which again is release from Thought. To Bernard Shaw there is only one kind of contemplation—" the contemplation of pure thought"! The entire system of Yoga is meaningless to him—there is no trace in all his work that he has ever examined or even heard of it. And the other kind of contemplation is equally foreign to him. His terrible Elders are engaged in the contemplation of nothing because

nothing in all this world is worth contemplating. All Shaw's life he has looked down upon Art. Never has he shown any idea of its meaning and essence and message. He has always spoken of artists and poets in a patronising tone hard to bear. To him they are pleasant people writing pretty word-patterns or shaping dolls to which we may turn for entertainment and consolation from the harsh realities of life; they are only to be taken seriously when harnessed in the service of propaganda. It has never occurred to him that Art is outside propaganda because it is the handmaid of Religion, and that when it is truly practised for its own sake it saves the world. For when Art is truly itself it teaches men *to see.* When Art is truly itself it teaches men *to love.* If love is lacking then the mightiest thinking, the purest thought, the greatest effort of contemplation are vain.

In *Saint Joan* Shaw chose to dramatize a mystic, and a saint. Here he was put to a severe test. Was he going to reveal how her sole guidance was the inner voice? We may grant, I think, that he does show this and that it is a great play. But did he *feel* it, did he *understand* it? Evidently not; for in the preface he shows a complete misunderstanding of the mystic position and even goes so far as to complain against Shakespeare's phrase "To thine own self be true, and it must follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man," on the ground that it neglects the individual's duty to the State!

Now in 1932 he gives us this story of the Black Girl's Adventure in her Search for God. It is a fable on the evolution of religion. Here we shall learn then whether Shaw has advanced any nearer to Religion, to Revelation. We find that he is exactly where he was when he came to London at the age of twenty-one. The girl searches for God. She samples a lot of the Gods man has agreed to believe in from time to time, including the No-God of the Nineteenth Century scientist. She turns them all down. Eventually she comes to rest—where? She comes to an old man digging in his garden (Voltaire). He assures her that the best thing for her to do is just to cultivate the garden with him and leave God alone. She accepts this. Soon an Irishman (Shaw himself) comes into the garden, and she finally marries him. The Irishman has the last word concerning religion—"Nothing would ever persuade him that God was anything more solid and satisfactory than an eternal but as yet unfulfilled purpose, or that it could ever be fulfilled if the fulfilment were not made reasonably easy and hopeful by Socialism." That is all. Thus ends her search for God. She does not find Him. But (how strange!) she rests content with a new theorem concerning Him. A new creed to which men shall cling parasitically in terror against the time when some one will disprove it. No ecstasy, no joy, no intuition of

faith—just this barren concept—thus ends her search!

Thus we see that our Bishop in his search for God has advanced no further than the Problem of Evil. It is strange; for within himself Shaw has always experienced such a deep feeling of Divine Significance (never missing an opportunity to gird at the scientists who were supposed to be undermining that intuition) that it is hard to see why he should have considered it necessary to formulate Creative Evolution in order to justify it. Such formulations only frustrate Faith. But Shaw, adoring Thought, preferred to let Experience look after itself while he explored subsidiary problems. The problem of evil is a subsidiary problem. However enormous, however painful, it cannot be overcome by Thought. There is only one way by which it can be overcome—by religious experience. He who, one way or another, through quiet inklings and intuitions or through ecstasy, experiences the feeling of a Divine Purpose is thereby enabled not to solve, not to shelve, not to evade, but to *dismiss* the problem of evil.

But Bernard Shaw so loved Intellect that he has always emphasised the rationalisings of Experience instead of leading men to Experience itself. It would seem that he has been muddled as regards this distinction, and at all times has felt some strange necessity to solve the problem of evil, till at last in ***Back to Methuselah*** he devised a Utopia, the most depressing in all literature, the inhabitants of which have overcome that problem. And how have they overcome it? By ceasing to be human! And the Black Girl cannot find God because all the time at the back of her mind is the idea that she must first solve that problem. It is most tantalising; for at moments Shaw has lucid intervals. "Make a little garden for yourself," says Voltaire to the Black Girl, "dig and plant and weed and prune; and be content if God jogs your elbow if you are gardening unskilfully, and blesses you when you are gardening well." We are delighted; here is a new, peaceful expression, unusual coming from the pen of Shaw; he is content to abandon Thought so that God may enter in. But our hopes are dashed on the entrance of that Irishman, who has the last word, and does not hesitate to drag the red herrings of socialism and creative evolution across the theme.

In this delightfully illustrated book there is a picture on page 56 of the Irishman (with Shaw's features of course) attempting to jump the garden gate when the idea of marriage was proposed. Did John Farleigh the artist realise what a perfect symbol the picture makes of Shaw's attitude, how it accounts for his failure as a bishop and an artist? For it does indeed and most happily symbolize his endeavour to escape from reality into the ivory tower of Thought. To get away, that has always been his object,

away from marriage of his own, away from children of his own, away from the cares and burden of everyday life, away from personal contact with all problems, away from everything save the luxury of *thinking about them.*

In thus suggesting that Shaw so far from being the Bishop of Everywhere is not a Bishop of Anywhere, I am not conscious of being unjust in any single sentence. But I am conscious that in showing how he does not possess the equipment to set up as a priest, I have not disposed of him. It is the last thing I wish to do. He cannot be disposed of because of the greatness of his real contribution. The latest volume of the Standard Edition of his Works sent out by Constable, *Doctors' Delusions Crude Criminology and Sham Education,** reminds us of how definite that contribution is. It has nothing to do with Religion; it remains within the province of militant sociology. There he is the supreme master with no rival past or present. There he is a constructive no less than a destructive thinker. The moment he stops thinking in terms of religion and takes up the cudgels on behalf of children or against doctors or prison authorities or schoolmasters then we are glad that his clear, hard, narrow mind was never rounded off by the mystic vision. We are glad; for truly this age would have been the poorer without the compassionate brilliance he sheds upon the problems of the day.

J. S. COLLIS

Visions of the Daughters of Albion. By WILLIAM BLAKE. Full Colour Facsimile—with an Essay by J. MIDDLETON MURRY. (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 15*s.*)

Most, if not all, inspired writings of a mystical or symbolic nature suffer at the hands of anxious commentators whose speculations tend rather to replace than illuminate the original texts. Witness, for instance, the innumerable "essays," "notes," "commentaries," etc. on the *Bhagavad-Gita.* Not that many are not helpful, but on the whole they create confusion, rising like a mist between the student and the message. The teaching is lost under volumes of exegeses. The inner meaning of the great scriptures of the world springs up from within the gradually awakening intuition of the individual student in the course of time if study is diligently and patiently pursued.

The writings of William Blake may be taken as an exception to this general rule, in part at least, because comparatively few have grasped his message with sufficient insight to essay an interpretation. Strangely, too, most of the lovers of Blake have become such after perusal and study of other students who have been able to reveal the essential beauty and charm as well as meaning hidden in what often appears impenetrable allegory, rather than as a result of personal contact with Blake's writings.

Mr. Murry has given us an essay-exegesis which will prove of intense interest and joy to lovers of Blake, while it cannot fail to win the interest of new enquirers, energizing them to make the effort necessary to win the pearl of great price.

C. T.

* *Doctors' Delusions Crude Criminology and Sham Education* (Constable, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Light. A Philosophy of Consciousness. By ARCHIBALD WEIR. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a remarkable book. That it is also exceedingly stiff reading is of course no criticism of its argument, but I must confess that its originality at times baffles the understanding. The basic position upon which the author builds is the rejection of every conventional category of thought—space, time, life, cause, personality, matter, etc.—as excluding the very fact upon which they are all dependent, the fact of Consciousness. Hence a viable philosophy, he maintains, must be a philosophy of Consciousness, a philosophy, that is, which concerns itself with the analysis, of the nature and manifestations of Consciousness.

Reason is but the "by-product of the nature of things". Consciousness "employs it as an indispensable servant, as a specialist, indeed, but never has either the place or the service been other than subordinate". And Consciousness is inseparable from the Unconscious. The nodal point at which there goes on a perpetual adjustment between the intimations of the Unconscious and the actualities of the Conscious is the Self. Self is therefore a necessary part of the All, and contains within its transient material framework—a framework, be it noted, in space and time, which is itself the creation of Consciousness—all other selves. Our knowledge of the Self is to be trusted so long as we do not confound it with developments from space-time existence. Right is a universal rule mediated by the Self between the Unconscious and the Conscious. Its authority is the authority of the universal. "And the general outcome of this obedience to authority through self universal is a humanitarian ethos in absolute opposition to animal methods of survival."

As Mr. Weir recognizes, this is, in technical language, an "organic" philosophy, and is not without resemblance at some points to the idealism of the Vedantists. The exposition is extremely suggestive, and though the unfamiliar terminology is forbidding, and the author's occasional references to his former work *Dark* indicate that an acquaintance with his earlier writings is indispensable to a full comprehension of his thought, the reader who takes up this book in an earnest and sympathetic spirit will be well repaid for his pains.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

An Indian Monk: His Life and Adventures. By SHRI PUROHIT SWAMI. (Macmillan & Co., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Twenty years ago W. B. Yeats, the Irish poet, introduced the *Gitanjali* of Tagore to an enthusiastic English public. He now presents Shri Purohit Swami in a long preface, hoping that his autobiography "may prove of comparable importance". We beg leave to doubt that, but certainly the book will attract as much *interest*—interest of an ephemeral kind, but none the less interest. For the Indian attitude to religion is just now a matter of supreme concern to the West, whose own religious institutions are near to bankruptcy. It hopes, by finding adaptable props in the East, to save the Western world for Religion after all. That, at least, is the idea of a body of keen thinkers, and they are followed from afar by a growing public in the libraries. What, however, will they make of this monkish autobiography which will, we suspect, be readily devoured by both curious and hungry alike? The style is good; competent friends have combined with the author to make a good literary venture. But the taste resembles that of the brilliant Dead-Sea apple—it is, to say the least of it, a little sour. No doubt there are fine passages and noble sentiments, but India has done better than this. Her religion and her philosophy are necessary to us; their enemies will be quick to draw attention to a flavour of sensational magic and wild asceticism in Shri Purohit's book, which can only harm the cause. It is especially impor-

tant, at this time, to present Indian religious life to the West with the utmost care; and after, say, the books of Dhan Gopal Mukerji, such tales as those of Shri Purohit about his personal ecstasies, aberrations, and illnesses smack of egoism and will seem regrettably far from that balance in spiritual life which constitutes the finest asset of the great seers; while his attitude towards marriage will appear almost hysterical to the Western mind in modern times. East and West have been strewn, both of them, with the wrecks and eccentricities of religious genius; such things have their interest for the psychologist; but this is emphatically not the moment to draw public attention to them in a popular book. Emotional and physical excesses have led Shri Purohit, despite his splendid efforts, his great affections, his magnificent flights of thought, to a health, at fifty, completely broken down, and to less than his fair share of inner peace. That comes of "exteriorising" the Lord. He is body *and* spirit, and near to us without the need of frenzied efforts to attain. The simple faith of Abu Sa'id rings truer here, truer especially for one who is not a genius on the Path:—

> They told the saint how one holy man could walk on the water, how another could fly in the air, and how a third could in the twinkling of an eye transport himself from one city to another. "The frog can swim and the swallow skim the water," he replied: "the crow and the fly can traverse the air, and the Devil can pass in a moment from East to West. These things are of no great account: he is a man who dwells amongst mankind, buys and sells, marries, and associates with his fellow-creatures, yet is never for a single moment forgetful of God."

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

The Mystery of the Mahabharata. By N. V. THADANI, M. A., Late Principal, Hindu College, and Rector, University of Delhi. Vol. I. Illustrated. (Bharat Publishing House, Karachi. Rs. 12.)

When at the present moment leading scientists of the world are coquetting with the electron, the proton, the photon and the crinoline concepts, and when philosophers of diverse denominations such as Idealists, Realists, Behaviorists etc. are standing wonder-dazed at the rapid march of science and scientific discoveries, Mr. N. V. Thadani's attempt to interpret the incidents of the Mahabharata, and the work as a whole in such a manner as to make out that it is a "picture of pure philosophy" has a romantic interest about it. The romantic character is enhanced when it is seen that the author resorts to the method of letter-analysis to establish his conclusions. The cell indicates the origin of the evolution of life. Sanskrit is a wonderful language, points out Mr. Thadani, which in "its vowels and consonants, general structure, Sandhi rules and grammatical forms," reflects some of the modern scientific concepts like "nucleus, cytoplasm, centrosomes, and chromosomes of the cell" (p. iii) (1) "The whole universe is created out of Purusha and Prakriti, the male and female energies of life . . ." (2) "The most elementary form of life is the cell . . ." (3) "The universe is partly manifest and partly unmanifest . . ." (p. v) The Vedas and the Mahabharata contain unmistakably the three fundamental ideas. Excluding the Introduction, there are nine chapters in this volume devoted respectively to "The Meaning of Mahabharata," "A New Language," "Systems of Hindu Thought," "The Golden Egg and the Universe," "Theories and their Application," "The Origin and Character of Sanskrit," "The Method of Interpretation," "The Hymns of the Vedas" and "The Gods of the Vedas".

Mr. Thadani seeks to maintain that the Vedas present a picture of the "Science of Life" (Chap. viii) and that "Vedic Gods represent different ways in which Life becomes manifest" (Chap. ix). The first volume under notice is devoted to a survey of the Ṛg-Veda from the standpoint indicated above. The second volume will deal with an elucidation of the "Mystery of the Mahabharata". That

the Mahabharata is not a mere epic but a comprehensive critique of systems of philosophy would appear to be the main thesis of the author, complete working out of which will be awaited with interest by students of ancient Indian literature and thought. There is a familiar line which proclaims that other works merely repeat what is contained in the Mahabharata, and that what is *not* contained in the Mahabharata is found nowhere else. "*Yadihāsti-tadanyatra-yannehāsti-na-tat-kvachit.*" Mr. Thadani may after all be right in his new interpretation of the Vedas and the Mahabharata. I am aware of a South Indian venture directed to demonstrate that the Rg-Veda knew all about Marsh Gas. But then, authors like Mr. Thadani should be prepared to be greeted with some opposition to their ultra-original interpretations of texts which unless strained in particular ways do not bear them.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Evidence of Immortality. By DON P. HALSEY. (Macmillan & Co., New York).

This book is evidently meant for laymen and is written in simple style. It is free from technicalities. The arguments offered for immortality cover a wide field. The problem has been studied from the religious, scientific, philosophic, psychic and spiritualistic standpoints.

Emphasis has been laid upon the existence of God as supporting the doctrine of immortality. It is assumed as a reasonable and logical premise "without which reason itself cannot exist, that God lives and in Him we live and move and have our being". (page 14). The author conceives God to be infinite Justice and infinite Love. He infers that with such God the wrongs of this life will be remedied in the day of reckoning. But is it not better to hold that retributive justice is at work everywhere in nature? Karma determines our evolution, here and hereafter, that is, in ultimate analysis, we ourselves determine.

The author then reproduces the views of Plato, Aristotle and Kant amongst others. He also quotes from later European thinkers including Bergson. He does not agree with Prof. Haldane in the theory of Absorption. He emphasises James's vision of the unseen world encompassing the little world of experience. So far as scientific viewpoints are concerned, the author thinks that "if there is not a clear demonstration of immortality there is no clear proof that there is no life beyond the grave". He then considers the existence of disembodied spirits and direct communication with them. According to him, conviction eventually comes from faith. Nothing is said about the final destiny of the soul.

Two kinds of immortality should be distinguished: (1) Personal Immortality, and (2) Supra-personal Identity.

So long as personality clings to the soul it is bound by the forces of Karma, and Karma determines the evolution of the individual, and of the race. But there is a supra-personal immortality: Personality may grow fine or gross according to Karma and so long as the chain of Karma continues the soul has its evolution through the cycles of manifestation. The soul can have its disembodied existence and in higher psychic states can feel its separation from the body. But even then it is not free from the inherent tendencies. True immortality lies in the complete freedom from Karma and evolution, from birth, growth, decay, death. It is eternally real. Such a freedom necessarily introduces us to the *supra-personal* conception of self.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

The Lure and Romance of Alchemy. By C. J. S. THOMPSON. (Harrap and Co., London. 5*s.*)

Alchemy has been variously regarded as (1) the alleged art of making gold and silver by transmuting the base metals, (2) the chemistry of the Middle Ages, (3) a philosophical system, dealing with the universal mysteries. It may be said at once that the reader of Mr. Thompson's book will obtain an idea of alchemy in each of these aspects.

Corresponding to these three aspects of alchemy, three main types of its practitioners, the alchemists, are to be discerned in the work under notice: (1) the gold seeker, or "puffer," held in derision by so many of the alchemical writers and painters, (2) the philosophical alchemist, the true forerunner of the modern chemist, and (3) the religious mystic, who regarded alchemical processes as allegories. The first type, which included many charlatans and cheats, followed alchemy merely in the pursuit of material gain; the second kind of alchemist was primarily interested in the wonderful changes which matter was found to undergo; and the third kind was mainly concerned in proving, by experiments conducted on the material plane, the truth of an all-embracing philosophical system.

The most fundamental conception of alchemy was probably the imagined unity of all things: "what is below is like that which is above, and what is above is like that which is below, to accomplish the miracles of One Thing," runs the first precept of the mysterious Emerald Table of Hermes Trismegistus, the supposed father of alchemy, the Hermetic Art. In keeping with this conception, all forms of matter were regarded as derived from a *prima materia*, and as possessing a common soul. This soul alone was permanent, the body or outward form of the metals and other kinds of matter being merely a transitory mode of manifestation of the eternal soul. The same fundamental conception led to the belief that the Philosopher's Stone, the medicine of the metals which could perfect them into gold, was closely related to the Elixir of Life, the medicine of man which could perfect his body and his mental and moral nature.

A study of this alluring subject makes it clear that alchemy was a crystal of many facets: a potpourri of chemistry, astrology, magic, mysticism, philosophy, theosophy, and other enticing ingredients. Each of these aspects is sympathetically handled in Mr. Thompson's interesting pages, and the author is to be congratulated upon his skilful selection from the enormous and bewildering mass of literature which confronts the writer on alchemy; the unusual wealth and variety of the illustrations also call for appreciative mention.

In a work covering so wide a field there are naturally many details which might be submitted to criticism. The text appears to contain few serious mistakes: possibly the most obvious is the statement (p. 160) that the several treatises bearing the name of Basil Valentine "were not printed until the second half of the seventeenth century, and the one by which he is best remembered, *The Triumphal Chariot of Antimony*, was not known until 1685". The *Triumph Wagen Antimonii* was published, in German, at Leipzig, in 1624: and this edition was reprinted in 1676; A version "faithfully Englished and published for the Common Good" by I. H. Oxon, (possibly John Heydon, the astrologer and rosicrucian), was printed in London, in 1660; and Richard Russell's English translation appeared in 1678. Valentine's *Chymische Schriften*, published at Hamburg in 1677, also contained the *Triumph Wagen*. Apparently the author refers to the Latin version published at Amsterdam in 1685, and translated into English by A. E. Waite in 1893. Other tracts ascribed to Basil Valentine appeared in print as early as 1602.

Too great an emphasis is perhaps laid upon the scientific value of the work of John Mayow (p. 229), particularly in view of the recent interesting researches of Prof. T. S. Patterson; and it is unjustifiable to claim that Mayow

was the first to collect gases in vessels inverted over water.

Symbolism is of prime importance in alchemy, and the author rightly devotes a good deal of attention to alchemical symbols, symbolical representations, and secret alphabets; many of his readers, however, will wish that he had included a glossary of alchemical symbolic usages (such as the toad, the dragon, the old man), and also interpretations of the symbolic illustrations reproduced on p. 127 and elsewhere—these so often leave the uninitiated reader guessing. The value of the book would be much enhanced also by the inclusion of a comprehensive alphabetical list of alchemical terms, including names of substances, apparatus, etc. We are sure that so attractive an exposition of a fascinating and romantic subject will be widely read, and we hope that the author may deal with these suggestions in a future edition.

JOHN READ

Hypnotism, Suggestion, and Faith-Healing. By ALEXANDER CANNON, M. D. (William Heinemann [Medical Books] Ltd., London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

Mesmer published his work *Ueber die Magnetkur* in 1775, and the hundred and ten years that followed saw the researches and publications of Braid, Reichenbach, Gregory, Liébault, and Charcot. But despite all that was done by these eminent men and their colleagues to demonstrate the indubitable value of hypnotism both as an anæsthetic and a curative agent in nervous diseases and certain forms of insanity, the medical profession as a whole has remained indifferent or hostile; and the treatment of disease by suggestion (to say nothing of the older and much abused methods of animal-magnetism) has been for the most part left to untrained outsiders, who usually do not know how to diagnose the conditions they set out to cure.

Dr. Cannon's excellent little handbook defines very briefly the scope of hypnotism in medicine, describes the methods employed by Liébault and others, and gives unanswerable reasons why the subject should receive the serious attention of medical men. Himself a psychiatrist of wide experience, the author is a profound believer in the value of hypnotism, which he uses daily, and with success, in his mental hospital work and medical practice generally.

All enthusiasts are apt to claim too much for their speciality; and Dr. Cannon is no exception; for, when he says that

> Crystal-gazing, Spiritualism, "Christian-Science," faith-healing, clairvoyance, and the like, can be fully explained by the study of the various phenomena which can be produced, at will, in the hypnotic states,

he is going very much farther than the facts warrant.

With what Dr. Cannon has to say about the ethical side of the question of hypnotism, all who have made any theoretical or practical study of hypnotism and the allied subjects, will be in cordial agreement. He writes:

> . . . In some cases, patience, as well as kindliness of heart at all times, . . . is required. (p. vii)
>
> It [hypnotism] is a power for good or evil; let no one therefore even hint at anything bad, either by word or action to an insane person! (p. 21)
>
> Under the hypnotic state the patient is extremely sensitive to your suggestions, and you must select your words; for remember that words are greater than the sword, and that *then—every* word has magic power. (p. 37)

R. A. V. M.

[Readers who wish to know what is the Occult view of Hypnotism would do well to study the article by H. P. Blavatsky on that subject, first published in 1890 in *Lucifer*, and now included in *Raja-Yoga or Occultism*. Mme. Blavatsky wrote in answer to several specific questions concerning hypnotism. And she stated that "Our replies must be made from the standpoint of Occultism alone, no consideration being given to such hypotheses of modern (another name for "materialistic") Science, as may clash with esoteric teachings." —Eds.]

Carlyle. By EMERY NEFF. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 10*s.*)

There is much in Carlyle that is merely eccentric and impermanent, but one may find in his writings the elements of an outlook on life which imperatively call for recognition in our own age. The dominant theories of Western civilisation to-day are not substantially different from those of the early nineteenth century: philosophically—materialism, and socially—*laissez faire*. It was against these that Carlyle waged impassioned war.

Brought up in the strict tenets of the Presbyterian creed, he went to Edinburgh at the age of fourteen to prepare himself for a clerical career. But the city no less than the university was saturated with the corrosive scepticism of the *philosophes*, and before long he found his faith crumbling. He found that Christian orthodoxy could not be sustained in the face of the rationalistic attack; that he must abandon it if he had any regard for intellectual integrity; and that there was no alternative but the then scientific view of the world as a meaningless conglomeration of natural forces. He thereupon relinquished his plans for entering the ministry, but against the materialism which appeared to be the only philosophy open to him his spirit rebelled instinctively.

Though he could not refute it on logical grounds, vaguely, insistently, he felt that it was false. One day, in 1822, something "like a stream of fire" rushed over him, leaving him more firmly convinced than ever that the universe was not a soulless mechanism. His comprehension, meanwhile, of German philosophy and literature was deepening, and he discovered in them, particularly the *Critique of Practical Reason*, a theoretical defence of that to which he had been clinging so passionately. Reason, Kant showed, had grave limitations: other faculties might legitimately be used for the elucidation of life's problems: the vision of the poet and the saint was no less true than that of the scientist. And Goethe was teaching that Nature was a garment for some invisible spirit which gave value to human actions. Such ideas in time dispelled the darkness in which Carlyle had been groping and, in *Sartor Resartus*, he wrote triumphantly, "The Universe is not dead and demoniacal, a charnel house with spectres, but God-like and my Father's!"

He was however no metaphysician: his interest was in practical affairs, he was a reformer. And he fiercely denounced the idea that men had no responsibility towards each other; that the world was a stage for unrestrained self-seeking; and that the only duty of the State was to preserve order. The industrial revolution, he saw, had greatly altered the economic structure. The distance between the rich and the poor had been greatly widened, and while wealth was heaping up at one end, at the other squalor and disease, physical and moral, accumulated with hideous results. But Society remained indifferent. Its philosophy was one of "non-interference": Every man for himself and devil take the hindmost.

Carlyle's whole career may be described as an angry and violent protest against such conditions. In practically every book of his, from *Signs of the Times*, through *Sartor Resartus* and *The French Revolution*, to *Chartism*, he dwelt on the misery and wretchedness of the common people, and announced prophetically that unless the wealthy, powerful and cultured classes emerged from their absorption in petty and selfish pursuits, and consecrated themselves to the service of the lowly, the same fate would overtake them as had engulfed the nobility of the *ancien régime* in 1789.

His dream of a high-minded and energetic aristocracy, or the Hero, the God-given Leader, establishing truth and righteousness in a sinful and chaotic world, is not altogether discredited. It is the inspiration of the many dictatorships which range over Europe to-day. But it is also the sign of the contradiction which vitiates Carlyle's attitude. All his life he crusaded for the Right, the Right in Action, the drama-

tic, masterful, effective Action. He did not realise—at any rate, not until the end, uneasily—that he was glorifying Might in action. He insisted, no doubt, that Right and Might were distinct, but he neither kept the distinction constantly in view nor understood that each of those principles has totally different methods of operation.

This failure—upon which Mr. Neff lays but light stress in an otherwise admirable volume—was, indeed, but one aspect of Carlyle's inherent incapacity to think things out, to weigh the evidence, to reserve his judgment. He did most valuable service in attacking the excessive individualism of his generation. He paved the way for that truer view of society which was to be developed by the Idealists of the later nineteenth century. But himself, he was no philosopher. His mind was too impulsive, too vehement, too heavily steeped in the Protestant tradition, to be capable of taking dispassionate views. He sneered at Lyell and Darwin; he wrote a malicious and ignorant attack on Cagliostro; he gradually lost sympathy with his friend Emerson who was working out a version of Eastern mysticism; and in all these respects, represented that antipathy to the unfamiliar, that insensibility to new currents of thought that is often, though mistakenly, described as being peculiarly Victorian.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Aspasia, The Future of Amorality. By R. E. MONEY-KYRLE. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

"The question is," said Disraeli on a celebrated occasion, "Is man an ape or an angel?"—and replied, that man is an angel. But psycho-analysts believe that man is not only a highly developed ape but should also return to the ape stage of evolution from which he has been trying all these years to emerge. Judged from this view-point psycho-analysis has been like an ill wind that blows no one any good.

Dr. Money-Kyrle, an eminent psycho-analyst, says that the world's unrest, depression and material discomfort, as well as national and social animosities, are all due to the Œdipus complex with all its ramifications. This complex which is another name for the frustration of our sexual impulses is, according to him, responsible for all that legacy of hate which is poisoning our domestic, social, national and international relationships. The cure for this, urges the doctor, is more of sexual freedom. But this runs counter to all that ancient philosophers and sages not only of India but of other countries have taught. Sex licence has always been a sign of decadence and has led to the downfall of nations. We should not, therefore, advocate it in any form. What the world needs at present is not a slackening of the standards in matters of sex but a stiffening of them, for only in this way can the highest moral purity whether of the individual or of the race, be attained. It has been wisely said in *The Voice of the Silence:*

> "Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart."

The book under review shows the admirable clarity, vigour, and persuasive power of the author, but I wonder if anybody in India familiar with ancient psychology will take its conclusions seriously.

DIWAN CHAND SHARMA

Wild Talents. By CHARLES FORT. (Claud Kendall, New York. $ 3·00)

Was it not Claude Bernard who said: "Science is built of facts: but a collection of facts is not science, any more than a heap of bricks is a house"? The heap of facts regarding physical happenings inexplicable by science, which the late Charles Fort so industriously amassed and presented in *Wild Talents*, bears a general similarity to those recorded in his *Book of the Damned* and *Lo !*, but in this last book there is a preponderance of happenings which seem to be related more directly to man. But no more than in those earlier works did the author achieve a synthesis, suggest a rationale, or point out the laws under which these phenomena occurred. The reader of *Wild Talents* is left to make what he can of the bewildering array of evidence for the existence in man of superphysical or psychic powers. Beyond the reiterated suggestion of the power of mind to affect matter, including our own bodies and those of others, little in the way of explanation has been attempted.

Phenomena frequently more wonderful and generally better attested were described half a century ago in *Isis Unveiled*, with the tremendous advantage of an accompanying rational explanation and statement of the laws governing their production. The present volume strongly suggests Mr. Fort's more than casual acquaintance with Madame Blavatsky's writings, although it contains but one casual reference to their author.

Mr. Fort was refreshingly unorthodox. He was opposed to vivisection and, disrespectfully classed vaccines and serums with powdered toads as remedies for human ills; he rejected the ape-ancestor hypothesis, which he suggested might better be reversed; he had a theory "that, in early and plastic times, a human being from somewhere else appeared on this earth, and that many kinds of animals took him for a model, and rudely and grotesquely imitated his appearance"; he accepted the possibility of prenatal markings and stigmatic wounds as expressions of the power of mind over matter. He flouted impartially the pretensions of science, the monopoly of "miracles" by religion, and the claim of the Spiritualists that disembodied spirits are the agents at work in the phenomena recorded.

Wild Talents is a disconnected series of accounts of the marvellous, drawn chiefly from the press of the last few years and ranging from poltergeist phenomena to unexplained disappearances, from ghouls and vampires to hailstones bearing pictures of the Virgin, from dowsing or water-divining and fire walking to curiously localized fires of mysterious origin and inexplicable deaths. Even the unjustly discredited Keely motor of some forty years ago is cited in substantiation of the author's claim that "engines have run, fueled with zeals."

The cases presented are impressive by sheer force of numbers. Science can and usually does ignore the challenge of a single circumstance inexplicable along materialistic lines, but when such a mass of phenomenal occurrences is brought together it should become more difficult to brush their cumulative testimony aside. As Mr. Fort put it: ". . .some of our opponents, if out in a storm long enough, might have it dawn on them that it was raining."

Mr. Fort's interest seems to have been largely in the phenomena for their own sake; as witness his no doubt half-facetious confession that the great ambition of his life had been to be able to give to chairs and tables the order: "Fall in! Forward march!" and have them obey him.

He does not even imply any moral responsibility attaching to the unconscious exercise of psychic powers against the objects of antipathy, but the evidence adduced for the power of injuring, consciously or unconsciously, the object of hatred or malice, without lifting one's hand, is overwhelming and disquieting. To give but one of the many instances cited of what Mr. Fort called "unconscious wizardry"—within the space of a year and a half, each of the four judges who successively committed and re-com-

mitted to prison a well-known British labour leader for refusal to pay arrears due to his wife under a maintenance order, shortly thereafter "died suddenly".

That any change involves disadvantages as well as gains the author granted, but he foresaw tremendous possibilities, constructive as well as destructive, in the development and control of these "wild talents," possibilities which may transform, if they do not wreck our civilization.

Wild Talents is not a reassuring book. It makes very real the terrible dangers, mental and bodily, which threaten the race in the coming "Era of Witchcraft," as Mr. Fort ominously named it, unless man's moral development proceeds apace with or outstrips the unfoldment of his psychic powers and faculties.

PH. D.

Plotinus on the Beautiful and on Intelligible Beauty. (The Shrine of Wisdom, 6 Hermon Hill, London.)

These are two essays reprinted from the Enneads of Plotinus and reveal a striking similarity of orientation to that of Indian Æsthetics. Both the Vedanta and the Sankhya have moulded Indian thought on the nature of the Beautiful. That the inmost nature of the Self and the Universe is *sachchidananda* or Bliss, is the central insight of the Vedanta. In everyday life we are moved by *kama* and *karma* born of *avidya*. Ignorant of our true nature as Infinite Joy, we maintain a round of superficial desires and activities, born of a mistaken identification of ourselves with the impulses of the body. Now, Beauty in nature or art breaks for us this spell of familiarity, and engages the soul in a mood of disinterested contemplation. That quality in art which produces this mood is *Rasa*. Kama and Karma are suspended for the time being and we see into the life of things. Thus beauty becomes the "pathway to Reality".* Thus æsthetic contemplation is akin to philosophic, and brings about, all unknown to the subject thereof, "a migration of the self"* from the empirical to the universal planes of being. But this vision is not complete *Jnana*, because it is evanescent, not being based on perfect apprehension or the ultimate implications of experience. This view makes Rasa or inward experience more fundamental in the apprehension of the beautiful; the outer sensuous appearance is only a stimulus which makes us forget ourselves and remember our diviner nature. Hence it is that sometimes even the plainest things evoke in us the "Vision Splendid". Hence it is that feeling as such is not the core of the æsthetic experience. Feeling carries us to the realm of the beautiful only when it comes trailing clouds of glory from the Supreme within and without. There is an illuminating approximation in this matter between Plotinus and Indian æsthetics; for him also Beauty is the veil of Reality. In both these essays Plotinus brings out the identity of Truth and Beauty and sketches the voyage of the pilgrim soul from the outward beauty of forms to the inner beauty of Ideas, and from the World of Ideas to the Good, the One beyond.

From the ethical point of view, also, there is a close similarity between the two. Indian thought utilises the Sankhyan theory of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas as a spiritual criterion of art. The highest art is that which stimulates Satwa guna, or purity of nature in us. If Beauty is an experience in which there is a revelation of the Supreme Spirit to the human soul, it is obvious that the experience must have a "cathartic influence" on the emotional and sensitive nature of the experiencer. This is not to say that art must be didactic in aim. This is only to say that the spiritual 'after-effect' must count in the evaluation of any particular piece of art or experience. The demand of Plotinus for moral purification as

*"Pathway to Reality" and "migration of the self" are expressions found in Professor Hiriyanna's Presidential Address to the Indian Oriental Conference (Proceedings, vol. ii) the best account in English of Indian Æsthetics known to the reviewer.—M. A. V. R.

preparatory for the vision of beauty is an echo of this Indian criterion of *Sattwo-dreka* or evocation of the spiritual.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Konnersreuth: A Medical and Psychological Study of the Case of Teresa Neumann. By R. W. HYNEK, M.D. Translated and adapted by LANCELOT W. SHEPPARD. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, London. 4*s.*)

Teresa Neumann,* the daughter of a Bavarian peasant, was born in 1898. At the age of fourteen she became a servant at the village inn, where she waited on the customers and also worked on the landlord's farm. At the age of twenty she sustained a severe spinal injury which resulted in her becoming a bedridden invalid. She was an extremely pious Roman Catholic; and in 1925, when about to be operated on for an inflammation of the appendix, she was cured phenomenally, we are told, as the result of a relic of a saint being placed on the affected part. Following this cure, which enabled her to get up and lead a more or less normal life, she began to see exceedingly vivid and realistic visions of scenes from the life of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels; and eventually she developed what are known as the "stigmata," that is to say, marks on her hands, feet, side and brow, corresponding to the wounds that Jesus is said to have received during the tortures that preceded his death. Teresa Neumann's stigmata have persisted right up to the present; and on Friday each week, she is said to witness in vision all the scenes of the passion and crucifixion as described in the Gospel narratives. While so doing, the stigmata develop into open wounds and bleed.

For all this the evidence seems to be perfectly satisfactory; but there are other details in Dr. Hynek's account—as for example that Teresa does not eat or drink anything at all except the consecrated wafer at communion—which in the nature of things would be very difficult to prove, or to accept without proof.

The phenomenon of the stigmata is not uncommon in the Roman Catholic Church, and we are informed that no less than 321 cases have been enumerated. Dr. Hynek, who regards them as due to miraculous intervention by the deity, notes with pride that they are unknown outside his Church, a fact that seems to him to confirm its unique status. It does not occur to him that an explanation may be found on other and non-supernatural grounds. The Roman Church is the only Christian body that makes a cult of the wounds of Jesus and encourages its members to visualise, sympathetically feel, and meditate upon them. Is it not more than likely, in view of all we know about the effect of the imagination on the physical body—*e. g.*, the well-known occasional effect of the imagination of the mother on her unborn child—that in the case of persons of peculiar psychological make up and unusually strong power of visualising, as Teresa's visions prove her to be, the object of constant emotional meditation should stamp its image on the flesh?

It is a curious illustration of the perversion of the doctrine of a great teacher by his followers, that so many of the popular devotions and cults, which the Roman Catholic Church fosters among its members, should centre round, not the precepts, but the physical body of Jesus, *e. g.*, the mother who gave it birth, his heart, his wounds. To what heights might not Western religion have reached if all this wealth of devotion through the centuries had been focused on the assimilation of the sublime ethical and mystical *teachings* of Jesus!

R. A. V. M.

* Since writing this review I see that the Pope has taken steps to suppress a number of mysto-hysterical cults that have been springing up in various places. Among other things he has caused Teresa Neumann to be sent to a hospital where she will receive treatment and be under observation.—R. A. V. M.

The Film in National Life. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. 1s.)

It is a familiar compliment paid to Englishmen that they do not think ahead and are almost always late in coming on to the ground, but when they do come, they set to work silently and with courage, and proceed with marvellous initiative to repair the errors of omission. The Report of the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films, appointed by some hundred educational and scientific organisations, proves and justifies this compliment. While Japan, Italy, Germany, France and the United States of America had recognised the need for a permanent organisation to improve the Film and make it serve national ends, Britain had remained unalive to that need and had left the task to private enterprise. The Commission came on the ground somewhat late, later even than the Indian Committee, but it has made a comprehensive investigation, co-ordinating and incorporating the results of many a previous inquiry and report, and has put forth a vigorous plea for the constitution of a Film Institute.

The Film Institute is intended to take up the development of all that is most valuable from the point of view of science, education, commerce, recreation, and artistic enjoyment. It must be able to give information and advice, to educate public taste, to conduct research ; to preserve film records of public events and compile descriptive and critical catalogues; to advise Government by certifying films as educational, cultural or scientific, and to undertake such duties as may be required in relation to Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates, such as certifying suitability for backward races, etc. These being its comprehensive duties, the Institute should have, according to the Commission, a governing board of seven members appointed by the Government and holding office for five years. There should be a staff including technical experts, a well-equipped experimental theatre, library and "cutting" room. They should also have an advisory body consisting of representatives of educational and scientific institutions, of representatives of film industry, of persons nominated and co-opted, and of representatives of self-governing Colonies and of India appointed by the Governments concerned, for advising and assisting with suggestions.

Every nation is seeking efficiency, and education as a means to it. The eye and the ear are the main approaches to the mind. The art of writing and printing had largely increased the matter that could reach the minds of the literate through the eye—and now with the mechanical devices that have given us the Movie, the Talkie and the Broadcast, comes the almost limitless expansion of experience through sight and sound.

Some apprehensions are beyond remedy. The belief has been, and in some measure persists, that the cinema is demoralising, that it relaxes the moral fibre, increases the habit of pleasure-seeking and saps the determination to do steady honest work ; that it develops expensive and unthrifty habits among the poor and that it increases crime. And there are those who take a pride in asserting that they have never, or very rarely, gone to the cinema. The evils attributed to the cinema are denied by experts and in any case seem exaggerated. Good or evil, it has come to stay, and the only question is how shall we use it so as to secure the greatest amount of good from it.

These apprehensions at least justify the desire for control and choice and the exclusion of undesirable films. Moralists are concerned with the health and the morality of the young and the immature. Nationalists are concerned not only with the obvious interests of national trade and industry but also with the no less important, if less palpable, interests of their distinctive culture to serve and preserve.

Purely educational and scientific films and films recording public events or embodying the best forms of national art will have little difficulty in securing international circulation, especially if an International Institute such as has been

set up by the League of Nations at Rome certifies to their fitness.

In regard to films other than educational in the wide sense, the lurking fear born of the nationalisms of the past does not seem to have disappeared. The Report speaks of Japan trying "vigilantly to protect her youth against the influence of Western films and compile a national film library showing the history, the traditions and social life of her people," of France taking steps "to protect all the national interests involved and in particular conserve her customs and traditions," of Italy seeking "to illustrate the greatness and destiny of Italy"—"each nation thus moulding this new force to the service of national ends".

These efforts at self-protection of even the advanced nations as against each other's films as a possible source of disturbance and danger to their cultural interest furnish food for reflection. Pure unmixed culture is a myth, even more so than pure unmixed race. Efforts to maintain both against the intrusion of foreign elements will nevertheless continue. There has been so much free commerce in thought that it would be difficult to settle definitely the ancestry or origin of all component elements of any culture. Nor is the distinctiveness of a culture or the value of a contribution to world-thought affected by the foreign origin of any component element so long as it has been assimilated and become integral to the culture that has taken it up. Exclusion may perhaps be justified as merely a protection of the immature and the unthinking from temporary phases of injurious imitation of foreign fashions. In a world which has become shrunk and small, with all fences destroyed, is it necessary to erect this wall of exclusion?

T. R. VENKATARAMA SASTRI

An English Treasury of Religious Prose. Selected and arranged by J. LEWIS MAY. (John Lane, The Bodley Head, Ltd. London. 5s.)

This *Treasury* falls only just within the definition of an Anthology. It partakes more, as the Compiler truly suggests, of the nature of a common-place book, and as such shows a wide acquaintance with the religious literature of England, the earliest excerpt being dated 627 A.D. Mr. May rightly feels that he should indicate to the reader what he means by the word "religious".

> Those, then, who like Blake look not *with* the eye but *through* it, whose gaze is not riveted to the world of sense, nor confined to the things of time . . . . those, I say, I should call religious.

We must further add that the writers of all the extracts were followers of the Christian religion, but there is no sectarianism shown in the selection, men of such widely different views as Cardinal Newman and C. H. Spurgeon both finding a place. No passage from a living author is included.

We wonder how many ordinary people in these days have read the sermons of Liddon, say, or even those of Cardinal Newman. *Grace Abounding*, by John Bunyan, must be a sealed book to the majority. Perchance if such take up this volume, they may be led to go to the original authors and read the extracts in their context. A vital difference between the compilation under review, and an anthology such as *The Oxford Book of English Verse*, lies in the fact that here an extract loses by being torn from its context, while a poem is, or ought to be, complete in itself.

The reader into whose hands this *Treasury* falls must decide for himself as to the value of the passages chosen. He cannot fail to be charmed by the literary beauty of many of them, but if the book is to fulfil what we take to be its mission, that is not enough. Personally we cannot feel in regard to *all* the selections, as Mr. May seems to feel, that they

> . . . will, to the thoughtful mind, furnish matter for meditation for at least one day, serving, perhaps, to shed a glow upon it; redeeming it from the petty and the commonplace.

T. L. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[**A. E. Waite** is well-known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers, the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

Current Spiritistic and Psychical Research is awaiting expectantly the views of the American S. P. R., on an alleged discovery that certain finger-prints, held to have been produced super-normally among other phenomena of the famous Margery mediumship, are not, as by him pretended, those of "Walter" himself, the control and deceased brother of Margery. They are now said to be impressions of a living person who was one of the sitters on a certain occasion when the prints of all present were taken as a supposed precaution, because finger-prints were promised at forthcoming séances. It does not appear that Mr. E. E. Dudley, who claims the discovery, is preferring a charge of fraud, except against "Walter" himself, and then it is by implication only. Margery—who is Mrs. L. R. G. Crandon, as all the world knows—is not accused of palming-off the impressions of a living hand as those of her brother, nor is any one else who belongs to the Boston circle. The palming-off, if any, is therefore the work of the control, and it has been pointed out acutely that in this manner "the charge only substitutes one miracle for another". Mr. Dudley's allegations were offered to the American Society for publication in its *Journal*,* but, having been declined thereby, they appeared in a special *Bulletin* of the Boston S. P. R. with corroborative reflections by Mr. Hereward Carrington and Mr. Arthur Goadby, both of them, like Mr. Dudley himself, being "well-known personalities" in American psychic activities. Most recently of all, a reputable Manchester weekly† devoted to Spiritism has been enabled to print in summary form a statement which it is proposed to publish in an early issue of the American S. P. R. *Journal*: it is to some extent an *avant-courier* of the promised Report on its investigations. It does not do more at the moment than (1) rebut a suggestion that the Society had a plan to suppress the question, (2) deny that it has any intention of delivering a verdict on the charge *per se*, or (3) do anything but "assemble, analyse and present . .

* *The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, together with its *Transactions*, enjoyed and deserved a similar repute to those of the English Society, throughout the period when they were in the care of Prof. Hyslop. He passed away some years since.

† *The Two Worlds*, Vol. XLV, p. 821. See also pp. 729, 807.

all the material evidence" bearing on the whole subject. Here is the case as it stands in mere outline, omitting suggestions of animus, easily exaggerated, on the part of the *Bulletin* towards the *Journal*, on the part of the *Journal* towards Mr. A. Goadby, and on the part of Dr. Crandon himself towards the Boston S.P.R. and its organ. All this is to be expected, and so are the animadversions and railleries of the general press about "a great setback" to Modern Spiritistic Research. It is to be observed that the best and oldest journal dedicated to the subject in Great Britain finds reason to hope that the promised Report "will provide conclusive new evidence" as to the connection of "Walter" with the finger-prints and will "add yet another chapter to the wonderful story of the Margery mediumship".* That will be excellent for those who are concerned, but it evades unintentionally the main points, which are not the authenticity of Mrs. Crandon's phenomena or the question whether her control produces super-normal finger-prints, but whether—on at least one occasion—he foisted on her circle as his own the impression of a living thumb.

We are reminded by Mr. J. Arthur Hill, who is of repute in psychical circles, that the Society for Psychical Research "was founded in 1882 by Prof. Henry Sidgwick, of Cambridge, and a group of scholarly and scientific friends". Its jubilee therefore was celebrated last year, but after what formal manner, if any, does not appear in his record.† We are told, however, in a few lucid pages, about the objects for which it stood at the beginning, the policy by which it had been characterised and something—under a few heads—of what has been achieved; as, for example, in collecting "evidence for telepathy between the living"; in the study and tabulation of 17,000 cases of psychical experience, obtained from people selected at random by means of a questionnaire; in the study of cross-correspondences, and so forth. As regards objects, they were and are the investigation of phenomena unrecognised by orthodox science; "but for which a certain amount of evidence seems to exist," including "suggestive therapeutics, dreams, multiple personality, and many other psychological things". The policy adopted is that of a Society which, as such, has no doctrines, is not propagandist, exists for investigation only and to ascertain the truth, if possible. For the rest, "its standard of evidence is high and it criticises severely," for which reason we are told, and know at full length otherwise, that it has been "anathematised by some spiritualists as a Society for Suppressing Knowledge". This, it should be explained, belongs rather to the old days, when some of us may re-

* *Light*, Vol. LII, p. 601. See also pp. 553, 564, 582.
† *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. CXII, pp. 712-721.

member the occasional joyous utterances of *The Medium* and *Daybreak*, among other periodicals of the nineties. A glance at the latest issue of the Society's *Journal* would dissuade anyone from supposing now a disposition towards silence in respect of spiritistic phenomena. While assured on the one hand that "it is not concerned with proving anything," on the other it pronounces, however rarely, a considered verdict—for example, that "between deaths and apparitions of the dying person there exists a connexion which is not due to chance alone."* Mr. Hill, on his own part, would appear to hold (1) not alone that telepathy between the living calls for no further evidence but that "it points to communication from mind to mind rather than from brain to brain"; (2) that in this case it is not a physical process; (3) that the existence of the spiritual world is therefore established, with minds existing therein; and (4) that such minds "may continue to exist when they cease to manifest through brains in the present material order".† On the question of human survival he is guarded and looks round for alternate explanations; but (1) in a quoted case of scholarship, "going beyond the knowledge of the sensitive," it is admitted that the script produced "was certainly characteristic of the two (disembodied) minds which were claimed to be the senders";‡ and (2) as to life on the other side he is disposed to believe that conditions "are more like our own than has sometimes been supposed," as also that this "is what will eventually be established"§—namely, the proclaimed belief of Spiritism. Finally, Mr. Hill visualises an intriguing prospect for experiment to come, affirming that "at any moment there may be invented some psychical spectroscope which may reveal as much of the super-physical world as the material spectroscope revealed of the stellar bodies in the depths of space".¶ Some of us, who are old students of psychic and spiritistic subjects, will be wishing that they may see that day.

According to Prof. Eddington, "Science has had to make room for a spiritual conception of the universe and man's place on it"; and Mr. Hill, dwelling on the present trend of Psychical Research, affirms that this also is moving in the same direction, being a recognition of the universe as other than merely physical. It "extends beyond what is perceptible or measurable by physical processes". He goes on to assert the continued *post mortem* existence and progression of human minds towards "some high attainment unthinkably above our present station," adding that the "central point" of the Christian faith, which regards us as "children of the Great Spirit

* *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. CXII, p. 714.
† *Ibid.* p. 713. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 719.
§ *Ibid.* p. 720. ¶ *Ibid.* p. 721.

who is our loving Father," is supported thereby. Some readers of these lines will remember that the British Medical Association met in August 1930, at Winnipeg; and it is on record that the Winnipeg Medical Society, connected with or arising out of the Manitoba Medical College, was active in making the arrangements for that important Congress. The President for the year in question was Dr. R. Rennie Swan, and in this capacity he delivered an address so far back as May 23rd of that year. It has become available in England only within recent days,* and is notable as a memorial of things that were thought and said on the threshold of the Association's Meeting. A generation since, or less, it would have been impossible for Dr. Swan or any other physician, however eminent, to have spoken at a Medical College on the subject of Immortality, unless indeed as a witness on the side of negation.

Dr. Swan, however, could offer to his audience a *Confessio Fidei* leading up to an affirmative testimony through considerations of the subject in its historical, scientific and psychical aspects, and taking as his keynote that " life may be tolerable if it is to end in sleep, but not if it is known to end in hopeless frustration and nothingness". It is not possible in a brief space to do more than select a few salient points, and they shall follow here in order.

(1) " The belief that human personality survives the dissolution of the body is neither confirmed nor discredited by science."† (2) " It is impossible to explain man in terms of flesh alone."‡ (3) " The real 'I' is something within, invisible, intangible imponderable, which directs, controls and governs this physical frame." (4) " Behind the thinking is the thinker." (5) " Man is a duplex being. Science must come, is coming to acknowledge it. He is a Spirit or Soul inhabiting a body."§ (6) " The most profound change in human thought . . . will, in all probability, follow the general recognition by Science of the immanence of a spiritual world."¶ (7) Regarding Psychical Research, it is added that when the slowly accumulating facts are recognised, " it will prove the continuity of life beyond the grave, " and this is denominated " a noble mountain peak " of attainment.

On that altitude the *Confessio* ends by affirming that the fear of death will be replaced " by a wondering desire for the undiscovered country ". These things are not cited because they lie all and utterly beyond challenge, but rather because, taken with their context, with the time and circumstance of their delivery, the place and the gathering, they furnish a not unremarkable testimony to the changing conception of the age on the relations between science and religion.

It is illustrated otherwise and vividly in records of fact and discovery, as in commentary thereupon. " The Turn of the Tide in Modern Science " is sketched graphically by Mr. J. E. Turner,**

* *Psychic Science*, Vol. XI, pp. 182-193. † *Ibid.* p. 186.
‡ *Ibid.* p. 187. § *Ibid.* p. 189. ¶ *Ibid.* p. 190.
** *The Contemporary Review*, No. 805, pp.72-79.

when he contrasts a forecast hazarded by Bertrand Russell in 1903, and now disproved radically by recent developments. Man was envisaged less than thirty years since as "the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving," and it was laid down unconditionally that the temple of his achievement was destined to be "buried beneath a universe in ruins". Now, on the contrary, it is possible to affirm that human personality is not merely "the climax of evolution, with limitless potentialities" but in kinship with "the Creative Intelligence". Mind is no longer an "accidental by-product of mechanical processes," while "the mechanisms of Nature" are not so foreign to intelligence as they appear at first sight to be. It will be observed, however, that the second point of the Russell contention remains untouched hereby, instead of "disproved radically". But it happens that Sir Francis Younghusband, discussing cosmic destiny,* offers an alternate hypothesis, namely, that, "co-extensive and coincident with the running down proclivity of this universe is a winding-up process, and that there is no final term to either". Here is another contribution at its value to the unending clash of speculation; and a few of us who, with Matthew Arnold, watch the strife, rather than share therein, may well afford to wait with open mind, content that the debate goes on. Even the "running down" theorists calculate many millions of years during which this one planet may continue to remain an abode for life. It follows that there is time and to spare for the bells of thought to ring all their changes. It may happen also that, in another form of symbolism, we may open another door, with a different kind of key, into the secrets of the universe, the secrets of the soul of man, their "glory of going on and still to be".

A. E. WAITE

THOUGHTS ON THE INDIAN SCIENCE CONGRESS

The Indian Science Congress held its twentieth session at Patna in the first week of January. Dr. L. L. Fermor of the Geological Survey of India was the President. There were nine Sections, the Congress had begun its career with only six. From the history of the Movement in India given in the Presidential Address we find that the Congress has from very modest beginnings grown into fairly large dimensions not only in respect of its numerical strength but also in respect of the magnitude of the output of work done. We are told, for instance, that while the published proceedings of the first session twenty years ago covered only 8 pages of print, those of the nineteenth session cover 467. During the present session the number of papers read seems to be even greater in some of the Sections. In the Chemistry Section, for example, Dr. P. Neogi told us that the number of papers read reached the record figure of 250. India has already her own niche in the temple of scientific fame.

* *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 161-175.

Practically all the Addresses delivered in the Congress stressed the economic and national side of the Movement in India. Some also drew attention to the cultural valuesand international bearings of such studies. This practical and applied aspect of the Indian Science Movement is as important as its purely theoretical and academic side. On the theoretical side, learned Societies and Journals and competent judges all over the world have approved the solid achievements of modern Indian investigators. The Raman Effect and Ghose's Law are but two notable examples out of many. The younger generation of Indian scientists have also made their mark, and the Proceedings of the Science Congress are an additional evidence that their mark bids fair to be a lasting one. It is not possible for me to make a critical survey of the wide field covered by these proceedings, save to remark that value and validity lie not so much in the results achieved as in the processes of achieving them. These latter are valuable even when no results have, apparently, been achieved.

Even a passing acquaintance with Indian Science cannot fail to make a deep impression on people with a serious turn of mind. The atmosphere of the laboratories and fields of scientific work in the India of to-day seems to be pulsating with a new stimulus and urge for original investigation. In the Upanishads we read of the Vessel of Mystery, the mouth of which is covered by a Lid of Gold, in which the Soul of Truth is hidden. The ancient seers prayed to the Effulgent One to remove the Lid and disclose to them the Truth. During the ages of comparative intellectual and spiritual torpor through which India has passed since the days of that Ancient Illumination, the Vase with the Golden Lid has been lost to the sight of many. The comparative stagnant placidity of India's intellectual life seems now to be stirred anew. The spirit of enquiry is abroad. The waves of awakened life are washing away the dust of centuries and rediscovering the Golden Lid. Increasing numbers are feeling the urge of the quest of truth. But the seekers must beware. The Vessel is one, but its reflections on the curved mirrors of Māyā are many. Instead of catching hold of the true Vase we may be running after alluring shadows. From the time of Bacon Europe has turned away from the true Vase of Gold. The result has been a phenomenal success in matter-knowledge and matter-control. But it is being borne on the West that its knowledge is after all the knowledge of illusion, and its control the control of a phantom that ensnares and enslaves. The Indian mind, with its profound background of wisdom, should not fail to exercise discriminating judgment when as now it joins in the quest of the Golden Vase. Even in the pursuit of objective science it must not forget and despise the legacy of its ancient philosophy and mysticism. That philosophy and mysticism may be helpful to-day in a variety of ways. They will show in a proper perspective the relative and intrinsic values of the objective and other studies and disciplines and their achievements. For, this question of value is even more fundamental than that of validity. In a sense, value constitutes validity. And value, as ancient Indian wisdom teaches, has an hierarchy ranging from ordinary material good to the supreme good of *Moksha*.

Science, as many of the Presidential addresses at Patna observed, cannot but be inspired by utilitarian aims. But do, or should, such aims include nothing but the production of material benefits? Must not Science look up to higher things and probe deeper? In the old Indian works on Medicine, Astrology or even Philology we find a preamble stating not only the immediate but also the ultimate purpose for which science has to be cultivated; and the ultimate object in every case is the attainment of Perfection. A certain kind of moral and spiritual discipline is accordingly enjoined for the benefit of the would-be votary of that science: not only for his benefit but for that of the community in

general. This is true and really serviceable utilitarianism. Science in the West has deliberately divorced itself from this moral, spiritual, cosmopolitan utilitarianism. It has not consciously set before itself the purpose of all-round beneficence. The result has been abysmal disharmony and distress. The ethical and spiritual neutrality of modern science has spelled disaster. India should not copy the West here. The old Indian plan was never to lose touch with the Centre; never to bar ethical and spiritual issues as irrelevant or inconsequential.

The Proceedings of this Congress also strike one as being encouraging in the sense that Indian investigators in their researches and experiments are trying to keep in touch with the latest advances. The Raman Effect and Raman Spectra are for instance some of the latest achievements. And we are told how the Raman Spectra are being utilised here for unravelling the mysteries of molecular structures. The debt of Chemistry to Optics has been great and it is now perceived that following this line Chemistry will probably find the clue leading to matter-constitution.

The President of the Physics Section summarized the position on the relationship of Matter and Radiation, and we find that the modern conception of matter-structure is being steadily and solidly reared upon the basis of the fundamental sciences of Mathematics and Physics. Dr. Stewart of the Healing Art Section raises some grave issues for the consideration of those who are glamoured by the modern craze for birth control.

I have taken a few of the topics discussed at random.

As regards India, one cannot help putting certain questions to oneself. First, is not any helpful and inspiring light to be gleaned from her Ancient Illumination for the many problems on the cosmic situation which Science is trying to understand and appreciate? We do not mean the problems commonly relegated to the realm of Philosophy. Have not the so-called myths and parables of the ancients any sense, any meaning for us scientifically? While the laboratory and field method of scientific enquiry is good and must be pursued, is it not time we recognised and re-understood another and profounder method which was called Yoga Method in India? Is ancient Indian culture so dead that we can have from the science point of view nought but a *post mortem* interest in it?

Lastly, in assessing the economic, national and cultural values of the scientific activities, we should never forget the central fact that, in the absence of adequate moral and spiritual balances and safeguards, such activities have been productive of both good and evil, actual and potential. It is likely that the evil will tend to overweigh the good unless the requisite balances and safeguards are now provided. India's appalling poverty demands of course a scientific development and utilisation of her material resources. But the process must be part of a complete process of Indian Self-realisation perfecting both its material and spiritual "moments".

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA

A CORRECTION

I read with interest the review you published of "Youth looks at Religion," [ARYAN PATH, Jany. 1933, p. 59] a book to which I contributed an essay. But there was one mistake your reviewer made. He said that two of the writers are Roman Catholics; and it is clear from his critique that he thought I was one of them. He is wrong. Miss Lowndes is the only Roman Catholic. I, myself, am an Anglican and it is therefore confusing if my essay is considered to be the result of the schooling that one expects in the case of Roman Catholics. Your reviewer said of the "two Roman Catholics," "they have no doubts". I have always thought that doubt as well as faith is the very stuff of religion.

London PETER WINCKWORTH

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Every time one thinks judicially, examining all sides, the way of the vivisectionist reveals itself to be bad and ugly. It finds no recommendation either from the pure moralist or the true philosopher; and the social servant, who has zealous eye for the public health, finds it increasingly difficult to praise the system when he is face to face with its results, as he encounters them in his labour of love day by day. Even on the basis of a crass materialistic philosophy of morals, the painful treatment—if we may not call it ghastly cruelty—meted out to animals cannot but be pronounced wrong. Granting that among the ranks of the vivisectionists are some researchers who experiment on animals with as much kindness for the speechless as they can muster, and do that with the good motive of alleviating human bodily pain, the cumulative result of their work does not justify the methods. But the evils of the vivisection system cannot really be fought, nor can the system itself be overthrown, as long as the wilderness of confused thinking, of which it is a part, is left untouched. Vivisection in itself is but a department of a larger system which Bernard Shaw characterizes as Doctors' Delusions. Among their numerous objectionable features vivisection is but one delusion, revolting to the sense and sensibility of truly refined people. The most progressive anti-vivisectionists, like Miss Lind-af-Hageby, recognize this, as is once more clear from the latest issue of her quarterly, *Progress To-day*. Not only does it attack the crimes of vivisection and the cruelty to animals but it also constructively tries to bring some help and light concerning the body and its health. In one of the short articles Dr. J. Stenson Hooker, M.D., sums up:

> We need a newer practice of Medicine, a newer order of doctors altogether, a fresh conception of disease and its management, a clean, harmless, purifying way of coping with all ill-health, the roping together of all the splendid things therapeutical still unknown to so many doctors, even newer ways of administrating State and Official Medicine—surely all this would play a part in the making for a goal that is good and an end which is almost divine.

Last October writing in this journal on "The Danger of Scientific Dogmatism" Henry Pratt Fairchild, Professor of Sociology at New York University, who is associated with many movements for social betterment, said:

> There has been a tremendous advance in the last few decades in the science of bio-chemistry, bacteriology, anatomy,

etc. Young physicians trained in the best medical schools are admirably equipped with this type of knowledge. But they are woefully deficient in the comprehension of the human personality. They are inclined to disregard the fact that human beings are not, and cannot be, standardized. The typical modern hospital is likely to handle its patients as if they were uniform lumps of matter that must respond in a given way to a given routine treatment. If they fail to display the expected response, it is too bad, but it is really their fault, and there is nothing to be done about it. Scientific medical knowledge is an invaluable equipment for the practitioner, but it is ineffectual and even dangerous if it is not complemented by a sympathy, comprehension, and intuition that rise above science.

But this is nothing new. Many years ago Bernard Shaw tried to save the doctors from their dilemma—in vain. Only the other day in Bombay he objected to his book being called a satire.

It is not a satire. It is a description of the actual situation regarding the medical profession. And the situation has become much worse since I wrote the book. I still hold the same views without any modification.

The three chief determinants of the health of the body are nourishment, exercise and sleep. The views of the old Esoteric Philosopy about them are radically different from those obtaining to-day, though both ancient and modern schools agree that prevention of disease is better than cure. These three indeed are master-preventives and their proper use would save our humanity from numerous ills; but that proper use itself depends upon the philosophy by which each individual lives his life. The modern doctor's preventives are injections which make of the body a veritable hospital, wherein more than one organ is under treatment. The materialist-psychologist advocates "no repression" *i. e.* indulgence, and soon the body becomes a menagerie where more than one beast growls for blood.

Another kind of danger lurks in the numerous systems of healing in which thought and prayer are used. Theosophy warns against these also, explaining that they do not effect true and permanent cures but in reality only transplant the seeds of diseases for future harvest. The most promising line of advance is what is generally called Nature Cure, in which the elements of earth, water, air, fire and light (*prithivi*, *apas*, *vayu*, *agni*, and *akasha* in Hindu nomenclature) are utilized. But even this method will not fully succeed unless the implications in this connection of St. Paul's statement are recognized: "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Nourishment, exercise and sleep must be studied as body-builders, and that body be recognised as the dwelling place of its Maker, the Soul.

卐

"Let him not do to another
what is not good for himself."

—*Yājñavalkya Smriti*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV APRIL 1933 No. 4

THE ONE AND ONLY CURE

Men cannot all be Occultists, but they can all be Theosophists. Many who have never heard of the Society are Theosophists without knowing it themselves; for the essence of Theosophy is the perfect harmonizing of the divine with the human in man, the adjustment of his god-like qualities and aspirations, and their sway over the terrestrial or animal passions in him. Kindness, absence of every ill feeling or selfishness, charity, good-will to all beings, and perfect justice to others as to one's self, are its chief features. He who teaches Theosophy preaches the gospel of good-will; and the converse of this is true also,—he who preaches the gospel of good-will, teaches Theosophy.—H. P. BLAVATSKY.

No thoughtful person can fail to recognise the universal symptoms of world-sickness referred to in the editorial of last November's ARYAN PATH; but the fact that so many people are conscious of those symptoms is a hopeful sign of the future. It is the sickness that cannot be diagnosed which defeats the physician, and as invisible, painless cancer, hidden deep in the body, is the most deadly of all evils.

In the past history of civilization, the inner sickness has so often been disguised by an outward appearance of health. Wars of conquest, revolutions, the developments of trade, the vast increase of nominal wealth under the credit system, have all been regarded by the majority of mankind as being, in their varying degrees, worthy and splendid achievements. When the symptoms of illness came too near the surface, as, to name but a single example, in the last years of Louis XVI, the attempt to cure it was made by a change of evil. For oppression and starvation of the poor, was substituted the murder of the aristocrat; and, because the poor were in a large

numerical majority, there was a momentary relief from pain, until the abscess began to re-form and suppurate again in another part of the body.

In the prevailing religions, also, the outward appearance of health has deceived mankind into the fond belief that all was right with the world. On the surface all seemed well, but the almost invisible growth of insincerity was slowly paralysing their vitality. For example, Jesus preached simplicity of personal life, but the Cathedrals raised to his honour were devoted to display; his priests dressed in elaborate and costly robes read aloud to the congregation the command to his disciples " . . . neither take two coats". A similar phenomenon can be observed in other religions.

But at the present time the world sickness cannot be denied even by those who are almost entirely lacking in moral perception; and the self-appointed physicians are busily advocating their various palliatives—cures in any radical sense they can never be. In America, the latest cure is known as Technocracy, the idolisation of the machine on a new economic basis. In Europe and the British Dominions, the main prescription has taken the form of trying to stimulate internal trade and production by taxing imports, a flagrant form of the common medical error that treats symptoms rather than causes. As a secondary measure, the principal countries of Europe meet together at Geneva, discuss reduction of armaments, and, since each of them is deeply suspicious of his neighbour's good faith, invariably fail to agree.

But these and all the other prescriptions have but a single object in view, to raise the economic standard, whether the rise be achieved by a revival of trade under the present capitalist system, or by a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth. The lessons of history in this connection go for nothing. In the past we have seen a long succession of periods in which various nations have become rich and prosperous, every such period being followed by a corresponding decline. And if we can formulate any law on the basis of historical precedent, it can only be that these alterations are invariable. Very obviously, then, the prescriptions offered by our economists and politicians are nothing but temporary palliatives for the present world-sickness. They cannot prevent the recurrence of the radical disease. The present depression is an unusually severe one, but the next may be severer still.

Let us therefore come to the only cure. It is well known, none better. It has found expression in the mouths of all the Adept-Teachers since the dawn of the present cycle of world-history, as a legacy of the Wisdom-Religion which antedates the Vedas themselves. All the Masters and the Mystics have been living exemplars of their own primary article of Faith. And none but the

blindest of self-seekers doubts the efficacy of this simple cure for all the evils of the world. In its direct and most comprehensible form, it may be stated in the form of the commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

Now, although it is not difficult to realise why this commandment is honoured only in the letter by the churches, mosques and temples, how are we to account for the failure in the case of so many professing Theosophists? For, however regrettable the fact, it must be confessed that the failure is often in evidence. In some cases it seems that the acceptance of that first principle of Universal Brotherhood has become perfunctory, giving way to a self-centred interest in the theory of spirit-development, to the desire for the exhibition of occult learning, and so to the prestige that may be won as "a teacher of the mysteries". In other cases, and these are in a majority, the profession goes no deeper than lip service. Those who will not go to personal inconvenience, or it may be expense, to serve the needs of a neighbour, can have no realisation whatever of the true intention and meaning of Universal Compassion.

What that intention is may best be illustrated by considering the meaning of love. Those who cheerfully subscribe to the article of the need for Universal Brotherhood must begin by asking themselves whether there is, in fact, any one human being whom they love in the deepest and truest sense of the word? Is there any one for whom they would gladly sacrifice their own happiness without any desire for reward, or even for acknowledgment; any one whose success is dearer than their own; any one whom they would not judge by their own personal standards of conduct or belief? For unless there be such loved ones in our own circle of relations and friends, we are not yet in sight of the path that leads to the portal of Divine Wisdom. "Love with an object" is not a Theosophical pursuit. Love without any thought of response, of reward or of recompense is the first step for the man of the world; he must begin and learn to distinguish between them; the former is fascination, the latter sympathy.

In *The Voice of the Silence* we find a few brief instructions for finding the Real Path, whose first step is Love without an object. The primary injunction, in developing and practising it, is—let not the senses make a playground of the mind. How simple a warning that appears to be; how immensely difficult to follow. For in this connection the word "senses" implies more than those solely concerned with the indulgence of carnal appetites. Lust, greed and indolence may find no place in the thought, and yet the mind may be the playground of desires essentially worldly and self-seeking—that world may be the occult world, and that seeking the mystic quest. We read further that it is necessary to "part the

body from the mind, to dissipate the shadow and to live in the Eternal"—in other words to realise the true Self, recognise the illusion of matter, and penetrate beyond it to a sight of the eternal reality. But they also who are described as "Buddhas of selfishness" act thus.

However, by even a little practice of Love without an object we have passed the limitations of the overwhelming majority of mankind. This preliminary step is formidable but has to be taken by the earnest aspirant who desires to practise self-discipline, so that he may not only win emancipation from embodied existence but also develop the power to renounce it.

If such ambition be too high in our stage of development, it is an ideal that before all others should remain ever-present in the mind—the Ideal of Renunciation as contrasted with that of Emancipation. Keeping then that high ambition always before us as the goal to which we must presently attain if we would retain conscious immortality, we must begin on the lower slopes of the long ascent, by cultivating a greater moderation and gentleness towards mankind as a whole. It serves no good purpose to hate what we regard as evil. Hate, which has its origin in self-love, invariably begets hate in others. We hate because our *amour-propre* is disturbed. It may be by a person whose conversation and acts are at variance with our most cherished principles of thought and conduct. It may be by a foreign nation which has ideals and traditions different from our own. Or it may be by the creed of another religious community, a creed to which we cannot subscribe. But in every case, the genesis of our distaste lies in our revolt against disturbance.

It is not the true Self, the Immortal Principle that is disturbed. There are times when, however faintly, we can feel the reproach of an inner protest against our anger. The self that is offended is the personality we develop for ourselves throughout life. It derives from our heredity and training by the fostering of inborn tendencies, many of them emerging from bodily appetites, others not less delusive, from intellectual tastes and abilities. And, from the balance of these tendencies,—(almost invariably contradictory in some respects, one set or the other in the ascendant, according to the strength or weakness of the controlling will)—we develop the personality we believe to be representative of our real ego. Personality is an ephemeral thing. After death, it will slowly disintegrate, but it is that self, and that alone, which is responsible for the foolish pride that cannot brook contradiction.

Wherefore, in this present condition of world-sickness, it is the duty of all those who know these truths to forsake their pre-occupation in the miracle-clubs, and whole-heartedly prosecute their search for the path that leads to the first gate of the Heart. By

doing that, they will not only serve their own eternal welfare, but the good of mankind. We may begin by learning the inner meaning of love, free from any trace of self-seeking, for another human being, husband, wife, child or friend. From that we may come to feel a greater tolerance for all the world of men. But it is not until, *by these means*, we have come to realise the true Self, that we can exercise that universal Compassion which is the Caste-Mark of the true Mahatma.

The magnetism of pure love is the originator of every created thing, and a man, free from worldly incentives and sensuality may cure the most "incurable" diseases.

And now is the time to begin that great work of cure.

It is well known that the first rule of the Society is to carry out the object of forming the nucleus of a universal brotherhood. The practical working of this rule was explained by those who laid it down, to the following effect:—

"He who does not practise altruism; he who is not prepared to share his last morsel with a weaker or poorer than himself; he who neglects to help his brother man, of whatever race, nation, or creed, whenever and wherever he meets suffering, and who turns a deaf ear to the cry of human misery; he who hears an innocent person slandered, whether a brother Theosophist or not, and does not undertake his defence as he would undertake his own—is no Theosophist."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Lucifer*, November, 1887

PLATO THE RELIGIOUS SEER

[**D. L. Murray's** philosophical expositions approximate the teachings of Esoteric philosophy as may be seen in his discussion of the Platonic Ideas in this article.—EDS.]

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH have kindly invited me to elaborate a sentence of mine in a review of Lowes Dickinson's *Plato and his Dialogues* which appeared in their issue for May, 1932. The sentence ran:

> It is less Plato the sociologist or moralist than Plato the religious seer that our day may return to for refreshment and revelation.

I had pointed out in reviewing Lowes Dickinson's book how hard it was to draw really applicable social lessons for a modern State from a writer who had in view the City States of ancient Greece, which, by modern standards, were little more than large villages, in which every citizen knew all the others and the whole body of them formed the Parliament; in which there was no labour problem, since all the manual work was done by slaves without rights; where there was no machinery to complicate production and distribution and no communications to bring the ends of the earth each morning to the harassed statesman's door.

On the other hand there are really no fundamental problems of philosophy and religion that were not explored by the Greek intellect. Accurate physical science, it is true, was impossible so long as experiment and the manipulation of instruments was generally regarded as a toil essentially "slavish". But the restraints of traditional religion had not prevented the restless Hellenic mind from hazarding those generalizations about the ultimate constitution of the Universe which attract the Materialists of our own day. Thales had conjectured that the whole process of the world consisted in modifications of the element of water, Heracleitus that its origin and end were fire —and that, like a flame of fire, all that is must burn away ("Everything passes: nothing remains"). Democritus, with a more scientific insight, achieved that theory of the atom which until very latest times has been the mainstay of modern physics. With such radical scepticism abroad about the meaning and value of Life, it is not surprising that the first figure to appear in the arguments of Plato's great dialogue "The Republic" is a Sophist who maintains, quite in the style of later worshippers of the Will to Power, that what we call Justice is nothing better than the Convenience of the Strong. Then as now philosophers might dispute over their rival dialectics; then as now the hierophants of established creeds might declare that on the impiety of questioning this or that dogma hung the ruin of mankind. To Plato, who saw the

youth around him being corrupted by the worldly opportunism of the Sophists (the Athenian substitute for our lecturers and journalists), just as in our own day it is invited to pin its faith to a "materialist interpretation" of history and a "psycho-analytic" dissolvent of the soul, the question at issue was more fundamental than the controversy of rival metaphysicians or the wrangle over rites and sacred books. It was the question whether there was really nothing in man superior to the appetites of the animals, and nothing (for that matter) more significant in all living creatures than the aimless dance of dead atoms. It was to know, as a famous French religious teacher of our own time has put it, "whether the universe is inert, empty, deaf, without soul, without heart, whether the consciousness of man finds no echo there more real and more true than itself" (Alfred Loisy).

In that day, as in this, Plato might have been invited to accept a historical revelation or to follow a long chain of reasoning from earth to the stars. But it was his genius to perceive that for the foundation of religion (not necessarily for its superstructure) a basis must be found unassailably sunk in the soul of man himself. Like Kant and Hegel in later ages Plato realized that the religion capable of withstanding all assaults must be a religion which man could not deny without denying his own nature. The Divinity of which he could never be robbed must be a Divinity that he affirmed, implicitly at least, in every judgment that he made.

In general terms Plato's answer to this most fundamental of all problems is known to everybody; to understand it in its full detail and implication is a task that has proved beyond the grasp of the profoundest philosophical intellects, beginning with his own disciple Aristotle. Plato approached the question as a problem of logic. How is it that we are able to assert of a number of individuals all differing in a greater and less degree from one another that each is *a man*; of a variety of four-footed creatures that each, despite difference of colour, size and speed is *a horse*; of a cluster of flowers, distinct in shading and petals, that they are all nevertheless *roses*? Who ever saw the *man-in-himself*, the *horse-in-itself*, the *rose-in-itself*? And yet, if we had not somehow knowledge of the pattern, the *ideal*, man or rose, how dare we affirm that this or that individual was truly a specimen of *humanity* or *rosaceousness*? In other words, so long as we keep to the bare particulars that sense presents to us, the world of Materialism, we cannot say anything about them. We can recognize them and reason about them only because in and through them we apprehend the Idea, the Archetype of which they give varied expression. So soon as we have consciousness enough to reason, we are presented immediately with a

world of spiritual realities lying behind the facts which eyes and ears present to us, lying behind them and yet shining through them, in whose light alone the perceptions of sense carry meaning.

Now the difficulties of the Platonic theory of Ideas are obvious. This realm of fixed Forms or Patterns hanging in some supercelestial æther with the still beauty of Greek statuary or Greek temples is a baffling conception. It is baffling too to understand how the Ideas in their serene purity can blend with the transitory flow of our mortal perceptions without defilement. To remove this difficulty, due to the *static* character of Greek thought, later philosophers conceived the Ideas as centres of energy sustaining the process of the universe, and in the sublime system of Hegel the Absolute Idea is a continuous activity that fulfils Itself in and through the contradictions of ordinary experience, which it reconciles in a higher unity. A more simple interpretation of the central feature of the Platonic philosophy is given by Dr. Inge when he writes: "Platonism is essentially a philosophy of values. The famous 'Ideas' are values—not unrealized ideals, but facts understood in their ultimate significance." The necessity under which man feels himself to attach to certain aspects of his experience a *value* which cannot be explained in terms of mere pleasure and pain or as a quality useful in the evolutionary struggle for existence is as certain as the logical necessities of his thinking which with Plato took the first place when he sought to define the Ideal world.

The spiritual values are generally taken to be three—Truth, Goodness and Beauty; and though other classifications can be made in which truth, goodness and beauty all appear as means to some ulterior, comprehensive spiritual satisfaction, for the purposes of the present argument it is enough to maintain that rooted in the nature of man there lies this ineluctable necessity to appreciate his experience not simply in animal terms of gratification and survival, as Hobbes and his successors argue, but in terms of the good and the bad, the ugly and the beautiful. No man denies that he makes these valuations who does not shortly make them without realizing that he is doing so; and no attempt to explain them as matters of physical convenience (the continuous endeavour of historical materialists and of many psycho-analysts) succeeds in anything but distorting their essential character.

But once we recognize with Plato that ideal demands are connatural with material ones in the constitution of man, we are driven to ask whether there is a dualism between man and nature. Has a universe for which goodness and beauty are mere illusions, less important than mist on the mountain side, for the mist has physical effects, has such a universe thrown up in freakishness

a being that at need prefers these ideal values to his own physical existence ? In the words of Loisy does the "consciousness of man [his consciousness of values] find no echo there more real and more true than itself" ? If so, the cause seems profoundly inadequate to the effect.

It is just here that the mystic or poetic consciousness bears its witness with decisive force. "Mystic or poetic"—for the difference between the two is not one of kind; Plato himself was philosopher, mystic and poet. In the lectures from which quotation has already been made, "The Platonic Tradition in English Thought," Dr. Inge reminds us how many of the leading poets in the English language have been Platonists by nature, or even without realizing the fact—and no doubt the phenomenon is not confined to English literature. It is scarcely necessary to allude to the sense of a spiritual realm interpenetrating and even blotting out the material world which pervades the poetry of India. Less hackneyed by frequent quotation than those passages in which Wordsworth has expressed the Platonic creed may be the following two stanzas from Edmund Spenser's "Hymne in Honour of Beautie".

That wondrous Paterne wheresoere it bee,
Whether in earth layd up in secret store,
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see
With sinfull eyes, for feare it to deflore,
Is perfect Beautie which all men adore,
Whose face and feature doth so much excell
All mortal sence, that none the same may tell.

Thereof as every earthly thing partakes,
Or more or less by influence divine,
So it more faire accordingly it makes,
And the grosse matter of this earthly myne,
Which clotheth it, thereafter doth refyne,
Doing away the drosse which dims the light
Of that faire beame, which therein is empight.

The principle of Platonism is the principle of sacramentalism. No Platonist will for a moment countenance the impoverished dogmatism which holds that the Spirit, the "wondrous Paterne" of the Ideal realm, cannot be mediated to our apprehension through material elements. If to believe that it can is "paganism" so much the better for the pagan religions. The real materialism is that which hands the whole framework of the world of shapes and colours over to spiritual non-significance—which is the Devil. Doubtless the operation of the sacramental principle has been unduly narrowed by those who would claim that only through the rites of their own Church or Temple can the Divine be communicated for the strengthening and refreshment of the human soul. But it is not by denying the efficacy of sacraments there where the great historic religions of East and West testify from agelong experience that it exists that any help will be brought to the spiritual starvation of the modern world. It is by acknowledging it there, and at the same time immensely extending the scope of it, extending it to the whole creation wherever beauty is revealed and to all humanity wherever a noble deed has disclosed the Ideal in action. To the centenary of the Oxford Movement in 1933, which com-

memorates the work of John Keble, the sacramentalist poet, among others, the disciples of Platonism can bring their wreath. For, to a wider extent perhaps than even the most liberal theologians have dreamed, the universe is not "inert, empty, deaf, without soul, without heart," but the revelation throughout of an Eternal Splendour.

D. L. MURRAY

A NOTE ON MISSIONARIES

That "the human side of the mission seems on the whole unduly weak" is the considered opinion of the Appraisal Commission of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, expressed in the fourth instalment of its forthcoming report, which was released for publication on October 13, 1932.

Admitting many noble exceptions to the indictment, the Commission yet finds in the history of missions plentiful examples of mixture of motive.

> With the legitimate motive have been associated such traits as love of adventure, ambition, the impulse to dominate or to impose one's type of mind on others, the "predatory temper," the will to power . . . . .
>
> . . . . The greater number seem to us of limited outlook and capacity; and there are not a few whose vision of the inner meaning of the mission has become obscured by the intricacies, divisions, frictions and details of a task too great for their powers and their hearts.
>
> The human side of the mission seems on the whole unduly weak. For there are two things which we may rightfully demand of the mission personnel. First, that in those services where there is a recognized standard of efficiency, as in teaching or medicine, the mission staff shall stand well. Second, that in the essential service of interpreting Christianity to the Orient, it shall not too far fail of its great theme. In neither of these respects can we speak of the total impression with the high enthusiasm we should like to offer.
>
> As a member of a church, sent out by a church, the missionary is prone to conceive his task as primarily that of promoting this organization. His Board, as a rule, embodies and intensifies this conception; and the missionary is likely to be dominated by the expectations of his Board.
>
> Every human organization has its hunger for influence, funds, membership; tempts its servants into ways of ambition within its ranks, and into a reputed "loyalty" which involves petty competition with other organizations of similar aim. The trail of self-interest within the organization lies like the trail of the serpent over the missions of Asia within our purview . . . .

The statement is frank enough as far as it goes. It is encouraging that a body of prominent American laymen are able so far to surmount their denominational prejudices and their probable bias in favour of the institutions they were sent to the East to evaluate. It is perhaps too much to expect that they could rise wholly above the differences of creed that now separate East from West, to take a world view.

Proselytizing agencies will never attract in numbers the highest type of personnel. But let the task of missionaries be conceived as twofold—as teaching, without proselytizing, the best that Western civilization has to offer and, no less important, as learning and taking back to their people the religious and philosophical treasures of the Orient—and not only will the problem of mission personnel solve itself but the ideal of world unity will be brought appreciably nearer realization.

PH. D.

YOUTH AND CRIME

[**George W. Wickersham**, Attorney-General of U. S. A., from 1909-13 in the cabinet of President Taft, served as Chairman of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in the U. S. A. The report of the Commission was published a few months ago. Liberty is the title given by "independent" youths to their acts of licence, and disrespect for law often results from a negation of the soul. What is happening on such a large scale in U. S. A. is also happening elsewhere. And Mr. Wickersham's article has a message for every country. We wish he had told us out of his vast experience something about the effects of the "new Morality" of no repression and full expression, especially in sex matters, on crime among the youth.—EDS.]

All writers on crime and many official reports on present day social conditions in the American States, emphasize the youth of a large number of offenders against the law. "Any programme for the prevention of crime," said the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, in reporting to President Hoover in 1931, "must begin with the proper treatment of the child offender. The lawless careers of most professional criminals begin in childhood." That report (No. 6), it is true, dealt only with the child offender in the *federal* system of Justice. But it also reviewed the conditions existing in the several States of the Union, the methods which in those jurisdictions had been tried with a view to preventing the delinquent child from becoming a permanent member of the criminal classes, and urged the adoption by the federal authorities of some means of avoiding the prevailing treatment of juvenile offenders in the federal courts with the ponderous machinery of criminal prosecution. Mr. Alfred Bettman of Cincinnati, in reporting to the National Commission (Report No. 4) the results of his study and analysis of twenty or more "surveys," or reports, on the administration of criminal justice in different States of the American Union, expresses the opinion that, "the juvenile offender is the heart of the problem and the instrumentalities devised by society for dealing with him the most important". That the percentage of juvenile to adult offenders is increasing, is indicated by the official reports of the United States government, which show that, whereas in 1923 about 15 per cent of all federal prisoners were under 20 years of age and in 1928 about 28 per cent between the ages of 20 and 24, the percentage of those under 20 had risen in the period 1924 to 1928 to 23 per cent and those between 21 and 24 had fallen to 22 per cent.* Lewis E. Lawes, the famous Warden of Sing Sing Prison, emphasizes the youth of a large proportion of the criminals under his care. He gives some facts which throw a challenging light on the problem. He says:

* U. S. Dep. Com. Rep. Prisoners in State and Fed. Prisons.

The records of Sing Sing show that ninety-seven per cent. of our prisoners were never associated with any boys' club, or any of the other juvenile associations where boys learn how to spend their leisure in wholesome recreation. Seventy-five per cent. of our prisoners are not skilled or learned in the mechanics or trades. Ninety-nine per cent. were not actively interested in church organisations. Seventy-five per cent. came to us with previous institutional experiences. That is true of first as well as fourth offenders. . . . Persons between the ages of fifteen to thirty constitute fifty per cent. of the population of the United States, yet they contribute seventy-three per cent. of our criminals. The problem is, therefore, with the young.*

In another book Mr. Lawes says that it is his firm conviction " that lack of respect for the law and all that pertains to its functioning—legislators, police, judges—explains most of the lawlessness of to-day".†

Mr. Lawes, in common with many other students of crime, expresses the conviction that much of our crime can be prevented.‡ He quotes with hearty approval what Col. Arthur Woods once said, while Police Commissioner of New York.

The preventive policeman is the policeman of the future. Police forces must try to keep crime from claiming its victims, as boards of health try to keep plague and pestilence away.§

Messrs. Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay of the Chicago Research Fund, made a study and report to the National Commission on the Social factors in Juvenile Delinquency.‖ An understanding of the behaviour of the child, they report,

necessitates a knowledge of the world in which he lives. Children always live and act in association with other persons. They live as members of groups, coparticipants in the activities of a dynamic social world ; it is artificial to view them and their behaviour apart from the various social groups of which they are members.¶

The report of Messrs. Shaw and McKay emphasizes the influence of bad environment upon the character of boys and girls. It serves to corroborate the accuracy of Warden Lawes's observations and to strengthen the conclusion that the most urgent problem for our communities is that of the bringing up of our children—removing them from environments that lead to revolt against authority and develop criminal instincts, and substituting practical scope for the expression of healthy physical activity, and wholesome education leading to a realization of the supreme importance in a self-governing community of respect for and obedience to law.

I am not sufficiently familiar with the reports of conditions in other countries to state the facts as they there exist, but the im-

* *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing*, by Lewis E. Lawes p. 356. [A review of this volume by Mr. G. D. H. Cole will appear in an early issue of THE ARYAN PATH.–EDS.]

† *Life and Death in Sing Sing*—Lewis E. Lawes, p. 246.

‡ Op. cit. p. 244.

§ Op. cit. p. 245.

‖ Report No. 13, Natl. Com. on Law Obs. & Enf. Vol II.

¶ Op. cit. p. 3.

pression I derive from general reading is that conditions similar to those above described prevail in many other lands than ours. This is hardly to be wondered at. Everywhere the hold of the authority that used to control youth has been loosened. Parental authority is not as unquestioningly respected as it used to be. The discipline of schools is relaxed. The Church no longer commands obedience to the precepts of the higher law. Organized society everywhere finds itself charged with the responsibility of parent, pastor and instructor of youth. One reads constantly of revolt against authority in every land—generally led by youth, as is natural, for youth is the age of protest and revolution. The State is a poor substitute for the family. No institution of State can worthily fill the place of a good father, nor of a worthy pastor. The State too often functions through bureaus and officials selected with but little regard for fitness. Still, much can be done by the State. Much is yet but imperfectly provided. In the present stage of our social existence the State must at least attempt more than ever before. To begin with, adequate playgrounds should be provided by the public authorities, where healthy opportunity may be furnished to work off youthful spirits. Organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts should be encouraged and State aid furnished to supplement private donations whenever necessary to secure adequate scope for the effective organization and functioning of these important agencies for the instruction of youth in wholesome out-of-door recreation and in a knowledge of nature. Without such organizations, city boys and girls grow up with very little to fill their minds and awaken their interests beyond the sordid influences of the crowded conditions amid which they live.

All games, all forms of sport, to be successfully played, must be conducted according to rule. Boys and girls quickly understand and adapt themselves to this fact, and will promptly penalize those who do not observe "the rules of the game". It should be easy to use this fact as a means of convincing them that in life, as in sport, the rules must be observed. Children should be shown that rules of law which they consider unfair to them are necessary for the welfare of all, and that the game of life, especially in crowded communities, requires that the rules be observed in order that they, as well as others, may live and enjoy a reasonable scope for the development of their abilities.

Schoolhouses and appurtenant grounds should be open at all times when not required by the regular courses of instruction, as playgrounds or clubhouses for the young. We spend enormous amounts of money, taken from the taxpayers every year, to build elaborate and extensive schoolhouses, in many cases surrounded with ample grounds. Nothing is more remarkable in any of our

American communities than the number of these palatial buildings which have been erected for school purposes in all parts of the United States during recent years. The cost of these buildings has greatly swelled the amount of public expenditure made under the head of "education". So determined has been our people to secure education for all, that few legislators or administrative officers have had the courage to analyse the "educational" budget, or to question the cost, necessity, or the proper economy in the erection of the educational palaces that have been built during the period of prosperity. With the present depression, however, has come a check in these often unnecessary and unduly extravagant spendings. It is a good time to consider the maximum use to which these costly buildings and ample grounds can be put. "Book instruction" for the children is not enough. Character building should be the objective of education. Learning to read and write and the elements of mathematics and science may be assumed as essential. Instruction in nature in her infinite expressions opens the way to wholesome interests. Physical instruction, with facilities for athletic development, is equally important. The Greek ideal of the harmonious development of mind and body should be the guiding principle of every school. Education is the process of forming habits of mind and body. As a general rule, it is only when there is no scope for the development of good habits that children fall into bad habits and swell the ranks of the criminals.

The theory underlying the establishment of reformatories is sound, but in general the State has lamentably failed to carry out the theory. As a result, *our reformatories too often have become breeding places of crime.* No system of dealing with offenders will work automatically. The increase in the number of young criminals is forcing this fact upon public attention.

Until recently, we in America have allowed our possession of a vast continent of great natural wealth to blind us to the need of economy in any direction. Thirty years ago, President Roosevelt began to preach the gospel of conservation of our natural resources, which, through the reckless waste of the past, had been so exhausted as to challenge attention and demand protection. Only more recently has public attention been directed to the conservation of something infinitely more valuable to the State than our trees, our mineral deposits, or our farms; that is, the lives and the character of our children. To deal effectively with the problems of crime, we must strike at its source. The neglected child is the cell whence springs the disease of crime. Perhaps if the State awakens to the importance of the conservation of child life and character, it may reflect back to the parents, and revive in them a new sense of their privileges and

responsibility for the lives they have brought into the world. To the extent that parents and the State unite in aiding the child to form good habits and develop a sense of the value of upright living, will the problem of crime be successfully controlled. Preventive measures to save children from committing themselves to criminal careers are as important as the prevention of disease. We are beginning to realize this. The Bureau of Crime Prevention, established a year or so ago in the Police Department of the City of New York, is a step in this direction. The growth and number of our great cities, which have drawn to themselves over one-half of our national population, has intensified our crime problem. The natural activities and the adventurous spirit of youth must have some innocent means of expression, or they will find unlawful outlets. Our governments must face this fact. Means of wholesome expression must supplant repression for the large majority, if we would check the increase of crime and conserve our youth for healthful and constructive lives.

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM

We, Theosophists, say that your vaunted progress and civilization are no better than a host of will-o'-the-wisps, flickering over a marsh which exhales a poisonous and deadly miasma. This, because we see selfishness, crime, immorality, and all the evils imaginable, pouncing upon unfortunate mankind from this Pandora's box which you call an age of progress, and increasing *pari passu* with the growth of your material civilization. . . . . The chief point is, to uproot that most fertile source of all crime and immorality—the belief that it is possible for them to escape the consequences of their own actions. Once teach them that greatest of all laws, *Karma* and *Re-incarnation*, and besides feeling in themselves the true dignity of human nature, they will turn from evil and eschew it as they would a physical danger. . . . . Justice consists in doing no injury to any living being; but justice commands us also never to allow injury to be done to the many, or even to one innocent person, by allowing the guilty one to go unchecked.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Key to Theosophy* (*Ind. Ed.*), pp. 207, 208, 210

SOME ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

[In the last two issues of THE ARYAN PATH we published a narrative of some supernormal experiences and their rationale by Mr. C. E. M. Joad. This month we print some of the experiences of **Mrs. Champion de Crespigny**, widely known both as an English novelist of distinction and as a leader in British Spiritualist circles. She has devoted for many years much of her time to the investigation of psychic phenomena, and given freely of her energy to the cause which she has so much at heart. We append an extract from H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, which bears on the case that Mrs. Champion de Crespigny narrates.—EDS.]

Although interested from early youth in problems connected with the supernormal and speculations about the after-life, I was inclined to look upon "mediums" with considerable doubt, and when a certain amount of persuasion brought me to the point of visiting one, I was very much on the watch for possible trickery, and more especially for anything that a little common sense or logic could not explain on normal lines. There had been so much talk of telepathy and of that over-worked and over-rated beast of burden, the subconscious mind, that I felt it possible, even if the medium did not wilfully deceive, the tortuous paths of human psychology might lead me into a hopeless morass.

So it was in a spirit of caution I first embarked on practical investigation of the truth of possible communication with the "great majority," and found myself convinced of something it was neither reasonable nor possible to set on one side as negligible.

In recording the following examples, I have chosen them as verifiable, or where there were witnesses who can bear testimony to the truth of them—not dependent on my word alone for their accuracy. The first is an account of my first experience with a medium of any sort, with results so remarkable that my interest was immediately aroused.

The medium was of the kind known as "direct-voice"—Mrs. Etta Wriedt of Detroit. I had been introduced to her on a Saturday and "sat" with her for the first time on the following Monday, at her house at Wimbledon. No one was in the room except the medium and myself. There was no furniture to speak of beyond the chairs upon which we sat. It was in complete darkness.

A voice professing to be a brother-in-law was heard almost at once by Mrs. Wriedt and myself. He established his identity in the same way he would have done it on a telephone by referring to incidents in our past lives, calling my husband by a name no one else in the family had used, and certainly unknown to the medium. Finally, he said my husband was waiting to speak and the voice then faded into silence.

A voice claiming to be that of my husband followed and of this interview I will speak briefly. Part of it was very remarkable and quite inexplicable through ordinary experience. But a reference was made—I thought—to flowers placed on his grave, which was incorrect, and I went away unconvinced and uncertain whether in spite of some remarkable evidence I should follow it up.

The following day I received a visit from an acquaintance whom at that time I knew very slightly, and who knew nothing of my past life; he had never met my husband. He told me that during a sitting he had had with a medium that morning a voice had spoken claiming to be that of my husband. The invisible communicator stated that his wife had been there the previous day, had misunderstood something he had said and had gone away with the impression that it had not been he who had spoken. He appeared to be very distressed and begged the sitter to take a message from him to me. The message was to the effect that I had been mistaken when I thought he had referred to his grave—that he had no grave, the ashes had been scattered, (a fact that neither medium nor messenger could conceivably have known), and he then made a definite reference to a ship in which he had served when in the Navy, in a form that *no one* could have sent me except my husband, nor would anyone else have known just what it meant. The bearer repeated it carefully from notes made at the time, without any understanding of its meaning, with a slight mistake in the spelling of the ship's name. My husband had left the Navy thirty or more years before his death, and to have gleaned the information the medium would have had to search in ancient Navy Lists not easily available, and even then would have had no guide as to which ship to select as of special interest.

In this experience all the usual objections are eliminated; thought reading or telepathy, the subconscious mind and ventriloquism. The message was given to a third person who had no idea to what it referred or even if there were any sense in it.

Since then I have had innumerable proofs of another world through my own experience and that of others. One of the most outstanding, although of a different nature, was the following.

Some years ago I was invited to a gathering of ten or twelve persons where a so-called "fire-medium" was to give a demonstration of her powers,—a form of mediumship unknown in this country since the days of D. D. Home. We assembled in an empty house in St. John's Wood where we formed a semicircle opposite a red-hot fire of coal and coke. A representative from a well-known daily paper was present among the sitters and was invited to go down into the cellar and select a log at random from a stack of wood.

This he did; the log was laid on the fire and turned about until red-hot all through.

The medium then went into trance and was controlled—presumably—by a Persian, an ancient fire-worshipper. He talked excitedly in what sounded like a foreign tongue, the only word I could catch resembling "Maseta," but which I have since learnt might have been intended for the name of the Fire-god "Mazda". The medium after a few moments of this walked to the fire and with her bare hands removed the log, red-hot all through. She first approached the newspaper correspondent, offering to him the burning log in her hand, but when at a distance of some inches from him we heard his hair singeing with the heat of it—he mentioned this in his published report the following morning—he shrank away.

She then, for some reason, approached me. I had learnt from a student of occultism of a law presumed to be super-physical, whereby it was asserted that through some method of compressing the ether a sort of sheath protecting objects from certain contacts could be formed. That the entire Cosmos is under the law of cause and effect, operating in various ways and conditions, would I presume be generally accepted nowadays, and that if a physical law was seen to be in suspension, some influence outside the knowledge of physical scientists must be superimposed.

So far as we understand it, human flesh in direct contact with red-hot matter must be burned, though the medium be in trance, asleep or dead. As that law was evidently in abeyance it was reasonable to suppose the super-physical to be in operation, and I argued that as it was obviously not burning the medium's hand it would not burn mine—and held it out. She placed the red-hot log upon it, made the round of the Circle, returned and removed it. There was not so much as a red mark on my hand when she took it off. The man next to me remarked that had it been in normal conditions I should never have been able to use my hand again.

It must be understood that I myself *did nothing*. I do not know how to put the law into operation. I did nothing beyond furnishing the passive conditions necessary for the demonstration. The newspaper correspondent showed *fear*, which neutralised the results of the operator, and his hair was singed. The faith which preserved me from fear was derived from my previous knowledge of a law which I saw operating before me. I was therefore able to offer the entirely passive conditions necessary. My attitude was negative. Fear is said to discharge disturbing vibrations into the aura, which destroy—break up—the protective etheric sheath. It will be remembered there were districts in Palestine where Christ was unable to perform His "miracles" owing to their want of faith.

But no explanation can be more than speculative. I can only record the facts. I have the newspaper report that came out the following day and the signed statement of some of those present.

ROSE CH. DE CRESPIGNY

Camerarius, in his *Horæ Subscecivæ*, narrates that once upon a time there existed a great rivalry of "miracles" between the Austin Friars and the Jesuits. A disputation having taken place between the father-general of the Austin Friars, who was very learned, and the general of the Jesuits, who was very *unlearned*, but full of *magical* knowledge, the latter proposed to settle the question by trying their subordinates, and finding out which of them would be the readiest to obey his superiors. Thereupon, turning to one of his Jesuits, he said: "Brother Mark, our companions are cold; I command you, in virtue of the holy obedience you have sworn to me, to bring here instantly out of the kitchen fire, and in your hands, some burning coals, that they may warm themselves over your hands." Father Mark instantly obeyed, and brought in both his hands a supply of red, burning coals, and held them till the company present had all warmed themselves, after which he took them back to the kitchen hearth. The general of the Austin Friars found himself crestfallen, for none of his subordinates would obey him so far as that. The triumph of the Jesuits was thus accomplished.

If the above is looked upon as an anecdote unworthy of credence, we will inquire of the reader what we must think of some modern "mediums," who perform the same while *entranced*. The testimony of several highly respectable and trustworthy witnesses, such as Lord Adair and Mr. S. C. Hall, is unimpeachable. "Spirits," the spiritualists will argue. Perhaps so, in the case of American and English *fire-proof* mediums; but not so in Thibet and India. In the West a "sensitive" has to be entranced before being rendered invulnerable by the presiding "guides," and we defy any "medium," in his or her normal physical state to bury the arms to the elbows in glowing coals. But in the East, whether the performer be a holy lama or a mercenary sorcerer (the latter class being generally termed "jugglers") he needs no preparation or abnormal state to be able to handle fire, red-hot pieces of iron, or melted lead. We have seen in Southern India these "jugglers" keep their hands in a furnace of burning coals until the latter were reduced to cinders. During the religious ceremony of Siva-Rātri, or the vigil-night of Siva, when the people spend whole nights in watching and praying, some of the Sivaites called in a Tamil juggler, who produced the most wonderful phenomena by simply summoning to his help a spirit whom they call *Kutti-Sâttan*—the little *demon*. But, far from allowing people to think he was *guided* or "controlled" by this gnome—for it was a gnome, if it was anything—the man, while crouching over his fiery pit, proudly rebuked a Catholic missionary, who took his opportunity to inform the bystanders that the miserable sinner "had sold himself to Satan". Without removing his hands and arms from the burning coals within which he was coolly refreshing them, the Tamil only turned his head and gave one arrogant look at the flushed missionary. "My father and my father's father," he said, "had this 'little one' at their command. For two centuries the Kutti is a faithful servant in our home, and now, sir, you would make people believe that *he* is my master! But they know better." After this, he quietly withdrew his hands from the fire, and proceeded with other performances.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, pp. 445-446

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION IN CHINA

[**J. W. T. Mason** who has been travelling in China and Japan sends us the following.—EDS.]

A few years ago, a grave scandal was caused in the political and intellectual circles of China by Professor Hu Shih, head of the department of philosophy and literature at the National University, Peiping, who declared: "Knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy." That seemingly innocent and obvious aphorism gravely compromised Hu Shih and caused suspicion to be directed against him as a possible counter-revolutionist. Only lately has he re-established himself. Hu Shih is the intellectual leader of China, just past forty years of age. It was he who gave the successful impetus to the Chinese movement to use the common language of the people for literary writing.

How did it happen that Hu Shih got into serious difficulties with the ruling powers of China by proclaiming the platitude that "knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy"? To understand is to know something about the mystery of China's attitude toward life. Knowledge and action have always puzzled the Chinese mind. How to reconcile them has been a never ending problem in Chinese philosophy. The Chinese mentality is narrow in the realm of pure thought; and what philosophy exists in China is based on practical considerations. Knowledge, acquired for itself, has had in China the utilitarian value of permitting scholars to pass examinations for government positions and secure possession of the perquisites.

For two thousand years, the philosophic—and practical—dictum that "knowledge is easy; but action is difficult," prevailed in China. This saying was attributed originally to the Chinese classics, dating far back before the Christian era. Hu Shih told me, however, that it is an interpollation, probably inserted about the beginning of the Christian era—doubtless for the purpose of giving full authority to the phrase. Knowledge being considered easy and action difficult, the Chinese sense of the practical caused the general culture of the nation to take the easy way and turn from the difficult way of life. Knowledge, therefore, as an end in itself became the dominant creed, and action was neglected. So, the system of examinations as the test of efficiency controlled the appointments of State officials, and ability in terms of action was regarded as secondary.

When Sun Yat Sen started his revolution which resulted in the establishment of the Chinese republic, he reversed the old saying. He declared: "Knowledge is difficult; but action is easy." He meant by that a very practical thing for a revolutionary leader. He meant that it is difficult for

revolutionary leaders to gain the necessary knowledge to carry the revolution to success; but it is easy for the people to act in ways the leaders direct. Therefore, the people must do what the leaders tell them to do.

Hu Shih, talking to me about Sun Yat Sen's reversal of the ancient creed, said that in some respects it is true. For instance, it is difficult for an engineer to acquire the knowledge necessary to plan a New York skyscraper; but it is easy for the workmen to follow the engineer's directions in building the structure. However, Hu Shih's mind, developed in western schools of thought, began to ponder on this problem more deeply. He found this dilemma: if action is easy and knowledge is difficult, why try to acquire knowledge? Why not take the easy way and concern oneself only with action? Why get knowledge as a preliminary to action, if action is not difficult?

So he wrote a pamphlet, bearing the title: "Knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy"—and consternation followed. The philosopher was charged with trying to overthrow the fundamentals of the republic and with seeking to cast reflections on the reputation of Sun Yat Sen. He had committed an offence almost as grave as a medieval philosopher in Europe might have done by challenging a saying of Christ. For Sun Yat Sen is the modern god of China. He occupies a posthumous position corresponding to that of Lenin in Russia. His portraits are in all public buildings and the leaders of the republic base their actions on his pronouncements.

Furthermore, it is obviously advantageous for the war lords who rule China by personal fiats, to hold fast to the principle that the people should do as they are told. Hu Shih, pointing out that both knowledge and action are difficult, seemed to be giving the people of China dangerous thoughts, and the antagonism directed against him made his position precarious. He is still regarded suspiciously by the Chinese leaders, but during the past year, since the Chinese government lost Manchuria, the Nationalist heads have been on the defensive, and freedom of expression is not suppressed as it formerly was. Hu Shih, therefore, is gaining the victory, and can say what he pleases without personal danger.

That does not mean, however, that China is now turning to action. Rather, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that acceptance of the Hu Shih principle means neglect of both knowledge and action by China. For, since China has always turned from the difficult way and has sought the easy way, any philosophy that "knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy" points to intellectual and material passivity as the consequence. Indeed, that seems to be the existing trend in China. Whenever attempts are made to stimulate interest in creative action among the Chinese, there is little response.

Wang Yang-ming, one of the very few Chinese interested in action, tried to turn his countrymen towards practical ways of progress, in the sixteenth century, but the fate that overtook his doctrine is characteristic of China's persistent rejection of any philosophy of activism. Wang Yang-ming, soldier, statesman and Confucian scholar, declared that "knowledge and action are the same". He attacked the dominant Shu-shi Confucian school which taught that, before engaging in action, it is necessary to know all about the course to be followed. Such an attitude towards life, however, leads to passivity, for we cannot know the course of action in advance, since creative activity makes its own course as it proceeds. Wang Yang-ming taught that knowledge resides within our inner selves and we should go ahead and act, not waiting to bring our knowledge to the surface. As we act, our knowledge takes the form of action and so both are the same.

For a while the Wang Yang-ming principle was in the ascendant, but soon the Chinese found a debased interpretation of the doctrine to substantiate the national repugnance to action. It was concluded that since knowledge resides in our inner selves, there is no necessity for study; all one needs to do is to trust to the inner self for doing things. Action under such an interpretation becomes scattered and ineffective, and so both knowledge and action tended to decline. The right interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy is that we must bring the inner knowledge to the surface by study and action at the same time and so increase individual competence. That was the interpretation given to Wang Yang-ming's teaching when it reached Japan in the seventeenth century. The Japanese pronunciation of Wang Yang-ming is Oyomei; and it is well known that the Oyomei philosophy, by emphasizing individual effort, played an important part in overthrowing the Shogunate and establishing constitutional government and modern progress in Japan. Such are the different results the same philosophic doctrine causes in a nation of passivity and a nation of creative action.

Unfortunately for China, Confucius did not emphasise the necessity for action. If he had done so, however, it is improbable he would ever have become the dominating force in China's social evolution. So, one may say, one reason for the hold Confucianism has always had on the Chinese mind is that Confucius showed no persistent interest in teaching the power of creative utilitarianism. The basis of the Confucian code is morality; but morality as a kind of static relationship among individuals and groups. Such, at least, is the way Confucianism has worked out in China.

The belief in morality as a kind of directing force, able of itself to produce progress, still prevails among the Chinese as a Confucian inheritance. As an example one

may take the attitude toward existing conditions of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, the former War Lord of Peiping, now living in Peiping and advocating China's reform on the basis of a return to Confucian principles. For three hours he talked to me about his ideas. Morality, he said, is the impetus behind all progress. If the people are immoral, it is because the rulers are immoral. If the rulers are immoral, the people will become immoral. The world war, he declared, was the result of immorality, and the millions of people killed during the conflict owed their deaths to lack of moral principles. I said to him that in China more people die of famine than were killed in the world war; and I added that if the Chinese were to adopt principles of material progress and learn how to co-ordinate their efforts and use modern ways of agriculture and industry the famine death rate would vanish. He replied:—

Not at all. The famines in China are sent by Heaven as punishment because the people are not moral.

He refused to agree that mankind has any capacity for creating new ways of progressive action by mental effort. Morality, according to his belief, controls everything. Progress is automatic if the nation is moral. Depression and poverty inevitably follow immoral actions. Heaven has given men knowledge of moral principles for men to follow or not. Obey the inner moral sense, Marshal Wu explained, and prosperity and happiness inevitably result.

It was useless for me to argue that moral men may be inactive. It is not the man who creates activity, but it is morality. Man need not concern himself with developing effort and energy. If he follows the moral way, sufficient activity will come forth. That was Marshal Wu's undeviating argument; and he presented me with a booklet entitled, "The Essentials of New Salvation Religion" in which the principles of morality are defined as "kindness, righteousness, ceremony, wisdom and faith".

No objection can be found to that definition, unless a non-Confucian objects to the inclusion of "ceremony". But, progressive action includes in addition development of technical skill and the expansion of the creative impetus through effort. One may be kind, righteous, ceremonial, wise and faithful and yet lack the impulse to action. Wisdom, in the Chinese sense, as the lives of so many sages testify, does not serve as a spur to action any more than do the other Chinese tenets of morality.

What one sees in the Chinese doctrine of moral principles is rather an escape from the pain and effort that progressive action entails. The responsibility for progress is put on morality instead of on the individual. Knowledge of moral teachings gives knowledge of the way of action by this doctrine, if morality is actually practised. As a matter of common human experience, this is not so. Creative action, plus morality, gives a more advantage-

ous result than if morality were absent. But, many men of intense activity, who have been benefactors of their nations, have not had high standards of morality. To ignore the living, what of Napoleon, who consolidated France after the Revolution and blazed the way for modern democracy on the continent of Europe? Or Rousseau; or Nelson; or a host of others? It is tempting to say that when life has taken a step forward in progress morality comes after and consolidates what has been done, revising it, so to speak.

But, it is not advantageous to progress to teach that morality of itself will impel a nation to develop activity. Confucianism has failed to carry China forward under modern conditions perhaps for this reason. The creative spirit of progress is the outcome of the association of knowledge and action; and until China understands the full meaning of this principle, which Hu Shih is beginning to teach in its primary phase, China must continue to flounder in a morass of misinterpretations of Life.

The new state of Manchukuo has as its Prime Minister a political leader who realises how essential it is to reform Confucianism for China's benefit. He is Cheng Hsiao-hsu, the leading classical poet of China, a foremost calligraphist and Confucian scholar as well as a former judge and military commander. He refused to join the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat Sen and declined high office under the republic, leading a retired life for the past twenty years, until he was called to head the new Manchukuo government. He was one of the tutors of the ex-Emperor of China, Pu-yi, now the Regent of Manchukuo, who by a twist of fate occupies the ruler's seat in Manchuria from where his Manchu ancestors emerged to conquer China, in the seventeenth century.

Cheng Hsiao-hsu, talking to me in Changchun, the capital of Manchukuo, told me that his desire is to start in Manchukuo a neo-Confucian movement, uniting the moral principles of Confucius with modern, scientific progress. He expressed admiration for the teaching of Wang Yang-ming, describing him as the creator of a philosophy of Confucianism for the people, while the Shu-shi school is a philosophy of intellectualism. Cheng Hsiao-hsu desires to co-ordinate knowledge and action, teaching the people to learn how to do things for themselves through their own initiative. If such an outcome results from the new spirit prevailing in Manchukuo, he believes the influence on China will be inevitable and will result in a Chinese renaissance. So may it be.

J. W. T. MASON

IS BUDDHISM A RELIGION?

[**Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids** carries on the examination of the concept of Religion which her illustrious late husband started in 1918.—EDS.]

The question is sometimes raised, whether a given cult, ancient, world-wide and still living, can rightly be called a religion. Can it be so called, when about one tenet or another, which most people would hold to be fundamental in any religion worthy of the name, it appears to teach nothing definite? Or when it even appears to teach rejection of one or more of them. The question was raised in 1918 before the British Academy by Rhys Davids—it was the last piece of critical work he did. He asked it concerning certain great Asian cults, especially of course concerning Buddhism. He tested these by applying to them five features, which Max Müller had decided might fairly be called "the broad foundations on which all religions are built up," namely, "the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life." He judged, having tested, that not one of those Asian cults had any one of these five. "Religions," he adds, "are constantly changing." The term 'religion' in popular usage has also to change "to cover these variations". And he suggests that a word so elastic as to result in much self-contradiction should be superseded.

Now the word religion is a term much younger than are most of the great cults to which it is applied. It would be difficult to find in any of them a word fairly synonymous with religion. And as to that, it is only we of to-day who, in coming to generalize about religion, feel the need of a general term. But we may find approximations to such a general term. Take this: In the 25th Suttanta of the Pali Dīgha Collection* we find, as usual, an ingenious, even eloquent, discourse built up around what is perhaps a very old *mantra*. This is made to take the form of a test question, namely: "What is this —— of the Blessed One in which he trains his disciples, and in which they, trained and having found comfort, confess as 'will is the beginning of the God-life'?"† Now where I have left a blank, we might reasonably put 'religion,' or at least 'religious teaching'. Actually the word is *dhammo*. This, meaning for India the 'ought-in-things,' the what should be, had come, in Buddhistic Scriptures, to be externalized as a body-of-teaching about what should be in man's life. And if it be conceded, that 'religion' would be no inapt

* *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, pp. 36 ff.

† *Ajjhāsayaṃ ādi-brahmacariyaṃ*. *Ajjhāsayaṃ* is no stronger a word than inclination. There was no good word for 'will'.

rendering here for *dhammo*, we have lit on yet a sixth foundation of what may be so called, and one not rejected by Buddhism.

Are we sure then, that in Max Müller's 'five' we have got deep enough to say: here is religion's true basis? As to that, he lived over a score more of years after putting these forward in his *Lectures on the Science of Religion* (1873, p. 287), and they may very well not have been his last word on the subject. At the same time not one of the five can we afford to waive aside. Can we say Rhys Davids was right in saying that, *e.g.*, Buddhism has not one of those five? But Max Müller was not happy in the way he worded the five. He might have expressed them in such terms that, without sacrificing a single vital truth, he could rightly have shown Buddhism as not to be excluded from his definition of religion. Let me try to show in detail what I mean.

Consider the second of the five fundamentals: acknowledgment of sin. The word 'sin,' a Teutonic, an Anglo-Saxon word, has long been associated with a Hebrew equivalent parallel to the transgressing or the defaulting in respect of a power greater than the individual man, and looked upon as external, whether the power be a code, a community or a higher being or beings. And the making good is in Hebrew bound up with confession, with offerings, which may count both as a fine and as a profession of contrite loyalty. In its verbal form, sin is none of these things; it is connected, I read, with the verb 'to be' and means identification of the sinner as being such: "Thou art the man!" "The guilty man," quotes Skeat, "is he who it was." We see the word lingering, *e.g.*, in the German *sind*, 'are'. The guilty man acknowledges: "It is I." Now in some cults it is not easy to equate the judicial force in the derived meaning of 'sin'. In Buddhism, transgression may be against the fellow-man, against the moral code, against the monastic rule; but not, *e.g.*, in the tribunal after death, so strangely passed over by modern Buddhists, is he judged as sinning against a Deity as externally conceived. On the other hand, he is often depicted as aware of, and as acknowledging unworthy conduct in thought, word, deed. If then we word this fundamental *in terms of the man*, we see that it is not only a feature in Buddhism, but as a fact a very prominent feature. We see also, that it is not only awareness and confession that figures; there is more: the man or self is confronted by a Self, witness of his conduct, making him aware of ill-doing. The phrase: "Does the self accuse the self?", the lines

> *. . . thou scorn'st the noble self,*
> *Thinking to hide the evil self in thee*
> *From self who witnessed it,**

are no mere poetic dramatizing for those who see in original Buddhism as a new shoot in its parent

* *Gradual Sayings*, I, pp. xvii, 132.

stem, Indian religion.

To strengthen this fundamental No. 2, I would reword it as "belief in every man that he is not habitually what he may be, can, should, ought to, be." In a word, recognition of what we now call 'conscience': "this Deity within my bosom".* But since this term is only of the West, I would exclude it with 'sin' from the definition.

The third fundamental, 'habit of prayer' has also its deeper wording. A superficial acquaintance with the Pali scriptures and Commentaries may seem to justify here the exclusion of Buddhism. But if we put aside the exegesis of later values, if we keep in view that the founders of Buddhism were attacking, not the heart of Indian religion, but its overdone externals, if we never forget, that with Deity in that 'heart' become immanent, prayer had become aspiration and righteous conduct, rather than any form of supplication, we hesitate. *The word itself* is never long absent from Sutta pages: the word *brahma*. This underwent cheapening in the hands of exegesists, and under the influence of monasticism. But for ancient Indian religion it was of supreme import. "Starting as 'prayer,' sacred formula, religious act, it becomes the symbol of holy thought and utterance, the outpouring of man in his highest longings. It is the best wish of a spiritually minded people that becomes for a while a personal god, and at last the divine essence of the universe."† We have no word of like power wherewith to equate *brahma, brahman*, but this we should do: we should keep in view what the word meant for religion in Gotama's day, and how deep was its significance, in his mandate to teach *brahma-chariya* to all men. Where Divinity has become accepted as immanent; where, as in original Buddhism, That was conceived, not as a Being, but as a Becoming, to be developed by and in the man through his way of living, prayer tends to be yearning and effort to become. The Jew could call the one a 'panting'; the Christian could speak of the other as *laborare*. In the word *bhāvanā*, 'making become,' the Buddhist has a no less fine contribution.

In the fourth, a more fundamental wording is "desire to make vicarious surrender of the self in what the self has, and direct surrender of what the self is". The "Take me! Use me!" of aspiration towards a Highest, Best, Most, is as truly to be called sacrifice (literally a making holy), as is any less direct offering. Outward rite of surrender is more accidental than essential. And here Buddhism proves no defaulter:—

I lay no wood, brahman, for
fires on altars;
Within the self burneth the
fire I kindle.
Ever my fire burns; ever tense
and ardent,

* Shakespeare, *The Tempest*.

† Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, p. 273.

*I worthily live the life that is Brahma.**

So is the Founder shown speaking. Here have we an offering noble in word, made nobler by the long life he led. For me such a fundamental were best worded as Man willing to place himself in the Highest Will.

I come to No. 5, the hope of a future life. Here it is only the word 'hope' that could sanction the exclusion of this feature from Buddhism. Had No. 5 been called 'belief in survival' my husband would have withdrawn to that extent his claim. But even so, it is only for the monastic values emphasized in the Piṭakas, that hope ceased to be true. It was only for the *śramaṇa* who had turned from life in any, even a happier world, that 'becoming,' that is, externally considered, rebirth, appeared undesirable. I cannot see this as true for the first teachers. No phase of Indian religion did more to strengthen and make relatively real a belief in man's life as a matter not of earth only, but of worlds than did original Buddhism. The winning by a worthy life a happy survival in a better world, as one further stage in 'becoming,' was held out from the first (so far as we can know it) down to the message of Asoka's Edicts as a sure and desirable result. The original teaching seems to have seen the man as ever in a state of change, and in this of effort to become. And so long as the materialistic feature of decay, as succeeding to becoming, is held as not applying to the spiritual man, a teaching of a vast hope will necessarily be integral with it. That the material feature did get hold of Indian religion I have shown recently in these pages.

Finally, what of the first fundamental, "belief in a divine power"?

Here once more the wording is unfortunate. The idea of 'power' is important, but it is made to bear too heavy a mission. This and that cult may single out this and that attribute in manhood carried to an infinitely high value, and see in it Divinity. Other cults may differ. But there is one aspect of Divinity which is fundamental, in that it is a corollary from the other four. These four when combined amount to a concept of Man as seeking after and striving towards a More than he knows himself habitually to be:—awareness of shortcoming, aspiration after that More than he yet actually (though not potentially) is, will to identify himself with, to co-operate with that More-in-will, and the belief that, as inherently, not matter, but spirit, he does not perish in process of becoming a More, but goes on to become that More elsewhere or elsewise.

But this More is irrational without a possible culmination in a Most. The living ever 'higher' bears the implication of a life, a being, yea, a becoming that is Highest. The point of consummation is quite beyond the con-

* *Kindred Sayings*, I. p. 212.

ception of the man of earth, and probably for many a stage beyond earth. But he knows he is seeking, is becoming ; he believes in a consummation in or with a Most, a Best, a Highest. Here, I believe, is a fundamental feature that neither Buddhism nor any other cult would commit suicide by rejecting.

So long then as we take accidents and partial aspects in religions, we may make out a case for rejecting from ' religion ' this or that cult. And this is true also if we seek to equate particular terms from one cult with those in others. But if we take our very man—not body or mind, but the user of these—our man-in-man, and get down to what is bed-rock in his life-quest, we may find that what is really fundamental in that quest is true of every world-religion, and calls for the exclusion from ' religion ' of none. For religion reveals to us the man seeking to become, as very man, a More with respect, explicit or implicit, to a Most.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS

What we desire to prove is, that underlying every ancient popular religion was the same ancient wisdom-doctrine, one and identical, professed and practised by the initiates of every country, who alone were aware of its existence and importance. To ascertain its origin, and the precise age in which it was matured, is now beyond human possibility. A single glance, however, is enough to assure one that it could not have attained the marvellous perfection in which we find it pictured to us in the relics of the various esoteric systems, except after a succession of ages. A philosophy so profound, a moral code so ennobling, and practical results so conclusive and so uniformly demonstrable is not the growth of a generation, or even a single epoch. Fact must have been piled upon fact, deduction upon deduction, science have begotten science, and myriads of the brightest human intellects have reflected upon the laws of nature, before this ancient doctrine had taken concrete shape.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 99

GOETHE'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL

[**William Harlan Hale** describes himself as "still a fledgling of twenty-two. I was born in New York, lived in London, Berlin and other belligerent capitals during the war; went to public school in Germany and private school in New York; graduated from Yale University, and am now landed at a desk on Vanity Fair. I founded a radical student's publication called the 'Harkness Hoot' at Yale and later wrote a book called *Challenge to Defeat*"— which was reviewed by Mr. G. D. H. Cole in our January number.—EDS.]

The intellectual world in 1932 gathered to celebrate the centennial of the death of one of the greatest figures of western culture. In reconsidering Goethe to-day, what we observe most forcibly about him is the singular universality of his mind; and on second observation we find that he was perhaps the last man in modern history to attain to that universality. Aristotle could reach it, Leonardo certainly achieved it, and many others like Leibniz and Bacon reached toward it; but since Goethe there have been only some spuriously "universal" bookmen like H. G. Wells. Goethe could write lyrics unequalled for their utter simplicity and charm; he could compose the epic *Faust*, a drama that took him from his youthful, individualist passion to the collective philosophy of his old age; he could engage in a hundred functions of state; and beside all this he could become, through his investigations and discussions, one of the leading scientific minds of the era. He could still hold together the threads of art, science, and practical life. But the very era in which his later years moved was marked by unprecedented expansions in the field of science (chemistry, physics, biology); in the field of practical life (industrial revolution, new economics); in the field of art (movements, schools, programmes). Specialization became the necessity for anyone who sought leadership. And it is the necessity to-day. Art and life have grown further apart; the laboratory scientist is utterly removed from broader considerations (and when he returns to them, he is usually untrustworthy); the business man rarely has time for intellectual interests.

This is the basis on which we to-day admire the man Goethe: his position as the last—possibly the greatest—"universal" man.

But what we often ignore is that all this participation, this energy, this crystalline growth, was purely the extension of a sharply central spirit. It was in no sense mental opportunism, versatile changeableness. The wealth of Goethe's many-sided output is all to be explained by his particular philosophy of the soul.

The era of Goethe's maturity witnessed the growth of two philosophic trends that were to become basic to our age. In the art of

Rousseauism and of the Romantic movements came the stress on the ego—on the self against the world, the first-person as superior to all material or social things. The ego was seen by this great intellectual revolt as an unlimited thing with infinite powers of extension. The main duty of the artist was to divorce himself from worldly compromises, and build up that ego—by inspiration through Nature, through solitude and introspection. Side by side with this highly spiritual and æsthetic doctrine was growing up in immense force the rational scientific attitude—the philosophy which was to culminate in the complete materialism of Darwin. The skeptical Encyclopedists had been followed by the hard-headed theorists of the industrial revolution; English thought, cool, pragmatic, "reasonable," was coming to reign over Europe.

Thus the breach between practical life and spiritual life was broadening; and there seemed to be no solution for the individual but that he choose either one or the other. There was an apparently hopeless conflict. Either you followed the completely extraverted, mechanistic thought of a new science and society, or you followed the completely introverted, idealistic imaginings of a new poetical spirit. The totality of existence was splitting up into its parts.

The poet, in other words, was exploring his own ego—but in whose terms? In the terms of his own ego, since he had banished the terms of outside life and the world. The scientist was exploring the material world—but in whose terms? In the terms of the material world alone, since he had banished the non-material soul or ego.

Profound paradox of modern life!

Goethe's early years of manhood were lived totally under the spell of Rousseauism—or of its German counterpart, the *Sturm und Drang* movement. He was Young Werther—all sensibility, and little sense. But his genius lay simply in this: in the very heat of his strain and passion he was developing a philosophy which should make that heat and stress subservient to the needs of the entire organism: to turn the violence of emotion, in other words, away from the disrupting thing it is in *Werther* and form it into a constructive thing, broadening and deepening the spirit. So we find Goethe gradually, with increasing sureness of step, moving toward a path where each emotion, each flight away from the centre, builds into the development of that central soul.

This philosophical course is the whole reason for Goethe's existence. It is the discovery of the most proper and fruitful relation between man and world. The poet Goethe recognizes at the start that we must work from the *inside out:* that the basis of everything is the first-person, the individual, the mystical Self, with all man's separate desires and emotions. The man Goethe re-

cognizes that we can do little if we do not observe closely the world of nature and society : we can express ourselves only when we are in relation to it, we can be fruitful only if we let the outside world work upon us. Our soul, our individuality, realizes itself only as it interacts with what is outside of it. Poetry, for instance, must be related to some distinct object that is outside the self : its origin is " subjective ," its treatment should approach the " objective ".

But what we are concerned with here and to-day is the converse of this philosophy. If our soul wins a real creative meaning only as it comes into an intimate, perceiving relation with the world around us, it follows that that world (in particular, the world of nature) wins a real meaning only as it relates itself to the soul—in other words, when it is perceived by the self.

What we have here is a great refutation of the entire doctrine of scientific mechanism. The natural world, in Goethe's view, is not a cool formula that goes on, logical, complete, and purposeless, through time and space, and upon whose surface, by an accidental shuffling of chemistry, we humans have been tossed. With the sensitivity and intuition of the poet, Goethe was able to see that such a purely mechanistic explanation—perhaps just because of its dead logic and fatal simplicity—would eventually lead into sterility. It had no meaning for man.

" Those things are true," he said, " which are fruitful." That is the summation of his scientific-ethical philosophy. Now do not substitute for " fruitful ," " useful "; then you miss Goethe. By " fruitful " things he means things offering possibilities—the possibility to deepen our participation in the world, to discern the aims of the spirit, and to strive on to some personal goal.

Of course, this is " wishful " thinking. It is unscientific. But the very fact that Goethe was so apparently unscientific made him one of the great scientific minds of the day ! He helped to bring science into relation with other things—especially with man ; and thus he was not bent on discovering *facts* so much as he was on discovering *relationships*, tracing developments, and finding links between apparently separate and therefore fruitless phenomena. Thus Goethe, while an opponent of mechanical theories of evolution, actually led directly to the discovery of the Darwinian theory.

When Goethe was pursuing science, he let the full intuition of his personality play over his facts, and tried to reach a vision of the " totality " of the world-organism ; he let the humanity of his character resolve the world of matter into a cosmos of movement, purpose, of meaning, where the spirit dominated the material.

When Goethe was writing poetry, he let the cool observation, which science had taught him, play over his imaginings, and

tried to make his concepts as concrete, as three-dimensional, and as close to earth, as ever possible.

His co-ordinating intelligence was thus placed squarely between the self and the world. A convinced dualist, he saw that all creation, all being and all movement could only be the result of the mighty interaction of these polar principles. His life was the repeated attempt first to make poetry strong by adding observation (world) to imagination (self); second, to make science true by testing matter (world) upon the needs and qualities of man (self).

A hundred years later, the Goethian philosophy of soul and action is still a living force—and still an unexplored *mysterium*. The world has not been able to dispose of Goethe as a mere classic, because it still has not mastered or even understood his ideal of a humanized science and of a worldly art. Darwinism and symbolism were the answers to Goethe's vision; and Goethe today—or, let us say, the Goethian philosophy—may be the answer to the bankruptcy of Darwinism and the blind alley of symbolist art.

Profoundly mystical and intuitive in his perceptions, Goethe was at the same time the complete pagan. He believed—and in *Faust* expressed—the antithesis to the gospel of Christianity: namely his belief that the salvation of man can take place only through his experience with the present world. Christianity of course holds that experience with this world is primarily evil, and to be avoided as much as possible. Goethe was incapable of such strange belief. He felt that experience and idea cannot be divorced, if a healthy spiritual balance is to be maintained. The earth is not—as Christianity said—sinful; and the soul is not—as science said—a delusion.

Goethe's philosophy of the soul deals, as we can see, not with system but with organism; it is incomplete, and leaves everything to the temper of individualism. But with all its mystical inwardness and its vague pantheism, it has a personal force that can make it become a real social influence. It proves for us again that spiritual life must begin from within, separate, intuitive, "wishful"; that it cannot be imposed from outside, as mere logic or as dogma.

WILLIAM HARLAN HALE

DOES THE "GITA" SUPPORT ORTHODOXY?

[**G. V. Ketkar, B. A., LL. B.,** is one of the two founders of the *Gita* Dharma Mandala, started in Poona in 1924 for the study of the great text and the spread of its teachings. The first part of this interesting article appeared in our last number.—EDS.]

The word *Shâstra* is not anywhere defined in the *Gita*. The word occurs at the end of each chapter in the concluding formula which describes the *Gita* as *Yoga-Shâstra*. There it means "system of knowledge". The word occurs in the last verse of the fifteenth chapter. There too it means "system of knowledge". When however the word *Shâstra* comes with reference to *Vidhi* it means "authoritative texts". It is impossible to conceive that the *Gita* could have included the Puranas and the commentaries on the *Smritis* in the authoritative texts referred to by the word *Shâstra*. Whatever may be the texts, the extant references to *Vidhi* in the *Gita* will show that they are accepted for guidance only for the sake of determining the proper method of performing sacrifices, austerities and devotion (see xvi-17, xvii-5, and ix-23 respectively). The *Gita's* acceptance of the *Shâstras* cannot be stretched beyond that limit.

Then we come to the meaning of *Shraddhâ*. The seventeenth chapter says that the *Shraddhâ* of good people is good but that of bad people is bad. Men with the latter kind of *Shraddhâ* worship ghosts and devils. Men with the good kind of *Shraddhâ* worship the Gods. The 37th verse of the sixth chapter is worth taking into consideration in determining the meaning of *Shraddhâ*. "He whose mind is unsubdued and who has strayed away from Yoga," even he has hopes of further progress in the path if he has *Shraddhâ*. The man with *Shraddhâ* is said to be capable of acquiring knowledge (iv-39). People who worship other gods are described as doing so with a particular kind of *Shraddhâ* (vii-22). We must find a meaning of the word *Shraddhâ* which will fit all these contexts. We shall have to translate it as "sincerity," or, "earnestness". *Shraddhâ* is a general subjective quality and not the acceptance of some particular thing without reasoning. The orthodox define the term as "absolute faith in the Guru and the Vedanta". It is this definition which they often try to apply to *Shraddhâ* in the *Gita*. But there its real meaning is sincerity or earnestness. Anything done without sincerity or earnestness will be of no use, although it is done outwardly in accordance with the prescribed method. On the other hand, anything done with sincerity and earnestness will result in good, even though the traditional method be not followed. This is the real meaning of the passage at the end of the sixteenth chapter. If by *Shraddhâ* the *Gita* meant ab-

solute faith in the Guru or Shāstra, Arjuna would not have argued the whole question with the Guru, and Krishna would have told him only one thing, *viz.*, "The Shastra says that a Kshatriya should fight; you are a Kshatriya and therefore you must fight." The long discourse of the eighteenth chapter is inconsistent with the orthodox meanings of *Shraddhâ* and *Vidhi*.

Another question which may be touched on here is, how far does the *Gita* accept the fourfold division of *Varnas* and the hundredfold division of society into castes? Intermixing of castes is denoted by the word *Samkara* in the speech of Arjuna at the beginning of the *Gita* (i-43). Krishna is silent over this fear of Arjuna about caste-confusion. It is argued by the orthodox people that this silence means an approval of Arjuna's reasoning. But a contrary inference can be drawn from the fact that Krishna uses the word *Samkara* in quite a different sense (iii-24). There it means a confusion of duties and not a confusion of castes. Thereby Krishna suggests that the thing to be avoided is not so much a confusion of castes as the confusion caused by people not doing their duties.

The place given to *Varnas* in the philosophical system of the *Gita* is again limited to that aspect of the system which divides duties according to natural inclinations (xviii-47). References in the *Gita* can be found which mention the then prevailing social divisions. But these have been tolerated there and given sanction only in so far as they provide for the assigning of social duty to everybody in accordance with his natural aptitude.

In the case of devotion and worship the *Gita* does not insist on the form and the materials with which you perform it (ix-26). It enumerates several kinds of sacrifices and tolerates all of them as long as they are selfless and sincere (iv-30). When the spiritual knowledge is the same, it matters not to the *Gita* whether it is described by any method or arrangement (see chapters vii to xvii).

Every one, whatever his traditional social status, is free to practise the way of devotion and can thereby reach the highest goal (ix-32). The man with real knowledge sees the inherent sameness of all life (v-18). These references will show that the *Gita* has in every case looked to the substance and ignored the outward form. This same liberal attitude of tolerance is extended to the prevalent social system of those times and the traditional authoritative texts. It has never insisted on a particular form of doing things. To try to get the *Gita's* support for the strict orthodox view is to narrow its meaning. It will be better if the champions of orthodoxy give up that attempt and find support elsewhere. The *Gita* does not support their narrow views. It is better to leave it alone.

G. V. KETKAR

THE FLUX OF SPIRITUALITY

[**Helen Bryant's** article is founded upon the Law of Periodicity or Cycles which produces the historical phenomenon of the rise and fall of cultures and civilizations. She contends that kings and legislators build more effectively than prophets and poets—and it might be added that the former succeed in proportion as they are inspired by the genius of the latter. The Buddhist Asoka is the most memorable example. The Russian experiment is founded upon, and inspired by, the gross materialism of modern science which already is becoming a thing of the past. Any State which enslaves the individual citizen, or even subordinates his interest to its own, is bound to fail. What the world sorely needs is an Asoka, a Marcus Aurelius, an Akbar; Russia has not produced one. It is interesting to speculate if future India will produce a great statesman inspired by the ideas and labours of M. K. Gandhi.—EDS.]

It would be fascinating though difficult to make a graph of spirituality, to trace its flux through time. The great peaks would surprise us, I suspect, by rarely coinciding with the lives of great religious leaders, for great religious leaders are apt to appear in times of spiritual drouth. Far more likely is it that we should find the highest manifestations of spirituality under great governors, when men's minds turned naturally into noble channels from the mere fact of living under conditions induced by rulers who, like Yao Shun and Yu of ancient China, "believed that government should be based on the purest ethics," yet that such government should be based also upon the popular will. Under the inferior successors of these worthy emperors public morality deteriorated, so that Laotze and Confucius arose in a time of moral indifference, and were poorly successful in reforming their era. Again, it was under the dubious government of such men as Herod and Pilate that the Jews were so far fallen from their previous high-water mark of spiritual sensitiveness that they failed to recognize in Christ the greatest of their prophets, and not only misunderstood but killed the Messiah their earlier prophets had taught them to expect.

Nor are dominations by religious factions eras of undoubted spirituality, for they are too often distorted by politics, intolerance, or greed. The Mohammedans who swept through country after country on a wave of religious zeal, were also animated by lust of conquest, the Crusaders who later opposed them went forth for loot, while the Catholics who persecuted "heretics" curiously interpreted Christ's injunction that men should love one another. . .

Religions, then, and spasms of religious enthusiasm are uncertain measures of spirituality, which continually manifests itself in other forms, such as arts, philosophies, loyalties, causes. The poet moved by the mystery and beauty of earth, the philosopher (and his modern *aide*, the scientist) seeking truth, the hero giving his life

in allegiance, the enlightened man struggling as Voltaire struggled, to sweeten with reason a brutally ignorant world, are all spiritually moved, and must influence our subtle and sensitive graph.

To realise this is to assess more justly the spiritual condition of our own day. For then in our own day, in our own hemisphere, we shall find—along with the decline of spirituality both in form and essence—a new outburst, parallel perhaps to the outburst of Christianity under the Roman emperors. But let us first glance at the evidences of decline.

The easiest way to understand the decline of spirituality in the West (especially in America, the archetype of the West) is to recall the state of Greece at the end of the fifth century B.C. At that time the young Greeks, their faith in their ancient gods already weakened, were finally reft of their superstitious beliefs by Socrates, but their minds were for the most part too undeveloped to replace the loss with the sense of honour, truth and beauty that inspired their teacher. The Greeks were right in saying that Socrates was dangerous to youth. He was—because the ideas he sought to impart were too lofty for easy acceptance. Only fine gold could be shaped by his flame: it irreparably distorted dross. To-day science has enacted the rôle of Socrates. It has destroyed our superstitions, and with our superstitions our fear of a punitive god. Those able to judge and discipline themselves have been freed from much that was hampering, but weaker spirits have simply lost the schoolmaster who kept them in order.

Unfortunately, at the same time, mere physical conditions of modern life have conspired to encourage laxity of ethics. Our life in cities makes us anonymous: we cannot easily supervise each other. Science has taken away our fear of god, cities have taken away our fear of each other. When people were anchored in plain view, so to speak, in villages, they were at pains to preserve their reputations for honesty at least, whatever strange quirks they may have otherwise indulged. But the city dweller breaks his word or harms the property or happiness of his neighbour without even feeling culpable, for he can move into another city or merely another part of the same city and forget what he has done. In consequence millions of people are ceasing to do as they would be done by, are ceasing to attach any value to honesty in even its simplest forms. The Western world which leads in proving to its own critical satisfaction the extraordinary nature of the universe is debasing its ethics as it increases its knowledge. The Western world, that is, all but one country, where an amazing regeneration is apparently taking place.

In one country, Russia, a new religion, a substitute for Christianity, has been found. For Communism is a religion—a religion for which the Russians have forsaken all other gods, including

the seductive Mammon. For Communism they are sacrificing themselves with as much ardour as the early Christians—and with less hope of personal reward, for those martyrs in Roman arenas confidently expected a blissful life-after-death, while these stern Russian zealots, sacrificing individuality, ease and beauty, believe in no such thing. They are sacrificing for their children, and not even for their children, but for the children of others, the future human race.

For they have not rejected the idea of heaven. Their religion promises a Utopia, as all religions promise it, be it a bliss of Nothingness or Plenty. But, a theoretical and absolutist people, they propose to build their heaven on earth. They propose to bring it about by organizing man so that he does not exploit his fellow man. And their efforts to do this have set them ablaze with a dramatic spiritual fire. Whether, when they have struggled and endured and succeeded, they will find the end all they hoped, whether the means they use to eliminate exploitation and inequality may not possibly eliminate a vital mental and spiritual excitement, too, is interesting matter for speculation, but does not detract from the spirituality kindled by their struggle. For the moment, the following of their star is enough. Those of us who have not been to Russia have at least seen movies and pictures of those people. We have seen them filing past the tomb of Lenin, their faces movingly redeemed by fervour. We have perhaps received letters from them, letters admitting hardship, sabotage, the rigorous denial of the individual, but nevertheless alight with enthusiasm.

Perhaps their vision of Utopia is an illusion, perhaps they are a long way from establishing it, perhaps they have furnished no proof that they can ever establish it. But they are the first of the Western peoples really to reconcile modern science with morality, by making science synonymous with the welfare of the State and the welfare of the State synonymous with religion. They have done this, moreover, in a way that catches the imagination and support of the masses. To fuse morality with government is of course no new thing (the Chinese were perhaps the first to effect it, though with a different instrument, that of a benevolent and intelligent monarchy), but since Christ said "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," earthly and heavenly kingdoms have grown further and further apart. Now the Communists have reconciled them in a way that cannot be upset by man's growing knowledge of the universe, since it embraces all such knowledge.

It cannot be thus upset, but it may, it seems to me, collapse from within. The electric current of enthusiasm galvanizing Communism must one day cease—and what then? Will not the Com-

munists' Utopia then discover itself to be a laboratory Utopia, bearing only such relation to the world as a robot does to a human being? No one, of course, could deny the superiority of a sound State over corrupt one, any more than one could deny the advantages of a sound body to a sound mind. But though the ideal environment will greatly assist in developing the ideal citizen, the citizen must still work out his own salvation—the environment will not do it for him. If his leisure is too highly organised, he will become merely a well treated slave. If it is not highly organised, he must use it according to his lights, and loyalty to the State will hardly prove a sieve fine enough through which to strain the decisions that will most vitally affect his character. He must find another touchstone to which to bring his life, that is, he will be faced, as man has always been faced, with the necessity of believing some spiritual concept greater than a State, a concept that will put the State in its proper place in this vast and mysterious universe, this universe in which the individual is at once so infinitesimal and magnificent. In other words, he must find his way back to the spiritual awe and wonder that makes man truly alive, he must rediscover the eternal flame that is reflected in the mirrors of fugitive religions, mirrors replaced as constantly as they are broken, and all distorting a little as they reflect.

HELEN BRYANT

The revolution of the physical world, according to the ancient doctrine, is attended by a like revolution in the world of intellect—the spiritual evolution of the world proceeding in cycles, like the physical one. Thus we see in history a regular alternation of ebb and flow in the tide of human progress. The great kingdoms and empires of the world, after reaching the culmination of their greatness, descend again, in accordance with the same law by which they ascended; till, having reached the lowest point, humanity reasserts itself and mounts up once more, the height of its attainment being, by this law of ascending progression by cycles, somewhat higher than the point from which it had before descended. The division of the history of mankind into Golden, Silver, Copper and Iron Ages, is not a fiction. We see the same thing in the literature of peoples. An age of great inspiration and unconscious productiveness is invariably followed by an age of criticism and consciousness. The one affords material for the analyzing and critical intellect of the other.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 34

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

III.—TIME

[This article is the third of the series which **Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E.** is contributing, the former two being on " Space " and " Motion ".—EDS.]

We have shown in previous articles how close is the correspondence between Western physics to-day and the broad physical principles moulded into the framework of *The Secret Doctrine* by its distinguished authoress. There is a mistaken impression among many as to the existence of a sense of antagonism in Madame Blavatsky against the teachings of formal Science, and it is but just that this idea should be exploded very definitely and specifically. We may well, indeed, let her speak for herself:—

> However imperfect and incomplete this explanation on " Gods, Monads and Atoms," it is hoped that some students and theosophists, at least, will feel that there may be indeed a close relation between materialistic Science, and Occultism, which is the complement and missing soul of the former. I. p. 634.

There is, then, no attitude of destructive criticism towards science. Instead is a desire to infuse into the teachings and the enquiries of the Western scientist that attribute of life Mme. Blavatsky refers to as the "soul," and which, willy nilly, the cold detachment of attitude of the "man of science" so persistently disregards. The phenomenon of "time" may well afford a case in point. Formal science regards time equally with mass and distance as one of the fundamental concepts.

The first pages of a text-book rarely fail to give us, indeed, the group references to a foot-pound-second system or to a centimetre-gramme-second system as the case may be; and upon this rock basis is built a whole superstructure of derived units—of velocity, acceleration, energy, power, and so on—the whole constituting a generally accepted " theory of dimensions".

Moreover, the " space-time" continuum of the modern relativitist has really done very little to remove this attitude of materialistic fundamentalism. Yet, ironically enough, it is this very materialistic fundamentalism that must inevitably break down upon the " Maya" of the time factor. Divorce soul as much as he may wish from considerations of space and matter—though goodness knows the folly of such an attitude—the Western scientist cannot evade, if he but faces up to it, the remorseless and relentless fact that in the consideration of the phenomenon of " time " he is dealing with something that is "different". Space and matter you may measure up. There may be just so much of it. Distance may be taken this way or that way. But time has only one way—" forwards," or shall we rather say "onwards". "Backwards" carries us

not to the phenomenon of time, but to memory, as to which we will defer discussion to a later article.

Here, then, is a most interesting situation. The " pure scientist " professes to concern himself exclusively with the material in nature, and he pursues his experimental researches to degrees of laboratory refinements that demand more and more the elimination of what he calls " the personal equation " in the recording of results. The frailties of the human consciousness must be frowned upon as " confusing the issue ". Therefore the recording of results must be made more and more mechanical. Yet every record takes time, and every scientific discussion involves the time factor, and the time factor is part and parcel of the human consciousness. So we have an inconsistency that must be faced and recognized.

Mme. Blavatsky deals with the phenomenon of time very early in Book 1 of *The Secret Doctrine*, in her opening discussions on the Seven Stanzas of the "Book of Dzyan". As students of theosophy are aware, the teachings of this work, the original of which is lost, are to be found scattered through innumerable Sanskrit MSS., and are of undoubted authenticity. The Seven Stanzas constitute a Story of Creation, a Theory of Evolution, a System of Cosmogony, or a revelation of the truth regarding the seven great stages of cosmic evolution, (referred to as the Seven Creations in the Puranas, and the Seven "days" of Creation in the Bible), according to one's outlook and beliefs.

It is the Europeanised version of the First Stanza with which we are primarily concerned in this present article. In her commentary upon the second verse of this Stanza (" Time was not, for it lay asleep in the infinite bosom of duration") we read (p. 37) as follows :—

> Time is only an illusion produced by the succession of our states of consciousness as we travel through eternal duration, and it does not exist where no consciousness exists in which the illusion can be produced ; but "lies asleep".

Here at once we get to the pith of the matter—a frank recognition that, in the language of Western mathematics, time is a function of consciousness. It cannot be divorced from life. That it is indeed "Maya" is a different point that does not affect the argument ; but whether it be illusion or reality, it is a function of conscious life. But let us continue the quotation from Mme. Blavatsky a little further :

> The present is only a mathematical line which divides that part of eternal duration which we call the future, from that part which we call the past. Nothing on earth has real duration, for nothing remains without change—or the same—for the billionth part of a second ; and the sensation we have of the actuality of the division of " time " known as the present, comes from the blurring of that momentary glimpse, or succession of glimpses, of things that our senses give us, as those things pass from the region of ideals which we call the future, to the region of memories that we name the past. In the same way we experience a sensation of duration in the case of

the instantaneous electric spark, by reason of the blurred and continuing impression on the retina. The real person or thing does not consist solely of what is seen at any particular moment, but is composed of the sum of all its various and changing conditions from its appearance in the material form to its disappearance from the earth. It is these "sum-totals" that exist from eternity in the "future," and pass by degrees through matter, to exist for eternity in the "past". No one could say that a bar of metal dropped into the sea came into existence as it left the air, and ceased to exist as it entered the water, and that the bar itself consisted only of that cross-section thereof which at any given moment coincided with the mathematical plane that separates, and, at the same time, joins, the atmosphere and the ocean. Even so of persons and things, which, dropping out of the to-be into the has-been, out of the future into the past—present momentarily to our senses a cross-section, as it were, of their total selves, *as they pass through time and space (as matter) on their way from one eternity to another*: [Italics mine] and these two constitute that "duration" in which alone anything has true existence, were our senses but able to cognize it there.

We have quoted this important passage from *The Secret Doctrine in extenso* because, having regard to what has been said in the earlier part of this article, the simplicity of its language leaves no doubt as to its meaning, and its meaning is fully in accord with the teachings of modern science.

Note in particular the passage "As they pass through time and space on their way from one eternity to another"—an affirmation of the link between two fundamentals—time and space—that finds its modern mathematical expression in the space-time continuum of twentieth-century physics. But if there is a difference between the Science of the Secret Doctrine and that of Western Europe it is indeed in the addition by the former to the latter of a "soul". And that is always worth while.

IVOR B. HART

In the words of a Sage, known only to a few Occultists:—"The Present is the Child of the Past; the Future, the begotten of the Present. And yet, O present moment! Knowest thou not that thou hast no parent, nor canst thou have a child; that thou art ever begetting but thyself? Before thou hast even begun to say 'I am the progeny of the departed moment, the child of the past,' thou hast become that past itself. Before thou utterest the last syllable, behold! thou art no more the Present but verily that Future. Thus, are the Past, the Present, and the Future, the ever-living trinity in one—the Mahamaya of the Absolute IS."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 446

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*

[**Max Plowman** is the author of *An Introduction to the Study of Blake* and of other volumes about the Mystic. During the War he served on the Western front, but later resigned his commission, was court-martialled and wrote his apology, *War and Creative Impulse*, which acknowledges its indebtedness to *Nationalism* by Rabindranath Tagore.—EDS.]

This is a fascinating book, a history, a work of humane learning and religious insight, a valuable commentary and a masterly arrangement of a vast subject. Professor Hiriyanna, formerly professor of Sanskrit at the Mysore University, has put into a single volume the salient features of all the available knowledge of Indian philosophy, and to this he has added interpretation and criticism which give unity to the work as a whole. The gentle and lucid commentary persuades the reader that he is in touch with a wise and humane scholar whose thesis is also his deepest personal concern. The book is thus redeemed from the air of oracular pronouncement so common to learned history, and its most abstruse themes are drawn into the circle of intimate subjectivity.

One cannot help contrasting these Outlines with the popular scientific "Outlines" recently published in England, though the comparison is anything but flattering to the West. It is perhaps significant that whereas the latest of these baldly omitted its own religion from its history, Professor Hiriyanna's book—or indeed any book dealing with Indian philosophy—simply could not be written by a person indifferent to religion. The fact involves the whole question of what is understood by knowledge. Professor Hiriyanna treats of knowledge that is inseparable from understanding. Our Western "Outlines" treat of knowledge almost as if its irrelevance to the soul of man were the test of its validity. If they were not really pathetic there would be something amusing about these childish attempts to collect the innumerable facts of human existence and serve them up as one huge dish, one vast Christmas pudding of information which the reader must "take" at a meal in the fond belief that he is adding to himself anything beside mental indigestion and abnormal powers of extroversion. But behind all such compendiums lies a false idea of knowledge, the idea that it may become synthetic by being made general. And that is a cardinal error; for true knowledge is always particular knowledge—the understanding in detail of some one

* *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. By M. HIRIYANNA, M. A. (Allen & Unwin, London. 15*s*.)

thing. And such knowledge is truly synthetic, because by it the mind increases its dynamic capacity and in the microcosm sees the macrocosm, whereas the mind fed on generalities is the mind destroying its own dynamism.

The knowledge of which Professor Hiriyanna treats is knowledge that has been assimilated by human consciousness. What is certain is that this knowledge must always take precedence over empirical learning. Man according to science is man as an acquisitive animal prowling the universe in search of the new. Man according to philosophy is man endeavouring to form a living body of understanding out of his own experience. These activities are only wrongly exclusive of one another. A due appreciation of them leads us to perceive that they should be as alternate as breathing, as perfectly balanced as the systole and diastole of the human heart. Man should not lose his animal faculties for the sake of understanding (and all science is an effort to extend the animal faculties); on the other hand, man should not lose his power of understanding in the effort to reach the unknown. Yet the danger in the first direction has, in some measure, always beset the East, while the danger in the opposite direction has always lain in wait for the West. "East is East and West is West" and the marriage of the two contraries will one day unify the world. What appears to be now of supreme importance to the human race is that, without derogation to either party, the wisdom of the East shall become the dowry of the West, and the knowledge of the West the marriage-settlement of the East.

Rightly applied, this book would help to serve that great purpose. It would teach Westerners what they are now so sorely in need of learning—the true inwardness of religion: it would show the true Christian the universality of his Christianity, just as it would reveal to the orthodox authoritarian the hollowness of his dependence upon dogma. Without removing one traditional stone, it would emphasise and explain the truth William Blake proclaimed to deaf ears a hundred years ago: "All Religions are One." The trouble is that such a book is left to languish as "a text-book for students". To me that is a grim irony; for as I am sure it is an invaluable book for the experienced thoughtful Westerner, I am equally convinced that philosophy is indigestible meat for babes. Young people should be rigorously debarred from the study of philosophy; for without the background of experience what does it become but theoretical and intellectual speculation? Prematurely acquired, it becomes a school of "isms," inevitably without vital meaning, that may actually serve as a defensive barrier to the very realizations of experience upon which living philosophy depends. And this criticism applies with special force to Indian philosophy whose

preëminent glory it is never to have been sundered from religion. Logic may be a useful hack for the young mind's exercise, and the logic that masquerades as philosophy in the West does it small harm; but who shall teach religion to inexperience, who shall deliver the mystery to the unready and the unprepared? What can such religion be but vague idealistic dogma which religious experience can only shatter?

The engrossing story of India's philosophic history brings home to us the gulf between Eastern and Western thought. In the West man has attempted to regard himself as part of pure phenomena: he has striven to draw conclusions upon the nature of things from the standpoint of absolute disinterestedness. But disinterestedness, apart from the love of something, is nihilistic, the creation of a void, the "non-entity" of William Blake. This void has, however, been the ideal habitation of the Western philosopher. And from this region religion had necessarily to be expelled; for religion betrays an emotional concern for the meaning of existence, and emotional concern is inconsonant with absolute disinterestedness. Therefore it had to go. The result is Kant, Schopenhauer, Hume and Voltaire. Thus the aridity of pure intellectual speculation supervenes upon and displaces the natural and human impulsion of consciousness. And this is inevitable once we delude ourselves into believing it possible for man to be disinterested about life; for life itself is interest, and where there is no interest there is no life. Thus disinterestedness apart from love (the heart of religion) is a delusion of abstraction. True philosophy can only begin when we have taken sides to the extent of believing that there is no such thing as disinterestedness apart from the disinterestedness that is religious to the core.

Therein lies the inherent weakness of Western philosophy. Forsaking religion, it becomes intellectual abstraction—"Abstract Philosophy warring in enmity against Imagination," as Blake said. Man cannot know himself as phenomena. "Know thyself" is sage counsel, but regarded in the absolute and not in the relative sense it is pure nonsense, nonsense of the very kind to which Western philosophy has too often fallen a prey. It is the attempt of the self to beget the self upon itself.

By its recognition of the inherent nature of religion Indian philosophy has been saved from this futile attempt. In its most abstract moods it has yet kept touch with life. In the direction of abstraction Buddhism seems to be as far as it has gone; but even here we are poles apart from pure intellectualism, for Buddhism retains its body of doctrine: it never becomes pure metaphysic. The Buddha himself was no mere intellectual speculator among intellectual possibilities, but a human sufferer seeking the clue to his own and all men's pain.

Reflecting upon this age-long record of spiritual achievement, one is struck again and again by the fact that every great school of Indian philosophy has come into being as a direct result of an individual mystical experience. By no effort of ponderous thought could the great principles of the Vedas have been laid down. Nothing but illumination—that joyous apprehension of the truth which liberates the Self from the self—will account for the sublime appreciation of eternal truths revealed in the Upanishads, the divine socialism of the *Gita*, the self-denials of the Buddha, or the spiritual liberalism of Jainism. They are all revelations—examples which teach us what poetry is in essence—expressions of what Blake calls "the Poetic Genius". Since the "Age of the Systems" there has been decline and insistence on the subordinate to the neglect of the primary, but the heritage is indestructible, and it is India's highest title to the world's regard to-day that she is still the living witness to the inalienable unity of philosophy and religion.

MAX PLOWMAN

NEW MORALITY AND OLD*

[**Prof. G. R. Malkani** is the Editor of *The Philosophical Quarterly*, the combined organ of The Indian Institute of Philosophy and of the Indian Philosophical Congress. He examines the answer of the Master of Selwyn to Bertrand Russell in the light of Aryan Philosophy.—EDS.]

Mr. Newsom examines here the case for the New Morality as propounded by Bertrand Russell in *Marriage and Morals*. That case rests on certain views as to the biological aspect of life, the study of the primitive man and his society, the psychology of human nature, the needs of modern civilisation and an estimate of social values. The new morality is clear on each of these points. The essence of its argument is that "uninhibited civilised people, both men and women, are generally polygamous in their instincts"; and it adds that there is nothing wrong in this, and that the exercise of sexual freedom is both right and just. This naturally brings it in conflict with the institution of the family with its restraints and responsibilities. The new morality therefore will have nothing of the family and will allow it to disintegrate, and leave the duties of procreation and the rearing of the young to be paid for and controlled by the State on a scientific basis and in the interests of the community and the nation.

Its logic is very simple. Sexual appetite is no better and no worse than the appetite for food; and yet no one dreams of putting any

**The New Morality*. By G. E. NEWSOM. (Nicholson and Watson, London. 6*s*.)

moral restrictions regarding its satisfaction. The natural requirements of health and of good manners alone must govern this satisfaction. The fact that sexual freedom will lead to the break-up of the family need hold no terror; for the family is already breaking up under the pressure of economic needs, the transfer of certain duties of the father of the family to the State in the form of social services, the newly-won freedom of women, and the inner instability of the family as at present constituted.

Mr. Newsom attacks this position vigorously. He holds that "the voice of Nature is clear for the monogamous family and not for sexual freedom". The polygamous herd and the social order of the hive are not patterns of social life that can be copied with any profit by man with his niceties of emotional behaviour, and his social and spiritual needs. He defends the view that the family is the great repository of everything that is valuable in the social and the spiritual life of man. Mr. Newsom is very emphatic that the sex-life of man must be harmonised with a high social purpose, so that it may lead to a greater integration of the character of man and the subordination of the lower to the higher in the scale of values.

No one who has the interests of the human community and human fellowship at heart can fail to sympathise with this view. As the ideas of men change, social order also is bound to change. The formulation of a social philosophy as that of the new morality is itself a symptom of the time. But any re-organisation of the social order must be based on a proper appreciation of values. That there are people for whom sex-life has an attraction in itself, while the responsibilities and the duties of family-life have an equally great repulsion, may be admitted. Such men will find their ends fulfilled in a social order which allows free play to their amorous instincts with the least possible interference from without. But the question of importance is whether the individual himself can find lasting satisfaction in this, and whether the soul of the community is normally so constituted as to acquiesce in an order which is professedly no order and which subserves no higher end than sensuous gratification. Love may be an anarchic force; but is there no value higher than sexual love?

No State-organised agency can be a substitute for the agency of Nature herself. The family is a natural group. Its disintegration will not only adversely affect the State, but even more so the individual. Without the natural affections and the sense of belonging permanently each to the other found in a family-group, sex-life will have no attraction for the more stable-minded. What is needed is a harmonisation of sex-life with the whole of life, so that emotions do not conflict with intellectual, ethical and spiritual needs. It is by the stabilization of sex-life alone that man can be truly free in other and higher spheres

demanding mental peace and repose. With this object in view certain sections of Hindu society have gone so far as to condemn divorce in every form. The union once made must be a union for life whatever happens. Indeed certain unions may turn out to be unhappy. But the very fact that they are permanent inclines each partner to a spirit of accommodation, good-will and mutual helpfulness. The unhappiness of a married life due to psychological causes is thus reduced to a minimum, while that due to natural causes is borne in a spirit of resignation and sympathy. This is a view that is more in harmony with the ultimate values of life.

There is another respect in which modern western civilisation might well take a leaf from the older Indian culture. Life is divided into four different periods or *āshramās*. Every one must pass through them and do duties appropriate to those periods of life. In the first period a person must observe strict continence and devote all energies to physical and mental culture as a preparation for the more arduous duties of the second period. In that he must, if he is normally constituted, marry and do the duties appropriate to the life of a house-holder. In the two last periods, he must gradually draw himself away from the bonds and obligations of social existence and realise a greater freedom. In such a scheme of life the body and its needs are neither wholly ignored nor unduly propitiated. The body is made to subserve a higher purpose of life, that of self-control, self-knowledge and self-illumination. Physical and æsthetic pleasure may be good in itself; but it has its own place assigned to it. Man is not a mere creature of desire. He has a greater destiny. The achievements of science too must be made subservient to a high moral purpose. They must be controlled in the interests of a more harmonious life and not allowed to be a disintegrating force both for society and the life of the individual.

The great conception which Hinduism offers with respect to the philosophy of life is the conception of *dharma* or duty. Life without duty, or without any restriction on self-indulgence is not human life and will not satisfy a normal human being. Freedom there must be, but it must not lead to anarchy. It must be exercised in the interests of the higher man, and it can only be so exercised when the traditional restraints have been recognised and the social conscience which we have inherited respected. Indeed there is no community which is perfect and free from maladjustments or social injustice. But all advance must be from within. We must accept certain duties and obligations before we can work for a purer and a nobler state. We must utilise our heritage in order to lift ourselves and, through ourselves, society. All social progress must ultimately rest on an ethical advance of the individual. In this

connection, one thing that is absolutely certain is that nothing really lifts human life above the life of an animal except a sense of duty and of obligation to others; without this, man is just a wayward animal. Mr. Newsom rightly challenges the new moralists to show whether the disintegration of the family in the interests of sexual freedom will at all conduce to greater harmony and happiness which is the desideratum of each individual, and whether it will give him that sense of responsibility and purpose in life through which alone man can realise his greatest good. We strongly recommend this book to all those who are interested in saner although old-fashioned views on sex and family.

G. R. MALKANI

A DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS*

Father Knox has a flair for arresting titles. But the title of his new book is a little misleading. It suggests a criticism of wireless talks, when in fact it is a destructive analysis of certain books written by Professor Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell, Mr. Gerald Heard, Mr. Mencken, Mr. Langdon-Davies, and Mr. H. G. Wells. It is true that these writers, with the exception of Mr. Mencken, have talked more or less frequently on the wireless, but I question whether their attitude to life is as predominant in the counsels and the policy of the B. B. C. as Father Knox in his opening essay on "Broadcast-mindedness" suggests. Doubtless it is convenient to use the microphone "as the symbol of a certain type of mentality". But it is an arbitrary symbol. For the wireless includes amongst its speakers many others besides the experts and semi-experts who tell us that we live in a scientific age, and must therefore revise our views, not merely of nature, but of human life. And if we listen with particular attention to these, it is not the wireless which predisposes us to do so, but the scientific, or, if you like, the materialistic temper of the age. So far as Father Knox means by "broadcast-mindedness" the habit of taking over from self-constituted mentors "a ready-made, standardised philosophy of life," I admit the danger he foresees. But Broadcasting House is not alone in threatening a dictatorship by experts. And some have even been so perverse as to complain that the Church to which Father Knox belongs has encouraged men to "acquiesce in that general will, which is formed by a governing class of experts". But the "Broadcast Mind" which he assails in this book is not the standardised, but the anti-religious mind, or rather, half-a-dozen particular minds which reject the traditional religion and culture of Christendom. His destructive analysis of the six books which he has chosen to attack is as brilliantly and pungently effective as his previous dissection, in *Caliban in Grub Street*, of certain professions of religion in the popular press. Yet, curiously enough, at the end of both books I have found myself sympathising more with the victims of his attack than with the religious expert who has exposed their illogicality and penetrated their guard; and this although I share to the full his impatience towards such popular fallacies as that the higher can, and must, be explained in terms of the lower, that reality is limited to the measurable and confined to the physical, or that metaphysics belongs to the "world of make-believe".

How is it, then, that a critic who

* *Broadcast Minds*. By RONALD KNOX (Sheed and Ward, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

scores devastatingly all along the line, yet leaves one questioning the positive value of his triumph? It is not merely, I think, the temper of his attack which is at fault, although there is an element of personal and professional conceit which occasionally alienates. The cause of dissatisfaction lies deeper than this. In one place he writes that—

> The habit, fortunately moribund in this island, of continually harping on the negative side of a religious creed, is one which Professor Huxley is evidently determined to emulate.

And he himself has fallen into the same habit in his treatment of scientific creeds, if he will forgive a phrase which for him perhaps will be meaningless. And this is due, I cannot but feel, to an imaginative deficiency in himself. Truth for him is too much a matter of logic, of expert dialectic. I do not deny the necessity of logic, but reality cannot be caught within the neat framework of the syllogism, and the captious controversialist differs from the man of true understanding in his conscious or unconscious assumption that it can be. He fails, in short, to meet the real issues, as, I cannot help feeling, Father Knox constantly does. For the revolt against Christian orthodoxy which he deplores is not the fruit of mere muddle-headedness or scientific arrogance. It has its roots in a conviction that Religion in the past has imposed a false dualism upon life.

The most obvious expression of this dualism is to be found in the separation of the Supernatural from the Natural, reflected, for example, in Father Knox's remark that "the religious notion attaches itself in the first instance to supernatural things, and only comes to be applied to natural things by *false analogy*". But it can be traced in the moral as well as the metaphysical teaching of the Church. Admittedly, Science in its reaction against Supernaturalism has fallen into Materialism. In denying the Supernatural, it has denied, too, the reality of Spirit. It has affirmed the unity of life, but at the cost of suppressing the eternal principle of which all life is the expression. Its monism is therefore only apparent. For the material world is no less separated from the spiritual when the latter is denied than when it is falsely conceived. Nevertheless, the reaction against a theological dualism, even if it has led to materialism, has a significance and necessity of which Father Knox takes no account, and it is becoming the more significant as science penetrates further into the elusive nature of matter. Consequently, when Bertrand Russell writes that "the dualism of mind and matter is out of date," or Mr. Langdon-Davies that happiness involves "the establishment and exploration of a united kingdom of the mind," or even when Mr. Heard conceives that man was "raised from his slumber within the group, and henceforward he must go on until he can rise even further and see himself and that group, from a higher standpoint, made one," they may not be arguing "in syllogisms which can be answered with *concedo* and *nego*," but they are affirming the necessity of a kind of wholeness which transcends that opposition of subject and object of which Father Knox is so tenaciously and expertly aware.

Of course, it is easy, and up to a point profitable, to expose the superficiality of Professor Huxley's conception of religion without a God, or of Bertrand Russell's light-hearted assumption that all sense of sin can be dismissed as a psychological aberration. And Father Knox does it very wittily. But he himself in his insistence upon God as a personality betrays in more than one place just that limited self-consciousness which projected the anthropomorphic God in whom the modern mind has ceased to believe, and not only the modern but such inspired minds of the past as the authors of the *Upanishads* who conceived in its integrity, as few other seers or philosophers have done, both the transcendent and the immanent nature of God. But for Father Knox who suggests that the East can only offer a "philosophy of religion without God," Sankara, it would seem, compared at least with St. Thomas Aquinas, was a godless pagan.

And his book fails as a creative piece of reasoning because it is the work of a man more expert in logic than profound in experience, a man who lacks that deeper unity of being by which vital truth is divined beyond the conflict of thesis and antithesis, and even as taking shape amid the confusions of mental error.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Hindu Monism and Pluralism. By MAX HUNTER HARRISON. (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press.)

The same consideration which makes the works of Professors Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta so valuable in the eyes of the specialist—*viz.* their exhaustive discussion of every point arising from and pertaining to the history of Indian philosophy—renders them unsuitable for the beginner who would gain a clear idea of the main problems which have exercised Indian thinkers. This is not a preface to the statement that Mr. Harrison's book is "elementary". Indeed, based on extensive knowledge, the monograph is in some parts highly technical. But it effectively concentrates attention on what is perhaps the central metaphysical issue, and the different answers it has evoked from different schools of Indian thought. It thus forms an admirable, if by no means easy, introduction to a subject of which the principal outlines are apt to be blurred in more massive treatises.

It is in the conflict between Monism and Pluralism that the root of the divergence between the great systems of Indian philosophy must be sought. What is the relation between the One and the Many? To Shankara, the single and supreme Reality being the *Atman*, the apprehension of the Many was but error. In the Sankhya system, on the contrary, Reality was conceived not as a homogeneous substance, but a compound of *Purusha* and the attributes of *Prakriti*. And between these two poles we have the modified *Advaitism* of Ramanuja which postulates simultaneously the Reality of the One and the Many. "The one Reality is not pure unity without difference, but a complex whole inclusive of infinite diversity of parts and relationships. The material world and the world of souls are thus in one sense separated from, and in another sense, united with Brahma."

The religious aspect of this metaphysical problem is the method of release or salvation. How can the individual soul attain *Moksha*? It is well known that the Vedantists of Shankara's school answered: By overcoming the illusion of separateness and multiplicity. Knowledge is the key; *Avidya* is the obstacle. In the Sankhya system, too, knowledge is the desideratum, but knowledge not of union with the *Atman*, but of distinction between Self and Matter. Similarly, Ramanuja also retained the concept of *Vidya* or Knowledge, but it was interpreted by him not in metaphysical but personal, moral, and emotional terms; it was viewed in the light of the teaching of the *Gita*. Ignorance in Hindu thought thus appears as the counterpart of Sin in Christianity, and Knowledge takes the place of Faith and Works.

The special value of Mr. Harrison's book is that he compares the views of the three main schools on all these points, with a concise summary of the criticisms directed by each of them against the other, and at the same time traces back to the *Upanishads* the origin of their distinctive features. He has thus produced a comparatively brief but excellent account of the dominant ideas of the Hindu tradition. True, some of his conclusions, such as that Indian speculation has been determined not by a disinterested love of truth but a practical religious aim, betray, in my opinion, a certain confusion of thought, but it would be ungrateful to dwell on them in the midst of so much that is sound and cogent.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Everyman's Talmud. By the Rev. Dr. A. COHEN. (J. M. Dent, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

This is the day of the handbook: "a manual of reference for travellers," as the dictionary puts it. The plain man grows busier, the output of literature increases; a handbook is all that he has time for. Travelling through the forest of modern information, he can rarely see the wood for trees. Too often he is led astray.

A subject on which he will necessarily demand to be informed, is the history of the Jews. He sees them round him in every sphere of human action; he cannot but be aware of their influence, for good or for ill, in all international affairs. He may dislike them, but, if he is honest with himself, he will be forced, however reluctantly, to agree with George Eliot:—

> One of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of this scattered people is that they have come out of it rivalling the nations of all European countries in healthiness and beauty of physique, in practical ability, in scientific and artistic aptitude, and in some forms of ethical value. (*Theophrastus Such*)

Normally one associates Jews with the Bible, with the more unpleasant features of the Old Testament perhaps, forgetting possible advances since ancient times. Of their other literature the plain man knows nothing. It is here that Dr. Cohen renders him signal service. His *Everyman's Talmud* embraces those six centuries of rabbinical teaching after the exile, upon which further progress in Jewish culture is based. It is most excellently prepared, and provides a summary of Talmudic teaching (with apt and frequent quotation) on religion, ethics, folklore, and the hereafter. Especially interesting is an exposition of the evolution of Jewish thought with regard to the incorporeality and transcendence of God, and the relation of the Deity to the universe.

This *Talmud*, a sacred landmark in Jewry, an influence incalculably powerful in history, deserves of us some study. At a time when the English were still savages and the Americans unborn, Rabbis, by means of the *Talmud*, were instructing a people of ancient lineage in laws and traditions which, it is not too much to say, alone kept the exiled Jews from destruction as a nation, engulfed, as they were, in vast hordes of alien blood.

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

[It will interest our Hindu readers to know that the Jews make a division of sacred texts very similar to their own: *Pentateuch*, the Written Law is like *Shruti*, while *Talmud*, Oral Law, like *Smriti*.—EDS.]

Leap-home and Gentle-brawn, A Tale of the Hanuman Monkeys. By FRIEDA HAUSWIRTH DAS. (J. M. Dent & Sons, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

"It is all a question of approach; the 'mysterious East' turns very humanly confiding eyes to anyone seeking it in simple direct kindly contact free from religious, race, or imperial bias." Thus Frieda Hauswirth Das who belongs to the band of Westerners, who through a sympathetic understanding have attempted to contact Indian life, free from prejudice and any sense of superiority.

The book appears to be written with many objects in view. First and foremost it brings out most forcibly the characteristics of the monkey tribe. Besides the tendencies of greed, hatred, and jealousy, with which we are sometime wont to connect animal life, it opens to our view nobler and higher instinctive qualities, such as love, a sense of responsibility, faithfulness and loyalty, which also exist in the animal kingdom.

In tracing the course of these Hanuman monkeys, Mrs. Das gives us an insight every now and then into Indian life. The stark poverty of "the sixty million human beings in India who from birth to death never know what it is to eat enough"; their religious instinct, coupled with the reverence they hold towards all animal life, especially that of the Hanuman; the picture of a Westernised Indian; the humanising touch given to the white man in India—all tend to make

the book more natural and true to reality. It is interesting because of its simplicity and humorous touches. It is founded on deep observation, and yet is free from long tedious descriptions.

But the best chapters are perhaps the last chapters where the "Yogi" of India is brought in. The astonishing powers developed through patience and perseverance by the "heathen" of India carry their own message. Unknown and unrecognised, an individual here and there determines to tread "the Path". Following with persistence the necessary rules, he sees his undreamt and unheard of faculties slowly unfold. True it is, that such "renouncers" may be found here and there in other countries—but if any place can claim to possess the greatest number, surely it is India, the land of religion and philosophy.

F. K.

South American Meditations. By COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING. (Jonathan Cape, London. 18s.)

In these meditations Count Keyserling again addresses himself to the championing of Spirit as the power that lies within us by which we may, if we choose, overcome the Facts of all the world. The author sees the World Process in terms of Gana *versus* Spirit. By Gana he means Primordial Life, the Nether-world, Blind Urge, the fatal flowing of everlasting libido, as opposed to a life determined by Spirit. He sees Man who "frets, pines, and despairs in the coils of Gana, of serfdom, of blind fate" but who yet divines that "these chains do not fetter him beyond hope of escape. Something drives him to step forth out of his captivity and to rise beyond it." Very often he appears to be speaking in the language of dualism and to deprecate monism. Yet apparently this is not really so for he writes:—

> Everywhere the very first relationship to Spirit was prayer, because, at first, Spirit was experienced as something outside self. And if withal there awoke the presentiment that Spirit nevertheless represents the deepest Self, then the meaning of all prayer corresponded to that of the ancient orison of the Hindus:
>
> From the Unreal lead me to the Real,
> From Darkness lead me to Light,
> From Death lead me to Immortality.

Without regarding the process in any evolutionary light Count Keyserling emphasises the event which he calls "the in-break of Spirit". There came a time when something novel appeared—the faculty of Imagination through which Spirit works. The working of Spirit is the thing that engages and has always chiefly engaged the attention of Count Keyserling. For this is where he finds Man's salvation—in the power to give Facts their significance. Take two Facts, supposedly hard and almighty—Sex and Gold. Sex may be made, as it has been, a fountain of happiness and joy—Dionysus. Or it may be made, as it has been made, Satanic, the source of evil and ugliness. It remains always the same fact, but its whole significance and therefore actual effect is determined by the spirit of man. A piece of gold may be worthless to a primitive and a bank-balance to a modern: it is the same piece of gold, the same fact, but its working reality is determined by the spirit of man. Man literally creates the facts, Keyserling keeps repeating. It is upon this power that he lays all the stress; for if Facts on any occasion are not the last resort but bend before Spirit, then on every occasion this is true, and man does indeed possess the power to overcome the world.

Such, I believe, is the main drift of *South American Meditations*, some four hundred pages long. It is similar to the drift of Keyserling's other work and does not say anything much that he has not said before. Nor does he say it better. The long words and the long wind are even more abundant than usual, his lack of artistry more evident. But he possesses the power of compelling the reader to go on, because at any moment one may come upon a strongly eloquent passage full of substance.

J. S. COLLIS

The Shakespearian Tempest. By G. WILSON KNIGHT. (Oxford University Press. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

From time to time plasterings are removed from the walls of ancient churches revealing the original frescoes beneath—often of surpassing beauty. Sometimes, in the process of cleaning a portrait, another is revealed beneath it. So, it would seem, Shakespeare is hidden behind a veil of commentary: as with the picture, so with the national poet of England, a restorer would be in due place.

Never was one more needed than to-day. Recent Shakespearian scholarship has given us nothing but a chaos of irrelevant suggestions. After three centuries, we are still without a "credible" portrait, to say nothing of the authentic picture.

This alluring task has been accepted by Professor G. Wilson Knight, a writer who was eminently fitted to undertake it. The result is a book of great interest, uniting wide scholarship with sensitive poetic apprehension. *The Shakespearian Tempest* is a work to read and meditate on.

Mr. Knight has sought to penetrate the web of Shakespearian phantasy: his method is not that of the scalpel but that of intuition. He attempts to show that the plays under Shakespeare's name exhibit a constructive unity and an enlarging vision. And the evidence he adduces is most impressive.

From this conclusion many scholars will frankly dissent. Personally, I am inclined to accept the author's contention, though I fail to see any incompatibility between borrowing and independence. It is seldom realised that creation and appreciation are *fundamentally* the same. He who appreciates, creates. Shakespeare, as I see him, was intent on the vision, not on the materials of his craft. Indeed, an artist absorbed in the creation of a flower may pick his petals where he will; it is the *new unity* that ultimately counts.

Now, the unity of Shakespeare's work is not mechanical but organic. However the plays may differ, they are the offspring of one mind and soul. This is my feeling, and I should have been grateful for confirmation or refutation. Mr. Knight, to my thinking, leaves me just where I was. His terms "tempest" and "music," though they occur frequently in the plays of Shakespeare, do not seem helpful in the present reference. The poet may have been penetrated with a thought such as the author ascribes to him. I do not think, however, that it amounted quite to a doctrinal position about human life and death, though it probably meant more than such mere play of fancy as Milton speaks of in a passage of *Lycidas*:

For so, to interpose a little ease,
Let our frail thoughts dally with false surmise,

And then, Mr. Knight tends to see too much in the reconciliation-pieces. I cannot ignore their historical origins. But of course the same forms can be used to different purposes: even the same kind of stanza can be employed to produce different rhythmical effects. But my point is, that Shakespeare in his later mood chose to indulge himself in that kind of imagination, but that he cannot be said to have reached anything and revised his view of life. He probably did not think he had a solution: his sombre Northern genius was powerless to pierce the veil of Maya to the Eternal Ethos. No wonder the final plays remain pseudo-harmonies. We do not find in them the "calm of mind, all passions spent" of a Sophocles or a Milton.

The unity of Shakespeare's plays is of a different order: I think I have found it in separating the picture from the frame in his work. Mr. Knight envisages Shakespeare solely in the "singing robe". There is the playwright to be considered too.

But whether we agree or disagree with the author's findings, his is none the less a work to be reckoned with. And the writing throughout is that of a poet. This is a book that every lover of Shakespeare should possess and ponder.

RANJEE G. SHAHANI

Alexandrine Teachings on the Universe. Four Lectures by R. B. TOLLINGTON, D. D., D. Litt. (George Allen & Unwin, London. 5*s.*)

The so-called Catechetical School of Alexandria was a remarkable group of scholars and philosophers of peculiar interest to the modern thinker. Their period was, roughly, the 1st century B.C. to the 3rd century A. D., when Alexandria was the cosmopolis of the world, and with unusual freedom and tolerance for expression of every shade of opinion. And the philosophers of this era, Philo, Clement, Plotinus, Origen and others, had a boldness and depth of thought that contrasts strikingly with modern materialistic theories of the universe.

This book consists of lectures given at Cambridge by a specialist in the Alexandrian school of speculative thought. Dr. Tollington's main object is to find so far as possible the common ground of opinion among the distinguished teachers of the period. As a secondary object he endeavours to show where, in his own view, modern thought harmonises with, excels or falls short of Alexandrine thought. And it is only in this latter respect that one would have any quarrel with his scholarly yet concise and readable survey.

The most striking instance of modern thought veering towards that held so long ago in Alexandria is not so much in recent scientific theories as in the philosophy of Karl Barth. Barth thinks of God as not merely immanent in man but also "beyond". He has re-captured the idea of the Divine Transcendence. Yet this idea of the human nature of man being transcended by the divine nature was insisted on by Clement and others nearly 1700 years before Barth. It is an idea highly characteristic of the Alexandrine mind, and reaches an extreme in Plotinus the mystic, whose transcendence has even been attributed to oriental influence. Dr. Tollington prefers to look on Plotinus as an extreme Platonist, but he produces no positive reason why Eastern thought should not have played its part in him.

In view of his general philosophy and of the fact that Porphyry tells us that "Plotinus was interested in Eastern thought," we cannot agree with Dr. Tollington that the Eastern visit under the Emperor Gordian is not of "much importance," nor do we consider it a legitimate inference that because "he went on military service and was there only a year" that he "probably had little opportunity for enquiring into Persian and Indian Philosophies". (p. 35). Of the teaching of Plotinus H. P. Blavatsky writes (*Theosophical Glossary*, p. 256):—

> He taught a doctrine identical with that of the Vedantins, namely, that the Spirit-Soul emanating from the One deific principle was, after its pilgrimage, re-united to It.

The difficulty of the Western mind in grasping the Eastern view of a "deific principle" is great. But the general study of the philosophy of the Alexandrians is clarified by a study of Indian philosophy. The root ideas are the same though clothed in different language; and when one is dealing with a confessedly abstract subject such as the transcendence or immanence of God, one is often apt, quite erroneously, to fall somewhat into the conception of an etherealised Personal Deity—instead of a Principle. A Theosophical Master once wrote:—

> The Hindu mind is pre-eminently open to the quick and clear perception of the most transcendental, the most abstruse metaphysical truths. Some of the most unlettered ones will seize at a glance that which would often escape the best Western metaphysician. You may be, and most assuredly are our superiors in every branch of physical knowledge; in spiritual sciences we were, are and always will be your—MASTERS.

Dr. Tollington does justice to the theories of "mediation" of the ancients of Alexandria. He sees where they gain over modern scientifically based ideas. "From Plato to Plotinus," he says, "the supreme power is good." Yet he cannot quite reconcile himself to the idea of the descent from spirit to matter, to the attitude that represents life symbolically as a tree with its roots upwards. "The recoil from material things, a recoil which seems to be excessive, involves," he claims, "a

lowered estimate of the world of sense." Even if true, is this too high a price to pay for a heightened estimate of the world of spirit?

G. W. WHITEMAN

A Buddhist Bible. Edited by DWIGHT GODDARD. (Thetford, Vermont, U.S.A. $ 2.)

Mr. Dwight Goddard, the author of *The Buddha's Golden Path*—a manual of practical Zen Buddhism, has now produced this admirable collection of the favourite sutras of the Zen sect. The work contains an essay by the editor on the Ch'an (Zen) School of Buddhism in China before the time of the Sixth Patriarch (Hui Neng), an easy-reading version of the *Lankavatara Sutra* based on the translation recently published by Professor Suzuki, a rearrangement of Gemmell's translation of the *Diamond Sutra* (*Vajracchedika*), Max Müller's version of the *Sutra of Transcendental Wisdom* and the famous *Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* edited from the recent translation by Wong Mou Lam.

Mr. Goddard in his essay on Zen in China is chiefly concerned with the influence of the Taoist teachings on the development of the cult; he points out that the difference between Taoism and Buddhism lies in the *laissez-faire* attitude of the former as contrasted with the more dynamic and austere principles of the latter. While the Taoist was somewhat inclined towards congenial company, wine and poetry, the Buddhist sage found that these things interfered with the perpetual concentration required for Realisation. There are interesting paragraphs on the difference between Tao and Nirvana, and he comes to the conclusion that Tao is the active aspect of Reality (analogous to the Sanskrit *Prajna*) and Nirvana the passive, yet this view would hardly seem compatible with the *laissez-faire* attitude.

The *Lankavatara, Diamond* and *Transcendental Wisdom Sutras* are based on the Mahayana doctrine of *sunyata* or "no-thing-ness," which teaches that all things are of the nature of *maya* (illusion) *as* things, and have separate existence only in our own minds. But as aspects of Reality their true nature is No-thing—that which is unconditioned by separateness and is the universal and inscrutable Norm of Existence. Things "are not independent of each other; they are only different aspects of the same things, they are terms of relation not of reality. Conditions of existence are not of a mutually exclusive character; in essence things are not two but one."

The Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch is the only work which has received the title of "sutra" which is not attributed to the Buddha or to a famous Bodhisattva, and it is indeed worthy of this honour. It is the finest and most intelligible exposition of the teachings of Zen and has the virtue of being free from the ceaseless repetitions and metaphysical dissertations which mar so many of the Sanskrit sutras. The sutra was originally written in Chinese by Fat Hoi who was one of the Patriarch's disciples and this translation of it was done by Wong Mou Lam in 1930. The teaching presented is that of the *Lankavatara* simplified; it sets out to teach realisation of the essence of mind—that is, the inward awakening of the intuition to Reality:

> Essence of mind is intrinsically pure; the reason we become perturbed is simply because we allow ourselves to be carried away by the circumstances we are under. He who is able to keep his mind serene, irrespective of circumstances, has attained true Samadhi.

The book will interest students of Far Eastern philosophy and mysticism, and is one which cannot fail to bring a great light to all treaders of the Path.

ALAN WATTS

Adventures in Philosophy and Religion. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. (The Macmillan Company, New York).

This is a volume of dialogues, in the Platonic manner, dealing with philosophic and religious subjects. The device has the advantage of hitting straight at the heart of the matter in dispute, but where the author himself is the advocate of a definite theory, the defects of his position are apt to be glossed over. Mr. Pratt frankly admits the weakness of the method. As a critical weapon, however, it is unsurpassed, and can lay open with precision and economy the weak points in any doctrine to which it is applied.

Two of the discussions are conducted by missionaries, one old-fashioned and the other modern, a hustling American business man, and two Buddhist monks. The object, apparently, is to estimate the value of Christianity to China and, incidentally, to determine its relation to Buddhism. It is clear that Mr. Pratt himself believes that the two faiths are not exclusive, and contain much that could be shared with mutual benefit. The third dialogue, between philosophers who discover that death has not annihilated their personalities, is concerned with their attempts to reconcile their various metaphysical doctrines with the indubitable fact of their individual survival. In a fourth dialogue, Mr. Pratt considers the pass to which religion has come in Western lands, and exhibits the inadequacy of both orthodoxy and humanism.

The most substantial portion of the book, however, is the long dialogue on metaphysics and epistemology. The participants are Socrates on the one hand, and representatives of different contemporary philosophical and pseudo-philosophical schools, ranging from the followers of Hegel to the followers of Dr. Watson. Socrates (or Mr. Pratt) finds one feature common to them—a strong determination to destroy the notion of a "subjective" entity, to reject the reality of the self, and to explain all the phenomena of life and nature in one uniform, "objective," impersonal terminology. In this respect, at any rate, idealism and naturalism are at one. They are monistic; they are in revolt against dualism. Socrates's own position may be indicated by a brief quotation:

> And when philosophers shall have abandoned the attempt to interpret the psychical in terms of the physical or the physical in terms of the psychical, when they shall have returned to the inevitable human belief that individual selves are real and that the spiritual life means more than logical implication, there will be some hope of attacking with a fair chance of success the great problems of philosophy.

But no quotation can do justice to the simple and effective manner in which he exposes the absurdities involved in Pragmatism, Idealism, Behaviourism and other –isms.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

The Faiths and Heresies of a Poet and Scientist. By R. CAMPBELL MACFIE. (Williams & Norgate, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a posthumous volume embodying "the honest, thoughtful conclusions of a noble soul facing the eternal verities". Dr. Macfie combines in himself the talents of a poet and a scientist and his aim has been to "assert eternal Providence, and justify the ways of God to man". For this he has brought to bear on his scientific searchings and conclusions his poetic intuition and vision.

The author in keeping with the modern developments in physics, etc., concludes that the reality behind the world is really "Mind purposively arranging facts and relations, or material causes". The scientific exegesis of the cosmos, on the whole, *suggests* to him a theistic interpretation. While this is true of the lower order of nature, it is more so in the case of the higher, *i.e.* the organic. The author refutes *in toto* the orthodox belief of science in a mechanistic or a noumenal theory of life. Life is to him a special creation on the part of the Deity, a doctrine advocated in the book of Genesis which, though

now despised equally by science and the Church, seems to him to deserve reconsideration. The author here advocates an emergent theory of evolution in his own way. Mento-volition alone as the noumenal activity manifested in life satisfies his causal instinct. Science which thus suggests a biophilic aim or purpose gives him the right to reject the mechanistic creed and believe in a God whose Will and Hand are at work in the dynamic structure of the universe. But by this science does not give much encouragement to believe in personal immortality, which also he is anxious to justify as a necessary part of his theism. In this the author finds a right to appeal to a philosophical interpretation of the sort that sees no Cause but God whose Will is manifested in our consciousness. Such a philosophy, though only an approximation to truth, seems to satisfy his incorrigible craving for a causal explanation of himself and the cosmos. Reason and intuition inform him that our consciousness, being a part of the Infinite Consciousness, cannot end, as that would imply a deicide.

In fact, the belief in a God rooted in intuition and encouraged by scientific inference becomes for him the basis of a theistic faith as well as of a hope for immortality. Such beliefs, though not of a conventional type, are yet of a saving type. The treatise may not appeal to rationalist, but it should to religious, minds for whom it may prove a source of some inspiration. The book ought to possess an index.

J. K. MAJUMDAR

Meister Eckhart's Sermons. Translated by CLAUD FIELD. (Allenson.)

Mysticism and vagueness are to some minds synonymous terms. A reading of Mr. Field's beautiful translation of Eckhart's Sermons will dispel that illusion. For in clear and trenchant prose, the search even for that vague something which is ordinarily declared to lie beyond the categories of thought assumes the lucidity of a logical exposition.

Most of Eckhart's positions are truly remarkable for their affinity with the views of other thinkers, considering they are the outcome of an experience, highly individual and independent of any conspicuous outside influences. The central doctrine of his philosophy is a belief in an Absolute Reality which as against the conventional Deity of European idealist tradition, is not contrasted to appearance, but is All-Comprehending, All-Enveloping, Ever-Present in the pantheistic sense of those words. But although his God differs from the general idealist God in that He is not a kind of Newtonian space holding together a world of inter-related appearances but vast and free and moving, He is *apparently* differentiated in the concrete ego; He is *apparently* bounded by the barriers of body, time and number, like the God of the Vedanta, for instance, which is surrounded by the *koshas* or sheaths of sense, energy and intellect. How then, the question arises, can the soul know God?

Eckhart's answer is that we realise God through the eternal generation of His Son in us; or as the Hindus would say by the sudden flashing of a vision across the mind of the sage, when deep insight comes and all things become apparent to him, when he perceives the cause of sorrow and the path of knowledge, in the manner in which the Buddha reached at last the exhaustless source of Truth.

This private vision may be natural or acquired. In Eckhart's own life it may have been natural. But he lays down a deductive system for the benefit of those who have to travel up from the actual perceptions of the senses, through the subtle analysis of rational discourse to the realisation of the beatific vision,—a system which calls for self-effacement, for the cultivation of detachment, utter detachment and selflessness:

> I would have you know that to be empty of creatures is to be full of God, to be full of creatures is to be empty of God.

MULK RAJ ANAND

The Secret of the West. By DMITRI MEREJKOWSKI, translated into English by JOHN COURNOS. (Brewer, Warren and Putnam, New York. $7·50.)

The "Secret of the West" is the lost continent of Atlantis, destroyed on account of the sins of its inhabitants, and especially, according to Merejkowski, for their indulgence in war. The book will be of considerable interest, not only to students of Mme. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, in which some of the esoteric traditions about the lost continents were given out, but also to the increasing number of people whose attention and interest have been drawn to the rapidly accumulating body of scientific evidence, which goes to prove that the story of Atlantis, so long regarded as the invention of Plato, is in fact nothing less than a fragment of sober history.

Merejkowski claims to have discovered very full confirmation of Plato's narrative in the *Book of Enoch*, though in the latter the story is veiled in mythical form. He has ransacked an immense range of writings classical, biblical and modern to find support for his thesis of the historicity of Atlantis; and has made an extremely interesting collection of ethnographical and other scientific data, as well as legends and myths bearing on the subject. But Merejkowski is not content to be an impressionist historian, and a very brilliant one: he must needs be a prophet too, a rôle that does not fit him quite so well. As prophet, he very properly denounces the wickedness of war, and warns the modern world lest it destroy itself in fratricidal conflict, and so perish off the face of the earth as did the Atlanteans.

It is superfluous to say of Merejkowski that he writes with vividness and power; but his genius is marred by a streak of eccentric fanaticism that runs through it, like a bar-sinister on a shield, and keeps cropping up all through the present book. At the back of his mind, and, as it were, in an isolated compartment of its own, is a curiously warped belief in some of the crudest forms of exoteric Christian salvationism and second-adventism. He says, for example:—

> It may be said that Plato, like all pagan antiquity, died from thirst and hunger—the thirst of true Blood and the hunger of true Flesh: the flesh and blood in the Dionysian, Osirian, Tammuzian, and other mysteries do not assuage because they are visionary.
>
> The end of the first world is in the West—such is the meaning of Atlantis. But the meaning of Christianity is: the end of the second world shall unite the East and the West: "For as the lightning cometh out of the East, and shineth even unto the West; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be."

Of Buddhism, he says:—

> The devil has already seduced one half of the world, the East, by Buddhistic pity; and now he desires to seduce the other half, the West; he wants to kill God, love with pity.

The cloudy bigotry of such passages contrasts strangely with the insight displayed in the following admirable account of the working of the law of Karma in history:—

> *If* at the end of the glacial period, there existed a huge island continent in the Atlantic Ocean, and *if* it perished from one sudden or several gradual geological revolutions, as is confirmed by the memory of the earth and all its creatures, then it is likely that this physical destruction was no accidental, senseless circumstance, but was pre-determined by something in the perished beings themselves, and was a punishment for something.

Which is almost an exact paraphrase of the esoteric teaching as set forth in *The Secret Doctrine*.

R. A. V. M.

The Buddha and the Christ: The Bampton Lectures for 1932. By Canon B. H. STREETER. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London. *7s. 6d.*)

Canon Streeter is a learned and respected Divine and the well-known author of about a dozen books on theology. This volume is an attempt to work out a practical philosophy of life and to probe the meaning of the universe from the standpoint of modern thought. Though the title suggests a comparative study of the teachings of the Buddha and the Christ, the author betrays predi-

lection for his own creed, and evinces prejudice against Eastern and Indian viewpoints. He concludes that Anglican Christianity alone possesses the remedy for modern ills.

According to this author Buddha is original and most himself in his moral teachings, and there he resembles Christ; but he differs fundamentally from Christ by reason of his inheritance and acceptance of the doctrines of Karma and Maya. Though the author professes himself not competent enough to expound and criticize the subtle tenets of Indian religion yet he condemns its polytheism "as luxuriant as the native jungle". He forgets that Max Müller defined Indian polytheism as being in reality "henotheism," and he also overlooks that Christianity too has abundant polytheism only in a different and cruder form.

The author's assumption that the Absolute of Indian religion is "static" and "dead" and excludes a "living and loving God" is not correct. A "living God" is a phantom unless He is metaphysically the Absolute Reality. The doctrine of Divine Incarnations is an important key to the understanding of this mystery of Indian philosophy. Divinity assumes human shape whenever spirituality subsides and materialism prevails, and so Hinduism never sets a limit to the number of saviours as does Christianity, but believes in Christ, in Mahomed, in Zoroaster as saviours of mankind along with Krishna and Buddha. Love of God is not "impossible," as the author concludes, because It is conceived as an Impersonal Reality whose "stuff" or *svabhava* (Nature) is *Anandam* or Absolute Bliss and Compassion. Canon Streeter is under delusion when he remarks that Krishna is "an apotheosis or a docetic Incarnation" and that Kali and Krishna are "inferior images of the Divine" so it is "inwardly idolatrous" to worship them. It is a gross misreading of Indian religion. His remarks "India has lacked men like Luther so it is sunk in trivial and debasing superstition" and that the "Hindu temple is more often an example of moral corruption" expose the superficiality of his knowledge of India. The author accepts the doctrine of immortality in the form of eternal life as a necessary deduction from a belief in God but fails to understand the inner significance and the logical strength of our doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation. These do not frustrate the purpose of life as he makes out; but on the contrary reveal life to be consistent as Law itself.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Light of Asia. By Sir EDWIN ARNOLD, illustrated by WILLY POGANY (David McKay Company, Philadelphia.)

Countless men and women regard *The Light of Asia* as the book *par excellence* of devotion. It is no ordinary epic: it is a sacred song chanted in Nature's wordless voice audible but to the heart of the devotee. Human dialects obscure rather than clarify such language. Yet being human we must resort to speech if that be our medium of communication. To the lover of this poem the Buddha has come to be the soul's ideal. And how shall another enter our heart that he may depict our conception satisfactorily? Mr. Pogany has contributed clever illustrations, two or three of which are beautiful though more sensuous than symbolic, Blake's influence to the contrary notwithstanding. They make this an excellent "gift book" thus spreading the soul-satisfying message of that Man of men, Gautama the Buddha. But the spiritual message of Asia is not for illustration. No drawings will stir those hearts in which Siddhartha is no sensuously beautiful Prince nor an emaciated ascetic, but the essence of human perfection out of time and space, the ideal of evolution through the ages—the lover and the guide without whom life loses its meaning and we resign ourselves to despair.

C. T

Magic and Mind. By E. J. D. RADCLYFFE. (A. & C. Black Ltd., London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

"I will point out the greatest, the chief cause of nearly two-thirds of the evils that pursue humanity . . . it is religion . . the sacerdotal caste, the priesthood and the churches." We may adapt this as the *motif* of Mr. Radclyffe's argument. Magic, he says, is wholly based on ignorance. He does not recognize the MAGIC of the ancients; his data being limited to the medieval witch-doctors and priests, forgetting that the counterfeit coin proves the real. The science of *mantra* (sound), talismans, and the use of nature's elemental powers is denied because so ludicrously conceived, while scientists adopt the rôle of the priests whom they have condemned and shout "Anathema"! Were Mr. Radclyffe to study Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, he would find much to amend in this volume. But the *motif* is sound, echoing the Greek Oracle—"Man Know Thyself."

Our ideas on education, politics, ethics, want purifying in the ascetic fire of devotion if knowledge of our essential divinity and inherent magical powers is to spring up spontaneously from within. Further Mr. Radclyffe emphasizes the lethal poison of *other*-dependence, stressing the necessity of freedom. Like many others he seems to identify freedom with materialistic denial of things spiritual. Yet this volume must be gratifying to all who would have man recognize himself as the only god (or devil) there is and have done with ceremonial magic disguised in the sacred name of Religion by bogus magicians styled priests—of church . . . yes and of scientific laboratories.

T. C.

Henry Vaughan and the Hermetic Philosophy. By ELIZABETH HOLMES, M.A., B. Litt. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

Miss Holmes has made an exhaustive study of the Hermetic poets of the seventeenth century. With this as a basis, supported by her knowledge of Hermetic teachings, she has given us what should serve as an introduction and incentive to further study of a subject not even to be outlined in a small book.

Henry Vaughan, like his brother Thomas, Jacob Böehme, Donne and others quoted in this essay, intuitively grasped fundamental laws of Nature, glimpsing the esotericism lying at the heart of religious philosophies. Theosophists will agree with Miss Holmes's contention that these were vouchsafed by the "subconscious" (or as they would put it, superconscious) mind of the poet, for such flashes of Genius, the Ancients taught, come from the super-, not the sub-conscious realms (*vide* Mme. Blavatsky's "Genius" *Lucifer*, Nov. 1889). The idea of microcosm and macrocosm, evolution through incessant rebirth (physical and spiritual), the doctrine of emanations and the immanence of deity as propounded by Spinoza and the "seers" of every age, are among the teachings woven into Vaughan's poetry. This is significant, not coincidental. Students of Theosophy must feel grateful to Miss Holmes for her labours in emphasizing the existence of this ancient system of knowledge forgotten or denied by the majority. What J. Middleton Murry is doing for Blake in THE ARYAN PATH (November 1932) and in his essays and books, that Miss Holmes is doing for the Hermetic poets. Such work must hasten the day when the Light which shone in the East shall illuminate the world.

C. D.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ORIGIN OF INDIAN CASTES

[In response to a request we have received several communications on the views of the late Mr. Charles Johnston concerning the origin and development of the Hindu Castes. Below we print views of two of our esteemed contributors.—EDS.]

I

I have been asked by the Editors of THE ARYAN PATH to comment upon the remarks of the late Mr. Charles Johnston in his Introduction to the *Bhagavad Gita* on the Indian castes—remarks to which attention was drawn by Mr. R. A. V. Morris in the January issue of this journal. It requires no great scholarship to see that, in the passages quoted by Mr. Morris, Mr. Johnston was merely indulging in some fancies of his own rather than drawing conclusions from established facts. There is no evidence for the belief that the Vaisyas belonged to a yellow race. There is no evidence for the assumption that the Kshatriyas and the Rajputs were always identical. There is again no evidence for the conclusion that the gods of the Vaisyas and the Kshatriyas were different from those of the Brahmans. And, lastly, there is no conclusive evidence for the assumption —which is often repeated by some interested critics, as if it were an established fact—that the Atma-Vidya of the Upanishads was a purely Kshatriya and not a Brahminical achievement; on the other hand, as Deussen says, the earliest form of the Upanishadic doctrine is to be found in the discourses of the Brahman sage Yagñavalkya in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*.

The origins of the Indian Castes are lost in obscurity. However there seems to be little doubt that, as Senart has pointed out, in its early stages the Hindu Caste system had some points of resemblance to the Greek and Roman social systems. Just as all the Indo-Germanic tribes had a common parent-language which developed on different lines in the different lands which they came to occupy after their dispersion, so they had common social institutions which developed in different ways in the different kinds of environment in which their lot was cast. The ancestors of the ancient Greeks and Romans reached Greece and Italy and created the City-State, while their kinsmen who wandered to the East and reached Hindustan created the caste system. The seed was common, which in different soils gave rise to different growths. The Indian *Kula*, *Gotra* and *Jati* correspond more or less to the Roman *Gens*, *Curia* and *Tribus* and to the Greek *Genos*, *Phratria* and *Phyle*. And the rule of exogamous marriage for the smaller group and of endogamous marriage for the larger group were common both to the Eastern and the Western Aryans. So also were the commensal regulations observed during religious repasts. The latter, being the external symbols of family unions, were confined to the persons of the same blood, like the Hindu funeral banquets even to-day. Thus the class or the caste, as well as the older tribe and the clan, was originally only the Aryan family writ large. Whatever names they may take in different countries, says Senart, they are no more than an expansion of the family, the organization of which they copy and extend. This primitive organization was subjected to different influences in the different lands to which the Aryan tribes penetrated.

In India the first and foremost influence was the presence of a large and overwhelming dark-skinned native population with their own customs and

manners, their own gods and goddesses and their own languages and institutions. The contrast between the fair-skinned Aryan and the dark-skinned Dasyu gave rise to the concept of Varna or the colour bar which afterwards came to signify caste. And the long centuries of struggle between the two races resulted ultimately, not only in the subjection of the darker race, but also in the stratification of the conquering tribes. The sacerdotal and the military classes came to be distinguished by division of labour from the common people, who, alongside of the subjugated natives, tilled the soil, tended the cattle and carried on trade. The stratification was the price which the conquerors had to pay for their conquest. Thus almost at the inception of the Caste system we have in operation both the principles of racial subjection and class hierarchy. In Greece and Rome civil and political ideas centring round a City-State gradually loosened the old narrow bonds of clan and tribe. But in India, where cities took no root and the immigrants were scattered over an immense area and came to live in small self-sufficient village communities, all the primitive ideas of exclusiveness gained strength and became firmly entrenched.

Secondly, when we come to historical times, we see after the fall of the Mauryan Empire a series of foreign invasions leaving their inevitable traces on the Indian social system. The Indian frontiers were continually harassed by the Bactrian Greeks, the Parthians, the Sakas, the Kusanas and later by the terrible Huns. All these alien races were gradually assimilated and given a more or less honourable place in the social structure. Almost all modern scholars are of opinion that the Rajput and the Ghurjara kingdoms that established themselves in medieval India were the results of foreign invasions. The conquering tribes were Hinduized, and a new Kshatriya chivalry arose out of the ashes of the old. It is apparently only after the Muslim conquest and the religious persecutions that India lost her powers of assimilation and her castes became hardened in self-defence into little cast-iron cells.

Thirdly, apart from invasions, wars and conquests, the normal civil life of the people and their daily occupations cut across all class and racial divisions and produced those powerful trade guilds of which we hear so much in the Buddhist *Jataka Tales*. "These guilds," says Mr. Blunt in his *Caste System of Northern India*, "were purely occupational bodies; persons following a particular profession, of whatever social class they might be, belonged to them." These corporations must have given a strong impetus to the formation of the innumerable, hereditary, functional castes—of potters, barbers, washermen, fishermen, shepherds, blacksmiths etc. —with which the Indian social system is honeycombed even to the present day. We should not forget the fact that orignally even the Brahmans and the Kshatriyas were distinguished from the rest of the community only as occupational castes, which in course of time became hereditary, and their example must have been copied below by the bulk of the population. And there is evidence to show that even the castes at the top of the social ladder, though they were largely hereditary, were by no means always homogeneous in character. For instance, it is believed that the Saivite temple priests in Southern India are recruits taken into the Brahman class from lower ranks, and we have already seen how the Hinduized alien conquerors of Northern India became neo-Kshatriyas.

Fourthly, in religious schisms and the formation of sects we have another force cutting across class divisions and eventually producing new groups, which in their turn by means of endogamous marriages and commensal regulations—the twin pillars of the caste system —developed in course of time into subcastes. Buddhism and Jainism, no doubt, never intended to upset the caste system, as was once believed. But in the changing fortunes of these faiths and the ultimate victory of the Puranic Hinduism, resulting inevitably in the recon-

version of large groups, a considerable intermingling of classes must have taken place in the social system. We are on surer ground when we come to the innumerable sects introduced by Vaishnavism, Saivism, and Saktism.

So far we have mentioned only the most important natural forces that have shaped the Indian caste system through the ages. There were numerous other influences like excommunications, mixed marriages, cross-breedings colonisations and distant migrations which contributed their own quota to the complexities of caste. We may pass over these and come to the great artificial force which in a subtle but very effective way created the atmosphere of ideas from which this complex organism derived a large part of its sustenance—*viz.*, the force of education.

Mr. H. G. Wells in his *Work, Wealth and Happiness* has an interesting chapter on "Why people work," which throws some light on the stratification and growth of the Indian social system. Taking Jung's concept of *persona* which means "a man's guiding and satisfying idea of himself," he applies it to the psychology of European society and discovers three types of *persona*—the peasant, the nomad or adventurer and the priest.

> There is the peasant tradition with its exaltation of toil and its desperate clutch upon property, its fear, its political submissiveness and its great power of passive resistance. There is the nomad tradition with its rapacity and handsome spending. There is the priestly tradition, the tradition of the trained and educated man with its repudiation of mercenariness, its conceptions of service and disinterestedness. How these strands interwove and interacted to constitute medieval society is a matter of history . . . . . All these traditions still mingle in us and about us. Out of them we build our *personas*, our conceit of ourselves, our conception of our rôles and of what becomes us.

We have the same strands in Indian society also, only the interweaving is checked by the principle of heredity. Mr. Wells goes on to observe "that the modern *persona* is being steadily modified by education in the direction of substituting . . . . . co-operative service for the pure acquisitiveness and desire for dominance of the traditional scheme." This is again exactly what was done for the Indian society by the great Hindu nation-builders from the anonymous author of the Purusha-Sukta in the *Rig-Veda*, where we have the first mention of the four-fold caste, down to Sankara and Ramanuja. The authors of the two Epics, the codes of Law and the Puranas, in fact almost all Hindu writers of any authority, so persistently maintained this theocratic ideal of *Çāturvarnya* that, in spite of all the transformations that society was undergoing before their very eyes, people looked upon the four-fold caste as the ideal norm of society to which they had to conform, if they wanted to save their souls. They created the *persona* of the priest and the prince, the merchant and the peasant. Not only were the four castes conceived as the creation of God, but also they were supposed to have a cosmic significance by being connected with the three eternal qualities of *Sattva Rajas* and *Tamas* of Nature itself and their permutations and combinations. Furthermore, they were adduced as part of the evidence of the inviolable law of Karma, the good actions of this life resulting in a promotion for the agent in the social hierarchy in the next life. Thus on all sides the ideal society was rounded off, and its various parts were supposed to work into one another with beautiful harmony like the parts of the Solar system. And a perfect social organism it would, perhaps, have been, if only India had been the universe and if dreams of men could at any time become realities.

But meanwhile what were the facts apart from ideals? There is no historical evidence to show that at any time in the history of India the society presented the neat horizontal straight lines so easily taken for granted in the theocratic system. The relation between the various castes and subcastes, as they existed in actuality, could not really be represented by a simple diagram of four straight lines, any more than the relations between the various dialects of Prakrit could be represented by a

neat genealogical table. Even a complicated system of intersecting curves would fail to do justice to the reality. But the simple artificial diagram, which was so indelibly impressed on the national imagination by the Hindu writers that an Indian peasant to-day questions it no more than he does the sun and the stars, served a great educational purpose. During the long centuries when a strong central government was either non-existent or was frequently changing hands, it was the theocratic ideal of caste system that saved society from disruption. What the Indian governing class failed to do, the sacerdotal class did after its own fashion. The Kshatriyas failed to build an enduring State which would prove a solvent for class jealousies and antagonisms, and ward off foreign invaders. The Brahmans built instead the caste system which for a long time mitigated class antagonisms and harmonised communities occupying varying levels of culture into one social unit, and which acted as a cohesive force in spite of the foreign invader. The caste system did not, of course, make for progress, but it maintained order. If the Hindus have not gone the way of the Greeks and Romans they have to thank the caste system. But whether life is worth living at any cost—at the cost of honour, independence, progress and freedom—is another matter.

Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy says somewhere that a perfection that has been is not the perfection for us. Wisdom lies in striving after a new kind of perfection in a new set of circumstances. The caste system has had its day. It is in ruins now. But those who condemn it as an illustration of priestcraft are as blind as those who still believe that it is a special creation of God. It is no more priestcraft than, say, the medieval Christian edifice of salvation. The builders of both were perfectly honest and sincere, and imagined they were building for all time.

Madras D. S. SARMA

II

Mr. Johnston's observations have some support in the *Mahabharata*. In the 188th chapter of the "Santi-Parva" it is said that "originally Brahma created Brahmins . . . . . The colour of Brahmins is white, of Kshatriyas ruddy, of Vaisyas yellow, and of Sudras black." The *Mahabharata* proceeds to observe that there occurred sometime in the past a fall from the exalted ideal of all belonging to one and the same caste.

There is no doubt that the caste differences which are now noticed in contemporary society are concomitant with a state of affairs brought about by the fall from the exalted ideal.

Modern India has produced many reformers who have endeavoured their utmost to eradicate caste evils and prejudices. Their endeavours, however well-meaning and idealistic, have resulted in the substitution of class-differences and class-conflicts, which are more reprehensible than castes. The old Aladdin's lamp of castes need not be exchanged for the new one of class-distinctions offered by modern magicians.

As the observations of Mr. Johnston occur in his introduction to a translation of the *Gita*, it would be very legitimate to investigate if his remarks find support in the *Gita* itself. Not only in Chapter IV, stanza 13 but, in the concluding chapter as well, (stanzas 41 to 44) the inevitability of caste distinctions is emphasized.

I do not see anything in Mr. Johnston's remarks which would be seriously challenged by orthodox upholders of the doctrines of the *Gita*. Heterodoxy raises its head in all attempts to interpret ancient Indian texts in the light of modern scientific investigations. Some of Mr. Johnston's statements are fanciful. The struggle between the Pandavas and the Kauravas is not responsible for the continued dominance of sacerdotal Brahmins. Even before the war, Brahmin dominance had

reached perfection inasmuch as Brahmins were accorded special treatment and privileges.

Of course, the *Gita* makes it perfectly plain that from a philosophical standpoint like the one which a *Sthitaprajnya* is expected to climb up to, caste conflicts and class differences cease to have any value. One who can maintain mental equipoise or equilibrium when confronted with the play and interplay of the values of existence which owe their origin to the permutations and combinations of the effects of the three Gunas so ably championed by the Sankhyas, and incorporated into their own teachings by the Vedantins, will not have anything to do with caste-differences and class-conflicts. Class-pride, caste-pride, civilisation-pride and other prides have been purged out of his mind. It is this aspect of the problem which European critics of the Indian caste system fail to understand consciously or otherwise. In a press interview at Bombay, Bernard Shaw is reported to have observed that there was enough of English untouchability, and that he had no time to think of Indian untouchability.

The existence of deep-rooted class-prejudices and class-conflicts is a common spectacle even in the most democratic of modern countries, and if these are not merely tolerated but even passionately vindicated, there is no reason why Indian caste distinctions may not be similarly tolerated and vindicated. On the contrary, tendencies directed to undermining caste distinctions as they obtain in India are clearly visible.

For purposes of a sociological division of labour, caste distinctions are doubtless necessary and inevitable so long as human nature continues to be what it is, but, according to the *Gita* and ideals of Vedanta proclaimed by other texts, there is hardly any place for caste-arrogance or caste-pride.

Under modern conditions of existence in India, membership of a particular caste involves or may involve one in a sort of disadvantage, but, if one only understands the real import of the call of the *Gita*, he would perform his duties attaching to his caste and office or station in life with philosophical disregard of consequences pleasant and unpleasant, and in a sky-lark spirit of fullness and cheerfulness. The issue has always been the divine origin of castes or their human origin. The former is the orthodox, and the latter the heterodox view. Mr. Johnston's analysis has some textual sanction as I have already indicated, and the element of heterodoxy appears only in his anthropological approach to the problem of Indian castes. To students of religion and philosophy, however, it is the philosophical approach that matters. I may add in conclusion that the attitude, which while applauding class distinctions condemns only Indian castes, strongly savours of — ?

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Kumbhakonam

THINKING—A FACULTY

"All the world," wrote Emerson, "is at hazard when God lets loose a thinker." This leads us to suppose that there are not many thinkers in the world! The greatest asset to a nation or a race is its finely organized, balanced minds capable of real thought.

King of the land, the water, and the air, man has yet to conquer the domain of his own mind. Voice circles the planet, pictures in the ether already presage undreamed of possibilities, inventions of all kinds draw man ever closer and closer to the door of the invisible, yet he has not yet become acquainted with himself.

People believe that because they are human beings, they know how to think. "Such nonsense," a person declares, "of course I know how to think! Did I not go to school, and have I not a university degree!" The mind to grow must receive continuous education. And the man who leads the fullest life is the man who continues to learn. Plotinus said:

Knowledge has three degrees, opinions, science, and illumination. The last is absolute knowledge founded upon the identity of the knowing mind with the known subject.

Modern education is to blame for our mental laziness, for it requires comparatively little exercise of the elements of original thought. We are taught this and that is so, but never *why* it is so. In the end, we acquire a fair knowledge of things as they seem to be, not as they are. We grasp the effects of things, but rarely the causes. Consequently we are without knowledge of how to improve conditions or ourselves.

The ancients considered the most important thing in life was that man be *trained* to think, and all preliminary education in the Mystery Schools was concerned with this problem of building the thinking faculty.

The question was never how long does it take to train a mind to think, but how well is it accomplished! They considered that even to build one faculty was the labour of a lifetime. It has been said that man's brain is his youngest vehicle. He has had a physical body much longer than he has had a mind, and his thinking faculty takes time to build. Thinking is a process in mind. Every individual is now using the power of thought, but in what way? We think, it is true, but how do we think—beautifully and constructively, or do we merely suppose that we think?

In the school of Pythagoras the student was compelled to devote a certain time exclusively to the reception of knowledge. He had to remain silent for a period of five years, as well. Pythagoras considered that this silence fostered the art of self-control, a very necessary thing in the training of the mind. Indeed, so beautiful a jewel in man's list of faculties was self-control, that many of the ancients spoke of it as an art. In this school was taught mathematics, from which was gained exactness. Music was taught the student as well, from which was gained rhythm, and astronomy from which was gained realization of cosmic immensities.

All the great teachers have taught that the mind was man's real world, and that his thoughts were the tools with which he carved his life story. In choosing his thoughts man chooses *results*.

Students of the ancient schools were taught to ask themselves: "Does my thinking travel in circles, or do I arrive somewhere? Is it tolerant thinking, plastic enough to admit of new thoughts and new ideas, or is it incapable of expansion? Do I think with proportion and above all with consistency? To-day we do well to ask ourselves these questions, and if we cannot answer them rightly, we must tear apart our thinking apparatus and build a new one.

Progress in thinking constructively is measured by capacity. People suffer from a kind of mental indigestion. That is because they start out trying to assimilate thoughts too big for their present mental equipment. We build capacity slowly, increase it gradually. People often do not realize that the mind is an instrument capable of fatigue, and for every period of intense effort, the mind must be given a similar period of rest and relaxation. Also it is to be remembered that it is not involvedness of thought that develops the mind, but the simplicity of thought.

Concentration is an aid to mind training, and has to do with the training and unfolding of the brain. We have no time to-day for concentration, for we can never do only one thing at a time! In our civilization we must do several things and all at once. We pick up a book and turn on the radio. We believe we know how to concentrate; we believe, too, that we are mentally alert the whole time we are awake, but very often we are not thinking at all! Consider how a crisis causes our mind to rise to organized, executive ability. But when the crisis is over, think of the resultant mental exhaustion! Training, however, will enable the thinking faculty to engage in prolonged, orderly thought.

To learn to think intelligently requires more time and effort than any other profession in the world. And it is only acquired through the most exacting dis-

cipline. People say to-day that life is so short, its problems so numerous and complex that time does not permit of complicated studies regarding spiritual and mental things. This is inconsistent. He who does not start to learn about himself and the true purposes of life because he feels he will not have time to finish, will never start no matter how much time he may have! When we look upon the future as an ever-diminishing thing, we forget that nothing we ever learn and build into ourselves is lost. Courage and effort are all that are needed.

There is no excuse for ignorance, and he who is really ignorant of the purpose of life is truly ignorant, no matter what his book learning or intellectual attainments. To-day the floodgates of thought have opened, and a great river of knowledge is rolling over the world. There is no excuse for man not making an attempt to improve his thinking organism, no excuse for not strengthening the mind. We improve the quality of the body by refining the process of our living, why not our thinking apparatus by the refining of our thinking?

However, merely training the intellect alone will never produce a true thinker. Intellect argues; Spirit takes of the deep things of Nature and reveals. A thinker is one who has built into himself those spiritual and ethical qualities that develop the higher nature. Such a man is permeated with realization and understanding of the natural order of things. He is conscious, too, of what he is and his place in the plan.

Wisdom is not the property of a chosen few. It is universal. But it is never revealed to those who have not earned the right to comprehend it or built the faculties necessary to lay hold of it. Beauty and grace of thought, harmonious and peaceful living, result from the familiarity with the true elements of thought. It has been said that man never really learns anything from without. Socrates maintained that he never taught anyone anything. He merely taught his disciples to bring knowledge forth from themselves. True wisdom comes forth from within, when the mind has been trained to orderly thinking. The words of the wise are a lamp to the feet, and a light on the way. We must read the wise, however, but think for our ourselves. One thought of our own, worked out even with great labour and striving, is better for the student, more of value to the individual life than a thousand brilliant thoughts voiced by another. Within the mind are gifts, treasures, abilities. To make the mind yield these lovely things, we must cultivate it.

To the philosopher to live is to think. We need philosophers to-day. We can unform our thoughts, and reform them. We are entering a wonderful era. But before man can truly live he must become master of himself and ruler of his own mind. All that man knows, he owes to the thoughts of some departed race. And he is the Builder of To-morrow.

San Francisco ISABEL STRADLEY

THE WOODCRAFT FOLK

During the Great War, the Scout Movement, a very military organisation in its early days, became most closely identified with the military machine in Great Britain (and not there alone). Scouts were "mobilised" for many home services and Scout Training was regarded as a fine preliminary to overseas service; and the success, from a military point of view, of its activities was considered complete justification of the claims it had made before the war. Throughout the war no one whispered that the slaughter was in any way inconsistent with pre-war professions of international brotherhood, and the ideal of service to one's country in its hour of danger was preached through every means open to the movement. "Service," alas, meant "slaughter," and there came a time when men wearied of it and peace ensued. A miserable, neurotic peace—but that is by the way. Among the millions of demobilised soldiers and sailors who returned to the country

were thousands of ex-Scouts, whose conception of "patriotism" and "service" was less naïve than it once had been. These ex-service Scouts formed the basis of a "pacifist" protest within the official Scout Movement. They believed that the Scout Movement had belied its own ideals in identifying itself so closely with the war machine and demanded the revision of its official attitude towards military and imperial questions and, virtually, the expulsion of the "old gang" of generals, admirals, aristocrats and clergymen who too long had, from their executive armchairs, urged youth to the annihilation of itself.

The revolt came to nought, as so many revolts did in those days, its leaders were expelled from the movement, and the rank and file were pacified by the lip-service of the "old gang" to peace and internationalism. A great deal of the blatant militarism of the movement was thrown overboard. The Scout Movement was never seriously in danger, however, for its authoritarian structure enabled it to silence criticism.

As a result of the rebellion the Kibbo Kift Movement was formed, which took the irreconcilables from the Scout Movement. Kibbo Kift claimed to get down to fundamentals. It proclaimed itself pacifist and internationalist and wanted to direct its educational work to the building up of a new world order. Its educational work had a more primitive basis than that of the Scout Movement. It dissociated itself from churches, religion and "service" to one's country (where this meant enmity to another's), and it used the appeal of primitive things—taught its members to love the unspoilt earth, preached a new physical hardihood, indulged in primitive crafts and pursuits, used crude and effective symbols and a mystic ceremonial.

Kibbo Kift had no real basis, however, and fell foul of its own members. It could not make up its mind whether it had anything in common with radical doctrines or required the co-operation of socialists and other progressives. Cranks assaulted it and it swung from one protesting doctrine to another. How ephemeral its doctrine was may be judged from the fact that it has now abandoned all its early teachings and methods and has emerged into a timid Fascism with the Douglas Credit Theory as its new war-cry. Thus it has run the full circle, for the new Kibbo Kift protests its patriotism more vociferously than did the old Scout Movement.

It is only important to this article because it threw off, in its early days, an organisation known as The Woodcraft Folk (The Federation of Co-operative Woodcraft Fellowships). The Woodcraft Folk was never in doubt for a moment about militarism and imperialism. Against every type and manifestation of these it has set its face. More, it believed that one was either for the old order or for the new. There could be no neutrality. So it allied itself with radical organisations and co-operative societies and set itself the task of building a "Scout" Movement for the working classes. However there are differences in method. The Woodcraft Folk is co-educational. It is bravely idealist, it believes in colour, song and festival and the appeal of primitive things—camping, fires, totems, and the adventurous open air life. It tries to make its members mentally and physically whole, for only with whole minds and bodies can they be fit to serve their fellow men, and it strives to liberate the pent-up creative powers in the spiritually starved children of the great cities and to build through them a cultural life for the new world it hopes to usher in.

Intensely creative though it is, it does not ignore science and it strives to equip children and young people with a knowledge of evolution and world history that they may put their own lives in perspective.

As to all its methods and achievements a full account of them must be sought in the movement's many publications. Suffice to say that it has now emerged as the largest of the new movements for children and young people.

I conclude by quoting its affirmation :

The Woodcraft Folk is a working-class movement. It is democratic in structure, free in educational method, and wide in appeal. It seeks to enlist the enthusiasm and energy of youth for the great task of our generation, the building out of our inequal and disorderly age a civilisation worthy of mankind.

It believes that any attempt to establish a new, world-wide economic order is dependent upon the training of youth in the science of our age and the deliberate cultivation of a world outlook in children and young people. To achieve this end the Folk seeks to forge a powerful educational instrument which shall inculcate those habits of mind and body necessary to bring man to devotion to world peace and a new world order.

The Folk welcomes all who are young under its banner. It asks that all who sign the charter and accept its laws shall give more than moral support; shall turn all their energy and determination to the service of the Folk, since its work is for all men and all time.

LESLIE ALLEN PAUL

[**Leslie Allen Paul** founded The Woodcraft Folk in 1925. He was successively butcher boy, hospital orderly, clerk, newspaper representative, Editor of *The Open Road*, lobby correspondent, free lance journalist, and lecturer in social subjects. He acted as the Chairman of Co-operative Delegation U. S. S. R., 1931. He is the author of *Pipes of Pan* (poems); *The Ashen Stave* (Songs); *The Folk Trail*; *The Child and the Race*; *Russia, 1931*; *Fugitive Morning* (novel).—EDS.]

MYSTICAL MATERIALISM

Mr. Middleton Murry in his review in your January issue refers (on p. 67) to an imaginative Marxism as a "mystical materialism".

May I be allowed to point out that this phrase which represents the root of much of the very loose thought now prevalent, is really a contradiction in terms?

Mysticism holds that a spiritual significance or reality is hidden in or underlies phenomena.

Materialism asserts that only the material is real.

In so far as Materialism becomes mystical it ceases to be materialism.

Moreover in so far as our idealists—Communist or other—take on a materialistic outlook they stultify themselves, since that view places a disproportionate emphasis on mundane things and makes their very ideals appear unreal.

Colchester FRANCIS ENGLEHEART

MODERN TALISMANS

I read not long ago in a newspaper of a new device for keeping influenza away. This takes the form of lockets, brooches or buttons, the making of which, it appears, keeps a certain pottery firm working night and day. These charms contain iodine. Dr. J. A. Goodfellow of Chesterfield explains that Iodine is capable of giving off a vapour which lodges in the throat and nose and thus strengthens the resistance of the breather to germs. The doctor has discovered by experiment a method by which Iodine can be controlled and made to give off any quantity of vapour. Hence the "charms" are simply Iodine distributors. It is claimed, incidentally, that Chesterfield has suffered less from the epidemic of influenza than any of the neighbouring towns.

No one doubts that Iodine has curative powers, but since I have read about Dr. Goodfellow, I have wondered whether ancient amulets and talismans, made by the wise men of old, had not still more potent powers, although their nature was unknown often to their users. Give one of Dr. Goodfellow's brooches to a person ignorant of the properties of Iodine, and the charm would still work.

The great magician, Apollonius of Tyana is said to have known the secret virtues latent in precious stones, and to have imparted them to his disciples. His talismans, according to Justin Martyr, "prevent, as we see, the fury of the waves, the violence of the winds, and the attacks of wild beasts". May there not be then in the traditions of the older peoples a real basis for some beliefs which are now considered superstitions.

London H. J.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Professor Max Planck, the doyen of international physicists, makes a clear statement about free will and determinacy in his recent book. Many people have been puzzled because Professor Planck holds to the belief in determinacy in Nature while declaring himself in favour of human free will. Our esoteric philosophy teaches the same dual doctrine, but more fully explaining the numerous puzzles of this "inconsistency". The Sanskrit term Karma covers the field both of determinacy and of free will. It is too vast a subject to be thoroughly examined in these columns, and we will revert to it a little later contenting ourselves by quoting four apposite aphorisms:—

Karma is an undeviating and unerring tendency in the Universe to restore equilibrium, and it operates incessantly.

There is no Karma unless there is a being to make it or feel its effects.

Karmic causes already set in motion must be allowed to sweep on until exhausted, but this permits no man to refuse to help his fellows and every sentient being.

Measures taken by an Ego to repress tendency, eliminate defects, and to counteract by setting up different causes, will alter the sway of Karmic tendency and shorten its influence in accordance with the strength or weakness of the efforts expended in carrying out the measures adopted.

On the eve of constitutional changes of a far-reaching character it is but meet and proper that our countrymen should direct their attention to the economic condition of the country. Political freedom should go hand in hand with economic progress and both are naturally interdependent. At the present day even the free nations of the world are in the grip of economic distress, and our country which is backward in industry and commerce cannot escape it but is bound to share the consequences of this world condition in the most acute and severe form.

Thus spoke Acharya P. C. Ray at Allahabad (*The Leader* 3rd March 1933). Judging by the standards of the machine age India is a backward country. Compensatingly it is less affected than Europe and the U.S.A. by the havoc wrought by the industrial revolution. In the latter territory the triumph of the machine has been the greatest. That "triumph" has a moral and a lesson for backward countries. Indian masses suffer, it is said, because the machine is non-existent; people of the U. S. A. suffer certainly, because there the machine is omnipresent. Mr. Howard Scott states :—

The technologist has succeeded to such an extent that he is to-day capable of building and operating engines of energy conversion that have nine million times the output capacity of the average single human being working an eight hour day.

Below we quote a few figures which give for the principal American industries the change in volume of output and in the employment of wage earners between 1923 and 1927:—

Industry	*Change in output.*	*Change in employment.*
Oil: Petroleum Refining	84% more	5% less
Tobacco	53% more	13% less
Meat: Slaughtering, Packing	20% more	19% less
Railroads, 1922-26 ...	30% more	1% less
Construction, Ohio Only	11% more	15% less
Automobiles, 1922-26 ...	69% more	48% more
Rubber Tyres	28% more	7% more
Bituminous Coal ...	4% more	15% less
Electricity, 1922-27 ...	70% more	52% more
Steel	8% more	9% less
Cotton Mills	3% more	13% less
Electrical Equipment ...	10% more	6% less
Agriculture, 1920-25 ...	10% more	5% less
Lumber	6% less	21% less
Men's Clothing ...	1% more	7% less
Paper	0%	7% less
Shoes	7% less	12% less

The U. S. A. problem is described by Archibald MacLeish in an article "Obsolete Men" reprinted in the *New English Weekly* (2nd February), from which also the above figures are taken:—

The sum and substance of the problem is this: from the purely productive point of view, a part of the human race is already obsolete and a further part is obsolescent. But from the consuming point of view, no human being is obsolete: on the contrary, an ever-increasing human consumption is not only desirable but necessary. These are the hard and pointed horns of the dilemma of our time.

Now what should India do? —Go ahead and build factories and instal machines?

The New English Weekly is edited not only with ability, but with religious fervour for his cause, by Mr. A. R. Orage who wrote in THE ARYAN PATH for February 1930 on "The Next Renaissance"; concluding that article, he said:—

What Greek and Roman culture did for the dark ages, I believe the *Mahabharata* may do for our own benighted age—more, in fact, because it springs from a higher source.

Another of our esteemed contributors, Mr. T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, delivering the Valedictory address of the Madras Presidency College Sanskrit Association (*The Hindu*, 2nd March) stressed the importance of the study of the *Mahabharata*.

There was no department of life which they could not find not treated in the great epic and there was vast scope for students to make a detailed study. Statecraft, war, law, sociology, international law, were some of the topics which could profitably be taken up and studied . . . To him a study of the Mahabharata was more interesting than a study of the other great epic, the Ramayana. The characters in the Mahabharata seemed to him to be more real than the characters given in the Ramayana. The treatment and description of characters were more lifelike. The speaker considered that the most tragic character in the whole epic was that of Karna. In him they had a complete illustration of what might be called "Tejovadha." In the epic the clash between two cultures had been well brought out and the lessons they could draw from it were many. The speaker therefore appealed to the students of Sanskrit to get themselves imbued with a true university spirit and study the Mahabharata in a critical spirit.

ॐ

शांता महांतो निवसंति संतो वसंतवल्लोकहितं चरन्तः ।

The great and peaceful ones live regenerating the world like the coming of spring.

— विवेकचूडामणि (*Crest-Jewel of Wisdom*)

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV MAY 1933 No. 5

THE LOTUS — FLOWER OF POWER

Nature speaks in symbols and in signs—WHITTIER.

The study of the hidden meaning in every religious and profane legend, of whatsoever nation, large or small—preëminently the traditions of the East—occupied the greater portion of the life of H. P. Blavatsky. She was one of those who remain convinced that no mythological story, no traditional event in the folk-lore of a people has ever been, at any time, pure fiction, but that every one of such narratives has an actual historical lining to it. She held that the religious and esoteric history of every nation was embedded in symbols. A parable is a spoken symbol: a fiction or a fable as some think; an allegorical representation of life realities, events and facts, according to the esoteric philosophy. Even fairy tales do not exclusively belong to the nursery; and though few, there have been those who have comprehended their hidden meaning and tried to explain it. "The Myths" says Horace in his *Ars Poetica* "have been invented by wise men to strengthen the laws and teach moral truths"; therefore Horace endeavoured to make clear the very spirit and essence of the ancient myths. Plutarch tells us that he was initiated into the secret mysteries of Dionysus, and writing to a colleague on the state of the soul after death he said that "the mystic symbols are well known to us who belong to the 'brotherhood'".

H. P. Blavatsky took pains to explain many parables, myths, and symbols in her writings. That

part of her instruction has not been brought out in our pages, because the modern mind is more literal than poetic, and generally disdains to treat fantasy and fairy lore seriously. But this month we have an opportunity. On the 8th of May every year Theosophists commemorate the anniversary of the death of H. P. Blavatsky, who expressed a wish ere her passing that it should be called White Lotus Day, as the flower best symbolized her life and mission. In her *Secret Doctrine* she devotes a whole section of the book to the exposition of symbols and among them is the Lotus. She has turned the key of interpretation several times; below we select two passages for study and reflection.

There are no ancient symbols, without a deep and philosophical meaning attached to them; their importance and significance increasing with their antiquity. Such is the LOTUS. It is the flower sacred to nature and her Gods, and represents the abstract and the Concrete Universes, standing as the emblem of the productive powers of both spiritual and physical nature. It was held sacred from the remotest antiquity by the Aryan Hindus, the Egyptians, and the Buddhists after them; revered in China and Japan, and adopted as a Christian emblem by the Greek and Latin Churches, who made of it a messenger as the Christians do now, who replace it with the water lily. It had, and still has, its mystic meaning which is identical with every nation on the earth. *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 379.

The Lotus, or Padma, is, moreover, a very ancient and favourite simile for the Kosmos itself, and also for man. The popular reasons given are, firstly, the fact just mentioned, that the Lotus-seed contains within itself a perfect miniature of the future plant, which typifies the fact that the spiritual prototypes of all things exist in the immaterial world before those things become materialized on Earth. Secondly, the fact that the Lotus plant grows up through the water, having its root in the Ilus, or mud, and spreading its flower in the air above. The Lotus thus typifies the life of man and also that of the Kosmos; for the Secret Doctrine teaches that the elements of both are the same, and that both are developing in the same direction. The root of the Lotus sunk in the mud represents material life, the stalk passing up through the water typifies existence in the astral world, and the flower floating on the water and opening to the sky is emblematical of spiritual being. (*Ibid.*, I, 57–58)

As the Lotus is symbolic of human evolution, human progression and perfection, in the highest aspect the Sacred Lotus represents the Holy of Holies—the Heart of Man. To this the true Buddhist is taught to direct his mind when he repeats: "Aum Mani Padme Hum"—"Oh! the Jewel in the Lotus". The true esotericist is one who penetrates into the very kernel of matter and regards the soul of things where the profane but perceives the external work of form.

ON HEARING

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

श्रोतव्यस्य श्रुतस्य च ॥

This expression occurs (*Gita* II. 52) in Krishna's exposition of Buddhi Yoga, the method of purifying buddhi, the power of discernment. This buddhi is translated as intellect, mind, heart; but it is a faculty of the lower man and must not be confused with Buddhi of the inner and higher man which Buddhi is a ray of Mahabuddhi, or Mahat, the Universal Mind.

Our understanding-discernment is clouded. Illusion (*maya*), delusion (*moha*), ever envelop the man. Buddhi-Yoga frees us from this bondage. Several are the marks of this bondage. Among them is this one—about what is heard and what remains to be heard. But every mark of bondage has within it the power to remove that bondage. The creator of the bondage and the maker of Karma is stronger than the bondage or the Karma.

Sight is regarded as the instrument of perception. Peoples' beliefs are based on what is seen, and those who believe on hearsay are looked down upon. That is right, for people should not act on hearsay. But to depend on our sight and say "I believe because I see," is also wrong. All belief is to be discouraged, whether it is due to hearing or to seeing.

Come to knowledge. We find that in modern science, observation, *i.e.*, sight, precedes deduction, theory, and report. When an experimenter's sight is satisfied he speaks, and on his report other scientists observe, and then the world hears and repeats—"science teaches." But this is unsatisfactory; for again and again science contradicts itself.

Turn to the world of Maharishis and Mahatmas. Their Divine Science, Brahma-Vidya, describes the evolution of the universe as based on Sound.

According to these Sages, evolution is an unfoldment and a procession, really speaking an unfolding-procession. The order is —Life as basic, immovable and immortal Spirit; then, Life as creative energy (*Daiviprakriti*); and then Life as ever-breaking, ever-multiplying matter (*Mulaprakriti*). All three are Life, or Life in three states—the root-states of what we call gaseous, liquid and solid conditions of

matter. All that is gaseous corresponds to spirit, all that is liquid corresponds to energy, all that is solid corresponds to matter. Each of these states is a wave of Life in which spirit-beings, energy-beings, matter-beings, emerge as a procession. The differentiating power, that which enables us to cognize the One as three,—and Life cannot be cognized otherwise,—is Sound. Sound-vibration (*nāda-dhvani*), condensing or materializing, forms stars; sound inherent in each orb produces forms belonging to that orb—down to the very atoms. *Shabda-Brahman* is Word-God, *i.e.*, the universe as a Living-Word. The music of the spheres is a fact; it is heard, not seen.

Again, these old Sages teach that of all our senses, that of hearing unfolded first; the human body evolved the ear as the primary organ; therefore it is said that man hears and should hear before he sees. Adopting the order of Nature these Sages, in Their system of education, put sound before sight—that which is heard before that which is seen.

The Vedas were heard, then repeated, then recorded. It is said that if one wants to understand fully the Vedas, he must hear them. Reading may yield a meaning for the mind, but hearing brings a meaning for buddhi, heart or intellect.

The order to be observed in gaining knowledge is—(1) Hear, (2) Memorize, (3) Contemplate, (4) Understand, and (5) Teach. In our Holy Order these are the five steps. What do we hear? *Shruti*, Revelation; when that is memorized we have what is called *Smriti*, Tradition; these two give the subject for, and become the cause of, contemplation; then understanding results; when one has understood through meditation on that which was memorized and heard, then he is to teach; and that fifth step is part of learning. Even understanding is insufficient; when all that is understood is repeated for the benefit of others, then is the gaining of knowledge completed.

When the Sages laid the foundation of Society in ancient and glorious India, They devised numerous rituals; each ceremony was a reminder to mortals, and told them of some spiritual truth. The Thread ceremony dramatized this fact, for during that rite is whispered into the ear of the boy the sacred text which is his subject of meditation and his guide in life. He followed the same order: he heard, memorized, contemplated, understood and taught.

This is the real order. Aspirants must never try to see or understand that which they have not heard. Prying and curiosity are undesirable; to try to see and understand that about which we have not heard, invariably proves fatal; even were it not dangerous, such an habit delays the securing of true knowledge; but it is dangerous, for we come under the influence of foreign evil influences.

The true Gurus have a definite

way of training Their chelas. The five steps are purificatory; they cleanse the heart or buddhi, and adjust the vision of the chela. Just as for ordinary seeing the right focusing of the eyes is essential, so also for seeing ideas; the chela must learn the right focusing of his heart, otherwise intuition will not function. This adjustment of inner vision, which enables the chela to see truths, is made through his ear. Those who try to see without prior hearing are deluded psychics. Even when they are successful in rending the visible veil, they do not understand what they see, and what they see is like unto what the poor man whose eyes are out of focus sees. Never attempt to investigate or experiment with the invisible, unless the Guru's word on the subject has been heard. There is never a new discovery in the realm of knowledge; all intellects discover the same facts and truths; each aspirant has to learn this—in theory first, and then by practice.

There are truths which are already heard and those which are yet to be heard; therefore, this method and these rules do not only apply to aspirants and disciples, but belong to *Guru-parampara*—the whole chain of Gurus. A Rishi is one who having heard the Vedas chants them for the benefit of the world. Some doctrines are already taught to us, others are yet to be taught. We must not allow ourselves to be snared by this pair, any more than by any other pair. How? We must not be proud of what we know, nor be anxious that others shall accept our knowledge; on the other hand, we must not be impatient about what we have still to learn, nor must we attempt to turn another page of the Book of Wisdom. That Book is a Living Book, and its pages turn by themselves for each learner. Our faith in what has been heard and what has been taught is tested through our attitude to what shall be heard, to doctrines yet to be taught. Detachment about gaining Wisdom is a virtue necessary in the practice of Buddhi-Yoga—the Path of Purifying the Heart.

B. M.

O Disciple, unless the flesh is passive, head cool, the Soul as firm and pure as flaming diamond, the radiance will not reach the CHAMBER, *its sunlight will not warm the heart, nor will the mystic sounds of the Akasic heights reach the ear, however eager, at the initial stage.*

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

THE NEXT STEP FORWARD

[**J. D. Beresford** began to write for publication over a quarter of a century ago, and has to his credit novels, dramas and essays which have entertained and instructed many. His association with THE ARYAN PATH, since its inception, has led him to study H. P. Blavatsky's scientific philosophy about which he writes, most appropriately, this month.—EDS.]

In the November number of THE ARYAN PATH, I had occasion to quote M. Bergson as saying apropos of the two sources of Morality and Religion, that "religion's representations of death are nature's defensive reactions against the representation by the intelligence of a discouraging, unforeseen latitude between the initiative taken and the effect desired". At the head of this article a preliminary note was printed advising readers to compare the substance of this and other relevant statements of M. Bergson's with the Theosophical view of the cycle of evolution, and more particularly with H. P. Blavatsky's statement with regard to the acquisition of individuality, "first by natural impulse, and then by self-induced and self-devised efforts —checked by karma. . . ."

Now this suggested comparison seems to me of peculiar significance not only to Theosophists but to all those interested in the development of the Spirit of man, a development which finds its most illuminating commentary in his various religions. Without attempting, therefore, to enter into the difficult problems set by a consideration of the intricate relations between the Manas (Mind) and the lower principles,* I propose to examine briefly two aspects of this development which seem to me to suggest a highly important indication of the step even now being taken between the dogmatic religions and the principles and beliefs that will presently supersede them.

Let us begin by going back to the primitive rites and superstitions indicated in the quotation given above, as illustrating the lowest point of the cycle. In this stage the influence of intelligence is very small as compared with that of the lower principles, and one of the most dominant motives of human action and belief is fear. In the animal world this motive finds no compensation through the intelligence. The animal reaction, whether displayed in flight, anger or a paralysis of the will, is a pure reflex. Man at his most primitive exhibits, in addition, another response: he seeks also to conquer certain fears, death among them, by an explanation, and in this attempt is to be found the first seeds of religion and science.

The earliest expressions of this attempted explanation are very much alike in principle. In the vast mysterious world of life that continually presents phenomena

* See in this connection *The Key to Theosophy*, Chapter VI.

outside the range of common experience, primitive man found himself beset with spiritual as well as bodily terrors, and it became necessary for him to account for them. Let us take, as a familiar illustration, an eclipse of the sun. As a terrifying phenomenon of great rarity this was completely beyond any rational explanation he could imagine, but it was one that had to be accounted for by some relation of it to man's defensive code of belief. He therefore postulated a dragon, one of his imagined spirits of the air, as the cause of the danger, and elaborated that simple fantasy, exactly as a modern child will do, by further postulating the dragon in question as a timorous creature that might be scared from its fell purpose of swallowing the sun by incantations and the violent beating of gongs. We may note in passing that as this procedure was invariably effective, the simple "post hoc ergo propter hoc" logic of the savage definitely establishes the theory as proved fact,—a form of reasoning that we have not, as yet, entirely outgrown.

Next, taking a long step forward, we find that the influence of agriculture on the quickening of civilisation—that is to say the formation of relatively permanent communities tied to a particular location by the need to sow, tend and harvest their crops,—produced a wonderful accumulation of rites and superstitions of a placatory tendency. Man in Early Greece, for example, conceived a whole pantheon of gods to whom he attributed all power to control the ways of nature. The attitude here is practically the same as that shown by the savage. Humanity is faced by the realisation of its own impotence. The ways of nature are terrifying and inexplicable. Therefore it becomes essential as a measure of self-protection to invent over-riding controllers of destiny who may be placated by worship and service.

Between these two stages we can trace a slight advance in the development both of natural impulse and of the "self-induced and self-devised efforts" to fulfil them. Though safety is still the prevailing factor,—the need to find defence against the unknown by explaining it away,—the element of sacrifice is now taking a new shape, inasmuch as it is now clearly recognised as a means to an end. The self-discipline of totemism survives and extends to other relations; and the idea of the scapegoat in diverse forms has begun to take shape as an escape from destiny by vicarious sacrifice.

In such a brief summary as this, however, it must be understood that the trace I am following is selected for the sake of illustration and is chronological only in a restricted sense. Many centuries before the Greek civilisation of, say, 800 B. C., the Egyptian religion influenced by a few stray teachings of the Ancient Wisdom had submitted its far more elaborate, and in some cases truly esoteric explanations

of the mysteries of man's being. But as nearly all indication of the beliefs of this and other Eastern civilisations becomes submerged in the next stage I propose to treat, the omission does not break the continuity of the argument. In the larger history of mankind, we find that the Ancient Wisdom is always represented, but its influence upon the mass of mankind is directly proportional to the degree of development attained in each cycle.

We come now to the third great movement, exemplified in the various forms of Christianity which still dominate Western thought. The "defensive reactions" are still well to the forefront, but the "natural impulse" discovers an immensely important new trend in the postulation of altruism as an essential value in any religious creed.

To take the defensive reactions first, it is evident that the teaching of the Christian Churches still follows in one respect the primitive function of providing an explanation. In this twentieth century our daily fears have little in common with those of the savage. The protection afforded by living in communities governed by a recognition of the altruistic principle has given us confidence and something of the courage of those who have never known danger. But the great threat of death is far more clearly visualised and it is the business of religion now to provide a full and particular account of it, just as it was the business of the witch doctors to account for an eclipse of the sun.

The average man and woman of the present day cannot, in fact, endure the mystery of the great riddles of existence with any greater fortitude than their primitive ancestors. Those riddles are, by hypothesis, outside the domain of science which can never hope to answer them by any inductive process of examination or argument. Wherefore the great mass of the people demands and receives from its religious teachers compact and comprehensive, though frequently inconsistent, answers to such critical questions as: What is Man? Whence does he come? and whither is he bound? Thus relieved of the burden of seeking a personal explanation, and assured that the future is safe on certain comparatively easy terms, the modern man and woman may go about the business of common life as if the rewards and satisfactions of the present world were the only matters of real importance. The Churches, in short, have merely provided another and rather more reasonable explanation of the birth, life, death cycle, based like the earlier theories upon a slowly developing tradition; and thereby administer an anodyne to deaden the fears of those minds which are not yet ready to face the eternal mysteries. If we can relegate all the inexplicable riddles of life and matter to the incomprehensible designs of an unknowable God, we are, it is understood, relieved from further responsibility.

Nevertheless, the "natural impulse" of our text continues to evolve and demand new explanations. Even science has played its part in the stimulation of our curiosity. She can tell us no more than could the primitive savage why, for example, an acorn produces always an oak and not an elm or a beech; but if she is unable to explain any of the fundamental mysteries, she is continually drawing our attention to them. Indeed, I submit that for the intelligent man of to-day, the world poses far more and far deeper mysteries than those which perplexed and intimidated our primitive ancestors.

What, then, is the nature of that next step forward which I began by suggesting as being imminent in the world of to-day? For many of us, the cut and dried explanation of the Christian Churches appears at last little less childish than the beliefs of polytheism or of still more primitive eschatologies. Yet we have by no means passed the stage at which we urgently need some kind of explanation of man's place in the Universe. The new account must cover all kinds of problems that Christianity does not even attempt to solve. We may not expect definitive and final answers to all our questions. But we do demand that such as can be given should rise above the level of fantasy and superstition, to satisfy the intelligence and, most important of all, awaken those responses which have been developed in us by age-old experience.

Such an account I find in *The Secret Doctrine*. It does not attempt to solve all the mysteries, nor to give a complete explanation of man's relation to eternity. There is a final and complete reason why it cannot do these things, and this is that if such an explanation could be given, we should not be able to understand it. We are reaching a stage at which deeper esoteric knowledge can be comprehended, but beyond that are many others which can be attained only by a slow process of self-development and initiation.

But *The Secret Doctrine* definitely opens out the way to beliefs that accord with the new development of thought. H. P. Blavatsky's elucidation of man's origin is as far ahead of the old creation myths,—although, in one sense, it includes and explains them,—as the modern astronomer's account of the stellar universe is ahead of the Ptolemaic. This analogy also holds good in another respect. For just as recent astronomical theories hold an element of profound mystery that was lacking in the anthropocentric theories of the Ptolemaists, so also does H. P. Blavatsky's account of man's origin and destiny leave us with a feeling of the profoundest awe and wonder.

In conclusion, I submit that the new step in development for which the world is almost ready, marks a radical change in religious thought. In the past, as I have endeavoured to show, man-

kind in the mass has demanded, and received, a complete and materially satisfying account of his relation to God and the Cosmos. Now, with a new equipment and a new courage, he is prepared to put away the fantasies of childhood and accept the sterner teachings of adolescence. He has to recognise himself not as the cherished, protected member of a small family, but as a pilgrim soul whose origin he cannot trace and for whose destiny he is primarily responsible.

J. D. BERESFORD

"When thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are . . . but enter into *thine inner chamber and having shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret.*" (*Matt. vi.*) Our Father is *within us* "in Secret," our 7th principle, in the "inner chamber" of our Soul perception. "The Kingdom of Heaven" and of God "*is within us*" says Jesus, not *outside.* Why are Christians so absolutely blind to the self-evident meaning of the words of wisdom they delight in mechanically repeating?

Man ought to be ever striving to help the divine evolution of *Ideas*, by becoming to the best of his ability a *co-worker with nature* in the cyclic task. The ever unknowable and incognizable *Karana* alone, the *Causeless* Cause of all causes, should have its shrine and altar on the holy and ever untrodden ground of our heart—invisible, intangible, unmentioned, save through "the still small voice" of our spiritual consciousness. Those who worship before it, ought to do so in the silence and the sanctified solitude of their Souls; making their spirit the sole mediator between them and the *Universal Spirit*, their good actions the only priests, and their sinful intentions the only visible and objective sacrificial victims to the *Presence.*

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 280.

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN OLD INDIA

[Below we print three articles which present the old Hindu views on three of the vital subjects affecting every Government in the world. The first deals with the internal economic structure of a nation ; the second with the policy of the rulers of a conquered State towards their subject peoples ; the third with the problem of internationalism. All three also show that ancient India was not backward in practical affairs because it was philosophically so greatly advanced.—EDS.]

I

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HINDU THOUGHT

[**Miss Eleanor M. Hough, Ph. D.,** is the author of *The Co-operative Movement in India.* In his Introduction to that volume the Rt. Hon. Sir Horace Plunkett wrote of Dr. Hough thus :—

In December last (1931) a young American lady, passing through London on her way from India to the United States, called upon me. She told me that she had written a book upon " The Co-operative Movement in India," and that if I would write a brief Introduction she would be greatly obliged. She was unknown to me ; I was in poor health and in hopeless arrears with some literary work I had hoped to do. She explained that she had spent the greater part of the year in India ; that her book was a " thesis " required for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the George Washington University ; and that her request was prompted by the frequent evidences, brought to her notice in the course of her Indian studies, of my keen interest in her subject. I could not do more than promise to consider her request. She left me a ponderous tome in typescript and a most favourable impression of my strange visitor. With thanks in anticipation and a charming courtesy, she wished me better health and was gone. From her ship she wrote that an eminent firm of London publishers had taken her book and would send me the proofs. These came in due course, together with an admirable Fore-word by Professor Kaji, which seemed to take all the wind out of my sails. Nevertheless, I set to work upon the formidable task of reading the book, and I simply could not put it down.]

Of economic theory in the modern sense we find comparatively little in the ancient Hindu literature, but there are many references to economic institutions, from which we can reconstruct the economic structure of ancient India and the conditions under which its people lived.

Our primary sources are the ancient ethical codes, the *Laws of Manu*, which is the earliest surviving Aryan code, the *Institutes of Vishnu*, and *The Sacred Laws of the Aryas as Taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Vasishtha, Gautama, and Baudhâyana.* Some of the gems of ancient Indian literature also throw considerable incidental light on the subject : the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Arthasastra* of Kautilya, minister of Chandra Gupta, who ruled in the brilliant period of Hindu history in the third and fourth centuries B. C., the collection of wise and quaint animal fables in the *Hitopadesa*, and the *Dhammapada*, in which are preserved the sayings of Gautama Buddha.

A brief consideration of the philosophical basis of ancient Aryan thought may help us to understand their economic conditions rooted in that soil. The unity of all life is a fundamental concept of their philosophy.

He . . . who by the similitude found in himself seeth but one essence in all things, whether they be evil or good, is considered to be the most excellent devotee.*

From this follows the sacredness of life and the religious sanction for conduct. To the devout Hindu every act is a sacrament.

Whatever thou doest . . . whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest, whatever mortification thou performest, commit each unto me.†

Perfection is held out as the goal of human endeavour, to be reached by effort through many lives, in which each reaps the consequences, good or bad, of his own actions.

The ancient Hindus' idea of value was the antithesis of modern western notions. All of this material universe, they taught, is unreal because impermanent.

Look upon the world as a bubble, look upon it as a mirage: the king of death does not see him who thus looks down upon the world.‡

When all desires that dwell in his heart cease, then the mortal becomes immortal, and obtains Brahman.§

He who becomes attached to material objects is held not to be a free man.

Wise people do not call that a strong fetter which is made of iron, wood, or hemp; far stronger is the care of precious stones and rings, for sons and a wife.¶

Contentment with little is listed in the *Laws of Manu* as one of the ten modes of subsistence permitted to all men in times of distress.$

But, in spite of the slight esteem in which material objects are to be held, Hindu philosophy does not sanction idling.

If anything is to be done, let a man do it, let him attack it vigorously!**

Men rise, not by chance or nature, but by exertions.††

Action, then, is recognized as necessary, but it must be disinterested action, performed as duty and without regard to its consequences.

A man enjoyeth not freedom from action from the non-commencement of that which he hath to do; nor doth he obtain happiness from a total abandonment of action . . . . But he who having subdued all his passions performeth with his active faculties all the duties of life, unconcerned as to their result, is to be esteemed.‡‡

On these foundations an advanced civilization was reared. "India in the olden times was not a land of jungles and wastes, but a land of abundant agriculture, brisk trade, numerous arts and crafts, convenient roads and trade-routes with wells and rest-houses, shade-giving groves and fruit-bearing

* *Bhagavad-Gita*, VI : 32.
† *Ibid.*, IX : 27.
‡ *Dhammapada*, 170.
§ *The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East* (*Katha Upanishad*), p. 110.
¶ *Dhammapada*, 345.
$ *Laws of Manu*, p. 427.
** *Dhammapada*, 313.
†† *The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East* (*Hitopadesa*) p. 253.
‡‡ *Bhagavad-Gita*, III : 4, 7.

trees at regular intervals, and prosperous cities. The Greek writers on Alexander's campaigns speak of 2,000 regular towns in the Panjāb alone."* There were two great universities in India in the sixth century B. C., at Kâsi and Takshasilâ.†

Megasthenes, ambassador of the Greek King Seleucus of Bactria to the court of Asoka in the fourth century B. C., reported municipal government in India well organized, with different groups of officials regulating industry and trade, keeping vital statistics, and collecting taxes.‡

The village was ever the major political unit. The Indian village has been called "the original type, the first germ, of all the divisions of rural and civic society in mediæval and modern Europe".§ It was almost self-sufficing, with considerable division of labour among its members, each recompensed by the services of his fellow villagers.¶

Administrative committees to maintain public halls, temples, tanks, rest-houses, and wells for travellers, to construct watercourses and places of worship, to protect against invasion and to relieve the distressed$ were elected by the people of the whole village, ballots being drawn from a pot.** Age and property as well as educational restrictions for committee membership were carefully laid down.†† Villages were largely autonomous and the activities of the central government were confined chiefly to protecting life and property and collecting the revenue.‡‡

The Public Works Department in the third century B. C., however, had charge of working mines; opening irrigation works; establishing factories; maintaining preserves and grazing grounds, highways of commerce, waterways, land-routes, and other facilities for communication; establishing markets and stores; constructing embankments, dams, and bridges; planting fruit and flower trees and medicinal plants; and protecting the disabled, helpless, and infirm.§§

Physicians were required to report to the Government each case of contagious disease. ¶¶ They were punished for malpractice and warned against "gathering experience" at the cost of lives of their patients.*** Sanitary regulations were strict.

The four main castes corres-

* Mookerji, Radhakumud, *Local Government in Ancient India*, p. 8.
† Law, N. N., *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, based on the Arthasastra of Kautilya*, p. 89.
‡ Dutt, R. C., *History of Civilization in Ancient India*, Vol. I, p. 223.
§ Monier-Williams, Sir Monier, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, p. 455.
¶ Mukerjee, Radhakamal, *The Foundations of Indian Economics*, p. 3.
$ Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
** *Ibid.*, p. 153.
†† *Ibid.*, p. 160.
‡‡ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
§§ Law, *op. cit.*, p. 2–3.
¶¶ *Ibid.*, p. 93.
*** *Ibid.*, p. 94.

pond to the four main functional groups which are to be found in any civilization. They were not always iron-clad arbitrary divisions of society on a hereditary basis, but once gave actual indication of the stage of individual development. Through successive lives on earth, each was to advance from the lowest to the highest stage.

The respective duties of the four castes of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras, are also determined by the qualities which predominate in the disposition of each . . . The natural duty of a Brahman compriseth tranquillity, purity, self-mastery, patience, rectitude, learning, spiritual discernment, and belief in the existence of another world. Those of the Kshatriya sprung from his nature, are valour, glory, strength, firmness, not to flee from the field of battle, liberality and a lordly character. The natural duties of a Vaisya are to till the land, tend cattle, and to buy and sell; and that of the Sudra is to serve, as is his natural disposition.*

Even in the period from which the ancient Hindu literature dates, however, occupation tended to depend upon the caste into which one was born. Trade, as a function of a lower caste, was frowned upon for Brahmans, although permitted in case of temporary necessity, with numerous restrictions.† The individual had ever to subordinate himself to the good of the caste and of the family, "joint in food, worship, and estate".

Trade was carefully regulated. There were laws generally applied forbidding adulteration of goods.‡ The *Laws of Manu* provided that all weights and measures must be duly marked and officially re-examined once in six months.§ The familiar medieval ideas of a just price and of governmental regulation of price are frequently encountered. It was the king's duty periodically to settle prices, taking into account transportation and storage charges, gross margin, and net profit.¶

Interest taking was considered generally reprehensible, but men of the two higher castes might "lend [money at interest] to one who neglects his sacred duties, to a miser, to an atheist, or to a very wicked man".$ A Vaisya might live by usury, but the interest was regulated by law.

Gold was employed in very ancient times as a medium of exchange, and coins were issued by the guilds at least as early as the third century, B. C. They were issued also by the free clans or autonomous communities.**

We have the prototype of modern principles of taxation in the *Laws of Manu*:—

As the Sun during eight months (imperceptibly) draws up the water with his rays, even so let him gradually draw his taxes from his kingdom; for that is

* *Bhagavad-Gita*, XVIII: 41–44.
† *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. II, p. 72–3.
‡ Law, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
§ *Laws of Manu*, p. 324
¶ *Ibid.*
$ *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. XIV, p. 175.
** Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 214–15.

the office in which he resembles the Sun.*

Import duties and sales taxes were common.†

Wage rates were fixed under Chandra Gupta, the use of pure and sound materials was enforced, and the performance of a fair day's work for fair wages was required.‡

Guilds are referred to both in the *Vedas* and in the *Laws of Manu*.§ A definite term of apprenticeship was prescribed, during which the apprentice was to be treated like a son.¶ A passage in the *Ramayana* describes the procession of citizens who went out into the forest in search of Rama, the gem-cutters, potters, weavers, armourers, ivory-workers and goldsmiths, together with many others.$

The merchant guilds did not attain the same development as the craft guilds, but there is evidence of corporate action among merchants, as in the co-operative chartering of a vessel. ** Ancient seals have been found in Upper India with the inscription: "Corporation of bankers, traders, and merchants."††

A discussion of the economic concepts of the ancient Hindus would not be complete without a reference to the generally recognized duty of sharing wealth, which is rooted in the idea of the unity of all life. It was forbidden ever to eat "without having given away (some small portion of the food)".‡‡ Benefactions were both sacred and secular, the latter including endowing schools and free ferries, digging wells, planting fruit-trees, and building rest-houses for the traveller.§§

The *Bhagavad-Gita* defines the right and wrong types of charity :—

> Those gifts which are bestowed at the proper time upon the proper person, and by men who are not desirous of a return, are of the *sattva* quality, good and of the nature of truth. But that gift which is given with the expectation of a return from the beneficiary or with a view to spiritual benefit flowing therefrom or with reluctance, is of the *rajas* quality, bad and partaketh of untruth. Gifts given out of place and season and to unworthy persons, without proper attention and scornfully, are of the *tamas* quality, wholly bad and of the nature of darkness.¶¶

It would be unreasonable to expect in ancient Hindu literature anything like a discussion of economics in modern terms, but a complicated economic structure did exist in ancient India and economic concepts were not lacking. Perhaps the most definite contributions to economic theory are the philosophical propositions that

* *Laws of Manu*, p. 396.
† *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. XIV, p. 200.
‡ Coomaraswamy, A. K., *The Indian Craftsman*, p. 61.
§ Mookerji. *op. cit.*, p. 35; Coomaraswamy *op. cit.*, p. 19.
¶ Mookerji. *op. cit.*, p. 51.
$ Coomaraswamy, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.
** Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
†† *Ibid.*, p. 213.
‡‡ *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. XIV, p. 240.
§§ Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
¶¶ *Bhagavad-Gita*, XVII : 20-22.

value is wholly subjective, that the material universe is unreal and unsatisfying because impermanent, and that contentment is to be found, not in the fulfilment of desires, but in their elimination.

ELEANOR M. HOUGH

II

ON BENEVOLENT DESPOTS AND DESPOTIC TRUSTEES

[**Franklin Edgerton,** well-known Sanskritist and Professor of Comparative Philology at Yale University is the translator of *Matanga-Lila : The Elephant Lore of the Hindus*, and of *Vikrama-Charitra : Vikrama's Adventures*, as well of the *Gita* and the *Panchatantra*.—EDS.]

In the twenty-five years since its discovery, much has been written on the "Hindu Machiavelli," that is the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, or Kauṭilya's *Science of Polity* the oldest and greatest of ancient Sanskrit treatises on political science. According to tradition it is the work of the prime minister of the Emperor Chandragupta, who overthrew the Greek regime founded by Alexander the Great in India. The reliability of this tradition is doubted by many scholars. For our purposes it is unimportant; in any case the work must be nearly as old as the beginning of the Christian era, if not somewhat older.

In this article I want to call attention to only one of its doctrines: one from which I think many modern governments could profitably learn, and which has not attracted the attention it deserves.

But first, by way of orientation for those who may not know the book, let me briefly set forth its general character and viewpoint. These are very important as a background for the particular passage we are about to consider. It is written wholly from the standpoint of the "prince who wants to be victorious" (*vijigīṣu*). His interests alone are made the goal. No other consideration is allowed in the slightest degree to interfere. And his interests are conceived in the most realistic, not to say cold-blooded fashion. The only question is, how may he get the better of everybody with whom he comes in any sort of contact? It is as if his ministers, his subjects, even the members of his own family, existed only for his gratification. It is calmly assumed that he is to use them all for his own benefit, exploit them ruthlessly, and throw them aside at any moment if they stand in his way. Still more, all foreign powers are his legitimate prey. His immediate neighbours are his natural enemies; this is taken for granted. The neighbour of his neighbour is indeed his natural ally, but only as being by definition his enemy's enemy; and his ally is to be used, quite unsentimentally, in his own selfish

interest, and so on. Without going into greater detail, it may be said that even a casual acquaintance with this work will indicate that it is absolutely free from moral scruples. If you want to study Hindu ethics, you must look elsewhere; the book of Kauṭilya professes to give advice solely directed to one end, the practical success of a conquering ruler. Morality may be all very well in its place, it seems to say; conceivably you may rate it higher than political advantage; in that case you need not take the advice offered here. It is the sole business of this book to expound the principles of practical statecraft, in a strictly cold and scientific fashion; and in following that aim it looks neither to the right nor to the left.

I have emphasized this general outlook of Kauṭilya because I want it to be particularly clear that he is the last author in the world who could be accused of that "weakness" or "sloppy sentimentality" of which our "hard-boiled" statesmen are apt to accuse those who want to apply morals to statecraft,—who talk of the "rights" of conquered peoples, for instance. Kauṭilya recognizes no "rights" at all, only interests; and he never allows another interest to interfere with that of his "would-be conqueror".

If, then, he ever does give advice which happens to sound moral, we may be sure that this is a mere coincidence. It only means that in this particular case he thinks that a moral course is likely to be politically profitable.

Now, then, let me quote the following extract from Kauṭilya's chapter on the treatment of a conquered land. It occurs in the fifth chapter of the thirteenth book, or the 176th chapter from the beginning:—

When he has acquired (by conquest) a new territory, let him overshadow the faults of his enemy (the former possessor) with his own good qualities, and the (enemy's) good qualities with yet more surpassing good qualities (of his own).

By performance of his own duties, and by acts of grace, remittance of taxes, largess, and distribution of honours, let him aim at the satisfaction and welfare of the subjects.

Let him reward according to his (previous) promises those (of the former enemy) who adhered to his cause; and yet more those who (specially) exerted themselves (for him). For one who does not keep his word cannot be trusted by his own party or by strangers. [N. B. And he will therefore not be successful. Not because it is right, but because it is profitable, one must keep his word.]

No more (can) one whose manner of life is uncongenial to the subjects (be trusted by them). Therefore he shall adopt the same character, style of dress, language, and customs. And he shall show attachment to the local deities, gatherings, festivals, and amusements of the country.

Among the leading men of the villages, castes, and associations of the country, his spies shall be constantly employed in calling attention to the misdeeds of the late foe (the former ruler), and to their lord's nobility and loving-kindness to them (these leading men), and the honours which he has paid to them. And he shall make use of them (the "leading men") by studied application of suitable gratifications, remissions of taxes, and protection. He shall see that proper respect is paid to all the

deities and to (men in all the four traditional) stages of life, and that gifts of land and money and remissions of taxes are bestowed upon men who are distinguished for learning, eloquence, or piety. He shall cause all prisoners to be released, and provide charity for the poor, helpless, and distressed. At [certain festival periods] he shall ordain, temporary abstention from taking the life of any living creature. . .

This passage shows some striking contrasts with traditional western methods of dealing with conquered territories. With us the conqueror usually has one of two aims. Either he seeks to annihilate as far as possible the cultural autonomy of the conquered land, to make it indistinguishable from the realm to which it is annexed, by suppressing differences of language, custom, and national feeling. This is usually the method employed when the conquered land adjoins that of the conquerors, as was presumably always the case in Kauṭilya's range of experience. Or, in the case of distant lands and those whose inhabitants differ very markedly in race and culture from the conquerors, so that assimilation is obviously impossible, there is a tendency, not always fully conscious but easily perceptible as a rule, to accentuate such differences, with implication of the fundamental superiority of the conquerors over the conquered. Members of the conquering people who reside in the conquered land keep themselves more or less aloof and superior. The "native" culture is treated with an indifference often tinged with contempt.

Kauṭilya, on the other hand, says that the conqueror should actually adopt the dress, language, and customs of the conquered—of course when living in their land; this is obviously implied, though not distinctly stated. He should seem to identify himself with them, patronize their religion, and encourage their local spirit in all its innocent forms. So far from trying to break down the provincial culture, he should encourage and develop it. He should make himself popular by acts of charity and largess, should lighten taxes, make the administration of justice lenient, and show an interest in local festivals and amusements. The Kauṭilya policy may be summed up by saying that the conqueror should exert himself to the utmost to make the conquered people glad of the change in government. His rule should contrast so favourably with the displaced regime that no one will wish for its return, unless a few who got personal profit from it.

And remember that all this is not due to any tenderness of sentiment. Kauṭilya does not care a snap of his finger what happens to the conquered people or their culture. If he thought it advantageous to the conqueror, he would quite cheerfully have them all blotted out of existence. No: it is simply that in his opinion it is to the advantage of the conqueror that the people of the annexed territory should be happy and contented. If they were not, he fears that they would be

a constant menace and a source of weakness rather than strength. And he thinks that they are not likely to be made happy by a policy of the iron hand, by suppression of their language and local culture, by humiliation and degradation.

This policy is not wholly without parallel in the West; and when it has been tried, it has seemed to be brilliantly successful. Something very similar to it was tried by Great Britain in dealing with the Boer republics conquered in the South African war. Result: when Britain became involved in war with Germany, the great majority of the Boers enthusiastically supported her and gave her very material aid against that same Germany whose sympathies had notoriously been on the side of the Boers in their war with Britain. Does not this suggest that Kauṭilya's idea has something to be said for it?

But usually, as we all know, the policy adopted is very different. It is not necessary to cite specific instances; many will occur to all who know modern history. The countless European wars of the last few centuries have furnished many examples of annexed provinces. After the annexation, the conquering government generally does its level best to suppress the local culture and the very language of the new province. This has been carried even to such a point that the people have been forbidden to speak in their own native language! How different is the policy of Kauṭilya, who tells the conqueror to learn the language of the conquered!

I venture therefore to suggest that modern governments might profitably ponder the advice given by this shrewd and unsentimental old Indian statesman; and that not on moral grounds at all, but purely on grounds of practical wisdom. It is at least worth considering whether it would not be advantageous to the conqueror that the people of the conquered land should be led to think of him as a friend and fellow-countryman, and to regard his government as a patron and supporter of their traditional culture, rather than as its implacable foe, or its barely tolerant and condescendingly superior foreign overlord. Perhaps it might prove that Kauṭilya was right in thinking that real profit for the "prince who wants to be victorious" lies in furthering the economic and cultural welfare of the conquered people, even if it seems to involve financial loss to himself; the money so sacrificed might be returned with interest.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

III

THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH

[**Manu Subedar, B.A., B.Sc. Econ.** (London), Barrister-at-Law, is the author of *Gita Explained by Dnaneshwara Maharaj*. " Dnaneshwari " has been called by H. P. Blavatsky, the " king of mystic works," and we hope to publish a review of it in an early number; meantime, here is something for practical politicians to think about.—EDS.]

The most confirmed materialist must acknowledge that, beyond the limits of his perception, there is a vast region of knowledge relating to the fundamentals of human life and to the origin and end of different phenomena. Spiritual learning comprises these laws affecting the human consciousness and its relation to the universe outside. The fact that this knowledge is rare and is not shared by the multitude accounts for much confusion and for the existence of quacks and charlatans since the days of antiquity. Under these circumstances, out of millions of individuals only a few seek this knowledge, and the hesitation with which they must necessarily approach every source of spiritual guidance can be understood and condoned. Many have sought to show the strait path under all climes and at all times. There have been many high-souled individuals who have shown compassion to common mortals and who have indicated the method of achieving joy and happiness within oneself.

A very high place amongst such teachers of mankind has to be given to Dnaneshwara Maharaj, who lived six hundred years ago. He has left to the world a masterpiece the *Dnaneshwari*. The *Gita*, on which the *Dnaneshawari* is the most outstanding commentary, provides spiritual guidance for men at every stage of life. Indeed, in certain portions it goes into technicalities of Yoga, which it is not possible for the ordinary reader even to understand. The *Dnaneshwari* has been rightly mentioned amongst the works on mysticism containing knowledge which only adepts can use with safety and success, yet it has plain and simple guidance for plain and simple men. With neither of these aspects is it my intention to deal in this article. It is the correlation of social and ethical life with spiritual well-being and progress, in the teaching of Dnaneshwara Maharaj, about which I wish to write. Attention should be directed towards the relationship which should exist between man and man in order to secure maximum welfare. It is the responsibility of an individual towards his higher self which creates man's obligations towards the rest of humanity. In the language of the highest realisation, it is " All in One " and " One in All". In relation to social science and the responsibilities of common citizenship, it means that every individual has responsibility for every evil which exists around

him. Because he does not perceive any direct connection between himself and any particular institution, system, or practice, which is harmful to other human beings, or which debases them or deprives them of their due, he cannot plead that he has nothing to do with it. A parallel thought worked up, not from the spiritual, but from the scientific point of view, occurs in many places in the writings of western thinkers.

Emphasis on this aspect has become important not only on account of the current events in the world, but because it is one of the most elusive factors for the individual seeker who aims at removing baseness from this life and at preparing for spiritual advancement. There is a dim realisation of this great truth in the statement that human nature is essentially good and, if left to itself, will seek harmony. What has not been completely exposed is the lengths of cruelty, dishonesty and mental reservation, to which man in his representative capacity can go. The standard case is that of a soldier, who in his private life would not hurt any one ; but in uniform and when charging the enemy he knows no other object except that of killing men. Men dealing in foreign trade, in enterprises like banking and shipping, in finance, in diplomatic and intelligence services, are no less unscrupulous and indulge almost habitually in acts conceived by them to be to the advantage of their own country, nation or group, but equally palpably to the serious disadvantage of other masses of human beings. Insidious propaganda inspired by purely political reasons is zealously aided and abetted by persons of both sexes, whose life in their own limited circle is without a blemish. Two wrongs do not make a right, but even a wrong inflicted incidentally prevents anything being set right, however much on the surface it may appear to be advantageous to one set of people. As a reaction of its impact, it creates forces that weaken the moral foundations even of those who seem temporarily to gain something; but, above all, it impedes the spiritual progress of the individual.

The central plank in the teaching of Dnaneshwara Maharaj is an emphasis on obligations ; and in human affairs, according to him, it is more important that what is due between man and man should be always kept in mind than the discussion of individual rights. All individual rights arise only after human rights are assured to the rest of humanity. Otherwise it is a phenomenon of exploitation. Privileged positions impose even greater obligations. So long as preference is shown in any society from any cause whatsoever, individual ambition and achievements will always be, but Dnaneshwara Maharaj would have us measure these in the form of service. The human race is conceived of as a human family, in which food is given to all according to their needs after the necessary obliga-

would not be welcomed by those who think that they have more to give than they will receive. Yet, until it is definitely established that one human being stands in the same position in all respects as another human being with regard to all material needs of the world, the defective organization of human society divided into armed camps, and as its reaction, the exploitation even of large masses of human beings inside the nation, must continue. A difference of status amongst men may be necessary even after the basic understanding is reached; and difference in personality and in spiritual growth must survive; but, instead of pointing away from reality as the present order of things now does, the new arrangement would, while making human beings better and bigger in all respects, accomplish more quickly even the material progress, on which everything at present is staked. If the great mass of inventiveness and effort which is directed towards the means of destruction or of defence, were diverted into the search for increased production in agriculture and manufactures, it is impossible to conceive that the world as a whole would be worse off than it is to-day. What would disappear is a sense of possession in individuals, and what would diminish is the insolent superiority which every nation claims over other nations, and the genuine dominance, which some countries enjoy over other countries.

Applying the teaching of Dnaneshwara Maharaj to modern conditions, it would be necessary for the individual to adjust his relationship not only with his immediate surroundings, his family, his community, tribe, or country, but also with the rest of the world. It would also be necessary for him not only to give up exploiting and dominating others, but also to avoid such evils in a representative capacity of whatever nature.

Those who search for joy eternal and for uninterrupted harmony, must lay the foundations thereof. While it is not given to every one to achieve this completely, even a temporary uplift from the normal worldly motives will bring peace to the mind and happiness to the self of an unprecedented character.

The *Dnaneshwari* provides for thoughtful individuals an inexhaustible mine of truths capable of being practised under all conditions by every one, whatever the stage of their spiritual growth may be.

MANU SUBEDAR

DETERMINISM AND FREEWILL IN SUFISM

[**Dr. Margaret Smith** wrote on " The Doctrine of Reincarnation in Islamic Literature " in our January issue, and now she turns to the twin doctrine of Karma. Every true Sufi is a Theosophist and understands that Fate and Freewill are but two aspects of one and the same Law.—EDS.]

The teaching of orthodox Islām on Predestination and Freewill lays its chief emphasis on the former. "Nothing can befall us, but what God hath destined for us" (Sura ix. 51), "God's behest is a fixed decree" (xxxiii. 38), "Verily God misleadeth whom He will and guideth whom He will" (xxxv. 9), and other similar verses of the Qur'ān indicate man's helplessness in the face of the Divine decree, though certain others suggest his responsibility for his own acts, *e.g.* "For its own works lieth every soul in pledge" (lxxiv. 41) and " Whoso does good benefits himself, and whoso does evil, does it against himself." (xli. 46)

It was against the orthodox doctrine of Predestination, by which it appeared that God was the Author of evil and that man was punished for actions not within his own control, that the Mu'tazilites rose up in the eighth century, calling themselves Ahl al-'Adl *i.e.* supporters of the Divine Justice, to proclaim the doctrine of man's freewill ; and it is significant that tradition has asserted that their founder was a disciple of Ḥasan of Basra (*ob.*, A. D. 728), who is reckoned as one of the earliest of the Ṣūfīs. Other individuals had already asserted the doctrine of Freewill and been put to death for their teaching, and the Mu'tazilites were also regarded as heretics by the orthodox, who accused them of dualism, because they explained the existence of evil by setting up a second principle, the will of man, against the Will of God.

The Ṣūfīs could not accept any doctrine savouring of dualism, while at the same time they would not repudiate man's moral responsibility for his actions. And therefore we find that they accept both doctrines, teaching the Unity of God and the over-ruling power of the Divine Will, as their thesis, accepting man's freedom of action and the obligation upon him to choose good rather than evil and to strive towards his own perfection, as the antithesis, and providing their own synthesis by which these two apparently contradictory doctrines were completely harmonised and shewn to be really only two sides of one and the same Law.

The earliest Ṣūfī conception of Ultimate Reality emphasised the Divine Will and regarded the universe as being the result of the activity of that Will. The Persian al-Hujwīrī (*ob.*, A. D. 1079), one of the early writers on Ṣūfī doctrine, gives us his conception of God as the First Cause, stating that all that exists is

dependent on His Will; what He wills, that He does, and what He wills is what He has known aforetime. His decrees are absolute and it is for His servants to submit themselves thereto in complete resignation to His Will. To Him belongs the power of predestination, both good and evil, and He is therefore the Only Agent and Sole Cause of all existence. Yet Hujwīrī himself states that the believer in the Unity, *i.e.*, the Ṣūfī, ought, while holding the doctrine of determinism (*jabr*), to act as though he believed in freewill (*qadar*), taking a middle course between the two. The Ṣūfīs use their power of freewill to signify their preference of God's choice to their own, and so are content with the good and evil which God has chosen for them.

Sahl Tustarī, an early Ṣūfī, who died in A. D. 896, says of God that in His origin—

> He was and there was nothing else and He dwelt in solitude apart. He knew and He willed and He ordained and predestined and directed. Actions are attributed to His servants, but the beginning is from Him and the end rests with Him. All things exist in the knowledge of God and by His decree.

But while laying stress on the fact that no man can escape his destiny, Tustarī gives man control over his own actions.

To al-Ḥallāj, the great mystic who was put to death for his teaching in A. D. 922, determinism is really foreknowledge. God foresees both good and evil, but He commands only good and therefore man can never urge predestination as a reason for wrong-doing or giving way to the pressure of circumstances. But man's will needs to be strengthened by God's grace. Abū Sa'īd b. Abi'l-Khayr (*ob.*, A. D. 1049), the writer of some of the most beautiful mystic quatrains to be found in Persian literature, stated in his teaching that man was freed from desire only when God freed him. And this was effected not by man's own efforts, but by the grace of God and His help, since God gave him the desire for freedom and led him to repentance, until he realised that all good acts were done by the grace of God and through His assistance, and that to attribute them to his own endeavours was polytheism, for it meant that another power was at work in the world beside the Divine Will. Even when the Ṣūfī is actuated simply by love of God in all he does, he finds no peace until he realises that it is God who loves him and enables him to love, and this is the result of the Divine love and grace, not of his own efforts. To Abū Sa'īd, this view of Divine Determinism seems essential to the acknowledgment, by the mystic, of the Unity of all existence: only so can he come to realise that all action depends upon God Almighty, and to know that "all is He and all is by Him and all is His," and that there is no place for "I" or "mine". Then the mystic wills—and here we see that after all Abū Sa'īd finds a place for freewill and human choice—what God wills;

his own will has vanished and he is free from desire, and has gained peace and joy in this world and the world to come.*

The question is argued very fully by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (*ob.*, A.D. 1273) in the *Masnavi*, where he insists that our actions, though due ultimately to Divine agency, are yet the result of our own freewill, and therefore we cannot hold God responsible for them. Evil may be decreed by God in order that good may be thereby manifested and realised, but while the good man should accept such apparent evil as coming from God, he will not accept evil that is the result of his own sinful passions. We are fully aware both of the over-ruling power of God and of our own freedom to do good or to do ill. Our humility, he says, is evidence of the former, and our sense of guilt, of the latter. Acceptance of predestination is no excuse for our evil deeds, for in every act which we *desire* to do, we are clearly conscious of our power to do it; but when we are faced with an action for which we have no inclination, we become determinists and cast responsibility for the omission upon God.† Rūmī distinguishes between the Ultimate Cause (Destiny) and the immediate cause, which is under our own control, but goes back to that Ultimate Cause.

This immediate cause was produced by that Cause; when did any cause proceed from itself without a cause? The ultimate Cause makes the immediate cause operative; sometimes, again, it makes it fruitless, and ineffective.‡

Rūmī, then, states plainly that all that happens is predestined, even though our actions seem to be our own and we are morally responsible for them. It is the creative act of God, he says, that brings our action into existence: our actions, therefore, are the effects of that Divine Creative act. Freewill, he says elsewhere, is the endeavour to offer thanks for God's benefits, *i. e.*, when exerted to choose the good and follow His path; determinism, on the other hand, is denial of those benefits, if we do evil and attribute it to Him and not to ourselves. For Destiny leads us always upwards and onwards, the Divine Will is for good and not for evil.

If the Divine Destiny shrouds thee in black like the night, yet the Divine Destiny will take thy hand at the last. If the Divine Destiny a hundred times seems to threaten thy life, yet it is the Divine Destiny that gives thee life and a means of salvation.§

There is no real contradiction between determinism and freedom for the true Ṣūfī, the mystic who loves God with such a perfect love that his will becomes one with the Divine Will, that one of whom Abū Yazīd had said that to him no choice was left, because to him God's choice had become the only choice. It is Love that solves the problem of the clash between determinism and freewill, for the true lover has no will

* *Asrār al-Tawḥīd*, pp. 376-378.
† Book I. 636.
‡ Book I. 843, 845.
§ *Ibid.* 1258, 1259.

of his own, that he should desire anything, whether good or ill; he who loves God, desires only what He desires, and he whom God loves desires naught but God Himself. "Love," said Shiblī, "is a fire in the heart, consuming all save the Will of the Beloved," and Jāmī also says: "The Ṣūfī has no individual will: his will is obliterated in the Will of God, nay, indeed, his will is the very Will of God." So Rūmī writes:—

> The word "compulsion" made me impatient for Love's sake: this is the shining forth of the moon, this is no cloud. They know the true meaning of "compulsion," whose eyes God hath opened. To them the unseen things of the future have been revealed, to them remembrance of the past has become naught.*

For such Ṣūfī writers as these the problem was solved, and the antithesis disappeared in unity of feeling, but certain of the Ṣūfīs discuss the problem on more philosophical lines. Ibn al-'Arabī (*ob.*, A. D. 1240) teaches that men have really no freewill, because all is determined by the Divine Will, since God is the only Real Existence; yet at the same time he asserts men's individual responsibility for their acts, which are logically self-determined, the determining self being simply an "individualisation" of the Divine Being. "Whatsoever Destiny decrees concerning a thing," he says, "is decreed by means of the thing itself. This is the hidden mystery of Determination." It was a celebrated Ṣūfī writer of the school of Ibn 'Arabī who was so concerned with this question that he devoted a whole treatise to it. This was 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (*ob.*, A. D. 1329), well known for his commentaries on Ibn al-'Arabī's writings, and also on those of the mystic poet Ibn al-Fāriḍ of Cairo. 'Abd al-Razzāq wrote an "Epistle on Determination and Freewill," in which he discusses the subject very fully. Predestination, he holds, represents the existence of the universal types of all things in the world of Universal Reason, *i. e.*, the Ultimate Cause, whereas self-determination is due to the individualisation of those types in the world of Universal Soul, in order to be adapted to matter; and these individualisations are attached to their immediate causes, by which they are produced, and appear at their appointed times. Freewill is itself predetermined. It is in this world of the Soul that every thing is set in motion, a movement due to the irresistible yearning of souls for their spiritual Source, Universal Reason, to which they seek to assimilate themselves and so to become universalised. As they progress on their upward way, with each step of the ascent they receive fresh inspiration from that Source, which draws them ever nearer to Itself. With each step, also, they exert an influence on matter, according to its power of receptivity, and so there results a series of changes in this world, which correspond to those taking place in the souls themselves.

* *Masnavi* Bk. I, 1463, 1466.

These changes may be so great as to involve creation or destruction, or of a lesser degree involving variations in condition only.

'Abd al-Razzāq therefore postulates the existence of a remote First Cause (Destiny) and also of an infinite number of interdependent, secondary, immediate causes. When man has made his choice, by the exercise of his freewill, the act, possible before, is produced inevitably, so that all action is at the same time both destined and free. It is foreknown to God and decreed that every act shall be produced by the united operation of certain causes, but it is also decreed that the agent shall exercise his freewill in the production of the act. Some, says 'Abd al-Razzāq, regard only the First Cause and become fatalists, others regard only the secondary causes and so attribute the absolute power of creation and decision to the human will. 'Abd al-Razzāq holds that a balance must be preserved between these views. The fatalists, he asserts, are as "one-eyed" as those who uphold only the existence of freewill. These latter are deprived of the right eye, the stronger, that which makes us contemplate the Divine Essence, the First Cause; and the former, the fatalists, are deprived of the left eye, the feebler, that which enables us to see outward things, the immediate causes. That one who sees properly, and who makes use of the two eyes of the heart, contemplates the Divine Essence with the right eye, and attributes both good and evil actions to the Divine Will; and at the same time regards the creatures with the left eye and admits the actual influence which they exert upon actions, but as a result of the Eternal Will of God, not independently of Him.

'Abd al-Razzāq emphasises the innumerable and intermingling causes at work in the world, and the processes which are in course of continuous development, in order to shew that in life, as in the exercise of purpose and will, there must be multiplicity. Matter varies in its nature, some being of a grosser type, and some finer and more subtle; it receives a soul corresponding to its type, and therefore souls also vary. Character and disposition result from the combination of the material and the spiritual, and it is for the soul to overcome the hindrances of the material body and itself to rise towards its spiritual Source. In the life to come, all souls will receive such retribution as they deserve. Some souls, who have made the fullest possible use of their capacities and their opportunities, will enter at once into the joy of the Blessed, while others, who fell short of the degree of perfection to which they might have attained, and who wilfully misused their opportunities, working evil instead of good, must undergo a process of purification, and endure punishment in proportion to their sins, but it will not be for ever.

'Abd al-Razzāq, like other Ṣūfī writers before him, asserts that

for the true mystic there is no conflict between determinism and freewill, no problem as to ultimate and secondary causes, for in the contemplation of the Divine Unity the Ṣūfī attributes all actions directly to God. Ignoring all ideas of relation, and suppressing causes and effects, he "folds up" creation as a carpet, bridges the gulf by a single leap, frees himself from the categories of "between" and "where," and becomes absorbed in the Divine Essence, dead unto himself and blind unto the created world, for he is submerged in the All, prevented from seeing the creatures, by his contemplation of the Creative Truth. Multiplicity, for him, has vanished, he has ceased to be aware of his own existence as distinct from the One, and this is the supreme joy, the final attainment, for he has reached the goal of the quest. Now, as Hujwīrī tells us, God has fulfilled in him that which He willed for him, that his last state should become once more his first state, and that he should now be as he was before he came into existence, when the spirit, not yet joined to an earthly body, dwelt in the Light and Presence of God.*

Then, 'Abd al-Razzāq teaches, when, after experiencing union with the Divine, the mystic returns to the world, the Vision of the Creative Truth does not distract him from regarding the creatures, still less can the creatures distract him from the Creator. This is the true gnostic, who has arrived at certainty ; he is no longer perplexed, for he well knows the relation of actions to God, since He has predestined them, but at the same time he does not deprive them of their relation to men.

The Ṣūfīs, therefore, have found the synthesis, and in their view no contradiction remains. Since all Reality and the only Reality is the One Divine Essence, then all that comes to pass is the result of the Divine Predestination, but since the soul itself partakes of that Divine Essence, it also partakes of the power to determine its own destiny—"Whatsoever the soul soweth," says Rūmī, "is from the Soul of the soul,"—and when it has realised its oneness with the One, then there is no more talk of "mine" and "Thine" for the individual will knows itself to be in very truth one with the Eternal Will of God.

MARGARET SMITH

* For a full account of the life and teaching of 'Abd al-Razzāq, *cf. Journal Asiatique* 1873, pp. 125 ff. My quotations from the *Masnavi* are taken from the Persian Text ed. R. A. Nicholson (Gibb Series).

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

IV.—PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

[**Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O.B.E.** was until recently an Honorary Research Assistant in the Department of History of Medicine, University College, and an Extension Lecturer at the University of London. He is the author of *Makers of Science, The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci, The Great Engineers, The Great Physicists* and numerous text-books on Physics.—EDS.]

In the series of articles under the above general title, we have considered in succession some of the more important and basic of the physical concepts of Western Science, and we have compared the trend of thought on these subjects as inspired by modern research with the general attitude of the theophilosophical writings of Madame Blavatsky in *The Secret Doctrine* of fifty years ago.

We have also shown a close correspondence between the two that cannot fail to be striking and significant. So far, however, we have confined ourselves to the realms of formal physics and mechanics. Here the cold materialism of the orthodox scientific mind was able to have full scope, although, as we saw in our last article, this attitude began to show definite signs of failure in dealing with the phenomenon—"time"—that willy nilly could not be divorced from the consideration of the human personality.

When, however, we leave the field of pure physics and consider the branch of Western Science known as psychology, we pass almost completely from the world of materialism to the world of personality—from the behaviour of inert matter to the laws of life. We have used the phrase "almost completely" very deliberately. Old habits, like old shibboleths, die hard. The ingrained and deeply rooted attitude of impersonal materialism towards scientific research has reached and has almost completely absorbed the Western psychologist of to-day. He is as definitely "out" to *measure* reflexes and impressions and the like as the pure physicist is to measure deflections and angles. A whole technique of experimental psychology has come into being; and following further the stereotyped lines of advancement, nowadays we have a very healthy and vigorous "applied science" known as "industrial psychology". Let there be no misapprehension about this. We have not only no quarrel with these developments, but we hasten to acknowledge freely and fully the reality and the growth of what is in fact one of the youngest of modern sciences in the Western world (although actually one of the oldest of Eastern studies), and to say that the application of the lessons of experimental psychology to modern industry has made for the undoubted better-

ment of factory and industrial life.

Yet the fact remains that we have here a science that concerns itself not with matter, but with mind, with the human personality, and the human consciousness; not with externals but with the "fundamental internals," that is, Life itself. Treat these as much as you like on a material basis, and you can do no more than learn about the husk. It is as impossible and as hopeless as would be an attempt to learn of the rich stores of treasure within a building by studying its walls and exterior. The door is open. Will you not enter?

There is one aspect for consideration in connection with the idea of "time" which was purposely not stressed in the previous article of this series, and to which we must now refer. It is that "time" is not merely a fundamental of physical science, but also that it is a *happening*—an *experience*—an attribute, in fact, of human consciousness. We laid stress upon the fact that time, unlike space, could only be measured one way, "forwards," or "onwards". Yet there is certainly a "backwards" also, belonging not to the future, but to the past. Here time passes beyond the ken of the physicist, and becomes material for enquiry by the psychologist; only now it is referred to as memory. We re-quote from *The Secret Doctrine*:—

> Nothing on earth has real duration, for nothing remains without change—or the same—for the billionth part of a second; and the sensation we have of the actuality of the division of "time" known as the present, comes from the blurring of that momentary glimpse, or succession of glimpses, of things that our senses give us, as those things pass from the region of ideals which we call the future, to the region of memories that we name the past. (I. 37.)

This is putting it as simply as possible in language that might just as easily have been employed by the exoteric materialist instead of, as was the case, by the esoteric occultist. It agrees in its formal aspects entirely with the viewpoint of the orthodox psychologist who tells us of the memory continuum arising from the contiguous association of a large number of successive impressions in a very short space of time. But let us follow H. P. Blavatsky further.

> The three periods—the Present, the Past, and the Future—are in the esoteric philosophy a compound time; for the three are a composite number only in relation to the phenomenal plane, but in the realm of noumena have no abstract validity. As said in the Scriptures: "The Past time is the Present time, as also the Future, which, though it has not come into existence, still is"; . . . Our ideas, in short, on duration and time are all derived from our sensations according to the laws of Association. Inextricably bound up with the relativity of human knowledge, they nevertheless can have no existence except in the experience of the individual ego, and perish when its evolutionary march dispels the Maya of phenomenal existence. (I. 43–44)

Eastern philosophy regards every finite thing as the illusion of ignorance—and those who have read an earlier article by the present writer on "The Doctrine of Māyā in Relation to Modern Science" (THE ARYAN PATH, April

1930) will at once appreciate the Māyā of memory and time. But beyond and behind the illusion of ignorance is the light of understanding. That is the goal; "There is no Religion higher than Truth" is the watchword to be found on the title page of *The Secret Doctrine*. Here East and West are on common ground. The writer is endeavouring to show in this series of articles that indeed there is much more of common ground than a mere watchword and phrase. Repeated attention has been drawn to the obscure and mystical phraseology of Mme. Blavatsky's writings in so far as it impresses the Western reader and student. It is in many respects a great pity that there should, even in a work written in English, still remain this language difficulty, but so long as the outward formality of expression of the West persists, the inward mysticism of the Eastern occultist must continue to present difficulties of interpretation. There we must leave it, at least hopeful that the succession of articles of which this is the fourth is successfully demonstrating a vast stretch of common ground between Western science and Eastern philosophy that augurs well for the attainment of the common goal of that highest religion which is Truth.

IVOR B. HART

The *matter* of the Eastern philosophers is not the "matter" and Nature of the Western metaphysicians. For what is Matter? And above all, what is our scientific philosophy but that which was so justly and so politely defined by Kant as "the Science of the *limits* to our Knowledge?" Where have the many attempts made by Science to bind, to connect, and define all the phenomena of organic life by mere physical and chemical manifestations, brought it to? To speculation generally—mere soap-bubbles, that burst one after the other before the men of Science were permitted to discover real facts. All this would have been avoided, and the progress of knowledge would have proceeded with gigantic strides, had only Science and its philosophy abstained from accepting hypotheses on the mere one-sided Knowledge of *their* Matter. If no physical intellect is capable of counting the grains of sand covering a few miles of sea-shore; or to fathom the ultimate nature and essence of those grains, palpable and visible on the palm of the naturalist, how can any materialist limit the laws changing the conditions and being of the atoms in primordial chaos, or know anything certain about the capabilities and potency of their atoms and molecules before and after their formation into worlds? These changeless and eternal molecules—far thicker in space than the grains on the ocean shore—may differ in their constitution along the line of their planes of existence, as the soul-substance differs from its vehicle, the body. Each atom has seven planes of being or existence, we are taught; and each plane is governed by its specific laws of evolution and absorption.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 149–150

A DREAM EXPERIENCE

[**William Saunders** is the author of *Ancient Handwritings*, Editor of *The Scottish Musical Magazine*, and Honorary Secretary of Leith Nautical College. The subject of dreams is full of puzzles for the student of western psychology, the youngest of the western sciences ; but all the phenomena connected with the dream-states of human consciousness are fully explained and scientifically tabulated in Asiatic Psychology. A very practical classification is given by H. P. Blavatsky in *The Transactions of The Blavatsky Lodge*, p. 79. —EDS.]

Under the date of 11th June, 1826, the following entry appears in the *Journal of Sir Walter Scott*, (2nd. Edition, 1910, page 209) :—

> Bad dreams about poor Charlotte. Woke, thinking my old and inseparable friend beside me; and it was only when I was fully awake that I could persuade myself that she was dark, low and distant, and that my bed was widowed. I believe the phenomena of dreaming are in a great measure occasioned by the *double touch*, which take place when one hand is crossed in sleep upon another. Each gives and receives the impression of touch to and from the other, and this complicated sensation our sleeping fancy ascribes to the agency of another being, when it is in fact produced by our own limbs acting on each other.

Shortly after reading the above entry for the first time, I retired to rest, and, although I seldom dream,—and when I do so, it is only after some severe or prolonged mental strain,—I placed my hands in the position described by Scott, but with only a very vague and indeterminate idea of attempting an experiment, the more especially as I am well aware of the influence of touch, taste, smell or hearing upon what one may describe as the dream centres. After wriggling myself into a comfortable attitude however, I found the position of my hands not at all convenient, so I abandoned it, and instead placed them flat upon my naked stomach, and in that condition promptly went to sleep.

I must here emphasise the fact that I was then in perfect health both of mind and body. I had been doing no more work or study than I habitually accomplish under the most normal conditions, and there was nothing on my mind of a character to cause any worry or psychical disturbance whatever. Further, for weeks—probably months—before that evening, my nights had been perfectly tranquil and absolutely dreamless. And, apart from a mere passing whim, I had gone to sleep with no thought whatever of staging an experiment, and with no intention of making any effort to keep myself in the intermediate state between waking and sleeping that is so conducive to the phenomenon of dreaming. Yet, at some hour in the morning, —probably three or four o'clock— I wakened out of a nightmare with a loud cry which aroused at least one other inmate of the house. I had dreamed that I had been awakened by a loud rat-

tat-tat on the knocker of the scullery door which gives exit to our garden. I groped through the back premises in semi-darkness and, opening the scullery door, was immediately pounced upon by one of two ruffians who gripped me round the stomach with enormous hands which held me as if I had been caught in a vice. I struggled and involuntarily emitted the cry which awakened me.

I can say freely and without any affectation or egoism that, during my waking hours, I should have no such nervousness in facing even two armed burglars as would force a cry of fear from me; and so far as its giving a reflex of my character in that respect is concerned, the dream was absolutely false. The French philosopher, M. Henri Bergson* remarks that "it is memories and only memories which weave the web of our dreams." If this should really be a fact, then my cry must have originated in some inherited primitive racial memory of danger emanating from contact between some extraneous fleshly organ and my own naked body. We have an analogous instance in the inherent horror which very young infants evince when some part of their naked bodies is brought into contact with fur of any description. This phenomenon is well known to experimental psychologists and it is undoubtedly one of the clearest manifestations of inherited memory that the records of science contain.†

In the experience cited, the all but immediate response to the touch stimulus is curious. I have long been in the habit of going to sleep with my hands resting flatly upon some part of my anatomy—generally, but not invariably, my chest—but I have never before had a dream which I could directly attribute to that. In the case in point, therefore, the main point of interest lies in the question as to whether the dream had its origin in the direct touch stimulus, or in a sub-conscious functioning of the mental processes directly induced by the impression made upon my brain on reading the extract from Sir Walter Scott's *Journal*. It was, no doubt, a combination of both that so actively stimulated the inherent, as well as the recently stored, memory cells, as to dislodge their respective contents which, as Bergson has so admirably shown, likewise combined to give the dream its essential and peculiar degrees of colour and direction.

No one, I think, will be disposed, at this time of day, seriously to dispute Bergson's contention that Dreams are the mental reconstructions of uncontrolled memories revived by means of powerful stimuli reacting upon the cerebral

* *Dreams* by Henri Bergson. English Translation by Edwin E. Slosson. London. 1914. Page 30.

† William James in his *Psychology* (Briefer Course) London, 1905, page 410, states, "Two of my children were afraid, when babies, of *fur*; Richet reports a similar observation." I have records of other detailed reports besides these but unfortunately cannot lay my hands on them at the moment of writing.

centres.* But that carries the investigator only half way towards the complete understanding of what the entire dream processes actually consist, and as to how they function in their entirety. The dream faculties, if one may be allowed the use of such a term, do not respond to more than a very insignificant number of the potential stimuli. During the entire period of somnolence such stimuli are indeed constantly present in the case of every sleeper. Yet, the proportion of dreams to the number of stimuli must, even in cases of the most inveterate dreamers, be very small indeed. What then are the conditions necessary to effect such contact between the essential stimulus and the memory centres as will produce the perceptive phenomenon that we call Dream. That is the problem which now clamours for solution. When that knowledge has been attained, we shall know to the most infinitesimal degree of what Dreams actually consist.

WILLIAM SAUNDERS

* "In sleep, properly speaking, in sleep which absorbs our whole personality, it is memories and only memories, which weave the web of our dreams. But often we do not recognize them. They may be very old memories, forgotten during waking hours, drawn from the most obscure depths of our past; they may be, often are, memories of objects that we have perceived distractedly, almost unconsciously while awake. Or they may be fragments of broken memories which have been picked up here and there and mingled by chance, composing an incoherent and unrecognizable whole."—*Dreams*. p. 34.

"Our memories, at any given moment, form a solid whole, a pyramid, so to speak, whose point is inserted precisely into our present action. But behind the memories which are concerned in our occupations and are revealed by means of it, there are others, thousands of others, stored below the scene illuminated by consciousness. Yes, I believe indeed that all our past life is there, preserved even to the most infinitesimal details, and that we forget nothing, and that all that we have felt, perceived, thought, willed, from the first awakening of our consciousness, survives indestructively. But the memories which are preserved in these obscure depths are there in the state of invisible phantoms. They aspire, perhaps, to the light, but they do not even try to rise to it; they know that it is impossible, and that I, as a living and acting being, have something else to do than to occupy myself with them. But suppose that, at a given moment, I become *disinterested* in the present situation, in the present action—in short, in all which previously has fixed and guided my memory; suppose, in other words, that I am asleep. Then these memories, perceiving that I have taken away the obstacle, have raised the trap-door which has kept them beneath the floor of consciousness, arise from the depths; they rise, they move, they perform in the night of unconsciousness a great dance macabre. They rush together to the door that has been left ajar. They all want to get through. But they cannot; there are too many of them. From the multitudes which are called, which will be chosen? It is not hard to say. Formerly when I was awake, the memories which forced their way were those which could involve claims of relationship with the present situation, with what I saw and heard around me."—*Dreams*, pp 36-38

I should be prepared to go still further than Bergson does, and say that besides all our past life, much, if not all, of our ancestral history lies stored in the form of somnolent memory, below the scene of our consciousness.—W. S.

THEOSOPHY

THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

[**K. R. Srinivasiengar, M. A.,** is a lecturer in the Philosophy Department of the Mysore Maharaja College. He tells us that he is indebted to Vivekananda's writings which removed the spell cast on him by his school, a Christian Church institute, under which Hinduism appeared to him hollow. "Blavatsky came very soon on my mental horizon: an old musty volume of *Isis Unveiled* was eagerly devoured." Then at the age of 19 he ran away "to the Tirupatti hills for practice of yoga! I sat there for 2 or 3 months but unfortunately I commenced at the wrong end of the matter, Hatha-Yoga, which so told upon my health that I had to return home to resume my college studies." Since then he has had a successful career and is "now working at a big thing 'The Metaphysics of Value.'" He adds that "the *Gita*, *Vedanta* and the *Secret Doctrine* are my consolations of Spirit, while western philosophy is my intellectual stamina."—EDS.]

Modern savants and philologists sometimes conjecture about the common source from which the different religious systems must have sprung, each absorbing the local colouring of its habitation and thus becoming distinct in course of time. This, however, is the teaching of Theosophy. Madame Blavatsky has described Theosophy as "the substratum and basis of all the world-religions and philosophies" (*Glossary*, p. 328). In her *Secret Doctrine* (I. xxxiv) she refers to "the universally diffused religion of the ancient and pre-historic world" and calls it the Secret Doctrine, which terms are equivalents of the Sanskrit Sanatana Dharma, Eternal Religion and Gupta Vidya, the Hidden Science. The proofs for this belief do not concern us here; I am interested in showing that Theosophy is a presentation in part of that Common Source and that it attempts to establish not only the fundamental unity of all ancient religions, but also the synthesis of Science, Religion and Philosophy. Theosophy "is not a *religion* nor is its philosophy *new*" (*Ibid.*, xxxvi). It has however a double function to fulfil.

Religion is generally considered to be a string of dogmas without scientific validity and a set of practices without rational basis. Theosophy shows that the truths of religion are scientific facts, though modern science may not yet have discovered them all, and that its practices are mostly allegorical dramatization of such facts.

Similarly Theosophical definition makes science a companion to philosophy; and the logical deductions of science teachings cannot but lead to philosophy.

Once again philosophy is not merely a series of theoretical speculations in the Theosophical system; from philosophical fundamentals are derived ethical rules to be used in the conduct of everyday life, and thus Theosophy endows philosophy with religious

warmth.

In harmonising the claims of science, religion and philosophy, Theosophy aims at restoring the ancient view about the unity of all knowledge.

Many ancient religious books contain the story of cosmic and human evolution, derived from the source referred to above. Because of the abstruse nature of the teachings, allegories and symbols which require a key for a thorough understanding are used, and they are used just as our chemists and metamathematicians use their formulae. The key having been lost these symbols have assumed an esoteric character. Then there are other parts of the old teaching which are veiled in glyphs and ideographs for they are too dangerous in the hands of the profane.

Modern Theosophy is not only an exposition of the old synthesis of Science, Philosophy and Religion, but further it attempts to explain the allegories of the old books. It also speaks of the hidden or esoteric aspect of knowledge.

The beliefs of religions are corrupted shadows of old knowledge; religious rites and ceremonies being also corrupted and broken remnants of old traditions. Some of these beliefs and practices may appear to the scientific mind as superstitions, but Theosophy is able to lay bare their esoteric meaning, their rational explanation. Take for example the belief in heaven and hell (with rewards and punishments respectively) common to all religions. Science may scorn it but only at the cost of abrogating its own claim to the scientific attitude of mind. Ours is not the only possible world in the universe. In fact, if we would substitute "a plane of existence" for the word "world," it is easily understandable that there are different planes of existence, even in connection with what we call our world. Science itself teaches that we are surrounded by myriads of invisible lives—microbes, bacteria, etc., —invisible by reason of their minuteness. Is it not then equally possible that there may be beings which are equally invisible owing to the extreme tenuity of their texture? Their worlds need not necessarily be above or below our world. Madame Blavatsky explains (*S. D.* I. 605):—

> When "*other* worlds" are mentioned —whether better or worse, more spiritual or still more material, though both invisible—the Occultist does not locate *these spheres* either *outside* or *inside* our Earth, as the theologians and the poets do; for their location is nowhere in the space *known* to, and conceived by, the profane. They are, as it were, blended with our world—interpenetrating it and interpenetrated by it. There are millions and millions of worlds and firmaments visible to us; there still greater numbers beyond those visible to the telescopes, and many of the latter kind do not belong to our *objective* sphere of existence. Although as invisible as if they were millions of miles beyond our solar system, they are yet with us, near us, *within* our own world, as objective and material to their respective inhabitants as ours is to us. But, again, the relation of these worlds to ours is not that of a series of egg-shaped boxes enclosed one within the other, like the toys called

Chinese nests; each is entirely under its own special laws and conditions, having no direct relation to our sphere. The inhabitants of these, as already said, may be, for all we know, or feel, passing *through* and *around* us as if through empty space, their very habitations and countries being interblended with ours, though not disturbing our vision, because we have not yet the faculties necessary for discerning them.

Just as a room may be filled with the rays of the sun, those of a lamp, X-rays, magnetic and electric vibrations and waves etc., each interpenetrating but not affecting the others, likewise the same portion of space may be occupied by several planes at one and the same time. The law of analogy and the law of continuity both force us to assume such a plurality of planes or states of existence. If this is admitted, then the "heaven" and "hell" of popular religions are simply different conditions of existence to which the souls of mortals who have "died" here "pass"—though in reality they are alive and right here. A soul, after discarding its material body, finds itself in a state of existence suited to its spiritual requirements. It is in its "heaven" or "hell" according to its old hopes, beliefs and longings of earth life. If it had done good deeds and longed for the joys of "heaven," it finds its "heaven" reproduced by its own imagination. The sinner who dies immersed in the desires and longings of his lower nature and believing in future punishments, would find himself surrounded by "fire and brimstone" images of his own making. The experiences of happiness or suffering are real and help to develop the soul. In this sense, then, "heaven" and "hell" are, Theosophy tells us, real *states* but not places. To quote again from *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 221 ft. note.)

A world when called "a higher world" is not higher by reason of its location, but because it is superior in quality or essence. Yet such a world is generally understood by the profane as "Heaven," and located above our heads.

In a similar manner Theosophy explains the religious belief in gods, angels, spooks, etc. Science already admits that there is nothing "dead" in the universe, and Lloyd Morgan even holds that the mental is not derived from the physical but that the two series run concomitantly in such wise that every level of development in the physical is represented by its corresponding mental process (*Mind at the Cross-ways*, p. 50). Theosophy once again insists upon the law of continuity and argues that as this law of correlation of the physical and the psychical is true, we can say this in the words of *The Secret Doctrine* (I. 607):—

But, if we can conceive of a world composed (for *our* senses) of matter still more attenuated than the tail of a comet, hence of inhabitants in it who are as ethereal, in proportion to *their* globe, as we are in comparison with *our* rocky, hard-crusted earth, no wonder if we do not perceive them, nor sense their presence or even existence.

It further states (I. 276):—

It is on the acceptance or rejection of the theory of the *Unity of all in Nature, in its ultimate Essence*, that mainly

rests the belief or unbelief in the existence around us of other conscious beings.

Theosophy thus supplies the key to the interpretation of fundamental religious truths.

When we turn to the achievements of modern science we find that many of its theories are inadequate unless illumined by the philosophic conceptions of Theosophy. Here again we can only illustrate our contention by taking an example or two regarding the ultimate nature of the universe. The latest utterances of men of science engender the hope that a time will soon come when the wisdom of the ancients will be justified by scientific labours. If this happens, the credit must go to Theosophy for having steadily pointed out that wisdom all these years, in spite of the calumny of H. P. Blavatsky and misunderstanding of her teachings, like unto the nuggets of pure gold. "Matter has disappeared," is now a well-worn scientific tag. Matter as hard indivisible bits called atoms disappeared long ago, but in their place came electrons or electric charges—still considered as particles—but now these particles themselves are discovered to be but centres of wave-disturbances; hence, the wave-theory of matter (Andrade, *The Mechanism of Nature*, pp. 163–66). On the other side, light waves also are discovered to be corpuscular in nature, thus marvellously confirming another of Madame Blavatsky's revelations, (*S. D.* I, 483 *et seq.*). The wave-disturbance is, of course, only space in motion or space energised (*The Mechanism*, pp. 141–42). Thus space has come to be the one great reality of the universe for science, and time also, since motion involves time. But fifty years ago Mme. Blavatsky gave the philosophy of this conception in *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 14); naming the "one absolute Reality which antecedes all manifested conditioned being" as Be-ness, she wrote :—

> This "Be-ness" is symbolised in the Secret Doctrine under two aspects. On the one hand, absolute abstract Space, representing bare subjectivity, the one thing which no human mind can either exclude from any conception, or conceive of by itself. On the other, absolute Abstract Motion representing Unconditioned Consciousness. (I, 14)

Also, on p. 37 there is a fine exposition of the inseparability of Time and Space and the conception of Duration ;—one would mistake it for a passage in a modern work on Relativity !

But further, what is the nature of this reality—the inner stuff of this Space itself ? Professor A. S. Eddington answers in *The Nature of the Physical World*, (p. 276 ff.)

> I will try to be as definite as I can as to the glimpse of reality which we seem to have reached. . . . . the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. . . . . The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds, but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness.

And Bertrand Russell makes it still clearer in the *Analysis of Matter* (p. 320) wherein he says that part of the contents of a man's

brain consists of percepts, thoughts and feelings, and since his brain also consists of electrons, "we are compelled to conclude that an electron is a grouping of events and . . . . . some of the events composing it are likely to be some of the mental states of the man to whom the brain belongs". Theosophy with a firmer grasp of the *principles* which underlie cosmic evolution, amplifies science by defining space itself, and Motion in space which is the life-process, evolution or manifestation. Since Divine Mind in Nature is still matter for conjecture and speculation on the part of scientists Mme. Blavatsky's explanations of what the Hindus called Mahat, Cosmic Intelligence and Akasha clarify our vision on the subject.

On the one hand Theosophy removes the dust of the ages gathered on old religions; on the other it removes the many accretions which confuse the issues of science; and it performs the dual function by the aid of a philosophy at once profound and practical.

Verily, then, Theosophy may well be called (*S. D.* I. 610) the "Thread Doctrine" (*Sutratma*):—

> It passes through and strings together all the ancient philosophical religious systems, and reconciles and explains them all. We say now it does more. It not only reconciles the various and apparently conflicting systems, but it checks the discoveries of modern exact science, and shows some of them to be necessarily correct, since they are found corroborated in the ancient records.

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

To the public in general and the readers of the "Secret Doctrine" I may repeat what I have stated all along, and which I now clothe in the words of Montaigne: "I HAVE HERE MADE ONLY A NOSEGAY OF CULLED FLOWERS, AND HAVE BROUGHT NOTHING OF MY OWN BUT THE STRING THAT TIES THEM." Pull the "string" to pieces and cut it up in shreds, if you will. As for the nosegay of FACTS—you will never be able to make away with these. You can only ignore them, and no more.

— H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. xlvi.

REVOLUTION AND RELIGION *

LENIN OR GANDHI ?

[**John Middleton Murry** is examining the world-problem of to-day whose soul is morality, whose mind is politics and whose body is society. In this article he refers to the method of non-violent resistance of Gandhiji.—EDS.]

What is the fundamental problem in the Western world to-day? Some will say (quite truly) that it is the problem of distributing the vastly multiplied production of modern industry. But that formulation, though true, is dangerous. It abstracts economics from humanity, and encourages men to forget what they are only too anxious to forget, namely that the economic problem of a technological civilisation is ultimately a problem of morality. For the obstacle to the distribution of the product of modern industry is the instinctive adhesion of innumerable men, in positions of absolute or relative economic privilege, to their own economic interests. Relative privilege in this order may be minimal; it may consist in one small degree of elevation above the subsistence line, the almost invisible distinction between quasi-independent poverty and complete pauperism: but the difference is enough to give a man the feeling that he has something to lose by radical economic change. On this instinctive conservatism of economic self-interest in the mass of the people, the possessors of real privilege can rely in times of crisis to preserve the *status quo* against any revolutionary change.

Thus the economic problem merges into the political problem, and the political problem into the ethical. The striking originality of Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, which I will not hesitate to call a great book: a book likely to become a classic for the imaginative and courageous minority in these disillusioned days—is that, with complete fearlessness, it disentangles the true nature of the political and ethical problem which underlies the modern world-chaos. That problem is, almost invariably, falsely simplified into one of pure economics or pure morality. Hence the almost universal sense, among imaginative men that the religious solution is futile. It is felt by them that individual self-perfection, self-realisation through complete disinterestedness, which is the pinnacle of the pure religious achievement, is irrelevant to the problem which menaces the world. Yet, at the same time, they feel that the fundamentally

* ***Moral Man and Immoral Society***, by Reinhold Niebuhr (Scribner's : $ 2)

cynical solution offered by Leninist Communism is not merely one to which they cannot devote themselves without self-violation, but is also one which, by the extremity of its cynicism, will prove to be ineffectual in the Western world.

These two conflicting convictions are the common heritage of imaginative men to-day. Niebuhr is the first thinker, to my knowledge, who has faced them both without flinching. The title of his book sets forth the basic contradiction from which these conflicting convictions derive. *The morality of which the individual is capable is of a higher order than any morality of which the large social group is capable.* The achievement of complete disinterestedness, towards which the ethically conscious individual strives, and must strive, as the ideal, is unattainable by society as a whole, or by any large and powerful group in society. It follows, then, that the individual who expects disinterestedness of society, or of a large social group, is indulging in romantic illusion. Disinterestedness can be demanded by a man from himself alone; from society, and social groups, he can, if he is reasonable, expect, at the best, the pursuit of a qualified self-interest.

But it may be said (again truly) that the self-interest of the Western industrial nations demands precisely the equitable distribution of the product of industry which originally was posited as the problem of modern technological society. This is a common evasion of the real problem of which even very intelligent people are guilty. The modern industrial nation is tacitly assumed to be a genuine *community*, and therefore capable of responding to the demands made by its self-interest, which (by hypothesis) is the interest of the community as a whole. This is pure self-deception. Those who embrace it assume the solution of the very problem they set themselves to solve: for the real problem is to create that genuine community, which would instinctively obey the interests of the community as a whole.

The Western industrial nations are not genuine communities. If they were, there would be no crisis, and no problem. Instead of communities, they are agglomerations of classes, united by sentiment, but divided by interest. Sentiment may be strong; but interest is far stronger. The rights of property—the interests of a class—prevail against the interest of the unborn community which demands that those rights should be abolished or drastically curtailed. It is the fact that it is built on this basic realisation which gives Marxian Communism the great influence it has in modern thought. Its "cynicism" comes far nearer to bedrock reality than any other theory of modern industrial society. It is not because of its cynicism that Marxism makes an enduring appeal, but because of its truth. Marxism is therefore a great contribution to the *ethical*

consciousness of mankind. For morality and self-deception are far asunder. Morality which refuses the truth is hypocrisy. And perhaps the most astonishing single merit of Niebuhr's book is the courage of its author—a professor at the Union Theological Seminary of New York, the greatest theological college in America—in proclaiming the essential verity of the Marxian analysis.

It is, of course, more surprising than it ought to be for a religious thinker to insist on the truth of Marx's insight. It is largely because religion has gone rotten in the West that men who call themselves religious are afraid of a social realisation that is implicit in the doctrines of the great mystics. Those who have learned from the mystics, and from their own religious experience, how profound are the ramifications of the Selfhood in the individual man, are not likely to be shocked by the realisation that self-interest dominates the life of society. Superficial religion is afraid of Marxism; but genuine religion is not. *Moral Man and Immoral Society* is a product of the genuine religion that is not afraid to admit the truth of Marxism; and it is, in my experience, unique.

So far from being afraid of Marxist Communism, Niebuhr has looked at it with perfect understanding—an understanding such as is hardly possible to the Marxist professed. To the Marxist, Marxism is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It is not that. It is three-quarters of the truth—more of the truth than any political theory there has been in the Western world. But its refusal to admit the truth of the remaining quarter is full of danger. Because of this refusal, as Niebuhr truly says, modern Marxism is at once "the great promise and the great peril of the political life of the Western world." For, unless its cynicism is mitigated, it will intensify the instinctive hostility against it, and will finally repel even those who, by virtue of their imaginative detachment, would be prepared to work in the revolutionary cause with a party which based its realistic understanding of the modern situation on the principles of Marx.

For the aim of Marxian Communism, as Niebuhr truly says, is the social aim which must be approved as the highest by the moral conscience, namely, the establishment of equal justice. Nor can objection be taken to Marxism because it seeks to dislodge injustice by force. Ultimately, the socially unjustifiable privilege which is the basis of social injustice, is defended by power and can be weakened or destroyed only by power. But, just as the social reformers, who place their faith in the progress of education and enlightenment, deceive themselves by refusing to admit that men who possess privilege will not surrender it simply because they learn that their privilege is socially unjustified; so the Communists in the West deceive themselves by refusing to

see that the threat and practice of violence precipitates into the ranks of their enemies all those potential allies upon whose co-operation they must depend for their social revolution. Many thousands of middle-class men and women to-day, taught by events to examine the bases of a social system so manifestly inefficient and unjust, and to accept the necessity of a social revolution, are by their very capacity for imagination debarred from sympathy with a programme of violent revolution which, in the delicate organisation of a highly industrialised society, and against the resistance of a majority to which its own violence has given a specious moral sanction, would have all the horrors of a prolonged and indecisive civil war.

Thus the political problem with which the imaginatively realistic mind has to grapple in the West to-day is singularly complex. The power of economic privilege which is throttling society can be countered only by power. To rely on peaceful persuasion is illusionism; yet to rely on methods of violence is equally futile, because the serious threat of revolutionary violence will inevitably unite the majority of an industrial nation against the social revolution. What then? Must we accept the Marxian prophecy that revolution will only come when the majority of the nation becomes strict "proletariat"—that is, condemned to economic misery so desperate that a revolutionary upsurge is inevitable? It is impossible. The instinct of self-preservation in the privileged classes which has guarded them in the past, will guard them in the future against such egregious folly as completely to disinherit its proletariat: it will protect them, and its own privilege, by securing them (by unemployment insurance and the like) against that absolute misery which is the revolutionary explosive. And without that economic basis of a proletariat made desperate by misery, the party of revolutionary violence will make no real advance.

What then are those, who are convinced alike of the material and spiritual necessity of social revolution, to *do*? What is to be their political strategy? This is the practical issue which Niebuhr's deep-searching and, to my sense, unerring analysis of the material and spiritual factors in the Western situation brings him at last: and he calls in aid the shining example of Gandhi. He examines with the same lucidity and sympathy Gandhi's somewhat inconsistent formulations of his principles, and shows that the inconsistency is due to the uniqueness of Gandhi's effort, namely, to apply the noblest moral insights of the saint to the realistic problem of massing power against power. Niebuhr makes clear the very vital distinction between the non-resistance of the pure individualist pacifist, and the non-violent resistance which Gandhi employs, and he concludes:—

There is no problem of political life to which religious imagination can make a larger contribution than this problem of developing non-violent resistance. The discovery of elements of common human frailty in the foe, and, concomitantly, the appreciation of all human life as possessing transcendent worth, creates attitudes which transcend social conflict and thus mitigate its cruelties. It binds human beings together by reminding them of the common roots and similar character of both their vices and their virtues. These attitudes of repentance which recognise that the evil in the foe is also in the self, and these impulses of love which claim kinship with all men in spite of social conflict, are the peculiar gifts of religion to the human spirit. Secular imagination is not capable of producing them; for they require a sublime madness which disregards immediate appearances and emphasises profound and ultimate unities. It is no accident of history that the spirit of non-violence has been introduced into contemporary politics by a religious leader of the orient. The occident may be incapable of this kind of non-violent social conflict, because the white man is a fiercer beast of prey than the oriental. What is even more tragic, his religious inheritance has been dissipated by the mechanical character of his civilisation. The insights of the Christian religion have become the almost exclusive possession of the more comfortable and privileged classes. These have sentimentalised them to such a degree, that the disinherited, who ought to avail themselves of their resources, have become so conscious of the moral confusions that are associated with them, that the insights are not immediately available for the social struggle in the Western world.

There is our tragedy. It is a most significant tribute to Gandhi that he should be the figure in whom the rigorous yet imaginative argument of Niebuhr's book inevitably culminates. Of the book itself I can only say that it seems to me of an altogether higher order than any other examination of the menacing problem of Western civilisation with which I am acquainted. It is a prophetic book: and I do not believe I shall be found the victim of romantic illusionism when I say that I believe it will prove to be forerunner of a new and enduring political movement in the English speaking world.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

AUDACITY

THE PHILOSOPHY OF A RUSSIAN EXILE*

[**R. Naga Raja Sarma, M. A., L. T., Ph. D.** is Philosophy Lecturer in the Government College at Kumbhakonam.—EDS.]

Deeply dissatisfied with the dominance of reason with its jurisdiction over scientific and mathematical truths; convinced that ancient philosophers and their modern successors, hypnotized by Hellenic thought into an uncritical submission to the de-

* *In Job's Balances—On the Sources of the Eternal Truths.* By Leo Chestov, translated by Camilla Coventry and C. A. Macartney, with a note on the author by Richard Rees (J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London. 18s.)

mands of Reason, had converted Metaphysics into a narrow discipline under the pretence of vindicating the status of philosophy as "free" inquiry; and believing that one must redeem oneself through "faith" as St. Paul teaches, and through faith alone, *i. e.* through a spiritual exertion of quite peculiar nature, which we must describe as "audacity" (p. 239), which is bound to be ridiculed by Reason with as merry laughter as that with which a pretty Thracian woman witnessed Thales, the father of ancient philosophy, tumbling into a well—Leo Chestov, the Russian philosopher now living in exile cries halt to the riotous rationalism of the so-called exact positive sciences. He utters in grave tones the warning that if philosophy is to fulfil efficiently its legitimate function of ministering to the soul-needs, it should calmly and courageously repudiate the claims of Reason, which is worshipped by contemporary sciences. For the benefit of readers of THE ARYAN PATH, I propose to examine this doctrine of "Audacity" in the light of the "Vedanta" of which I dare say Leo Chestov knows the elements, though he makes a not very illuminating reference to Maya. (p. 229.)

I

Contending that Spinoza's formula "Deus=Natura=Substantia" is tantamount to a denial of God, and that the philosophy taught by Kant and Hegel owing allegiance to that Reason which rules over triangles and perpendiculars is not free but fatally fettered, Leo Chestov in his "Foreword" (pp. xi to xxxi) maintains that until and unless "all the *pudendum ineptum*, and *impossibile* which our forefathers plucked from the tree in Paradise" are clean relegated to the limbo of oblivion along with "universally valid judgments" and "self-sufficient piety," Philosophy *qua free inquiry* would be impossible. In the first part entitled "Revelations of Death," Chestov examines the philosophy of Dostoievsky and of Tolstoy. The interrogation of Euripides "Who knows if life is not death and death life?" stands as the headline of Chestov's study of Dostoievsky. The Angel of Death gave Dostoievsky a second sight which revealed to him the disconcerting truth that life is death and death life. Dostoievsky's works bear ample testimony to an internal struggle to fit in or force that truth perceived by him through the instrumentality of second sight into the strait-jackets of "Omnitude," and his metaphysical message to mankind is: "One cannot demonstrate God. One cannot seek him in history. God is 'caprice' incarnate who rejects all guarantees. . ."

Tolstoy's *Diary of a Madman*, *Father Sergius*, *The Death of Ivan Ilych* and *Master and Man* are studied. "Activity, working for mankind, even the most useful, the most disinterested action, comes from the devil, and is worthless in the eyes of God.

Works, even the holiest, do not save the soul but destroy it." (pp. 106-7.) And "Down here on earth all was of importance, but there one wants something quite different . . . Let us flee to our dear Father-land . . . for thence we are come and there dwells our Father," would appear to be the revelation of death, according to Tolstoy.

In the second part containing 52 sections, under the general headline "Revolt and Submission," Chestov counsels abandonment of modesty and advocates the cause of "audacity" with force and brilliance. The 49th section entitled "Sola Fide" constitutes, in my view, a confession of philosophic faith by Chestov. Faith and *not* Reason (which guarantees twice-two being four) is to guide the destiny of man.

The third part "On the Philosophy of History" has four essays respectively dealing with "Spinoza in History," "Pascal's Philosophy," "Plotinus's Ecstasies," and "Ethics and Ontology". Chestov arraigns Spinoza for the offence of having slain God, and observes that Spinoza "was slaying Him at His own divine free command and of his own un-free human will," of course in the light of the equation Deus=Natura=Substantia which is so obnoxious to Chestov. Pascal's philosophy exhorts us not to seek strength or assurance in this bewitched world. The mystic experience (glimpses of which may be found in Pascal's *Pensées* and the *Enneads* of Plotinus) know nothing of human laws, compulsions and constraints. In the concluding essay Chestov answers some criticisms urged by Prof. Hering on his "Memento Mori".

II

These conclusions of Chestov sketched above are adequate to enable one to accompany the champion of the principle of "audacity" in his "pilgrimage through souls"; but one is entitled to ask what reward awaits the pilgrims at the end of the pilgrimage. With Chestov's conclusion that the truth lies in the Scriptures, the Vedanta will agree, substituting the Vedas and the Upanishads, for the Bible. That the present life is death and death is life will be easily granted. The existence dominated by "*a priori* synthetic judgments," mathematical truths, scientific victories, is ignorance-ridden. It is enveloped in Cimmerian darkness. When the ordinary folk governed by Reason and Ethics imagine that they are awake, the genuine seer is fast asleep. When the folly-ridden folk are asleep, the seer is awake. (*Yanisa-sarvabhootanam-tasyam jagarti-samyamee—Yasyam-jagrati-bhootani-sa-nisa-pasyatomuneh. Gita*, ii-69.) When Chestov condemns reason and self-evidence as "nothing but a mere 'assoupissement et enchantement surnatural'," and wants acceptance of the principle that "God blinds some and enlightens others" he has the support of the Upanishads. The *Katha Upanishad* emphatically asserts that only he whom God

selects can reach Him, and that Reason is hardly competent to yield higher knowledge. (*Yame-vaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah-Nai-shatarkena-matih. . . Katha*-2-9 and 22.)

III

Chestov makes much of the legend of the Fall and repeats *ad nauseam* that Reason and Ethics are due to eating of the forbidden fruit. This would hardly solve any philosophical problem. Old Khayyam has out-Chestoved Chestov in an adroit apotheosis of "Audacity" under the dynamic urge of which he cries aloud to God to take man's forgiveness for all the sins with which man's face is blackened, and give man His forgiveness. It would appear from Chestov's account that when the Angel of Death arrives "before time," he gives his victims second sight, but in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, the Angel arrives just in time and does his work without troubling to give his victims the said second sight. Revelations of death do not help one in the cultivation of steadfast adherence to the gospel of "Audacity". Death is the goal of life. Another life is the goal of death. Unless Chestov admits some such doctrine, his own theodicy, grounded though it be on "Audacity," will not have a better fate than the theodicies against which he delivers furious onslaughts. Death is the most natural thing, the only end to life or lives till one perfects himself or enjoys his inherent spiritual bliss, (*Jatasyahi-dhruvo-mrityuh-dhruvam—janmamrita-sya—chaBahoonam—janmanam-ante-Jnyanavan-mam-prapadya-te—Gita.*) The principles of "Audacity" again must fail to account for the fact that God was not justified in permitting the Evil One to tempt Job and involve him in all sorts of difficulties. A theodicy grounded on "Audacity" renders the cosmic mystery simply more mysterious.

IV

One may be a thorough-going misologist. One may completely repudiate the claims of Reason. One may be an ardent advocate of "Audacity". Unless, however, this "Audacity" is shown to be capable of explaining satisfactorily the facts of life and the hopes of the hereafter, its pragmatic and philosophical value may not be great. The Vedanta views life or Samsara—recurring cycles of births and deaths—as beginningless in time—*Anadi.* The Universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is manifestation of the Supreme Spirit—Vishnu or Siva according to theological predilections and presuppositions—who administers the karmic law. Evil, difference in endowment and equipment, victimisation, exploitation, the Dualisms of true and false or valid and invalid in the theory of knowledge, of the moral and the immoral in ethics, of the beautiful and the ugly in aesthetics, of activity and passivity in volition—are all traceable in the last analysis to the respective karma done by individuals. Countless

lives will have to be gone through. The Supreme Power has an Infinite number of Infinite attributes of which *Sat*, *Chit*, and *Ananda* (Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss) can in a way be grasped by finite man. The inherent bliss of individuals is beclouded by evil and good karma. The stock of karma is to be exhausted without a residue. *Sravana*, (study of scripture) *Manana*, (mental rehearsal) *Nididhyasana*, (contemplation) and *Samadhi* (Yogic concentration of attention on the Supreme) are means of Final Realisation of the majesty of the Supreme Being. Actions good and bad bind the individual, but done in a spirit of disinterested dedication to the Lord, they do not bind him. In the light of the Vedantic doctrines sketched above, the principle of "Audacity" pales into insignificance.

Sankara, the monarch of Indian monistic metaphysics, regarded the universe as a colossal appearance due to Fontal Folly. Madhva the champion of pluralistic theism and realism insisted on the execution of a dynamic spiritual programme for final realisation, and freedom from the ills of recurring cycles of births and deaths.

Chestov solemnly observes that Tolstoy one dark night fled from his home "not knowing whither or wherefore". (p. 138.) Death is the goal of life according to the Vedanta, and in strict obedience to the Law of Karma which no amount of "Audacity" could violate individuals will pass through a series of births and deaths till the final Realisation of one's inherent Bliss is attained.

V

The Vedanta will endorse Chestov's opinion that the truth lies in the Scriptures, especially the truth that is not accessible to the senses. The last word on this subject was uttered by the author of the Vedanta Sutras in the *Sastra-Yonitva-Adhikarana*. That Spinoza proclaimed a lie to mankind and that he slew God are simply rhetorical rodomontade which may not enhance the philosophical prestige of Chestov. But assuming for purposes of this estimate of Chestov's philosophy that all he says against the contributions of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel is just, fair, and well-grounded, how does his "Audacity" enable one to have a philosophy of life, a theodicy, and how does it direct daily conduct? "Audacity" lynches Negroes, violates the Belgian neutrality, perpetrates untold atrocities in the Congo basin, laughs at the League of Nations; and Pascal and Plotinus, Tolstoy and Tertullian have vanished. That need not disconcert us. Those who live have obvious duties to themselves and their fellowmen. One has a duty to enrich the secular and spiritual life not merely of oneself but of others as well. Works good and bad bind only when the doer or the agent avariciously covets the consequences. The essential, fundamental and foundational nature of the self

finite and Infinite (*Jivatma* and *Paramatma* as the *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* has it) is beyond good and evil. But so long as finite individuals live, move and have their being here, and vegetate cribbed, cabined, and confined, they will have to adhere to a programme of secular and spiritual activity with clear and distinct consciousness (I use these terms though Chestov re-acts to them as a bull to a red rag) that their actions and innermost thoughts are under the surveillance of the Supreme Lord who cannot be hoodwinked by "Audacity". Such is the quintessence of the *Gita* doctrine of " Karma-Yoga ". Of course, Sankara demands "Karma-Sanyasa," riddance of all works good and bad. But then he admits the value of a programme of action *sub specie temporis*.

Chestov's dithyrambic lament that the path of Reason leads to an exaltation of Ethics and the repudiation or subordination of Ontology is as "audacious," as amusing. Some ethical discipline is indispensable and obligatory on all. Deity is not "Caprice incarnate". Law is as much Its Infinite Attribute as Caprice. It guides the destinies of individuals, and nations in accordance with Karma individual and collective. It has no malice. Favouritism is unknown to It. (*Vaishamya-nairghrinya-adhikarana*—Vedanta Sutras.)

Reason may very well pave the way for the emergence of higher powers and spiritual visions. The *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* made use of Reason to demonstrate the existence of God. Condemnation of Reason, while Chestov's "Audacity" and "Suddenly" are so nebulous and unable to place in the hands of man "a balance hitherto unknown to man in which Job's sorrow really weighs more than the heavy sands of the sea," (p. 367) is a polemical or controversial legerdemain. The Lord says to Arjuna that He would bestow on him a divine vision, (*Divya-chakshuh*) specially for a specific occasion, of exhibition of the Lord's Cosmic Form. (*Visva-roopa-pradarsana.*) If that momentary vision of the Glory of the Lord should be converted into a precious life-possession, Reason, and Ethics grounded on Reason cannot be repudiated and overthrown.

I rather think it is time to conclude. Chestov claims that his " Audacity " would unlock the door to which Old Khayyam " found no key " but the Vedanta asserts that Reason (*Yukti*), Audacity (*Dhairya-Kaschit-dhherah-* etc. *Katha.* iv–1), Ethics, and consistent and courageous pursuit of means of final realisation (*Sravanadisadhana-anushtana*), are *all* equally important and indispensable for deserving and earning final emancipation from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. Riddance of all Karmic residue means enjoyment of unalloyed bliss ever in the service of the Lord. *Cui est credendum*, Chestov or Vedantic seers ? I feel sure readers of THE ARYAN PATH are in a position to decide for themselves. My comments

notwithstanding, Chestov's work is a stinging challenge to modern life. It is superb and brilliant, genuinely more philosophic than many of the namby-pamby performances of lotus-eating thinkers occidental and oriental, and of pinchbeck authors and metaphysicians who are suffering from an entirely needless reputation and who are groaning under the weight of greatness thoughtlessly thrust on them by the multitude. Chestov's "Audacity" has a prominent place under the Sun.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

PROF. JACKSON ON MANI AND MANICHAEISM*

[**Dr. Sir Jivanji J. Modi** has already been our honoured contributor and is too well-known in east and west to need any introduction.—EDS.]

Two religious heresies disturbed greatly the Sassanian rule and people of Persia. (1) Mazdakism or the heresy of Mazdak and (2) Manichaeism or the heresy of Mani.

Mazdakism arose in the reign of Kobad in the early part of the sixth century A. C. It was started by Mazdak, a minister of Kobad. Mazdak was the first Iranian Socialist.† He had persuaded Kobad, his royal master, to join his creed. His socialism was of a very bad type, because, in preaching on the community of property, he recommended the community of womanhood also. He lowered the status of marriage ties. Kobad's son Khosro (afterward Chosroes I, known as Anoushirwan or Noshirwan the Just) saved his royal father and the country from the clutches of Mazdakism. Mazdak was put to death in 528 A. C. On coming to the throne, Chosroes called a number of *bazams* or assemblies of the learned of the country to discuss this and other social and religious questions. These *bazams* were like our modern "conferences". In the matter of its after-effects, this heresy of Mazdak was nothing compared to the heresy of Mani. It is on the subject of the belief of this heretic Mani that we have a recent learned publication from Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson.

Prof. Jackson is a "thoroughgoing" man. "Thorough" is, as it were, his watchword. He is a thorough student, a thorough scholar, a thorough writer, and a thorough traveller. He has thoroughly shown his thoroughness in all its parts in the present publication. A full contents and bibliography are followed by a brief

* *Researches in Manichaeism, with special Reference to the Turfan Fragments*, by A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON, Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University (1932).

† *Vide* my paper "Mazdak, the Iranian Socialist" in the Dastur Dr. Hoshang Jamasp Memorial Volume. *Vide* my "Memorial" Papers pp. 112 *et seq.*

sketch, which, though brief, is for ordinary readers, full of information on Manichaeism and its history. Then follow his translations of Turfan Pahlavi Manichaean fragments with texts. Part III contains matters specially interesting to Parsi students, as therein he gives his own reading and translations, with notes, of the passages in the Pahlavi Shikhand Gumanik Vijar and the Dinkard referring to Manichaeism.

Prof. Jackson's reference to his *shisyas* as a *guru* is touching. As he says, it well reminds a Parsi of the relationship between the aêthrya (pupil) and his teacher (aêthrapaiti). The Parsi Meher Yasht speaks of this relationship or friendship between the teacher and his pupils as being above all other friendships and as being nearest to friendship between two relatives. It speaks of this friendship as seventy-fold (haptaithivâo antarê aethra-paiti. s. 116). How pleasant to find that, thanks to God, Prof. Jackson has produced a galaxy of good aêthryas; and they have all, as the ancient good *shisyas*, good *chelâs*, stood by the side of their *aêthrya-paiti*, their *guru*.

THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON MANICHAEISM

Up to about thirty years ago, there were three sources of information on Manichaeism: (1) Early Church Fathers, (2) Mahomedan writers, like Maçoudi, and (3) Parsi Pahlavi writers.

1. Of these three classes of informants, the first, the early Christian Fathers wrote, not with a view to give any account of, or information about, Manichaeism, but—Manichaeism, being a rival of Christianity—with a view to refute it.

2. The Mahomedan writers wrote, not with a view to refutation, because Manichaeism, having been mostly driven from Persia, had retired to the East and North-east, to the regions of Turkestan and adjoining parts of Central Asia. That being the case, Manichaeism was no rival to Mahomedanism.

3. As to the Parsi Pahlavi writers, they, like the early Christian Fathers, wrote with a view to fight against Manichaeism which threatened to become, and for some time actually became, a great heresy in the midst of Zoroastrianism. So, though not an actual rival of Zoroastrianism, it had begun to act against the Iranian Renaissance—social, political, and religious—founded by Ardeshir Babegan who had come to the throne of Persia in 212 A. C. and founded the Sassanian dynasty. Ardeshir died in about 242 A.C. Mani (216–276) flourished, with his heresy, a little after Ardeshir's death, and troubled the reign of Shapur who carried on, with some rigour, the Renaissance begun by his father. The Renaissance, as in the case of all renaissances, was not universally liked. For example, Jasnasfshah, the King of Tabaristan, a dependent king, had, in his letter to Dastur Tansar or Taosar, the Prime Minister of Ardeshir, protested against what

may loosely be called a kind of caste-system rigidly sought to be introduced.* It was a kind of caste-system, purely based on profession, the like of which, at one time, prevailed even among the ancient Romans.†

Thus this heresy of Mani was a great event in the religious history of Persia. Though punished and persecuted, it continued long in Persia. Being a kind of an offshoot of Zoroastrianism, though not a rival of Zoroastrianism, it continued long in Persia, and influenced even some Zoroastrians.

ATTEMPT TO FOUND AN ECLECTIC FAITH

Several attempts have been made, now and then, here and there, to found an eclectic faith. Ptolemy had made such an attempt in Egypt. Akbar had made one in India which was less successful than that of Ptolemy. Manichaeism was such an attempt in Persia. Some attempts are made, even nowadays, here and there, of founding a Universal Brotherhood, with a kind of faith which is "a synthesis of elements from various existing religions". The attempts are to form, if not exactly a new religion, a new kind of belief or faith. Of these modern attempts, the one of the present Mazdaznans of America, who have now spread in Great Britain and other parts of Europe, is an instance. It reminds us more of Manichaeism than any other attempts, if not in all its beliefs, in its formation. Like Manichaeism, it has taken some elements from Zoroastrianism and some from Christianity. I have given in a letter in Gujarati in the *Jam-e-Jamshed* Bombay an account of my visit to one of their sittings in July 1925. (Letter 41 of my travels in 1925.)

MANI

Mani, a Mazdayacnan and a Parthian Arsacid by birth, was born in 216 A. C. near Bagdad, of a father who, himself, was somewhat of an eclectic in religious views. He made his first appearance as a new eclectic and preacher in March 242 A. C. on the coronation day of Shapur I. His heretical preachings led Shapur to expel him from his country within a few years after. So, he went out preaching his new faith in various countries like Northern India, Tibet, Chinese Turkestan and Khorasan. He went on preaching, as well as learning, especially from some Indian sources. By that time, perhaps, the clamour against his new teaching, which of course had many Zoroastrian elements, was toned down a little, and when he returned to Persia, Shapur's son Hormuzd who reigned for a very short time (272 to 273) looked on his preaching with a tolerant

* It was not altogether a new introduction because Jamshed is said to have introduced it, hundreds of years ago. *Vide* my paper "Was there any Institution in Ancient Iran like that of Caste in India?" (*Jour. Anthropological Society of Bombay*, Vol. XIII No. 8, pp. 816–822. *Vide* my Anthropological Papers, Part IV, pp. 199–205.)

† *Vide* the chapter on "The Caste System in Rome," in "The End of the Ancient World," by Mr. Ferdinand Lot, pp. 100 *et seq.*

or indulgent spirit. Hormuzd's successor, Behram I, was not of such tolerant spirit, and unable to oppose the trend of public feeling, put him to death in 274 A. C.—about 32 years after his first appearance as a preacher. The ancient Persians on the whole were a tolerant people. Had it not been so, Christianity would not have spread so much in Sassanian Persia. But the manner of Mani's death, that of being flayed alive, if true, may be taken as a black spot upon Persian toleration.

THE SPREAD OF MANICHAEISM

I think very few religious sects have spread their influence so far and wide or exercised so enduring an after-influence as Manichaeism. Even by the time of Mani's death, his teaching had spread far and wide, if not so much in Persia itself, much in the East and in the West, where it had become, a powerful rival to Christianity.

In the matter of religion, Persia has been more than once a peril to the West. Even before the appearance of Christianity, the puritanical form of its religion had influenced the West. The ancient Persians are spoken of as "The Puritans of the Old World". The Rev. Charles Kingsley, while speaking of the Egyptian religion of the time of Ptolemy I, says:—

> The Old Egyptian gods had grown in his dominions very unfashionable, under the summary iconoclasm to which they had been subjected by the Monotheist Persians—the Puritans of the Old World as they have been called.*

Capt. Little, while speaking of the modern Parsis of India, speaks of their progenitors of Persia as "the Puritans of the East".† Of the possible Puritan influence of Persia upon Greece, Max Müller said:—

> There were periods in the history of the world when the worship of Ormuzd threatened to rise triumphant on the ruins of the temples of all other gods. If the battles of Marathon and Salamis had been lost, and Greece had succumbed to Persia, the state religion of the empire of Cyrus, which was the worship of Ormuzd, might have become the religion of the whole civilized world. Persia had absorbed the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires; the Jews were either in Persian captivity or under Persian sway at home; the sacred monuments of Egypt had been mutilated by the hands of Persian soldiers. The edicts of the king,—the king of the kings—were sent to India, to Greece, to Scythia, and to Egypt, and if "by the grace of" Ahura Mazda, Darius had crushed the liberty of Greece, the purer faith of Zoroaster might easily have superseded the Olympian fables.‡

After this there was Mithraism which spread as a rival to Christianity and led the Christian bishops, in order to secure the stability of Christianity, to adapt many of their Christian beliefs to the beliefs and requisites of Mithraism, even to the extent of adopting the 25th of December, at first a Mithraic religious seasonal festival, as the birth (natal) day of Christ. Such being the case, the new faith of Mani of Persia was another peril for Christian Europe.

* Alexandria and her School (1854) by Rev. Charles Kingsley.

† A Narrative of the Operations of Capt. Little's Detachment (1794) p. 334.

‡ Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*, Vol. I, p. 162.

MANICHAEISM LOSING ITS ORIGINAL ASPECT WITH ITS SPREAD OUT OF PERSIA

I think that Prof. Jackson is right in saying:—

> Perhaps it [Manichaeism] preserved a more original aspect in the region that gave it birth, the Babylonian province of the Persian Empire and its environs. (p. 17)

I would remove the word "perhaps" from his sentence and say that it seems to be really so. The Manichaeism, as now presented by the previous Zoroastrian, Christian and Mahomedan writers, jointly with the newly discovered writings, may be taken as a little different from what he taught at first on the Persian soil. It seems that, when driven from the Persian soil, he went towards the East,—towards Turkestan,—not only preaching his beliefs, but also learning further some other beliefs.

Prof. Jackson's account of its spread in the West up to distant Spain, where it went marching across both the shores of the Mediterranean, is interesting. "The Priscillianists of Spain were tinged by Manichaeism."* (p. 18). The Albigenses were an offshoot of them.† It is very strange that Manichaeism, though itself dead as a separate belief, is said to have left its influence on much later Christian sects such as the Paulicians of Armenia and Asia Minor which were seats of Manichaeism in early times and the Bogomils of Bulgaria.‡

The Paulicians sprung up in Armenia in the second half of the seventh century. Their founder Constantine belonged to a dualistic community. He was drawn to his new heretic belief by the epistles of Paul. Hence the name of the sect. He died about 684. One may, or may not, see in Paul's epistles, anything of the strict dualism of Manichaeism, but this seems to be a case of how one reads his own thoughts in another's writings.

> They held the ordinary dualistic doctrine common to all the Manichaeans, expressly distinguishing the Being to whom the present world owes its creation and government from the maker and ruler of that which is to come.

As to the Bogomils of Bulgaria their name means "friends of God," wherein the syllable *bog* reminds us of the Iranian *baga* God (Indian *bhagavan*, Slavonic *bog*). It was a later heretical sect of the Greek Church prevalent in Bulgaria in the twelfth century. They also like the main sect, the Manichaeans, with its offshoots, the Albigenses and the Paulicians suffered persecutions.

THE ELEMENTS OF HIS MANICHAEISM

Prof. Jackson gives us an excellent general outline of Mani-

---

* The followers of Priscillian, a bishop of Spain "who embraced some of the errors of the Gnostics" and who was arraigned as an heretic and put to death in 385 A. C.

† For a brief account of Mani's doctrine and its relation to the Albigenses. *Vide* my Gujarati work, entitled "Future Life or the Immortality of the Soul" (ભવિષ્યની જીંદગી અથવા આત્માનું અમરપણું) 1889 pp. 107–8 n. I.

‡ *Encycl. Britt.* 9th Ed., Vol. 18, pp. 433-34.

chaeism (pp. 7–16). This outline leads us to indulge in various thoughts. He says :—

> The religion of Mani . . . was distinctly and designedly a synthesis. Among his spiritual predecessors he especially acknowledged Zoroaster, Buddha and Jesus as pioneer revealers of the truth which he came to fulfil. (p. 17)

Mani tried to do in Persia, what Ptolemy I had partially succeeded in doing in Egypt and what Akbar failed to do in India. He wanted to produce and preach an eclectic faith having the elements of Zoroastrianism, Christianity and even of Buddhism. Buddhism had advanced to the doors of Persia, though it had not entered into the heart of Persia proper. It had influenced even some important personages, and we learn from a recent book,* on the Religious History of China, that it was an Iranian prince, the Parthian prince An-shihkao, who first preached Buddhism in China.

The so called dualism of the Zoroastrians—the conflict between Spenta-Mainyu and Angra-Mainyu —was at the bottom of Mani's teachings, though not in Zoroastrian wording. He claimed to be the Paraclete—the Comforter, Consoler, Intercessor—referred to by Jesus Christ. Some Indian, old Babylonian, and Mandaean beliefs with Hellenistic Gnostic features† were intermixed. As to Mandaeasm, I think, in it again, there was more a varnish of Zoroastrianism because Mandaeasm itself was a mixture and had more of Zoroastrian than other elements.‡

Mani had divided his followers into two classes. The formation of the upper—the Elect or Perfect—who were asked to live a life of celibacy and austerity, points much to the influence of Buddhism.

THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF ZOROASTRIANISM BELIEVED TO HAVE SPECIALLY INFLUENCED MANI

Among the different elements of Zoroastrianism, the belief in the two Principles seems to have especially influenced Mani. In the text, with translation, of the Berlin manuscript, as well as in the Stein manuscripts, given by Le Coq,§ the Sun-god and Light are often referred to. Mr. Fisk of America thought that the two principles assigned to Mithra, the Sun-god, led to the Manichaean heresy. Mrs. Murray-Aynsley, says :¶

> Zoroaster (Zerdusht) assigned to Mithra, the sun-god of the Persians, two principles and made those exercise two distinct forces, each independent of the other, under the names of Ormuzd (good) and Ahriman (evil). This, in time,

* *A History of the Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Opinions in China, from the Beginning to the Present time*, by Dr. Leo Wieger, S. J. (1927) p. 66.

† p. 7

‡ *Vide* my Paper on the Mandaeans in the *Journal of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute* No. 23.

§ *J. R. A. S.* Vol. for 1911 Article VIII pp. 280 *et seq.*

¶ *Symbolism of the East and West* by Mrs. Murray-Aynsley, with Introduction by Sir George Birdwood (1900) p. 18.

in the opinion of Mr. Fiske (the American upholder of the Darwinian theories), produced the Manichaean heresy, in which the devil appears as an independently existing principle of evil; and thus in part at least, was continued the old Asiatic worship of the sun in comparatively modern Europe. The heresy, says Mr. Fiske, "was always rife in Armenia; it was through Armenian missionaries that Bulgaria was converted from Heathenism, and from thence, Manichaeism penetrated into Servia and Bosnia, which latter was its headquarters from the twelfth century onwards, and was a perpetual thorn in the side of the Papacy."

A MANICHAEAN CONFESSION PRAYER

The connection between Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism reminds us of the Manichaean Prayer of Confession,* and the Zoroastrian Patet Pashimáni† or prayer of repentance or confession, which is compared with the Patimokkha‡ of Buddhism. The Manichaean Confession Prayer is said to be of "a relatively more recent date."§ It consists "of an enumeration of possibly committed sins, for which forgiveness is being implored. This enumeration comprehends fifteen articles or counts each being introduced by the words, the Second, the Third etc."¶ The prayer was intended for "the auditores or Manichaean laymen."$

It is the form of some parts of the Manichaean confession, that reminds us of the Parsi Patet. A form, similar to the following, often recurs in the Manichaean Confession:

My God! If in our sinful condition we unwittingly should somehow have been infractors against, or causers of discontent in the Five-God by a bad and wicked mind . . . now my God cleansing ourselves from sin we pray *manastar hirza.*** (*i.e.* our sin remit.)

The Patet of the Parsis also has a formula of Confession and it enumerates all possible sins.†† The word literally means "going back" or receding from the transgression of the law; and so it corresponds to the Hebrew T'shubâh which also means returning or going back. (1) The Manichaean Confession commences with

* For this Manichaean Prayer of Confession, *Vide* the late Mr. A. V. Le Coq's article "Dr. Steins Turkish Khuastuanift frun Tun Huang, being a Confession-prayer of the Manichaean auditores." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. for 1911 article VIII. pp. 277 *et seq.*

† For the Zoroastrian Patet Pashimáni, *vide* Spiegel's Avesta Part III, Khordeh Avesta. Bleeck's Translations p. 153.

‡ The Patimokkha of the Buddhists is their book in which are summed up the rules and directions which they have to follow and the disregard of which is a sin. "It is regarded with much reverence by the monks, from its having from times immemorial been ordered to be read twice monthly in every monastery." *Encycl. Br.*, 9th Ed. Vol. IV p. 434 col. 2. Dr. T. W. Rhys Davids gives, in the above article on Buddhism, a brief account of the rules and directions. It is said to have been composed earlier than, or about the time of, Asoka's Council about 250 B. C.

§ *Jour. R. A. S.* Op. Cit. p. 278.

¶ *Ibid* p. 279.

$ *Ibid* p. 280.

** These words in the Manichaean Prayer of Confession which we find in Dr. Le Coq's Text are said by him to be words of the Middle Persian or Cuneiform language. If so, I think 'Mana' is Middle Persian *mana*, mine; *star* is Middle Persian *star* to sin; *hirza*, from a root, corresponding to Avesta *har* (Lat. salvere, to save) or Avesta *harez*, to leave off, to let lie.)

†† *Vide* my Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsis.

" Khormuzta the God and the Five God."* (2) The Parsi Patet commences with five Yathâ Ahu Vairyos (Yatha Ahu Vairyo panja). The Parsi Yatha Ahu Vairyo, being the oldest Mazdayasnan prayer, a pre-Zoroastrian formula of prayer, is something like the Word of God. The Parsi Patet has eleven *kardehs* or sections. (3) All possible sins are mentioned in the Patet, one after another, and each *kardeh* ends, as in the case of the Manichaean Confession, with a similar or somewhat similar form of repentance, *viz*:—

If I have been sinful of that (sin), O God ! I repent of all the sins committed through thought, word and action, physical sins, or spiritual sins, sins related to this world or to the next world. I repent with three words—*i. e. manashni, gavashni, kunashni,* (thought, word and deed). I repent by saying the Patet.

The Khormuzta, the God in the Manichaean Confession prayer above referred to, seems to be another form of Hormaza (Ahura Mazda). The first part *khor* when written in Pahlavi can be read as *hor* and *vice versa*.

REFERENCES TO MANICHAEISM IN PAHLAVI BOOKS

We said above, that Prof. Jackson has referred to two Pahlavi books, and given their texts and translations with notes, which refer to Manichaeism. The first is Shikand Gumanik Vajar.† He has given the early part of the portion which refers to Manichaeism. The second is the Dinkard.‡

The Shikand Gumanik Vijar says that Mani had thousands of delusions. (*a*) Among these delusions is one which we often hear now, *viz.* " Man is a two-footed animal." Mani seems to be the first who said something like this. He said: "Mankind are two-legged demons, and animals four-legged."§ (mardum dev-i do pâva gusfand chehâr-pâyân. s. 15.) (*b*) Again, we nowadays speak of microcosm and macrocosm. We find something of this kind in Mani's teaching. He said :—

He (Ahriman) arranged this Little World which, like mankind and cattle (and) other living creatures is a wholly-copied replica of the Great World, with the other embodied creation. (s. 24)¶

(*c*) Our Jain readers will be interested in one of the teachings of Mani justifying the non-killing of living things. He says that killing animals is the work of Ahriman. So, when you kill a living being, you do the work of Ahriman. (ss. 42-45)

Two of the ten teachings of Mani as given in the Dinkard draw our special attention. (1) In the second teaching we find a tinge of Mazdakism.$ (2) Adarbad recommended marriage with a

* *Jour. R. A. S.* Op. cit. p. 280.

† Chap. XVI. S. B. E. Vol. XXIV, pp. 243 *et seq. Vide* Shikand-Gumanik Vijar. The Pazand-Sanskrit Text together with a fragment of the Pahlavi, by Hoshang Jamasp and West (1887) p. 167 *et seq.*

‡ Bk. III. Subject 200. Dastur Peshotan's Volume V, Text pp. 242-43. Translation (English) pp. 315-17. Trans. Gujarati, pp. 295-97. D. M. Madon's Edition, Vol. I, pp. 216-10.

§ Jackson p. 177.

¶ *Ibid* p. 179.

$ No. 3 in Jackson's list ; p. 205, No. 2 in Dastur Peshotan's list, Vol. V Text p. 242.

woman of good family (nishman min tokhma). Mani recommended marriage with any woman, even out of good family (nishman minach bara tokhma).* In other words, he recommended marriage even out of community. In the portion of the Dinkard referring to Manichaeism, Mani is represented as opposing the teachings of the Primate, Adarbad Maraspand.†

The Dinkard has other references to Mani. (1) The first is in Bk. V,‡ where Mani is referred to with Alexander, Zohak, Messiah who were disturbers (varvishan-varân)§of belief. (2) The Dinkard's second reference to Mani is in the 9th book. It says that a chapter of the book (mentioned below in the foot-note) treats of the evil teachings of Mani.

The Shayast la shayast ¶ makes three classes of religions:

(*a*) The pure laws of religions (avizeh dât)$

(*b*) Mixed religions (gomizeh dât)

(*c*) Low or bad religions (vatar dat)

This division is something like our modern division "good, bad and indifferent". Among the first class, the good, the writer takes his own religion, the veh-din, *i. e.* the Zoroastrian religion. Among the third class, the bad, he takes the Zandists (zindîk), the Christian (Tarsâk) and the Jews (Yahud). Among the second class, the (mixed), he takes the *Sinik, i.e.* the Chinese. This Chinese is, as suggested by Darmesteter,** the Manichaean. The Epistles of Manuschihar seem to connect Manichaeism with the country of China.

The Epistles of Manuschehr†† refer to Manichaeism indirectly, Manuschihar was the head priest of the Parsis in Persia in the ninth century A. C. (The third epistle is dated 881 A. C.). His brother, Zadsparam, was the High priest of the Zoroastrians of Sarakh "in the extreme north of Khorassan where he seems to have been associated with heretical Tughazghus," who were, as pointed out by Maçudi, Manichaeans in belief. Having been thus associated, Zadsparam introduced several

* Jackson's list No. 5. Dastur Peshotan's No. 5 Text; No. 4 Guj. Translation.

† Mani lived from 216 to 274. He flourished in the reign of Shapur I, who reigned from 240 to 271. Adarbad Maraspand was a great primate in the latter part of the reign of Shapur I and in the reign of his son Hormuzd.

‡ Bk. V, Chap. III 3. West, S. B. E. Vol. 47, p. 126; Dastur Peshotan's Dinkard, Vol. IX, Pahlavi Text p. 480 l. 12. Gujarati Transl. p. 579, Eng. Trans. p. 618. Madon's Ed. Vol. I p. 437 l. 12.

§ Bk. IX Chap. XXXIX, 13; S. B. E. Vol. XXXVII, p. 278. Dastur Darabji Peshotan's Dinkard, Vol. XVIII, Eng. Translation, p. 23. Chap. XXXVII, Pahlavi Text p. 30; Guj. Trans. p. 15. Madon's Edition. Vol. II, p. 857 l. 18.

¶ Chap. VI, 7 S. B. E. Vol. V.

$ (1) The Shayast la shayast, by Dr. M. B. Davar (in the Press)

(2) Shayast-ne shayast. A Pahlavi Text on Religious Customs, by Jehangir C. Tavadia, Hamburg, 1930, p. 97, 1.9 *et seq.*

** S. B. E. Vol. V, p. 296 n. 1.

†† Epistles II, Ch. I 12 *Vide* Mr. B.N. Dhabhar's Ed. (1912) p. 57 l.8

innovations, especially in the ritual of Bareshnum. These innovations were not liked by the people who protested at the headquarters and Manuschihar reprimanded his brother.

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI

Life and Experiences of a Bengali Chemist. By P. C. RAY (Kegan Paul, London. *7s. 6d.*)

Westerners interested in the East have up till recently been inclined to think chiefly in terms of her metaphysical sages. We have been captivated by the potentialities exhibited in her *gurus* and *yogis*. At the same time our admiration has neither been blind nor overwhelming; we have smiled at their flagrant deficiency in living "in this world which is the world of all of us, where we find our happiness or not at all". Not unjustly our idea of the best India can do in the expression of wisdom is symbolised by the *guru* to whom Edward Carpenter once paid a visit. That *guru* was a remarkable man; many things were possible to him which were outside the apparent reach of Carpenter and his fellow Westerners. But his deficiencies were discouraging. His disregard for beauty, his blindness to nature, his contempt for enjoyment of any sort, his dogmatic stupidity when confronted with a few simple modern scientific facts, his deadness, in short, to this world which is lovely and to be loved—made his psychic powers and Olympian indifference appear as inadequate compensations. He represented only half of what humanity has a right to expect and the will to admire. Moreover our personal experience of young Indians in England convinces us that they also are of the same opinion, only more so: that they are less appreciative of and less interested in their *gurus* and *yogis* than we ourselves are. We judge that the youth of India to-day is not going to tread the old path. To-day there are other representatives—men like Gandhi, Tagore, and Sir P. C. Rây. Of Gandhi and Tagore I cannot speak here, save to suggest that neither of them are typical Orientals in the old sense, and that the two of them taken together give a truly exhilarating idea of what India, perhaps, is about to be.

Sir P. C. Rây, unlike Gandhi and Tagore, is not a literary man and his book, telling of his life and experiences, has grave faults as a book, lacking as it does in planning and literary economy. And it is too modest (he has even omitted to include one single photograph of himself); we see and hear too little of Sir P. C. Rây, and get instead quite an unnecessary amount of Macaulay, Carlyle, Mussolini, Emerson, Benjamin Franklin, Laski, and Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless the faults of the book are not important, for they do not conceal the man. The book unconsciously reveals his wholeness, his common sense, his sensible idealism, his love of India without sentimentality, and his hatred of false knowledge. It is obvious that he exercises a great deal of influence outside, no less than inside, his laboratory. *Here*, we feel, is the kind of man Young India responds to.

He has given up his life chiefly in the service of Chemistry. His extraordinary success in this line seems to disallow the idea that the East has no head for Science—an idea which his *History of Hindu Chemistry* has done much to dispel. The whole world having recognised and called upon the services of Rây and Bose can hardly continue to regard the East as incapable of Science! But the most significant thing about Sir P. C. Rây is that he established the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, an important and successful industrial enterprise, and yet was ready to join with Gandhi in the Gospel of Charka. As he was more business-like than the business men in the creation of the Works, his attitude towards Spinning and Machinery should command the utmost respect and study. The

injury done to the people of India on behalf of Lancashire (an injury immense and unforgivable and utterly impossible to explain away by any amount of word-wash) is not his only reason for opposing the swift industrialism of India. It is because he is as anxious as Gandhi to save India from the hell of a futile mechanisation. His attitude of realism and idealism here is something with which his younger contemporaries should be proud to associate themselves.

Again, he is a supreme example of the University Man who has been to England, but is absolutely opposed to the mad rush of young Indians to procure degrees. Over against false knowledge, examination-facts, and the prize-winner brain, he displays his deep knowledge of their fatuity. If his influence here is a widespread one India may be saved in the future from the Educationalists—from whose clutches Europe is only now beginning to escape.

In conclusion I would like to quote certain words in an Address to him from the students of the Presidency College; they will serve to emphasise the remarks above concerning *gurus* and *yogis*.

> . . . . Yours was, Sir, no small achievement. Your way of life with its distinct Indian traits, recalled us to the sweet and simple and manly days of Indian attainment. You have been to us all through a guide, philosopher and friend. Easy of access, ever-pleasant, ever-willing to help the poor and needy student with your counsel and your purse, living a life of sturdy, celibate simplicity, with genuine patriotism, not loud but deep, *you have been to us an ancient Guru reborn*, a light and an inspiration from the treasure-house of old Indian spirituality.

It is plain—is it not?—that a *guru* is no longer regarded as one who sits still, but as one who is prepared to take an active part in life, like P. C. Rây in the laboratory and in the field of politics.

J. S. COLLIS

The Chinese Idea of the Second Self. By E. T. C. WERNER (Published by The Shanghai Times, Shanghai.)

A small pamphlet is sometimes worth a multitude of books. Within these fifty pages of clear type Mr. Werner, an authority of long standing on matters Chinese, has compressed a mass of learning of the utmost importance. He guides us through the maze of Chinese cosmological ideas to some very sensible conclusions. Both the students of comparative religion and the philosopher will benefit by his clarity and be thankful for his sense of humour.

The primitive Chinaman, stooping to drink in a pool, caught sight of a second self. Shutting his eyes in sleep he was also conscious of a second self performing various actions. Knowing nothing of reflection or dreams—for such conceptions are beyond primitive man—he endowed, in both cases, this apparition with separate reality. In time he recognised it on other occasions—in his shadow, for instance. In time he gave it permanent being. The transition period is long and Mr. Werner conducts us through curious byways of eschatological research, showing us how, as time went on, the Chinese elaborated their simple idea of the second self and devised some quite subtle theories concerning it. A *second* self implies a *first* self. What did they think of that? Mr. Werner answers with a kind of diagram "putting Chinese cosmogony in a nutshell"—it is admirably done.

What becomes of the individuality after death? The answer is simple enough. If a man has identified himself with his spiritual self, led a good life according to Confucian precepts, that part of him continues to exist in heaven, and his *yin*, or emotional counterpart, returns to the *yin* of earth and his identification with it ceases. On the other hand, he who has not conformed to the said precepts, loses his *yang*, his spiritual individuality, and retains (until his second death) his *yin*, or perishable emotional individuality.*

* Theosophical students will easily detect their own teachings as expounded in *The Key to Theosophy* by H. P. Blavatsky in these Chinese explanations.—EDS.

Time brings a development in the idea of the second self. "Consciousness," as we perhaps come to call it,

> is a differently-conditioned form of the Power manifested throughout the Universe. The energy which drives galaxies of stars at a terrific speed through Space, when it lights up our material brains (which, until then, may be compared to an electric bulb before the current is turned on) is called consciousness. Our second selves are thus affiliated to the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. (p. 43)

Our second self turns out, in importance, to be our first self and part of Reality Itself. Primitive man was not so far wrong, groping in the dark, and Hope lies ahead.

> Therefore all progress grows sacred with wondering expectation. We and the world may go forth from each old year into the new, certain that in that new year there will be for us some novel life, something better than the best experience of life, and better than our conceptions of the immortality we hanker after. And so from life to life, worlds without end. (p. 48)

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

The Golden Boat. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. Translated by Bhabani Bhattacharya. (Allen & Unwin, London. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

A book by Rabindranath Tagore is like a spirit that leads us by still waters where we may recollect ourselves and regain our integrity. And we need to do this now more than ever, for at no time, perhaps, in any civilised country have the things of the spirit counted for so little as to-day in England and America. The financial crisis that we hear so much about is only one aspect of the general bankruptcy of creeds and systems in our noisily trivial civilization. The Great Powers are proud of their military empires, but in gaining the world they have lost their souls and we, who are their subjects, in the midst of satiety, inwardly starve. Consequently, that of our modern poetry which can be said to have any spiritual significance is eloquent of revolt and despair. In contrast to this state of things, Tagore, with his stillness of spirit and his purity of vision, stands like a saint.

The present book is a collection of poems, fables and sketches covering fifty years of the poet's life. It moves through many moods, in turn gravely philosophical, playful and satirical; but beneath all moods, like a deeper tide, there is a tranquil sense of Being, a constant apprehension of the relation of the Transient and the Eternal, from which is borne a lyricism that invades the mind like a gentle wind bringing with it an intangible loveliness.

> Man has climbed mountains and crossed oceans. He has gone down to the depths of the earth in search of gold. But has he ever known the secret of filling up the void in his soul?

Even between our heart and that of the beloved stretches an infinite void which we attempt to fill with the trifles of day-to-day life. It is this sense of the intangibility of things, of our individual isolation, that give his love lyrics their strange poignance. This and his nearness to the simple and enduring things of nature, the untroubled passing of clouds and the diurnal rotation of darkness and light; his joy in grass and trees and water and all the common language of the universe,—this sets Tagore's work above and beyond the writing of our time or, indeed, of any time, for these things are fundamental to the nature of man in all ages.

> In me the life-spark has grown dim under the fumes of thought. So, to see its undarkened flash, I have to turn to the grass, to the tree.

To-day, particularly, we have much to learn from a man who, in the maelstrom of modern life, has retained such a simple steadfastness of vision. His poems should be read slowly over and over till they gradually transform our world. That their beauty is not merely a melody of words is evident from the fact that even in translation they speak to us as soft voices in the heart. Mr. Bhattacharya is to be congratulated on having produced a translation that reads with such natural spontaneity.

PHILIP HENDERSON

The Destiny of Europe. By F. McEACHRAN. (Faber and Faber, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The thesis upheld here is that there exists a definite and distinguishable European tradition upon the recovery of which depends the salvation not only of Europe but of the rest of the world. To defend it successfully it is necessary (1) to define with reasonable clearness the substance of the tradition, (2) to prove that the primary elements of European culture have converged toward its creation, and (3) to show that nothing comparable exists elsewhere. I cannot feel that Mr. McEachran's book adequately meets these requirements.

The tradition he sees maintained in Europe up to a century or so ago is very similar to the humanism associated with Mr. Irving Babbitt and his school: a sort of individualism with the emphasis on self-restraint. The idea is sufficiently vague to need considerable elaboration, the more so because Mr. McEachran refers now and then to religion as something desirable. Yet he nowhere stops to explain what he means by religion and how it is related to the humanism he advocates.

This ambiguity is only deepened by the rapid historical survey of which the book mainly consists. It is argued that the legacies of Greece, Rome and Christianity have coalesced into a single tradition. But is it certain that there is any possibility of coalescence between the ethos, the *Weltanschauung*, of Greece and of Christianity? Again, the individualism implicit in Christianity, has it not taken, as Troeltsch has described them, radically divergent forms? In what sense was Greece individualistic? Did it not, on the contrary, envisage the fusion of the individual with the State—anticipating Jean-Jacques Rousseau—and, at the same time, exclude from humanity a large class of persons on the ground that, as Aristotle said, they were merely "instruments of action," possessions, property? Is Kant's dictum that every man must be treated as an end in himself really Greek in spirit? How then explain away the statement of A. J. and R. W. Carlyle in their monumental *History of Medieval Political Theory* that the Stoic doctrine of Equality marks the dividing line between the ancient and modern worlds? . . . . . Mr. McEachran provokes such questions at nearly every point in his argument.

He contends, finally, that there is nothing outside Europe corresponding to this tradition. Now, if I leave aside Russia and the middle West, which may perhaps be only distortions of European culture, it seems to me a little rash to assert that no principles of "unity, multiplicity and moderation," such as Mr. McEachran claims to be the characteristic features of the European type, are to be found in the East. Is restraint restraint, only if clothed in a Greek phrase? Can any culture survive for long—and no one questions the tenacity of the civilisations of India and China—without a regard to these elementary conditions of life? Is Mr. Babbitt utterly wrong in looking upon China as a cradle of humanism? Mr. McEachran thinks that, since the East has adopted industrialism and nationalism, it must also adopt "Plato and Aquinas". But industrialism and nationalism have not so much been adopted as acquiesced in, to escape from the yet more intolerable evil of European imperialism based on economic power. Because Bacon and Rousseau have been reluctantly admitted, why should the Upanishads and the Buddha, Sankara and Confucius, be precipitately thrown out?

Mr. McEachran's aims, I admit, are commendable; he urges the release of the individual from the stifling influence of contemporary mass movements, and seeks for a basis on which the warring nationalities of Europe can be reconciled. But by putting forward a nebulous doctrine and defending it with precarious if not untenable historical generalisations, I fear he alienates even a sympathetic reader.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

The Great Pyramid in Fact and in Theory. By WILLIAM KINGSLAND, M. I. E. E. Part I. Descriptive. (Rider & Co, London. 30*s.*)

In view of the unique archæological importance of the Great Pyramid and the controversies which have been raging round it since the days of Piazzi Smyth, Mr. Kingsland has done a most valuable service to all who are interested in this great monument of the remote past—and who is not?—by giving us a careful, systematic, and unprejudiced account of its design, construction, and dimensions.

Mr. Kingsland, who is a practical engineer, as well as a writer on philosophical and mystical subjects, spent some months in Egypt in 1931, in order to study the Pyramid at first hand and to check the sometimes conflicting observations and measurements of previous explorers. The present volume sets forth the result of his labours, and gives us the most accurate figures obtainable as to the dimensions of the exterior of the Pyramid and of its interior passages and chambers. The book is richly illustrated by an admirably reproduced series of photographs, sketches and plans.

The appearance of this authoritative work is peculiarly timely having regard to the publicity recently given to the claim of Mr. D. Davidson and others of his school that the Great Pyramid was built under the immediate inspiration of Jehovah, by a Pharaoh, who did not understand what he was doing, in order to embody for all time a number of mathematical and other facts and also the orthodox biblical theology of Man's supposed Fall and Redemption—to play the part, indeed, of a supplement to the divine revelation alleged to be contained in the Jewish scriptures. That the builders of the Pyramid did possess a profound knowledge of geometry, mathematics, astronomy, and architecture, together with a highly developed technical skill, is proved by the character of the building itself; but Mr. Kingsland demonstrates that many of the more extravagant claims of the Biblical Pyramidists are founded on inexact measurements and may therefore be dismissed as baseless. He shows, moreover, that the so-called "Sacred," or "Pyramid" cubit of 25·025 British inches, invented by Piazzi Smyth, has no existence in the actual measurements of the structure; but that the unit of length used by the builders was the Egyptian cubit of 20·612 British inches.

Although one of many superficially similar monuments, the Great Pyramid is unique in size, proportions, and structural details. Compared with it, the stonework of the Second and Third Pyramids—its nearest congeners—is rough and inferior. *Their* purpose was evidently to cover the tombs of their founders, which were cut into the rock on which they stand. In neither of them have there been discovered any interior passages in the masonry itself; whereas in the Great Pyramid—rightly or wrongly attributed to Khufu, the second king of the fourth dynasty—the complex and mysterious system of passages and chambers is one of its most inexplicable features.

The problems in connection with the meaning and purpose of the Great Pyramid are no harder to solve than the question of *how* it was built. How did men, at that stage of civilisation, manage to quarry, transport over long distances, cut to shape with the utmost accuracy, and finally place in position, the enormous stones which formed the external casing of the Pyramid; and how, in particular, were the gigantic granite roof beams of the King's Chamber—the largest of them weighing about 73 tons—raised into position 160 feet above the foundation level? And yet, we are told, "there is no record in Egypt itself of any gradual development of architectural knowledge and skill." Mr. Kingsland may well ask:—

> How did the exquisite technical knowledge and skill displayed in this vast structure suddenly make its appearance? . . . . . Though the Great Pyramid is *in* Egypt, is it *of* Egypt?

The present volume constitutes Part I of Mr. Kingsland's work, and we shall look forward with the keenest

interest to the publication of Part II, in which he promises to deal with the theoretical side of the problem of the Pyramid, and to endeavour to answer the question :—

> Are the admitted facts sufficient on which to base *any* consistent theory whatsoever of this magnificently enigmatical structure, every detail of which is a problem ?

R. A. V. M.

Tolstoi : Zyn Wezen en zyn Werk, Tolstoi : The Man and His Work. By Mrs. Roland Holst. (W. L. and J. BRUSSE, Rotterdam.)

Students of the writings of H. P. Blavatsky will remember with what respect she refers to Tolstoi and his views ; how in *The Key to Theosophy* she cites him as one who tried to carry out the noble precepts of the Christ literally ; how in one place she quotes at length from a lecture of his on "Life," introducing the passage by inviting her readers to see for themselves "how near his views are to the esoteric and philosophical teachings" of higher Theosophy ; and how she speaks of his effort to tread the Aryan Path as "the real escape he made beyond the delusions in which most of us live".

Tolstoi's struggle to effect this escape, and his achievement, are decribed in detail in this book. Unlike most of his admirers, the author of the present work sees Tolstoi's life as a unity. To most students the contrast between the first half of his life and the second is so strong, that they find it impossible to see any vital connection between the two. To Mrs. Roland Holst the unifying element is obvious. It is to be found, she tells us, in an ever-present urge to self-realization. In most of us this urge is soon exhausted—an easily extinguished spark ; but in Tolstoi it burned his long life through, like a glowing fire, energizing him to continued effort to express that which was most real to him at any given time. His "self" was full of contrasts, his ideals altered and expanded, grew as his varied experience of life matured the capacities of his powerful mind and soul. Hence the apparently irreconcilable phases of his character and work. It is from this soul-standpoint, then, that the author delineates Tolstoi's character and tells of the vicissitudes of his outer life, his development and second birth, and finally his struggle for spiritual mastery of himself. And then she asks : What is Tolstoi's significance for our own times ? Are his views on ethical and social questions still of practical value for us to-day ? Can they help us now in our present efforts to bring about a spiritual renaissance in social life ? The writer's answer is an emphatic affirmative, substantiated by a careful analysis of the principles for which Tolstoi stands and their connection with the present situation. Her general conclusion would seem to be that Tolstoi's message is the very one needed at the present juncture.

Mrs. Holst has herself passed through many phases. A socialist of many year's standing, she was for a long time a confirmed adherent of the more materialistic forms of this view of life. But recently she has become aware of forces at work in human life, which she previously knew not of. She has come to believe in Socialism of a new kind. Her present attitude she has summed up in a work of more recent date than the one under review :—

> Perhaps the times are ripe for a Socialism rooted, not in the interests of a group, but in the welfare of all; which knows no enemies, only fellow sharers of the common lot, fellow victims of a tendency the West has been manifesting continuously for many ages—a tendency to wander away from the original source of things.

Did not Tolstoi strive to realize just such an ideal as is implied in these words ?

A. DE L.

The Romance of the Inward Light. By L. V. HOLDSWORTH. (J. M. Dent and Sons, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

When George Fox set out in the middle of the seventeenth century to be the apostle of a new reformation, his conception of a direct inward illumination from God within every man's inner being was largely experimental. True, the use of the word Light came from the Gospel of John—"the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world"—and the inward power of salvation described by the mystic Jacob Boehme was an example which may well have come before Fox's notice. But it was from no outward source, Eastern or Occidental, that Fox's sense of revealed truth, of apprehension by a stronger, higher power than himself, was derived. It came from personal, mystical experiences—"openings," as he called them. And it was this sense of personal guidance by an inward illumination that was the spiritual force behind seventeenth century Quakerism.

The faith of Friends spread in those days of fervour like a flame. Persecutions, vile imprisonments, and virulent attacks only seemed to nourish the spiritual power of the Quakers. And it is the romance which lies behind the stories of these fervid apostles of light, the sufferings which they endured for truth's sake, and the reality of their sense of guidance, which form the theme of this volume. Written from an imaginative point of view in the style of the author's previous work, *A Book of Quaker Saints*, the thread of the lesson of the Inward Light runs throughout. And although no other unity is apparent (some of the sections being loosely historical, some imaginatively biographical, and some frankly fictional episodes with a small basis of fact), yet it affords many vivid descriptions of stirring days and many sympathetic pen-pictures of such striking characters as Fox, his wife Margaret Fell, and Elizabeth Hooton, the first Quaker woman preacher.

If there is a fault in the telling, it is that the sense of hero-worship, especially as regards Fox, is at times somewhat oppressive. As Rufus Jones admits "Fox no doubt overstressed the range and scope of inward guidance." He was something more than a man with strange, piercing eyes and a mysterious power over all who met him. And his violent opposition to the priests and their "steeple-houses" was not altogether sound.

But Mrs. Holdsworth does show the founder of the Society of Friends as a rich and complex nature, even if she slurs over a few of his weaknesses. She shows that he was far more than a fanatic with an *idée fixe*, and that as he himself says, "I had a sense of all conditions," so that he could mix with anyone, from the Lord Protector to the humble farmer's handyman, and feel their needs. She sees Fox as the Seeker after Reality, the man who, when appealed to to fight for the Commonwealth against a tyrant king (a cause he must have sympathised with much) replied that he lived in the virtue of that power and life which took away the occasion of all wars. The higher way was always the choice of Fox and his companions. And the ancient Quaker "plain language" and refusal to do "hat-honour" were simply the results of carrying the determination to "publish Truth" into profitless channels.

The early Quakers, in fact, never shrank from the practical application of the truths which they believed had been revealed to them experimentally—whether it meant loss, imprisonment, floggings or even death. Such records as *A Book of Quaker Saints* and *The Romance of the Inward Light*, even if rather highly tinged with the imagination for some, are for that reason an inspiration in these days when men are not used to suffer for their beliefs or to endure material loss for a non-material truth.

G. W. WHITEMAN

CORRESPONDENCE

FROM PARIS

EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC OPINION

[**J. B.** endeavours this quarter to give us the real French view on War and other problems, in contrast to the official or journalistic outlook.—EDS.]

Quite hackneyed, no doubt, is the comparison one could draw between France and China: both countries blessed with—or labouring under—an ancient civilization; both creative, yet leaving the rest of the world to develop and mature their own inventions; both essentially agricultural, with all the implications of a peace-loving and conservative spirit; both rather too often subject to invasions and civil wars; both the laughing-stock of younger countries for their thriftiness (or avariciousness) —not to mention a host of other features they possess in common. And just as China was, until quite recently, supposed to remain petrified in her ancient ideas, customs, and prejudices, it may be that French public opinion appears to outsiders as immovably fixed on its pre-war positions—which is very far indeed from being true. For what we all know of foreign countries and foreign politics is mostly based on what our newspapers say, and the latter's sources of information are Governmental doings and—newspapers again. Now I wonder if there is a country where both the Government and the Press reflect public opinion less accurately than they do in France. Between them there is a chasm which is growing steadily and unaccountably wider.

When a boy, I was rather shocked to find in one of George Meredith's earlier novels the French incidentally described as a warlike nation. Nowadays I realize that up to 1914 their attitude in this respect was not quite worthy of their ripe culture. The older generation, which had witnessed the defeat of 1870, seemed to consider war as a not quite unhappy event, provided it should end in victory. It was generally regarded as a normal possibility, something that could not be averted and therefore was not worth worrying about.

Following on the excitement of the Dreyfus affair, which was really the case of sincerity *versus* authority, the struggle of liberty against tradition—a conflict which we should have thought could never be quenched—the first few years of this century seemed flat and dull. What strangely remote, mysterious entities foreign nations seemed to be in those days! America or Spain, Britain or Russia, were like puppets on a stage; the one might be the hero, the other the villain, but we never ex-

pected to meet them face to face in real life or to see our fate intermingled with theirs. Colonies we already possessed on the map, but not in our national consciousness; they were an unpleasant subject, suggestive of uncouth names, malaria, violence and bloodshed.

Then about 1908 or 1910 things seemed to brighten up a little. New tendencies were, one by one, finding expression; quite in a small way, perhaps, yet proving that we need not for ever remain in the same groove. As an instance take Romain Rolland's novel, *Jean Christophe*, which answered exactly to the hankering of the younger generation after German culture and German friendship. But what this meant to us will probably remain incomprehensible to readers who have not known the French of the 1870 generation and their bogies called "Prussia," "Bismarck," and so forth. One could at last breathe an exhilarating atmosphere of anarchy and scepticism. The time-honoured idols—religious, political, artistic—were going to be thrown into a bonfire. . . .

Then some unpleasant Franco-German incidents occurred. Very few people knew that our case in Morocco was not a completely sound one, and the whole nation was caused to believe that Germany was deliberately seeking a quarrel—precisely what an old French idiom calls "*une querelle d'Allemand*". An intelligent man succeeded in averting the peril of war, and was called a traitor and a scoundrel for his pains. Another statesman, quite narrow-minded, but who has never been suspected of bribery, came into power, and there was a sudden change in the atmosphere. He had never concealed his desire of recovering his native Lorraine, and though the younger men felt in no wise concerned with that old grievance, they allowed themselves to be unconsciously fanned into a state of irritation against Germany. It was then quite easy for him, when the time came in 1914, to give the whole machinery a stealthy flip, and everything toppled over on the side of war.

All this we began to understand only ten or fifteen years later. We cannot now explain, or excuse, our collective war-time blindness—except that it was exactly the same in all the other countries. Romain Rolland's aloofness, for instance—he went to live in Switzerland—was universally criticized, even in the most liberal circles. Some men did feel uncomfortable because German and neutral papers were not allowed in France, and the more reflective minds were alarmed by the humbug of inter-allied politics. Anyway, they could not protest. Thus passed five weary years in the midst of material suffering, dire bereavements and fear of the future.

Fear, indeed, has been weighing on us unceasingly for the last twenty years. Fear is the explanation of all the events in French politics at home and abroad. After the fear of the German in-

vasion, we had the fear of bolshevism, and, as people will always vote *against* something, not *for* something, the first general elections after the war returned a strong Conservative majority. The same army was kept up as before 1914, though the need for it was no longer apparent. The occupation of the Rühr district which made France so unpopular in the whole world was deeply resented by the French themselves, so the next elections (1924) turned against M. Poincaré's policy. But financial troubles and a carefully put-up panic enabled his party to call him to power again in 1926, for, as André Siegfried wittily remarked, "the average Frenchman carries his heart on the Left, but his purse on the Right"!

Meanwhile certain documents and books were being published, for instance, Fabre-Luce's *La Victoire*, and also the note-book of the late George Louis, who had been our Ambassador in Petersburg until M. Poincaré removed him; more recently Demartial's and René Gérin's bold and outspoken books; also several war and post-war novels were being translated from the German, and by degrees an ever-growing section of the French Public realised that we had been thoroughly hoodwinked. The desire for peace is now all the deeper in this country because people understand that war is never the spontaneous onslaught of a bloodthirsty nation, but is artfully prepared and brought about by the will of a few men.

Yet before we had time to settle down to peace, new causes for apprehension had arisen. Our next-door neighbours are all brandishing their swords. A people that we have always loved and that we are not conscious of having ever wronged is being systematically taught to hate us. Its schoolboys are drilled in the use of rifles and machine-guns, and the *Duce* holds out as a reward the joyful expectation of firing them on us one of these days. "Empty words," some may say; but on the shores of the Mediterranean, rhetoric is equivalent to might, and speech is readily transformed into action. Millions of Germans give their allegiance to another Dictator who also calls vengeance on the French, and whose hold on the crowds seems to be but an appeal to the silliest passions. The mysterious land of the Soviets is said to be accumulating an enormous military strength. Japan imitates but too well the felonies of European nations, and so on, and so on. Thus movements towards international goodwill are paralysed, and, in fairness to what one may call the devotees of militarism in France, it must be allowed that they have good reasons for alarm. Some people, even here, believe that complete and unconditional disarmament is the only way to peace, but they are as yet few, and powerless. The socialist party has made disarmament a catchword only on the understanding that it will never be carried out. In a State-ridden

country like this, hundreds of thousands of small people, who thrive more or less directly on the army, the navy, the gun manufactories, etc., would lose their living. They can hardly be called militarists, because the regiment, the submarines, the aeroplanes or the powder factory are to them like pet cows, never to be thought of as instruments of war. They are too ignorant of modern history to realise that even a defensive war is carefully avoided when the stocks of ammunition are felt to be rather short.

A constantly recurring phrase in the official utterances of our statesmen is that treaties must on no account be touched. I have never met any Frenchman in flesh and blood who was prepared to support this opinion. They realise all too well the imperfections and absurdities of the Treaty of Versailles; surely it would have been revised by now if the Germans had honestly desired it. It is not felt that they ever did, or else they were very tactless. It has ever been the unlucky fate of Franco-German dealings that everything happens à *contre-temps*; any amenable disposition on the one side is sure to meet with a rebuff on the other. Generally speaking the French consider the Germans are difficult and discouraging partners, who have hardly played the game. No doubt the Germans think exactly the same of us. Preventing the *Anschluss*, the unification of two countries who have exactly the same culture, language, interests, etc., is also generally felt to be a hopeless and nefarious job. A smaller section of the French "intelligentsia" regret the alliances with several new States in central Europe, doubting if they can conduce to the preservation of peace.

I have tried to give an unbiased, though very incomplete account of French opinion regarding international affairs. I have left out all our extremists on the nationalist as well as on the pacifist side. After all it is of some significance that not even the most rabid French patriot would venture to say, like his compeers in other countries, that he believes in war.

Of all our problems and fears of the last twenty years, nothing has been solved, removed, or become a "bygone". And now France, as well as other countries, must in her turn face the problem of unemployment, with its terrible consequences. But nothing perhaps, is more distressing to those Frenchmen who are now middle-aged than to witness the indifference of younger men to the possession of political liberty. Of all the conquests and ideals of the nineteenth century, we thought it was perhaps the only one that had been worth dying for. Yet not only do we see our neighbours deliberately renouncing this hard-won privilege, but even at home the younger generations are ready to throw themselves into the hands of any despotic power; the greater part of the *bourgeoisie* and the aristocracy of money would naturally prefer an autocrat on

the Italian pattern; while those who possess nothing, and also a great many "intellectuals," are turning towards communism, which can at least boast of remarkable constructive qualities. The glaring incapacity of the Republican State to deal with present problems makes it probable that a revolution must break out sooner or later. Which of those two directions it will take seems at present quite impossible to foretell.

J. B.

SHAKESPEARE THROUGH EASTERN EYES

The review of Dr. Ranjee G. Shahani's *Shakespeare Through Eastern Eyes* in your February ARYAN PATH mentions, among other high qualities of the author, "a wide knowledge". Any non-Indian reviewer, unacquainted with the actual state of affairs in India, cannot be blamed for such an assumption; for he would naturally take for granted that the "facts" and citations given in the book must be unimpeachable. But any one who has seen Shakespeare acted in the vernaculars in India, and knows at first hand something of the literatures drawn upon by Dr. Shahani, cannot but feel that the author has evidently no first hand information about plays and scenes which he describes as if they were still standing before his mind's eye. In fact, Dr. Shahani is hopelessly at sea when he talks of the Gujarati, Marathi and Urdu stage versions of Shakespeare's plays. And he is no less at sea when he brings forward every now and then "Eastern standards" and "Oriental canons" of literary criticism as trump cards in order to score off Shakespeare. On p. 70 he gives himself away when he speaks of "faring forth in a literary punt for the demolition of all ducks, swans (of Avon or elsewhere) or even geese". But my present purpose is to show that the facts, the very premises on which Dr. Shahani bases his "thesis," are utterly wrong.

We shall put aside the "interlude" of the "young Indian gentleman freshly returned from England," who reads *La Vie Parisienne* and *Candide* at dinner, —a periodical and a book quite outside the ambit of our Indian playwrights. Let us examine the concrete "facts" marshalled by Dr. Shahani in the very short chapter entitled "Interval". At the outset we are given what reads like a personal reminiscence of a performance of "Hamlet" in what our author persistently but wrongly calls the "Marahti" language. We are informed that the play has "undergone a strange transformation,"—it ends happily, for "we see Hamlet majestically strutting towards the vacant throne . . . with the fair Ophelia,—or, rather, Kamlata, on his arm." (p. 60) Now the only Marathi version of "Hamlet" that has been popular on the stage is a careful and close translation by the late Professor Agarkar; it does not end happily; both Hamlet and Ophelia die in it as in the original; and "Kamlata" is certainly not the Indian name given in it to Ophelia, —it is "Mallikā". What *has* the Doctor seen?

Only two pages later we are startled to read that the same "Kamlata stands for *Desdemona*" in a "very popular musical version of *'Othello'* in *Gujarati*"! On p. 63 our guide veers again from Gujarati to Marathi and informs us that "the Marahta even likes his Shakespeare turned *sangit*—made musical." The Shakespearian plays that have been popular on the Marathi stage were *not* "Sangit"; it was the special distinction of the company that staged them that it eschewed all music. On p. 64 Dr. Shahani tells us that "'The

Winter's Tale' has figured on the Urdu stage in a strange metamorphosis." And his authority for this is a Professor's "dim recollection of having seen it acted in Urdu,"—" information " which our author modestly regrets he is " unable to supplement "! The Urdu version of " The Winter's Tale " called " Murid-e-Shak " was one of the Shakespearian successes of an eminent actor-manager, the late K. P. Khatau, and it was a fairly close version of the original, as were his still more successful stage versions of " Hamlet " ["Khūn-e-Nāhaq"] and "Romeo and Juliet" ["Bazm-e-Fāni"] On p. 65 we are told about the successful Marathi version of " Hamlet " that "neither the title, names nor characters have been changed". This is the version by Agarkar, mentioned above, of which the title is "Vikāra Vilasita," and in which the names of all the characters are Indianised. On the same page our historian says that " 'The Winter's Tale' was turned into Marahti by one Mahajani, under the name of 'Vitor Vilsit' ". Let us assume that the impossible "Vitor" is a misprint for " Vikar". But, as said above, " Vikāra Vilasita " is the name of Agarkar's version of "Hamlet,"—a version that is prescribed to-day for the M. A. examination in Marathi by the Bombay University. Finally, on p. 67, Dr. Shahani writes :

> "Macbeth" never seems to have appeared on the Gujrati or Marahti stage, and I am not aware that it has been translated into these vernaculars. Lady Macbeth is utterly unacceptable to an Indian audience.

As a matter of fact, "Mānājirāo" is the name of a very well-known and very close Marathi version of " Macbeth " by the late Professor S. M. Paranjpe ; it exists in book form ; it was quite a success on the Marathi stage ; and, Dr. Shahani's theorising notwithstanding, it was exactly Lady Macbeth's part that made the play not only " acceptable " but quite a stage success.

So much for Dr. Shahani's " facts," and his knowledge of the vernacular versions of Shakespeare in this Presidency. Let us now turn to his interesting theories of literary criticism. Unfortunately, though Dr. Shahani talks a lot about "Eastern standards," "Oriental principles of literary criticism" and "Eastern canons of judgment," the nearest approach he makes to these "standards" and "principles" and "canons" is to quote the dicta of the well-known Vedantist, Swami Vivekānanda, and of two or three not well-known Professors ; and similarly, although Dr. Shahani makes a sweeping mention of "the entire literature of India" (p. 142), the nearest acquaintance he betrays with Oriental literature is by way of well-known translations or vague generalizations on them by persons who are not known to be Orientalists of any repute. For instance, Dr. Shahani tells us on p. 120 that "religion is so vital a matter with the Oriental . . . . that it becomes the very basis of his literary criticism" ; and, again, on p. 142 that "the entire literature of India is steeped" in "religious mysticism". And what is his authority for saying so ? Swami Vivekānanda's nebulous dictum that "Art is Brahma" ! Well, for the matter of that, everything, including our Doctor's thesis, is Brahma—or Māyā. But any one who knows the definitions of "Kāvya," poetry, given by the most eminent Sanskrit writers on poetics—Daṇḍin, Mammaṭa, Vishvanātha, Jagannāth—need not be told that they all lay stress on the æsthetic appeal as the real differentia of "Kāvya". Similarly, any one who has even a casual acquaintance with the whole range of "classical" Sanskrit literature, of which Kālidāsa is believed to be the highest peak, should know that this literature is quite innocent of "religious mysticism". In fact the intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of this mass of literature is so crystal clear, the beliefs and ideas of the writers are so clearly defined and systematized, that mysticism is the last thing one should expect to find in their works. Dr. Shahani, stalking behind "the Indian"—in order to "demolish" all "ducks, swans (of Avon or elsewhere) or even geese"—complains that "no character in Shakespeare contemplates transcendental problems and essays to give a satisfactory

answer to them." Which character in Kālidāsa, or Śūdraka, or Bhavabhūti, or Harsha, performs this feat? Is a stage play the place for discussing "transcendental problems"? And yet the learned Doctor gravely compares "Hamlet" with the *Gita* and meanders through three or four pages to establish the superiority of chalk over cheese.

Is it that a pardonable ambition to "demolish" Shakespeare and thus appear original, combined with an unpardonable ignorance of the material he so recklessly handles, has led Dr. Shahani to pass off the cobwebs of three or four persons as the general verdict of educated India? I cannot speak for the whole of India, but I can for at least the Bombay Presidency *minus* the backward desert of Sind; and I know that the young literary lions of Gujarat and Maharashtra do not think or write as Dr. Shahani would have us believe they do. The Doctor has every right to believe and say that Shakespeare was a third-rate poet, or that the solitary Sindhi classic, "Shāhjo Risālo," is far superior to anything Shakespeare ever wrote. But he has no right to pass off his own or his coterie's crotchets as the considered judgment of all educated Indians.

Bombay J. S.

THE ORIGIN OF INDIAN CASTES

The origin of the four Indian castes, still appears shrouded in mystery to seekers of Truth. Hypotheses and conjectures have their value in science and also in the reconstruction of lost history. They may serve to stimulate and direct thought, guide and enlighten enquiry. But oftener than not they have proved false guides leading into a morass of confusions.

The late Mr. Charles Johnston's hypothesis about the origin of Indian castes and religions to which a correspondent in THE ARYAN PATH of January draws attention is suggestive within certain limits of both validity and applicability. We may say this without raising the issue whether the position may or may not be "heterodox" to scholars. Considering the insufficiency and inadequacy of the data now available to scholars for making any kind of dependable deductions in matters lying in the dim borderland of history, one should feel extremely nervous in making any assertion whatever as to what may be or may not be orthodox to scholars as regards such matters. The colour and physical structure of the races of mankind, the fundamentals of religious and social consciousness and institutions, the essentials of the ritual and art-expression of beliefs and emotions —are so old and so deep-laid that we can hardly expect to be able to get down to their beginnings. Archæology has long held fast to the orthodoxy of her Old Stone, New Stone and Metal Ages. There are facts justifying such classification. But do these facts justify any inference, positive or negative, as to the *value* of the human cultures connected with these ages? Does the use of stone implements, in the absence of any other conclusive evidence, prove the primitiveness of barbarism to the hilt? Does the practice of the cult of Magic prove it? A culture proud of its mechanistic achievement and glorying in the complexity of its life may fail to appreciate the rude simplicity of the stone implement; and a science blinded by its own matter-madness may deride the ancient magic cult of barbaric peoples. But nothing is proved as to the value of "primitive" cultures by this want of appreciation and understanding. And this want of understanding has been common but not universal among enquirers.

Divergent opinions were held and are still held as to the values and historical probabilities of the immemorial human complex. That complex is twofold—a

complex of race and a complex of culture. Under the first we may note complex of colour and of other physical features; under the second, complex of belief, art and ritual, and of dialect. Now this whole manifold of ancient human complex is a fact which has to be admitted as a first premise of any process of historical deduction or interpretation relating to the remote past. There may have been many theories of all kinds as to the origin and development of the human complex, but it would be wrong to claim that any position has ever been held among competent and conscientious investigators that might be called "official" or "orthodox". There has never been, in matters of guessing and theorizing, a generally agreed position in modern scholarship. Views and surmises have not tended to converge to a focus. Any new or old suggestive idea as to the mystery of human origins is welcome. It need not be afraid of any official ban or challenge of orthodoxy.

Even within the range of recorded history, where greater light can be brought to bear upon any uncertain or disputed position, scholastic orthodoxy seems to be less assertive and less imperative to-day than it was yesterday. One entrenched position after another has been blown up by the explosive mine of new facts or affinities discovered. The discovery of the Indus Civilisation has proved such a mine of explosion in Indian history. It is now agreed that we possess actual evidence of a pre-Aryan and pre-Vedic civilisation in India. But whilst agreement exists as to the great age of the Indus Civilisation, are competent scholars agreed as to the prefix *pre* or *post* which some would so lavishly attach to Aryan, Dravidian, and so forth ? Now, though opinions are and have been held about these, one can hardly claim that opinions have converged or are tending to converge to a focus of simplified solution in regard to these problems. There is no official ban of any kind for new or old theories essaying to make a fresh survey of the entire field of facts and prepare a fresh résumé of them.

So the late Mr. Johnston's theory is not called upon to submit to any official test of scholastic orthodoxy. Conscientious scholars must for the present be content to plead *ignorance* as to the riddle of Indian castes and religions. At any rate, they must defer judgment and wait for more light. A suggestion like Mr. Johnston's cannot be to them anathema. No; but a suggestion like this, to be valid and to be applicable, must submit to another kind of test. That test—the logical test of any hypothesis—has a positive and a negative aspect.

First, is this theory adequate and sufficient as a résumé of the relevant facts of the Indian ensemble of castes and religions ? In other words, does it tally with them ? Second, putting this theory aside, is it not possible to marshal and explain those facts in a more satisfactory way by a different supposition ?

Before putting it to this test we have ruled out for reasons given above the preliminary objection that might be taken on the side of modern scholarship. Now, Mr. Johnston's theory does not quite pass either of the tests. It is quite right when it lays the roots of the four castes deeper than mere social economy, convenience and convention. The distinctions were possibly fundamental. But not in the sense and to the extent contemplated by this theory. It was not the case of *ab initio* divergent races of different colours etc., coming to conflict and ultimately fuse with one another. It was not the mechanical or chemical combination of diverse elements giving a compound. It was rather like an organic growth in which a nucleus of living matter radiates into divergent lines of energy and evolves into a variety of organs and functions. We start with unity and end with unity in multiplicity or organic unity. The origin of the four castes as contemplated in the famous Purush Sûkta of the *Rik* and *Atharva* Vedas is of the nature of this organic evolution—the four castes evolve from the four limbs of the supreme Purusha. The Mahabharata,

again, while speaking of the four colours of the four castes, says that the colours are all differentiated from a primary colour. In fact, "colour" in ancient mystical literature is primarily a dynamic spiritual entity having its manifestation in *guna* and *karma*—that is, a certain arrangement of springs of action and behaviour resulting therefrom. The physical colour—red, white and so on—is an accident, sometimes even a separable accident, of the physical expression of the dynamic entity which is the Seed of race or of caste. It is the dynamic entity of the proton and electron that constitutes the "caste" of an atom of matter and assigns its place in the realm of *properties* and *functions*. Fundamentally, the dynamic entity is, like the Idea of Plato or *élan vital* of Henry Bergson, creative, shaping and informing its own appropriate vehicle and instrument in the planes of mind, life and matter. It works at and through the nucleus of mind, life and matter stuff. It works out differentiations not only in the human race, but all through Nature, animate or inanimate. In the human species we recognise the four types which, dynamically speaking, are the four varnas. The four colours have an esoteric but not necessarily a physical nexus with the four varnas. White for instance is the esoteric colour of Brāhmana Sattva—the true and pure Varna. When the *Gita* says that the four Varnas have been organised by the Divine Being Himself, in accordance with "moments" of character and conduct, what is really meant is this primordial differentiation of the four fundamental and universal types of modes of being and functioning. Hindu scriptures arrange plants and animals and even stocks and stones according to these radical types. It is a Cosmic Pattern.

This, in brief, was and has been the "orthodox" theory of varnas in India. As we saw, modern historical research has nothing to say for or against it, just as modern science has nothing to say for or against a résumé of the universe on the lines of idealism. Modern research not daring to challenge or veto it, this view of the origin of castes and cultures should be found to be more in consonance with the deeper "intuitions" of philosophy and science, and more agreeable to the facts of Indian race evolution, than any other hypothesis including that of Mr. Johnston.

Whether the Aryans came from outside or not, they came and lived as a race complex and as a culture complex from the very beginning; the Varnas or Seeds of Caste in the fundamental sense above explained were there. They could not but be there. In the Vedic ensemble of conditions the seeds themselves can no doubt be traced. But in actual manifestation neither organic unity nor plasticity nor even transmutability of the "limbs" was yet lost. Whether in actual manifestation the four seed types had as yet expressed themselves into four different colours, anatomies and cultures is an issue which the historian or the ethnologist has no means of deciding at present. It may be noted however that the Seed or *Bîja* is a deep-acting dynamic entity which in course of time will tend to evolve striking changes in physical and other characters. The Idea will naturally fashion its own appropriate vehicle. Its action is profounder than that of the secretions of the thyroid and other glands now admitted by all physiologists. Hence one should expect certain differentiations of physical and other characters after the varna principles have for some time been in operation. We need not here discuss the question of promiscuous mixing of the four pure castes and resultant confusion (*sangkara*) to which the *Gitā* also refers.

Each Type has like a rotating top its axis of rotating equilibrium. It can correct oscillations from that axis and readjust itself within certain limits. When those limits are exceeded it topples over. Now, in India, the Aryan race complex must have come in contact with other race complexes, black or yellow. There must have been resulting oscillations or variations from the Aryan axis. The Aryan race and culture

complex both underwent change. One thing seems certain—the growth and evolution of the Aryan complex in India have proceeded more from causes acting latently and from within, than from causes acting from outside. The process has been more central than peripheral, more of the nature of evolution by unfolding than of the nature of evolution by accretion and epigenesis. Mr. Johnston's theory seems to have laid its emphasis on the wrong place.

On the culture side also it is wrong to construct any watertight compartments and hold that such and such beliefs were the exclusive possessions and contributions of the white, red, yellow or black peoples. A mechanistic way of thinking will be of no good. Science is no monopoly of any particular race or colour. Neither was Ancient Culture or *Vidya* the monopoly of any particular group of men. The Aryan light and the Aryan Path disclosed themselves and still continue to disclose themselves to the appropriate Vehicle whenever and wherever that happens to exist. It is true that some aspects of ancient Brahmavidyā (*e.g.* Panchāgnividyā) revealed themselves first to Kshatriya kings, and were afterwards communicated to Brahmanas. But the Upanishads do not say or show that Brahma Vidya as such was in the exclusive possession of any one colour. The Vedas, too, unmistakably show that they contain the germs at least of all those ideas and beliefs that Mr. Johnston's theory would call future accretions or acquisitions. The *Rik-Veda*, for example, is not a simple picture of primitive nature-worship and ancestor-worship. Mr. Johnston's theory has pulverized the organic unity of Aryan race and culture evolution.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA

Calcutta

सत्यं दानं क्षमा शीलमानृशंस्यं तपो घृणा ।
दृश्यन्ते यत्र नागेन्द्र स ब्राह्मण इति स्मृतः ॥
शूद्रे तु यद्भवेल्लक्ष्यं द्विजे तच्च न विद्यते ।
नैव शूद्रो भवेच्छूद्रो ब्राह्मणो न च ब्राह्मणः ॥

—महाभारतेषु वनपर्वे.

Truth, charity, forgiveness, good conduct, gentleness, austerity, and mercy, where these are seen, O King of the Serpents, there is a Brahmana. If these marks exist in a Shudra and are not in a Dvija, the Shudra is not a Shudra nor the Brahmana a Brahmana.

—MAHABHARATA, VANAPARVA.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

A very weird and most interesting sketch, entitled "Mortimer's Ghost," is contributed by Mr. A. N. Monkhouse to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (Feb. 10th). In it is shown clearly the dual nature of man, spiritual and devilish. Mortimer confides to a friend that he feels his mind is being "monkeyed with" by some outside agency. Villainous and cruel suggestions are injected into it. His friend, though wishing to help, and realizing Mortimer's genuine distress, can do nothing. Some evenings later he calls on Mortimer, and asks "How is the ghost?" The reply showed that Mortimer suspected his friend of being the undesirable outside agency. "I won't have it," he said, "I shall buy a revolver. I'll shoot any man that tries to take possession of my mind. No, I don't know it's you—not yet." After some conversation Mortimer was soothed down, and parted with his friend almost genially. "I'm my own ghost; that's the idea?"—were his parting words. But he bought a revolver the next day, and shot himself. One is left with the idea that he had discovered that it was no outside agency but in reality himself who was the "ghost".

Every one has these two sides to his nature but fortunately in the great majority the devilish side is not so prominent. Stevenson in *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* gave an extreme case; so did Lord Lytton in *Zanoni*; so does Mr. Monkhouse in *Mortimer's Ghost.*

Lord Lytton describes how the neophyte Glyndon deliberately disobeys the commands of his occult teacher and by his own act brings himself face to face with "a ghostly and remorseless foe," a phantom of evil raised by himself and only to be conquered by himself. This "Dweller on the Threshold" was the personification of his "unholy desires and criminal designs," ever to be in attendance on him until he by a pure and good life was able to resist its appalling influence. This "Dweller" is surely within us all, but quiescent. The imagination of certain writers, however, has pictured its awakening in the soul so strong in evil as to be disabled from conquering the black shadow —which too is a fact in Occultism.

Such devilishness—the evil heirloom of past lives—cannot be explained without some Theosophical knowledge. Mme. Blavatsky tells us that although spirituality should be at our present stage on an ascending arc, yet

the selfishness of the *personality* has

so strongly infected the real *inner* man with its lethal *virus*, that the upward attraction has lost all its power on the thinking reasonable man. In sober truth, vice and wickedness are an *abnormal*, unnatural manifestation, at this period of our human evolution—at least they ought to be so. (*The Secret Doctrine* II, 110)

What, then, is the cause of this abnormality? The root cause is that mankind does not live naturally, and therefore attracts to itself the evil influences of past generations.

Where are they stored? How do they emanate? Theosophy teaches of a certain subtle essence or atmosphere which encircles our globe, and which is visible only to the clairvoyant eye. It absorbs into itself, like a sponge, all the evil influences which a man generates, at the same time darting forth the evil influences gathered in the past. This atmosphere is known as the Astral Light. Eliphas Lévi, the learned Kabalist, termed it the "Great Serpent". This "Great Serpent" affects humanity as a whole, and individually as an individual responds to it. Those "in whom there is no guile" will not be touched, but they are few in number. The vast majority are affected to a smaller or a greater degree, each according to his power to resist the evil. But there are certain individuals in whom lie hidden, unknown to themselves, seeds of very evil potentiality, and these seeds the "astral light" matures. Such are the sanctimonious Jekylls who turn to wrathful Hydes, the Glyndons full of ambitions and doubts who pry into the secrets of others, and the self-harassed Mortimers who shoot themselves. Having sown within themselves seeds of conscious evil, they must either tear them up from the soil or reap the harvest.

Just as solar rays and lunar influences affect the labour of the farmer, so also is the work of the human soul affected by beneficent and maleficent forces in the universe. Every evil has its good counterpart in nature. The astral light in its lower aspect is devilish, but in its soul it is divine. This is the higher Astral Light or Akasha, the universal space in which lies inherent the eternal Ideation of the universe. Every time the human mind soars to the world of the universals it attracts to itself the purifying and elevating forces, which religions name angels, gods and divinities; contrariwise the mind's counsels are darkened by its association with the personal, the passional, and the beastly, which are named devils and demons. The former are the cause of inspiration, the latter of delusion.

Within the last two or three months we have noticed references to the mysterious legends which trace a weird connection between seals and men. In *The Manchester Guardian* (Jan. 20th.), Mr. Alasdair MacGregor recalls Fiona Macleod's "Song of the Seals". The Celts believed that the MacCodrums of North Uist were

seals under enchantment and that they came to the Hebrides as secret emissaries from the Courts of the Kings of Lochlann in the Land of Sleep. On the West Coast of Ireland, it is said, certain families are the direct descendants of seal folk. For instance, some members of the Coneely family were in the distant ages metamorphosed into seal men and seal women by "art magick". Mr. MacGregor quotes a folklorist who had investigated the traditions as current in Donegal up to the end of the nineteenth century: "Until lately the islanders of Aranmore could not be induced to attack a seal, they being strongly under the impression that these animals were human beings metamorphosed by the power of their own witchcraft." And now, in *The Golden Book Magazine* for March, is printed a story by John Masefield, the poet-laureate, entitled "The Sealman". In it an ancient dame relates certain instances of seal men, attested to by her father. We are told that when one, O'Donnell, died, his wraith walked to the beach and passed into a bull seal, "and the bull seal walked like a man at the change of the moon, like a big tall handsome man". This sealman wedded a mortal maid and their son was a sealman, a lovely child with hair like seal's fur. At night it might be seen playing with the seals in the sea. The boy grew up and in his turn fell in love. But tragedy was the doom of the maiden, for in her love she "went down into the sea with her man, who wasn't a man at all," and was drowned.

What is the real meaning of these extraordinary traditions? They could not have persisted without having some basis of truth.

A melancholy interest attaches itself to the review-article on p. 340, by Dr. Sir Jivanji J. Modi, the venerable Parsi scholar who died on the 28th of March. Of academic distinctions he had many. France was particularly appreciative of his work, her Government nominating him in 1898 "Officier d'Académie," and in 1902 "Officier de l'Instruction Publique"; in 1925 he was the recipient of the distinction "Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur". He was an honorary LL.D. of his own University of Bombay, a Ph.D. of Heidelberg University, while Sweden and Hungary also paid tribute to his scholarship. The Government of India bestowed on him the title of Shams-ul-Ulma, and in 1930 he received the honour of Knighthood. A great linguist, a voracious reader, an eloquent preacher, especially of Zoroastrian ethics, and a conscientious student, Sir Jivanji has written on a vast number of subjects, always learnedly, and often interestingly. He took a kindly interest in the THE ARYAN PATH and accorded to our representative an interview which appeared in January 1931 under the title of "Eastern and Western Cultures". In the July number of that year he wrote on "The Path—A Zoroastrian view."

卐

"The fight against the personal idea is a long one."

—ROBERT CROSBIE

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV JUNE 1933 No. 6

CAN WAR BE ABOLISHED?

In order to answer the question, "Can war be abolished?"—we must first enquire if war be a disease in itself, or merely an outward symptom of an inward and hidden malady. If his patient have a high temperature, a doctor does not try to cool him by applying ice or dosing him with febrifuges, but seeks to diagnose some underlying trouble; and when he has found it, prescribes accordingly. In like manner, to abolish war, we must first look for, and then remove, the causes of which it is the symptom and the effect.

Were war an isolated or accidental phenomenon, it would be quite easy to do away with it. The smallest exercise of commonsense by persons of average intelligence—and most statesmen must be so classified—would prompt them to do or suffer almost anything in order to avoid it; for the experience of 1914–1918 proves that, under modern conditions, war is disastrous to all who engage in it: victors and vanquished being involved in a common ruin.

But going to war is not an action decided on by reasonable men after careful consideration of pros and cons, as one might decide to remove from one house to another. It is rather to be compared to an act of violence committed on a rising tide of hysteria by a man who has lost control of himself. Those who recall what happened in 1914, will remember the wave of intense emotion that passed over half the world, and swept away all vestige of collective reasoning power and discrimination. The vast majority in all the nations involved were so dominated by a tempest of jealousy, fear, and the hatred that always goes with fear, together with an intermingling of more generous emotions, as to be quite incapable of rational

thought or action. Men were as little masters of themselves and their destiny as though they had all been drugged or hypnotised. Quiet, kindly disposed, people became as bloodthirsty as Apache Indians on the war-path; and normally intelligent folk developed a blind credulity and were eager to believe any sensational rumour, however absurd. In such a state of mass hysteria, the actual declaration of war was only an incident, inevitable in the circumstances, just as the violent actions of a man suffering from delirium are the necessary consequence of his bodily condition. The murder of Franz Ferdinand and the political intrigues, which preceded and followed it, could never have set the world aflame unless the world had been in a very inflammable psychological condition. Throw a lighted match on the ground and it will burn itself out harmlessly; but if it happen to fall on a heap of gunpowder, there will be an explosion. Serajevo was such a lighted match.

War-fever is something like malaria, inasmuch as its virus remains passive in the patient's blood for a time, and then becomes mischievously active, afterwards relapsing into passivity, during which it appears to be renewing its energies in preparation for another outbreak. To carry the simile a step further, we may say that violent attacks of both malaria and war-fever do not occur to people whose systems are not already infected with the microbes of those diseases.

The life history of the malaria microbe is well known, thanks to the researches of the late Sir Ronald Ross; but the nature of the bacteria of war is less widely recognised. Functioning, as it does, on the plane of psychology and not on that of biology, it cannot be isolated in the laboratory, nor detected by the most powerful of microscopes. It is engendered by the union of egotism with lack of self-control. Every individual who pursues his own personal ends, regardless of the rights and happiness of others; every employer who seeks to extract from his business the last penny of profit by underpaying or overworking his men; every workman who tries to get the highest pay for the least possible work, even to the point of ruining the industry in which he is engaged—may be said to be infected with it. Its poison works in nations as well as in individuals; and every government that ruthlessly carries out the kind of policy that an Italian statesman in a moment of patriotic delirium called *sacro egoismo*, is its prey. Such individuals and such nations are ripe for war; and, despite all the resolutions of all the peace conferences, will be carried away by what is literally war-fever when the critical moment comes.

In psychological conditions like those of 1914, war would again become inevitable. The emotional temperature of the world would again rise to fever heat; and in our excitement, hatred would again be envisaged as a

virtue, and wounded self-esteem as zeal for the honour of the fatherland. The great majority of us would forget all the overwhelming arguments against war, and be apt to plunge blindly into what in our saner moments we recognise as an act of collective suicide. Of course we should rationalise our hysteria, and find excellent reasons for regarding the particular war then in the making as different from all previous wars. We might even persuade ourselves, as many excellent people did in 1914, that our war was in the nature of a holy crusade against war in general.

If we have correctly diagnosed war as the expression in violent action of the periodical crises of a disease of the psyche, of which the root causes are egotism and lack of self-control, it will follow that peace conferences, pacts of non-aggression, League of Nations, and the like, while excellent in their way, do not really touch the root of the matter at all. The only real and effective antidotes to war are unselfishness and self-control; and every advocate of peace must begin by establishing these conditions *in himself*. By so doing he will become immune against those outbursts of collective hysteria which constitute war-fever, and will be able to exercise cool, impersonal, dispassionate judgment in a crisis. The influence of but a few such individuals on their neighbours, and even on governments, would be quite out of proportion to their numbers.

The abolition of war, then, would appear to depend primarily on an ethical and spiritual movement inspiring individuals to build up the basic conditions of peace in themselves: through them the nations will be influenced. The political propaganda of peace is useful only if it proceed *pari passu* with such an ethical and spiritual movement; but, without it, must be quite ineffective.

What can a man do more than die for his countrymen ? Live for them. It is a longer work, and therefore a more difficult and a nobler one.

—CHARLES KINGSLEY

WHITTIER AND THE BRAHMO SAMAJ

[**Arthur Christy** was born in China. He has travelled extensively in the Far East and has spent many years in the study of comparative religions. His most recent work, entitled *The Orient in American Transcendentalism*, published by the Columbia University Press, is the first attempt to examine extensively the beginnings of the intellectual and religious contacts of the Orient and the U. S. A. At present he is investigating the extent of the oriental influence on American men of letters. The following article presents some interesting facts which have been heretofore completely ignored by American scholars. In this centenary year of the death of Ram Mohun Roy, the founder of the Brahmo Samaj, this article is of special interest.—EDS.]

Whittier is nearly the last of the nineteenth century American poets in whom one would expect to find appreciable evidences of an Oriental influence. He was a Quaker, for the greater part of his life actively engaged in a journalistic war against the slave-trade, a resident of New England villages, and never known as a man of wide reading. Yet in much of his religious poetry there appear quotations from and allusions to the *Bhagavadgita* and the Vedanta in general. These evidences of an Oriental influence will gradually be recognized. Interpreters of American literature realize the necessity of considering the sociological, philosophical, economic, and religious soil which nurtured the civilization of the new world and its literary culture. In this broader view one sees clearly that Oriental seed had been sown and that it often flowered in the most unexpected place and manner.

There can be little doubt that among the influential agents in the work of introducing Orientalism to America were the early apostles of the Brahmo Samaj, some of whom visited the new nation. During their visits they lectured widely and their audiences enthusiastically endorsed their message.

In Whittier's prose work may be found two unique references to the Brahmo Samaj. At the conclusion of the essay entitled "Haverford College" appears a letter addressed to Dr. Thomas Chase in which Whittier wrote :—

> That Haverford may fully realize and improve its great opportunities as an approved seat of learning and exponent of Christian philosophy which can never be superseded, and which needs no change to fit it for universal acceptance, and which, overpassing the narrow limits of sect, is giving new life and hope to Christendom, and finding its witness in the Hindu revivals of the Brahmo Samaj and the fervent utterances of Chunda Sen and Mozoomdar, is the earnest desire of thy friend.

Even more enthusiastically did Whittier write to James T. Fields, the Boston publisher :—

> I hope thee will see the wonderful prophet of the Brahmo Samaj, Mozoomdar, before he leaves the country. I should have seen him in Boston but for illness last week. That movement in India is the greatest in the history of Christianity since the days of Paul.

In the light of such cordial

approval of the Brahmo Samaj, it would be profitable to compare minutely the similarities between Whittier's broad Quaker beliefs and the eclectic doctrines upon which the Indian movement was founded. But preliminary to such a study should be a general survey of the manner Whittier himself used Oriental themes in his poetry and the reasons for their use.

We may safely assume that the poet saw little difference between his own Quaker concept of God as an inner light, or the Eternal Goodness, to use his own phrase, and the cosmic Brahman of the Vedanta. Whittier was not a theologian, although his work was deeply tinged with Christian doctrine. He had great, humane sympathies; his labours in behalf of the negro are a sufficient proof. And since he drew no divisive lines for race, there is no reason to suspect that he excluded, on creedal bases, the convictions of sincere searchers after truth who happened to bear the label of other ethnic faiths.

A clear illustration of this catholic sympathy will be found in the poem "Miriam". In this poem appears a long dialogue between Whittier and a friend on their unsolved doubts, the books they called the "bibles of the ancient folk," and the old moralities. The conversation takes place on a Sabbath after the friends had left the Quaker meeting house. To the question of God's responsibility for the races of mankind, and the nature of truth, Whittier answers:—

> Truth is one
> And, in all lands beneath the sun,
> Whoso hath eyes to see may see,
> The tokens of its unity.

In support of this view, he insists that in "Vedic verse" and "the dull Koran," in the thoughts of "our Aryan sires" and "the slant-eyed sages of Cathay" is evidence that the Oriental "read not the riddle all amiss". As if in defence of his latitudinarianism, Whittier continues :—

> Nor doth it lessen what he taught,
> Or make the gospel Jesus brought
> Less precious, that his lips retold
> Some portion of that truth of old.
>
> . . . . .
>
> We come home laden from our quest
> To find that all the sages said
> Is in the book our mothers read.

This wholesale finding of the teachings of the Oriental sages in the Bible, and the inclusion of the Brahman, Mohammedan and Confucian, if only by implication, in the "all-embracing Fatherhood" of God, indicates an eclecticism that is much akin to that of the Brahmo Samaj. Furthermore, there are other lines in "Miriam," such as:

> Each in its measure but a part
> Of the un-measured Over-heart,

which richly connote Whittier's sympathy with the Vedantic principle of an all-enfolding divinity. It is obvious, even in the light of the lines scantily quoted here, that his beliefs were far removed from the Hebraic concept of a universe composed of three distinct and separate entities—God, man, and matter.

Whittier's explanation of his eclecticism is clear. He welcomed, he said, from every source the tokens of the Primal Force,

Beneath whose steady impulse rolls
The tidal wave of human souls;
Guide comforter and inward word,
The eternal spirit of the Lord!

Well, such lines are too pantheistic to be Christian, and too Christian to be good pantheism. Furthermore, the last line—"Eternal outflow and recall"—indicates anything but the Hebraic-Christian conception of the creative processes of the universe. In the controversy between the proponents of monism and dualism, Whittier seems to have allied himself with the former. God, for him, was immanent in the world, constantly emanating into new forms. This was a basic tenet with the thinkers of both the Vedanta and the Brahmo Samaj. There can be little doubt that Whittier's Quaker belief in the light that lighteth every man had expanded into a philosophy of unique affinities with that of so reputable a sage of the Hindus as Sankara. Without this basic affinity, Whittier might never have been attracted to the Brahmo Samaj. But he was cordial to the Hindu elements of the movement, and when he found that men like Mozoomdar were men of deep personal piety who had woven into the Samaj all the best kindly and personal elements of Christianity, he became an enthusiastic friend and supporter.

In conclusion, there is no more final evidence of Whittier's great interest in the movement than the three "Hymns of the Brahmo Samaj" which are included in his collected works. To these hymns Whittier added the following:—

I have attempted this paraphrase of the Hymns of the Brahmo Samaj of India, as I find them in Mozoomdar's account of the devotional exercises of that remarkable religious development which has attracted far less attention from the Christian world than it deserves, as a fresh revelation of the direct action of the Divine Spirit upon the human heart.

I quote the second of the three hymns:

We fast and plead, we weep and pray,
From morning until even;
We feel to find the holy way,
We knock at the gate of heaven!
And when in silent awe we wait,
And word and sign forbear,
The hinges of the golden gate
Move, soundless, to our prayer!
Who hears the eternal harmonies
Can heed no outward word;
Blind to all else is he who sees
The vision of the Lord!

There is, of course, no way in which to determine the public influence of such an enthusiasm as Whittier's. For at least two generations his audience was the serious, religious-minded public of America. In the light of the facts, who can doubt that the Brahmo Samaj, which grew up as a movement of religious reform in India, was unexpectedly to prepare the soil of America for the missionaries from India who were to follow? And who would have dreamed that a provincial poet, long regarded as an orthodox Quaker, was to be a most important nexus in the chain of reasons and events which have culminated in flourishing Orient-inspired cults in America and the broadcasting of the teachings of Theosophy? Surprising indeed are one's discoveries as he re-reads the old poets with new spectacles.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

THE GOSPEL OF MASS-PRODUCTION

[**Hugh I'A. Fausset** is a mystic and philosopher whose detached observations on the chaos of our machine age have a practical value and interest. His thoughts should be kept in mind by the reader in perusing the article which follows this: "Bolshevism between East and West".—EDS.]

Whether we lament or exult over the present collapse of Capitalism, we cannot but admit that it is having a very educational effect, and not the least on the Capitalist himself or on those who still believe that the selfish profit-making motive is not an anachronism, but, if intelligently directed and controlled a necessary and beneficent dynamic. I do not believe so myself, since I cannot understand how a motive which is morally indefensible and which the Capitalist himself would be the first to reject as the dynamic of his own family life, can be socially or economically justifiable. But I recognise that we are only just emerging from a long era of human history in which the struggle for existence and subsistence was a hard and bitter fact, and that the habits of thought and conduct induced by that long struggle cannot be thrown off in a day. Men of outstanding imagination and of fine moral sensitiveness have doubtless always challenged these habits and insisted, even in times when a combative egoism seemed a necessary condition of survival, that a true life must be grounded in selflessness. But hitherto their words have seemed to the majority of men the utterance of unpractical dreamers or at best applicable to some Utopia of the Future. The significance, however, of our own day lies in the fact that the apparent material obstacles to the saint's or the poet's dream of a co-operative community are at least very greatly reduced. I need not discuss here the situation which has arisen through the application of science to industry, the paradox of poverty in a world of plenty.

What I am concerned with is the reaction of rationalistic business-men and their like to facts which compel even them to recognise that the economic situation has changed and to modify their appreciation of the competitive impulse. To modify—yes, and even to reorganise—their ideas as they reorganise their business. But whether they are apostles of "technocracy" or disciples of Mr. Ford, they are alike in evading a fundamental approach to the problem. They are ready and even eager to "rationalise" selfishness, but they wish to preserve it, in the guise of "enlightened self-interest," as the corner-stone of the future temple of a prosperous humanity. Consequently I cannot help suspecting that despite their fair words and plausible arguments they will prove to be as ineffectual as the money-changers whom Jesus

drove out of another temple. Curiously enough, too, it is easier to evade facing the conditions which govern a true realisation of a creative life to-day, when the material obstacles to it are no longer so formidable, than it was when for most men they seemed insurmountable. For previously the necessity of self-sacrifice was not doubted. No man could respond to the call, "Come, follow me," or hope to qualify for the new kingdom of harmony which was promised him, without surrendering his old self and its attachment to things. The call was clear and unequivocal. For most men the sacrifice demanded was too great. Circumstances, they would plead, made it impossible. But just because the sacrifice demanded seemed to challenge the whole order of material life and to involve a heroic act of faith, its truth was less likely perhaps to be compromised, at least in men's minds, than in a day when Christianity of a kind can be approved as a good and even necessary business policy.

It is exceedingly tempting to-day to think that because outward conditions have altered, inward conditions have altered too, and that the emphasis which was laid by spiritual teachers in the past upon the necessity of sacrifice is no longer relevant now that science is promising us a superfluity of commodities; that we can, in short, get the best of both worlds and combine the riches of the spirit with an unfettered enjoyment of all the cheap and diverting objects of need or pleasure with which mass-production will soon supply us.

Among those who have been recently preaching this seductive gospel is Mr. Filene, whose book, *Successful Living in this Machine Age*, was published last year. Mr. Filene is a highly successful Boston storekeeper, and like many Americans of his kind he has not been content merely to make money or even to perfect the machinery of his business. He has concerned himself with the ethic of trade in general and he has become convinced that its purpose is "to serve people, not merely to support the business-man concerned in it". So far so good. But being a hard-headed business-man this ideal of service had to be reconciled with private profits. He wished to be a benefactor to his kind, but he wished also to be well paid as heretofore for his service. And in the gospel of mass-production he has discovered a way of satisfying both his conscience and his acquisitive instinct, of building up his own profit upon the universal profit of mankind. And it is consequently with an almost ecstatic delight that he demonstrates that the two are no longer incompatible. In his own words:—

> Mass Production is not simply large-scale production. It is large-scale production based upon a clear understanding that increased production demands increased buying, and that the greatest total profits can be obtained only if the masses can and do enjoy a higher and ever higher standard of living.

Since, in short, successful mass-

production necessitates both mass-consumption and mass-leisure or in other words high wages and short hours, it will, he argues, change the whole social order, dissolve all class-distinctions and class-privileges, liberate mankind from the struggle for mere existence to which all but a small minority have been bound in the past, and, far from standardising human life, guarantee for all, as never before, the possibilities of distinctive self-expression.

Mr. Filene proclaims his faith with such uncritical enthusiasm, despite his claim to be an apostle of "fact-finding," that he exposes himself damagingly to assault not only from humanists but from economic realists. For even if theoretically successful mass-production necessitates an ever increasing mass-consumption and so should break down the old barriers of nation, class and privilege, it can paradoxically only do so when these barriers have been broken down and a world-community has been realised and organised. Until that has happened an employer whose markets are not in his own country cannot, by paying high wages, increase the buying power of his foreign customers, but may well lose his markets through being undersold by a foreign employer who can produce a similar article at a lower price by paying lower wages. Mass-production, in fact, if it is to do all that Mr. Filene claims for it, depends on real and enlightened co-operation between the whole of mankind, a condition which to-day seems remote enough. And his fundamental error is in assuming that all the barriers which self-interest has raised between men and nations will be broken down by a more informed self-interest. It is doubtless true that we are experiencing to-day the first stages of what he calls "The Second Industrial Revolution," and that the conditions of machine-production are compelling some business-men at least to realise that greed, competition, cheating and exploitation no longer pay. Yet the motive even of these, as Mr. Filene complacently insists, is a selfish one. It only differs from that of their predecessors for whom trade was uncompromising warfare, in being "enlightened selfishness". And personally I cannot believe in the reality of such a virtue. I cannot believe that "human selfishness" will ever "function unselfishly for the common good on a world-wide scale," or conceive a future community of "intelligently selfish human beings selfishly concerned in bettering the condition of all humanity".

There is of course a sense in which disinterestedness is in the highest interests of the self and is even perceived to be such by those who are disinterested. The truly disinterested man, however, is not "intelligently selfish," but imaginatively selfless. He has undergone a profound inward change by which the old self has been cast off and a new self, that is creative both in its thought and its action, has come into

being. And no "Industrial Revolution" will succeed or transform the world into a creative and co-operative community which does not express this inner revolution and the appreciation of true values which such a revolution inevitably brings.

That selfishness, however discreetly modified by the pressure of facts, can never be really "enlightened" is revealed very clearly in the chapters which Mr. Filene devotes to such subjects as education, religion, art, mechanization, or personal adjustment, and in which he constantly betrays a crude insensitiveness to the finer human values, and this despite the fact that he is quite clearly a generous, warm-hearted and liberal-minded man, who is sincerely anxious to liberate his fellow-men from the poverty and toil which cramp their lives. But while we may agree with him that the world of the future will have as little use for selfishly superior persons as for timidly acquisitive business-men, and applaud his desire to free mankind from the struggle for mere existence, his disregard of any but the material facts and needs of human nature is constantly apparent. Certainly he professes himself to be a champion of all that will make men more truly human, but "enlightened selfishness" blinds him to the fact that "the way of human liberation" involves something more than material security and mental development.

Only the truly selfless man can know what are the essential human needs and values, because he will himself have outgrown all false and delusive needs. But such qualitative values are swamped in the liberated life Mr. Filene visualises, in the quantity of standardised things, which, as a good merchant, he is anxious to sell for his own profit and that of others. In the world saved by mass-production, which he conceives and champions, the inward being of man promises to be overwhelmed and stupefied by external excitements and satisfactions. Nor does he really face the fact that the constantly increasing capacity of mass-production, even if accompanied by a like capacity of mass-consumption, must ultimately reach a saturation point in those comforts and luxuries which move him to such lyrical ecstasy.

He does, indeed, ask "how shall the masses use the wealth and leisure and security which mass-production will bring to them," and he admits that in the remote future, when all the more superficial appetites have been satisfied, "we may expect that there will be some general liberation from the tyranny of things". But how this return to simplicity will occur and what, if it does, will happen to mass-production, he does not stay to enquire. And it is difficult to see how meanwhile the generations who, as he gleefully anticipates, will be accepting the tyranny of things until their digestion is glutted, will achieve "successful living" in this or any other machine age.

Mr. Filene's mistake and that of those like him is of course a confusion of means with ends. To preach salvation through mass-production or any other form of rationalised trade or economics is to evade the central issue. Mass-production is a mechanism. But above all it needs to be controlled, directed, and utilised by men and women who have outgrown a false attachment to things and who, by so doing, have become really social. And so long as they cling to the possessive instinct, as Mr. Filene does, they have not become completely human and so they are not qualified by imaginative insight to " better the condition of all humanity". They may possibly exploit mass-production successfully, but much of what they produce and distribute will not supply the essential needs of ordinary men and women, but will only create distracting and artificial needs.

Nevertheless such evangelists as Mr. Filene are hopeful portents. The moralists have always taught that unselfishness and co-operation were in reality in the highest interests of the self, but so long as the conditions of buying and selling proved that greed and competition, if ultimately short-sighted, brought considerable immediate returns, the business-man could turn a deaf ear to the moralist's teaching. But science and the machine are in process of changing all that. They are compelling the shrewder business-man, and even politician, to recognise the necessity of co-operation and to work for a unified world-organisation. And ultimately it will be forced upon them that such co-operation can only be realised organically, through the death of " intelligent selfishness," although civilisation, as we know it, may of course have to die a violent death before the intelligently selfish have learnt that a creative life cannot be combined with a possessive.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

BOLSHEVISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

[**Hans Kohn** is the author of *A History of Nationalism in the East* and *Nationalism in Soviet Union*. He lived many years in Asiatic Russia, has travelled widely, and at present resides in Jerusalem. His article is enthusiastic over the industrialization and westernization of Russia, but we also ought to have another picture drawn—Russia triumphant in machine and mechanics like the U. S. A., but with armies of unemployed; possessing wealth and the power to make more wealth but also beset with the problems of glut and poverty. Perhaps Russia will benefit from the lessons of the U. S. A., but that would be a subject for a third picture.—EDS.]

Maxim Gorki, the great lover of the Russian people, who himself came out of its lowest depths and was the friend of bare-footed tramps, has described Russian life in a realistic and unsweetened way in his fascinating volume *My Childhood*. He has seen all the contrasts of Russian life, its drabness and ugliness, the terrible poverty and illiteracy of the people after many centuries of serfdom and neglect, and on the other side the lofty longings, the beautiful fight uphill, standing out in keen contrast to the miserable background. In his book which appeared in 1913 he sketches for us an old peasant couple, grandfather and grandmother, who in the contrast of their characters are representative of the Russian peasantry. Grandmother is a big woman, fat and plump, entirely uneducated and often very silly. She has the spaciousness of the Russian earth, Mother Earth, as it is called in Russian, and she seems in a primitive, impersonal way attached to the earth, to nature, like a plant. She is soft and kind, passive and contemplative. Grandfather is entirely different. He is bony and of a strong frame, scraggy and hard. He is half-educated but he is eager to learn; he is active but he does not know yet to which aim to direct his activity. He opposes a harsh narrowness to Grandmother's exultant boundlessness. He is not yet a personality but he has emerged from dim and semi-conscious vegetativeness and is on his way to become under proper guidance an educated individuality. Meanwhile he misses an outlet for his energies: he beats Grandmother and her meek acquiescence rouses him to beat her more and more.

Gorki has tried to interpret these two aspects of Russian life in his essay "Two Souls". Grandmother is for him the East with its mystic and contemplative spirit, Grandfather the Occident with its scientific and ever active civilization. Russia has been a meeting place of East and West by her history and by her nature. Asiatic and European races have during fifteen centuries mixed their blood in the immense plains of Eurasia. For many centuries the country was ruled by Eastern hordes. The Russian form of Christianity had its origin in

Byzantine tradition and sank into the magnificent apathy of the East; the great creative forces of the West, Rome and medieval philosophy, the Renaissance and Reformation, left Russia untouched. The natural communications led from Moscow not westwards but along the rivers to Kazan and Astrakhan and into the heart of Asiatic steppes. The Russian peasants lived like the masses in Asia in abject poverty and illiteracy, as serfs, and in a perpetual danger of famine; the women of the Russian nobles were secluded in harems, and the merchant of Moscow much more closely resembled the merchant of Asia in clothing and habits of life, in his domestic arrangements and his outlook on the world than the traders of Western Europe.

Peter the Great was the first Tsar to try to open Russia, at that time wholly Asiatic, to western influence. He did it in an oriental way—by ruthless despotism. But his and his successors' reforms remained superficial and reached only a very small upper circle of society. In the nineteenth century a growing number of the newly formed middle-class intelligentsia turned their eyes westwards. Charmed by the refinement and intellectual discipline of western science, they became apostles of westernisation and education in Russia. They tried to raise the standards of Russian social and economic life to the higher levels of Europe and to combat the corruption, inertia and apathy of Russian life. By the efforts of the intelligentsia. Russia had two souls, as Gorki put it, an Eastern and a Western one. Gorki's sympathy was entirely with the Western soul. Grandfather was perhaps not a pleasant character, he was half-educated and narrow-minded, but at least he knew something, he was active, he was on the way upwards. If there was any hope for an educated progressive Russia attaining European standards it was through Grandfather, not through Grandmother.

Bolshevism has resumed the work of Peter the Great and the westernised intelligentsia of the last century on an incomparably greater scale. They undertook to westernise an eastern country with a new boldness of conception and an unprecedented systematic thoroughness. They had no love and no understanding of the Asiatic past of the country and the people, for mystical contemplation, for the easy-going timelessness. Their attention was turned entirely towards the future, a future of organized activity and scientific efficiency. The efforts of Bolshevism have been directed during the last fifteen years to educating the population of the Soviet Union for a Europeanised and industrialized standard of life, to remoulding entirely all ways of life and thought. Success could be achieved only at a tremendous cost: the old foundations of life had to be radically transformed, ancient traditions to be destroyed, one hundred and fifty million human beings had

to be uprooted out of their native Mother Earth and re-planted under entirely different conditions intellectual and moral. But this westernization could be undertaken for the very reason that the people dealt with were Asiatic by their past and by their disposition. Their collectivist energies and their faculty to suffer and to endure made the communistic experiment possible. The fact that the masses in the vast Russian Empire who partly were Eurasians and partly Asians of a pure stock lived still a semi-conscious unindividual or pre-individual life, rendered them easily accessible to the moulding influences of Bolshevism. But their Eastern soul brought into the new faith of Communism the old fervour and the mystical enthusiasm for the absolute, the hatred of compromise, a certain savageness of the extremes. Modern individualism, with its emphasis on the independent value of the individual, had no claim here. Bolshevism has been, like the reforms of Peter the Great, but on a wholly different scale, the Western force shaping this Eastern boundlessness into form, hammering the masses out of their apathy and their defenceless acceptance of fate to creative energy and to will power. As Gorki had predicted: Grandfather has won his fight against Grandmother. Grandfather has grown and he has learned and is still full of eagerness to learn. The new youth in the Soviet Union follows his ways. It is full of confidence in itself, active and hard, imbued with the joy of a pioneering generation. The great world significance of Bolshevism lies in this attempt of an all-embracing westernisation of Asiatic or semi-Asiatic masses, who are summoned from the apathy of the times when men took no thought for ordering society and dominating nature according to their wants, to play their part in history for the first time, adapting to their purpose western methods of production and organization, and guided by a faith born of western philosophy and western rationalism and bearing the stamp of the triumphal march of the machine-age.

In this attempt to westernise eastern lands Bolshevism is not alone. We witness to-day the re-awakening of the whole East under the irresistible compact of western civilisation. New means of communication and the penetration of the machine into the remotest parts of the once secluded East have opened it everywhere to the influences of the West. New methods of education are being introduced into the East, replacing the old traditions which were rightly considered out of date. A very difficult and complex problem not of simple imitation but of creative adaptation is put before eastern nations. But, as a prominent American educationalist with a good knowledge of the East has remarked, if the East is to survive in the twentieth century it must of necessity modify its institutions and its

traditions in such a manner as will enable it to meet the demands which a fluidic and dynamic civilization founded upon scientific concepts and technical equipment places upon all nations to-day. The same view was expressed authoritatively by the League of Nations Mission of Educational Experts to China :—

> In view of the imperative and urgent necessity of modernising social and economic conditions in China, the main object of the education of the masses should be to point out the road leading to modernisation. It would not, therefore, be advisable, as is at present the practice, to explain everything in terms of the past, but rather to give prominence, as the (Bolshevist) Russians do when giving object lessons, to the needs of the future. In China the future is too often neglected, both in the education of the young and in adult education. This is perhaps due to the highly developed historical sense of the Chinese, but if China is to be rapidly modernised, men must look forward rather than back.

The Soviet Union attempts this modernisation by looking forward in a radical and sweeping manner, paying no regard to the past. Bolshevism is performing the modernising of social and economic conditions; the transformation of education and life which has gone on during these years in the entire East, with a ruthless vigour and uncouth disregard for tradition, finds its parallel in Kemalist Turkey. Russia had been like China, India or the Ottoman Empire, a poor agricultural country primitive in its equipment and lacking in efficiency. Bolshevism is aiming at "changing Russia with enormous speed from a backward country, an agrarian country, into a progressive country of large scale industry". But the same is aimed at to-day, although at a much lesser speed, by all Oriental countries. During the nineteenth century the East had been satisfied to supply to the West products of the soil and raw materials, and to import in return machinery and to form a market for industrial products and capital investment from the West. Since the world war the East has tried to emancipate itself, not only politically but economically, to secure an active participation in world economics, not to accept passively the part assigned to it by the West. The East wishes to set up its own industries, to promote their development by a protective tariff policy, to modernize its agriculture and to apply technical advance to the service of its own purposes. This effort of Europeanisation, undertaken to-day by the entire East, is carried on systematically and with an utter disregard for traditional values or for the sufferings of the individual by Bolshevism. In this way the Soviet Union becomes a pioneer in the march of the East towards the West. The policy of industrialisation aims at converting the Soviet Union from a country economically, technically and culturally behind the modern age, into a country well abreast of scientific civilisation and with a highly developed technical equipment.

This economic acculturation of Eastern lands to Western methods

must be accompanied by a psychological and cultural revolution. The Oriental Russian had little sense for time, order, preciseness. If you asked a Russian and he answered "seitchas" or "zavtra," these words meant, "instantly," or "to-morrow" according to the dictionary, but with the Russian they meant "sometime," "who knows when?" or "when it pleases God". One of the most used Russian words was "nitchevo," which meant "nothing," but also "all right," "never mind," or "who cares for it?" The natural attitude of the Russian at his work or in his office was an easy-going carelessness; his attitude towards men and affairs was cordial and lenient but far from efficient. Bolshevism has tried to re-shape the Russian according to western standards of efficiency, to provide him with a sense of order and proportion and attention to detail. This westernising zeal of Bolshevism has made the Soviet Government concentrate on intensive educative work, on the training and uplifting of the backward masses, on awakening their initiative, and on enlisting their active interest in public affairs. Universal education and the introduction of modern technical progress are the most powerful weapons for transformation of an eastern country into a westernised one. Russia had always been a Eurasian Empire on the borders of East and West. During the Tzar's regime the Eastern element was in the ascendency. Bolshevism tries to enthrone the Western element. Thus far it is certainly in harmony with the spirit of the age, but the question remains open whether it is not destroying by its method and speed some of the most precious inheritance of the East, some of the most essential treasures of humanity.

HANS KOHN

THE THREE LISTENERS

[**G. V. Ketkar, B.A. LL.B.,** is a lover and a student of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and has done much to popularize its message.—EDS.]

Three men listened to the message—but with three different results! The way in which you listen to the message determines its effect on you. The meaning of the message is as broad and as deep as is the ocean. But, as the Sanskrit saying goes, every pot will take the water according to its own capacity.

Arjuna, Sanjaya and Dhritarashtra—three men heard the Lord's Song—the *Bhagavad-Gita*. The Song begins with a question from old blind Dhritarashtra. He wants to know what happened on the battlefield and what was the fate of his own sons. It seems that he does not care to know anything beyond that. He is blind not only in the physical sense, but in the spiritual sense also. His affection for his own sons and his anxiety for their welfare blinds him to everything else. The tide of knowledge is flowing in the message, but not a drop enters his mind. It is closed against it. Dhritarashtra has no word of appreciation, no comment or remark to offer on the wonderful manner in which spiritual knowledge was revealed to Arjuna in the divine message. Throughout the *Gita* he is silent so we have no evidence in the *Gita* itself as to how far the message was understood by the blind old man. Elsewhere in the *Mahabharata* we find that Dhritarashtra was really pained at heart and felt dejected when he heard the message. Strange is this curious attitude of Dhritarashtra. But it is true, and it has a deep lesson for all of us.

Why was Dhritarashtra grieved when he heard the *Gita* from Sanjaya? It was because he thought that as the *Gita* prepared the mind of Arjuna for the fight there was thus no chance of success for his own sons—the Kauravas. That was his only concern and curiosity in asking Sanjaya to tell him the news about happenings on the *Kurukshetra* battlefield. His mind was not open to anything else, even though it were the Divine word itself.

Sanjaya on his part could not suppress feelings of profound joy and wonder. "Again and again," says he, "I think of the Message and I rejoice." (*Gita* xviii-76). He could not also suppress his own appreciation of the message. He considered himself fortunate that he was privileged to hear it. He knew that it was Yoga explained by the greatest of Yogis—the Master of Yoga himself (*Gita* viii-75). And he drew his own moral from the story. He has put it concisely in the last verse of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. He knew that Krishna and Arjuna—the Guru and the Chela—formed a unique pair: Arjuna ready with his bow

and arrow to fulfil his painful duty and Shri Krishna the Master of Yoga teaching him to preserve his inner calm in the tumultuous surroundings of a disastrous war. Where these two qualities combine there will be perpetual success, prosperity and power. (*Gita* xviii–77.)

In a metaphorical way Sanjaya has expressed the key of the *Gita's* greatness. The combination of action and peace of mind forms the core of the teaching. Arjuna in the beginning of the *Gita* was a man of action without that deep philosophy which backs the action with the force of inner conviction. Without Yoga the bow and arrow and even the strong hand that wielded them became hesitating and weak. With Yoga they derived infinite strength. This was figuratively explained by Sanjaya in the combination of Arjuna and Shri Krishna. In one stroke Sanjaya has brought out both the external and internal significance of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. This was because he had that sympathy with Krishna and Arjuna, whereas Dhritarashtra had none. At the end of the *Gita* Krishna tells Arjuna not to waste this message on one who has no ears to hear (*Gita* xviii-67). Unhappily Sanjaya had to perform this thankless task of telling a message to one who had no ears to hear. But Sanjaya himself had the eyes to see and ears to hear. His moral of the story has its own value. His appreciation of the *Gita* is particularly helpful to those who are perplexed by the various interpretations put on this scripture by different schools of thought. For here is a sympathetic listener of the message who has recorded his view of it. That is more valuable than a score of commentaries.

But Sanjaya lacked one quality which is essential to a perfect listener. He must have been previously seeking the message. Sanjaya was not placed in a situation of conflicting duties. He had ears to hear the message—but they were not longing for it. On Dhritarashtra it was like seed thrown on a rock. On Sanjaya it was like seed thrown on ordinary soil. But on Arjuna it was like seed thrown on a soil duly ploughed for receiving it. The conflict of duties that perplexed him must be cleared up at once. Nothing but a definite and convincing solution of his dilemma could satisfy him. Till he could see his way clearly he would not move an inch, but would sit trembling in his armour and thinking of the dire consequences of his action one way or the other. Should he fight for the truth to the bitter end or should he give it up, at a critical moment, allowing his enemies to finish their own dreadful design as they liked? He would throw away the wealth of the whole world if the true solution were not put before him. He would have no peace of mind till then. And of all the people around him Krishna alone possessed the wisdom that would make his way plain. Krishna had in

his hands not only the reins of his chariot, he also had in his hands the reins that could drive Arjuna's mind to the truth through the bewildering tangle of doubts and difficulties. Arjuna must know the truth there and then, at all costs, from Krishna and Krishna alone, otherwise he is undone. Arjuna had no nerve to move one way or the other. He dropped his bow and arrow. No moral strength was left him to lift them save the conviction that he was doing the right thing in the right way.

Dhritarashtra was unable to understand the message, Sanjaya appreciated it properly, but Arjuna translated it into action. "I know the right thing and the right way and I will do it"—that was his answer to the message. (*Gita* xviii–73.) His appreciation was action itself. He answered the message by following it.

The right way to look at the *Gita* is to look at it through the eyes of Arjuna.

G. V. KETKAR

Some one has said—Goethe I think—that the old pagan religions taught man to look up, to aspire continually toward the greatness which was really his to achieve, and thus led him to regard himself as but little less, potentially, than a God; while the attitude of man under the Christian system is one of humility, of bowed head and lowered eyes, in the presence of his God. In approaching the "jealous God" of the Mosaic dispensation, it is not permissible to assume an erect position. Thus a change of attitude becomes necessary as soon as we postulate a Deity who is outside and beyond us. And yet it is not due to the Christian scriptures in themselves, but solely to the wrong interpretation given them by priests and churches, and easily believed by a weak humanity that needs a support beyond itself on which to lean. The Aryans, holding that man in his essence *is God*, naturally looked up to Him and referred everything to Him. They, therefore, attributed to the material of the body no power of sight or feeling. And so Dhritarashtra, who is *material existence*, in which thirst for its renewal inheres, is blind.

—W. Q. JUDGE, *Notes on the Bhagavad-Gita*, pp. 11-12

THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

[**Ronald A. L. Armstrong** is the Editor of the *Sufi Quarterly*. The description of the process of reincarnation given in this article is not a happy one though it has a basis of truth. Many who read the Buddhistic books fail to grasp the important teaching about the Skandhas. Similarly our esteemed contributor who is trying to present the Sufi point of view has not distinguished between the personality built of Skandhas and the individuality—the indivisible soul. Personality is not the surviving soul; the constituents of that personality are mortal; their transformation between death or disintegration and birth or re-assemblage must not be mistaken for the activity of the individuality, the soul, the real man who is immortal. After death the personality disintegrates like the body, but the individuality survives and returns.—EDS.]

In her article in THE ARYAN PATH for January Dr. Margaret Smith explained the attitude of certain Islamic sects towards the doctrine of reincarnation. Dr. Smith is an authority on Islamic mysticism. Her articles on that subject in THE ARYAN PATH, and her various books, have been authoritative contributions for which we cannot be too grateful. But she is forced to admit that, for the most part, Islam looks upon reincarnation as a heresy, and that the Sufis, the mystics of Islam, reject the idea altogether.

To the article the editors have, however, prefixed a significant statement. They say that "the Sufis very probably taught Reincarnation, in some mystic form in their exoteric degree, reserving for their esotericists the details of the doctrine."

I want, to discuss that suggestion now—and to explain in more detail the Sufi attitude to the whole question. It should not be forgotten that words are poor means to the discussion of mystic truths. We are all, in some sense, blind—and must remain so, ecstatic vision apart, until our inner eyes are opened. An intellectual approach to such questions is nevertheless permitted, and even desirable, if so be that we recognise to the full the limitations of mental capacity.

Do the Sufis, in reality, condemn the idea of reincarnation? I myself have never found any reference to this belief in the works of the Sufi poets and philosophers, while the late Professor Browne of Cambridge, perhaps the greatest authority on the matter in recent years, states categorically in his *A Year Amongst the Persians* that "metempsychosis, so far as I have been able to ascertain, is uncompromisingly denied by all Persian philosophers". I admit, however, that possibly there are carefully veiled mystic allusions to the idea, for exoteric students. That is a matter for elaborate study. Important such allusions, even if they exist, can never have been. And for these two reasons. Firstly, and of least consideration, reincarnation was heresy to the orthodox in Islam. Already under

suspicion as "free-thinkers," the Sufis could in no way better protect themselves (and, in ancient times especially, their lives) than by open denial of a particularly dangerous doctrine, whatever they thought in their hearts. This they could do the more easily in that, and secondly, reincarnation belongs to a category of conceptions that have, for the Sufi, no vital significance. Why is that?

A Sufi *Murshid* of our own time has put the case most aptly and I cannot do better than quote him here. He used to say he had been asked one day by a Hindu *Guru* about this theory of reincarnation which was, the latter claimed, absent from Sufi writings and never expounded in their schools. The *Guru* added that he could not understand how such great and perfect beings as there are among the Sufis, known and recognised by the spiritual world, could ignore this idea, and enquired if the Sufis held to any definite belief in the matter. The *Murshid* replied that they were, indeed, aware of this problem, but that for them it was beside the point. The principal business of a Sufi, he said, is to deny his limited personality and affirm the sole existence of God, in order that the false ego, which is subject to births and deaths, may fade away, and the true ego, which is the Divine hidden in man, may rise and discover itself. In this lies the fulfilment of the main object of creation. The Sufi thinks that what is past and unknown to him, is of little use to him; what is coming and not known, is an unnecessary worry for the present time. He believes *just now* to be all that is important, and if *just now* can be made as he wishes it to be, he desires nothing better. Among the Hindus, continued the *Murshid*, the belief in reincarnation is prevalent, and yet the greatest principle of the *Vedanta*, from which all the different beliefs of the Hindus are derived, is *Advaita* or *no duality*—in other words *unity*. "May I then ask," he concluded, "if this, the principal teaching of the *Vedanta*, is better promulgated by thinking about the doctrine of reincarnation, or by leaving it alone?" That is a mystic conception:—the One-ness of God and man first, and the details of the journey thither so much second that a serious man will not stop to consider them.

In *esoteric* practice, questions will none the less come up, and intellectuals among the Sufis will allow the problem to be brought before them. Their guides will, I believe, sometimes give indications of an attitude to follow—so that the editors of THE ARYAN PATH are right in their suggestion. What is this attitude, to be turned over by the initiate in his mind? I have had it explained to me by a Sufi *Sheikh* of exceptional powers. The soul, travelling to the earth from Eternal One-ness, gathers specific personality and individuality as, radiating from the Centre of all things, it becomes more and more a separate entity. On its way, it

meets other souls returning from the earth plane. From them it learns many things. There is "give and take," buying and selling, learning and teaching (all this is, of course, metaphorically expressed). But who teaches the most? The one with the most experience, the one who is going *back home*. This latter gives the map of the journey to the soul travelling *towards* Manifestation. It is from this map that the travelling soul strikes his path rightly or wrongly. One soul may have one kind of instruction, another soul may have another kind; one soul may be clear, another may be confused. Yet they all go forward together as the travellers of a caravan, taking with them the precious information, the things which they have learned from the others on the journey. It is for this reason that every child born on earth possesses, besides what he has inherited from parents and ancestors, a power and knowledge quite peculiar to himself and different from that which his parents and ancestors possessed. Yet he does not know whence he received these gifts, nor who gave him this knowledge. Some souls are, of course, more impressionable than others. Some are deeply impressed by a personality who leaves little impression upon others. Some receive many impressions—so many that it is hard to distinguish which impression has more effect and which less. However, in the end, *one* impression is predominant in every soul. Now *impression* is a phenomenon in itself. As a man thinks, so is he. And what *does* a man think? Of that with which he is most impressed. What he is most impressed with, *that* he himself *is*. *Man is his impression.* A soul, impressed deeply by some personality coming back from the earth, becomes that personality itself, with which it is impressed. Suppose that a soul is impressed, on its way here, by the outgoing spirit of Beethoven. When born on earth, he *is* Beethoven in thought, feeling, tendency, inclination, and knowledge. Only, in addition to this personality, he has the heritage of his parents and ancestors. And others may be in the same case, though they will have taken the impression differently and in different degree, while the hereditary admixture of tendencies will also be different. It would not be wrong, therefore, to call this newborn soul a *reincarnation* of Beethoven. The soul itself, coming from above, has no name or form, no particular identity; it makes no difference to the *soul* what it is called. Since it has no name, it might as well adopt the name of the coat which was put on it—that is to say, the predominating personality with which it is impressed. The robe of Justice put on a person makes him a Judge, and the uniform of a policeman makes him a constable; but the Judge was not born a Judge, nor the constable a policeman. They were born on earth nameless, if not formless. Distinctions and differences belong to the lower

world, not to the higher.

There is something more to be considered. In taking an impression, and with it an individuality, the soul borrows property, as it were—some in the spheres beyond the grave, as it comes in, and some with its physical heredity. Taking over this property, it also takes upon itself the taxation, obligations, and other responsibilities that go with it. Often the property is not in good repair, or damage has been done to it, and it falls to the new soul's lot to repair it—or, if there is a mortgage on the property, that also becomes the new soul's charge. Together with the property, it becomes owner of the records and contracts of this property it now holds. In this is to be found the secret of what is called *Karma.*

That brings us to a point of supreme importance in discussing the Sufi attitude. The *Sheikh* objected to any insistence on the idea that a man's *karma* must *necessarily* drag him back to earth for a period or periods of reincarnation. He said that precautions must be taken that the door be left open for souls who wished to enter the Kingdom of God, that they might not feel bound by this dogma. This is the mystic speaking, not the theologian. He felt it important that a man should dwell always on the *divine* nature of his soul, and therefore the eternally-present *possibilities* of its coming to fulfilment and god-consciousness, here or hereafter. To hold before oneself the probability of a series of reincarnations is firstly to concentrate on one's individuality, that "ego" which is the mystic's greatest foe, and secondly to foster a certain sluggishness in one's attitude towards final realisation—if that is not for me *yet*, why bother about it? Such an attitude is the exact reverse of the Sufi conception of re-union at any moment through the power of Love.

The Sufi's feeling about *karma* is similar. Certainly he admits the scientific relations of Cause and Effect—what a man sows, that he must reap—but he qualifies his belief in this dogma by remembering the power of the God Within.

In a sense, then, though, for the reasons given, the Sufi sets the doctrine of reincarnation on one side as unimportant, it may yet be said that within the esoteric circle he admits it. He allows, that is to say, that a man's personality, plus his *karma*, can return to this plane again and again through the impression it makes upon incoming souls. The Sufi, I think, would put it like this:—*Who* is such and such a man? Is he, so far as his personality is concerned at the time of death, identified with his earthly and emotional attributes or with his purely spiritual qualities? It may safely be said that nearly every single individual born into the world is, in his heart of hearts, more or less solidly identified with his individuality, and that "the flight of the Alone to the Alone" is beyond the reach of the vast majority of mortals. Reincar-

nation, therefore, is admissible even by the Sufis. The mass of men reincarnate; hence, roughly, the doctrine of reincarnation is true. But the Sufi will not admit that reincarnation is an *absolute* rule or *necessary* consequence. There is the *great* reservation to be made about the actual soul. The *soul itself*, according to the Sufis, can never reincarnate. The personality returns, perhaps: impressed on another soul. But the soul itself, on its journey from Heaven, through Earth, to Heaven again, touches the earth-plane once and once only. It itself is nameless and formless and divine. Little by little the veils of separate identity drop away from it, and it approaches once more the Source of its origin. The Sufi *Sheikh* I have already quoted, speaks of this return of the soul to its home, and how it may be a conscious or unconscious return. I should like to quote his eloquent words here:—

> The soul, drawn by the magnetic power of the Divine Spirit, falls into It with a joy inexpressible in words, as a loving heart lays itself down in the arms of its Belovèd. The increasing of this joy is so great that nothing the soul has ever experienced in its life has made it so unconscious of the self as this joy does; but this unconsciousness of the self becomes in reality the true Self-consciousness. It is then that the soul realises fully that "I exist". But the soul which arrives at this stage of realisation *consciously*, has a different experience. The difference is like that of one person having to be pulled, with his back turned, to the Source—and another person having journeyed towards the Goal enjoying at every step each experience it has met with, and rejoicing at every moment of this journey in approaching nearer to the Goal.

One last word with reference to the Soul and the doctrine of Reincarnation. The Sufi attitude to these questions resembles, I think, that of the Buddhists. The Soul goes on, the Personality comes back—so the Sufis say—and yet the Eternal Soul is undivided and "in every place without moving". The Buddhists explained by the simile of a candle: "If a candle is lit from another, the light does not pass from one to the other, but there is a continuity of the process." Or if asked: is it the same being that is reborn or another? they would reply, "Neither the same nor another." It is not the same, then, who does a deed and who receives the recompense or punishment for this deed? "It is not the same, but neither is it another, for without the thirst of the one, the other would not have arisen." They also used another simile:—

> If somebody plants a tree and another later steals the fruits of that tree, can the thief plead as an excuse that he did not take the property of the other, for the other owns only the tree which he planted, but not its fruits? No, for without the tree the fruits would not exist.

RONALD A. L. ARMSTRONG

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL POISONER

[**C. J. S. Thompson, M. B. E.,** is a specialist who has written numerous volumes on the mystery of things—of Perfumes, of Alchemy, of Pharmacy; he is the author of *Poison Mysteries in History, Romance and Crime,* and *Poisons and Poisoners.*—EDS.]

The history of great poisoning cases shows that as a rule the crime of murder by poison is planned in secrecy. The poisoner acts alone and rarely attempts the administration of the lethal dose in the presence of another person.

Criminal poisoning is therefore not a matter of sudden impulse but is usually thought out a considerable time beforehand, for the poisoner sets about his plans with the utmost cunning so as to avoid suspicion or detection.

Every crime that is committed is committed when the reasons for doing it outweigh the reasons for not doing it. The principles of good and evil in the individual will really battle with each other, and when the latter overcome the former, the decision to carry out the crime is accompanied by the dread of discovery and punishment. In endeavouring to analyse the motives of the poisoner, should there be any, we usually find that they fall into several defined classes; but such is the strange working of the human mind, that what to some person might seem a wholly adequate motive for causing but a slight injury, might to another seem to justify in their mind the crime of murder. Thus the study of the psychology of the criminal poisoner is complex in more senses than one.

The action of the poisoner may be the result of psychological mechanisms to which any average person is exposed. It is not confined to any one class or type of individual. He or she may be well-educated, intelligent and apparently a perfectly normal person. On the other hand, the individual may be of a coarse nature, callous and ignorant, with brutish and cruel instincts.

Thus we find, that if in the environment of an individual a peculiar combination of circumstances prevails which renders it extremely difficult or impossible to satisfy some strong desire by any course of action permitted by convention, a state of mind is produced which prompts him to break the code. The whole purpose of his emotion is to induce him to action. His mind becomes dominated by one idea, and such is its power that it blinds him to facts and arguments in so much that, at the time, there appears no risk in carrying out his design.

In planning the crime of murder by poison it is probable that but few deliberately weigh the risk, for craft and cunning play such an important part in the mind of the poisoner that he thinks detection almost an impossibility.

His object to remove the barrier or obstruction that stands in

the way to the attainment of his desire becomes such an obsession, that he sets out to accomplish it by that silent weapon of death at a time when it is least likely to cause suspicion to rest upon himself. It is typical of the poisoner that he takes no account of human suffering or of agonising pain. Whether he employs arsenic or strychnine, he only looks for the desired end. He must carefully think out and decide how the poison is to be administered and when.

In Europe, during the Middle Ages, such plots became so common that poison came to be more feared than the assassin's knife, and the professional poisoner played an important part in these political dramas. In the fifteenth century, certain European States formally recognised secret assassination by poison, as shown in the still existing records of the notorious Council of Ten. From them we learn that on December 15th 1543, John of Ragusa offered the Council a selection of poisons and declared himself ready to remove out of the way any person whom they deemed objectionable. The Presidents, Guolando Duoda and Pietro Guiarini placed this offer before the Council on January 4th 1544, when it was resolved to accept this patriotic offer and to experiment first on the Emperor Maximilian. John had drawn up a regular tariff for the removal of distinguished personages, which was graduated according to their rank. Thus for a King his fee was 150 ducats, for a Duke 60 ducats and for a Marquis 50 ducats.

But the use of poison as a political weapon in Europe began to wane in the sixteenth century after an attempt on the life of Queen Elizabeth by a man called Squire, who placed poison on the pommel of the saddle of a horse she was about to ride, in the pious hope that her hand having come in contact with the poison, it might in some way be introduced into her mouth or nostrils. The last attempt to remove political personages by poison in England was in 1917, when a plot to kill the Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) and his colleague Mr. Henderson by means of certain poisons was discovered—a plot instigated by some misguided women who did not believe in the policy pursued in the Great War by these members of the Government.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, besides the customary methods of administration in food or wine, the secret poisoner often attempted to remove his victim by causing him to absorb some powerful poison through the skin; hence we have the many picturesque stories of the use of poisoned gloves, boots, shirts and other articles of apparel. An instance of the employment of this method in India occurs in the legendary story of the Queen of Ganore, who is said to have killed Rajah Bukht by impregnating his marriage robes with poison. Todd also records the deaths of several historical personages in India who

are said to have succumbed to the effects of wearing poisoned robes.

With the object of ascertaining the predominant motives that have actuated criminal poisoners, I have made an examination of twenty notorious cases that have been tried within recent years, with the following result. In eight cases, the object of the crime was to obtain money or property; seven might be ascribed to motives of sex or lust; one to hatred or jealousy, while in the remaining five no evidence as to motive could be adduced.

With respect to the first mentioned, the motive of greed is ever a powerful one. It is common knowledge that a passion for property, especially as it involves the sense perception of money, is to be found among people of every race, and gold is the prevailing lure. Sometimes the desire for grasping of wealth, when within reach, becomes overwhelming and appears to have the same definite influence on some people as blood on a preying animal. There are cases on record in which people have been led to commit serious crimes by the mere sight of a large sum of money.

The sex motive to which seven of the twenty cases may be attributed includes such emotions as love, jealousy and hatred. The sex instinct in most individuals is primarily represented by lust. Love and hatred are only the positive and negative aspects of the same relation. But a woman's hatred is generally much more intense than that of a man; and usually among women, hate, anger and revenge may be considered as but different stages of the same emotion. Gross, the German psychologist, declares that real hate has three sources, *viz.* pain, jealousy and love. Where sex instincts form the basis of the motive we may assume, that the mind of the individual becomes dominated by a fixed idea which becomes intensified by dwelling upon it. Some person who stands in the way of the fixed desire has to be removed. If poison is the chosen weapon, the victim must be watched until an opportunity occurs when the method, secretly planned, can be carried out without drawing suspicion on the plotter of the crime.

In considering the cases in which there appears to be a complete absence of motive for the committal of the crime, it is significant that, in the majority of these, the criminal proved to be a woman. From early times, poisoning as a "feminine" crime has been remarked by such ancient writers as Livy and Tacitus; and in studying the history of criminal poisoning it is noticeable that there has always been a high percentage of women poisoners. In the United States of America statistics show that five-eighths of the murders by poison have been carried out by women, who have either been housewives, housekeepers, nurses or servants. In France also from statistics covering twenty-one years, between 1851 and 1872,

the women accused of criminal poisoning numbered 399 against 304 men charged with this class of crime.

The question arises why should women more than men be given to this form of crime ? In answer to this, a well-known psychologist observes that every murder, except that by poison, requires courage, the power to do, and physical strength, and as a woman does not usually possess these qualities she spontaneously makes use of poison ; hence there is nothing extraordinary or significant in the fact. It is due to the characteristics of the sex. Women certainly have special facilities and opportunities for administration, as in the majority of cases the lethal dose is mixed with food or drink which is naturally prepared by a woman. A famous psychologist goes so far as to say with regard to criminal poisoners, " where evidence does not point to a woman, look for an effeminate man who has feminine characteristics, as the perpetrator".

As an instance of the type of criminal poisoner who works without any apparent motive, mention may be made of Helen Jégado, a domestic servant, in France, who was suspected and tried for having caused the deaths of twenty-three persons. She is described as being a common hard-featured woman of repulsive appearance, with dull expressionless eyes. It was noticed that wherever she had been employed mysterious deaths had occurred, and in her last situation where she had been cook, seven people had died after undergoing terrible sufferings. She had nursed each one with devotion, for as she later confessed " she neither hated nor was jealous of anyone but was really fond of her victims ". She was utterly callous to human suffering and appears to have been irresistibly impelled to crime by her evil disposition. At her trial she admitted that she had administered the poison to her victims as it gave her actual pleasure to watch them die.

Another case was that of Anna Schönleben, a German woman, who appears to have had no compunction in murdering any one who stood in the way of her ambition. While employed as a housekeeper in a family, she poisoned two people and attempted the life of a baby. At her trial she also admitted that she was amused by the sufferings of her victims, and had a real passion for poisons generally. After being convicted for her crimes, she declared in Court that her death would be fortunate for mankind as it would have been impossible for her to have abandoned the practice of poisoning.

A still more curious case was that of Jeanne Gilbert, a young French woman, who was charged with having poisoned eleven people in and near the village where she lived in the south-west of France. During a period of two years, ten people had died under mysterious circumstances in the district with symptoms

pointing to arsenical poisoning, but no suspicion appears to have been aroused until a Madame Pallot, who lived in the village, was seized with a sudden illness after eating a portion of a small cheese she had found on her window-sill one morning, which she took to be a gift from a neighbour. She died within three hours, and the remains of the cheese, on being analysed, were found to contain a large quantity of arsenic. By a curious chain of circumstances the possession of a considerable amount of arsenic was traced to Jeanne Gilbert the wife of a farmer in the village, and she was arrested and charged with the crime. At her trial she admitted having purchased the arsenic which, she declared, she had used for killing rats, and for this purpose had placed it in small cheeses, specially prepared, and left them about. She was careful however to put them where her intended victims might find them, and they had accepted them as anonymous gifts. No motive whatever could be assigned for the terrible series of crimes brought home to her, but she was convicted and executed.

It is noteworthy, in cases of this kind, that the poisoner is not satisfied with one victim but often repeats the crime several times. It would appear as if such criminals were the subjects of irresistible obsessions beyond their control.

The homicidal type who distributes poison indiscriminately is more common in the eastern than the western hemisphere. In India, where arsenic has probably been more generally used than any other substance for criminal poisoning in secret, particulars are difficult to obtain; but the reports of the official analyst of the Bombay Government show that some types of the homicidal poisoner have been common for the last fifty years. The criminal, who is generally described as a "strange woman," is said to mysteriously appear in some bazaar or street and, during her peregrinations, distributes some sweetmeats of one kind or another impregnated with arsenic. Before suspicion is aroused, she manages to disappear in the crowd and is not seen again.

One typical case recorded is that of a man who went into a shop and entered into friendly conversation with a stranger he met there. Before leaving, the stranger courteously presented him with some sweetmeats which he took away and distributed among his friends. The result was that five men and a boy were seized with symptoms of poisoning, but meanwhile the "stranger" had disappeared and could not be found.

The importance of the study of the psychology of the criminal is now engaging the attention of the police in several countries in Europe; and from it, it is thought possible that, in the future, some method may be evolved which will prove of considerable value in the prevention of crime.

C. J. S. THOMPSON

CORRECT AND INCORRECT THINKING

THE USE OF ANALOGY, SYMBOLISM AND PARABLE

[**I. Shaw Maclaren** is the author of *Res Relictae* and *What and Why*, two epistemological volumes. In this suggestive article he values more correctly than is ordinarily done the power of analogy and symbol in mind training. Esoteric philosophy regards analogy as the guiding law in Nature, the only true Ariadne's thread that can lead us to the solution of deep mysteries. As to symbols—the attention of our author and others like him may be drawn to the following aphorism: "Every symbol must yield three fundamental truths and four implied ones, otherwise the symbol is false."—EDS.]

The senses are avenues through which comes all the first hand knowledge we have of the outer world. They are the gateways of our knowledge of physical things. To all primarily this world is a sense world, a world of things that can be seen, of noises that can be heard, a world of whose shape and character the senses tell us, a world of common sense.

What the senses give us is confined to first-hand impressions of the outer physical world. Through the avenues of sense are brought in the raw material of knowing, like the loads of fruit and vegetables coming in to market in the early morning. But we have a power that enables us to assort these impressions as the market men assort and arrange their goods, to group these impressions and manipulate them, and that power is called reason. Reason is the second instrument of knowledge. Its business is to pass the raw material of the senses through the transmuting mills of the mind and to supply us with the product in the shape of rational knowledge. Rational knowledge is different in kind from sense knowledge. Rational knowledge is knowledge of the physical world at second-hand after it has been metamorphosed by reason. The whole rough product of the senses is thrown into the factory of reason to be returned in due season arranged, rectified and codified in the shape of the physical sciences.

The methods of our second kind of knowledge are those of exactitude fitted to deal with material things which it arranges according to the laws which govern and limit the use of reason. These methods are numerative and logical. The data with which it deals in common with its results are positive and definite. It takes our knowledge of the stars, gained by means of sight and artificially extended sight, subjects it to the laws of causation and numeration, and gives us back the more or less finished product in the shape of astronomy. It takes our knowledge of matter gained through carefully adapted use of the senses, subjects it to the laws of causality and returns us the science of chemistry. Science is the product

of reason acting upon the data of the senses. The data of the senses are all of the physical material world and the dealings of science are all with the physical material world.

As these two instruments of knowledge, the senses and reason, confine their presentations to objects of the outer world, does the sum of these presentations constitute the whole corpus of our awareness? Have we no knowledge of our inner selves, of what is variously called our heart, our passions, our spirit, our soul? And if so how is such knowledge obtained and what are its methods and its nature? Reason is dumb on the subject of the soul. Its methods of measuring and numbering fall useless when applied to the intangible.

Let it be called what it will, the world of the soul, the affairs of which the heart speaks, of which literature speaks, the affairs with which art deals, the ethical world, the world in which such things as beauty and goodness have their being,—this world which occupies the thoughts of humankind is not attained to either through the senses or through reason. A knowledge of it cannot be imparted from one human being to another except by means of symbols but these symbols are drawn from the sensual physical world. The power of making use of symbols, of using physical phenomena as symbols of another world of things, of drawing *analogies*, is the third instrument of knowing, and the knowledge gained by it is the third kind of knowledge.

A symbol never gives an accurate representation of any spiritual process but only a loose idea of it. Consequently in every instance, as only giving an inadequate and free general notion of what it is meant to represent, being by its nature indefinite, it can never be used as a premiss in definite logical or rational processes of thought, but must be dealt with in the manner and fashion peculiar to analogy.

All our knowledge of things which are not physical material things takes the form of imagery drawn from the sensual world. There is no other manner in which you could deal with non-physical processes such as the emotions than by giving them a temporary physical dress. In language these pictures or images are called metaphors, and the greater part of language in ordinary current use is metaphorical in its texture and is thus inadequate for use in logical disquisition. Being but loose imagery and elastic analogy such language is not armed for service where the premisses of rational thought require apposite, accurate definition.

The whole of our knowledge of the non-physical, non-material world must be expressed in terms of analogy. Every word that can be used in this third form of knowledge is used with its secondary or symbolical, not with its primary or physical meaning. Take any word by way of example. Take "depth," for

instance. When the word "depth" is used in connection with such a metaphysical entity as sorrow it has to be rid of its corpulence first. Sorrow may be said to be deep, but you cannot say it is six feet deep. Or take the word "weight". You can speak of a weight of care, but the word "weight" must before this is done be rudely abrupted from its physique.

A farmer wishing to learn of the condition of his fat pigs gains the required knowledge by touch and sight. This kind of knowledge is sensual knowledge. Should he wish to know if it will pay him to sell them in their present condition he brings his arithmetical calculation into action and thus acquires reasoned information on the subject. This is rational knowledge. If he wishes to drive these pigs to market o'er moor and fen, o'er crag and torrent, he may do so; but this kind of moor and fen is not the kind of moor and fen he sings of in church on Sunday, which is moor and fen gazetted for use by the ethical faculty, moor and fen acting as accredited symbols of a portion of ethical knowledge. Scarcely an object of nature but has been roped in at some time or place for analogical use by the ethical faculty. The whole paraphernalia and linguistic furniture of hymns ancient and modern is analogy set to music, and when we sing of rocks of ages, doors ajar, beautiful rivers, golden thrones, and fountains of blood, we are correctly drafting in the sensual world to take its place when analogised as ethical knowledge.

There should really be no difficulty or confusion in their uses, as the lines of demarcation separating the three sorts of knowledge are distinct and clear. There is no overlapping. The sense faculty, the rational faculty and the ethical faculty together enacting with their special processes cover the whole field of human consciousness.

To find spiritual methods properly applied one should look at the methods employed by correctly operating ethicists. The parable methods of Jesus of throwing bare spiritual processes are in order. The imagery of Shakespeare, the myths of Plato, the metaphors of Paul—these are instances of correct thinking. Every real moralist has used the method of symbols whether those symbols have taken the form of allegories, parables, tales, stories, fables, or myths, or whether they have taken the form of monuments or pictures of architecture, or of sculptured stone. The most common form of symbolism is metaphor, and the use of this, often unsuspected, is the source of endless confusion.

It is easy to see the metaphorical character of much language as soon as a moment's thought is given and it is only necessary to take a step back into their original tongue to see the analogy that underlies such words as "conversion," "salvation," "tribulation," and hosts of others. One has only

to go a few steps farther back still and the metaphor encrusted in "soul," "spirit," or "character" becomes clear. The word "character" meant originally the dried-up bed of a mountain torrent, and when an early thinker came to give a name to that spiritual thing which he could not see or lay hands upon, but which he otherwise perceived, that is to the record in each man of his past actions and ancestry, he could think of no better image than the dried-up bed of a mountain stream which shows by the torn-up banks and de-rooted trees, the stranded logs and piled-up rocks, the history of many a winter spate and stormy freshet. He therefore applied the same name to the two things, and the identical word had thenceforth to do double duty. It has two uses, the one applied to a definite logical physical process, the other to an indefinite analogical spiritual process. It is the same with the word "spirit" or with the word "soul". "Soul" comes from a word originally meaning ocean. Nothing seemed to represent that vague, imponderable, indefinite, spiritual entity which we now call the soul so well as the wide and limitless ocean which reflects every passing ray of light and darkens its gloomy depths at the approach of evening. The physical ocean, however, can be sounded with a plummet and its depth measured with scientific accuracy, but the other kind of ocean says to your scientific methods, "ha, ha!" The radically metaphorical nature of these words has become superficially dimmed by time and use and they are now employed by inaccurate thinkers as if they represented so many definite entities like so many sticks and stones; but words such as these only make a rough shape at fitting indefinite spiritual processes and it is a fool's game to try to use them as one would use sticks and stones. The living pages of great writers glow with an abundance of fresh-minted metaphors. In ordinary service hacked and worn ones pass free and useful currency.

Within these three forms or faculties or departments the whole body of real knowledge is built up. But outside and beyond this world of achieved certainty developed from sense-awareness unfortunately is found another world the world of non-sense.

Each faculty is required of necessity to confine its functioning within its allocated sphere. A person approaching an object of the soul such as religion may allowably for the moment neglect the use of his sense of smell, and overlook his skill in mathematics, but he must set his ethical faculty afunctioning. The muddled thinking and destructive confusion from which the world suffers to-day arise from a failure to segregate the separate fields of knowledge, to misemploy their uses. It is incorrect thinking to apply scientific methods to ethical subjects, just as incorrect as it would be to try to solve a mathematical problem by the use of the nose. It is incorrect thinking to attempt

to enclose imponderable spiritual objects which by their very nature are incapable of defined limits within exact definitions. To attempt to make dogmatic assertions on religious subjects is an instance of incorrect thinking. It is an infringement of a cardinal law of thought. Dogma is an excellent example of non-sense. It is the result of the rational faculty set to do work of which it is incapable. One might as well attempt to play cricket with a collar stud. An example of partial non-sense lies in the use of the word psycho-analysis. The hyphenation of an imponderable such as psyche with a physical process such as analysis may perhaps be allowed as a picturesque poetic phrase but to consider it a science is non-sense. The phrase "science of ethics" is another hybrid monster of thought suitable for the pantomime season. The age-long controversy between science and religion may be taken as a museum specimen of nonsense in its pure and crystalline state of nonsense embedded in its natural matrix of absurdity. The scientist purely as such acquires his narrowed outlook from the neglect of a whole species of knowing. He is a one-way street man, progressing by means of his mathematical machinery with ever-increasing speed, forgetful that beyond the block there is another stream of traffic going in exactly the opposite direction. Possibly that portion of the grey matter of his brain which ought to be directing the machinery of his ethical faculty, has been deprived of the blood stream of life commandeered for the overtime working of his rational faculty. If this be so then the scientist may be claimed to be, to that extent, in a state of mental deficiency. The statement made by many scientists and claimed for truth, that this world is a mathematico-physical world alone, may be taken as the height of non-sense, it being understood that the word "height" as here used is employed in its ethical and not in its physical sense, the height referred to not being of the kind which is expanded through the physico-mathematical realms of bent space.

I. SHAW MACLAREN

THE ABSOLUTE

[**William Kingsland, M. I. E. E.**, is an old student of Theosophy and the author of *The Real H. P. Blavatsky, The Mystic Quest, Rational Mysticism, Scientific Idealism, Christos, The Religion of the Future* and *The Great Pyramid, in Fact and in Theory,* which last was reviewed in our issue for May.—EDS.]

The term *The Absolute* as used in philosophy has a well-defined and well-understood meaning which has evolved from the original etymological signification in the Latin *absolutus*, p.p., of *absolvo=ab*, from + *solvere*, to loose. This philosopical meaning attaches to a Principle or Being which or who is the ALL of the Universe, both manifested and unmanifested. It is not departing very far from the etymological derivation of the word to say that the Absolute is *absolved*, not because of what it *once* was, but because it *never* was anything from which it could be absolved. It never was anything *relative.* The word itself implies the opposite of relativity; and necessarily and logically that which is all cannot have any relation to any of its parts.

Let us examine a few of the ways in which this term has been used by writers at various times and from various points of view.

It is hardly necessary to deal with the philosophy of Kant in his recognition of a transcendent Reality beyond the reach of the intellect which is limited in its concepts by the "categories" of time, space, and causation. He left the Absolute severely alone—as, indeed, we shall see presently it ought to be, so far as speculations regarding its nature are concerned.

Nor need we consider Hegel, who endeavoured to storm the Absolute by means of a special *dialectic.* Schopenhauer and von Hartmann have each contributed to the dialectic of the Absolute; but it still remains the great paradox of metaphysical speculation.

One of the clearest explanations of the nature of the concept of the Absolute by one of our modern writers is that given by the late F. H. Bradley in his work *Appearance and Reality.* The two terms *Absolute* and *Reality* are rightly used by Mr. Bradley as synonymous: for the Absolute must necessarily be the ONE Reality.

Thus he says:—

> Reality is above thought and above every partial aspect of being but it includes them all. Each of these completes itself by uniting with the rest, and so makes the perfection of the whole.

He insists that the Absolute, or Reality, is "one harmonious whole". Thus he says:—

> The Absolute is not many [*i.e.*, it is *Unity*], there are no independent reals. The Universe is one in this sense, that the differences must exist harmoniously within the whole, beyond which there is nothing.

He insists that Reality is *experience*; but into that question it is not necessary to enter here,

since it is a speculation as to the *nature* of the Absolute, and may possibly find a contradiction, or at all events a paradox, in the fact that logically absolute consciousness is unconsciousness. But of the nature of the Absolute as Reality contrasted with Appearance or phenomena, he says :—

Everything to complete itself and to satisfy its own claims, must pass beyond itself, nothing in the end is real except the Absolute. Everything else is appearance. . . . Viewed intellectually Appearance is error. But the reality lies in supplementation by inclusion of that which is both outside and yet essential, and in the Absolute this remedy is perfected.

To this he adds a paradox—and, indeed, we must say that all statements in this relation which have any validity are paradoxical, as for example the *neti, neti* of the *Upanishads* in speaking of that which, although the ALL, is yet " not this, not that".

The degree of reality is measured by the amount of supplementation required in each case, and by the extent to which the completion of anything entails its own destruction as such.

One can readily recognise here the correspondence of this with the paradoxical mystical teaching that the *self* must be lost in order that the *Self* may be found; or, in other words, *Self* only becomes complete in the ONE SELF, the Absolute.

What that subtle Being is of which this whole Universe is composed, that is the Real, that is the Soul, *That art Thou.* (*Chhandogya Upanishad*, VI, 9, 4.)

Going back to Plotinus we find that philosopher saying :—

You must not, therefore, conceive it [Being] to have interval, nor evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must you admit that there is anything prior or posterior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor posterior about it, but the *is*, is the truest of all things about it, and is itself, and this in such a way as to be essence and life :—if this be the case that which we call eternity will present itself to our view. (*Enn.* III,V.)

Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles* says :—

To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something.

It is clear, then, that though we can *apprehend* that there must be an absolute Principle, we cannot in any wise *comprehend* It. The concept is a necessity of thought; but at the same time we must not overlook the fact that in mystical experience we also find it to be a necessity of our nature.

Some few, whose lamps shone brighter, have been led
From cause to cause to nature's secret head,
And found that one first Principle must be.

H. P. Blavatsky tells us that the Secret Doctrine establishes as its fundamental principle

An Omnipresent, Eternal, Boundless, and Immutable PRINCIPLE on which all speculation is impossible, since it transcends the power of human conception and could only be dwarfed by any human expression or similitude.

This fundamental principle is further defined as :—

The ABSOLUTE; the *Parabrahm* of the Vedantins or the one Reality, SAT, which is, as Hegel says, both Absolute Being and Non-Being.

It is also described as *Be-ness* rather than *Being*. It is "the One Unity" in which spirit and matter, or subject and object are synthesised.

It is greatly to be regretted that in a work recently published by Dr. G. de Purucker under the title of *Fundamentals of the Esoteric Philosophy*, which professes to be an exposition of *The Secret Doctrine* of Madame H. P. Blavatsky, the noble and time-honoured conception of the Absolute Principle which is "the Rootless Root" of all things, and which is a conception common alike to philosophy, to theology, and to mysticism, to East and to West, has been stultified in a manner which can hardly fail to bring the profound philosophy of *The Secret Doctrine* into contempt with those who have not studied that work for themselves. Dr. Purucker says:—

> Whence came the "Absolute," the "Supreme Self," or "Spirit" or Paramatman, of which we are sparks? By growth from within outwards. It was once in incalculable æons gone by, a Man. Think of the sublimity involved in this teaching; consider the almost endless æons of the past; and that what in its far, far-away origin was a spark of divinity, a spark of another and former "Absolute," is now our "God," our Paramatman, our "Supreme Self" of which we are verily the children, and "in which we live and move and have our being".

In no sense whatsoever can we conceive that "the Absolute was once a man," though we can and *do* conceive not merely that man was *once* the Absolute, but that he is never anything else.

It is true that Dr. Purucker tells us that he is not using the term *the Absolute* in the sense of Western philosophy. We should rather think he is not; but neither is he using it in conformity with Eastern philosophy or with that of *The Secret Doctrine*. Nowhere in these can he find any postulate that the Absolute or *Parabrahm* was ever anything else but ITSELF in its absoluteness. And if it can be said to be possible in any sense to have a *relative* Absolute, even such an Absolute must be the *Root* and *Source* of all that *of* which it is absolute, and cannot "once have been" any of its parts or manifestations.

We may grant a number, an inconceivable number, of *relative* Absolutes in the sense that they all exist within the One absolute Absolute as *aspects* of that Absolute; or, as they have sometimes been called, *Monads*—possibly but doubtfully the Monads of Leibnitz. But these Monads can only be *aspects* of the absolute Absolute because of our conditioned intellectual necessities. As Mansel pointed out long ago in his *Limits of Religious Thought*:—

> That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within it the sum not only of all actual but of all possible modes of being.

Thus the real fact is not that the Absolute was *once* man, but that—if we are to use the word *once* at all—it is the other way about, and we have to say that Man was *once* the Absolute, and that his evolution (*involution* rather) is the process of re-

becoming THAT. We must in fact reverse all Dr. Purucker's concepts to have the real esoteric teaching, whether of *The Secret Doctrine* or of philosophy and mysticism in general. Every student of these knows that it is precisely the "growth from within outwards" that has led man out from his source into the limitations of his present consciousness; and that it is only by the *reversal* of that process, by turning *inwards*, that the consciousness of what he *is* can be regained. It is only this that can truly be called a *sublime* concept: whereas Dr. Purucker appears to think that the sublimity lies in extension and becoming.

We are approaching the concept that man *is* the Absolute even in modern psychology. Bergson tells us that "intellect has detached itself from a vastly wider reality"; that "intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation"; that "both are derived from a wider and higher form of existence"; and that "it is there that we must replace them, in order to see them issue forth".

This "higher form of existence" can only have its completion in the Absolute which is the Self of all selves NOW. And just as we are not normally conscious of the activities of our subconscious selves, so also we are normally unconscious of the activities of our supra-conscious selves, reaching back to the One Self, where, as Bradley says, it "completes itself".

It must, I think, be the mystical rather than the philosophical aspect of the Absolute which will interest us most; this fundamental fact that the Absolute is not merely logically the Self of all selves, but that we can actually in consciousness attain to a realisation of our oneness. Without that background to our nature and being, man has no root or source; and only the common anthropomorphic conception of Man as a *created* being remains—or else blank negation. Yet there is really no difference between the "That art Thou" of the *Vedânta* and the "in Him we live and move and have our being" of St. Paul.

The great mystic achievement is the attainment of a conscious oneness with the Absolute. "In mystic states," says William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* "we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness." He then goes on to say:—

> This is the everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime or creed. In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystical classics have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man with God, their speech antedates languages, and they do not grow old.

I think, however, that as regards the consciousness of the Absolute which has been attained at any time by our classical mystics, or

which can be attained by any man at the present stage of the evolution of humanity, we must enter a *caveat*. Not merely have we to note that these mystical states are rare and unenduring, and are therefore not what we mean by *attainment*; but we must also say that in none of these states has any, or can any individual reach any further than a *relative* Absolute, or that Absolute which constitutes the *Atman*, the Self, the Logos, the Unity of our own particular Solar System; while beyond that lies the unity of our particular Universe, of which astronomy now indicates the limits, as well as the existence of other such Universes: perhaps in "infinite" numbers despite Einstein's curved space-time which is "finite but unbounded". That much we may grant to Dr. Purucker's *relative* Absolutes; only, as already pointed out, these Absolutes were not *once* men, but man—if the term applies to other systems than ours—*is* never in Reality anything else than the Absolute.

In introducing any *time* concept in reference to the Absolute, we are not escaping from the limitations of the formal mind; and while it is true that in the mystical states of consciousness we do escape these limitations, it is not necessarily true that we have thereby reached the absolute Absolute. We must in fact recognise that *so far as the formal mind is concerned* the absolute Absolute is only, as Récéjac tells us in his *Philosophy of Mysticism*, "the extreme point where we arbitrarily suspend causality, continuous and successive magnitudes; nothing but an artifice to arrest the infinite progression of our ideas". In any case, "time" has no meaning in connection with the Absolute, whether that Absolute be postulated as a relative Absolute or as the absolute Absolute.

But while it is true of the intellect that the Absolute may be regarded as "nothing but an artifice," the mystical experience shows us that in reality it is something vastly more. The mystic experience is the pledge and evidence of that "higher form of existence" of which Bergson speaks, and in the certainty of the existence of which humanity has never been lacking as an *intuition*, however feebly, or even grotesquely, that intuition may at times have been exhibited in exoteric forms of religion, or denied by materialism.

And if we men may look forward confidently to "becoming" the Absolute, it is only because it is from THAT that we have the *appearance* of having issued forth: while all the time:—

> Behold I, poor fool that I was, imagined that it was I; but behold! it is, and was, of a truth, God. (*Theologia Germanica*).

W. KINGSLAND

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

NATURE IS ALIVE: HUMAN EGO IS SUPREME*

[**J. D. Beresford** reviews recent books of two world-famous scientists, the Indian J. C. Bose and the German Max Planck. As accredited spokesmen of modern science they proclaim two fundamentals of Theosophical philosophy—Nature is a Living Whole, and Man is the Ego Possessing the Power to Control Causes.—EDS.]

Within the limitations that its disciples have clearly defined, science, the systematic study of knowledge, has moved forward so rapidly in the course of the last hundred years that it may be said to have changed its creed from a dogmatic materialism to a kind of tolerant agnosticism.

This change is not to be found by examining the personal creed of individual scientists. Quite recently I heard a broadcast "talk" on "The Future Life" by Professor Julian Huxley in which he used precisely the same arguments and adopted the same attitude that characterised the thought of the 'nineties—of Ernst Haeckel, for example. Incidentally, Professor Huxley opened with his most illuminating statement which was to the effect that the more one studied the material body of men and animals, the more certain one became that it could not be the vehicle of an immortal soul. The reply to that might be that the intensive study of psychology on the other hand would produce in the mind of the student, a growing certainty that the puzzling phenomena of, say, hypnotism, dual-personality, loss of memory, or healing by suggestion, could not conceivably be due to bio-chemical causes. In other words, no argument on this particular question can have any value if it is biased as the result of specialisation in one particular line of research.

Nevertheless, if we find that the individual scientist,—and more especially in this connection the biologist,—continues in the same rut that was worn for him by his predecessors more than fifty years ago, science, itself, as such, has completely changed its message in the same period of time. At the end of the last century the layman, who made a cursory study of all that science had to teach him, must have decided, on those grounds, that man was a casual by-product of cell-differentiation, a material phenomenon that endured for a certain number of years and then ceasing, for whatever cause, to react as a whole, rotted and disappeared,—a creature without past or future. To-day such a layman,

* *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta, Vol. VII, 1931-32*, edited by Sir J. C. BOSE (Longmans, Green & Co., London. 25*s*.)

Where is Science Going? By Professor MAX PLANCK (Allen and Unwin, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

with an immensely greater task of reading before him, would be left in a condition of great uncertainty. He would find that science as a whole had no certain message for him, whether mechanistic or spiritual.

Some aspect of this change of thought may be found in the study of two recent books, both scientific. The first of them need not detain us long. Its title is *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta, Vol. VII, 1931–32*, edited by Sir J. C. Bose. I have already had occasion in these pages to refer to Sir Jagadis Bose's researches into the sensitivity of plant life, and the interesting parallels he has been able to demonstrate between the reactions of vegetable and animal life. In doing that, he has rendered a considerable service to general knowledge by demonstrating scientifically one aspect of the truth accepted by all Theosophists, namely, that life with its attendant consciousness inheres in all matter,* and that there is no difference in its essential nature, no definite "break" between the inorganic, the vegetable and the animal kingdoms.

In the present volume of these Transactions, however, we find only a record of those familiar preoccupations of the students of science, which stirs the impatience of the progressive mind, and so often provoked the contempt of Madame Blavatsky. We may pass those further experiments that have been undertaken by the Institute to disprove various objections that have, or might have, been, raised to the original demonstrations of vegetable reactions. The scientific method demands always that assurance should be made doubly sure. But the experiments undertaken to investigate the nature and action of certain vegetable poisons on fish, seem to arise solely from an unpurposive curiosity, and the results can be of interest only to other scientists.

Our second book is of a very different type. Professor Max Planck, whose name is hardly less influential than that of Einstein in the world of Mathematical Physics, has written an essay entitled *Where is Science Going?* —and the material of it is of the very greatest interest. The main theme is that question of causation which has been influencing the development of physics for some years past: the question whether, in the microcosm of the atom, the law of cause and effect is absolutely infallible, or if we may not attribute to the electron in certain circumstances an indeterminacy that has some kind of analogy to free-will. This contention Herr Planck is not prepared to admit, but the true worth of his essay for our present purpose will not be found in his contribution to that controversy.

What should appeal to the layman in this essay, and more particularly to those who have followed the latest developments of

* Cf. *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 274, etc.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

NATURE IS ALIVE: HUMAN EGO IS SUPREME*

[**J. D. Beresford** reviews recent books of two world-famous scientists, the Indian J. C. Bose and the German Max Planck. As accredited spokesmen of modern science they proclaim two fundamentals of Theosophical philosophy—Nature is a Living Whole, and Man is the Ego Possessing the Power to Control Causes.—EDS.]

Within the limitations that its disciples have clearly defined, science, the systematic study of knowledge, has moved forward so rapidly in the course of the last hundred years that it may be said to have changed its creed from a dogmatic materialism to a kind of tolerant agnosticism.

This change is not to be found by examining the personal creed of individual scientists. Quite recently I heard a broadcast "talk" on "The Future Life" by Professor Julian Huxley in which he used precisely the same arguments and adopted the same attitude that characterised the thought of the 'nineties—of Ernst Haeckel, for example. Incidentally, Professor Huxley opened with his most illuminating statement which was to the effect that the more one studied the material body of men and animals, the more certain one became that it could not be the vehicle of an immortal soul. The reply to that might be that the intensive study of psychology on the other hand would produce in the mind of the student, a growing certainty that the puzzling phenomena of, say, hypnotism, dual-personality, loss of memory, or healing by suggestion, could not conceivably be due to bio-chemical causes. In other words, no argument on this particular question can have any value if it is biased as the result of specialisation in one particular line of research.

Nevertheless, if we find that the individual scientist,—and more especially in this connection the biologist,—continues in the same rut that was worn for him by his predecessors more than fifty years ago, science, itself, as such, has completely changed its message in the same period of time. At the end of the last century the layman, who made a cursory study of all that science had to teach him, must have decided, on those grounds, that man was a casual by-product of cell-differentiation, a material phenomenon that endured for a certain number of years and then ceasing, for whatever cause, to react as a whole, rotted and disappeared,—a creature without past or future. To-day such a layman,

* *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta, Vol. VII, 1931-32*, edited by Sir J. C. BOSE (Longmans, Green & Co., London. 25*s*.)

Where is Science Going? By Professor MAX PLANCK (Allen and Unwin, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

with an immensely greater task of reading before him, would be left in a condition of great uncertainty. He would find that science as a whole had no certain message for him, whether mechanistic or spiritual.

Some aspect of this change of thought may be found in the study of two recent books, both scientific. The first of them need not detain us long. Its title is *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute, Calcutta, Vol. VII, 1931-32*, edited by Sir J. C. Bose. I have already had occasion in these pages to refer to Sir Jagadis Bose's researches into the sensitivity of plant life, and the interesting parallels he has been able to demonstrate between the reactions of vegetable and animal life. In doing that, he has rendered a considerable service to general knowledge by demonstrating scientifically one aspect of the truth accepted by all Theosophists, namely, that life with its attendant consciousness inheres in all matter,* and that there is no difference in its essential nature, no definite "break" between the inorganic, the vegetable and the animal kingdoms.

In the present volume of these Transactions, however, we find only a record of those familiar preoccupations of the students of science, which stirs the impatience of the progressive mind, and so often provoked the contempt of Madame Blavatsky. We may pass those further experiments that have been undertaken by the Institute to disprove various objections that have, or might have, been, raised to the original demonstrations of vegetable reactions. The scientific method demands always that assurance should be made doubly sure. But the experiments undertaken to investigate the nature and action of certain vegetable poisons on fish, seem to arise solely from an unpurposive curiosity, and the results can be of interest only to other scientists.

Our second book is of a very different type. Professor Max Planck, whose name is hardly less influential than that of Einstein in the world of Mathematical Physics, has written an essay entitled *Where is Science Going*? —and the material of it is of the very greatest interest. The main theme is that question of causation which has been influencing the development of physics for some years past: the question whether, in the microcosm of the atom, the law of cause and effect is absolutely infallible, or if we may not attribute to the electron in certain circumstances an indeterminacy that has some kind of analogy to free-will. This contention Herr Planck is not prepared to admit, but the true worth of his essay for our present purpose will not be found in his contribution to that controversy.

What should appeal to the layman in this essay, and more particularly to those who have followed the latest developments of

* Cf. *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 274, etc.

physics with an intelligent, though it may be untechnical, interest, are certain clarifying statements made by Herr Planck—statements that reveal the lucidity of his own mind, and indicate that relation of Science to Religion which should presently permit of their complete reconciliation in the human mind.

I will cite two passages only in illustration of this suggestion.

> The man who cannot occasionally imagine events and conditions of existence that are contrary to the causal principle as he knows it will never enrich his science by the addition of a new idea (p. 114).

And the second runs:—

> The fact is that there is a point, one single point in the immeasurable world of mind and matter, where science and therefore every causal method of research is inapplicable, not only on practical grounds but also on logical grounds, and will always remain inapplicable. This point is the individual ego. It is a small point in the universal realm of being, but in itself it is a whole world, embracing our emotional life, our will and our thought (p. 161).

Now let us, in the first place, consider these statements in their original context. Taken together they may be said to define the just place of science in the realm of human knowledge. The first statement, for example, cuts away the ground from under the feet of those, (a high proportion of professional scientists), who maintain that all and every experiment must be conducted without prejudice, and that the only certain knowledge is that derived from such exact experiment.

No doubt it has been, and will continue to be, argued that the imagining of "events and conditions," even in Herr Planck's extreme case of such events being contrary to all experience, constitutes no more than the preliminary hypothesis sometimes necessary as a direction post for experiment, and that no such hypothesis has any value until it has been proved and re-proved by a long series of direct observations. But the mind of the unprejudiced thinker, ranging far beyond the limits imposed by Science, must inevitably demand whence the incipient inspiration of the "imagination" is derived? A priest or an artist, a Roger Bacon or a da Vinci, unconfined by any scientific training whatever, may anticipate the discoveries of future ages, although their writings have no influence on their contemporaries. A Blavatsky may go still further and set out that vast plan of Being, some fraction of which has since been tediously corroborated by the methods of observation and measurement. Can we then doubt that those who draw inspirationally from the unfathomable well of knowledge are tapping the original source of wisdom, and that all the resources of science are but a secondary activity whereby some trickle of the overflow is slowly accepted by the reason and laboriously added to the list of established facts?

Herr Planck's second statement goes still deeper, indicating as it does not the source of wisdom, but our single means of interpreting and giving it expres-

sion on the material plane. For if this "ego" of ours, (using the word in Herr Planck's sense), were no more than a temporary, evanescent aggregate of material atoms, though it might in its marvellous complexity be capable of scientific knowledge, it could not originate the wisdom of a Bacon, a da Vinci or a Blavatsky. The difference between the two functions is that between two modes of being. One is mechanical, the other vital. One postulates no more than the need for an intricate interrelation of chemical reactions to diverse stimuli, the other demands a relation between the material expression of humanity and some source of infinite wisdom. In brief this "ego," this "whole world, embracing our emotional life, our will and our thought" is capable at its highest of transcending all those "laws" of matter which furnish the final tests of science. If a man be capable of imagining "conditions contrary to the causal principle" he may, also, be capable of controlling them.*

Returning now to our unprejudiced layman, one may well imagine him as demanding with Herr Planck, though in a rather different sense: "Where is science going?" It must seem to him in Tennyson's phrase to falter where it firmly trod, to be on the verge, if it is not already over it, of saying: Science by virtue of its self-imposed limitations can never hope to originate any theory as to the intrinsic nature of man's being, its proper field of inquiry being limited solely to the examination of the phenomena of cause and effect presented by what we know as matter.

Moreover it is worthy of remark that this last term, still accepted by Professor Julian Huxley in its original significance, must now be regarded by the physicist as incapable of definition. He may be able to recognise, classify and assign a statistical probability to the manner in which matter behaves in various circumstances, but he has now to admit that he has no more certain knowledge of what matter is, nor of what it may be capable in rare conditions, than he has of the spirit of Man.

What, then, can we say to this puzzled layman of our instance when, having failed to find any answer to his essential question in the pronouncements of Modern Science, he demands, it may be, whether this precious instrument of Reason that has been responsible for all the scientific wonders of twentieth century civilisation, must be regarded as fallible if not utterly worthless when we seek an answer to our fundamental enquiry as to the essential nature of the Universe?

Our answer to that question and to the one that preceded it, "Where is Science going?" is implicit in the second quotation made from Herr Planck's essay.

* It must be clearly understood, however, that the principles and laws here referred to are only those deduced by observation on the material plane. No reference is intended to the higher laws of the spiritual world, such as, to quote the most familiar instance, the law of Karma.

Reason is, in fact, only an instrument, and must be regarded as such. It plays a necessary part in our daily life and science is almost entirely dependent upon it. It is a product of consciousness to which it may be said to bear some such relation as science does to Faith. For the scientist is as dependent upon faith as is, though in a very different direction, the religious convert. Every experiment in the laboratory must be made on certain antecedent assumptions, only a proportion of which are referable to deductions from previous experience. The very use of reason itself assumes an antecedent belief in its validity. In short, reason however precious a gift is a secondary phenomenon of life, dependent upon that consciousness of which faith may be said to be an aspect.

Even as I write this, for example, proceeding in what appears to my judgment as a logical sequence, I am aware that behind the intellectual activity that sorts and seeks to express my ideas, there lies a vitalising belief in my own ego, which states the first principle of Descartes in the inverted form: I am, therefore I think. And that seems to me the proper sequence since I know that I am responsible for my reason, and am what I am as a consequence of an age-long process, and not as the result of my own thought and experience, even though I can defend that dogmatic "I know" solely on the ground of faith.

But how, finally, from such premises is it possible to answer that enquiry as to the future of Science? It has been suggested that it owes, as Herr Planck himself implies, at least some of its advance not to the use of reason founded upon experience, but to those incipient inspirations which have directed its experiments. But as we have seen, it can never by its present methods hope to answer the fundamental question "What is man?" It would appear therefore that in the future Science must take its proper place as a material activity, serving many valuable uses, but unable to furnish any evidence on the main philosophical speculation.

Like Reason, Science must come to be regarded as subsidiary to Faith, and dependent upon it.

J. D. BERESFORD

Fatalism implies a blind course of some still blinder power, and man is a free agent during his stay on earth. He cannot escape his *ruling* Destiny, but he has the choice of two paths . . . there are *external and internal conditions* which affect the determination of our will upon our actions, and it is in our power to follow either of the two.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol I, p. 639.

PRISON AND PRISONERS*

[**G. D. H. Cole,** who is a socialist and a humanitarian, reviews an important volume dealing with an important problem pressing for solution.—EDS.]

What are prisons for? Are they simply lock-ups, within which men and women who are regarded as dangers to society can be shut away, and so made incapable of further harm to their fellows? Or are they reformatories, where those who have fallen upon evil courses can be retrieved and restored for decent civic living? Or are they places of horror and despair, where men are to be made so wretched as to deter others from following their bad example? Through the centuries the conflict between these three ideas of prison persists unending: and few are they who can give a clear answer telling their own view of what a prison ought to be.

There is, indeed, nowadays much less emphasis on deterrence and far more upon reformation among those who write and think seriously about prison conditions. But in the minds of those who do not think seriously the conception of deterrence still strongly persists; and modern prisons even are largely built upon this idea. When there is a crime wave anywhere, the demand at once arises for longer sentences and more stringent prison treatment, as means of scaring off some of the potential criminals. But, as Warden Lawes points out in this book, there is not a particle of evidence that stringency or even savagery of punishment ever deterred anybody. Indeed such evidence as there is points the other way. Those American States which have sought to combat the increase of crime by stiffening up their penal laws are not more free from crime than the rest. If there is any difference, they have more of it, and more than they had when their laws were less vindictive. But it is hard to shake out of people's minds the idea that prison life ought deliberately to be made unpleasant, even if it can be shown that the unpleasantness is likely to worsen, instead of improving, the characters of its victims. The feeling that the life of the criminal in gaol ought, even apart from the mere fact of confinement, to be worse than that of the least well-off among the innocent dies hard, even when it is seen that the greatest hardships are often inflicted, not on the prisoner, but on his unfortunate wife and children.

This, however, has at least been gained—that the idea of deterrence has become discredited among the experts, who were once loud in its praise. There remain the ideas of reformation and of mere incarceration in the public interest; and these two need not conflict all along the

**Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing.* By Warden Lewis E. Lawes. (Constable & Co., London, 8*s.* 6*d.*)

line. For it is possible to say that the test of whether a man should be kept in prison or not, should be his dangerousness to society if he is at large, and at the same time that, when a man is shut up on this account, everything possible should be done to improve him, so as to make him suitable for early release.

This, I think, is the theory which Warden Lawes, with his long experience as Warden of Sing Sing Prison in the United States, has in his mind. He pleads strongly that the men under his care should be so used as to fit them for a resumption of normal life; and he also argues vigorously for the indeterminate sentence—that is, in effect, for a system which will allow a prisoner to be released as soon as his conduct and character seem to offer a reasonable prospect of his behaving as a decent citizen in the future.

That this view is right in principle seems clear enough. But how are we to act up to it? In the first place, a prison can only act as a reforming influence on its inmates if it is able to give them plenty of decent useful work to do, and if this work is of a sort to help them towards earning their livings honestly and usefully after their release. But this is a problem which no prison in the world (unless there be some in Russia) has yet satisfactorily solved; for as soon as prison administrators get busy setting their charges to work at the jobs most likely to be of benefit to them, there arises from employers and workmen alike the cry that the labour of prisoners is being used to take the bread out of honest men's mouths, under unfair conditions of public subsidy. This is said whether or not the prisoners (or their dependents outside) are allowed to receive wages for their labour. Yet until this plea is firmly disregarded it is clear that the prison administrators will be set an impossible task. A high proportion of prisoners are of fairly poor mental equipment and have little or no knowledge of a definite trade. They need work and training above all else. Yet this they are nowhere allowed to have on an adequate scale, though the old severe restrictions on prison labour have been to some extent broken down in recent years.

This problem, however, can at any rate be solved as soon as we care to solve it. The other problem—of determining the duration of a man's or woman's confinement by the criterion of dangerousness to society—rouses much more formidable difficulties. For who is to make the decision, and on whose advice and recommendation is it to be made? Can we yet trust psychiatrists and prison psychologists, with their mental tests and their increasing use of psycho-analytic methods, to tell us when or whether a prisoner can safely be let out? Can we trust individual prison Governors, acting on the advice of these experts? Or can we trust any sort of tribunal of appeals? Clearly, a good prison Governor with a

real *flair* for the appreciation of character, could do far better than he can to-day if he were allowed to judge when his charges could safely be let go. But prison Governors differ like other men; and it would be impossible to hope that any system of indeterminate sentences would work out satisfactorily in every instance. There does seem, however, to be a stronger case for this than for any other system, at least in respect of prisoners sentenced nowadays to long terms. Warden Lawes pleads strongly for it; and his argument is not totally weakened by the fact that a part of it depends on the impression made by his own personality and judgment.

This book is, of course, about the United States; and certain things strike very forcibly the reader who comes from Great Britain. The first of these is the assumption, made throughout as unquestionable, that American justice is utterly uneven in its dealing with rich and poor. Again and again the author mentions, with some indignation but wholly without surprise, how rich criminals get off, or escape with light sentences, when poor men are sent up for long terms or to the electric chair. Secondly, Mr. Lawes is very emphatic not only about the influence which Prohibition has had on the increase of crime, but also about the way in which this influence has worked. It began, he tells his readers, by making crime vastly more lucrative, as well as less frowned on by a public opinion largely made up of law-breakers. The standard of living of the criminal classes rose sharply out of the high profits of bootlegging: but very soon the number of persons anxious to share in these profits rose so fast as seriously to overcrowd the profession. The criminals, accustomed by now to their higher standard of expenditure, resorted to more and more dangerous and violent crimes in order to maintain it; and deterrent measures were utterly ineffective in checking the wave of crime. At the same time the newspapers, by glorifying the exploits of the gangsters and extracting every ounce of sensation out of the stories of bootleggers and gunmen, created in the minds of thousands of young people a passionate emulation of the life of the successful criminal, and helped to bring about a great increase in juvenile crime, and especially in juvenile crimes of violence. Mr. Lawes is most emphatic in his denunciation of the press for its share in the fostering of violence and the falsely romantic view of the life of the underworld.

He is no less emphatic in his attack on the death penalty, both for its futility as a deterrent, and because he believes that many of those who suffer it could be made into decent and useful citizens. He denounces it too as resulting in the grossest inequalities of treatment between man and man, partly owing to differences of wealth—a rich man, he says, is

practically never executed—and because of the growing reluctance to inflict it save under the impulses of popular hysteria. The death penalty has been abolished already in some of the American States; and these have no more crime than the others. May it disappear soon all over the world!

I feel that in this review I have said far too little about Warden Lawes's book as a whole and too much about those parts of it which deal with principles and controversial issues. A large part of it consists of an account of his own experiences as a prison official, and it is richly adorned with accounts of particular persons and events. Its weakness is that it gives too unclear an impression of what the real running of Sing Sing is like. Warden Lawes is hostile to the theory of prisoners' self-government on which his famous predecessor, Osborne, attempted to act. He holds that prison government must be benevolent despotism, and not democracy; and that privileges granted by the administration must remain always privileges revocable at will, and must never become rights. The prisoners are there to be disciplined, and guided back under discipline to better citizenship. They are there, for the most part, because they are unfit to govern themselves; and as soon as they are fit to do this, he holds that they should be let go. Till then a hand firm as kind is necessary.

This seems sound; but what it means in practice depends very much on the conditions under which the administrator works. How much freedom has he in finding the right sort of work for his men? How well are the prison buildings and equipment adapted to the needs of a reforming policy? How much discretion does the law allow in the granting of special privileges, as well as in the remission of sentences? In Russia, I am told, prisoners are regularly allowed to go home at the week-ends, and to earn wages in gaol for the support of their dependants. They have far more freedom of movement, and are far less under a sense of social degradation than prisoners in any other country. Only the political offenders are apt to have a hard time in Russia. The common criminal is subject to a procedure which assumes that to make a man wretched is the worst way of making him a better citizen. Warden Lawes, I think, has worked towards this idea as far as the laws of the United States have allowed. But I fancy he is too much the paternal despot to go all the way with the Russians. Yet all that way, I feel, we must go if we are to be justified in putting men and women in prisons at all. It is hard to justify on any account: it is impossible unless we can reconcile the life of the prison with reasonable human well-being and with the expectation that most of the prisoners will come out better citizens than they went in. That cannot be, if during their prison life they are to be utterly cut off from normal sex relations and

contacts with their wives and families save under the artificial conditions of a prison visit. In Russia, prisoners who are allowed home for the week-end seldom run away. In capitalist countries, they would doubtless run away more; for such countries offer both greater chances of escape and far more opportunities for successful crime. But is not that a part of the indictment of capitalism—that through economic inequality it breeds crime, and the opportunity for crime? Warden Lawes has had a hard task; for America must be the hardest place wherein to govern a prison well, crime having there the most specious glamour and the most abundant opportunity.

G. D. H. COLE

DURATION AND TIME*

[**Prof. Mahendranath Sircar** of Calcutta Sanskrit College is the author of *System of Vedantic Thought and Culture, Comparative Studies in Vedantism and Mysticism in the Bhagavat-Gita;* his *Mysticism in the Upanishads* is to be shortly published. In this scholarly review he points out how the late Professor Mead of Chicago arrives at "an element of indeterminism" like the German Max Planck whose book is reviewed elsewhere in this number. Students of H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* will note the similarity of teachings about Eternity and Duration or Periodicity and Boundlessness of Time; the latter now called "is-ness," is the "Be-ness", a term coined by her to render more accurately the essential meaning of the untranslatable Sanskrit *Sat*, which is neither Being nor Non-being. Our readers' attention may be drawn to *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, pp. 37 and 44.—EDS.]

Original and subtle is the work done by Professor Mead. His work justifies his characterisation by Dewey as "a seminal mind of the very first order". This volume raises many important problems; the central theme is the conception of the Present. This conception is applied to the study of emergence, sociality, and self, in the first four chapters, which contain the main thesis of the book. Four more chapters have been appended as supplementary essays.

The present has been defined as the locus of reality. Reality exists in the present. The present, of course, implies "a past and a future and to those both we deny existence". The conception of the specious present suggests a temporal spread, which could take in the whole of temporal reality but would eliminate the past and the future.

Prof. Mead conceives the present as continuous with the past and as emergent out of it. The main question that he considers in relation to the present is the status of its past. The distinctive character of the past in relation to the present is mainly that of irrevocability. The past is that out of which the present has arisen and is an irrevocability. But this identical relation is never the whole story. The doctrine of emergence compels us to believe that the present is in some sense novel, something not completely determined by the past out of which it arises.

The present, so far as it is new, will have in it "an element of temporal and causal discontinuity". Mead seems to reconcile the novelty of the present with scientific determinism; but how? This leads us to the basic principle of his theory. The past does not contain the

* *The Philosophy of the Present.* By GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, edited by Arthur E. Murphy, with a preface by John Dewey (Open Court Publishing Co., London.)

present before it is emerged. There is an element of indetermination in the present.

Mead is anxious to retain the continuity between the past and the present, and at the same time to regard the present as something new. And this he does by taking the past in two different senses. The irrevocable past is the past of any given present. Its determining condition will "be ideally, if not actually, fully determinable in the present, to which it is relative". But when a new present arises with emergent facts, not containing the former present, its determining conditions, hence its past, will be of necessity different.

New objects are continually arising and a new present re-orients the subtle conditions of an older era. The old view in Philosophy regards the past as for ever passed. Mead thinks that the relation of the past to the present is the ground of its pastness.

He describes the relation between Emergence and Identity: "All of the past is in the present as the conditioning nature of passage, and all the future arises out of the present as the unique events that transpire." The emergent is a unique growth, unique in the sense, that it is not either the full *repetition* or the complete divergence from Identity. The former takes away its meaning, the latter denies the historical continuity. The emergent is really improvement upon the identity, and it puts a new colour upon it from the perspective that it creates.

He holds, especially in criticising Alexander, that the past which physics requires is simply the expression of identical relations in nature, not an antecedent environment existing in itself and giving rise in its identical being to all subsequent reality.

This past is dead past, and not the living one which grows in temporal transition. This temporal transition is a unique sort of relativity and it gives us a kind of temporal perspective or "system". This temporal perspective has a centre, from which its relation to past events is organised, and what is emergent from our social standpoint will follow from and be reflected in the past of another. But, at the same time, Mead is very eloquent in his affirmation that "every event by which it becomes possible to differentiate passage cannot be resolved into the conditions under which event happens".

Prof. Mead then goes on to describe the sociality of emergence. It implies sociality as the capacity of being *several things at once.* The new emergent event must be in two systems in such a way that "its presence in the latter system changes its character in the earlier system or systems to which it belongs," and its older relations are reflected in the new system it has entered.

Mead holds that "the emergence of mind is the culmination of the sociality prevalent throughout nature". Mind is the highest expression of emergence; behaviour and sensation pass here into meaning. But, even here, the principle of sociality is not lost. In reaching to the meaning of sensation, the individual has a reference to both systems at once. When meanings are understood in their highest generality, the individual then can command a wide variety of standpoints and is able to isolate that which is common to all.

In the supplementary essays Mead considers the character of the nature of things as it appeared to the research scientist. He insists that material objects—objects of science—are not to be dismissed as sense data or as appearance. He takes the common sense standpoint and does not commit himself to an epistemological theory. He puts the question: "Can we in thought reach that, which is independent of the situation, within which thinking takes place?" He says he approaches from the "standpoint of a science that has undertaken the development of thought from the lowest behaviour," and he concludes like an empirical realist that mind can never transcend the environment on which it operates.

The empirical realism of Mead does

not confine our experience to "the manipulatory idea of contact experience". There are many contexts in which our experience is viewed. The one we accept as standard will determine the direction of activity and its meanings. This power of discovering meaning transforms present experience and justifies the transcendence of immediacy. This transcendence is essentially social for it involves a reference, for meaning, to something existing outside the "time system, within which they are reckoned". This transcendence leads us to the organisation of perspective in which an individual takes *the rôle of the other* to interpret experience not from his ordinary standpoint, but from others. This generalisation and organisation take us beyond the physical object. This is not a new unattainable object but a generalisation of social objectivity.

In this context of meaning and sociality, we pass beyond immediate experience and welcome *space-time* not as "the metaphysical superior of the physical object" (as in the system of Alexander) but "as a natural development of the '*community of interpretation*' of which the physical object is a limited experience". We thus achieve social objectivity through organisation of relative perspective. This organisation of perspective is the complete picture of social objectivity of which the theory of relativity is a phase.

Mead begins with the immediate object of experience but rises to the conception of the whole as a social objectivity in which all the terms of experience immediate or implied are integrated.

This does not reduce space and time to a metaphysical reality nor does it identify it with material objects but it implies it as the factor in total experience and social meaning.

The central theme of Mead's philosophy lies in the conception of Sociality as simultaneous existence in two different orders. Prof. Dewey says: "It seems to have something in common with the combination of great originality and unusual difference to others, which marked his own personality". The doctrine of relativity is a case in point. The author has referred to the increase in mass of a moving body, as an *extreme case of sociality*.

Mead has a fling at the "Parmenidean Solid". But he has lost sight of the present as the constant point of reference which transcends the past and the future. The present can be the locus of reality only as the meeting point of life which is the continuity of the past and the future, but which in itself, as the constant point of reference, is really transcendent.

In fact the present cannot be understood, it always eludes the grasp. The moment it is understood, it is no longer present. The *present* as the locus of reality is beyond time. It is "is-ness". It is absolute.

The idea of Mead's present as *sociality* reduces the absoluteness of the "is-ness" to its relativity or, in Vedantic terms, introduces us into the order of Maya. Mead has no idea of identity apart from the sociality of emergence; we cannot rise above the relativity idea, which to him is very fascinating. But still more fascinating is the conception of a *timeless present*. This present is freedom, and not sociality. It is not solid, it gives a unique freedom from the compelling force of time and change.

Mead has not been able to show satisfactorily how the lower type passes into the higher where the higher is qualitatively different from the lower. In emergence the new order may be related to the old, but how the new emergence becomes qualitatively superior to the old is not sufficiently explained. Complexity cannot plead for the complete newness of the emergent. In fact, the sociality which emerges in this fineness in the higher type is all along present in this functioning throughout existence. But the principle of sociality proves that it is the highest generalised principle working throughout the whole, and as such is older than any of the emergents. It must, therefore, be a universal plan, applied to the concrete facts of life. And, therefore, this

principle must be more universal and speak for its supra-empirical character.

Sociality, therefore, is not a blind principle that is anyhow attaining to self-consciousness in the last stage of evolution; rather its universal application and working show it to be the immanent principle running through the whole.

It only requires the unfolding of consciousness to experience it as such. Emergence, therefore, has a meaning for the scientific realist, whose imagination cannot see the whole. And the newness of the emergence has meaning only for him; this newness is nothing absolutely new. It is new in its appearance in relation to a quite different setting. Though Mead is anxious to avoid *repetitive evolution* in the scientific sense, still his reference to the past and the revaluation of the past in the light of the new emergence, commits him to evolution as a repetitive process. The emergence of the new as qualitatively different makes his position somewhat different from the ancient view of evolution, and in fact every emergence by its influence upon the past is transforming every moment our view of the world in time; and in this sense the world, every moment, has a new orientation. Mead is anxious to make the evolutionary process more complex as it rolls on; but his constant reference *to the past* is significant; he makes the present as the development of the past, though the past *does not contain* it. Here is his essential difference from the Hegelian outlook. Every moment a new world is being evolved. The whole thing has an empirical outlook. The emergent may be new, but the inevitable continuity of the new with the old at once speaks for the transcendence of both of them in the embrace of the whole. They may differ amongst themselves and live in two orders relatively different. The new may be an advance upon the old, but this continuity and inevitable reference to each other supposes a third order in which both are enclosed. This third order is not grouped in the relativity theory. It is metaphysical. The scientific realist, although he condemns metaphysics, has an unconscious reference to it.

Mead along with Alexander and Whithead seeks to objectify the features of experience, which a dualist philosophy regards as merely subjective, and to show how these notions, purged of their subjective connotation, could take their place in a system of category as a pervasive character of realities, take their start from nature and not from mind. Mead says sociality and psychological process are but an instance of what takes place in nature, if nature is an evolution. From this it can be gathered that Space and Time are to Mead objective realities and not intuition of sense, as they were to Kant. Space and Time in Mead have not the same implication as they have in the system of Alexander. Alexander conceives them as the creative matrix of the whole world detached from the productions or the emergents. Mead's originality lies in showing that every event has a "Space and Time" structure. But they are so essentially related to it, that they can never be separate from it. They form an element in the entire process of sociality. These are elements of the changes which sociality indicates. Space and Time cannot be distinguished from the process of evolution and sociality. They find place in the metaphysical process and change.

Mead combines in him the spirit of realism and empiricism. He has not the boldness to conceive an abstract spatial-temporal world; because he feels keenly like an Empiricist that Space and Time cannot be separated from events and their emergents or, in other words, from sociality. Even here Mead has not been able to envisage any continuity in time or space, for by their very reference to events they have the character of *pictorial space* and *sentimental time.* His idea does not rise above the discrete "Time Sense" associated with events, though he has the sense of sociality in the conception of time. But this sociality does not lead us to suppose a non-empirical reality of Space and Time.

Mead has not been able to get above the discrete "Time Sense" and see the continuity of time, in which past, present, and future are exhibited in a single intuition. The idea of sociality introduces continuity, but since this is always related to events, we do not get to the conception of space and time independent of events.

Hindu Metaphysics show a better conception of Time in the sense of (1) Moments, (2) Cyclic periods, and (3) Eternal duration. Space has also the sense of direction and expanse. The Hindu conceives the possibility of absolute space and absolute time. Time and space in this sense are not related to events. The absolute space and time are metaphysical concepts that have no direct relation to events and which could be known only by intuition. Mead has given us a continuity, but not the endless continuity which gives us the real sense of time.

Moments and cycles are discrete-sense of time cut out of the eternal duration and have a reference to events. They are measured by events; in fact, they are relative to them. But in eternal duration or absolute space we rise above the sense of relativity. Space indicates the eternal receptivity, Time the eternal continuity. Receptivity and Continuity imply a trio in energy, *i. e.* the eternal possibility which is Sakti, or Maya. In fact, spatial temporal reality is suggested by self-expression of the Absolute through Maya.

Schopenhauer has rightly instituted the objectivity of Space-time in the place of the Kantian Ideality of them. Vedanta has also accepted spatio-temporal order as the objective expression of the creative energy or Maya. Mead does not conceive such a back-ground of the cosmic order. In fact, he criticises Alexander's creative Matrix of the Metaphysical Space and Time. Alexander's approach has a similarity to Vedanta, but he allows Space and Time to appropriate the place of the Absolute; and in this makes the grievous error of displacing the context of existence by the form of appearance.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

WORDSWORTH'S SOUL-STRUGGLE*

[**J. P. W.** brings out the distinctive features of Mr. Fausset's study of Wordsworth, and points out how it presents a truer picture of the poet as well as the man than previously drawn by leading writers.—EDS.]

So many literary critics have given to the world the fruits of a close study of Wordsworth, that another volume might seem almost superfluous, but Mr. Fausset's book breaks new ground and almost displaces the poet from the high pedestal to which he was raised by a long line of critics, such as Matthew Arnold, Lord Morley, Myers and others.

Mr. Fausset gives us for the first time a consistent and convincing solution of a problem which his predecessors in the field of Wordsworthian criticism either failed to give or did not attempt to unravel. Matthew Arnold made a true statement of fact, but failed to account for the astonishing fact, when he wrote in his well-known essay on the poet:—

> Wordsworth composed verses during a space of some sixty years; and it is no exaggeration to say that within one single decade of these years, between 1798 and 1808, almost all his first-rate work was composed.

How is it that Wordsworth's creative genius was practically exhausted from the age of thirty-seven, although he lived to the age of eighty? On this Mr. Fausset writes in his Preface:—

> Although many intelligent and interesting explanations have been offered from the time of De Quincey to that of Mr. Herbert Reed,

* *The Lost Leader: A Study of Wordsworth.* By HUGH I'ANSON FAUSSET (Jonathan Cape, London.)

I cannot help feeling that all of them are partial or fail to go deep enough because the critics have studied Wordsworth's life rather as an intellectual or psychological problem than as a spiritual event.

In this sentence is brought out the very distinctive quality of Mr. Fausset's work. His book deals primarily not with Wordsworth's poetry, but with his inner life. Our author takes the principal events of the poet's life, and examines with philosophic insight the effects of these events on his inner and spiritual nature. Mr. Fausset adds value to his argument by profuse quotation from the poems, and makes us feel that he is not merely expounding a theory of his own, but is giving us a true presentment of Wordsworth the poet and Wordsworth the man, and a very correct diagnosis of his inner life as influenced by his experiences and as reflected in his poetry.

While developing his thesis Mr. Fausset gives expression to profound thoughts on the problems of human life, the laws of spiritual development, and the pitfalls to be guarded against in our search for Reality. His book, therefore, is not only one of literary criticism but is a psychological and philosophical study of the deeper problems of human life, interspersed throughout with observations which strike the reader by reason of their depth and profundity. One such passage we shall permit ourselves to quote :—

The ultimate goal of human life must always be an absolute serenity of spirit. But this vital peace, in however small a measure, is only given to the man who has cast down the last of his personal defences, who out of his deep faith in the creative will of Life and through freedom of attachment to things, has dared to be insecure and in that insecurity has discovered a perfect safety.

The most important feature of Mr. Fausset's book, is of course his successful tackling of the problem which has baffled previous critics, *viz.*, the eclipse of Wordsworth's genius at a comparatively early age. This is traced to his improper relations with Annette Vallon during his short stay in France in 1791-2. In THE ARYAN PATH for October, 1932, Mr. Fausset contributed an article on this theme, and the Editorial note suggested that the explanation would be accepted by students of the esoteric philosophy if not by western psychologists.

Mr. Fausset traces the early life of Wordsworth as described in "The Prelude," and points out how even in his Cambridge days—

the singleness of being and of vision which he had always enjoyed, 'the quiet stream of self-forgetfulness' upon which he had floated, were no longer serenely his. A rebel self had awoken in him which at times went its own wilful way. His own mental rhythm was no longer in perfect accord with the deep rhythm of life. . . . And to this mental fermentation was added the first faint stirrings of passion and romantic love, themselves a sign of his changed condition. For the desire to complete the self in another which underlies the sex-impulse proclaims a nature which in the necessary process of growth has become to some degree divided and one-sided. (p. 72)

The "long probation" of this divided consciousness, which Wordsworth was never to outgrow, had thus definitely begun. It was with this divided consciousness that at the age of twenty-one Wordsworth went to France and there fell a victim to his passions. Mr. Fausset writes :—

For the first and last time in his life he was completely possessed by love for a woman. The inmost defences of his selfhood went down before the rapture that seized him. He was blindly infatuated as only those who have jealously guarded the shrine of their being can be, when life compels them to fling open the doors. And beneath the overtones of romantic exaltation he felt the throb of sensuous desire. . . . Wordsworth who had prided himself so delusively upon his temperate blood, was powerless against the sudden onset of so intoxicating a desire. It transfigured him into a being for whom discretion was no longer a virtue nor self-security a condition to be prized. Within a few weeks he and Annette were lovers in the fullest sense, and when she left Orleans for Blois in the spring of 1792, she was with child. (p.103,104).

Wordsworth was now a fallen man. During the early part of his stay in France his enthusiasm had been fired by the great ideas which led to the Revolution, and he had decided to throw his lot in with the Brissotins, but all his fiery zeal evaporated after he had given way to his passion for Annette, and he returned to London in January

1793. Not only did he leave poor Annette to her fate, but "he turned his back upon the ideas and forces which for good and evil were to determine human development during the next hundred years" (p. 206). Mr. Fausset points out that Wordsworth by quitting France then escaped the tragic fate of the Brissotins, but his life in more than a physical sense had come under the shadow of death.

It is important to note that, according to our author, the act of sin with regard to Annette did not by itself bring about the eclipse of Wordsworth's creative years. Genuine repentance and honourable amends could have saved Wordsworth, but he, for a number of years after, futilely tried to pacify his guilty conscience by various acts of self-deception and false compromise with his own Spirit.

Wordsworth's "Fall" is dealt with in Part III of the book, but the succeeding Part—"The State of Sin"—is perhaps of greater psychological interest. Here Mr. Fausset points out how Wordsworth resorted to one subterfuge after another to salve his conscience. At the same time he showed the most reprehensible callousness in his treatment of Annette whom he had left in France. Mr. Fausset has given some quotations from her letters, and points out that only a callous nature could have failed to suffer deeply with the writer of such letters. Even if Wordsworth so suffered, outwardly he was acting as any unscrupulous Lothario, but with every month that passed he paid for his self-love with more and more of self-hatred.

Contact with Coleridge and companionship with his sister Dorothy had later a salutary effect on Wordsworth and helped to reëstablish his shattered being to a certain extent, but as Mr. Fausset shewed in THE ARYAN PATH, "he never really succeeded in healing the division in himself".

We are now nearing the memorable decade which was to witness all Wordsworth's best known poems. As pure poetry these will always occupy a high place in English literature, but Mr. Fausset's detailed examination of these poems convincingly shows, we think, that as philosophic interpretations of the deeper problems of life they cannot be accepted without challenge, and that the ideals propounded in them are not in keeping with the ideals and teachings given to the world by the true mystics and philosophers.

Mr. Fausset's criticism of Wordsworth's poetry in Parts V to XI of his book is superb, and it would be hard to imagine its being better done.

It is interesting to compare Mr. Fausset's treatment of Wordsworth with that of Frederick Myers in his famous volume in the "English Men of Letters" series. Mr. Myers tells us there that he had access to many manuscript letters and much oral tradition bearing upon the poet's private life, but that he had shrunk from narrating such minor personal incidents as the poet himself would have thought it needless to dwell on. Mr. Myers writes:—

> I have endeavoured, in short, to write as though the subject of the biography were himself its Auditor, listening, indeed, from some region where all of truth is discerned and nothing but truth desired, but checking by his venerable presence any such revelation as public advantage does not call for and private delicacy would condemn.

Possibly Mr. Myers may have had access to the Annette papers. If so, one cannot help feeling, after reading *The Lost Leader*, that his estimate of Wordsworth is sadly incomplete, inaccurate, and one-sided. Of the "Lucy" poems, Mr. Myers wrote:—

> And here it was that the memory of some emotion prompted the lines on *Lucy*. Of the history of that emotion he has told us nothing; I forbear, therefore, to inquire concerning it. That it was to the poet's honour I do not doubt, but who ever learned such secrets rightly? Or who should wish to learn? It is best to leave the sanctuary of all hearts inviolate, and to respect the reserve not only of the living but of the dead.

Mr. Fausset has approached his subject differently, and sweeping aside all shams and pretences has attempted to give in his biography not an idealised portrait, but a picture of Wordsworth as he really was.

We shall close our review with a quotation from one of the early pages which gives, in our opinion, the keynote to the whole problem which our author has so skilfully tackled. Wordsworth is there described as—

> a potential mystic who failed to complete himself at a crucial point, failed to pass from the state of childhood and boyhood when the spiritual is inevitably a condition of the natural to a creative maturity when the natural should be as inevitably a condition of the spiritual.

J. P. W.

Æschylus, The Prometheus Bound. Edited with Introduction, Commentary and Translation, by GEORGE THOMSON, M. A. (Cambridge University Press, London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Since we must consider the soul rather than the body, however finely apparelled the latter, this review must deal with the ideas of the trilogy of Æschylus, rather than with the literary scholarship of its translator and commentator.

From a careful study of the technique and the "organic symmetry" of construction used by Æschylus, Mr. Thomson has built up a conjectural reconstruction of the theme of the two missing plays of the series. How far he is successful, how far he falls short, may be gauged by comparing his conjectures with the myths of all nations on the same theme. For Prometheus is Lucifer, once bright "Son of the Morning," is Loki chained in Hell; he is the "host" of the Hindu *Manasaputra* who lit the fire of self-conscious mind in the mindless human race by incarnating therein, thus becoming imprisoned by that very act of sacrifice. Prometheus is the human Ego in every one of us, here and now, at once a god in its own right, and a poor prisoner chained to the rock of the material nature, ever torn by the insatiable vulture of desire.

Mr. Thomson gives us, alas, very little in the way of such practical interpretation, but he is right in claiming that Zeus is here represented as cruel and tyrannous; for nature mirrors back to man the evil that springs to activity only with the birth of self-conscious choice; man's heavenly powers, when degraded, become his harsh despot, and the creative power of will, inverted, becomes the procreative force of desire.

Mr. Thomson is happy in predicting that in the last play there must be a change in the nature of the two antagonists, and a reconciliation between the two. That is to say, that when spiritual development supersedes the physical and purely intellectual, there will no longer be war between the principles of man's nature, and humanity will find itself Self-redeemed. For Hercules, descendant of dark Epaphus, begot by the touch of the hand of Zeus alone, is one with all the "immaculately-born" saviours, who awaken to their second, *spiritual* birth, through their own Self-efforts and Herculean endeavours; and he is, also, like Zeus, Prometheus, Athena, and the whole Pantheon, an aspect of every man's nature. Æschylus, being initiated in the mysteries, had a scientific basis to his poetry. And while Mr. Thomson produces internal evidence to show that this is the last trilogy written, he does not mention the fact that its author was condemned to death for profaning the mysteries by presenting them in public in these very plays of Prometheus.

There are many interpretations of the myth, supplementing, but not invalidating each other, for it deals not only with individual evolution, but with that of the whole universe, a fact perhaps "glimpsed" by Mr. Thomson. In *The Secret Doctrine*, Mme. Blavatsky writes:

> The Promethean myth is a prophecy indeed. . . . . It points to the last of the mysteries of cyclic transformations, in the series of which mankind, having passed from the ethereal to the solid physical state, from spiritual to physiological procreation, is now carried onward on the opposite arc of the cycle, toward that second phase of its primitive state, when *woman knew no man*, and human

progeny *was created, not begotten.* That state will return to it and to the world at large, when the latter shall discover and really appreciate the truths which underlie this vast problem of sex. It will be like "the light that never shone on sea or land," and has to come to men through the Theosophical Society. That light will lead on and up to the *true spiritual intuition.* Then . . . . " the world *will have a race of Buddhas and Christs,* for the world will have discovered that individuals *have it in their own powers to procreate Buddha-like children—or demons.*" (II. 415).

If those sincere souls who believe that the betterment of the human race lies in eugenics and birth-control (in reality a pernicious fallacy) will delve into this moving drama of Prometheus, they will find there clues to the nature of the science of *true* birth-control. But they will be wise, however, to take, in conjunction with this play itself, the chapters in H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* on Prometheus (Book II, Part I, Section XII; Part II, Section XX), which will give a key to him who takes the trouble to turn it. And without the Promethean fire of understanding to light up its inner meaning, the play remains just a beautiful fable, instead of a living presentation of history, past, present and future.

W. E. WHITEMAN

A Treasure House of the Living Religions. Edited by ROBERT ERNEST HUME. (Scribner. New York. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This is probably one of the largest anthologies of the world's Scriptures that has ever been published, selections being made from the sacred writings of no less than eleven religions, combined with extensive bibliographical details. Professor Hume's work may be regarded as documentary confirmation of the Theosophical truth that all religions are aspects of the same Teaching, and it is indeed a revelation to read through a single chapter in this anthology and to find the same truths repeated again and again in varying forms. He has divided his selections into chapters under subject-headings, such as Humility, the Perfect Man and Unselfishness, and has given passages containing the essential teachings of the various religions on these subjects.

Professor Hume has, however, made one grave omission—there are no quotations from the scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism, containing the sublime *Prajna-Paramita, Avatamsaka* and *Lankavatara Sutras*—and thereby he fails to give a comprehensive survey of Buddhism. He would have done well, also to include passages from *The Sutra Of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui Neng,* one of the masterpieces of Chinese religious literature and an excellent exposition of the Mahayana. We are at a loss to understand why the author did not quote from these texts. But apart from this failing Professor Hume's work is an admirable guide to the study of comparative religion. It contains a bibliography of the complete scriptures of each of the eleven religions (with the one exception mentioned above) together with their chief English translations; and in the large number of parallel quotations from them the reader will find sufficient proof of the fact that all religions are one in essence, and that the strife between them exists only on account of human blindness. As a Japanese poet has expressed it,

> Though many paths there be
> To reach the mountain's height,
> All on climbing see
> The same moon's light.

ALAN W. WATTS

Issues of Immortality. By CORLISS LAMONT, (Henry Holt and Co., New York.)

This interesting little book professes to be an introduction to the subject. It is an attempt to analyse the implications of the idea of immortality, but not to investigate either the origin or the truth or the value of the idea.

The writer's inclination is towards an "Aristotelian" view of the relation of soul and body. Body and soul, mind and matter, are distinct but complementary factors. Modern biology and psychology have promoted a strong conviction of the interdependence of body and soul. Some moderners, *e.g.*, McDougall, Bergson, Driesch, advocate a certain "animism" according to which the soul is a psychic structure, not spatial itself, which *acts into space.* But I think the author would not hold such a view to be incompatible with the Pauline idea of a "spiritual" body in the future life: an idea here illustrated by quotations from Anglican writers such as Westcott, Gore, Streeter, Matthews. Some suggest that the new spiritual body is being built up during this life as a kind of sheath within the physical body. Thus we are reminded of Eastern thoughts of an inner integument of the spirit.

The author is clear that the Platonist dualism, which makes soul or mind independent of and even foreign to the body, has lost its appeal to human emotion and human intellect. He is careful to note that we cannot be sure that Plato himself was ever a "Platonist" in this sense of the word.

The Christian belief in immortality, when it came, was based on the "evidence" of the resurrection of Jesus. Shewing the future life of the faithful as a condition of glory instead of gloom, linking it up with the moral values of earthly life and representing it as the immortality not only of the soul but of the whole man, this belief, says Mr. Lamont, "swept the Mediterranean world and beyond". There were many crude ideas of the resurrection of the "flesh". Even Augustine held that God would collect all the elements of the body which are scattered at death and would reunite them at the resurrection. But the emphasis on a "resurrection of the body" (whether in the Pauline sense or otherwise explained) separated the Christian idea of immortality from the "Platonist" idea.

In recent times, it is pointed out, less attention is paid to "evidences" whether Christian or Spiritualist and more to argument. Most of the modern arguments for immortality go back in principle to Kant. Thus we have the argument from the significance of the Moral Law in conscience, the argument that the cosmos is not likely to have produced a "personality of infinite value" in order to scrap it at death, and the argument (Fichte) from the limitless time required for the perfection of a spirit which is essentially limitless.

The author sets a great value on the "Aristotelian" view of the relation between soul and body. But he sees that it is no easy matter to work out the implications of a "resurrection of the body." For example, the "glorified body" would need a "glorified environment." Perhaps he has hardly stressed enough the supreme implication of immortality, *i. e.*, a living and creative Power, which guides the life of the individual on earth so that it may already share a life eternal in quality; and which provides in the future life a higher kind of body and a higher environment than the earthly, making that life and this a continuous unity even through a process of "miraculous" transformation. All this, of course implies a *faith* which runs beyond all arguments: but, as the author notes, it was Kant's intention not to prove immortality by argument, but by argument to make room for faith.

G. E. N.

The Spirit of Language in Civilization, by KARL VOSSLER, translated from the German by Oscar Oeser, (Kegan Paul, London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

In this closely reasoned and intensely terse book of less than 250 pages is presented a most important contribution on the Philosophy of Language, the matured fruits of seven years of the author's scientific study of the languages of the West. Beginning with the origin of Language, the reader is taken through Language and Grammatical forms, Language and Religion, Language and Nature and Life, Language Communities, Language and Science — and Language and Poetry. In every case the author has distinguished the " inner language form " from the " outer ". He regards language as a spiritual and creative activity, a natural function of the mind and a medium for thought and exchange of ideas (p. 218).

The book contains many original ideas and observations that are thought-provoking, though some of them are controversial in character. His concept of language differs essentially from that of Croce, for he makes spiritual personality and not individuality the vehicle of language. In the view of the author, " religion depends only indirectly on language, and it can frequently dispense with the mediation of language. " In religion what one intends may go far deeper than what is spoken; but one doubts much if " worshippers in a church can even feel themselves the more intimately in touch with their god, if they do not understand the language used in their cult " (p. 25). One also wonders if climate and nature of the soil can have no influence on the speech of man, as the author seems to hold. The author relegates to the realm of pious hope the possibility of realization of a practical common language for the world (p. 167).

" Language Communities " is the longest chapter in the book, and is more readable than the rest. Against the contention of philologists that there is no connection between national character, mental disposition and language, or that, at any rate, it is scientifically unprovable, the author asserts that a national language is the whole of the nation's mind, and that national feeling, and national character are dependent on and embodied and realized in the national language (p. 115f.). Language cannot serve as a sure test of racial affinities for the historian of civilization when, as the author observes, the Viennese plutocrat can speak Czech with his maid, Hungarian with his coachman, French with his mistress, Italian with his music master, English with his governess and German with his family (p. 121). The author differs from Croce whose philosophy denies the concept of Translation. The purpose of translation is " an economic saving of labour, *viz.*, the trouble of learning a foreign language, " and " perfect translations are strategic fortifications, behind which the language genius of a people defends itself against the foreigner by the ruse of taking over as much from him as possible " (p. 182).

The style of the author is generally matter of fact. Some of his statements seem difficult to understand, even with reference to their context; taken out of their places, they become unintelligible, nay mysterious, even to the careful reader; while his coinage of expressions renders more difficult a study that is already trying. On p. 82 is a typically tough sentence; and one like " German or Italian as specific national, individual instrumentations of language thinking are identical with German or Italian language ornamentation" (p. 135) is clumsy and looks un-English. Other instances might be cited. It might be that, for this defect, not so much the author or translator is responsible, as the abstruse nature of the subject and the fact of German being not easily translatable. Let us hope that the translator has realized the purpose intended by the author in his Philosophy of Translations. The impression persists, however, that he has not helped sufficiently to clear the obscurity in thought and language which besets the reader almost at every stage. These

are matters of minor magnitude; and the value of this scientific study is enhanced by the modesty of the author, which finds expression in the last page of the text.

S. V. VISWANATHA

On the Meaning of Life. By WILL DURANT (Ray Long and Richard Smith, New York. $ 1·50)

This is a symposium on the meaning of life elicited and commented on by Will Durant, the well-known author of *The Story of Philosophy* and *The Mansions of Philosophy*. At the instance of the publishers, Dr. Durant addressed a letter of enquiry to a hundred contemporary leaders of thought asking them what meaning life had for them, what kept them going and what help—if any—religion gave them. This book records the answers of more than twenty-five prominent men, among whom are M. K. Gandhi, Sinclair Lewis, E. A. Robinson, André Maurois, Abbé Dimnet and Bertrand Russell.

The book begins with a mordant and incisive statement of the present world-crisis. Dr. Durant assigns the chief rôle in this collapse of man's inner world to the "emancipation" of thought. Truth, he says, has not made man free but has disintegrated his soul and social order.

Then follow the views of his correspondents. Some of them accept the mechanical view of things but insist that the values of life are inherent in life itself. One of them answers with cool defiance that food is what keeps him going and is the source of his inspiration! Mencken and Sinclair Lewis have no need of God and immortality to be happy. Charles Beard, Powys, Robinson, Gandhi and J. H. Holmes display a serene faith in the idealistic view of life. André Maurois, the French man of letters contributes a delightful philosophical phantasy sketching the colonisation of a group of English men and women in the moon and the scepticism of later generations regarding their "mythical" King. A doctor contents himself with asking for advice as to how human life may be raised above the level of the insects. A lady, Helen Wills of tennis fame, writes delightfully of her "restlessness" for beauty and perfection, but the idea of perfection she has is that of a perpetual ride straight ahead in a fast moving automobile into the infinite. Her letter is a perfect expression of the thrill psychosis described recently in the pages of THE ARYAN PATH.

The book affords rich and varied fare, but one must confess to a feeling of disappointment. Many temperamental reactions are recorded but the real source of the present spiritual *malaise* is not laid bare. Dr. Durant's diagnosis in terms of the suicide of the intellect only confirms the conviction that modern civilisation has not moved from *Manas* or Mind to *Atman* or Spirit. The utilitarian formula of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the Spencerian metaphor of the Breath of Life, and recent affirmations of humanism only indicate in Bergson's phrase the addition "of the same to the same," and do not carry us to a new dimension. Oswald Spengler speaks of the motive force of the present civilisation as the search for the Faustian Infinite. As Radhakrishnan puts it, there may be a barbarianism of the mind as well as a barbarianism of the body. Unless a clear and decisive realisation of the positive content of the spiritual life, compact of spaciousness of life (*pranaramam*), joy of life (*mana anandam*), and fullness of peace, (*santi samruddhi*), comes to prevail, I see no way out of the present trouble. Without it, Dr. Beard's hope of providing the good life for all may end only in a democratisation of indulgence and Holmes's creative joy may come to be confused with the satisfaction of instinct. The book is more a cry for light than a source of it.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

The Lankavatara Sutra. A Text of Mahayana Buddhism. Translated from the original Sanskrit with an Introduction By DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI. (Routledge, London. 16*s.*)

Just as the West is deeply indebted to Professor Max Müller and Professor Rhys Davids and his wife and other scholars for its wide knowledge of Pali Buddhism, so its indebtedness grows yearly deeper to Professor Suzuki and his colleagues for the wealth of Mahayana Buddhism with which he is steadily supplying readers of the English tongue. The present volume is the fulfilment of the promise implicit in the author's *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra* published in 1930, and is the fruit of seven years intermittent labour on this famous MS. The Sutra is of profound importance to students of Zen Buddhism, as it was chosen of all others by the famous Bodhidharma for his pupils to study, but its appeal is far wider. Curiously enough its systematic study has been neglected of late years, and it was only Professor Nanjo's translation of the original into Sanskrit in 1923 that once more brought it into prominence. The present English version is based on this Sanskrit translation with occasional reference to the T'ang MS. All that can be said of its age is that it is older than the first known Chinese translation in 443 A. D. and this fits in with its obvious close connection with Ashvagosha's famous *Awakening of Faith* which would seem to be an attempt to write down in systematic form the contents of the *Lankavatara.*

The importance of the Sutra lies in the fact that it contains almost all the principal teachings of Mahayana Buddhism. The form in which they appear, however, is almost chaotic. As the author says :—

> In the *Lankā* all the most fundamental conceptions of the Mahayana are thrown in without any attempt on the part of the compiler or compilers to give them a system. This is left to the thoughtful reader himself who will pick them up from the medley and string them into a garland of pearls out of his own religious experience.

None the less, Western readers are fortunate in having Dr. Suzuki to guide them in the task of stringing.

The form of the Sutra is a series of dialogues between the Buddha and one Mahamati, a famous Bodhisattva, which took place in Lanka, the modern Ceylon, whither it is alleged the Buddha went, to deliver this Sutra. The text makes difficult reading, particularly the section of *gathas* or verses over which the translator confesses he had the utmost difficulty. Each of the nine principal Mahayana Sutras expounds something not found in the others, and the peculiar province of the *Lanka* is its insistence on self-realisation and the need of rising superior to the limitation of the intellect before true enlightenment can be obtained. It is this factor which makes it of such value to students of Zen. As the author points out :—

> A mere intellectual understanding of the truth is not enough in the life of a Buddhist; the truth must be directly grasped, personally experienced, intuitively penetrated into: for only then will it be distilled into life and determine its course. (p. xvii)

Space forbids even the briefest exposition of the contents of the Sutra, but the doctrine of the indwelling Buddha, the inherent perfection which must be slowly and steadily revealed by the elimination of accumulated dross, is pure Theosophy, and students of *The Secret Doctrine,* once they become accustomed to slightly different usage of such words as Alayavijnana and Manas, will find in these terms, and the companion doctrines of Suchness and the Void, an exposition of the Ancient Wisdom which antedated that of H.P.B., but is only another expression of the same undying Truth.

We understand that an Index to the Sutra will be published later as a separate volume.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[**A. E. Waite** is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

The American Society for Psychical Research continues to issue amazing accounts of the Margery mediumistic phenomena. There is the testimony, for example, of Dr. Mark W. Richardson, and it falls into two divisions, being (1) that which is concerned with alleged "apports" and "deports" that have not been "susceptible of scientific observation and control"; (2) that which can be "classified and published as actual facts". As regards the first class, the occurrences are described as "bizarre, unpredictable, uncontrollable"—in a word, "beyond belief". They include the appearance of a live pigeon in a dining-room, "though windows and doors were securely closed and locked," the manifestation and disappearance of flowers, jewels, bank-bills of various denominations, and so forth. Of the second there is a single experiment registered, but one which was repeated successfully on a second occasion. As instructed by "Walter," the familiar "control" of Margery, Dr. Richardson—alone in his office—chose, face down, a calendar sheet at random; made on the back of it a print of his right thumb in ink; placed the sheet in an envelope, and the envelope in his pocket-book. He carried it about in this manner for three days, unknown to all, the date-number on the obverse side of the sheet being unknown also to himself. At the end of that time he attended a Margery séance and placed the envelope, as directed, on the table, the room being in absolute darkness. At the close of the sitting the envelope was still in its place, but when examined presently under a bright light it proved to be empty. The calendar sheet was found subsequently on the hall table, where it had been carried from the séance-room on the fourth floor. The date-number had, previous to this, been seen by Margery, as well as the thumb-print, in a state of semi-trance, while an automatic writing medium, taken into another room, had given the number independently and directed inquiry to the hall. Dr. Richardson regards the twofold experiment as "beyond criticism,"* which notwithstanding, a counter-view may not impossibly emerge. Meanwhile the long-promised Report of the Ame-

* *The Journal of the American Society*, December, 1932.

rican S.P.R., on the charge that certain "Walter" thumb-prints in wax, obtained at the Margery sittings, "are identical with those of a living man," is still delayed; and one of our most respected contemporaries has affirmed in a leader that "the time has clearly arrived when some definite statement should be made."* It is high time indeed, when a person so eminent in psychical research as Dr. W. F. Prince has come forward to testify that "in the light of proved facts" the "Walter" claim is "fraudulent". It is past high time when Mr. Harry Price has affirmed in the course of a public lecture that the methods of control used by the National Laboratory of Psychical Research in London are "so rigid that they frightened Dr. L. R. G. Crandon, who cancelled Mrs. Crandon's (Margery's) appointment when he saw them"—meaning an appointment for testing her mediumistic powers.† As a fact, it is now fully twelve months since the American S.P.R. took up the matter of the charges and spoke of a full investigation; but so far its official organ has proffered only "innuendoes and assertions."‡ The Boston S. P. R., which brought the charges forward has not only published rejoinders but has adduced, at their value, some further alleged "plain, cold facts" on the Margery case. It may be that in a not distant time to come the unbiased Spiritist will be compelled to leave Margery, as Slade and Monck and others were left at an earlier epoch—namely, in that class major of mediums whose phenomena are at times inexplicable—or at least unexplained—but are referable at others to the too familiar arts of trickery.

It happens unfortunately that the year 1933 has opened amidst a storm of accusation in the psychical field. The names involved are numerous, with Margery at the head of the list—attacked, however, at the moment through the channel of her alleged "control". The kinds of mediumship are also varied, from the spirit photography of John Myers and the late William Hope to supposed materialisations connected with the name of Victoria Helen Duncan; and from those of a certain Cyril Budge to the telekinesis marvels of Rudi Schneider, which, on the authority of Mr. Price, were once distinguished as "beyond reproach,"¶ but are now questioned by the same witness on the basis of "an automatic photograph" shewing "an arm free behind Rudi, when both his hands were supposed to be controlled by sitters in front".§ As to this, and the conclusions drawn therefrom, it is needful to remember on our

* *Light*, February 17, 1932, p. 104

† *The Two Worlds*, February 3, 1933, p. 94.

‡ Cf. *ib.*, March 24, p. 227. "The Research Committee"—of the American S. P. R.—"has spoken, but in each case it has failed to face the issues and has merely questioned the motives of the critics."

¶ *Light*, March 10, 1932, p. 149.

§ *Two Worlds*, March 24, 1933, p. 230, deriving from the *Sunday Despatch* of March 5.

part the testimony of Dr. Eugène Osty, the investigations and records of the Paris Metapsychical Institute, the more recent evidence of Prof. D. F. Fraser-Harris, and, perhaps most important of all, the counter-witness of Dr. J. Hutton-Chisholm, who was present at the séance when the accusing photograph produced its fatal picture.* It is to be noted also that, outside a communication to the secular press, Mr. Price printed his conclusions on the subject in " An Account of some further Experiments with Rudi Schneider," and that it appeared under the auspices of the National Laboratory, as also in the name of its Council, fourteen of whom were present at the experiments. We are informed, however, that none of these was consulted on the Report, that none saw it in MS., and that " the Council as a whole were kept in ignorance for ten months of the photograph". The Acting-President has intervened to register their disagreement with " the implications in the Report."† It will be seen that a pretty quarrel is progressing in respect of the two most famous mediums of the present day, not to speak of some minor personalities who offer their affirmed powers for examination.

Whether it is possible to reach certitude on the physical side of so-called psychic phenomena seems again thrown open to debate. If this be the outcome of research equipped with a great network of apparatus for the discovery of fraud at séances, what shall be thought of Spiritism in its past history when no such checks were dreamed of, while most were quite impossible in the existing state of scientific equipment? On the other side of the subject—the return of the dead to testify that indeed there is no death—very different problems beset us; and it looks far indeed to the time when they will be taken out of the way. The fixed conviction of Sir Oliver Lodge may rivet our sympathy, and we may wish with all our hearts that something shall emerge ultimately from his proposed test of a sealed letter. He has (1) composed a message which no one else has seen, (2) has committed it to memory, (3) placed it in a sealed envelope in a safe at the office of the S. P. R., (4) where it will remain till his spirit after death announces through a medium that the time has come to open it, (5) by revealing the contents to him or her. The hope is that his personal memory will remain, in which case Sir Oliver concludes that the question of Survival will have been determined affirmatively,‡ and

* *Light*, March 17, p. 163.

† *Ibid*, March 31, p. 191. See also *Ib.*, April 7, p. 214, reproducing a letter to Schneider from six Members of the Council.

‡ *Light*, March 3, p. 132, reproducing from the *Daily Express*. Cf. the *Two Worlds*, February 24, p. 145, by which it appears that Sir Oliver again refers to the scheme in his forthcoming book, entitled "My Philosophy".

once for all. But, sympathy and hope notwithstanding, we can imagine the psychics going to work forthwith and attempting to forestall the event. Alternatively, when the day comes, and Sir Oliver carries his green memory to the other side of life; when he communicates—let us assume—his long kept secret message: what of the Research Officers, the Prices, the Dingwalls and so forth of that period? What of its telepathic and other hypotheses? Will there ever be an end, one asks, to the variations of doubt and question, the ever-ringing changes of the spirit which denies, like Mephistopheles? We ourselves have seen wonders in our day and have heard of others by the thousand; we have compared the testimonies; we know the great names and have talked with some who bore them; on our shelves are expositions of the subject at its highest level; but which of us has reached a term? Which of us does not hope that "after all these voices there is peace," perchance somewhere, but not in the Land of Psyche? Let us glance therefore at that which belongs to the Land of Nous, or its threshold, in current thought of the moment.

An essay on the "Revival of Prayer"* by the Rev. H. Chalmer Bell may be passed with a word of agreement on several points: the "unknown country" connoted by the idea of mental prayer, so far as English peoples are concerned; the utter truth of the statement that old Puritanism stifled prayer by preaching; the unquestionable fact that in Christian schools the masters of methodised prayer are Roman Catholic; the inevitable existence of common features characterising all the methods; and so forward to the dissolution of the spoken Word in the Prayer of Silence, with the import thereof in view of the Quaker doctrine that "spiritual progress is achieved in silence". Beyond this, beyond the prayer of quiet, more deeply stilled and deeper yet indrawn, extends the world of Higher Contemplation. There is also Dr. J. Scott Lidgett's brief study of "Subjectivity and Reality"† which strikes "the electric chain" within us by suggestions and citations concerning that *quelque chose en moi qui soit plus moi*, a "that" within us which is "consubstantial with something" other than ourselves. In virtue hereof perchance it is said otherwise that Man is "organic to the universe";‡ in virtue also of which we are told that it is within the capacity and should become the office of Man to impress coherence and consistency on an apprehended universe. It is in virtue finally of this *plus moi*, or I beyond the I, that personality may be "the culmina-

* *The Contemporary Review*, February 1933, pp. 211-219.

† *Ibid.*, March, pp. 307-313.

‡ Pringle-Pattison, quoted by Dr. Lidgett.

tion of evolution" as Dr. Lidgett lays down. But such Transcendental Ego is Love beyond all Love, the All without which St. Paul knew that he was nothing, of which Dante says that it "moves the sun and all the other stars". Here is the coherence and here the consistency which the Super-I within us impresses upon the postulated otherness without. It comes about in this manner that our projection of Love upon the universe is the projection of the Inmost Self thereon. But that which "moves" is also that which rules, even if such determinism is other than that of Einstein.* We seem to trend thus on that "sphere of Holiness" which Rudolph Otto denominates as "utterly non-rational," because it is supra-rational. It is not less assuredly a mind-state and may belong to that "change of mind" about which Dr. Jacks speaks, saying that it consists not merely "in getting a new one into us, but also, and perhaps more, in getting the old one out of us". The old mind: *voilà l'ennemi*, he tells us. Again it is the mind of Love, is that, which "moves the sun and other stars," an inward mode wherein we are "farthest removed," with Otto, "from all phenomenology" and abide in the sacrosanct of being.

A. E. WAITE

THE PUZZLE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Apropos of the Editorial intention "to publish some useful articles" designed to solve "the Puzzle of Indian Philosophy" as presented by Mr. C. E. M. Joad in THE ARYAN PATH (Aug. 1932) the present letter undertakes to meet some of the standing difficulties in the way of an intelligent appreciation of Indian philosophy.

Out "to appreciate for the first time the distinguishing characteristics of Hindu thought, and to understand the wideness of the gulf that separates it from European philosophy," Mr. Joad pauses to consider for a moment "the reasons for this separation and for the consequent ignorance of and comparative indifference to Indian Philosophy in the West." As to the etiology of this cultivated ignorance he assigns "two main reasons: the form of Indian philosophy is unfamiliar, the content unsympathetic". By way of expounding his position he adds further that "the form of most of the Indian systems is broadly the same"—namely "the original poems, the *sutras*, and the commentaries upon and developments of the *sutras*" originating in "philosophical truths intuitively perceived, revelations of reality, which are considered to need neither argument nor defence." Accordingly :—

> Puzzled by the form of Indian philosophy, the Westerner is unable to see why it should have been adopted. Is it not, he cannot help wondering, prejudicial to new thought to compel it to accommodate itself within the bounds of a traditional system? Does not the religious veneration with which the systems are regarded as complete compendia of truth tend to stifle free enquiry, and to substitute scholarship and textual criticism, dialectical skill and the ingenuity which is required of those who must fit new pieces into old frameworks, for the free play of the unfettered mind?

* *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April, 1933, p. 474, in which Sir Herbert Samuel quotes Sir Arthur Eddington as affirming that "Einstein is still a convinced determinist".

This is, indeed, a piece of incisive criticism which, if true, would cut straight into the very vitals of Indian philosophy. "In the second place," as he proceeds to observe, "the doctrines themselves, although of profound metaphysical importance, are uncongenial to the Western temperament," on account of an ingrained "pessimistic attitude to this world" as also one "of fatalistic resignation," for both of which the Westerner with "his temperamental incapacity for renunciation in life" has an instinctive distrust and apathy. Mr. Joad has, however, the philosophical insight to acknowledge that "these are temperamental and not intellectual differences". That is a saving clause serving to minimise the argumentative strain.

In meeting the force of this two-fold criticism, we propose to concentrate on the formal or methodological aspect of the case—referring only incidentally to its material or doctrinal side; for an off-hand remark, or a perfunctory discussion about such problems of foundational importance as the doctrine of *karma* and its relation to the freedom and *summum bonum* of man would make the situation worse instead of clarifying the issues in question. All that we can conveniently note on matters doctrinal is that all the different schools of Indian Philosophy, with the exception of a few heretical ones, unite in enforcing the message of the autonomy of the Spirit—that spiritual freedom which is always born of "self-knowledge" or "self-recognition". To know and to be free—this has been the gospel of all alike; and, as the orthodox schools will add, to know in a corporate as well as individual capacity, to know in the company of seers (*Rishis*) and mystics, handing on the torch of illumination from age to age, and to bring that corporate wisdom to a luminous personal focus. Here at least the Western mind that has through the ages drawn its inspiration from the edifying text of the Gospel of St. John (viii, 32) —"And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free"—will feel itself drawn to its *alter ego* by virtue of an elective affinity.

Undoubtedly, a critic like Mr. Joad is well within his rights to cry "halt" and ask: How does all this tall talk about freedom square with the ingrained authoritarianism of Indian philosophy? Does not the dogmatism, inherent in the inveterate habit of appealing to Revelation (*Shruti*)—which has its necessary counterpart in the strait-jacket method of clothing itself in the age-long *Sutras*—suppress free thinking and thus sound the death-knell of all philosophy?

But, then, it will not do to forget that there are always two sides to a question. Surely we cannot afford to minimise the importance of Authority and Tradition, of *Shruti* and *Smriti* in the economy of our spiritual life. Authority or Tradition as the custodian of dogmas, prescribing the limits beyond which the private judgment of man may not go, is an invaluable asset for humanity. What blurs our vision of this home-truth is the emotional haze created by the magic phrase—"This Freedom!" —the craze of the modernist. "But freedom from what?"—one may pertinently inquire. Not surely an "unchartered freedom" to drift endlessly—which is, at least humanly speaking, neither possible nor desirable. Indeed, freedom, to be properly construed, must be placed in the context of spiritual values; taken out of that context and used without a qualification, it becomes a doubtful asset, if not a downright liability, in the make-up of the spiritual balance-sheet of humanity. That explains the importance of the qualifying epithet "spiritual" so often prefixed in such contexts to the word "freedom". Without the prefix it is a a mere cipher: with it, it has a local value. Hence, here as elsewhere, freedom has to be saddled with safeguards, so that it may be pressed into the service of philosophic thinking. That is why free-lance thought or unbridled reasoning (*niramkusha-tarka*) has never found favour with representative minds of Ancient India; and, as a matter of fact, it has been placed under a ban by

that great master-mind, Shankaracharyya. For, in India at least, philosophical thought has never been an intellectual pastime merely, cut off from the moorings of all other values of life. This is the peculiar trait or individuality of Indian philosophy, and has to be accepted as such. Hence, in assessing the worth of Indian philosophy at the thought-exchange of the world, its exponents must see that they do not depreciate its peculiar thought-currency in order to secure an international credit.

Along this line of reflection one is sure to discover, if he has eyes to see, that the much needed adjustment of the respective rights of Authority and Free-thinking, of Revelationism and Rationalism, of Dogmatism and Criticism has been effected, once for all, in the domain of Indian philosophy. Here also Shankaracharyya appears in a representative capacity. Appealing, as he does, invariably to the authority of the *Shruti* in matters philosophical, the much too common imputation of unreasoned dogmatism stands refuted in the recognition by Shankara of the importance of what has been aptly called "the internalizing of authority". This is evident from his frequent insistence on *anubhava* or integral experience which personalises the impersonal certitude of *Shruti*. Nothing short of this certitude of personal experience will meet the requirements of the situation. As one noted Catholic philosopher of recent times also testifies :—

> The human mind is so constituted that only intrinsic evidence compels assent. No matter how great the authority of the witness, assent is impossible unless the truth in question is luminous to us, is felt as such by us.

Accordingly, entrenched as he was in an inflexible orthodoxy, Shankaracharyya had yet the courage of his conviction to assign to full rational insight its proper rank and authority in the matter of attainment of the highest bliss of mankind. So he has given the verdict that "a man who somehow espouses a creed without previous discussion or critical reflection is dispossessed of beatitude and incurs evil"* This is typically illustrative of the spirit of Hindu orthodoxy which, though depending in the end upon a provisional faith, employs nevertheless a faith that *enquires*. This inquisitive frame of mind is clearly indicated by the systematic emphasis upon *jijñāsā* or critical enquiry as the necessary prelude in the making of Indian philosophy. Thinking always proceeds by questioning experience, and unless there be in evidence this questioning spirit, the search after truth becomes an impossibility.

The steel frame of the *Sutras*, as the critic may justly contend, serves as the natural embodiment of the spirit of Indian philosophy, which is largely under the controlling lead of authority; and the unmistakable affinity in this regard may not unjustly be said to argue a pre-established harmony between the two. Now, the extreme terseness of the *Sutras* which spells their congenital weakness has its historic justification. In the absence of present-day printing facilities, the entire mnemonic (*i.e. Sutra*) literature that had to be improvised could not but invoke a rigidly compact form despite the risk of obscurity and ambiguity. The same enforced necessity of abbreviation, that has engendered this anæmic helpless state of the *Sutras*, has itself invented a remedy in the prescript of periodical infusion of new blood from concrete flesh-and-blood existence of commentaries and scholia. Thus embodied and vitalized the *Sutras* prove to be a tower of strength by providing a mariner's compass, as it were, to the individual commentators who might otherwise navigate in an uncharted sea without being ever brought to definite moorings. The *Sutras*, therefore, were designed mainly to arrest the rampant growth of unfettered free-thinking that leads nowhere in the end,—at least, not to the establishment or discovery of truth. The temperamental bias of the Indian

* *Vide* his Commentary on the *Vedantasutras* I. 1. i.

mind against chronicling or conserving historical data or individual peculiarities explains this natural predilection for the *Sutra* form. In a wider reference the same tendency expresses itself in the instinctive preference, not for personal, but corporate immortality.

The *Sutras*, accordingly, are conservative—illustrating in a limited manner what we understand by the phrase "conservation of values". "So careful of the type," the *Sutra* seems, "so careless of the single life". Indeed, the *élan vital* of Indian philosophy has from time immemorial carried forward the undying past into the living present which it interpenetrates, and thus, pressing on the frontiers of the unknown, created fresh channels of thought. That seems to be also the drift of Sir S. Radhakrishnan's suggestive phrase—"the constructive conservatism of Indian thought". Furthermore, it is in reference to the *Sutras* in their constant conjunction with commentaries (*bhâshyas*) that Indian thinkers have achieved the much-needed solution of the standing conflict between the timeless or unhistorical and the temporal or historical characters of truths. What the *Sutras* finally emphasize is just this interplay of timelessness as well as historicity of truths, and the guarantee that all our temporal strivings after truth survive in the *Sutra* which is the fittest emblem of the being of Eternal Silence—that is, as the Upanishadic thinker would add, this very Atman.

Calcutta S. K. DAS

ROMAN SCRIPT FOR INDIA

The rapid communization of knowledge in the West has been due largely to its possession of an easily manipulated script-system based on the alphabetical letter, in contradistinction to the syllable, as the unit of writing. In India, the unwieldiness of the indigenous scripts has stood against a like result.

The inherence of the vowel "a" in the normal form of the consonant is the root-cause of the complexity of the Indian scripts. Because of this, vowels other than "a," in forming their respective syllables with each consonant, have necessarily had to be provided with a duplicate set of combining signs; instead of being (as they are, in the Roman alphabetical system) merely in juxtaposition with the consonant in their original form.

Thus, in Devanagari—the typical and the most widely used script of India—each of the thirty-four simple and of the scores of the conjunct consonants, as it combines, in order, with the twelve vowels other than "a," has to effect a fresh modification of form. Hence, the number of literary symbols that the beginner has to master before he can read a book in Devanagari runs up to several hundreds!

The alphabetical character of Roman makes it immune from this "tyranny of the inherent 'a'" and saves it from the clumsy multiplicity of syllabic configurations which are so very necessary in Devanagari. Its simplicity further enables Roman to dispense with the need for independent symbols for diphthongs, which are formed out of their component, primary vowels. Yet again the use of the letter "h" as the aspirating particle, similarly eliminates the need for the ten aspirated consonants ("kh" etc.) of the Devanagari system.

The economy of symbols in Roman is of use to the modern world in two different ways. It minimises effort on the part of the beginner, and smoothes the way for universal literacy—the *sine qua non* of democracy.

Secondly, it adapts the Indian vernaculars to being written on the typewriter. With Devanagari as the script, a typing machine for Hindi must, both in point of construction and of operation, be a rather formidable affair. Commerce and letters, the two departments

of life wherein the typewriter comes in most useful, would benefit considerably from India's adoption of Roman.

Unfortunately, Roman has no equivalents to the whole group of palatals,* four in number (excluding the related nasal); three of the five nasals;† and two of the four sibilants,‡ of the Devanagari system. Western Orientalists, in their transliteration of Eastern texts, get round this difficulty by the systematic use of diacritical marks over or underneath related letters in the Roman alphabet. But this practice is bound to confuse the non-scholar and, indeed, is wholly inadaptable for common, everyday use. A few new symbols will have to be added on to the existing Roman alphabet.

But firstly India has to rescue the Roman characters from their present confusion, and rearrange them in the phonetic order laid down by Panini.

India, again, can have no use for that Western oddity—the "capitals". Professor W. T. Brewster of Columbia University frankly admits, in his *Writing of English*, that words "are capitalised merely because we are used to seeing them in capitals". The absence of them, so far, in Indian writing has in no way detracted from the beauty or effectiveness of Indian letters.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the hold that English now has upon India will, far from facilitating her adoption of Roman, actually militate against it. For between the loose and inexact way in which the alphabet is now employed in the writing of English and the rigorously phonetic way in which it will have to be employed in the writing of the vernaculars of India, confusion is inevitable. The remedy seems to lie in the systematisation of English spelling.

Apart from its structural superiority to the scripts of India (as, indeed, to those of the entire Orient), Roman has a further indisputable title to become the common literary medium of all-India. It is the script of scientific symbology the world over. It is the script of Europe, of Turkey and of the two Americas. It is not unknown to the *intelligentsia* of the "Far East". The adoption of it by India will link her, culturally, with the outside world.

V. S. GANAPATI SARMA

Kumbhakonam

No.	Devanagari characters which have no "Roman" equivalents.	How transliterated at present.
* 1.	palatals : ट ठ ड ढ	ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh
† 2.	nasals : ङ ञ ण	ṅ ñ ṇ
‡ 3.	sibilants : श ष	ś ṣ and sometimes ç sh

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

In the important discussion on determinism and free will now going on among both scientists and philosophers the aspect emphasized in eastern esoteric philosophy as well as in Hindu thought is overlooked—who or what determines the course of any being or of any process? Design and purpose are in evidence everywhere in Nature; what force or energy works out that design? Teachers of the old world described determinism as the effect produced by the impulse of Will (the ensouling essence of the one and sole principle of abstract, eternal Motion); inherent in this effect or determinism is the fresh cause—the force for a new determinism. "Within fate is the power to overcome fate," is an occult maxim. With this principle as his guide the reader will be better able to appreciate the extracts given below as well as the reviews of important books—of the scientist Max Planck by Mr. Beresford, of the philosopher Mead by Professor Sircar, appearing elsewhere in this issue.

———

"Man's Future on the Earth" is the last of a series of papers contributed to the *Personalist* by the well-known philosopher F. C. S. Schiller. His conclusion will interest all students of mysticism and of idealistic schools of thought:—

> We have no abiding habitation on the earth, nor has the earth an assured position in the stellar universe, nor is the physical universe itself eternal and constructed to endure. It . . . is stamped throughout with the marks and signals of impermanence. So I am not disposed to withdraw the judgment I pronounced more than forty years ago when I declared Time to be the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect. The physical universe is, and seems destined to remain, a disappointment. Can we escape from it? Can we emancipate ourselves from the oppressive spell it casts even upon our thought? Can we raise the Veil of Maya? With the aid of Philosophy, perhaps. For to philosophy the point of view of science is not final, and it has the right to insist that all known *data* have to be included in the final synthesis. We should do well, therefore, to remind ourselves how very artificial and selective a creation of our science the physical universe really is. It by no means satisfies the demands of a philosophic synthesis. It by no means uses up all the material provided by our immediate experience. For do we not all live in worlds upon worlds of dream, imagination, and aspiration, which supplement, transmute, and transcend the physical universe? True, we mostly look upon, and down upon, these worlds as "subjective": but this should not be taken as denying that they are real. It means merely that they are not at present of great pragmatic value, . . .
>
> But this does not entitle us to deny them psychical reality, any more than a dogmatic monism has a right to

deny them metaphysical reality. Hence a philosophy which reckons seriously with the metaphysical possibility of pluralism and with the psychological ultimacy of personal experience will think twice before it assumes, without further ado, that the present universe of physics is all the being there is, and that the human soul is inextricably entangled in it and cannot conceivably rise above it. But at this point may we not finally remind ourselves that all the major religions have always offered us the assurance that our present world of shows and shadows is not the only nor the true reality, and hinted to us the transcendent glories of their heavens and the terrors of their hells? The argument has led to the threshold of religion, where we must arrest it; but philosophically there is nothing to hinder us from recognizing an indefinite plurality of worlds, with a series of transitions into worlds of higher reality and greater value, which would be heavens, or of nightmare lapses into illusion and unreality, which would be hells. And of both heavens and hells would hold the law, which was enunciated at the outset, and several times repeated, namely that everything will be what it turns out to be in virtue of what it has been through!

Reminiscent of the true doctrine of Karma are the words of Dr. Schiller in the same article :—

The fact that progress always remains precarious and "contingent" and cannot be formulated as a law, may be found to have some interesting implications. It may mean that we are not *forced* into progress against our will, though we *can* progress *if we will.* In other words, to effect progress our assent is really needed. So, then, we are not the helpless victims of a destiny that drags us to a predestined end; we can actually, to some extent, steer our course and that of history. This is a possibility which should not only enhance our responsibilities, but also encourage us to play a part that seems no longer negligible. Once we realize that our own action is an essential factor in our future, we can proceed to devise means for grappling with the evils which beset human life. They are many and serious enough, and largely inherent in our nature. But our faith in evolution, meaning thereby the possibility of change, justifies the hope that neither our nature nor that of the universe is irrevocably fixed, and if it is possible to change it at all, it can be changed for the better. It is with this hope in our hearts that we should face the future and survey our present anxieties.

The death of Sri Devamitta Dhammapala will leave a great blank in the ranks of those who work for the cause of Buddhism. He was the founder of the Maha Bodhi Society. As a young man he came into contact with H. P. Blavatsky, who advised him, as a Buddhist, to work for Buddhism —advice that was taken and faithfully carried out to the day of his death. In a message to all Buddhists, some years ago, he wrote :—

I have spent 40 years in Bengal, Bihar and Benares in the service of our Lord, and with the help of a few friends I have been able to keep up the activities of the Maha Bodhi Society. I owe everything to my parents, to the late Madame Blavatsky and to the late Mrs. Foster of Honolulu.

With a rare singleness of purpose he devoted himself to his cause, and not only was he happy in labouring for its growth in the west as in the east, but also was he fortunate in beholding the fair results of his endeavour.

ओ३म्

उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।

Arise, awake, seek the Great Ones,
and learn wisdom from Them.

कठ ३, १४ (*Kathopanishad*, III, 14)

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV JULY 1933 No. 7

THE ARCHITECTS OF IDEALS

The following is taken from a stenographic report of a lecture "Ideals in Daily Living" delivered before The Sassoon Mechanic Institute of Bombay :—

The daily round of common tasks, for most men and women, means drudgery from which divinity has gone. With poetry and romance the Gods dwell; these are banished,—and the common round of daily life for the ordinary men and women has become a maze in which they lose themsleves. For most, life is aimless, and most live through it without grasping its purpose and meaning. Verily, it is true that "Light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not," for our days are dark with drudgery of petty and small deeds, sometimes pleasurable, at most times insipid, at others positively painful. Little successes, small failures, some peace, a great deal of struggle and disappointment, and life ebbs away—and it all seems such a waste. And yet the great thinkers and philosophers and poets have regarded this common life of small plain duties as something sublime—"drudgery divine". Just as the modern scientists harness electrical power in Nature to give us light, heat and comforts, so the true poet-philosophers speak of an ocean of radiance surrounding us. They tell us that every one, however humble, is capable of hitching his wagon to a star.

This thought brings us to the chief word in the title of the lecture—Ideals. Ideals are Patterns of Light which lead us on our journey through space and time. . . . . Look upon them as Eternal Images, Immortal Patterns, which the Gods have fashioned for man's beholding. Turn to Plato and examine his teaching about Archetypal Forms or Ideas. According to Plato

Ideas rule the world; but what kind of ideas? Eternal and Immortal Ideas. Patterns of Light have been drawn by master-minds, by sage-seers, by poet-philosophers. The great mind tries to understand Ideas existing as the Mind of Deity; the true seer perceives what the ancient sages have already painted: the real poet echoes what he hears of the song celestial. Our humanity is so conceited and self-centred that it looks upon the past as the age of savagery; it looks upon Spirit as fumes of flesh; it thinks that vital truth was never known, and that all that this age can do is to struggle and experiment. Look at the old view: truths exist as images, as patterns, as archetypes, as cosmic numbers; and all the events of our lives, small incidents or important happenings, are true or false according to whether they are correct reflections from those divine Images, or are but shadowy creations of mortal minds..... True sages, seers and poets are like architects and they have drawn plans of life, numerous plans, one plan to suit each stage of evolution in our human kingdom; and we must learn to build according to those plans. These true Architects of Life do not belong exclusively to one country and to one era; in every clime and in every century they have arisen for they are the real friends of the human race. The plans prepared by these Architects everywhere and at all times, are identically the same, for the unfoldment of human life proceeds on exact and definite lines. Just as in embryology we know the exact and detailed course of the fœtus week by week for the period of nine months, so also these Sages and Architects know every stage of human soul-development and have provided for our own guidance a chart and a map. The patterns of spiritual, mental and moral growth are as complete and exact as are the charts of the physiologist and the anatomist. It is this idea which I wish to stress; for, once we familiarize ourselves with it, confusion vanishes and we know what to do.

If we link up our duties with these patterns and images we see a way out: Ideals resolve the great conflict of duties, show us what our duties are, and reveal how our true duties can be correctly discharged. Ideals are the weapons of the Soul and they help us to live and act correctly. You might ask: "How is it that we do not perceive these patterns and ideals?" Imagine a cart driver jogging along on a bumpy road in the dark night. Does he look up to admire the beauty of the starry firmament? Does he say—"Here is the Great Wagon going round the Pole-star, and here is the Lady's Chair, vacant and empty but ready for some one's repose, and here is Orion, the mighty hunter?" No, he is blind to the sky as most humans are blind to the ideals. If the cart driver were intelligent those stars would tell him many things,

nay, they would act as his guides and friends. Have you not contemplated when travelling in train or driving in bus, how the stars accompany us ever and always. While earthly scenes change, the rough road becomes smooth, and now we pass through a village and then through a city and then through a jungle, the sun, the moon, the stars are ever our companions. Such are the Ideals. They are always with us on our journey through life; but engaged in earthly things we do not, alas, always recognize them. We are so taken up with huts and hovels, gutters and gullys, that we have no eyes for the sky and its brilliant beauty. . . .

And now we must close—

Three great ideals, three patterns of light we have seen. First, each one of us should be learning and growing, day by day, hour by hour. Second, real growth takes place only when we energise ourselves and adopt self-induced and self-devised ways in life and in action. Third, our desires and thoughts must take into account the supreme fact that Nature composed of countless units is One Indivisible Whole and that each labouring at his own board and in his own home, affects all human beings for weal or woe.

These three ideals look remote, look learned, look cold, look hard to understand or perhaps simple ! A little study, some thought given to them will show that they are the very water and air and fire we need for our real sustenance, for our mental, moral and spiritual life.

The first teaches us that each one of us, great or small, grown up or infantile, is learning, not from books and schools, but from daily striving, from hourly living. The second teaches that within each one of us is the actor, the inspirer as well as the admonisher, and that it is necessary to seek him out, to listen to his voice within the heart. Finally we learned that each one of us must act with justice to ourselves and with mercy towards others, for sacrifice implies both justice and mercy.

These three ideals are three powerful lights; they show us what our true duties are and enable us to fulfil them. They are harbingers of knowledge which brings vision, of peace which gives power, of wisdom which begets love. With their aid our drudgery becomes divine, our life becomes an inspiration. May you, may all of us possess strength to live by the three lights so that we radiate peace on all whom we contact.

SLEEPING AND WAKING

[**Max Plowman's** ideas seem to have a basis of actual experience. The upward progress of the human soul is a series of progressive awakenings, each advance bringing with it the idea, that now, at last, we have reached "reality". Eastern esoteric philosophy names seven states of consciousness—(1) waking, (2) waking-dreaming, (3) natural-sleeping, (4) induced or trance sleep, (5) psychic, (6) super-psychic, and (7) spiritual; while the exoteric classification is four-fold—jagrat, swapna, sushupti, and turya. All the states of Consciousness in sleep have their correspondences in the waking state; thus dreams in sleep and ecstatic visions in contemplation are analogous. Mr. Plowman's views will become more clear to the student familiar with the above classifications.

The idea that the true poet is the recorder and that poetry "records the historic progress of the soul" is also an ancient one. The authors of the Vedas are known as recorders; they heard the songs chanted in heaven and repeated them on earth. They are described also as the Seers of the Hymns, *Mantra-Drashtaras.*

In conformity with the above it would not be possible for any student of eastern occultism to accept the claim Mr. Plowman makes on behalf of Jesus, "as a unique figure in the history of man". Surely our esteemed author does not mean that Jesus was the first human being who "perceived God as his father". Not only is there a long line of Illustrious Predecessors of Jesus who said "Aham eva Parabrahman—I am verily the supreme Brahman" but also there is a long line of Gurus who taught to their chelas "Tattvamasi—thou art That". There is the famous example of Aruni who taught his pupil Shvetaketu, and that of Yajnyavalkya who taught his wives and disciples—Maitreyi and Katyayani.—EDS.]

The perception of truth always comes with a sense of awakening. We wake to recognise. However strange the sudden appearance of truth may be, in itself it is perfectly familiar: we come to it as a sailor to his own port; we know it as certainly as we know a friend's face in a crowd; this is what we have sought even without knowing what we were seeking. Yet with this sense of complete familiarity there is the great and sudden sense of awakening. A film, like the veil of sleep, falls from our eyes: suddenly we are transported on to higher ground, and with assurance we know the way.

This fitful process of moving from one level of consciousness to a higher is the manner of man's whole spiritual progression. As the tree at its top puts forth a bud that must risk its life at a higher point than any bud upon the tree has known before, so the consciousness of man is required to move upon ever loftier altitudes. To live properly he must enter momentarily upon the future with complete confidence, and this he can only do in the strength of vision; for vision is the recognition of the hitherto unknown, and the true life of consciousness is a recurring series of moments of recognition. Such a moment of vision—such a budding upon the tree of life—was the moment

when Jesus perceived God as his father. Then, for the first time, man was at home in the world, fraternally related to the whole cosmos: then, for the first time, creation gave back to the creator the perfect image of his design. That achievement of vision remains unsurpassed. It is because no one has believed the truth that Jesus believed, with the simple and absolute recognition that was his, that he remains a unique figure in the history of man and has been worshipped as a mythological and divine being. But it is impossible for human consciousness to recede from the point he attained, and although the fatherhood of God may now mean truth or complete error to men, according as it is imaginatively or rationally apprehended, it is to that apex of recognition that human consciousness aspires, and will continue to aspire. For man cannot go back upon himself: the tree cannot deny its utmost bud: the vision seen by one man makes a landmark for the world.

The question which torments the mind of man is: can vision be believed? And the answer is that it can only be believed by those who see it. When, as we say, the truth "dawns" upon us, we do not wonder about it; we are not dubious; we say that we know. But our conviction is, in itself, quite unpersuasive to another. Unless we can truly incarnate our vision, he must have his own; and when he has had it he will need no persuasion. The effort to persuade men into any kind of belief is wholly misguided; for when we do not know the truth all tales about it are fabulous, and when we see the truth we cannot disbelieve it: that is an impossibility. Our whole concern then should be to incarnate the vision, that is, to do the works which follow naturally upon it.

The poet gives us a perfect example of what our behaviour should be. He sees; but he does not thereupon run about trying to persuade other people to his point of view: he creates an image of what he has seen, he makes something that embodies the event, and his poem becomes a reflection of the vital truth of his individual experience. Then, and not till then, has the truth become incarnate. Then it is persuasive; for if we in turn have imagination, we are, through the reflection, able to receive and acknowledge the light. The poet does not write to persuade, but to record. He is the true historian of man's spiritual progress: his work is to record the achieved moments of the soul.

One of the finest examples of the awakening of the soul to truth is to be found in Keat's *Ode to a Nightingale.* That it was an awakening is shown very clearly by the conclusion:—

> Was it a vision or a waking dream?
> Fled is that music. Do I wake or sleep?

Those are obviously the words of one who has seen something with such intensity he wonders whether the evidence of his physical eyes can now be believed. Coming back from the realms of

vision, he stands for a moment like a swimmer on the shore, too dazed by the waves to recognise the familiar. Coming suddenly upon us as the lines do, while the vision is still freshly with us, they seem at first hardly to belong to the poem—to be a comment upon it, almost an afterthought. But that is a superficial impression. Those questions are truly integral, for they complete the circle of experience and bring us—as all truly lived spiritual experiences bring us—back to earth. Without those lines the poem would be incomplete, for they express the authentic and inevitable wonder the visionary always feels upon his return. Keats came back, like Moses from the mount, with the glory round about him, and dazzled by the light he cries: " Was it a vision or a waking dream ?"

To apply the question is a good test. Do you believe it was a vision, or a waking dream ? Was it a sudden accession of increased consciousness, or was it a lapse from fully awakened consciousness to a state of dream ? No doubt most people to-day believe that Keats's experience was of the nature of a lapse. Many would read us treatises on the emergence of the subconscious—without understanding what they read. The vulgar idea of the poet as a mere dreamer would find confirmation in the very question; and the modernist, who imagines himself to be beyond the reach of what he calls "romanticism," would probably agree with the vulgar in believing Keats's consciousness at the time to be subnormal. So that to say, as we shall now say, that this condition —whatever it was—was *the* condition of consciousness imperative to the apprehension of truth, is to say something that will be scouted by nine people out of ten.

Beside that conclusion let us place the fact that here we have one of the greatest poems in the world—one of the undisputed glories of English literature. "Can men gather figs from thistles ?" Can an inferior state of consciousness produce what is in itself acknowledged to be fruit of the highest consciousness ? Either the poem must be rejected as inferior, or the state of mind in which it was written acknowledged as supreme. Poetry is miraculous, but not in the sense that it would be if it were an effect without due cause: it transcends, but it does not disobey the laws of rationality. Poetry we have said records the historic progress of the soul; so we must either abandon the theory of lapse, or the poem.

We have the advantage over Keats at the moment when he had just finished the poem in that we now know it for what it was. We can test it objectively. But the question was a very real one to him. " Was it a vision or a waking dream ?" is no mere rhetorical expression of surprise. Keats was deeply concerned to discover the validity of his experience. At the moment he only knew that something wonderful had happened to him. What was

it? Had he been awakened to the perception of imaginative reality—had he seen inner reality existing in its own eternity beyond the realm of transient appearances? Or had he slept and wandered in the garden of faded memory? It was a terrific question.

Let us go back and examine the steps of his progress. He had begun upon earth in the ferment of personal desire:—

My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains
My sense as though of hemlock I had drunk.

There is sleep there: a drowsiness almost like the approach of death. There is the desire of death—"That I might drink, and leave the world unseen"—but there is love transcending death—"Away! away! for I will fly to thee"—and by the time he reaches the fourth stanza he has achieved complete detachment from all personal craving: now his spirit is full of worship and he is lifted by the strength of pure passion into the realm of adoration. "Already with thee." Thus he has attained to identification with the object of his love, and immediately he realises its eternal identity—"immortal Bird"—and so becomes detached from it again, returning to his "sole self," new-born by the experience, and "forlorn," as a new-born child is forlorn, wondering, as a child might wonder, whether his realisation of the world of common day were a sleep or an awakening.

The movement is according to the pattern of all visionary experience. Compare it with the first poem of Blake's *Songs of Innocence* where, as Mr. Wicksteed has pointed out, the whole process of incarnation is perfectly symbolised: there is the same ascent, the same recognition, the same moment of identification, and the same return to earth. The order is of course the order of all creative action and is symbolic of every fully realised sexual experience. This love-process lies at the heart of reality, and without it reality cannot be known. That is what we, of the modern scientific world, have forgotten. We believe that reality can be known unemotionally—that if we only piece the parts of knowledge together with sufficient care then we shall really know the truth. We act as if the creative process itself were an irrelevant and rather tiresome handicap to real knowledge—something the wise man is wise to overlook; so we inverse the eternal order which puts all knowledge in dependence upon consciousness, and putting knowledge first, endeavour to make consciousness trivial. We succeed in making it chaotic. Our energetic strident will to knowledge defeats itself, for the receptive soul alone has knowledge of reality, and when the mind becomes noisy and clamorous the soul is deafened: it cannot hear the intimations of truth, which are usually whispered.

Blake could have answered Keats's question better than any man of his day; for what he describes as "visions of Eternity"

were the delight of his life and the source of all his tremendous activity. Not that Keats himself was long in need of an answer. In what is very probably the next poem he wrote, the *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, the answer is given with a directness almost didactic. " Beauty is truth, truth beauty." Keats is persuaded that what the imagination seizes upon as beauty must be truth, and the validity of his imaginative experience with the nightingale is thereby wholly established. The nightingale ode ends with a question; the *Ode on a Grecian Urn* answers it; the power of imagination is all its theme. The poems are naturally sequent.

For Blake, the sleep of unconsciousness was the sleep of death. This sleep is the subject of his greatest poem, which begins:—

> Of the sleep of Ulro ! and of the passage through
> Eternal Death ! and of the awakening to Eternal Life.

The poem itself comes to him after the manner of an awakening:—

> This theme calls me in sleep night after night, and ev'ry morn
> Awakes me at sun-rise : then I see the Saviour over me
> Spreading his beams of love and dictating the words of this mild song.
> " Awake ! awake O sleeper in the land of shadows . . ."

Death, sleep, vegetative life and spiritual awakening were for Blake four distinct conditions which mortals suffered or enjoyed.

The sun was for him the saviour from sleep: when we have learned to bear his "beams of love," " the cloud " of mortality (which enfolds us like a womb) " will vanish " and " we shall see his face ". The symbolism is recurrent. It is the sun that loves the earth and woos it into fructifying life. So it is that the earth, upon which the sun shines, becomes "the Garden of Beulah," " a mild and pleasant rest . . . given in mercy to those who sleep. " Man reposes from Eternity in the sleep of Time. At the end of *Jerusalem* he is described as " returning wearied into the Planetary lives of Years, Months, Days and Hours: *reposing*, And then *awakening* into his Bosom in the Life of Immortality."

Do we sleep or wake ? It is the great question. The most awakened souls seem to have been most conscious of their own sleep. Blake, Wordsworth, Shelley—the idea of awakening from the dream of life is one that haunts them. The Eternal, says Blake, is ever present to the wise. Therefore their movements from lower to higher altitudes of consciousness are constant: their angels ascend and descend Jacob's Ladder, and at the foot they seem to sleep. Just as there are levels of consciousness in sleep (to be glimpsed in the moments between sleep and waking), so there are levels of waking consciousness. They live most who are most constantly aware of them.

MAX PLOWMAN

ASCETICISM AND MODERN CIVILIZATION

[**H. M. Tomlinson,** the well-known author of *Gallions Reach, All Our Yesterdays* and other books, writes on a subject debated by many thoughtful writers. His point of view will clear the minds of those who are confused or puzzled by the Fast-Practice of such a man as Gandhiji.—EDS.]

To the Western man, the idea of asceticism—which never enters his head—would be as crazy as choosing to be hungry and cold when he could be comfortable. The same man, to keep his attention fixed and bright while testing the speed of a machine, will dominate his body into complete accord with his purpose. Because he does surmise that when for any high reason he must do his best, and must concentrate his intelligence on the riddle of market prices fluctuating mysteriously, or the task of jumping a number of fences in record time, or the arcanum of rates of exchange, or the championship of his golf club, then he must "keep fit" as he calls it. Though what is happening to him when there is no good reason to apply himself, when indeed his affairs are normal and vague in a world no more muddled than usual, he is not impelled, of course, to remark.

Yet certainly he makes his friendly acknowledgment to spirit, which if young and fit he may readily call to his aid when he resolves to attain a great altitude in an aeroplane, even if his only test for the power of its sustaining virtue is a cardiograph. It would embarrass him to give that power any name but that of an applicable material quality. And why should we embarrass him with a rare suggestion? It is seldom useful to speculate aloud and confusingly on the nature of matter or no matter, when the aim is to attain the highest efficiency of an engine. That would be unreasonable. There the engine is. What do we know about it? What, in truth does anyone know about it? It may be all too late now in the progress of industrial society to speculate on the potency of the machines, except their horse-power; or on the proper way to control that power, except that their young drivers should have bright eyes, stout hearts, and steady nerves.

That is why, in western civilization, the subject of asceticism has an absurd look, if it is so much as noticed. Why stop and prepare to meditate, when you know what to do? The comic artists of the West, with no ill intent, but as a robust and genial statement, the fun of which is at once apparent, delight in depicting Gandhi's gaunt simplicity in repose. That explains to everybody what he is. No comment is necessary. Simplicity is comic as well as strange, and puts him beyond argument. Would a sane and reasonable man reduce life to

its bare elements for no better purpose than to learn where he is in relation to the sun, moon and stars? As though the things of earth could have any relationship with whatever laws may direct to their destiny such extraneous phenomena! I do not suggest here in untoward irony that we westerns should, and would if we had but a glimpse of the light familiar to a Guru—about which I know nothing—attempt to live by the austere rules which to him are right. For let us say he is dedicated. He divines what we do not; and his asceticism is but his way to his service in the universal. That charge is not laid upon most of us, for we have heard no distant drummer; and most of us could be gratuitous subjects for comic cartoons if in aberration we fancied we had heard a far signal, unheard by others, in a dawn about which the local calendar had no word. The fact is that, without his light, the austerities which belong to his service would be, for most of us, indistinguishable from self-torture.

And that indeed is what the practice of asceticism fell to in the West, in monastic life. It was prompted not by cheerful apprehension of a distant yet perhaps ascertainable good, but by a woeful conviction of sin. It became, not help along a difficult path, but good in itself. It gratified the sense of sorrow over iniquity, so the more humiliating the self-punishment, the more virtuous the sinner became. The argument for its practice, therefore, was perfect. If a man himself does not know what measure of punishment his sin needs for expiation, who should? Self-punishment, and the uglier the more saintly, went to lengths of purification so disquieting that to the unsaintly merely to name them would be indelicate. Walt Whitman, with his fulsome adoration of the body, yet the simple satisfaction of its needs, was much nearer the holy man than some of the figures accorded haloes in the Christian calendar because in life they lived cadaverously.

To stint the means to a full life, despite the devotional sackcloth and ashes of the saints, can be as sacrilegious as the profaning of a Temple; a crime common to-day over most of Europe, where industrial civilization, for the better working of its machinery, condemns vast multitudes of people to a most austere existence. Their condition, living on the verge of starvation, shows plainly enough that to withhold from life whatever pertains to a full tide of blood and a disposition essaying and buoyant, may have unexpected consequences. Idle hands, kept alive, but not very much alive, by the charity of the taxpayer, at last induce a kind of paralysis of the mind; the moral code becomes blurred, and black and white, and right and wrong, merge into an indistinguishable grey in which nothing is clear, in which both faith and desperation blend as apathy. Involuntary asceticism may have

results as dismal as those occasioned by the self-punishment of men and women who would be holy.

Men may, in fact, through deprivation, see not more clearly, but see nothing of importance at all. Instead of a reduction of life to its bare bones releasing a glimpse to other values, not apparent when the body is full and luxurious, only bare bones may be seen, which is death. I will not deny that that is so because out of evil only evil must issue; for if the principles that govern the machines and organization of industrial society are cruel because they use life only for material ends, then it is certain that the bodies of superfluous citizens of that society will be valued as waste for the scrap-heap. When a man is on the scrap-heap, he knows where he is. What is waste? Why, even a temple is that when its value is forgotten.

I do not advocate sackcloth and ashes as a fashionable mode for the West; but it seems to me that if a little sackcloth became general for a space, however brief, and some ashes were poured, just as a sign that in wonder a doubt had come that something was vitally wrong in our way of life, and that the defect must be found, then at least the uproar and the confident shouting would die down; and as little as that as a result would be a welcome and promising first benefit. Yet so far from sackcloth, there revives a desperate attachment to the old flamboyant national colours, simply because the ancient emblems hang heavily in the wind, and are the less brave and free. Therefore the West, to keep up its courage, while viewing in consternation the worsening languor of its elaborate machinery and the disruption of its political systems, shouts and cheers still more loudly the emblems of those forces which have brought about its unescapable dilemmas; for now we are not persons, but masses. Nor is it ever easy to get the old gods overturned, even when there is a common suspicion that they are images of questionable attributes, whose gifts are dubious; fear of them restrains. What would happen if they were thrown down? On what could we rely, if not on the power of that which has made us what we are?

What we are! Could that be other than good? How is it possible to doubt that? Whatever may be the outcome of our way of life, and it is true that our devotion to some old ideas is now having strange and even startling consequences, we are not aware of inherent fault. It is only that our formulas and prayers are not working so well as they did. For we have not yet learned that the aspect of our world is only the reflection of what we are. That aspect at present is fairly terrifying; but in it we do not recognize the defects and distortions of our own common thoughts and opinions; unchanging, we wait for the reflection to change. There is no suspicion that the threatening spectres are ourselves.

Our present anxieties, just when our energetic cleverness should have made us so much better off than our forefathers, arise from the fact, it may be, that increasing speed and noise and the threat of the multitude allow no opportunity for the use of so much as common-sense; even the inclination to pause and consider what it is we do, and what is the destiny of our acts, leaves us. Our standard of values, never verified and revised, becomes depraved. Even the sense of right and wrong grows confused, and evil is good, and good is folly, to people whose anxiety is desperate when affairs are moving too fast, though not to an end which is visibly promising. We do not yet know that when we submit to any power, for what we hope to gain by our submission, then we must accept whatever be its issue, though its full inherency is unknown to us; and the devil may be in it. The desirable fire which Prometheus stole from Heaven was a handy element, docile in its original hollow pipe, but it held potencies beyond the knowledge of the first benefactor of man. That tube now is blowing great guns. Man contrived to filch power from the gods, but he forgot to bring away with him the necessary clue to its right use; so here is Chaos come again?

A little asceticism, a voluntary reduction of life to its essentials and no more, and a pause in which we could humbly consider the cause of our infelicity, when our dark Satanic mills cease to smoke with their old volume and when the show and the tushes of power do not work with their old unfailing magic, seem desirable.

Desirable, yet unlikely. Instinctively we know that a changed outlook, which a changed opinion must give us, would not be enjoyable, because it could not include those things which would meet our desires.

Laissez faire! With that, it may still fall out by good luck that we may be able to gratify our desires; it is worth waiting for. After all, things may not be so bad as they seem. Why give the matter anxious thought? Thought is dangerous, and inimical to desire. Not only dictators, but everybody whose position still gives them more or less of what they want knows that. It is not a matter for argument. Instinct tells us so much. For we really know well enough, on instinct, that the ideas out of which has grown the modern State, with its arbitrary powers, yet its wide latitude for whoever will give it unquestioning devotion, topples at the touch of an independent thought, doubtful of the good in it. We have yet to glimpse the meaning of a full life; we have no notion that it may have no outward show.

H. M. TOMLINSON

THE WISE ONE

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

> Unto the Supreme Spirit (Brahman) goeth he who maketh the Supreme Spirit the object of his meditation in performing his actions.—*Bhagavad-Gita* IV. 24.

This verse ends the description of the Sage (Buddha).

The Buddha is one whose buddhi is lighted by the Light of Gayatri or of Mahachaitanyam, *i. e.* of the Spiritual Sun hidden in our visible sun. Just as our minds are enlightened by wisdom, so in the course of evolution our intuitive-soul (buddhi) is enlightened by super-wisdom, the soul of wisdom, the secret wisdom, which solves the mystery of the universe. Then man becomes Super-Man or Buddha.

Ordinary knowledge may be compared to prose, but the other is like poetry and song. Gayatri is the spirit of poetry, and real poetry of sound and words is composed by intuitive-souls and is fully grasped by intuition; prose is born of and can be grasped by mind. The true words of any Sage possess poetic rhythm and beauty; to understand that we must feel them.

Again, there is philosophy, which gives us principles and details of what human minds have thought out, and such philosophy helps our mental growth. But there is super-philosophy: the pure intellect (buddhi) reflects within itself Divine Images or Ideas, and such intuitive-souls make a record of them. Such a record of super-philosophy is like a mirror in which Nature reflects herself.

Therefore the Sage (Buddha) is a poet and a philosopher.

Then Buddha is the Aged One —old of Soul, hoary with experience. That experience is so profound that its possessor is able to penetrate directly and simply all problems and phenomena. The child is direct and simple in questioning; the Sage is direct and simple in answering; mental questioning, fretting, doubt, puzzlement, worry exist not in him, and so this Aged One is ever young.

This description of the Sage is in the fourth discourse in which Krishna speaks of the mysterious doctrine of Avataras, Divine Incarnations. In verses 16 to 24 we are given a picture, a description

of the Sage whose goal is the Source of Avataras.

Gupta-Vidya, Occultism or Esoteric Philosophy teaches that there are four classes of Jivan-Muktas, Emancipated Beings. All such have overcome Karma, *i. e.*, they need not perform any action, they need not exert themselves, because for them nothing remains to be known or obtained. They know themselves as impartite Universal Beings, and experience the joy within their own consciousnesses while reposing in the ocean of peace.

Of these four classes of liberated souls there are some who resolve to follow the Path of Krishna, the Path of Avataras; they resolve to descend to earth, and out of their own choice live in bondage for the sake of the race. That kind of a Sage is very rare—he who lives ever awake, ever active. It is said that the idea and ideal of performing Karmas produce the four classes of Jivan-Muktas. Just as by Guna-Karma, qualities of past deeds, the four castes arise in the human kingdom, so also by a similar process four classes of Jivan-Muktas arise. They are: (1) Those who live in Turya—a state of deepest trance; (2) Those who live in Sushupti—highest meditation; (3) Those who live in Svapna—exhilarating dream condition. Then there is the *fourth:* Those who live in Jagrat—in the waking, active state on earth. This last type of Jivan-Mukta, Free Man, gives up his Impartite State of Turya, his Meditative State of Sushupti, his happy and exhilarating state of Svapna, and assumes the active life of Jagrat. He is the real Living Mahatma. By special discipline and training he fits himself to serve the three worlds throughout Ananta-Yuga, the Boundless Age. In Buddhistic terminology he is called Bodhi-Sattva: he who incarnates in his pure buddhi or intuitive-soul the truths of Adi-Buddha, the Primeval Buddha.

The Sage described in the fourth discourse which deals with the Doctrine of Avataras is the Living Mahatma, who is active for the sake of others. The Path of Krishna, which He says is superior to all other paths, treading which this last class of Sages reach Him, and having attained never never fall, but are ever engaged in revolving His Wheel —that Path one in a million treads. It is of such Mahatmas difficult to find (vii. 19) that Krishna enumerates the qualities.

We who are attempting and learning to walk that Way must use these nine verses. They provide a channel for us who aspire to sense inwardly the nature of the living Mahatma, the Wakeful, Watchful, Active Mahatma. These verses make a Picture, a mental Image; what an idol is to the physical eyes, an object of contemplation and adoration not because of its substance but because of its symbology, that too is this description to the eye of the Soul. Reading these verses, memorizing them, thinking about them, using them to build an

image, to paint a picture, to carve an idol, we will glimpse the Spiritual Face and the Lotus Feet of the Living Mahatma.

Let us look at these verses. They deal with action and an actor of a particular kind. Actions bind; actions set free; inaction deludes, inaction enlightens. In the first of these verses, the sixteenth, Krishna says that even bards and poets (कवय:) who possess insight and intuition are confused as to action-inaction. Therefore Krishna explains the nature and mode of that particular kind of action whose performance produces no bondage, nay more, the Living Mahatma engages himself in such performance. In that performance we are able to feel that no action has been committed. It is effortless action, because it comes easily to us, is natural. When one strains oneself in the doing of a deed it is of the nature of Rajas, the motion of desire.

Now, all the actions of the Living Mahatma are such easy, flowing, natural actions, and two characteristics are common to all of them: (1) the action of the Sage is never rooted in desire; (2) the action of the Sage is begun, carried on and ended by the Light of His philosophy and wisdom.

In performing actions day by day we must be guided by this Picture of the Sage, whose hands bless us; whose head creates the thought-dreams which impart knowledge to us; whose heart-meditation rays forth compassion which brings us His Vision; and drawing us into His innermost high trance state, He makes us the gift of gifts—opening our sight for a moment, He makes us behold the Glories and Excellencies of The Temple of the World.

B. M.

Behold, the mellow light that floods the Eastern sky. In signs of praise both heaven and earth unite. And from the fourfold manifested Powers a chant of love ariseth, both from the flaming Fire and flowing Water, and from sweet-smelling Earth and rushing Wind. Hark! . . . from the deep unfathomable vortex of that golden light in which the Victor bathes, all Nature's wordless voice in thousand tones ariseth to proclaim: Joy unto ye, O men of Myalba. A Pilgrim hath returned back "from the other shore." A new Arhan is born.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

LIVING MESSENGERS CALLED WORDS

EVOLUTION, *not* CREATION, *by means of* WORDS *is recognized in the philosophies of the East, even in their exoteric records.*

—H. P. BLAVATSKY,
The Secret Doctrine, II. 42.

[Below we print three essays on the subject of sound, speech and words.—EDS.]

I

THE LIMITATIONS OF LANGUAGE

[**G. B. Harrison, M.A. (Cantab) Ph. D. (London)**, deals with the soul aspect of words. Like the dual aspect of consciousness, ever shifting and ever abiding, words also have a passing personal connotation and, again, the permanent and constant image they evoke. Words like men are mortal, and then there are Immortal Words or Words of Power. The article brings out the truth of eastern Occultism which affirms that "to pronounce a word is to evoke a thought, and make it present: the magnetic potency of the human speech is the commencement of every manifestation in the Occult World . . . . . The Word (Verbum) or the speech of every man is, quite unconsciously to himself, a blessing or a curse." —EDS.]

Men learn to speak so early that they forget the mechanism and the limitations of speech. Speech is made up of words, and words are sounds that stand as signs for a vast range of wants and thoughts. Such sounds by themselves mean nothing except by general agreement of those using the same language. It is curious indeed that man should have chosen his tongue and ear as the means of communication; for there are many advantages in gesture and movement which can be perceived by the eye, and with generations of development perhaps a wider range of emotion could have been expressed. Certainly for some emotions dancing is more satisfying than language.

Nor are words the only means of communication between men. Knowing no Arabic and having no lamp, I once tried to buy lamp oil in an Arab bazaar by sign language; the process took half an hour but it was successful. Most men use gesture of some kind to help out language but there are few universal gestures; the beckoning sign, "Come hither," of an Eastern means "Go away," to a Western.

Words have, however, at least one advantage over gestures, for they can be recorded in script and print, and though the dancer can speak to multitudes at one moment, the written word remains so long as the language can be understood.

The process of speech is exceedingly complex, for the words symbolise so various a range of conceptions; each word in a sentence will touch and sensitize some different mental nerve, and a

phrase such as "the scent of a red rose" will evoke images of smell, colour, touch and memory. The process has to be reversed by the hearer; the sounds are translated into symbols; the symbols evoke the images; and the effect of the whole combination is passed into the perception.

When spoken language is translated into writing and then reconverted into words by the reader, a second process of symbolisation occurs. For written words are themselves composed of letters which are again symbols for sounds. By constant practice the whole process of reading is almost instantaneous, but it removes both writer and reader one stage further from the original thought which is to be exchanged, and adds new obstructions to complete understanding, for we are in a faint, subtle way affected by the material form of the page; even the appearance of the type will carry with it a host of individual associations.

Moreover, written language often differs from spoken language. To many the process of transforming the symbols of sound into symbols of script is painful and laborious; the mere act of fluent writing needs some training of the hand, and the labour of the pen is soon obvious.

Written language differs most from spoken language in those tongues where shades of meaning are expressed by stress and intonation and not by tense, mood or arrangement. English is notably a language of stresses, and the simplest sentence will often bear as many implied meanings as there are words. So plain a statement, for instance, as "he never worked for me" becomes by stress: "*He* never worked for me"—but his cousin did; and "he *never* worked for me"—and those who say it are wrong; and "he never *worked* for me"—for he was an idle scamp; and "he never worked *for* me"—but against; and "he never worked for *me*"—but for my father. All the implications come out of the sentence according to the word stressed.

In written speech these stresses can easily be missed, for italics are usually considered a feminine device disfiguring the page. The good writer will by the very rhythms of his sentence make them felt, and the good reader will sense them—for indeed reading is an art as well as writing.

The vague and general meanings of words are agreed on; but the commoner the word, the wider its range of meanings, and the more personal. It follows that language is a limited medium for the expression of any complex experience or emotion. Words are only understood when both to speaker and to hearer they convey approximately the same meaning. The most enduring books are those which are permanently comprehensible and deal therefore with common experiences which constantly recur. There is no word which will convey the rare experience to one who has not felt it. Hence most teachers of religion who have something new

to present set forth their thoughts in familiar symbols, endeavouring to pass from the known to the novel.

But here again the difficulties are immense. Jesus spoke of God as his Father. This word father comes to each individual tinged with the emotion of his feeling towards his own father; insomuch that even an idea seemingly so simple as "God the Father" has been understood in two entirely contradictory ways. To some God is Father, for "Fatherlike He tends and bears us," protecting His children from the dangers of their inexperience; to others He is Father because He chastises His sons, and the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* found chastisement a great proof of the love of God:—

> If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son is he whom his father chasteneth not?
>
> But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons.

These words "God" and "love" bear so many meanings that they become meaningless. "God" is applied to all kinds of conceptions from a crude little image to the idea of a Mind pervading, willing, controlling the Universe in its immensity and minuteness; whilst "love" stretches from mating to the highest forms of selflessness.

Some words too have a habit of coming to life almost as objective beings, and particularly abstract words which summarise a range of complex emotions. In certain states of mind, particularly the more primitive, a process becomes personified. Thus the word "death" denotes the change that occurs when a physical body ceases to be active, and gradually by reason of the importance of this change to living bodies the word swells and becomes more portentous until Death is a live and terrifying deity with his own symbols, worship and ritual. He becomes fate, the ally of darkness, the last enemy to be overthrown in the final triumph of God—and all this because men invented a word for the cease of life.

Words can become exceedingly dangerous, especially when men worship them, and worst of all when books—which are but collections of words—become deified: the pages of the Bible and the Koran are spattered with the bloodshed in the name of God..

Words are the coin of thought, and like all currencies liable to the fluctuations of the market. Words change their meaning, and often their social value and status, at one time expressing a rare or noble thought; and then by over-use they become smooth and valueless. Sometimes they are highly charged with emotion and then in changed circumstances the glow fades and the word loses its colour. Eighteen years ago such words as "reprisal" were full of a ghastly intensity; reprisals are now but an evil memory to those who lived through the war, and to the younger generation mean nothing.

Again, seeing that words often

take their colour from the experience of the speaker, they are inadequate to express anything that lies beyond the hearer's capacity for experience. A man may express his thoughts to his own satisfaction, for the expression reminds him. Yet the purpose and art of language is not merely self-expression but communication so that the great writer needs a reader as nearly as possible on his own level. To use words to their fullest the speaker must therefore be able to understand the experiences of his hearer and to express his own thoughts in words which will evoke his hearer's memories. Great writing or speaking needs a vast experience; and indeed the first quality of a teacher is to enter into the mind of his disciple.

The exact meaning of a word to each individual comes from his own past. As the late Sir Walter Raleigh wrote :—

> The mind of man is peopled like some silent city with a sleeping company of reminiscences, impressions, attitudes, emotions, to be awakened to fierce activity at the touch of words.

But in each man the same word will stir different emotions. Herein lies the great difficulty of words as a currency for the exchange of thought; it is so hard to be sure that any phrase conveys the same exact meaning to hearer and speaker.

The greatest danger in the use of language is to misunderstand its nature and limitations; for words are like chisels, dangerous to handle, easily blunted, but in the hands of an artist, keen and penetrating, his tools in the work of creation.

G. B. HARRISON

II

ON THE MISUSE AND ABUSE OF WORDS

[**George Godwin,** novelist and biographer, continues the same examination but brings out more prominently the ill effects of misunderstood and misapplied words, and also of the exploitation of words. How apt sound the views Mr. W. Q. Judge expressed in his *Letters That Have Helped Me* (p. 12) :—

> Words are things. With me and in fact. Upon the lower plane of social intercourse they are things, but soulless and dead because that convention in which they have their birth has made abortions of them. But when we step away from that conventionality they become alive in proportion to the reality of thought—and its purity—that is behind them. So in communication between two students they are things, and those students must be careful that the ground of intercourse is fully understood. Let us use with care these living messengers called words.]

The problems of our modern world may not differ in essentials from those of earlier ages; but in complexity and dimensions they are such that it becomes more and more difficult for the seeker after truth to come by it, and this whether he would know the truth about Russia, the merits or demerits of Swaraj, or the true characters of such world figures as Gandhi, Mussolini or Stalin.

At such a time, it is quite obvious, the need for integrity in speech, and the right use of words is a prerequisite for sound judgment and even an approximate (the best we can ever hope for) appreciation of the facts and the problems inherent in them.

Let me take an example—Soviet Russia.

Whatever may be the opinion of the reader of this vast social experiment, one thing is reasonably certain, and that is that it is an application with modifications here and there of Marxist social philosophy.

It might seem superfluous to say as much, but for the fact that the word "bolshevism," by which this system is known, has come to have a connotation completely divorced from its proper meaning. It has become, for many millions unfamiliar with the facts (as is the present writer), a term of abuse.

It is quite a common thing to hear this word, and its cant version, "bolshie," used much as the term "Hun" was used between 1914–1918. The reason is the same in both cases. During the war it was deemed necessary to employ the word Hun for the enemy so that Germany, for the masses, should stand for the crimes of Attila rather than for the virtues of Goethe. To-day, the term "bolshie" is employed to signify abhorrence of the U. S. S. R., so that the real issue, the respective merits of the two systems, shall be obscured by prejudice and abuse.

It is this sort of verbal outlawry of such terms that does infinite damage, the effect being disastrous because it diverts the attention of the hearer from the authentic meaning of the words and looses in his mind a set of images and emotions that are impediments to clear judgment or any judgment at all.

The unthinking man who hears the term "bolshie" employed only in notes of contempt or opprobrium, does not hesitate to consider the adequacy of the grounds for such obloquy. And the chances are he reacts in such a manner that his mind is rendered incapable of considering the underlying realities that would be otherwise the subject of quiet and dispassionate examination.

It is probably true to say that the western world has been completely anæsthetised by this outlawry of a single word and rendered incapable of looking squarely at a social and economic phenomenon without parallel in the world's history.

To take one more example of the harm wrought by the abuse or misuse of words, one might take the name Gandhi. For those who know the man it is a word that evokes emotions and sentiments similar to those evoked in the West by such names as Lincoln, Gordon or Knox.

But the name has another connotation altogether. For millions it stands for an absurd figure of fun or for indefensible sedition.

In this case, too, the result is to throw the intellectual machinery

out of gear and to release all that is most unworthy in the passions of the unthinking mob.

To attach to such words that, rightly used, connote high ideals of social justice or national aspiration, moral opprobrium, is intellectual treason.

The word "Socialism" is a striking illustration of how ignorance, fear and prejudice, can father upon a word a set of ideas remote from its authentic meaning. It is not many years since to be a Socialist was to confess to subversive tendencies. The word was uttered with the deepest of contempt, if not with downright horror.

It is probable that many people for whom this social philosophy would have appealed (since in essence it is merely the application of the Christian religion to the economic sphere) were deterred from examining its principles by the obloquy that attached to the outlawed word Socialism.

It is very much the same when we consider the manner in which words with an emotional content are used to-day. There must have been a time in the world's history when the word "Love," was one of terrific force. Doubtless the first men to love reserved their term for that terrific experience of the human soul for its appropriate occasion. But to-day so debased has the word become that we speak of loving golf, motoring or the novels of Miss X.

Time and misuse have blunted language and robbed it of much of its former power to evoke strong emotions. Our verbal currency has worn thin, so thin that we respond but feebly to the stimulus or respond not at all. We accept the cant phrase and accept as minted gold the gilded sixpence of verbal currency. Worse, we accept unquestioningly coins that are spurious, and pass them on.

Little wonder then that men who desire to use language as an instrument for the communication of emotions and ideas are being driven to the expedient of coining language anew, and we have the strange productions of such bold experimenters as James Joyce and those who follow him.

The flippant use of extravagant words—the perpetual misuse of the word "marvellous" and the like—one may pass over as foibles of the moment that will pass. Every age has seen such absurdities. But the tendency of our time to invest words connoting ideas of terrific import to the world with ignominy is to throw up before the enquirer after truth a verbal barricade so high that the truth beyond is often beyond his reach.

GEORGE GODWIN

III

SOME SPECULATIONS ABOUT SOUND IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

[**A. B. Gajendragadkar, M. A.,** is Professor of Sanskrit at the Elphinstone College, Bombay University, and co-editor of *The Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona. He has annotated and published several Sanskrit Texts, and is known for his wide learning.

In Indian Philosophy four kinds of Vach or speech are interpreted in numerous ways one of which our learned author offers—all these are expressions of the real Esoteric instruction, partly explained by H. P. Blavatsky who writes :

Thus Vâch, Shekinah, or the " music of the spheres " of Pythagoras, are one, if we take for our example instances in the three most (apparently) dissimilar religious philosophies in the world—the Hindu, the Greek and the Chaldean Hebrew. These personations and allegories may be viewed under *four* (chief) and three (lesser) aspects or *seven* in all, as in Esotericism.—*Secret Doctrine*, I, 432.]

The Hindus are said to be a nation of philosophers. Max Müller called them " the most highly gifted race of mankind". The peculiar climatic conditions of India and the absence of anything like a struggle for existence favoured the development of philosophical thought among the Hindus in ancient times. Endowed with highly imaginative minds and living in forests, far removed from the disturbances of worldly life, the ancient seers indulged in speculations about problems that have troubled mankind since the beginning of time. One striking peculiarity of ancient Hindu thought is that the problem to which the thinkers directed their minds received consideration from almost every possible point of view, with the result that there is such a bewildering variety of solutions to it offered by different people. In ancient India complete freedom of thought prevailed. There was no such thing as being bound by the shackles of authoritative texts then. Take for instance philosophy. Here we find speculations ranging from the gross materialism of Cārvaka to the sublime idealism of Śaṅkara. Almost every phase of philosophical thought in the West is represented in one form or another in Hindu philosophical works. Some have even wondered whether it is possible to advance philosophical inquiries further than where they have been left by Hindu seers and whether what are regarded as new theories are not just the old ones presented in a new garb with improvements in details.

These general characteristics of Hindu thought apply to theories of sound as well. And I propose to present in this article some of the Hindu speculations about sound.

Four Kinds of Speech

Speculations about sound or speech date back to the oldest of

the Hindu sacred books, *viz.*, the *Ṛgveda* where in I. 164, 45 it is declared:—

> Four are the forms assumed by speech. Brāhmaṇas, who are controllers of mind, know them. Three, being deposited in a cave, do not manifest themselves. The fourth form of speech men speak.*

Various are the interpretations that are offered for this stanza, but the one which is pertinent to our purpose refers to the theory of the origination of vocal sound. According to this theory when a person desires to speak, he gives the first impulse to mind, which then strikes the bodily fire, which in its turn sets in motion the air in the body. This air starts from the Brahmagranthi (Brahma-knot) or Mūlādhāra (base-support), which is a centre of mystic spiritual energy situated somewhere at the base of the spinal column, and travels upwards through the navel and the heart on to the mouth from which it ultimately emerges in an audible form.† It will thus be seen that vocal sound, which manifests itself in the form of spoken words, is the air which, starting from the base of the spinal column, where lies the fountain-head of all energy in the body, travels upwards into the mouth, and coming in contact with various parts thereof such as the throat, (*kaṇṭha*), the palate (*tālu*), the dome of the palate (*mūrdhan*), the teeth and the lips, gives rise to the different sounds that constitute the Sanskrit alphabet. These parts of the oral cavity, contact with which is responsible for the assumption by the air of different articulate sounds, are known as *Sthānāni* or places. Eight such places are enumerated and these are made up by the addition of the heart, the root of the tongue and the nose to the five mentioned above.‡

It has been said above that in the origination of articulate sounds the air starts from the base of the spinal column and travels up to the mouth. This journey represents the development of sound from its extremely subtle form to the gross. In this development there are four stages, which give to *Vāk* or sound its four forms.

Thus at the Mūlādhāra, which is the starting point of the deve-

* चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि
तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनस्विनः।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेङ्गयन्ति।
तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति॥

† आत्मा विवक्षमाणो हि मनः प्रेरयते, मनः।
कायाग्निमाहन्ति, स प्रेरयति मारुतम्॥
ब्रह्मग्रन्थिस्थितः सोऽथ क्रमादूर्ध्वपथे चरन्।
नाभिहृत्कण्ठमूर्धास्येष्वाविर्भावयति ध्वनिम्॥
—संगीतरत्नाकर I. iii. 3–4

‡ अष्टौ स्थानानि वर्णानामुरः कण्ठः शिरस्तथा।
जिह्वामूलं च दन्ताश्च नासिकोष्ठौ च तालु च॥
—पाणिनीयशिक्षा 13

lopment, the Vāk is known as Parā or the highest. Parā Vāk is really the most subtle, or transcendental form of sound. It is in fact Śabda-Brahman or Brahman in the form of sound. Though it is all-pervading, its special abode in the body is the Mūlādhāra or Mūlacakra. Nobody can have sensual perception of Parā Vāk, except, according to some authorities, the Yogins, who can have access to it in the state of deep concentration.

The second stage in the development is reached when the air goes up to the navel. Here it is known as Paśyantī Vāk. It is not so subtle here as at the Mūlādhāra and is within the mental perception of Yogins. According to certain authorities this stage represents will-power.

The heart is the next stage, where Vāk is known as Madhyamā. This is the stage of intellect. When we close our ears, we seem to hear some kind of rumbling noise. That is a manifestation of Madhyamā Vāk.

When at last the air reaches the mouth and manifests itself in the form of the various sounds of the alphabet, it is known as Vaikharī. It is the Vaikharī Vāk that we use in our everyday life. It represents the gross manifestation of Śabda-Brahman and as such is non-eternal as opposed to the three preceding forms which are eternal.

The Ṛgvedic stanza with which we commenced this section will now be clear. The four forms of speech are Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī.* The first three of these are subtle and unmanifest and are consequently spoken of as having been deposited in a cave. Only the fourth, *viz.*, Vaikharī, is available to men for use. That is why the Veda declares: "The fourth form of speech men speak."

Indian philosophical thought tends to culminate in the doctrine of the oneness of all existence. The most prominent example of this is of course the Advaita or monism of Saṅkara. Beginnings of this tendency can again be found in the *Ṛgveda* where one seer has declared, "The one existence the wise declare manifold."† Not only is this tendency observed in pure philosophic thought, but also in other speculations. Thus in the case of sound as well we have seen that all different sounds are the developed manifestations of one eternal sound, called Śabda-Brahman, which in the process of development is known as Parā Vāk at the initial stage. If, therefore, we want to realise the Sabda-Brahman, we must go from the manifest to the unmanifest, from the gross to the subtle. Vaikharī is

* परा वाङ् मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिसंस्थिता ।
हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ॥

† एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति ।
—ऋग्वेद I. 164. 46

the manifest form of sound. The three unmanifest subtle forms are from the spiritual point of view much more important. "Heard melodies," sang Keats in his *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, "are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter." Similarly, with reference to these four kinds of speech we may say that heard sounds are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.

The Spota of the Grammarians

Sanskrit Grammarians have evolved a peculiar theory of their own as regards the conveyance of sense by sounds. This theory is analogous to the Vedāntic theory of Brahman and its manifestations. How do we understand the sense from a word?—ask the grammarians. Take for example the word "kamala," which means a lotus. The syllables *ka*, *ma* and *la* possess no expressive power individually. Nor can they convey the sense conjointly, because conjunction is not possible between them, as the syllables are evanescent. As soon as I utter *ka*, it is lost in the thin air. It has no existence when I pronounce *ma* and *la*. Therefore all the syllables conjointly cannot express the sense. Under these circumstances the grammarians postulate the existence of one eternal indivisible word, called Spoṭa,* which is sense-expressive and is revealed by the cognition of the last syllable of a word helped by the impressions created by the preceding syllables.

This Spoṭa closely resembles the Brahman of the Vedāntins. Like Brahman, the Spoṭa is eternal and Impartite. Brahman, though different from the world, is revealed by the various objects therein. Similarly, the Spoṭa, though different from the various syllables, is yet manifested thereby. As Brahman is at the bottom of all worldly phenomena, so the Spoṭa is at the basis of all sound phenomena.

Eternal and Non-Eternal Words

Long discussions are carried on regarding the question as to whether word is eternal or non-eternal. The Mimāmsakas with their doctrine of the absolute authoritativeness of the Veda, maintain the eternity of word. Grammarians support them. Naiyāyikas on the other hand hold that word is non-eternal. An interesting discussion on this point is found in Durga's Commentary on the Nirukta of Yāska.

Yāska divides words into four classes—noun, verb, preposition and particle. An objection is raised against this. How can you have any division of words at all? For words are impermanent. They enjoy existence only as long as they are in contact with the organ of speech of the speaker and the organ of hearing of the listener. And a division of entities, which vanish so quickly, cannot be made.

Against this it is pointed out that words have a double charac-

* This technical name is thus explained: 'स्फुटति अर्थः अस्मात्। स्फुट्यते व्यज्यते वर्णैः अयम्। स्फुटयति प्रकाशयति अर्थम्।'

ter. We must make a distinction between Śabdākṛti or genuine form or conception of word and Śabdavyakti or the individual embodiment or manifestation of that conception. The former is eternal, the latter evanescent. When I pronounce the word "kamala," I am only giving audible manifestation to the conception of kamala, which is eternal. This sounds so similar to Plato's doctrine of the idea of a thing. The chair I see before me, though impermanent, is only an embodiment of the idea of a perfect chair, which is eternal. That is what Plato believes.

PROPAGATION OF SOUND

The Naiyāyikas, who believe that sound is evanescent and lasts only for a few moments, have formulated two interesting theories regarding its propagation. The question is: How is sound, produced by, say, the beating of a drum at some distance, heard by us here? Sound is evanescent and it perishes as soon as it is produced. How then is it heard at a distance?

The first explanation of this is according to what is known as the Vīci-taraṅga-nyāya or the maxim of the wave-ripple. In the case of water we find that when a wave is produced at a particular place, it gives rise to another wave near-by and this to a third, and so on, so that the wave that reaches the shore is not the wave first produced, but the last of the series started by that first wave. Similarly the sound, created by the stick on the drum, produces another sound, which in its turn gives rise to a third until the last of the series reaches our ear and is heard by us.

This theory was found defective. It was observed that waves, such as those in a sea, travel in one direction only. Sound on the other hand is heard on all sides of the place where it is originally produced. To account for this phenomenon the Naiyāyikas started another explanation known as the Kadamba-koraka-nyāya.* According to Sanskrit poetical convention the Kadamba tree puts forth buds simultaneously on all sides at the thunder of clouds. Similarly sound, such as that of a drum, produces similar sounds in all the ten directions simultaneously and these travel on all sides according to the maxim of the wave-ripple. It will be noticed that the theory of propagation of sound according to the Kadamba-koraka-nyāya is nearer the truth.

A. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

* सर्वः शब्दो नभोवृत्तिः श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते ।
वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन तदुत्पत्तिस्तु कीर्तिता ।
कदम्बकोरकन्यायादुत्पत्तिः कस्यचिन्मते ॥
—भाषापरिच्छेद st. 165-166

TEMPTATION

[**Claude Houghton** is much in the public eye because of the appearance of his books—new editions as well as fresh output. In this article he writes on the phase of psychological experience common to all earnest aspirants who try to live nobly a life of discipline and of expression of virtue. Temptation is experienced only by those who heed the voice of conscience and who seek the light of soul-wisdom. As the shower cannot fructify the rock, so occult teaching has no effect upon the unreceptive mind. As the water develops the heat of caustic lime so does the teaching bring into fierce action every unsuspected potentiality latent in a man.—EDS.]

Until comparatively recently, every temptation was regarded as one of the many shadows cast by that melodramatic personage the Devil.

This is no longer possible, for the Devil has become as advanced as the age. He has abolished himself. It is his supreme achievement. The whole of his mesmeric and spectacular reign contains no triumph comparable with this abdication. It is his subtle acceptance of the fact that no one believes in him any longer. Were he to appear in traditional shape—cloven hoofs, horns, and a tail—modern people would not throw an inkstand at him ; like Luther, they would merely laugh. But the Devil is very well aware of this fact. He's right up-to-date ; he's kept abreast with the advance of modern science ; he recognises that the old publicity methods are obsolete—and he's adapted himself to this Brave New World. He's become invisible. He's vanished into air—into thin air. It is difficult not to admire his strategy.

But despite this dramatic disappearance of the Devil, man continues to experience that state of inner conflict signified by the word Temptation. The order and degree necessarily vary with each individual, but few would claim immunity from those sudden onslaughts which transform the inner life into an arena. As these mysterious invasions are no longer attributed to the Devil's malignity, it may be profitable to consider certain aspects of temptation in the hope that we shall establish its essential quality, and, possibly, discover clues to its origin.

First, it is suggested that a primary effect of temptation is to isolate us. We are withdrawn from the world of men and women and become, as it were, a stage in a dark theatre on which principalities and powers contend for the possession of our will. Often the deed to which we are urged—and the end proposed by every temptation is always the perpetration of a deed—may appear trivial if regarded from the rational level. But, for the one tempted, this is of all impossibilities the most impossible. The state of temptation exists only where there is an absolute belief that great issues are involved. Consequently the deed to which we

are urged cannot be viewed as an incident in time, for it is felt to be an event in destiny. To the rest of the world, it may seem trivial: to the one tempted, it is pregnant with significance. Hence his isolation.

It is, perhaps, impossible to over-emphasize the relativity of temptation. That which tempts one man is regarded by another as opportunity, and this fact must be faced resolutely in any attempt to generalize concerning the essential quality of temptation. That there is no universally recognized standard of good and evil has perplexed many thinkers, and driven others to despair, but it remains a fact—and one which is not to be circumvented by sophistry, or removed by passionate dogma. A nation's conception of God reveals the degree of spirituality attained. It is not possible for this conception to be identical with that of another nation, any more than it is possible for two men to possess precisely the same values concerning good and evil. No two mirrors on earth reflect the same objects from exactly the same angle. Every man glimpses the city of God from a unique standpoint.

Inner conflict and isolation, then, may be predicated of every type of temptation, but here generalization would appear to end. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that every temptation is in the nature of an *assault*, and it may be that the discovery of the citadel attacked—be its name what it may—would provide another generalization and an important one.

It is suggested that, in every instance, this citadel is what a man loves best. Temptation is an assault directed against an individual's holy of holies. It is a subtle inducement to deny what is held to be sacred. It would seem that this, and only this, explains the chaotic ferment created in the psychic being by the onslaught of temptation. What is most precious is being menaced. Pottage is being offered for the birthright. Craving and loyalty contend for the possession of the will. All is darkness, perplexity, commotion.

To surrender is to exchange reality for unreality—as the result of a deliberate and conscious choice. It is to dethrone one's god and to kneel to a usurper. It is to be guilty of profanation. And therefore, it is to enter the inferno of remorse.

All this the world well knows; yet none knows well
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.

But, it may well be asked, why is this assault possible? Revolutions do not occur in a well-ordered State. What is the origin of these insurgent desires which seduce the sentinels, capture the citadel, and make the will their ally or their slave? Whence comes their knowledge of the weakness of the defence? From what is their power derived? And how is it that, having triumphed—having created havoc, and left desolation—these desires can

return again to triumph anew? Why is it that Memory—in whose archives the vandalism of their many raids is recorded—is impotent to organize effective resistance against the next assault?

It was stated in an earlier paragraph that, in every instance, the citadel attacked was what a man loves best. To be free from temptation a man must love one thing *only*. The lives of the saints reveal an epic attempt to love only God. But, in most of us, there is a divided allegiance. There is the love which, normally, occupies the centre of our being (it is that for which we would sacrifice most) and there are lesser loves which, normally, inhabit the circumference. Temptation occurs when one of these peripheral loves seeks to storm and occupy the centre—to establish itself on the throne and to grasp the sceptre of the will.

We may know ourselves, therefore, by the order and degree of the temptations that assail us, for each reveals what we have loved or served. Pride may strive to convince us that we hate certain of these desires which subdue and humiliate us, but it is wisdom to recognize that it is we ourselves who—by perversity or the servitude of long custom—have given them the ascendancy which they exercise to our detriment. Often it is terrible to look upon that we have once served. It is, in fact, so terrible that frequently we elect to regard the apparition as a spectre from the pit rather than acknowledge it as an aspect of ourselves. One of Nietzsche's most penetrating aphorisms is pertinent in this connection:—

> "I did that," says my Memory. "I could not have done that," says my Pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually—the Memory yields.

Temptation, then, varies with each individual for no two men love precisely the same thing in exactly the same degree, but—in every instance—temptation is a state created by an assault on the central love. If the attack be repulsed, this central love becomes the more surely established, and therefore the better able to resist the next invasion. If the citadel be surrendered, it is the more vulnerable to the next attack. But, as a Spanish mystic discovered, surrender need not necessarily be wholly a loss. It can waken humility. "How many right feelings spring from the madness to which we are urged by the beast." The humiliation of surrender delivers us from the isolation of pride. It reminds us of our actual stature. It calls to remembrance that we can claim nothing as our own except our weakness. It blunts the arrows of our criticism. We return to our place in the ranks of humanity.

It is important to realize that the mere absence of temptation does not necessarily constitute a state of grace. A man may be below temptation. He may love nothing—in which case there will be no citadel to be attacked. Conflict is evidence of vitality,

for every conflict represents the warring of antagonistic beliefs. The serenity of that man who, loving one thing only, is free from temptation has nothing in common with the inertia of a man who, loving nothing, is incapable of experiencing inner conflict. Hence, possibly, the meaning of the phrase—"Count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations."

We seek the Real. Always and everywhere that is our quest. We are in a world where nothing endures, where everything fades almost as soon as it is glimpsed, and amid the many deceptions of this ever-changing mirage, each of us, in his degree, seeks an image of the Eternal. And so it is that we love that best which seems most real to us. It may be a woman, it may be an art, it may be a cause—or it may be spirit. But, whatever it be, it gives us assurance of substance, of permanence—of something outside and above the shifting shows of time. What we love is God to us.

So, finally, we return to that malevolent personage, the Devil—now travelling incognito in the realms of the invisible. He has gone the way of all symbols which have ceased to be significant. Nowadays, we do not regard him melodramatically. We no longer invest evil with the insignia of satanic sovereignty. We see it as something squalid, second-rate—a projection of our pride, lust, or avarice. It is our unreality. Our temptations are subtle inducements to deny that which it is life to affirm. While we love one thing best, and not one thing only, these inner conflicts are inevitable, for each love contends for the full and undisputed possession of the will.

It is wiser to regard temptations as charlatans rather than ambassadors from Satan. It is more honest to recognize that their power over us is derived from our weakness. We have taken their bribes and therefore have become their accomplices. It is saner to see in them those aspects of ourselves which we deny. Then they will shrink to human proportions and, perhaps—finally—dwindle to shadows.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Beware, Lanoo, lest dazzled by illusive radiance thy Soul should linger and be caught in its deceptive light. This light shines from the jewel of the Great Ensnarer, (Mara). The senses it bewitches, blinds the mind and leaves the unwary an abandoned wreck.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

THE POWER OF POETRY IN THE STRUGGLE OF LIFE

[**E. Merrill Root,** Lecturer at Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, U. S. A., is the author of two volumes of verse, *Lost Eden,* and *Bow of Burning Gold.*—EDS.]

The passing of life is like the ceaseless flow of a brook—merely so much water running to the sea. But across life, as across the brook, fall images of beauty that fill the lapsing flow with form and colour: birches, like snow that even summer cannot melt; fantastic mountains of the restless clouds; cool freckled stars of woodlilies and tracery of ferns; the shadows of strolling lovers . . . Thus upon the hurried flow of time, struggling onward toward the sea's illusive permanence (for the end is but the origin), falls the image of abiding beauty. Eternity is not after, but within, time.

Something like that, I think, is the relation of poetry to the struggle of life.

For poetry is art inducing time to realize eternity. All spiritual geniuses know, by direct experience, that eternity is the present tense of time—the great *I Am.* But they can communicate this, with all its atmosphere, only if they are (in the widest sense) poets. For the function of poetry is not only to reveal eternity in perishing and passing things, but to make it credible and persuasive by the witness of beauty. Like waters troubled into fretful noise our temporal lives plunge downward toward the illusion of death, and until we awaken to eternal life we think this lapsing flow and blind hurry of the waters is all: but it is not so; and (thanks to poetry) we can know it, and realize the azure mirrored heaven, or the idle music of a cascade, or the rainbow architecture of the frolic foam,—eternal amid transience. Then, wise with that illumination, we change the struggle of life into the mastery of life.

Too often, alas, we are like some man on a park bench by a lake, his mind intent on action and acquisition, his thoughts still full of expediences and ambitions. But it may be that even into the vision of the lowered and vacant eyes of such a man, suddenly a white swan will drift, its calm beauty mirrored in the even calmer beauty of its shadow. Like that white swan upon that black water, so poetry (if we will but see) hovers upon the waters of time.

We hear great poetry, and life is forever changed. It is not that poetry teaches us—for teaching is still the technique of time: rather, like light which tells us nothing but by which we see all things, poetry comes to us with the white shock of incredible revelation. We listen to great poets, and we see that second light which is beyond the light of the sun. And *sub specie æternitatis* the struggle for existence is

not what it was: it is understood, it is purged by pity and terror, it is widened to a new dimension of being. Action and acquisition, expediences and ambitions, propaganda and science and controversy, are like the wind which is the earth's own narrow atmosphere, blowing things obviously and violently to and fro but changing little; poetry is like the sunlight which shines in unshaken quiet across that wind, bringing life to corn and rose.

Poetry, which is the oblique light of eternity, makes the great transvaluation of values. It transfigures the struggle of life, from its basis in earth to its height in the spirit. In the dullness and the dreary-go-round of the day by day, it opens magic casements on the perilous foam of beauty and the mystery and miracle of shores undreamed of in the world's philosophy. It brings a renaissance of wonder; a sense of the many mansions; a feeling of a fathomless universe. And it does so by revealing magic in the simplest things—music.

> Soft as a bubble sung
> Out of a linnet's lung—

the minnows that, forgetting the struggle in their vital joy,

> Ever wrestle
> With their own sweet delight—

the sunset

> Where ships of purple gently toss
> On seas of daffodil.

Through such poetry of Nature, as Wordsworth says,

> With an eye made quiet by the power
> Of harmony, and the deep power of joy
> We see into the life of things.

And all the poets who realise the latency of the infinite within the physical world serve us in the same way, and set our feet upon the first mile of the Great Path. And for the second mile, poetry reveals eternity within the depth and height of the human spirit also, and every

> Wondrous thing
> A man may be 'twixt ape and Plato.

So Shakespeare, so Browning, so in a different way Blake and Whitman. And poetry goes higher still, into the intimate mysteries of the shadow and the light, from that finite ocean of darkness and death which George Fox saw, up to that infinite ocean of love and of light which he saw above it. Poetry knows life "a dome of many-coloured glass" staining "the white radiance of eternity". Poetry knows, like Lear (his life lifted above hope and fear and desire and death), how to take upon it "the mystery of things" and be one of "God's spies". We hear such words,—varied from the realization of the physical world "innumerable of stains and splendid dyes," up to the white, highest, blinding intuitions and experiences of the spirit—and the struggle of life is changed, as Domremy was changed by the life of Joan of Arc, or Jerusalem by the passion of Jesus.

And once we have experienced great poetry we are,—in the only credible sense,—beyond good and evil. For, seen from eternity, is not tragedy the most divine of comedies? In the second light of great poetry, King Lear "fantastically dressed in wild-flowers,"

wandering in the misery of madness, is nearer the Kingdom of Heaven than the proud and foolish Lear who cursed his daughter. Death itself, and the transience of the world, with this second light upon them, are beautiful: "After life's fitful fever, he sleeps well". . . "We are such stuff as dreams are made on" . . . Great kings in their misery sad, are raised by poetry into a tragic joy, a tragic greatness, as when Achilles said to Priam, "Thou too, I hear, wast in the old time happy." The poignance of lost youth, even in the pessimist's despite, becomes good: "Yet Ah that Spring should vanish with the rose!" is the very affirmation and eternity of Spring. Poetry purges us of vulgar sadness; poetry lifts us above the fever and the fret of men; poetry says: "Be of good cheer: in me you overcome the world." All things, lifted into poetry, are—beyond good and evil—*great.*

A secular and worldly age understands poetry and religion least, and needs poetry and religion most. It does not understand them, and it needs them, because they are the finite reaching up for the infinite, the infinite bending down to the finite. When we follow poetry, it is as if, some early evening, we approached a tree on a hilltop, and thought we saw apples hanging on its branches, and climbed for them . . . only to find them—*stars!*

E. MERRILL ROOT

That ancient seer [Kavi Purana] which the Gita and the Mahabharata mention as abiding in the breast of each, is first a prophet and poet; then he falls asleep, and awakes as a blindfold logician and historian, without materials for reasoning, or a world for events, but groping towards them; next a painter, with an ear for inward phantasmal music too; at last a sculptor carving out hard, palpable solidities. Hence the events destined to occur in this outer world can never be either foreshown or represented with complete exactitude in the sphere of dreams, but must be translated into its pictorial and fantastical language.

But besides this dim, prophetic character, referring to isolated events in time, thy dream, like all other dreams, has a more universal and enduring significance, setting forth, as it does, in a series of vivid symbols, a crowd of spiritual truths and allegories that are eternally true to the human soul.—*The Dream of Ravan.*

EQUALITY

[J. D. Beresford's ideas, herein presented, if pushed to their logical conclusions, would mean the introduction of a "caste-system" on a pure and true basis. Is the western civilization spiralling to the position which made it necessary in ancient India to form the four great castes in due recognition of the four divisions of the Human Kingdom, to which the *Gita* refers in the fourth and the eighteenth discourses ?—EDS.]

In the broad phases of historical development as it is known to us from literature over a course of some 6,000 years, there has been no period that offers any true analogy to the conditions of the present day. The most obvious reason for this is the extraordinary progress made during the last hundred years, in ease of communication. But it is with results and not with causes that we are concerned in this article, and, among many results, more particularly with one only, namely, the movement towards the claim for equality.

There are two main aspects of this claim, religious and political, or social. The first, judged by the standard of the Christian Churches, is theoretical rather than practical. Starting from the assumption that "all men are equal in the sight of God," the Church proceeds to demonstrate that men are anything but equal in the sight of the Priest; since the very office of Priesthood constitutes a claim to superiority, by its division of humanity into the two classes of teachers and disciples. Some sects, most notably the Society of Friends, have recognised this inherent contradiction and sought to remedy it in their methods of worship, but for the Christian Church as a whole that primal assumption of equality has very little influence in the practice either of its priests or its congregations.

In its second, political or social, aspect, however, the gospel of equality has gained enormously in influence during the last couple of generations. As a political doctrine, socialism, once regarded as revolutionary, is now criticised by the extreme left of communism as nothing more than an economic and bourgeois remedy for the world-disease of poverty; while the general principles of Democracy are now so well established that it is hard to believe that they have ever been in dispute,—although the first English Reform Bill reached its centenary only last year.

This movement due to the spread of education, enormously aided in turn by the proliferation of cheap newspapers, has produced the phenomenon of "class-consciousness". The gospel of Rousseau and his followers from Tom Paine onwards, that every man has equal rights, is now, with ever diminishing qualifications, accepted as an axiom. And at the present moment two of

the great countries of Europe are ruled despotically one by the son of a blacksmith and the other by the Georgian bandit, Djugashvilli, who will be known to history as Stalin; while England's Premier was born a member of the working-classes and gained his present position by his own virtues and effort, without the influence of either wealth or patronage.

If then we could draw any general inference from the astonishingly rapid advance made by the broad gospel of Equality in so short a time, it would surely be that the tendency of world development was in the direction of some form of socialism, collectivism or communism, founded on the principle that men are all born equal and must have equal rights. Moreover, we should be tempted to prophesy further, that by extension the principle would lead to the negation of nationalism, and that in some not too far distant future the whole civilised world would be approaching the ideal of one of those Wellsian Utopias which prefigure the generosities and liberation of a Golden Age.

Finally in this connection is it not the great accepted principle of the Theosophical Movement to work towards a Universal Brotherhood of Humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour? And does not that principle imply an effort towards the eradication of all those handicaps imposed by birth in present social and economic conditions?

And yet, although we must give unqualified assent to those two last questions and are able to draw but one deduction from the recent trend of social evolution, we have to face what I regard as an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of a condition in which there can be anything more than equality of opportunity among men.

For if we may attempt the difficult task of making some kind of summary of the movement of life on this planet so far as we have any knowledge of it, one tremendous and unequivocal process immediately confronts us. This process is that of an unceasing struggle which can serve its purpose only by working upon the *differences* between individuals, between species, or between nations. From all the evidence we have of the working of evolution we must grant—whatever may be our particular theory with regard to its various stages and the generating force behind them—that no such development would have been possible if every member of succeeding generations had been born precisely alike. Biologists have long puzzled over this curiosity, and failed utterly to account for it, but none would deny that there are, and must always have been, fundamental and intrinsic variations between the individuals of each family, whether in the vegetable or the animal world. And if we desired to make a perfectly safe generalisation with regard to life from its simplest to its most complicated developments, it would be by

saying that no two aggregations of cells were precisely equal in every respect.*

In the simpler forms of life, these differentiations become increasingly difficult to detect as we work our way back towards the most primitive cell aggregates. Indeed, it is a matter of inference rather than of observation that one amœba differs from another. But when we pass from the vegetable and animal kingdoms to human life, the claim that "nature" never repeats a particular pattern cannot be confuted. Even in the nearest approximation to such a repetition, the case of "identical" twins,—entities assumed to have sprung from a single ovum,—there are always easily recognisable differences between the two children.

So far, however, we have taken count only of purely physical considerations, and interesting and important as these undoubtedly are they furnish no more than a means of approach to the far more important question of the essential differences between one human being and another. (Any account of the relation of the spiritual and physical make-up of man would necessitate too long a parenthesis in this place. But I have assumed the Theosophical explanation of various problems in heredity, namely the pre-eminently reasonable suggestion that the re-incarnating ego is drawn to a particular environment, a particular embryo, by the influence of a sympathetic attraction exercised by the psychic emanations of the parents.)

Have we, then, a right to assume that not alone the physical body of one human being differs essentially from that of any other, but, also, the expression of that immortal principle within him which we recognise as the true Ego? No Theosophist would hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative. If we accept the principle of the Pilgrim Soul, of a spiritual evolution attained by individual effort through countless experiences and re-incarnations, we must accept, also, the inevitable *sequitur* that the world about us is peopled by those whose egos cover an enormous range of spiritual development. Sometimes it may happen that a soul is confined within a defective physical envelope incapable of giving it the expression proper to its stage of development. But speaking broadly we must assume that there is a very close correspondence between the almost infinite variety of abilities, virtues, tendencies, potentialities, we find in human beings, and the stage of development attained by the generating ego.

It is impossible, in our present state of knowledge, to trace this correspondence to its source, to assert that such and such a person must have had certain experiences in past lives which find expression

* It may be that the recent deductions of the physicists, based on Heissenberg's principle of Indeterminacy, which attributes a certain amount of "play" to the electron, will ultimately lead to the conclusion that this tendency to variation is a fundamental characteristic of all matter.

in his, or her, present character. We must, for instance, assume that the lessons learnt in earlier incarnations may be either permanent or impermanent in their effects upon consequent lives. But we can affirm without fear of contradiction, on the one hand, that animalism, cruelty, hatred, lack of sensitivity and sympathy, are characteristic of the young soul, and on the other that spirituality, love of humanity, the urgent desire to conquer the animal desires mark the advancing stage of those who have benefited by a long series of incarnations. At the furthest extreme we recognise the few, the Masters and Adepts who have attained to a fuller consciousness, and are able to draw upon the inexhaustible fount of the Inner Wisdom. That they should be so few in number indicates the fact that this world is at present only as yet in the earlier stages of its spiritual evolution.

To summarise this brief statement of belief with regard to the quality of man and his relation to himself and to the world, what we have done is to show that there is a constitutional tendency to variation throughout the universe, a tendency possibly inherent in the very nature of matter. From that we infer that progression, evolution is only made possible by the struggle which is the inevitable consequence of this variation. Finally we have suggested that this struggle becomes the vehicle whereby the "Pilgrim Soul" may win its way through the differentiation that represents pain and conflict back to that state of Perfect Unity which is the peace beyond all understanding of Nirvana.

Let us return now to our opening statement with regard to the contention that in a perfect state all men would have equal rights, and demand first if that is conceivably possible and secondly if it would be even desirable.

The first question has answered itself. In this stage of our evolution, men are born so far differentiated that the gap which separates the Adept from the savage, (civilised or otherwise), is infinitely greater than the gap that separates the savage from the higher animals. The fact that the gap is bridgeable in the former case and, with possibly very rare exceptions, not in the other has no relevance in this connection. The conclusion with which we are confronted is that of all living creatures man is the only one in whom the divergence between individuals becomes so great that it constitutes a difference in kind. How then can we possibly admit that men are born equal, or with still greater force that we should accord them equal rights? Can the spiritually minded, those who have advanced and are advancing in their pilgrimage, be ruled or taught by those who are either in the earliest stages of soul discipline and experience, or, worse still, in a stage of retrogression? We have to face the fact that whatever his potentiality for development, no man can realise

more than a fraction of it in a single incarnation. We have to realise that the caste system of India is justified in differentiating between degrees of holiness, and that in the Western world we should be sinning against a great spiritual principle if we delegated the powers of government to the control of those who have had little spiritual experience. (In passing it may be well to note that it is this lack of spirituality which must ultimately wreck the Bolshevik rule in Russia.)

Finally, we must ask ourselves how these conclusions can be made to accord with that first principle of Theosophy quoted in our sixth paragraph? The answer to that will be found in any number of THE ARYAN PATH. Our way to development through the conflict and agonies of this world of illusions, is by the paths of self-discipline and of love. It is our duty and progressively it will become our pleasure to help the "living Dead," those who are ignorant of the Esoteric truths and Wisdom, not less than those who are our fellow pilgrims. But we shall not serve our own purpose nor that of the world at large by blinding ourselves to the truth that men are born unequal and in chains (to reverse Rousseau's dictum), the chains being those we ourselves have forged in our earlier lives; and that "a man is priest or prince, a slave or a servant, not because of birth into a particular family or group, but because of the qualities of his heart, the capacities of his head, the efficiency of his hands."

J. D. BERESFORD

आत्मौपम्येन सर्वत्र समं पश्यति योऽर्जुन ।
सुखं वा यदि वा दुःखं स योगी परमो मतः ।

—श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता.

He, O Arjuna, who by the similitude found in himself seeth but one essence in all things, whether they be evil or good, is considered to be the most excellent devotee.

—BHAGAVAD-GITA, *VI, 32*

THE DOCTRINE OF WILL IN SHAKESPEARE

[**John Middleton Murry** points out that fate or determinism and free-will or self-determination are not opposites but are complementaries. This is the old teaching of the Law of Karma. Two horses these—which draw the car of evolution. When man is a slave to one, he is slave to both; when he conquers destiny, he is no more free, for he is but a channel of Universal Forces. Human evolution proceeds by self-devised and self-induced ways, but always checked by Karma, till man becomes Karma-less, *i.e.*, an Impersonal Force for Universal Beneficence. Following the article we give an extract bearing on the ideas of our esteemed contributor on "men of destiny."—EDS.]

Two familiar quotations from Shakespeare appear to bear directly upon the question of the will. First, Cassius' words to Brutus:

> Men at some time are masters of their fates:
> The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
> But in ourselves, that we are underlings.

The second Iago's indoctrination of the reluctant Roderigo.

> ROD. What should I do? I confess it is my shame to be so fond; but it is not in my virtue to amend it.
>
> IAGO. Virtue! a fig! 'tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus. Our bodies are gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners: so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce... why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills. If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions: but we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts; whereof I take this, that you call love, to be a sect or scion.
>
> ROD. It cannot be.
>
> IAGO. It is merely a lust of the blood and a permission of the will.

They seem at first sight to be categorical. Are we to conclude that Shakespeare was asserting the doctrine of complete individual freedom?

In the first place, it is always dangerous, and always unwarrantable, to impute to an author the opinions of his dramatic characters; and second, in both these particular cases, Shakespeare has applied his own corrective. Not when Cassius chides Brutus, far less when Iago lectures Roderigo, can we look for the pure sentiment of Shakespeare. Cassius and Roderigo are both contrivers (though one is noble, the other base) seeking to persuade another to the action they themselves desire. What could be more natural, for what could be more persuasive, than an appeal to the vanity of their victims? For, indeed, the doctrine of free-will, as enunciated by these interested moralists, is a doctrine of egotism.

Mark further: what is it that Cassius has to overcome in Brutus, by his appeal to free-will? Brutus' love of Caesar. And what has Iago to overcome in Roderigo? His desire to escape his hopeless love for Desdemona by death. These obstacles to the plans of Cassius and Iago come from the noblest elements in their victims' characters. The doctrine of free-will is used to undermine the scruple of nobility. Iago, of course, is the past-master at this

devilish game. Whereas Cassius is a noble fanatic, he is the mystery of iniquity itself. His agile brain utterly confuses poor Roderigo. First, in response to Roderigo's lament that his virtue is not of power enough to quench his hapless love, Iago assures him that it is a question of the will merely. Precisely thus might an austere moralist seek to stiffen the fibre of a weakling. But Iago turns it all to the devil's purpose. Poor Roderigo's genuine love-passion is degraded into "a lust of the blood and a permission of the will". Roderigo's timid soul is outraged: "It cannot be." But Iago overwhelms him.

So, in these two famous instances, Shakespeare gives the doctrine of free-will to the tempter. It is a potent weapon in the devil's armoury. Are we then to rush to the conclusion that Shakespeare believed that "it is *not* in ourselves that we are thus, or thus"? That would be extravagant. Nor does the truth lie in between these contrary positions. It belongs to a different order. And the order in which the truth concerning Shakespeare is to be sought is expressed by the still more famous words of a character in whom, all serious critics are agreed, an approximation to Shakespeare's own nature may be found.

> Let us know
> Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
> When our deep plots do pall: and that should teach us
> There's a divinity that shapes our ends
> Rough-hew them how we will.

There is, I think, the gist of Shakespeare's own counter to the doctrine of Iago. It does not belong to the realm of the old and sterile controversy between Free-will and Determinism, at all. The doctrine of Free-will, as enunciated by Iago, is the mere instrument of an overweening egotism. "I have it in my power"—such is the conviction of Iago—"to do what *I* will." Hamlet is far beyond this futile posturing; this incipient megalomania. For the deep plots of the finite mind he has contempt. It is the unwilled, spontaneous action which is indeed creative.

In short behind Hamlet's words is a *religious* awareness. Hence they have taken root so deep in the general memory, and become part of the religious wisdom of the English race, which welcomes these poetic expressions of an unformulated and unformulable faith. The conscious will in man, says Hamlet, can shape but the rough outline of a life; the form, the final reality, is shaped by a deeper power. But in their context, Hamlet's words say more than this: behind them is concealed a fragment of the self-knowledge of the great artist who conceived him. It is a subtle assertion of the supremacy of "inspiration". What Shakespeare knows as a poet, Hamlet declares as a man of action. And the correspondence which all great critics of Shakespeare, from Coleridge to Bradley, have sensed between Hamlet and Shakespeare is due, in the main, to the fact that Hamlet thinks like an artist,

and like a great artist. It is not that we can know, except dimly, how the mind of Shakespeare worked; it is that our expectation would not be disappointed if we were to know that it worked like Hamlet's mind. There is no other character in the whole of Shakespeare's work of whom that can be said.

The religious awareness that is half-hidden and half-expressed in Hamlet's words is the religious awareness of a great artist. He, more than other men, knows the reality and the creative virtue of the condition of selflessness. "As for the Poetic character," said Keats, in whom we may surely look for the elements of Shakespeare's composition, "it is not itself, it has no Self." And this is true. The true creative condition is one of selfless spontaneity, when man becomes the perfect instrument of the obscure utterance of Life. His will is in abeyance, his egoistic self-consciousness fades away: because he is the vehicle of a new creation.

Nor is this condition the peculiar privilege of the artist, as such. The artist, in this respect, is but a particular example of the religious man. Imagine that selfless condition of the artist, which is attained by him when he is an artist indeed, no longer confined to the creation of art itself, but expanded until it suffuses the total activities of a man. Such a man would be a wholly religious man. He would be incessantly the instrument of God's will, for he would live in a condition of pure and uncorrupted spontaneity. Not one of his acts would be his own, yet every one of them would be perfectly individual: not in the barren sense of "individual," that is, different from others', but in the positive sense of the word, wherein "individual" means "pure and purely creative". Such a condition, of complete religiousness, we can ourselves only imagine; towards such a condition, we may be sure, the remembered religious leaders have approximated. Of such a condition, the selflessness of the great artist is premonitory and symbolic. Our name for those whom we recognise to have advanced a perceptible degree towards this condition is "men of destiny".

They may be prophets, poets, statesmen, warriors, revolutionaries; but all alike are distinguished from the mass of men by this half-evident quality of "selflessness," this capacity of becoming an instrument for the obscure creative urge of life. They are greater than themselves; they speak with authority, and not as the scribes; they act with creative power, and not by pattern or memory: yet their power derives from some kind of obedience, not from any self-will. To this order of men Shakespeare manifestly belonged. He was the supreme artist-type of this kind of creative men. But art, in the ordinary sense of the word, is only one single mode of creativeness. Creativeness utters itself in other ways: in the government of

a nation, in the rhythm of sequestered individual life, in the conduct of war, in the discovery of a new invention, in the scriptures of a new religion. But in all these modes of the creative life, the doctrine of Hamlet holds good, because it derives from the creativeness which it seeks to define.

And because it derives from the self-knowledge of a creative man, it glides sinuously between the rocky opposites of Free-will and Determinism. It knows, by instinct, that these two are but the contradictory half-truths with which men, in whom the creative flow of life has ebbed to a trickle, make ghostly war on one another. Shakespeare gives the doctrine of Free-will to lower natures as a snare with which they may entangle higher ones into rash and fatal enterprises. And however varied may be the grounded opinions of the nature of Shakespeare's life-wisdom, I believe that no man into whom the work of Shakespeare has entered would deny that one element of it was the intuitive conviction that men are *not* masters of their fate. That conviction is knit into the most intimate substance of Shakespeare's tragedy. But neither are men the blind puppets of destiny, nor the victims of malignant chance. Indeed, Shakespearian tragedy is, more than anything else, a simple passing beyond this false and mechanical dilemma. It tells us that though men are not masters of the events of circumstance by which their lives are hedged, they are masters of the inward quality of their lives: and somehow, this inward quality of the human life is more important than all outward circumstance. The important thing is not that a man is triumphant, or defeated, but that he should be "heroic": obedient, come what may, to the deepest promptings of his soul. Hence, the Shakespearian hero is always "passionate" on some level or other; he is never egotistic, never coldly calculating. His passion may be, as it is in Hamlet, united with a plenitude of intellectual consciousness, or, as in Othello, with very little intellectual consciousness (who can imagine Hamlet taken in by Iago's trick with the handkerchief?): but, essentially, they belong all to the same order —for better or worse, they are warm, spontaneous, big men; majestic or delicate beings, replete with animal grace, caught in the world's great snare. They may be fools, but they are glorious; they go out like fiery flames in sudden darkness, not like a feeble match-light guttering into gloom.

Hamlet is no exception: it is merely that he is more delicately organised. Into his passionate spontaneity consciousness itself has to be fused. The instant action is not for him, save at the moment of supreme crisis; and then he is quick as sudden incandescence. To no final avail, indeed, in the eyes of men. But what of that? He has been himself, and not himself. He has manifested Energy after his kind,

and been the vehicle of God—even a prophet of the Lord. For a whole epoch of the Western consciousness was to find itself mirrored in him.

The secret of Shakespeare's morality is spontaneity. That is admirable and lovely to him. And spontaneity has nothing to do with free-will. Free-will is a doctrine framed by the ego, to justify the ego: and so is determinism. Determinism is the ego run mad, enforcing its finite schematism upon the infinite of life. Shakespeare believed in neither. How could he? If ever a great man's work were the outcome of spontaneity, deriving from beneath and beyond the ego, it was his. He knew, by immediate experience, that "the poetic character is not itself: it has no Self"; and he knew also that the poetic character, in its purity, is a type of richest living. Therefore his heroes are like him: they also have no Selves; they are neither determined nor free. They are Life.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

Great Genius, therefore, if true and innate, and not merely an abnormal expansion of our human intellect—can never copy or condescend to imitate, but will ever be original, *sui generis* in its creative impulses and realizations. Like those gigantic Indian lilies that shoot out from the clefts and fissures of the cloud-nursing, and bare rocks on the highest plateaux of the Nilgiri Hills, true Genius needs but an opportunity to spring forth into existence and blossom in the sight of all on the most arid soil, for its stamp is always unmistakable. To use a popular saying, innate genius, like murder, will out sooner or later, and the more it will have been suppressed and hidden, the greater will be the flood of light thrown by the sudden irruption. On the other hand artificial genius, so often confused with the former, and which in truth is but the outcome of long studies and training, will never be more than, so to say, the flame of a lamp burning outside the portal of the fane; it may throw a long trail of light across the road, but it leaves the inside of the building in darkness. . . . Thus between the true and the artificial genius, one born from the light of the immortal Ego, the other from the evanescent will-o'-the-wisp of the terrestrial or purely human intellect and the animal soul, there is a chasm, to be spanned only by him who aspires ever onward; who never loses sight, even when in the depths of matter, of that guiding star the Divine Soul and mind, or what we call *Buddhi-Manas*.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Lucifer*, November 1889

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

ACCORDING TO RABINDRANATH TAGORE

[**Humbert Wolfe** is a mystic and poet as well as a satirist and a literary historian. As the Principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, he is also a man of affairs.—EDS.]

The republication after more than twenty years of the lectures delivered by Rabindranath Tagore at Bolpur affords an opportunity of reconsidering his general ethical system. Emphasis should be laid at the outset on the word "ethical" because Tagore is not in the ordinarily accepted meaning of the term a metaphysician. He does not, that is to say, begin by facing the difficulties of cognition, and by proceeding thence to review conduct in the light of the limits imposed by that review on the possibility of reaching a firm conclusion. His attitude, like that of Shaftesbury and the other English empiricists, is rather to take the validity of knowledge for granted. Thus, for example, when in the course of these beautiful and most moving discourses he contemplates the problem of evil he hardly glances at the preliminary problem of error. Yet for the metaphysician error is a more stubborn dilemma than evil. For, if we can explain the possibility of error without necessarily abandoning the likelihood of truth, we are in a fair way to accept evil without excommunicating good.

We must, therefore, address our minds to Tagore's teaching, not in the hope of having epistemological puzzles solved, but rather as to the exposition of a faith in terms of one of the sweetest minds that ever married belief to reason. Nor is this a reflection upon Tagore. If we read the works of one of the Christian Fathers we do not, and should not, expect a disquisition on Plato's "to tì ên einai" nor on Aristotle's Metaphysics Gamma. We take it for granted that they start from the basis of the revealed doctrine of Christ, and that their effort is to interpret the gospel and not either to question it or to provide it with a new metaphysical basis. So it is with Tagore in his exposition of the Upanishads. Tagore himself says in his brief preface that—

> To me the verses of the Upanishads and the teachings of Buddha have ever been things of the spirit, and therefore endowed with boundless vital growth; and I have used them, both in my own life and in my preaching, as being instinct with individual meaning for me, as for others, and awaiting for their confirmation, my own special testimony, which must have its value because of its individuality.

We must, therefore, approach *Sādhanā* as a commentary, an all but inspired commentary,

* *Sādhanā*. By Rabindranath Tagore. (Macmillan & Co., London. *3s. 6d.*)

upon one of the great Faiths of mankind. From that angle we cannot criticize it: so nobly, with such ecstatic wisdom is it written. We can only recapitulate its main outlines, believing that at no time in history was Faith more endangered and more urgently needed for the salvation of Man.

There are here eight lectures in all, and though Tagore himself would indignantly deny that they cover more than the fringe of his subject, to a Westerner they seem to express the whole matter and to seal it with effortless loveliness of utterance. The main thesis throughout is the dichotomy between self and the world, self and the soul, self and beauty, self and the Universe and self and God. The teaching of the Upanishads on all these oppositions is the same, and might without complete falsehood be summarized in the saying "What shall it profit a man to win the whole world and lose his soul?" In the first lecture Tagore discusses the relation of the individual to the universe. He points out that in the West there had been a tendency to treat Nature as the enemy, in the East she is the first and last a friend. He does not mean by that, nor do the Upanishads mean, that we are to yield to the animal in ourselves and rejoice in the apparently chaotic processes of death and decay. He means that the attitude of Wordsworth is the true attitude, the ability to establish unity between the mind of man and the mind of the world, and so to extend both in unity. He would not, like the amiable Professor Irving Babbitt, regard such an attitude as "going out and mixing oneself up with the landscape." He would say rather "our birth is but a dream and a forgetting" and that, if we wish to dream the dream true, we must tax our memories to the utmost and go back to that place where there is the unity from which Nature and the individual proceed—the Karma-yoga.

If then we accept this preliminary doctrine we proceed on an orderly basis to the consideration of soul-consciousness. Here we are taught that in so far as we hoard our own soul we waste it. In the exquisite image used by Tagore we are like the oil in a lamp before it is kindled. Only when the oil burns into light and, therefore, communicates and is about the Father's business of illumination, do we find ourselves. Love of children, and of lovers is a step on the way, but the steps slope through darkness to the love of all things, and so, of God. Obviously, however, the question of evil cannot be avoided. Is not, the logician asks, the mere existence of evil the destruction of the system which depends for its truth on the extension of good. To this the Upanishads answer not, as Tennyson vaguely hinted, that evil is somehow good, but that evil is part of good in the heavenly counterpoint. Evil, on the one hand, is but an incident in the universal progress. On the other it is as necesssry to good as

the measure of the brightness of day is to the darkness of night. We must accept the dictation of sorrow and pain as a means of release into the serenity where, both being transcended, we are not merely no longer at the mercy of either, but are enriched by their conquest.

This brings us to the problem of self, and here Tagore is at pains to refute a widely prevalent conception both here and in India as to the true meaning of Nirvāna. It is true, say the Upanishads, that we must surrender self, but not by extinction. We must not lose it but extend it into the unity of the universal self. "Mukti," which is deliverance from evil, is not self-destruction: it is to prevail over māyā, the appearance which springs from "avidyā". In other words Nirvāna so far from being non-existence is intense existence in the most athletic cleanliness of sheer being. It is the death of ignorance, but it is the risen body of the lord of Truth.

Hence it is but a step to love as the law of Unity, and action as the realization of love. The Upanishads, unlike the Fakirs, do not believe that the Way is to bend the head and let evil sweep by on the whirlwind. It is part of the privilege of love to work, to be and to suffer for it. "This" as Browning sweetly said, "is the same soul. Can thy soul know change?". It cannot. East and West acceptance is more eager, more active, and more burningly alive than refusal. Buddha accepts for all His world, and those who follow Him can only do so at the price of an acceptance, even if that implies death in the body.

It will be seen that all that has been attempted here is to give a halting summary of what a Mahatma—for Tagore if any man deserves the title—has written. It would be as idle to bring metaphysical question to a superb rendering of the Upanishads as it would be to apply the principles of Kant to the Sermon on the Mount. All that it becomes the commentator to say is that here with the faultless diction of great poetry, the Faith which has led half the Eastern world to light is interpreted with the lucidity of the moon on water. In the luminous tenderness of that exposition we may all not only learn much, but this most of all—to re-examine our own faiths. They will be the stronger and the finer if they emerge unshaken from that test.

HUMBERT WOLFE

HERITAGES IN THE MELTING POT*

[**Dr. Kalidas Nag** of Calcutta University is the Editor of *India and the World*, the organ of the Greater India Society.—EDS.]

For the last few years the students of human history, no less than the reading public, have been treated to "legacies" and "heritages" of the different nations. Proprietary instinct of individuals as well as of communities is proverbial, and from time to time, therefore, are published "balance sheets" of national assets and liabilities. Economic interpretation of history is at least as old as the *Wealth of Nations*, that classical work of Adam Smith, coming from the end of the eighteenth century in the wake of Industrial Revolution. Now in our days, not only the material but the spiritual assets of nations are being evaluated under the urge of a conscious, unconscious or semi-conscious sense of *economy*. What is my heritage? What are my legacies? What are the advantages accruing therefrom? What part of my assets can I utilise in this present age? What amount of my national asset can I convert into liquid wealth intensifying our national as well as our international commerce? Such are the questions which are being asked by every nation today, both from the point of view of material as well as spiritual relations.

Dr. Kenneth Saunders, a liberal Christian missionary directing the Pacific School of Religion, has taken upon himself the task of the "Chief Valuer" of the Asiatic Property Trust Limited, composed of three leading partners, India, China and Japan. The function of the valuer, it is needless to say, is both difficult and delicate, often involving summary judgments, capricious awards and, in places, unequal evaluation. Luckily, Dr. Saunders has given up the precarious method of evaluating the heritages of non-Christian nations simply to prove that these past heritages can find their fulfilment in Christianity. Such an attitude is neither historical nor rational; for Christianity itself, as a heritage, is being severely examined today by Christian individuals and denominations from the point of view of an utilitarianism which is very modern and certainly not a hundred per cent Christian. Dr. Saunders prefers the path of objective, as opposed to subjective, evaluation, and consequently he has succeeded in bringing out an eminently readable, sympathetic and inspiring study, *The Heritage of Asia*. His personal contact with the lands and the peoples discussed in the book helped him to discriminate the chaff from the grain, and his comparative study of the three great civilisations from the Middle and the

* *The Heritage of Asia*. By Kenneth Saunders. (Macmillan Co., New York. $1.75)
Hinduism To-day. By D. S. Sarma. (Ganesh and Co., Madras. Re. 1/8)
Neo Hinduism. By D. V. Athalye. (D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., Bombay. Rs. 5, 8 as.)

Far East will be read with great interest and profit. The original texts in English translation at the end of the book, we are sure, will heighten the interest of the readers. A believing Christian as he is, the author could not help reading Christian influence on national leaders like Gandhi, Hu Shih and Kagawa. But to the majority of cultured nationals the Rise of the Christian Power in the East (as sketched by the late Major B. D. Basu of Allahabad, India) appears more as a factor humiliating the self-respect of the Asiatic nations rather than stimulating their spiritual and cultural aspirations. Christian *power* and Christian *ethics* are in tragic clash to-day on the field of human spiritual consciousness and, as dominating nations, the Christians have the greater responsibility of preaching and practising humility and charity, the noblest legacies of Jesus Christ whom Asia adores as one of her great sons and sages. The heritages of the Asiatic nations are found wanting here and there according to the modern valuation; the Occidentals and the Church Christians no less would be found wanting in many respects; and that explains why most of the great mass movements of the non-Christian communities are following the path of *national* transvaluation of values rather than of a supra-national or international church organisation.

Hinduism To-day, by Prof. D. S. Sarma, one of the most lucid and stimulating writers on philosophical subjects from South India, is a work composed in a different key, that of national self-assertion against unhistorical and ungenerous attack of ill-informed Christian theologians upon Hindu religious systems and practices. The following passage will illustrate our point, coming as it does from a sober Hindu philosopher analysing the assumptions of a German Protestant philosopher, Rudolf Otto, the author of *Christianity and the Indian Religion of Grace:*

> After giving a short account of the *Bhakti* movements in India the author proceeds to compare Indian Theism with Christian Theism and comes, of course, to the conclusion that the latter is far superior to the former. But what takes our breath away is his warning to Indian Christians that they should not fall into the error of Sadhu Sundar Singh and accord to the *Gita* and other *Bhakti* literature of India a place even secondary to that of the *New Testament*, or a rank even equivalent to that of the *Old Testament*. This is distinctly a slap in the face of those patriotic and pious Christians of India, who are honestly trying to correlate the religion of Christ with the spiritual traditions of their ancient land and see whether a type of Eastern Christianity could not assimilate as much of Ramanuja and Ramananda as Western Christianity did of Plato and Plotinus. None but a narrow minded theologian could think of asking Indian Christians to be faithful to the traditions of Israel and to their fierce and vindictive tribal deity—Yahweh.

Over a century ago Rammohun Roy, founder of the first Universalist Church of India, whose centenary we are going to celebrate this year, struck a note of warning to our Christian friends through his three *Appeals to the*

Christian Public in Defence of the Precepts of Jesus. Christian missions, as agencies of social service, have undoubtedly played a great rôle in humanizing the instinct and institutions of modern Asia and specially of India. But Christian theology has continued down to this day to appear as a exotic plant. Hence the attempt on the part of men like Dr. A. J. Appasamy, author of *Christianity as a Bhakti Marga, What is Moksha*? etc., and of Mr. V. Chakkarai, author of *The Cross and Indian Thought*—all tending to prove a unique orientation of the Indian spirit towards Christianity. But searching of the heart is equally manifest in the Hindu camp where eminent thinkers like Sri Aurobindo Ghose, Prof. Radhakrishnan, Prof. Sarma and others are attempting to revaluate the criteria of spiritual life, marching away from arid ritualism to the sincere seeking of consolation and salvation through *Bhakti. Hinduism To-day* is a very faithful spiritual barometer to gauge Hindu reactions in the face of the time spirit.

Mr. D. V. Athalye, in his book *Neo Hinduism*, attempts to delineate this renovated Hinduism through the messages and magnetic personality of Swami Vivekananda. It is a very faithful anthology of the sacred thoughts and writings of the Bengali spiritual pioneer, disciple of the unlettered mystic, Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa. Being the favourite disciple of a master who realised and practised the *truth of all religions*, Swami Vivekananda was ever eager to show veneration and enthusiasm for all religions. But he was opposed to a vague sort of a *universal religion* coming from his learned Christian contemporaries, like Dr. Burrow, who claimed Christianity to be but another name for that universal religion. It was not the ideal of Vivekananda to bring round all men to his way of thinking but to give them, if possible, a lift up, thus reflecting the hereditary Hindu genius of tolerance and respect for all spiritual experiences. Hence the magnificent hymn to all religions coming from this great son of modern India which concludes :—

> We stand in the present but open ourselves to the infinite future. . . . Salutations to all the prophets of the past, to all the great ones of the present, and to all that are to come in the future.

All the great leaders of modern India have, more or less, conformed to this line of spiritual realisation, Rammohun Roy and Keshab Chunder Sen, Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, Gandhi and Tagore, each one of them passionately devoted to their great national heritages of faith, and ever ready to enrich the symphony of human spirit by collaborating with brother harmonists from all nations, praying to—

> The One supreme Spirit, creator of so many colours and denominations, for ever remaining above them !
>
> *Ya eko avarno bahudâ Saktiyogât Varṇân anekân nihitârtho dadhâti.*

KALIDAS NAG

VEDANTA AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS *

[**Professor R. Naga Raja Sarma, M.A., L.T., Ph. D.,** indicates how Vedantic teachings can purify and rescue what there is of good in the psychology of Freud.—EDS.]

Born in Vienna fifty years ago, psycho-analytic technique, theory, and practice are still going strong. Certain characteristic bodily or neuro-muscular symptoms which accompany neurotic patients may be traced ultimately to psychic factors. Life is a sum-total of responses to multifarious urges. Sex-urge is the most tremendous of all. Normal life with countless inhibitions social, moral, legal, *et hoc genus omne*, does not afford the fullest opportunity for free and unrestrained responses to the urges. Repressed urges lead to psycho-somatic abnormalities. Abnormal behaviour like hysteria when subjected to careful analysis is sure to reveal suppressed urges mostly of a sexual character. Dreams afford the most favourable occasion for the uprush of the suppressed urges. This is the quintessence of the Freudian Psychology and Psycho-analysis.

Joseph Jastrow feels sure that "after half a century, psycho-analysis is very much on trial" (p. 18–Introductory note). Whether the House that Freud Built has been constructed on the Rock of the Ages so as to endure eternally or whether it is just a flimsy yet fascinating structure which will collapse before the earliest storm of criticism are the questions attempted to be answered by Joseph Jastrow in the volume under notice. Describing the course of the "Libido," examining Freud's interpretation of Dreams, and explaining the place of the "Id," "the Ego and the Super-ego" in the Freudian scheme, Dr. Jastrow reviews the application of Freudian psychology and psycho-analysis to Religion, Education, Arts and Civilisation. This takes us to the end of the first part.

Examining the essentials of the Freudian dream-argument and psycho-analytic technique, Dr. Jastrow ventures on a sort of cautious and non-committal prognostication, towards the conclusion of the work and its second part, that the future of Freudian psycho-analysis will be assured *if* the "extravagant implications and speculations that for the time have obscured and discredited it" are discarded and repudiated.

Dr. Jastrow is positive that the psycho-analytic march cannot continue along the present lines. The movement is "far too much a cult," "far too little a science". Psycho-analysis cannot be rejected *in toto*. Dr. Jastrow thus wants a repudiation of uncritical assumptions and a re-direction of the psycho-analytic venture along the path of hale and healthy humanism, as I understand the matter.

Before closing this brief notice, I only desire to add that any attempt at the salvaging or rehabilitation of psycho-analytic theory and practice can succeed better if the conclusions of Indian psychology are borne in mind. Conclusions of Indian psychology embodied in the Sanskritic texts bearing on the six systems, and the Upanishads, indicate that many of the urges, or motives, or springs to activity that is hideously selfish, anti-social, anti-religious, anti-other-worldly, have either to be completely eradicated or sublimated. Arjuna queries why an individual even against his wish apparently is driven to the commission of crime and sinful acts. (*Atha - kena - prayuktoyam - papam - charati - poorushah – Anichhannapi-varshneya — baladivaniyojitah — Gita* —iii–36.) The Lord answers that sinful activity is the direct response to the stimuli supplied by Desire and Anger. (*Kama-esha-krodha-esha* etc. iii–37.)

* *The House that Freud Built.* By JOSEPH JASTROW, Ph.D, LL.D. (Rider & Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

The term "Kama" is highly and peculiarly suggestive and includes all the Freudian urges and more in its connotation. The desire—the flaming and consuming desire—for possession, power, prestige and other values of life, is "Kama". The psychosis developed in an almost lightning-flash-like manner which makes one fly at the throat of those who thwart one's plans and projects and seek to nullify your desires, is the psychosis of ire or anger. "Krodha".

That the sublimation of ire and desire (*Krodha* and *Kama*) will usher in an era of new humanism is the message of the Vedanta. If individual, social, communal, national and international behaviour is to be regulated by that sublimation, the divinity of man which is just now only "music of a distant drum" will be a soothing symphony within ear-shot. It is the spiritual and moral dynamics of this sublimation advocated by the Vedanta which is directing the footsteps of those who are progressing along the Aryan Path attracted by the *vis a fronte* of a new Humanism. A rational reciprocity between the Freudian motivation and the Vedantic sublimation is the need of the hour.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

[Louis Morgan's part in making *Everyman* attractive takes the shape of eliciting useful opinions of well-known authors on a variety of subjects ; *e g*. in its issue of 15th April we are given the views of St. John Ervine whose straight-from-the-shoulder words on Freudism are worth quoting in connection with the above able review from the pen of an Indian Scholar.

" Freud ! Freud has ruined more lives than you or I will ever know, and he has almost finished off literature. The word *complex* goes to some people's heads. They get drunk on it. They go to psycho-analysis as others go to cocktail parties. And look what Freud has done to friendship ! He's killed the kind of friendship that was so prevalent when I was a young man. Men had men for friends, and women had women. If a young man had a young woman for a friend he was considered a namby-pamby. Or over-sexed. But now if you walk down the Strand twice with the same man, the bobbies run you in ! "]

REALITY AND SORROW*

[**Professor G. R. Malkani** is the Editor of *The Philosophical Quarterly* and the Director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner.—EDS.]

This book is an interesting survey of contemporary philosophical thought. The author has indeed made no attempt to give a new philosophical system ; but he has given a clear indication of his leaning towards some form of idealism ; and in the last chapter on " The True Philosophy " he has averred his belief that that philosophy is still in the making. He says :—

> That system of philosophy towards which all our contemporary types are converging will not be identical with any of them, because it will contain only what is durable and eternal in the thought of our age. But that new system which is now in the making is the answer to our question. It is the true philosophy.

This attitude of mind is quite in accord with the view that " the possession of wisdom does not make a person a philosopher but rather the possession of a passion, an ardent longing for wisdom". It is no doubt true that there must be this longing before anybody can possess wisdom. But the true goal of philosophising must be this wisdom

* *An Introduction to Living Philosophy.* By D. S. ROBINSON. (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. $ 3·00.)

itself and not merely the longing. Philosophising must lead to wisdom. If, then, in the author's opinion "no true philosopher boasts of having wisdom," it is because philosophy has completely missed its mission in the West. The author indeed sets out a grand objective for the philosopher,—" insight into the hidden depths of reality, perspective on human life and nature in their entirety, in the words of Plato, to be a spectator of time and existence." But little evidence is found anywhere in the book of this type of wisdom. We find ourselves led through a great variety of intellectual concepts vying with each other in subtlety and in boldness but not in vision. Indeed each individual philosopher may be said to have a certain field of clear vision from which he starts. But the vision is in every case circumscribed by certain intellectual prejudices derived from the culture and the social environment of the time.

The main problems discussed from different points of view are the following: (a) The problem of knowledge and existence. (b) The problem of truth and error. (c) The problem of the relation of mind and body. (d) The problem of value and evil. These problems are evidently interrelated. But it cannot be doubted that the problem of problems is the problem of the nature of the whole or of the ultimate reality. It is just here that systems of thought by Western thinkers inspired by intellectual curiosity or love of the abstract fail to give satisfaction to a passionate seeker after truth. There is nowhere to be found that directness of truth and illumination that is contained in the Upanishadic formulae " Thou art That " or "I am the Brahman or the Absolute," the starting point of the Vedantic philosophy. Here philosophy is merged in religion and religion in philosophy. Western thinkers, on the other hand, by divorcing the two, make philosophy a matter of dry and abstract intellectualism having little relation to the needs and the ideals of life as it is, and make religion a matter merely of tenets and dogmas having no relation to the intellectual life of man. Nowhere do we find that happy combination of reason and revelation without which a philosophy that will satisfy is impossible.

It is probable that the whole difference in the form and the content of philosophising lies in the original motivation. The author has considered different types of motivation,—the hedonic, the theological, the sociological and the scientific. Needless to say that none of these types is true with regard to the main systems of Indian thought. The Indian thinkers start with an acute consciousness of pain, the uncertainty of life and the final death of the body. They seek to find out means which would lift them out of mere biological existence and make them immortal. This they find in the knowledge of the true Self or Self-realisation. It is the highest goal of philosophic endeavour. Philosophy thus becomes for an Indian not an aspect of life but the highest life itself.

The author alludes to the pessimism of Hindu philosophy. But no thinker is so bold as to deny the fact of evil. And yet Hindu philosophy simply makes it its starting point not its end. Philosophy must arise in pessimism but it cannot stay within it. It is rather a fundamental principle of all true philosophy that a proper view of reality which will dispel our ignorance will at the same time dispel the sorrow and the gloom of life born of this ignorance. There is nothing good or bad in reality itself. These are distinctions which arise from a certain limitation of vision. He who sees well and rightly does neither weep nor rejoice,—but he is satisfied.

G. R. MALKANI

THE KORAN OF PERSIA

[**R. P. Masani** is the author of *The Conference of Birds*, an essay based on the famous poem "Mantiq-ut-Tayr" of the mystic Attar.—EDS.]

No orientalist has done more than Dr. Nicholson to quicken the interest of the English reading public in Islamic mysticism. His exquisite translation of Jalaluddin Rumi's world famous masterpiece lays open for the general reader another hidden treasure of Sufi lore. The *Mathnawi* is the most notable exposition of the Sufi doctrine and is venerated in the East as the Koran of Persia. It is believed that Jalaluddin devoted forty-three years of his life to this monumental work which contains as many verses as the Iliad and the Odyssey put together. A literal translation of such a poem full of metaphorical and mystical meaning would be absolutely unintelligible, whereas a free rendering embodying matter strictly appertaining to a commentary would scarcely satisfy students desirous of understanding the text. Probably, owing to this difficulty, no European scholar had so far attempted anything more than an English version of selected fragments of the poem. Dr. Nicholson has, however, undertaken to give a faithful translation of the complete poem numbering twenty-five thousand and seven hundred verses. The translation of the first four books of the original poem has been published in two volumes and the final volume will be awaited with great interest.

Bearing in mind the difference between translation and interpretation Dr. Nicholson has not attempted to convey the inner, as distinguished from the outer, meaning of the text. In several places, however, he has indicated, by words in brackets, the mystical sense, or inserted words by way of explanation where the terseness of the original necessitated expansion to bring out even the literal sense. The following extract will serve as an illustration of the metaphysical meaning of Rumi's verses as well as the knowledge and skill with which Dr. Nicholson has rendered them in English:

> The rational spirit (the Logos) is (coming) to the mouth for the purpose of teaching: else (it would not come, for) truly that speech hath a channel apart:
>
> It is moving without noise and without repetitions (of sound) to the rose-gardens *beneath which are the rivers.*
>
> O God, do Thou reveal to the soul that place where speech is growing without letters.
>
> That the pure soul may make of its head a foot (fly headlong) towards the far-stretching expanse of non-existence.—
>
> An expanse very ample and spacious; and from it this phantasy and being (of ours) is fed.
>
> (The realm of) phantasies is narrower than non-existence (potential existence): on that account phantasy is the cause of pain.
>
> (The realm of actual) existence, again, was (ever) narrower than (the realm of) phantasy: hence in it moons become like the moon that has waned.
>
> Again, the existence of the world of sense and colour is narrower (than this), for 'tis a narrow prison.
>
> The cause of narrowness is composition (compoundness) and number (plurality): the senses are moving towards composition.
>
> Know that the world of Unification lies beyond sense; if you want Unity, march in that direction.

It will be seen that the words in brackets simplify considerably the work of the student. A commentary included in the same volume would have enhanced its value, but Dr. Nicholson has deliberately held it over until the whole work has been studied and translated. "*The Mathnawi*," it has been said, "is easier than easy to the ignorant but harder than hard to the wise." To the learned translator it must have been the hardest, and he confesses that for him "there are still many difficulties".

Having said so much about the translation, we may make a few observations about the poet and the deep mystical significance of his poems. For our present purpose the dry bones of biography may be dispensed with and

* *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rumi* (Four volumes). Translated into English by REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON, Litt. D., LL.D. (Printed for the Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial," and published by Luzac and Co., London.)

the poet may be allowed to introduce himself to the reader with his own mystical exposition of himself. Here is the negative side of his being :—

What is to be done, O Muslims? for I do not recognize myself,
I am neither Christian nor Jew, nor Gabr, nor Muslim,
I am not of the east, nor of the west, nor of the land, nor of the sea.
I am not of nature's mint, nor of the circling heavens.
I am not of earth, nor of water, nor of air, nor of fire ;
I am not of the empyrean, nor of the dust, nor of existence, nor of entity,
I am not of India, nor of China, nor of Bulgaria, nor of Saqsin ;
I am not of the kingdom of Iraqain, nor of the country of Khorasan,
I am not of this world, nor of the next, nor of Paradise, nor of Hell.
I am not of Adam, nor of Eve, nor of Eden and Rizwan.
My place is the placeless, my trace is the traceless,
'Tis neither body nor soul, for I belong to the soul of the Beloved.
I have put quality away, I have seen that the two worlds are one ;
One I seek, One I know, One I see, One I call,
HE IS THE FIRST, HE IS THE LAST, HE IS THE OUTWARD, HE IS THE INWARD ;
I know none other except "Ya Hu" and "Ya man Hu."

This is the positive side :—

If there be any lover in the world, O Muslims,—'tis I.
If there be any believer, infidel, or Christian hermit,—'tis I.
* * * * *
Earth and air and water and fire, nay, body and soul too—'tis I.
Truth and Falsehood, good and evil, ease and difficulty from first to last,
Knowledge and learning and asceticism and piety and faith—'tis I.
The fire of Hell, be assured, with its flaming limbs,
Yes, and Paradise and Eden and the Houris—'tis I.
This earth and heaven with all that they hold,
Angels, Peris, Genies and Mankind—'tis I.

In the *Mathnawi* the poet elucidates the Sufi mysteries by means of various parables and anecdotes, and justifies the ways of God to man. Sufism is the religion of Love ; and Love, the astrolabe of heavenly mysteries, is the keynote to the *Mathnawi*. The Universe is the reflected image of the "Eternal Beauty". The realisation of this Beauty is brought about by universal Love. Using the symbolical language of the Zoroastrian faith, the Sufi describes this love as the sacred fire which in a moment consumes the love of self and everything else other than God. At the outset Jalaluddin hails this love in stirring words, of which the following is a free translation :—

O thou pleasant madness, Love !
Thou physician of all our ills !
Thou healer of pride,
Thou Plato and Galen of our souls !

In proportion as the mystic loves his Beloved, he sees the Divine Essence permeating all creatures and all the universe. All the love stories in the *Mathnawi* and in other Sufi poems are mere shadow-pictures of the soul's passionate longing to be re-united with God, and Jalaluddin sings in exultation that the soul's love of God is God's love of the soul. Union with the Beloved and absorption in the Deity are natural corollaries to this belief. The Sufi now puts duality away. He sees that the two worlds are one. One he seeks, One he calls. Immersed in unity, he knows neither law nor religion, neither form nor phenomenal being. In this stage of its journey the soul is isolated from all that is foreign to itself, that is to say, from all that is not God.

How far this doctrine of *fanā*, or passing away from one's phenomenal existence, was influenced by Buddhism and Perso-Indian pantheism is a very interesting problem for research students to work on ; but it may be pointed out that *fanā* is accompanied by *baqā*, everlasting life in God. Therein the Sufi doctrine corresponds more with the pantheism of the Vedānta. It is not enough to die to self. To abide in "The Truth," after having passed away from self-hood, is the mark of the Perfect Man. Dying to self, he lives in God. Many a poet has sung exultingly of the bliss of that unitive state, but what can be more touching than the following verses in which Jalaluddin prays for self-annihilation in the ocean of the Godhead, and in which that gifted poet

of the fourteenth century anticipates the theory of evolution of man in the material world and foreshadows his growth in the spiritual world:—

I died as mineral and became a plant,
I died as plant and rose to animal,
I died as animal and I was man.
Why should I fear ? When was I less by dying ?
Yet once more I shall die as man, to soar
With angels blest ; but even from angelhood
I must pass on : all except God doth perish.
When I have sacrificed my angel soul,
I shall become what no mind ever conceived
Oh, let me not exist ! for non-existence
Proclaims in organ tones, "To Him we shall return."

R. P. MASANI

Intellectual Crime. By JANET CHANCE. (Williams and Norgate, London. 5*s*.)

Mrs. Chance attacks what she regards as present day indifference to truth. She finds such indifference in politics, business, education, the press, and particularly in religion and in connection with morality. Even scientists are not free from it, though she declares that "there can be no examples of intellectual crime in science proper". Her main object is to show that religious belief is the greatest of intellectual crimes and to urge that the only honest attitude towards the problem of existence is that of the agnostic. She goes no further than Huxley when he declared that he had "a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble". For those who take up any other attitude she has contempt and says, "They are persons to whom it has not occurred that there are such things as intellectual standards of right and wrong."

With much that Mrs. Chance says most people will agree. Intellectual integrity is rare. Humbug of the most outrageous kind is tolerated in almost every sphere of life. Any amount of respectable truth is merely lies. Steadfastness to truth and courage are the two qualities most needed in the special circumstances of to-day. Any group of people that was truthful and had the courage to act accordingly would revolutionise the world. To the exent that this book will cause its readers to give up false ideas and be honest with themselves it can be warmly welcomed, and that it may have such an effect upon some who read it can be taken for granted; but its effect will be limited because the author confines herself to the approach to truth by means of the rational mind—by the methods of experiment and verification adopted by natural science and by the use of logic—she will have nothing to do with what the poets and saints have to say about truth. What they say, she asserts, has no universal value, so it can be ignored. This is as grave a refusal to consider the evidences of truth as the examples she gives provided by politicians, journalists and clergymen. There is a direct approach to truth, which is not the way of the rational mind but of the intellect in the sense of the universal mind, and it is as much an intellectual crime to disparage or deny it as it is to pretend that you believe what you know to be false or to shut your eyes to obvious facts. Mrs. Chance does say in one sentence about the religious man that we can "accept his statement provisionally and try to discover what it is that gives rise to the feeling he describes". That remark indicates her honesty ; and it is a pity that she does not realise that it is worth while in the spirit of science itself to try to discover what the sages and mystics meant when they have announced their discovery of truth. Had she done that she would have found that throughout the ages these discoverers have found universal truth, in which they agree, in which there are no contradictions, and that this truth can be verified by all who choose to do so.

C. B. PURDOM

History as a Science. By HUGH TAYLOR (Methuen, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

It has been the author's task "to suggest how far the scientific method of induction can be applied to history." Incidentally he believes that "the unsatisfactory state of the study of history is largely due to the conflict in the mind of the historians between the interests of conduct and the interests of knowledge." This attitude carries weight from the fact that the author has a ripe experience of teaching in leading Public Schools and as an Army tutor, and is not only a classical scholar, but also a King's Scholar (Durham).

His unrest has also been experienced by others. Lord Morley felt "in a subconscious sort of way that something was amiss in the treatment of history". So early as 1889 Edward Eggleston in his *History of America* agreed "no one can relate events without sympathy and imagination"; thirty-five years later, H. G. Wells claimed to treat things in his *Outline of History* "in his own fashion". Prof. Decio Pettoello, in his recently issued *Outline of Italian Civilization*, speaks of "history requiring a synthesis in order to form a judgment of values". In March 1933, G. K. Chesterton complains "how curiously history is taught". And now Hugh Taylor makes a book of six closely reasoned chapters, carrying the idea to a more practical issue by "following the rules of a strictly scientific investigation".

He suggests that the modern historian " cannot see the truth if he has a strong motive for looking at the facts in a predetermined light". Thus, Frederic Harrison's work "was deprived of any real scientific value by the habit of attempting to convey valuable moral lessons and establish important scientific truths at one and the same moment". Again, while Dr. G. P. Gooch "seems at times fully alive to the fact that the function of history is to discover the truth and interpret the movement of humanity," yet he, and similar writers, are prone "to pretend to investigate causes while in reality aiming at the production of an impressive moral effect".

Upon history, says the author "the free play of a scientific imagination should be permitted," and insists on "the futility of expecting any real progress so long as the old educational method remains in use". . . . "An investigator who wishes to discover the truth should exercise free speculation on the causes of historical events, institutions and tendencies, undeterred by the fear of consequences."

Having thus castigated the old and adumbrated the new, he develops his thesis and applies it in informative chapters on "Government," "War," "Revolution" and "Conduct," and sums up his arguments :—

> The characteristics of the leading nations of the world, together with the main features of civilization, are to-day the result of a certain definite process of development, the nature of which it is the business of history to disclose. It must discover the main principles in accordance with which social and political evolution has taken place. No new light can be thrown on this important problem by the old system of studying the history of a particular nation and detailing the result in narrative form. More fruitful would seem to be the method of investigating separately certain institutions and phenomena which are common to the human race and which seem of decisive importance . . . . The indispensable condition of success in social, political and economic reform is that any changes in the existing order must harmonize with pre-existing evolutional tendencies; and only a knowledge of the laws of progress gained by inductive observation, will enable this condition to be fulfilled. A rich and promising harvest awaits the use of the inductive method in history.

Here, then, is a theme worthy of mature thought, particularly by students of national and international affairs. History, henceforward, may not be, as Arnold Forster once put it, "sparkling with episode and full of dramatic incident" but it stands a better chance of being helpful to humanity, because its study may lead toward a clearer path of light from the past, so that the future may be less complicated—perhaps more serene.

W. H. STEER

Things New And Old. By W. R. INGE. (Longmans, Green & Co., London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

It is easy for anyone to find out what the Roman Catholic Church stands for, believes in, and is. It is far from easy for anyone to discover what the Protestant Church stands for, believes in, and is supposed to give. *New Things And Old* is a series of addresses delivered at Cambridge to the younger members of the University by Dean Inge—especially with a view to informing youth as to the contribution of the Church of England in modern times. Here, we think, if anywhere, we will learn what Christianity means to a modern Churchman. Dean Inge really makes an excellent symbol of that Church. What has he to say? It would be impossible to summarise it, for nothing sincerely clear emerges. Prejudices, easy moralising, gibes, a few epigrams, anæmic exhortations, one thousand quotations from others—but no conviction, no love, no charity, no passion, no inner seriousness. His excursions into Science have at least the merit of being amusingly written, and we may even welcome his far from happy advance into the field of æsthetics since it is so rare to find a prelate who has attempted to recognise and understand the poetic experience. We can tolerate his moral exhortations though we cannot help wincing at his use of phrases like "the bright young things". In his references to economics we can overlook the Victorian attitude of an old man, but *nothing* can excuse the historical silliness and middle-class spitefulness of this sentence—"Our Lord was not a proletarian. He belonged to an independent, self-respecting, yeoman class."! And nothing can console us for the fact that when he speaks on his supposedly specialist subject of religion, not only has he nothing to say, but what he does say is muddled up. Arriving inevitably at the subject of Faith we read:—

> Now, I think, we must admit that we cannot arrive at the religious conception of the world by studying nature. The reliance upon "evidences" has been carried too far. We must not go back to Archdeacon Paley. From finite things to infinite causes there is no road. And religion certainly did not arise in this way. Even the poetic and mystical interpretation of nature, such as we find and treasure in Wordsworth, is on a different plane from the old logical "proofs" of the existence of God.

Paley is wrong, but we may pass Wordsworth. That sounds good enough—but the whole point is missed. May I emphasise these words with all my might?—there is nothing wrong about the "proofs" of the existence of God, there is nothing wrong about producing the Argument from Design, *provided it is the expression of an experience.* If it is mere intellectualism it is useless, but if it is an experience *then it is on precisely the same plane as Wordsworth.* (Whitman's marvellously effective poem *This Compost* is pure Paley *experienced.*) This is vital to any opening or closing discussion on Religion, and it is completely muddled up by the Dean—and we suspect more and more that this is so because he has had no religious experience himself. That is why he is not only incapable of saying anything fresh but cannot clothe the old truths in the language of conviction.

J. S. COLLIS

That Immortal Sea. A Meditation upon the Future of Sexual Morality. By CLIFFORD BAX. (Lovat Dickson Limited, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

When we find on the first page of this book references to cocktails, gramophones, negro dances, tube-railways and aeroplanes, we may be forgiven for thinking that Mr. Clifford Bax does not intend to take his task too seriously. Like Rhodes he evidently thinks that truth is simple and should be expressed with as little mystification as possible. He does not claim to be an authority on either religion or sex, and he sedulously refrains from quoting the work of those who have that distinction. "If we avoid any generalisations," he writes, "and satisfy the pedant by qualifying every sentence, we become as irritating as a

man with a nervous cough." There is not a single cough, nervous or otherwise, in this book but rather a loud and hearty shout of affirmation. He writes with immense exhuberance, but with no suggestion of Izaak Walton's "study to be quiet" or the deep undertone of the mystic. Mr. Bax often hits the nail on the head, but like Dr. Johnson he frequently breaks the surrounding woodwork. He is a little too robust and jolly, a little inclined to splash about in the surf of "that immortal sea". His message is not for the initiate or the morally wise but for those who are insensible to religion and merely fashionable in their sexual experience. He shouts and bangs to attract attention. Often there is a trumpet call of warning, and sometimes he plays upon no more than a penny whistle.

Mr. Bax is definitely on the side of the angels, even if he appears to assume a somewhat corybantic attitude. He is strongly opposed to those writers who are anti-Christian and who persistently stress the importance of sexual promiscuity. He believes that our materialism is a temporary phase, that we shall return to a belief in the soul and to a manner of living compatible with it. He does not offer a new religion but advocates the breaking down of egoism and the finding of love again. Despite his "whirl of words," his essentially modern manner, he pins his faith to the teaching of Christ, to that simple entreaty—love one another.

On the subject of sex Mr. Bax believes in the possessive instinct and rigid fidelity between husband and wife. He writes :—

> In the future, people will acknowledge that sexual promiscuity, far from being a gallant crusade against inhibitions, is a vulgar misuse of personality.

He would have the sexual instinct "only an accessory of love, a source of heart-easing delight". Love, he thinks, free from "all the dark emanations of egoism," will heal a sick world as nothing else can do. He writes :—"The full emergence of love, the full revelation of the immortal self within this world of mortality is, in my view, the climax to which humanity, and perhaps all sentient creatures, are imperceptibly progressing." If Mr. Bax has not written a profound book, he has at least given us one that is extremely honest. He cannot rouse the torpid, after the manner of Savonarola, but his message should quicken the disillusioned of the younger generation, should make them realise that life is more than a denial of the spirit, and love more than sexual gratification.

HADLAND DAVIS

Origins of Sacrifice: A Study in Comparative Religion. By E. O. JAMES. (John Murray, London. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Studies in the Birth of the Lord. By ELWOOD WORCESTER. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.)

Sacrifice is a word which covers a long series of meanings, from the blood offering made in a necromantic ritual or to win the favour of a god, at one end of the scale, to the altruistic surrender of one's personal interests for the good of mankind, at the other. The universality of the conception of sacrifice in one form or another suggests that it must be the expression of a fundamental law in the life of humanity: a law that affects all men, though the selfish and ignorant interpret it basely and the wise and generous nobly.

Mr. E. O. James, who is President of the Folk Lore Society, traces the history of sacrifice from Palæolithic to recent times. He is moderate and judicial, and resists the temptation to speculate far in advance of the known facts, which in some books bear to the theories built up around them a proportion rather like that of the bread to the sack in Falstaff's tavern bill. The facts about early man revealed by archæological research, though still all too scanty, yet afford, or rather hint at, a certain amount of valuable information as to his religious beliefs and customs. The ancient practice of staining the bones of the dead with red

ochre had clearly a ritual or magical significance; and the Aurignacians, who painted lifelike animal pictures on the walls of caverns an unknown number of millennia ago, in all probability did so in order to put a spell on the animals so that they might fall an easy prey to the hunters of the community, in a manner analogous to the hunting magic practised by some American Indian tribes in the immediate past.

A large part of the book is devoted to tracing the origins of the sacrificial elements in Christianity. The author recites the stages by which the Eucharist developed from a memorial meal into a mystery repetition of the "Sacrifice of the Cross". He points out the significant resemblances between the rites of sacerdotal Christianity and those of some of the ancient Mystery-Cults. In his final chapter, which deals with sacrifice in certain of the non-Christian religions, Mr. James writes of Buddhism:

> The institution of sacrifice was foreign to the fundamental metaphysical philosophy of Buddhism, the whole of existence being reduced to purely ethical and spiritual concepts which limit the vision of reality to subjective intuition of the Absolute attained by renunciation—

which is quite good, but is not the "subjective intuition of the Absolute" an extension rather than a limitation of the "vision of reality"?

Mr. Elwood Worcester, whose sentiment is strongly Christian, is nevertheless both frank and impartial in his scholarly analysis of the birth stories as told in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke; and those who are interested in the subject will find in his book an admirable summary of the controversy about the supposed miraculous conception and birth of Jesus.

R. A. V. M.

The True Christian Religion. By EMANUEL SWEDENBORG. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 2s.)

Emerson placed Swedenborg among his seven Representative Men, as The Mystic. For the great Swede was able, not only to pierce into the esoteric meanings of the Bible, but to perceive clairvoyantly the recondite springs which move this material world of effects.

Swedenborg wrote in Latin. The heaviness of his early translators has proved a bar and stumbling block to people who dislike to read difficult prose. The last book he ever wrote has been fortunate enough to fall into the hands of Mr. F. Bayley for translation, with the pleasant consequence that we are now presented with this extremely readable version.

The True Christian Religion was begun in 1771 and sums up the entire message of Swedenborg to his own and future times. It contains also the constructive principles upon which his followers have founded their organization, The New Church. It devotes a good deal of space to the esoteric explanation of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, a doctrine which had been grievously muddled by succeeding centuries until he found it hopelessly misunderstood. He explains that Love, Power and Wisdom are the real Trinity, being the three chief expressions of God. His next care is to prove that they pass as an influx from God into man and that everything fine and noble in men's thought and deed arises out of this divine influx. The rest of this book is occupied by a successful endeavour to destroy the idolatrous explanations proffered by unspiritual clerics to their flocks, and to expound the true Christian doctrines of Faith, Baptism, Charity, Regeneration, Imputation and Free Will. He illustrates his points by graphic accounts of what he beheld in the world of spirits.

Yet Swedenborg had his limitations. He is indubitably fine whenever he tries to lead an orthodox Christian into a purer perception of religion, but he fails whenever he attempts to catch the Ineffable within the net of visible and describable forms.

PAUL BRUNTON

The Place of Man and other Essays. By NAGENDRANATH GUPTA. (The Indian Press, Ltd., Allahabad.)

The first essay, from which the book takes its title traces in terms of exquisite imagery, man's place in the Universal plan.

The second "Art in the West and the East," begins with a general survey of art in the earliest times. The first and the earliest artists were poets who chanted their own creations. Although the origin of decorative art is not known, it was already pursued in Egypt seven thousand years ago. The author gives a short account of Chaldean, Assyrian and Persian painting, sculpture and architecture, and says that Greece and Japan in the olden days were outstanding in that the entire nation in both of these countries was devoted to art. The early Roman art which disappeared when pagan Rome became Christian Italy was strongly influenced by the early Grecian. In a short outline of the history of painting we are brought into modern times, and then in the second part of this essay we go back to the Orient and we hold our breath in awe at the glory of ancient India, to which the still existing art treasures testify. Elephanta, Karli and Ajanta with their "colossal images, wide spacious halls and magnificently carved pillars bear silent witness to an art as great and greater than that of the days of Michael Angelo". The author sums up this absorbing article by drawing a comparison between the old European and the Indian art. While the former confined itself to beauty of form, the latter suggests the beauty, the life, within the form. The one was realistic, the other, symbolical.

Essays of a more personal nature and distinctly eulogistic follow. The writer gives us a picture of the life and works of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and of the well-known Swami Vivekananda, a disciple of the former. Then an appreciation of Vidyapati of Mithila and Bengal, the poet whose nationality was disputed because he was able to write in two languages with equal facility and charm.

Another great poet is the subject of the sixth essay, Rabindranath Tagore. The writer produces a striking picture of the personality of this remarkable man and includes one poem of marvellous beauty *viz.* "Urvasi"—Urvasi, the symbol of the glory of the first morning of Creation, "the expression of all the buoyant spontaneous joyance of Nature".

The seventh essay is a critical survey of modern literary work in general and the pride of nations in particular in upholding their own writers as proofs of a nation's greatness. As if the stamp or seal of a nation could be set upon a great mind. Not in India, nor in Greece nor in Rome was literature ever used as a medium for the assertion of national superiority, whereas the opposite is sadly true in the European world to-day, where the habits of thought individually and collectively are ego-centric.

The last essay is a short sketch of comparative religious beliefs in ancient India, Egypt, Greece and Rome. On present day conditions the writer observes that the ancient wisdom was known and followed long ages before it fell on the barren soil of Europe, that Jesus once again taught this wisdom and that "what is called the materialism of the West is in reality the inability of all the nations of Europe to realise the teachings of Jesus Christ as a living faith".

There are frequent allusions throughout the book to the narrow scope in which our lives are lived. Man's quest for the things that appeal to the higher faculties is sporadic, led off into side issues or checked by worldly affairs. In India the ancient teachings of Karma and Reincarnation and of man as the maker of his own destiny are bound up with the life and thoughts of the whole nation. In the monumental works of Madame Blavatsky these ancient teachings are set forth and explained for the benefit of those who are seriously seeking.

M. F.

Can We Save Civilisation? By JOSEPH MCCABE (The Search Publishing Co., Ltd., London. 6s.)

Matthew Arnold who criticised Victorian Philistinism was described by his detractors as an elegant Jeremiah; but the author of this book who subjects to devastating criticism the entire social, political, economic and educational fabric which the modern world has built up has none of his graces of style, nor his urbanity of manner. He is a vigorous, hard-hitting, and zealous writer who points out the plague spots of modern civilisation with much candour. He suggests several remedies for restoring peace and tranquillity to this distracted world. He describes himself:—

> I drink much beer, consume much tobacco, follow football matches with joy, love films (if not too arty or educational), and devour immense quantities of detective, humorous, and Western stories . . . . . The anæmic people who find symptoms of degeneration in our football crowds, cinemas, jazz dancing, etc. ought to look up what the supposedly healthier grandfathers of these folk did with *their* leisure.

But his book is in the main an indictment and a warning.

In the first place, Mr. McCabe says that civilisations like some kinds of fruit carry within themselves the seeds of their destruction. This is what has happened to the ancient Egyptian, Babylonian, Chinese, Arab, Greek and Roman civilisations. They had their day and ceased to be. This is what is going to happen to modern civilisation as well. It is also on the way to committing suicide; and before that catastrophe happens, should not something be done to save it from self-destruction? He looks round and finds that the economic structure is collapsing because there is no co-ordination between the means of production and the average capacity for consumption. In politicians he has not much faith and believes that the political machinery should be over-hauled. He is worried over the rate at which the human species is multiplying itself and is frightened at the economic rivalries of the nations. He believes that the world is on the brink of a great war on account of the increase in armaments, the restrictions against immigration and the poisonous hatred of the alienated territories. With nothing but scorn for an educational system which is so remote from the interests of normal human life, he is impatient with those people who believe that human nature cannot be changed. To put an end to this muddle he advocates a scientific adjustment of production, distribution and consumption, the setting up of an Economic Council of experts, the introduction of the Referendum, the inculcation of the principles of birth-control, the substitution of arbitration in place of war, and the bringing of education into line with the needs of the present-day life. There is nothing new in these suggested remedies, but our pointed attention is drawn to them on account of the challenging way in which he emphasizes their desirability.

But all is not lost, he seems to say, for this modern civilisation of ours has done a lot for us by emancipating our minds from many kinds of superstitions; by teaching us the value of organisation, co-operation and team-work; by bringing home to us that the economic interest is dominant and fundamental, and by harnessing science to the needs of the individual as well as the collective life. It is in the inculcation of the scientific spirit, he thinks, which modern civilisation has engendered, that the future happiness of mankind lies. Evidently Mr. McCabe is an enthusiast for science and a foe of organised religions, but he does not know that as there can be so much cant in the so-called religions of mankind, so can we have it in the domain of science as well.

Though it is not possible to see eye to eye with the author of this book on several points, still one cannot help saying that it deserves to be read.

DIWAN CHAND SHARMA

CORRESPONDENCE

ETHICS OF VEGETARIANISM

[**Rasvihari Das, M.A., Ph. D.**, is Professor of Metaphysics and Indian Philosophy at the Indian Institute of Philosophy (Amalner). The seventeenth chapter of the *Gita* offers a rational basis for the selection of foodstuffs; in her *Key to Theosophy* H. P. Blavatsky explains the subject thus:—

One of the great German scientists has shown that every kind of animal tissue, however you may cook it, still retains certain marked characteristics of the animal which it belonged to, which characteristics can be recognised. And apart from that, every one knows by the taste what meat he is eating. We go a step farther, and prove that when the flesh of animals is assimilated by man as food, it imparts to him, physiologically, some of the characteristics of the animal it came from. Moreover, occult science teaches and proves this to its students by ocular demonstration, showing also that this "coarsening" or "animalizing" effect on man is greatest from the flesh of the larger animals, less for birds, still less for fish and other cold-blooded animals, and least of all when he eats only vegetables . . . . He must eat to live, and so we advise really earnest students to eat such food as will least clog and weight their brains and bodies, and will have the smallest effect in hampering and retarding the development of their intuition, their inner faculties and powers . . . . We believe that much disease, and especially the great predisposition to disease which is becoming so marked a feature in our time, is very largely due to the eating of meat, and especially of tinned meats. (p. 218)]

There are a good many people, particularly in India, who conscientiously abstain from all kinds of animal food. There are various reasons which induce persons to restrict the source of their bodily nourishment to vegetables only. Some may not like to take animal food because they think it will be injurious to their health. Some avoid such food because they believe that it produces certain mental propensities which in the long run make us unhappy. Others have no clear idea as to whether animal food is really harmful to our physical or mental health, and still they are very particular in not taking such food because it is prohibited in their scripture. But one may not believe in any scripture; may not think that animal food has any evil effect on our mind or body; and yet may refrain from taking such food purely on ethical grounds. We shall try to consider what these grounds are, and whether they can be consistently maintained.

It might be supposed that we should select our food for its hygienic value only and should not trouble ourselves in this matter with moral questions, which are pertinent only in our relations with one another as human beings. Such a supposition would have nothing wrong in it if, in choosing and securing our food, we were not involved in actions which are in conflict with our moral principles, or if what we select as our food were always presented to us merely as food. When, for instance, we choose animals for our food, they are presented to us not merely as food, but as living beings endowed with the powers of consciousness and feeling. In using them as food we cannot help being cruel to them and unnecessary cruelty would be condemned by all moral philosophers.

The fact that we can be cruel or kind towards animals, in the plain sense of the words cruel and kind, shows clearly that we can have a worthy or an unworthy attitude of mind in our dealings with them. This implies that our conduct towards lower animals may be an object of moral judgment. If this were not so, then a white man might as well think that his conduct towards a black man cannot be morally judged. This would reduce morality to a concern of particular groups and deprive it of universal validity and application. It is no doubt true that the difference between

a man and a lower animal is far more striking than the difference between any one man and another. But the difference between us and animals is certainly not so absolute as to make the principles, which ordinarily govern our moral conduct, inapplicable in the case of our dealings with them.

Our moral conduct implies that certain things are recognised by us as good or valuable in themselves and it is our duty to try to realise them. We ought to do what is good. But we may not always be able to do what is good. Our physical and psychical constitution may stand in the way. Even when we are unable to do what is good, we may still recognise that it ought to be done. Thus if an action is generally done in the world, it is no proof that it is good, because what is done is not the same thing as what ought to be done, and what ought to be done is alone good.

To determine what is ultimately good, we should go to ethics, but every one of us, even without a study of ethics, has a certain moral faculty by which he can recognise moral values in things; he can know that certain things are valuable in themselves and ought to be pursued and preserved by all rational beings.

Life is one such valuable thing. When we perceive this, we are naturally averse to indulging in activities which make for death rather than for life. We should have respect for life not only because it is valuable in itself but also because it is the basis of other values. Moral and other higher values can be realised only on the basis of life.

Happiness is also a thing to be valued for its own sake. All our activities, therefore, which are calculated to increase happiness in the world should be commended, and those that contribute to the misery of the world should be condemned.

Charity or love is one of the highest moral values we know on earth. In fact in the opinion of many competent persons supreme worth can belong only to this virtue. No saint would be saintly if he had no love. A man is truly morally great to the extent he has been able to develop the spirit of love in him.

True love is not selective. If the principle of love really works in us, we cannot love some and hate others. We shall have a loving attitude towards all. We ordinary mortals, however, are not blessed with the love that inspires a Buddha or a Christ. Even if we try, we cannot produce in ourselves a feeling of positive love towards all beings. But negatively at least we may try to abstain from thoughts and actions which are inconsistent with, or hostile to, a spirit of love.

If we now judge, in the light of these values, the conduct of a man who takes animal food, we clearly see that it cannot be morally justified. One cannot take animal food without making oneself responsible for the destruction of life and for the misery it involves. It needs hardly to be mentioned that the causing of death and misery, even of animals, is certainly inconsistent with the spirit of love which every moral being ought to cultivate.

Against this position an opponent of vegetarianism may argue in this way:— In any case we have to eat, and eating will mean destruction of life in one form or another. Even if we eat merely vegetables we shall kill life, because vegetables too have life, and some say they have feelings also. If a distinction is made between a lower and a higher life, and if lower life can be sacrificed for higher life, then animals, which are lower in the scale of life than men, may be used to support the higher life of men. In any event all higher values are realised not in the lives of animals but in those of men, and so the best use that can be made of animals is to make them serve the cause of these higher values by becoming food for men. Besides we find in nature that one animal lives upon another and so it seems part of the scheme of nature that animals should be used as food. Lastly, our present civilisation, of which we form part, and which provides us with opportunities for realising any

higher values, is dependent upon militarism. It is because soldiers are there that we are kept in peace at home to pursue the course of our virtuous life; otherwise we should fall an easy prey to robbers and robber-like nations who would destroy our life and property, and would show no consideration for our women and children. We should therefore be able to defend ourselves. And we shall do it well when we can kill and be cruel. Cruelty is thus a military virtue and it cannot be kept up on vegetarian diet. If we are not ourselves soldiers, we have to maintain soldiers and can therefore never free ourselves wholly from the guilt of non-vegetarianism which is part of a soldier's life. The vegetarian thus pursues an impossible ideal.

Let us now attempt a reply to this criticism. We have to make a distinction between lower and higher life, and when a choice is to be made between them, we should certainly choose the higher rather than the lower life. If there is a conflict between them such that one cannot be had without the sacrifice of the other, the lower life should certainly be sacrificed. Now, if human life could not be maintained without animal food, then there would be nothing wrong in the killing of animals for the sake of human life. But human life can be maintained without animal food and it is proved by the fact that millions of men have lived and do live without such food. Therefore the killing of animals for the sustenance of human life is not justified. Vegetables no doubt have life, and may have even feeling, but there is no denying the fact that vegetable life is vastly inferior to animal life, and so it cannot be argued that because we kill vegetables we should kill animals also. It is as good as saying that because a lower good is sacrificed, therefore a higher good should also be sacrificed.

When we consider the amount of misery involved in our killing animals and calmly reflect over it, we certainly find ourselves guilty of wanton cruelty. Death for an animal, that is used for food, is usually a painful process. It begins to suffer the pain of death from the moment it apprehends the coming doom. Actual dying is probably not so painful as the mortal fear of death and the helpless struggle to escape from its sure grip. There is nothing to show that a plant ever dies such a painful death, that it has any prevision or fear of death or undergoes such terrible suffering.

It is true that many animals live upon other animals. But, as we have already pointed out, the fact that animals *are* killed by other animals does not mean that they *ought* to be killed by men. Moreover, in the consideration of a moral question, it is strange to suggest that we should act like wild animals. It would be a bad day for humanity if it were to accept wolves and tigers for its moral ideals.

Coming to the last question that cruelty is a necessary element in the present civilisation, we have to point out that, if it is really so, it is bad enough for civilisation, and we should not make it still worse by adding to the amount of cruelty that already exists. All good people, believing in higher ideals, are working against the militarism of modern states, and in the shaping of our moral conduct we should not go on with the assumption that militarism is an inalienable aspect of civilisation.

Even if it be a fact that we have always to fight for the preservation of our culture against uncultured people, it is wrong to suppose that one cannot fight or defend oneself unless one takes animal food. There are many soldiers who can fight but who do not take animal food. Among animals too we find that many animals which do not live upon other animals can fight and defend themselves. Modern fights are not won by animal ferocity but by intelligence and science, and for the cultivation of these animal food has never been shown to be an indispensable factor.

We may even grant for the sake of argument that soldiers are always

necessary for the maintenance of civilised life and they must as a rule take animal food. But it will be a strange argument which will say that because some people must do a certain action, therefore all people should do it, even when we recognise the action to be bad in itself. We may be indirectly connected with the killing of animals by our support to a state which maintains meat-eating soldiers. But the fact that we are distantly connected with the killing of animals cannot be urged as a reason why we should, by eating meat, be directly connected with such killing, especially when it is neither evidently desirable in itself, nor necessary for the preservation or realisation of any higher ideals.

The world in which we live is an imperfect world, and by our very existence in it we share in this imperfection and are partly responsible for it. This is however a reason not for our remaining content with all our imperfections but for struggling against them. The spirit of perfect love may be impossible of realisation in this world. But which of our moral ideals are realisable in their perfection in this imperfect world? It is only given to us to make honest endeavours to realise them as far as we can, and it is certainly possible for most of us to abstain from animal food and thus save many unfortunate creatures from the tortures of needless death.

Amalner RASVIHARI DAS

A PROJECT OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

[**C. R. King** deals with a subject on which all true reformers feel deeply. The ideal which H. P. Blavatsky painted in 1889 is this:—

Children should above all be taught self-reliance, love for all men, altruism, mutual charity, and more than anything else, to think and reason for themselves. We would reduce the purely mechanical work of the memory to an absolute minimum, and devote the time to the development and training of the inner senses, faculties and latent capacities. We would endeavour to deal with each child as a unit, and to educate it so as to produce the most harmonious and equal unfoldment of its powers, in order that its special aptitudes should find their full natural development. We should aim at creating *free* men and women, free intellectually, free morally, unprejudiced in all respects, and above all things, *unselfish*. And we believe that much if not all of this could be obtained by *proper and truly theosophical* education.—*The Key to Theosophy*, p. 226.]

Mr. George Godwin wrote recently in THE ARYAN PATH on the subject of international education. My experience and plans in the matter may therefore be of interest to readers.

The League of Nations Committee for Intellectual Co-operation, of which men of such distinction as Prof. Gilbert Murray, M. Bergson, Prof. Einstein, and Dr. R. A. Millikan, the authority on "cosmic rays," are or have till recently been members, has paid some attention to the spreading of the principles of the League among school-children and students in all member-states. That there is still very much to be done in this direction is shown by recent events in the Far East. Japanese students constitute a by no means inconsiderable element of support for Japanese policy, and there are plenty of people, old and young, both in England and France who agree with them, in spite of the fact that there is a good deal of "League of Nations" teaching in England, and that M. Henride Jouvenel, now the French Ambassador in Rome, told me in 1925 that this teaching was being officially given throughout France. And Japan, France, and England are by no means the only countries where there is scope for such work.

On this ground alone there is room for an international educational centre on a bigger scale than any that yet exists, but such a centre should not confine itself to, or even directly indulge in the dissemination of internationalist propa-

ganda among the young. If the education of the peoples of the world were right in other respects, a proper attitude towards other countries and towards the principles of the League of Nations would follow as a matter of course.

In the present educational systems of the world there is very considerable waste—waste of human wealth, human character and capacity. The results of this waste are evident in the state of the world to-day. Yet all our aching problems, national and international, are created by men, and soluble by men. For the most part, they are problems of human character, and the solution lies in the school. The instincts of the child for good can be much more highly developed than is usually done.

One grievous symptom of the waste to which we referred is the distaste which the majority of children even now have for learning, and the acquiescence in this as in the nature of things by the majority of teachers. The only remedy for this is thoroughly first-class teaching from the very outset: the potentialities inherent in the application of such teaching on any considerable scale are rich in the extreme. True teachers are the Vestals of wonder; with proper treatment the natural love of learning can be kept alive probably in every child. The man who loves learning is not only better informed and broader minded, and therefore a better citizen, than the man who does not, but he has on the whole a better moral character, a more developed personality, and is a happier man.

Again, there is much more scope than is generally utilised in schools for the development of public spirit. Though childhood is notoriously self-centred, and junior republics and self-governing bodies of children may degenerate into tyrant-ridden crowds, most children—especially the very young unspoiled ones—have the capacity for public spirit. They are all willing to make their contribution to the public benefit on special occasions, and often ready of resource to the end. Moreover, in the right atmosphere the most unexpected children are liable to develop an interest so intense and so broad-minded in public affairs that it may well be called public spirit.

The possibilities of the progress of human nature through the development of the inherent generosity and the co-operative instinct of childhood are, in particular, vast and almost unexplored. The co-operation which is supposed to be fostered by sport usually also begins and ends with sport. But little children, quite apart from sport, are wonderfully willing to co-operate and to help each other, often unwisely but out of sheer good will. This instinct is often choked by the prevailing spirit of competition. It is the business of the teacher, without losing the stimulus to be derived from healthy competition, and without making a fetish of co-operative methods which may mean that one able and energetic child does all the work, so to develop this childish spirit of mutual helpfulness that it shall be an abiding factor of character in great things, in the affairs of a life-work as in small private and domestic matters. He must foster the right kind of co-operative effort in large school undertakings, such as plays in which the provision of properties as well as the acting offers scope for this spirit.

Of initiative there was perhaps never more need than now in the world's affairs, but it is liable to be crushed by current methods of education. Initiative is not fostered by the still abiding repressive discipline. It is the problem of the modern teacher to reconcile the modern claim of the individual for freedom with the necessities of a reasonable discipline, which shall insist that, in the interests of that law and order which are a necessary condition of freedom, all orders of authority shall be punctiliously obeyed, and also that freedom shall be freedom to work happily, and not freedom to indulge in anti-social hooliganism. Beyond this it is not necessary or right to encourage submissiveness for its own sake. In the right atmosphere, such as we have described it, where excessive paternal organisation

is avoided, the growing ego will develop a due spirit of initiative, and one that will be less likely to act in undesirable directions. In such an atmosphere many boys who elsewhere are reckoned dull will develop the most surprising new interests and enterprise.

True teaching on the principles above set out is an art, of which the ultimate inspiration is a vision of the world of the same nature as that of the artist usually so-called, and of which the ultimate fruit is the revelation of the "mystery and the majesty" of life. The true teacher is an artist, and the artists are the truest teachers. Hence it follows that the staff of such an institution as is here described should have not only first-class academic qualifications but also something of the quality of mind which distinguishes the artist.

What is really needed is a centre for the wider international dissemination of the proper principles of education, of which the influence will also act in the direction of greater international understanding. The International Teachers' College of Columbia University, New York, is not advantageously situated for the performance of the latter function; and the Institute Jean-Jaques Rousseau of Geneva, though it is in the right place, has never, for reasons on which it is not necessary to enlarge here, commanded the international prestige which is essential for the successful fulfilment of the functions here desiderated.

In the years 1925, 1926, and 1927, I had the support of leading educationalists and public men in England and other countries for a more ambitious project, and though circumstances which had nothing to do with the essential practicability of the plan militated against the immediate fruition of the beginnings that were then made, and though international financial conditions are at present particularly unfavourable, I see no reason why the plan should not eventually be fulfilled. There is no doubt that the world has need of it.

Since it is the teachers above all who have the opportunity of influencing the peoples of the future in favour of international understanding, what is contemplated is primarily an International Teachers' Training College at Geneva. It is obvious that such a college, where teachers in training could study, if only for short periods, the work of the League of Nations at first hand, would have a valuable formative influence. The debates of the Council in its Glass Chamber are, as is well known, public, and I have watched there Tewfik Rushdi Bey arguing with Mr. Amery about Mosul. Such experience would often beget a missionary fervour for the internationalist outlook which, though it is not the only thing needful, is nevertheless essential. But though the college would be at Geneva, because that is the most convenient meeting place of the nations, it should not be associated with the League of Nations as a political institution. It should stand for co-operation between all nations, and take students from those countries which are not members of the League as well as those which are.

What is first needed in practice, however, is a school which shall serve as demonstration school for the college, where the principles above enunciated would be carried out. And though the college should aim chiefly at influence through the training of teachers, because in general that offers the widest and surest scope, it should aim also at attracting as school pupils, some who will be destined, by virtue of their developed ability, to be leaders of men in their own countries.

The staff of both Training College and demonstration school should be as far as possible the same; and, by virtue, of the first class standing of the staff, the institution should exert influence in favour of the best principles of education and of internationalism not only among those who might go there as school pupils, teachers in training, or vacation course students, but also on the general educational system of different countries, and, ultimately, international public opinion.

Prestige is the first essential of such an institution. I saw several members

of the League of Nations Council in 1925, received from all of them sympathy, and from the definite suggestion of official support from their countries in the event of the successful launching of the scheme. The particular suggestion was that state scholarships both for school-pupils and for students in training might be made tenable at the projected "International College," if the latter could get some sort of recognition from the League Committee of Intellectual Co-operation. I was in touch with several members of this committee, and it would have been willing to pass a resolution approving the principle of the projected institution. There was a very definite prospect of official support from some countries, if the old International Labour Office building had been taken. This very suitable building, by the way, which fell vacant in 1926, had until 1919 been a School with an international clientele, and only a misunderstanding at a Geneva lawyer's office prevented its being taken for our purpose. Latin and Central European countries are more favourable to the idea of State support than Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries. M. Mello Franco of Brazil, and M. Benes of Czecho-Slovakia, were especially sympathetic, and there was a distinct chance of help from Royalist Spain: while I was assured by Senator De Brouckere of Belgium that the abortive effort to start an International University at Brussels would not hinder the co-operation of his country in the plan: on the other hand Dr. Nansen of Norway, a country naturally more favourable to international ideals, could not hold out any prospect of official support by the making tenable of scholarships. The late Director of the Training of Teachers at Oxford was prepared to send graduates in training as teachers for a period to the institution, and tentative arrangements were made for the giving of lectures by distinguished authorities. I actually made some start with the building up of a demonstration school in Geneva. I was at one stage offered the use of the existing international School, then in its infancy, for this purpose, but was obliged to decline this as control over the demonstration school is essential to such an institution as was planned, and control was not included in the offer. The reasons why all the bright prospects here invoked did not materialise are not matters for detailed public narration: but they were by no means inevitable, and the subject, I think, is of more than antiquarian interest seeing that the plan "is not dead, but sleepeth" merely.

London CHARLES KING

ON AMATEUR LIVING IN INDIA

[**Frank C. Bancroft, B.A.** (Princeton), **B.D.**, was travelling secretary to the American Student Christian Movement in 1927, and was ordained Deacon in the Episcopal Church in 1930. He came to India in 1931 as Fellow under the World's Student Christian Federation, and is staying on in India "which I had come to love". He writes:—"I spent two months travelling third class through South India with an American friend from the American University, Cairo. We started at Sabarmati Ashram and 'did' about 7,000 miles to Cape Comorin and back through Travancore and Hyderabad to Calcutta, all for about Rs. 270 each, all-inclusive."—EDS.]

To the casual observer, the *Gita* and modern sportsmanship might seem completely disparate activities of the human spirit. But there is a basic attitude sufficiently universal to embrace not only these, but true science, profound art, and many other aspects of the life of man. It is the amateur spirit, and it might well be contended that the lack of such spirit in the attitude of most

Europeans to their residence in this country has had far-reaching and very detrimental effects. It is easily seen that the common idea underlying all these things is a certain foot-freeness toward life. In the same way that a sportsman is schooled to place the game above the prize, Arjuna is admonished to carry on his life according to the best available light, leaving all care about results to powers beyond his ken. Art which is purely commercial and science with gain as the fundamental end are unworthy of their names. In Ananda Coomaraswamy's book *The Dance of Siva* one finds a fascinating application of this amateur spirit to the love-life of man, under the heading "Sahaja". It would seem that the spirit of inner detachment is necessary before life at any point can seep to profound levels or soar to sublime heights.

Now there is a lamentable lack of amateur spirit in the attitude with which most Europeans regard their lives in this country. That old Satan —desire—corrodes or short-circuits most of the delicate wires over which cultural and spiritual charges might play. Most Europeans here have their eyes riveted too intently upon the goal-posts, and consequently miss the fun and enrichment of the game. They go away tired, unsated in victory or frustrated in defeat, and form opinions about the country in which they have never really lived as they rest from deck-tennis or shuffle-board. Fortunately, they exhibit a new attitude in these games—otherwise they wouldn't be able to obtain partners.

Let us leave generalities behind and glance at facts. In the main, there are four classes of foreigners here: government officials, commercial agents, missionaries, and tourists. They all have axes to grind and the axes, alas, succeed pretty well in monopolizing their attention. The officials are here to keep order so that a lucrative trade may continue; the agents to make money; the missionaries to make converts; and the tourists to feel thrills. Perhaps it could be viewed more charitably. Let us say that the officials wish to aid in the advancement of a backward country; that the agents are interested in promoting trade in an unindustrialized land; that the missionaries strive to serve the unfortunate; and that the tourists come to understand India. Leaving aside for the time being the first set, what can be said of the technique with which the latter motives, when they exist, are pursued?

It is indeed a rare official who maintains consistent social intercourse with the people whom he has presumably come to serve. His knowledge and opinions of the real Indian people are drawn either from his predecessors and colleagues, or from an occasional talk with some wealthy and westernized Indian whose own knowledge of them is extremely limited and whose desire to serve them may be alloyed by financial considerations. His house, his club, and his hot-weather resort are studiously constructed to recreate conditions which will so far as possible encourage the delusion that he is really back in his native land. The attitudes, actions, and social technique of Indians are judged by a superficial comparison with the life he has known abroad. Those basic assumptions and age-old insights which lie behind many of them are seldom known, for the simple reason that they can be learned only by intimate common living.

Little need be said about the commercial man and the sight-seer, both of whom live far remote from Indian conditions. True, the former has his babus and mistris. But he judges them purely by their activities in a form of life which is alien to their nature, and never bothers to know them at home, when they are human. Like the official, his home is calculated to help him hide from himself the fact that he has to live in the East. If he is gifted socially he may enjoy the clubs; otherwise his leisure life is either solitary or nasty. When he returns home he lectures to various Rotary Clubs about "My Life

in India". The tourist buzzes through the country in first-class compartments, looking out the windows with the eyes of Miss Mayo; or he becomes interested in "strange customs" and makes several furtive trips to the villages in the same spirit as one might go to the Municipal Zoo.

The missionaries have one less servant than these others (especially since the depression has come to the aid of holy poverty) and occasionally have Indian friends to dinner. These latter usually fall into three categories; converts who are pretty safely de-Indianized; prospective converts who are given the opportunity of seeing what a Christian home is like; and influential non-Christian "friends" who may be induced to subsidize aspects of the work which are not too evangelical. The missionaries return these calls in the proportion of about one to ten.

But there are better missionaries, some who are even willing completely to give up the social amenities of the West and live with and like Indians (few and far between!). Even here, though, there is a predominance of that condescending attitude which says that "to help people one must be like them". A dozen blue moons go by before you hear: "To understand people one must be near to them."

It all boils down to the fact that there are so few Europeans here simply with the idea of living, that they could be counted upon one hand. Even to Indians, one has always to be explaining his reason for being here, as if residence in India were so pitiable a condition as to be made possible only by the strongest of inner drives!

Of course we must not be blamed too much for this attitude, for behind it there is a huge, almost universal and seldom-questioned assumption: that life must be primarily purposive.

It is just here that the amateur spirit makes its voice heard. Summing up the series: devotion for devotion's sake, the game for the game's sake, art for art's sake, science for truth's sake, comes *Life for Life's sake*. The amateur spirit by no means advocates passivity and purposelessness; an amateur will run himself to death in a game, while the professional constantly calculates on his own interests. But the amateur will also constantly be refreshed by the rhythm and vitality which flow to him from the game itself, while the professional needs repeated charges of external motivation. Most people all over the world are so busy doing something that they have no time to live, never realizing that the quiet, harmonious life is the only one which can receive quickly from others and which can send out those disinterested, spontaneous sparks of real self-expression which alone can contribute anything to anyone else.

After being in one of the purposive groups for my first year in India, it has been my privilege to *live* in the country during the present one. I place a certain amount of value upon the width of travel which the cheapness of third-class tickets has permitted me to indulge in; but much more deeply I value the diversity and profundity of friendship which Indians have so generously granted me; and I am convinced that even a greater endowment would come to one who is more whole-heartedly prepared to fulfil the conditions.

To become specific, I do not refer to such things as wearing Indian clothes, eating Indian food, and living in the bazaar, all of which I have done. If one finds pleasure in these, let him do them. The conditions are much simpler. Let him live in whatever kind of house he thinks suitable, and wear whatever clothes his taste and economic ethics dictate; but let him invite Indians frequently to his home, and let him spend hours, days, and weeks in theirs. Then if he cannot become really an amateur, losing all sense of self, comrades, adversaries, and goals, in the game, at least he can give his opponents the satisfaction of knowing against whom they are playing. And he can gain respect for them in knowing them.

Calcutta FRANK C. BANCROFT

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The question asked by Claire Bergson Endersby in the April 1930 issue of THE ARYAN PATH: "Is Sorcery employed in Modern Shops?"—would seem to be answered very definitely in the affirmative by the data published by the New York "Consumers' Research" in its Bulletin. This organisation would probably object to the word sorcery, but that is a matter of little moment; what interests us is that the methods by which high pressure advertising and salesmanship are "psychologising" the public for profit are being brought to the attention of the consumer, and that an organised attempt is being made to supply the layman with impartial information regarding the various commodities on the market and to warn him against the many tricks by which skilful misrepresentation, flattery, sex-appeal and exaggeration are made use of to induce him to buy, almost against his will and certainly often against his original intention.

Consumers' Research is very young as yet, but it already counts many thousand members. It has published a series of handbooks, listing specific commodities under their brand names and grouping them as recommended or not recommended on the basis of particulars regarding price, materials used, and so forth. It also publishes a General Bulletin in which economic topics are discussed from the consumers' point of view. It is here, more especially, that the battle is waged against the various forms of "sorcery" employed by advertisement writers and salesmen.

If Consumers' Research has already many friends, it has also many enemies. Unnecessary to explain why. On the other hand it is encouraging to read that there are notable exceptions—very few, it must be admitted, but all the more notable on that account—cases of manufacturers who have themselves coolly and impartially considered the criticism offered by Consumers' Research, and have taken steps to improve matters at their own end.

It will be well if Consumers' Research will turn their attention to the question of advertisements. Advertising, we are told by a writer in *The Spectator* (April, 21st.) is both a science and an art—a science because it seeks "to discover by experiment and observation the tastes, actual and potential, of different elements of the population; an art because it depends on an appeal to the

imagination through ear and eye, by means of alluring words and pictures".

The writer is not blind to the fact of dishonest advertisements, but says that "responsible journals endeavour to exclude them, and the wiser traders who rely on the quality of the goods they sell discover that honesty is the best policy". Even a casual glance at the newspapers produces not this impression. Also, "to arouse the sense of want among potential customers" and to quicken their imagination by "alluring words and pictures" is sailing perilously near the wind. Advertisement within limits is necessary. If you have an article to sell, you must take means to let people know that you have such an article; but to create new desires in people (who are already overburdened with desires), to whet new appetites—surely this is undesirable from any moral point of view.

The Consumers' Research is obviously a defence alliance against being "done" by manufacturers. It seems already to have had the effect of making some of them "wiser," and brought them to acknowledge, intellectually and practically, that honesty is the best policy. This is a step in the right direction; but a further step—a very long step—has still to be taken, namely, to elevate the moral status of the merchant, the trader, the shopkeeper. The old Hindu ideal of Vaishya Dharma, suitably restored, would contribute substantially towards building a cleaner and more prosperous world, for in such a world commerce would not mean competition but a proper distribution of the gifts of nature and of man for all, and then, verily, advertising will not be boosting but education.

The Search for April is a special double number (a very attractive one) commemorating the nineteenth centenary of Jesus Christ. It contains an interesting article by J. O. Mackenzie, which deals with the subject of the Cosmic Christ from the Theosophical standpoint. The writer frankly makes H. P. Blavatsky's books the groundwork of his article. After pointing out that "Christ, the true esoteric saviour—*is no man*, but the DIVINE PRINCIPLE in every human being," he says:—

> But what a difference there is between the conceptions of the Christians of the first few centuries and the conceptions which priestcraft have presented to the multitude in the name of their Lord! Are not the words which the Gospels make Jesus say, "Ye have taken away the key of knowledge; ye entered not in yourselves and them that were entering in ye hindered," equally applicable to those who have monopolized the grand ideal of the Christ, the Universal Spirit of Wisdom, and the Higher Self of every human being? Under the pretence of giving people a saviour, there has been shut out from their minds the one vital truth that the true Christ lived and dwelt in their own hearts.

ॐ

"The wheel of Sacrifice has Love for its nave, Action for its tire, and Brotherhood for its spokes."

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV AUGUST 1933 No. 8

THE LIMIT OF RESPONSIBILITY

"I have no meal for to-day, what will become of me to-morrow?"

Long ages ago this depressing question was asked by one dominated by economic forces like unto those of to-day. Some five thousand years ago it was repeated by Yudhishthira, the eldest of the five Pandavas, reduced to distress by past strifes and by an impending war. It occurs in a talk the Prince has with Krishna, his own and his brothers' benefactor and friend. In the Bhagavat Yāna Parva of the Udyoga Parva of the *Mahabharata* this is what the head of a royal house says:—

When a man born and brought up in a respectable family coveteth the possessions of others, that avarice of his destroyeth his intelligence; and intelligence being destroyed, shame is lost; and loss of shame leadeth to a diminution of virtue; and *loss of virtue bringeth on loss of prosperity.* Destruction of prosperity, in its turn, ruineth a person, for poverty is a person's death. Kinsmen and friends and Brahmanas shun a poor man as birds avoid, O Krishna, a tree that beareth neither flowers nor fruits! Even this, O sire, is death to me that kinsmen shun me, as if I were a fallen one, like the breath of life quitting a dead body! Shamvara said that no condition of life could be more distressful than that in which one is always racked by the anxiety caused by the thought—*I have no meal for to-day, what will become of me to-morrow?* . . Some men when overtaken by poverty elect death; others remove from cities to hamlets; others retire into the woods; while others again become religious mendicants to destroy their lives. Some for the sake of wealth are driven to madness; others, for wealth, live under subjection to their foes; while many others, again, for the sake of wealth, betake themselves to the servitude of others. . . . O Krishna, a man who is poor from birth is not so much distressed as one who, having once possessed great prosperity and having been brought up in luxury, is deprived of that prosperity. Having through his own fault fallen into distress, such a person blameth the very gods with Indra and his own self. Indeed,

knowledge of even the entire scriptures faileth to mitigate his pangs. Sometimes he getteth angry with his servants, and sometimes he cherisheth malice towards even his well-wishers. Subject to constant anger he loseth his very senses, and his senses being clouded, he practiseth evil deeds. . . . If he is not awakened in time, he goeth certainly, O Krishna, to hell, and, indeed, *wisdom is the only thing that can awaken him*, for, if he obtaineth back the eye of wisdom he is saved! When wisdom is regained, such a man turneth his attention to scriptures; and attention to scriptures aideth his virtue. Then shame becometh his best ornament. He that hath shame hath an aversion from sin, and his prosperity also increaseth; and he that hath prosperity truly becometh a man. . . . He that is without shame and sense is neither man nor woman. . . . He that hath shame . . . obtaineth emancipation, which, indeed, is the highest aim of all righteous persons!

These and the words on war and peace which followed, sent Krishna to the court of the enemy, as an envoy of peace. It was the failure of His mission which brought about fratricidal war, and in the fall of the State, the individuals also fell.

The citizen is bound up with the State. The causes which lead to distress and the forces which restore prosperity form a circle—the circle of evolution. Conditions of to-day are analogous to those before the great war between the two branches of the human family—the Kauravas and the Pandavas.

Confusion, suffering, defeatism, are rampant in the world to-day. In every country many are distressed, and more are apprehensive and perplexed. The common weight of woe bears hard upon the sensitive, grieved by their impotence to set right conditions. Many such are goaded by the urge both to act themselves and to have their nation act beyond the confines of their own respective spheres, whereas their only hope of peace of mind lies in a clear delimitation of responsibility for present action for each man and each country.

Power connotes responsibility; only tyranny disclaims it. Conversely, none has responsibility beyond the lines traced by his power and his own duty. There is a fascination in the duty of another, which casts its spell no less upon the State than on the individual. It is so easy to see what calls for righting in a foreign state or in another's character or conduct—so much easier than honest self-analysis and action on the findings!

The whole task of man or State may be summed up as determining the limits of their respective responsibilities, observing those limits strictly, and discharging their duties punctiliously within them. As the State is but an aggregate of the individuals who compose it, the same rules of conduct should apply *mutatis mutandis* to both. In fact, it is to the failure to demand of the State the standard of morality observed by its foremost citizens in their private lives that have been due many of the evils of secret diplomacy, including the colony-grabbing policy. "Responsibility" is the sheepskin ever

donned by the wolves of national greed. The cant about "the white man's burden" and the Western nations' *mission civilisatrice* was but so much dust thrown in the eyes of the easily deceived majority. "To ride abroad," like medieval knights, "redressing human wrongs" appeals alike to nations and to men. None the less, "it is better to perish in the performance of one's own duty. The duty of another is full of danger." Alas! the *Gita's* warning falls often on deaf ears, until experience teaches the lesson.

But avoiding others' duty is a negative virtue. It must be balanced by the full performance of one's own. A State has not fulfilled its whole duty when any within its borders are denied equal rights or privileges on the ground of race, colour, creed, birth, or social position; when preventable misery exists side by side with prodigality, to give the lie to human brotherhood. Will any claim there is not ample scope for the efforts of statesmen and patriots of every land to set their own house in order?

The responsibility of the individual within the limits of his own duty is correspondingly vast—circumscribed only by his powers. To pay that which is due to family, community, nation, and humanity is the duty of each; how to discharge it? That question is debated by politicians, idealists and philosophers.

True progress is in terms of the development of the nobler qualities, and the only sound basis of political reform is individual regeneration. As world peace rests on the good faith of every nation, so does the commonweal depend on every citizen.

The same circle of the fall and rise of virtue was preached by another sage—Confucius. From ancient China as from ancient India the same message reaches our twentieth century. Will it listen?—

> The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.
>
> Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their States were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole empire was made tranquil and happy.
>
> From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of *everything besides.*

THE LIMITATIONS OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT

[**Edmond Holmes** is the author of *The Creed of Buddha*, and *The Creed of Christ*, among other volumes. He belongs to that very small band of Westerners who read correctly the old Eastern philosophies. Although over eighty years of age, he still marches with the times, as this article clearly shows.—EDS.]

Speculative thought, on its highest level, is the attempt of the human mind to understand the universe. What it means by understanding the universe it has to find out for itself in and through the very effort that it makes to achieve that end.

Let us think of the Universe for the moment as having two antithetical ends or poles to its being,—what is ultimate in analysis, the Infinitely Little; and what is ultimate in synthesis, the Infinitely Great. How far can speculative thought hope to go in the direction of each of these poles? That its advance towards them should become increasingly difficult as it approaches them is what we have every reason to expect. For, as conscious beings, we live our lives in the middle regions between the two poles; and conceptions of the world around us which are generated by our experiences in those regions, and which work well on the whole as long as we remain there, may be expected to work less well as our thought moves towards either extreme; and we must face the possibility of their ceasing to work when the more familiar horizons of thought have been left far behind.

There is indeed a vital difference between the two extremes in respect of the concepts which we use when we are trying to investigate them. The concepts which regulate our thought in our advance towards the Infinitely Little are virtually common to all normal minds, and are therefore apt to impose themselves on us as being absolutely valid; whereas the concepts which we carry with us from the middle regions of experience when we are thinking about the Infinitely Great, vary from age to age, from people to people, from creed to creed, and —so far as men are in earnest about "great matters"—from mind to mind, and may even vary appreciably within the limits of each individual life.

We can see, then, at the outset, that of the two extremes, the Infinitely Little, the ultimate element in the scientific analysis of physical phenomena, is the more likely to yield its secrets to the inquiring mind. Yet even there the explorers who have gone furthest in the advance to their goal are beginning to find that, beyond a certain point the concepts which they brought with them and which had so far never failed them, concepts which are firmly embedded in human thought and human speech, refuse to work, and that it is not easy to find substitutes for them.

Professor Lindeman, in his

work on *The Quantum Theory*, makes this clear, and explains how it comes about. After pointing out that there are serious objections to both the corpuscular and the undulatory theory of light, he goes on to say :—

The reason for all these difficulties lies in the inadequacy of spatio-temporal description . . . . . any method of observing any particle is bound to affect the circumstances of that particle . . . . . the act of observing the one co-ordinate causes a change in the conjugated co-ordinate. Whichever two co-ordinates are chosen, for instance position and momentum, or time and energy, the accuracy of the one observation will produce an inaccuracy of the other . . . .

Why is this? In answer to this question, our author explains "how the indefinables upon which all our thought processes depend were formed" and shows "that they cannot be justified". His words, which deserve our closest attention, are as follows :—

For the description and classification of natural phenomena we use words and symbols. Symbols are defined in words, and the words, if they are to be of any service, must represent ideas which are common property amongst those who are concerned to know what has been written. In natural science certain words have assumed a specific meaning. These may be called the scientific concepts which are the basis of all discussions and calculations. A physical law expresses an accurate numerical relation between such concepts. If the law is known, then some of them can be expressed in terms of others. Ultimately, however, there must obviously be certain indefinables, in terms of which we express the other concepts. The three indefinables commonly used in physics are length, time, and mass. From these, with the help of certain systematized physical observations or laws, we can derive or express other physical concepts.

How does this method work when applied to the study of ultimate particles? Says our author :—

It is not easy to make clear the arbitrary nature of the space-time framework which we have chosen in order to describe reality. The co-ordinates are so convenient in the case of the grosser macroscopic phenomena, immediately perceptible to our senses, and have become so deeply ingrained in our habits of thought and so inextricably embalmed in our language that the suggestion that those indefinables may be meaningless, or, at the best, only statistically valid, is bound to meet with a certain amount of repugnance.

The concept of position, length, or space is based upon the possibility of determining distance. If this were in principle impossible there would not be much sense in employing any spatial co-ordinates. It has only recently become clear that an accurate measurement of distance is in principle impossible. This follows simply from the atomic structure of reality.

How it follows is then explained at some length. The upshot of it is that an endeavour to observe the position of (an ultimate) particle imparts to it motion, and so defeats itself.

It is impossible therefore to speak of any definite, accurate, ascertainable relation between one ultimate particle and another, comparable with the distance between one milestone and another. The desirability, or indeed the possibility, of describing relations between ultimate particles in terms of distance or space is thus open to grave doubt. That such relations can be established between gross material objects is due. . . to their size and rigidity, compared with the minute reactions which can be perceived. But to assume that these

concepts have any meaning when applied to ultimate particles is quite unwarranted.

It can easily be shown that the concepts of temperature, of colour, of smell are inapplicable to ultimate particles. It is the same with the concept of distance. "Observing distance [between electrons, let us say] changes it."

"When we endeavour to describe the behaviour of ultimate particles it may therefore well be meaningless to do so in terms of space and its related indefinable time." "Nevertheless," says our author "it is impossible for us, constituted as we are, to escape from spatio-temporal co-ordinates. We cannot think in other terms, we cannot even speak the new language which would be required."

So much for the Infinitely Little. A final interpretation of it by human thought is, as far as we can see, impossible, for the simple reason that the concepts which we bring with us from what I have called the middle regions of experience, and which work so well there that we take their absolute validity for granted, work less well when we are trying by their aid to study the ultimate constituents of matter, and at last cease to work. And one reason for this is that "any method of observing any particle is bound to affect the circumstances of the particle"; or, in other words, that the Infinitely Little changes under our hands while we are trying to understand it, and changes in response to the very efforts that we are making to understand it.

To understand the Infinitely Little is the business of a small group of specialists, to whom it has, as it were, been delegated by the rest of mankind. The results of their labours may indeed prove, in the last resort, of vital importance to all of us; but while they are at work they are left to their own devices, it being clearly understood both by them and by the outside world, that they are working, disinterestedly and wholeheartedly, in devotion to truth for its own sake and on behalf of their fellowmen.

But to understand the Infinitely Great is the business of each one of us, a business which he cannot delegate to others without serious loss to himself. And if the Infinitely Little withholds its innermost secrets from us, in spite of our using for the study of it concepts which are virtually common to all normal minds, and methods which are accepted as correct by all who are specializing in physical research, what hope can we have of wresting its secrets from the Infinitely Great, to the study of which we bring concepts that vary, as I have said, not only from man to man, but also in some cases—and those the most significant of all—from the man of yesterday to the man of to-day? The Infinitely Little baffles us because it changes under our hands when we are trying to understand it; but it is we ourselves who change under

our own hands (so to speak) when we are trying to understand the Infinitely Great. For, so far as the concepts that we form of the Universe in its totality and innermost reality—for this is what we mean by the Infinitely Great—are genuinely our own, we must needs react to them in character and conduct, and, therefore, modify them as the result of their helping us to modify ourselves. To transform oneself is to transform one's whole outlook on life; and to transform one's outlook is to transform oneself.

The different concepts which men form of the Infinitely Great have of course much in common. The variable elements in them which constitute in each case what is private and personal in one's outlook on the world, are small as compared with the underlying assumptions which are held in common by large masses of men, — by Catholic Christians, by Protestants, by Moslems, by Hindus, by Buddhists, by idealistic agnostics, by materialistic agnostics, and so forth. And behind all such assumptions is one which is so widely held that its validity is instinctively taken for granted by nearly all men, especially in the West, who are seriously interested in "great matters," and not by these alone but by all who meditate, if only for the passing moment, on the larger problems that challenge us.

Let us see what this is. A philosophy is an interpretation in general terms of a particular field of experience, an interpretation which satisfies the head and the heart, either or both, of the interpreter. There are many fields of experience which are sufficiently wide and important to demand philosophical interpretation; and there are, therefore, many philosophies, or branches of philosophy. Thus we have moral philosophy, political philosophy, social philosophy, the philosophy of art, of education, of economics, and many more. But in speculative philosophy proper the field of experience has no limits. It is the universe in its totality and innermost reality—this and nothing less than this—which the speculative philosopher, the metaphysician as he calls himself, desires to understand. But before he can start on his enterprise, he must come to some understanding with himself as to the nature and the range of his task. In our attempts to interpret the Infinitely Little our starting point is sense-experience, which is virtually common to all men, variations in it being easily corrected by reference to the experiences of the normal or standardized man. But what is to be our starting point when we set out to interpret the universe as a whole? What preliminary conception are we to form of the field of experience which we are going to investigate? What preliminary idea have we formed of the universe? What preliminary meaning do we attach to the word?

This is the question of questions for the speculative thinker.

But it is one which he seldom consciously asks himself ; and, so far as he does answer it, he does so instinctively and without realizing to what he has committed himself. What do we mean by "the universe"? The average man is at no loss for an answer to this question. "We mean by the universe the world which lies around us, the world which we look out upon, the world which sense-experience reveals to us, the world to which we, as corporeal beings, belong." This, though he would not set it forth in so many words, is his answer to that large and vital question; and he has no misgiving as to its correctness.

But there are serious objections to it. To begin with, who guarantees the intrinsic reality of the world which we look out upon? Who guarantees that the outward and visible world is "the universe"? Are we to say, with Aristotle, that "sense-perception proper, free from any admixture of association and interpretation," is infallible? No. We know too much to-day about the inner constitution of the material world to be able to endorse the naïve realism of a thinker who lived more than two thousand years ago, when science was still in its infancy. But, apart from this difficulty, to which I will presently return, there is the more obvious difficulty that there are variations in sense-perception, in virtue of which different men receive different impressions of the surrounding world. If a colour-blind man (as we call him) sees green where I see red, who shall arbitrate between us? Who is to say that I am right and that he is wrong? I can but plead that nearly all men see things as I see them. This means that I regard the sense-experience of the normal or "standardized" man as the ultimate criterion of reality, and the world which that experience reveals to us as the real world and the whole world. (I am looking at things for the moment from the standpoint which popular thought, following the lead of Aristotle, instinctively adopts.) But in what capacity do *I*, as a standardized man, guarantee the intrinsic reality of the outward world? Do I mean by "I" my corporeal or my self-conscious self? The guarantee that I might give in the former capacity would obviously be worthless. If my guarantee is to be effective it must be given by the inner I, the self-conscious self, the perceiver, the thinker, the knower. But if it is given by the inner I, it is clear that I cannot give it without, in doing so, guaranteeing a higher degree of reality to myself. Unless my metaphysical credit stands high, what is the value of my guarantee?

This is one objection to the naïve "realism" of the average man. The next objection is one which the more recent researches of physical science into the constitution of the atom have presented to our thought. The world which we look out upon is woven, so to speak, on the space-time framework. If that

world is as real as it seems to be, if it is in very truth the whole world and the only world, then the space-time framework must be absolutely real, and the space-time concept must be absolutely valid. But, as we have already seen, the space-time concept is so far from being absolutely valid that beyond a certain stage in our study of the inner constitution of the material world, beyond a certain point in our approach to the *primordia rerum*, it fails us completely and refuses to work. This failure disposes of its claim to absolute validity, and in doing so disposes of the claim to absolute reality of the world which is woven on the space-time framework.

There is another objection to the ascription of reality to that world, which we owe to the researches of the physicist. Starting with the Aristotelian assumption that sense-perception proper is infallible, and passing on from this to the further assumption that the world around us—whether supernaturally created or naturally self-existent—is in itself what it seems to be to our senses, and as such is real in its own right, physical science set to work to analyse it into its constituent elements, in the hope of finding the bedrock of its reality. This has not been found and, as far as we can see, will never be found; for there seems to be no such thing. The basis of reality in the world around us, as revealed by the labours of the physicist, is more a quicksand than a bedrock. Instability and indeterminacy* are among its leading features. The atoms which for a while science was content to think of as the "bricks of the universe," have broken up, as it pursues its researches, into ultimates—or shall I say penultimates?—which seem to defy further analysis, for the reason (as we have seen) that, beyond a certain point, we cannot observe them without changing them.

Out of these elusive penultimates, with ultimates behind them which are as yet unknown, the world of our everyday experience is unceasingly built up. How? By the interpretative action of the conscious self of man. There is no colour in the physical world, as it is known today to the physicist, no sound, no smell, no taste. The investigator has left all these behind him as he makes his way towards the Infinitely Little. The world has become for him "a picture in black and white". His business is to see "when a pointer coincides with a graduation in a scale" and to note the exact point. "Practically," says Sir A. Eddington, "every exact physical measurement resolves itself into a reading of this kind." It is the conscious self of man which translates the electro-magnetic waves of the physical world into colour, the

*"The result of our analysis of physical phenomena up to the present is that we have nowhere found any evidence of the existence of deterministic law."—*Physics and Philosophy*, a paper read by Sir A. Eddington.

vibrations of the air into sound, and so forth. If that is so, must we not turn, in our quest of ultimate reality, from without to within, from the phenomenal world which does not hold in itself the secret of its own phenomenal reality (if I may be allowed the paradox), to the self whose interpretative action on the constituent elements of "matter" has woven for that world the familiar garment which it wears *for us* to-day?

To identify the physical world, which in itself is, as science assures us, a world of "shadows" and "symbols," with the universe, and to try to find the solution of all ultimate problems within its limits, is to make a baseless assumption the starting point of a hopeless quest.

We need, for the free range of speculative thought, a wider field of experience than that which the familiar world, woven as it is on the Space-time framework, allows us. If we define beforehand the universe, the All of Being, in terms of the sense-experience of the standardized man, and forbid speculative thought to look beyond that horizon, we beg the greatest of all questions in the act of asking it.

What then?

EDMOND HOLMES

(To be Concluded)

Alas, alas, that all men should possess Alaya, be one with the Great Soul, and that, possessing it, Alaya should so little avail them! Behold how like the moon, reflected in the tranquil waves, Alaya is reflected by the small and by the great, is mirrored in the tiniest atoms, yet fails to reach the heart of all. Alas, that so few men should profit by the gift, the priceless boon of learning truth, the right perception of existing things, the knowledge of the non-existent.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

THE GITA AND SPIRITUAL FREEDOM

[**Professor D. S. Sarma** is the translator and annotator of the *Bhagavad-Gita* (special students' edition), *A Primer of Hinduism*, and *Hinduism To-day*, reviewed in our last issue.—EDS.]

In the March and the April numbers of THE ARYAN PATH Mr. G. V. Ketkar has discussed the question: "Does the *Gita* support orthodoxy?" The aim of the present article is to show that the question raised by him is only a part of a much bigger question—the question of spiritual freedom. As freedom is one of the most important aspects of spiritual life, it would be interesting to know the comprehensive teaching of the *Gita* on this subject. And I think it would be convenient if we divide the subject into three parts:—(1) Freedom from the bonds of the flesh, (2) Freedom from the bonds of the world, and (3) Freedom from the bonds of the spirit itself.

(1) The control of the animal appetites is the beginning not merely of spiritual life but even of human life. Only in spiritual life it assumes such importance that the tendency may easily develop into asceticism. Therefore the question may be asked at the outset—Does the *Gita* support asceticism? Does it ask us to gain spiritual freedom by suppressing the flesh altogether? Let us hear what it says:—

> Yoga is not for him who eats too much nor for him who eats too little. It is not for him who is given to too much sleep, nor for him who keeps vigils too long. But for a man who is temperate in his food and recreation, who is restrained in all his actions and who is regulated in his sleep and vigils, yoga puts an end to all sorrows.

The *Gita* accordingly recommends to us foods that promote longevity and strength, condemns in very severe terms all kinds of penances which consist in the torture of the body, and pleads everywhere for the wise direction of nature and not for its repression. According to its teaching the ideal Yogin is a resolute spirit riding his flesh with a firm hand but never using his spurs cruelly. He is a gallant rider who loves his horse and uses him to his best advantage. It is remarkable how often the *Gita* admits the strength of nature in man and recognises the importance of the sublimation of one's instincts and tendencies. I will give one or two instances:—

> Fettered by thine own tendencies, O Arjuna, which are born of thy nature, that which through delusion thou seekest not to do thou shalt do even against thy will.
>
> Even a wise man acts in accordance with his own nature. All beings follow nature. What can repression do?

Thus freedom from the bonds of the flesh is only through obedience and discipline. This preliminary discipline, by which a man gains inner control and unity, the

Gita calls Buddhi-Yoga. But it is only a precarious freedom, requiring perpetual vigilance. True freedom comes to us spontaneously and easily when we set our minds on something higher than mere self-control. In an oft-quoted verse the *Gita* says:—

The objects of sense fall away from the embodied soul when it ceases to feed on them, but the taste for them still remains. Even the taste falls away when the Supreme is seen.

Accordingly we are led on from the preliminary *buddhi-yoga* to the main yoga or fellowship with God to be gained through righteousness, love and wisdom, through Karma, Bhakti and Jnana.

(2) Just as harsh repression is not the way to freedom from the bonds of the flesh, so hasty renunciation is not the way to freedom from the bonds of the world. Just as one has to use one's body for the purposes of the spirit, so also one has to use the world for the rehabilitation of the soul. The *Gita* would whole-heartedly endorse the remark of the English poet that life is a valley of soul-making. It teaches us in a hundred different ways that spiritual freedom is not for him who runs away from the world, nor for him who becomes a slave to it, but for him who remains in it and works there in the light of a higher world. Man's activities in this world become fetters to his soul only when he is self-centred, but they become the very channels of freedom when their object is not the self. The *Gita* says:—

The world is fettered by work unless it is done as a sacrifice. Therefore, O Arjuna, give up thy attachments and do thy work as a sacrifice.

Again,

This world is not for him who makes no sacrifice, O Arjuna, much less the other.

In these passages the ideal Yogin, who remains in this world but is not affected by it, is implicitly compared to a sacrificer. But in other passages he is also compared to a faithful servant or a skilful artist. For Yoga is perfect service, it is also skill in action. The artist who is devoted to Beauty, the scientist who is devoted to Truth as well as the moralist who is devoted to Righteousness feels in his heart of hearts amidst all his activities: "Thy service, O Goddess, is perfect freedom."

It is well known that the *Gita* teaches every man to do his *Svadharma* or his own duty and thereby reach the goal of life. We have the quintessence of that teaching in the following verse:—

He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded—by worshipping Him through the performance of his own duty does man attain perfection.

But it is not so well known that the *Gita* connects *Svadharma* with *Svabhava* or the man's own nature. The duties of men in this world are determined both externally and internally. Externally they are determined by their station in life and internally they are determined by their own natural endowment. The latter is far more important than the former. The *Gita* clearly says:—

He who does the duty imposed on him by his own nature incurs no sin.

Thus the gospel of *Svadharma* taught by the *Gita* is connected with man's natural endowments below and the service of God above. Hence it is not only a gospel of freedom but also a gospel of beauty. For what is beauty, as some one has said, but the blissful perfection which creatures attain when they are absolutely true to the law of their own being? It is an aspect of spiritual freedom which is commensurate with the Law.

(3) By freedom from the bonds of the spirit I mean freedom from all traditions and institutions which are the embodiments of the spirit in the past. Just as harsh asceticism is not the way to freedom from the flesh, and hasty renunciation is not the way to freedom from the world, so also a total non-conformity is not the way to freedom from the rule of custom and tradition. Freedom from the institutions of the past has to be gained in the same way as freedom from the flesh and the world, that is, by obedience and transcendence, and not by rebellion and non-conformity. The wisdom of the teaching of the *Gita* on this point is remarkable. It does justice both to the authority of tradition and the sovereignty of the soul. It advises us to go to the *śastra* for guidance, but insists on our following the spirit and not the letter. As I have said elsewhere, it tolerates neither the arrogant freethinker who discards all scriptures and becomes a law unto himself, nor the blind literalist who makes a fetish of his scriptures and follows the letter of the law, killing its spirit. Hence the apparent inconsistency in some of its utterances regarding the authority of the Vedas. On the one hand it includes the study of the Vedas in its lists of virtues, because it is a means to the knowledge of God, and speaks of the divine origin of the Vedanta; but on the other hand it says that the vision of God can be gained not through the Vedas nor through gifts and penances but by exclusive devotion to the Lord. There is, however, no inconsistency in the teaching for a student who understands its general spirit. It is easy for any one to tear a passage from its context and prove that the *Gita* supports authority and not freedom or *vice versa*. There is, for instance, as Mr. Ketkar has pointed out, a passage which conservatives who want to uphold the authority of the ancient codes of law at any cost are never tired of quoting. It occurs at the end of the sixteenth chapter.

Therefore let the scripture be thy authority in determining what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. Knowing the scriptural law thou shouldst do thy work in this world.

If we read the whole chapter dispassionately we shall learn from the context that the *Gita* advises us to seek the guidance of the *śastra* for curbing the three deadly sins of lust, wrath and greed, and not for resisting any desirable social reform. As

against one or two texts like this upholding the authority of tradition, we have scores of texts in the *Gita* which assert the freedom of the sovereign soul.

Fools who rejoice in the letter of the Veda say, "There is nothing else but this."

As is the use of a pond in a place flooded with water everywhere, so is that of all the Vedas to a Brahman who knows.

When thy mind which is distracted by the Vedic texts rests steadfast and firm in spirit—then wilt thou gain true insight.

Even a man who merely desires to know of Yoga transcends the Vedic rule (*S'abda-Brahma*)

The Yogin who having attained to oneness worships me abiding in all beings—he lives in me *howsoever he leads his life.*

And it is interesting to note that the *Uttara Gita* which is supposed to be the sequel to the *Bhagavad Gita*—though a very poor sequel—asserts the spiritual freedom of man in rather extravagant terms:—

A boat is necessary until one gets to the other side of the river; but when a man once crosses the stream, of what use is the boat to him?

As a husbandman throws away the husk after threshing the corn, so does a wise man give up the scripture entirely and concentrate on the knowledge and insight gained through it.

As milk is not necessary for a man who has drunk nectar and is satisfied, so are the Vedas not necessary for a man who has known the Supreme.

But more than the precept, the example of the *Gita* in this matter is invaluable to us. Everywhere it follows the old Upanishadic tradition, but it extends that tradition in such a way as practically to re-create it. As I have shown in my Introduction to the Students' Edition of the *Gita*, it takes the traditional concepts of *yoga*, *karma*, *yagna*, *dharma* and *varna* and gives them a far wider connotation than they originally had.

Thus the answer which the *Gita* gives us in this part of our enquiry is the same as that which it gives us in the other two parts. It advises us to use our scriptures as we ought to use the bodies with which we are endowed and as we ought to use the worldly circumstances in which we are placed. Scriptures are not ends in themselves, but are only the means to an end; and the road to spiritual freedom lies through obedience and discipline.

D. S. SARMA

अपि चेदसि पापेभ्यः सर्वेभ्यः पापकृत्तमः ।
सर्वं ज्ञानप्लवेनैव वृजिनं संतरिष्यसि ॥ अ. ४।३६

Even if thou wert the greatest of all sinners, thou shalt be able to cross over all sins in the bark of spiritual knowledge.

—THE BHAGAVAD-GITA—iv-36

PSYCHOLOGY: INDIAN AND WESTERN

[**A. R. Orage**, at one time, edited *The New Age* and is now the Editor of *The New English Weekly*, which though very young has already made its mark. This contribution is more in the nature of random notes than an essay; these are informative in facts, and suggestive in thoughts. A periodic repetition of ideas, true and false, takes place; epidemics alternate with periods of health; and this is as true of the mind as of the body. Mr. Orage's remarks about Behaviourism bring out this cyclic phenomenon. There are also other ideas with which the student of Esoteric Philosophy is familiar.—EDS.]

A good deal of the Western failure to realise the priceless values of ancient Indian culture is due, I believe, to its association with the East and the Oriental. In a very general sense there is, no doubt, a radical difference between the East and the West, just as there is between the North and the South; but it is as profound a mistake to identify Indian culture with the East as it would be to identify, let us say, Plato, with the South merely because he happened to be a South European. This identification of India, which stands for the Aryan culture of an Aryan people, with the whole of the "East," has resulted in two serious misunderstandings. In the first place, the "East" has been given a much higher rank than properly belongs to it in the history of culture; and, in the second place, Indian thought and literature have been given a much lower place than they merit. It is necessary, I think, to detach India from the general concept of the "East," and to associate Indian culture with the other great cultures of the world, the Egyptian, the Greek and the Roman. By so doing we not only remove from the pure Aryan culture of India the local associations which now unduly cover it, but we make it impossible for world-students to neglect its conscientious study. I have been amazed to find, for instance, students of the Egyptian, the Greek and the Roman cultures, who are not ashamed to admit complete ignorance of Indian culture. They would dislike to be caught tripping over the order of the Dynasties, the relative ranks of Æschylus and Euripides, or the illustrious names of the Augustan period; but they would be rather gratified than ashamed to confess ignorance of Vyasa, the Upanishads and Shankara. I believe, on the other hand, that it is impossible to be a "good European" and, still less, a man of the cultured world, without at least as much informed appreciation of Indian as of Egyptian, Greek and Roman authors. Moreover, I believe that it is precisely for the lack of this essential element that European and world cultures are now languishing. It is all the more important, therefore, that India and Indian culture should be free from their adventitious associations with the "East" and claimed and ac-

knowledged to be the spiritual possession and now the birthright of the modern man.

* * *

One of the characteristic movements in current science is the attempt to explain psychology in terms exclusively of physiology. The School of Bechterev in Russia was the pioneer of the Behaviourism of America, and from these two centres the world of Psychology has for the moment been almost completely conquered for Physiology. To such a degree has the conquest been carried that it is now not only unfashionable, but even a little heretical, to profess to believe in a "psyche" at all; and from dispensing with the the hypothesis of an indwelling subject of experience, the more extreme members of the School of Reflexology or Behaviourism have even come to deny, as unprovably subjective, the fact of consciousness itself. This of course, is emptying out the baby with the bath with a vengeance. You set out as a psychologist to discover the significance of consciousness, the meaning of ego, and the interactions of consciousness and organism; and you end by denying consciousness and affirming organism alone. Psychology, in short, has ceased to exist, and only Physiology remains.

* * *

It would be another blunder, however, to assume that this school is uniquely and typically Occidental—and thus to set it in combative contrast with "Indian" thought. Indian culture in respect of the study of psychology is so rich that practically no theory can be advanced to-day that has not been anticipated and thoroughly explored in recorded Indian thought. There is no doubt whatever that Behaviourism, even in its most refined and comprehensive statement in Bechterev's Reflexology, is in India as old as the hills. At least three of the six great schools of Indian thought, classified by Max Müller, are both "atheist" and behaviouristic; and I am inclined myself to discover the same polarity of theory in the two scientific schools of Buddhist thought. In other words, Behaviourism is not new; it is not exclusively Occidental; and it is not in contrast with Indian thought. What distinguishes "Western" from Indian culture in respect of the science of Psychology is not the presence or absence of a school of rigid Behaviourism or even the presence or absence of the assumption of the reality of Consciousness. I repeat that for every school of Psychology in the modern West a parallel and a forerunning analogue can be found, not in the vague "Orient," but, in Aryan Indian literature. On the other hand—and this is of paramount importance—it is *not* true of Indian Psychology that all its schools are yet represented in Western thought. On the contrary, on this very matter of the reality of Consciousness, and its prime importance in Psy-

chology (in contrast with the place, if any, it occupied in Behaviourism),—outside of one or two students, of whom Dr. Daly King, of Columbia University, is the best-known, there is practically no *psychological* school to represent it in the West. (I naturally do not regard Berkeleyan idealists as other than philosophers; they are not psychologists in the strict sense.) The distinction is, therefore, as I say, not one of contrast between Indian and modern Western thought, but one of comparison; and the conclusion to be drawn, it seems to me, is that whereas modern Western Psychology is disposed to identify itself more and more with Behaviourism, including the practical denial of Consciousness, *Indian* Psychology, though it includes Behaviourism among its schools, is not only disposed to, but in its ripest students does, identify itself more and more with pure Psychology. It is as if, with a longer period of study and more favourable conditions for it, Indian culture in respect of Psychology had mapped out and intensively explored every possible view, including Behaviourism, but only to concentrate more and more on pure Psychology; whereas, on the other hand, Western Psychology, having only relatively recently begun its serious study, is not only disposed to believe it has found something new in Behaviourism, but is disposed to confine itself to that extreme and partial school. But it is all the more important, if this is the case, that the values of Indian culture should be reasserted in precisely this field. It would be as great a calamity for Western Psychology to get "stuck" in Behaviourism, with the triumphant example of Aryan Indian culture to show it the way out, as it would have been if, say, the English Drama got "stuck" in the mystery-plays of the Middle Ages and had never been introduced, via the Renaissance, to the invigorating antecedent models of the Greek drama. For exactly as the English stage, in the absence of the impulse from an ancient superior culture, would have remained essentially "provincial," Western Psychology, in the absence of familiarity with the superior examples of Psychological studies, recorded in Indian literature, is likely not only to remain "provincial" but eventually to become positively "rustic".

* * *

It is one of the lesser-known traditions of the Greek Drama that its earliest exponents *lived to create it.* Everybody is, of course, aware, that for several centuries before dramas were written down, memorised, rehearsed and presented, their authors had been in the habit of improvising them. The Schools of Rhetoric undoubtedly originated in this way by degeneration. But there is all the difference in the world between preparing oneself to improvise a part in a great drama and preparing to write a play for others to memorise and

enact. In the first, the indispensable discipline is of oneself; in the second it is primarily that of words. Consider what it entailed by way of self-preparation, for example, to be able on a great public occasion and upon a theme suggested at the moment, to determine one's part in relation to the developing whole and to improvise the actions and, above all, the speeches appropriate to it. In the Italian Commedia delle Arti we have merely the popular survival of it; but in the greatest days of the Greek Drama, before plays were composed, written down and memorised for production, this art of improvisation was carried to such a degree of mastery that, on occasion, the actor-dramatists actually spoke the language and played the rôles of, as it were, gods.

I mention this to draw another distinction between Indian and Western Psychology in favour of the Indian. It would be unfair to say that Western Psychologists are for the most part content with observation only, while the great Indian Schools of Psychology have required of themselves both observation and personal experience. But it is not unfair to say that, on the whole, the method of Western psychologists has been that of experimentation upon others, whereas the method of Indian Psychology has required self-experimentation first and foremost. The result is to be seen in the consequent contrast of the ultimate products. A great "psychologist" in the Western sense is not expected to be great in personal experience. It is enough that he knows more about the science of Psychology than anybody else and has arrived at his conclusions by the accepted methods of observation, deduction and verification by experiment. But in the field and tradition of Indian Psychology, whether, in fact, a great psychologist was always a great soul also, at least he was and is expected by repute to be one. It is true that for results in psychological self-development, objective criteria are difficult to set up for common acceptance, and perhaps, on that account if for no other, so-called subjective results are discounted in the Western scientific method. But, on the other hand it is also true that in psychology, of all sciences, literally nothing of real value can be learned by observation alone or even by experiment upon others, since the latter also is only a form of observation. What, however, is needed is a means or a language for expressing subjective results in objective terms—terms, that is, intelligible and accessible to scientific students. We need, in short, a language that shall be common to students of Psychology in both the Indian and the Western traditions. And only then, I believe, will it be clearly demonstrated that in all important respects Indian Psychology is at least several centuries of culture in advance of the Western.

A. R. ORAGE

THE DISCOVERER OF OXYGEN

[**Dorothy Turner, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D.** (London), of the University of Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) takes it for granted that Priestley discovered Oxygen on the 1st of this month of August, 1774. But can we be certain that Oxygen—of course under another name—was unknown to remote antiquity? And with regard to that which Priestley made famous as phlogiston, perhaps the time is not very far distant when science may want to re-adopt the derided name. One of the great Theosophical Adepts once wrote:—

> We believe in the much laughed at *phlogiston*, and in what some natural philosophers would call *nisus* the incessant though perfectly imperceptible (to the ordinary senses) motion or efforts one body is making on another—the pulsations of inert matter—its life. The bodies of the Planetary spirits are formed of that which Priestley and others called Phlogiston and for which we have another name.]

In these days of sub-division and extreme specialization of scientific studies, it is pleasant to look back to a time when there was no distinction between what we now call science and philosophy, when the experimenter, as well as the thinker on the Olympian hilltops, not only recorded observations but tried to assess their value. Thus to the investigation of nature was added that contemplation which earned for the thinker the title of *philosopher* or lover of wisdom.

In times past a philosopher took all learning for his province. Even in the late eighteenth century it was not incongruous for a minister of religion to do original experiments in chemistry and in electricity, to write comprehensive histories on the development of the sciences, to write on history and political theory, to study Chaldee, Syriac and Arabic, to take part in current theological and political arguments and to preach the Gospel. Such manifold activities mark the life of Joseph Priestley (1733–1804).

Priestley was gifted with that first requisite of a scientific investigator, namely, an unbounded curiosity. He had many opportunities for following up those studies to which his natural curiosity led him. Indeed Priestley's duties always left him abundant leisure and time seems to have ambled very pleasantly with him. He began the serious study of chemistry and electricity in his spare time as a teacher of classics. Later he was appointed as pastor in charge of a chapel at Leeds. For several years he experimented in chemistry and carried out his duties to his congregation. He gained a considerable reputation among the men of science of his day and was honoured by the French Academy by being made a foreign associate. For some years he acted as librarian and literary companion to Lord Shelburne who generously allowed him an annuity even after he had left his service. The years spent with his wealthy patron were the

most fruitful of Priestley's life. Not only did he have a congenial post, but he had leisure for his own studies, quiet rooms in which to work and the advantage of intercourse with other philosophers both in London and on the Continent.

When Priestley left his patron to take up duties once more as a minister of religion, he was still able to continue such friendly discussions with the cultivated men of his time. His new post was at Birmingham. There he became a member of a scientific club called the *Lunar Society*. Members used to meet on Mondays nearest the full moon as this enabled members to have the safety of the moonlight as they dispersed to their homes, no unimportant matter in those days of footpads. At these meetings, Priestley used to meet Erasmus Darwin, James Watt, Josiah Wedgwood and William Herschel. Unfortunately for Priestley he allowed himself to be drawn aside from purely scientific discussions and to enter into theological and political arguments. He thus brought trouble upon his own head through the publication of unorthodox views. Priestley's liberal attitude was misinterpreted and his sympathy with the revolutionaries in France led to the sacking of his house by the Birmingham mob. He escaped to London but his position became so unbearable that he emigrated to America. He settled in Pennsylvania where his last years were spent in tranquillity.

Although Priestley's controversial writings have been forgotten, he will always be remembered as an original experimenter who added considerably to our knowledge of gases. His researches were commenced when he was a minister in Leeds. It happened that next door to his house there was a brewery. Priestley was curious about the processes involved in beer-making and so decided to examine the gas given off from the fermenting liquids. Thus it was mere chance that set him working on the study of gases, a subject which he advanced so far that he was given the title of Father of Pneumatic Chemistry.

Priestley identified the gas of the brewery with "fixed air," which we now know as carbon dioxide. Like other chemists of his day, Priestley spoke of gases as kinds of air. He investigated the properties of this "fixed air" as well as those of many other gases including inflammable air (hydrogen), ammonia (alkaline air), hydrochloric acid (acid air) and sulphur dioxide (vitriolic acid air). In experimenting with gases, he adopted the methods in use at the time. Before his day, chemists had learnt to collect gases by letting them displace water in a jar. Priestley went one stage further and collected gases by displacement of mercury. He was thus able to examine gases which were soluble in water and which would have escaped detection on the older methods. Priestley gave an account of these researches in

a work of six volumes published between 1774 and 1786 entitled: *Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air.* The work is of considerable interest. It describes the homely apparatus with which he worked and, since it is a laboratory record rather than a summary of his work, it enables us to follow how he worked and how he arrived at his conclusions. It shows how Priestley's open and original mind led him to seek out many paths of investigation. But it shows also that there were many loose ends in his thinking, that he failed to follow up many a useful clue and that he frequently marred a good experiment by a too-facile interpretation.

The most important of Priestley's work on gases was his discovery of Oxygen on August 1st 1774. He was then in London staying at the residence of his patron in Berkeley Square. The discovery was the result of chance, and indeed it seems as if the very unmethodical character of Priestley's work enabled him many times to stumble upon something new. He had already obtained several different "airs" by heating various substances. Why not try others? It happened that he possessed a powerful convex lens or burning glass and this gave him a ready means of heating small quantities of a substance enclosed in a glass vessel, for he merely had to concentrate the sun's rays upon it by means of the lens. He tells us that it was quite by chance that he decided to heat red calx of mercury to see if any "air" could be obtained from it. Referring to this experiment he says:—

> . . . . The contents of this section will furnish a very striking illustration of the truth of a remark which I have more than once made in my philosophical writings . . . that more is owing to what we call *chance*, that is, philosophically speaking, to the observation of *events arising from unknown causes*, than to any proper *design*, or preconceived theory in this business . . . . . For my own part, I will frankly acknowledge, that at the commencement of the experiments recited in this section, I was so far from having formed any hypothesis that led to the discoveries I made in pursuing them, that they would have appeared very improbable to me had I been told of them; and when the decisive facts did at length intrude themselves upon my notice, it was very slowly, and with great hesitation, that I yielded to the evidence of my senses.

We can well imagine Priestley's surprise when he saw the red calx change to gleaming mercury, a colourless "air" being given off meanwhile. He found that a candle burned in this new air with a vigorous flame and that mice lived in it longer than in the same volume of ordinary air. In other respects it seemed to him to resemble ordinary air. As the new air appeared beneficial to the mice, he tried the effect of breathing it himself and felt a curious exhilaration. "Who can tell," he said, "but that in time, this pure air may become a fashionable article of luxury. Hitherto only two mice and myself have had the privilege of breathing it." He even suggested that the new air might relieve patients suffer-

ing from pneumonia. It is no wonder that he felt a naïve delight in his discovery.

Later, Priestley sought some explanation of these remarkable results. A chance observation is indeed a rare occurrence and is usually without significance unless it is interpreted according to some philosophical scheme. That which suggested itself to Priestley was one with which he and all other chemists of his day were familiar, namely the *Phlogiston Theory*. This theory, which sounds so curious to our ears to-day, was an attempt to explain combustion. A mysterious substance *Phlogiston*, the principle of fire, was believed to be present in all inflammable bodies. During the process of burning, it was held that the body parted with its Phlogiston. The calcination (*i.e.* oxidation) of a metal was thus regarded as the loss of its Phlogiston. It was the calx (oxide) that was regarded as the element, while the substance that we call the elementary metal was held to be a compound.

Now Priestley had noticed that his newly-found gas helped things to burn readily. In terms of the current theory, he therefore interpreted this fact by saying that it helped them to part with their Phlogiston. In order to absorb Phlogiston so easily, Priestley thought that his new gas must be devoid of Phlogiston in the first instance. He therefore called it *Dephlogisticated Air*.

So far Priestley's reasoning was clear enough. But when he tried to explain why the red calx, (a substance remaining after mercury had "given up its Phlogiston") should be able to give off a further supply of Phlogiston, he found himself entangled with difficulties. Indeed his views on this point were never clearly expressed. It never occurred to him that the very difficulties he encountered showed that the Phlogiston Theory was inadequate to explain the new facts. He still clung to the theory. His last work, published during his retirement in America, was a gallant defence of the old theory: *The Doctrine of Phlogiston Established*, written some twenty years after further experiments had shown decisively that the theory had outworn its usefulness.

Like many another man of mature years, Priestley was reluctant to give up beliefs which he had long held. Moreover, his interests were so varied that he had never given his whole heart to scientific investigation. For instance, his vocation as a minister of religion often intruded itself into his thinking as when he said:—

> Let it be remembered, that a taste for science, pleasing, and even honourable as it is, is not one of the highest passions of our nature, and the pleasures it furnishes are even but one degree above those of sense; and therefore that temperance is requisite in all scientifical pursuits. Besides the duties of every man's proper station in life, which ought to be held sacred and inviolate, the calls of piety, common friendship, and many other avocations ought

generally to be heard before that of study. It is therefore only a small share of their leisure that most men can be justified in giving to the pursuit of science.

These words which are quoted from the characteristically discursive preface to his work: *The History and Present State of Electricity with Original Experiments* (1767) suffice to sum up Priestley's attitude towards scientific studies. Brilliant though his inferences sometimes were, he preferred to let his mind sweep over a wide field rather than to limit himself to a single line of intensive investigation. He liked to write comprehensive histories on Vision, Light and Colours, on Electricity, on the Rise and Fall of Empires and on the Corruption of Christianity. Great experimenter though he was, his attitude was that of child-like happiness and wonder rather than of complete absorption in a task demanding his whole powers. He never professed to be a chemist and perhaps never appreciated his own work. He was, as Cuvier said "Le père de chimie moderne que ne voulait pas reconnaître sa fille".

DOROTHY TURNER

The Sun being the heart and brain of our pigmy Universe, we might compare its *faculae*—those millions of small, intensely brilliant bodies of which the Sun's surface away from the spots is made up—with the blood corpuscles of that luminary—though some of them as correctly conjectured by science are as large as Europe. Those blood corpuscles are the electric and magnetic matter in its sixth and seventh state. What are those long white filaments twisted like so many ropes, of which the *penumbra* of the Sun is made up? What—the central part that is seen like a huge flame ending in fiery spires, and the transparent clouds, or rather vapours formed of delicate threads of silvery light, that hangs over those flames—what—but magneto-electric aura—the *phlogiston* of the Sun?

—FROM A LETTER OF AN ADEPT

THE HOLY MEN OF HINDUSTAN

[**Paul Brunton** has had an all-round experience in journalism and has been editor of *World Trade*, and other business periodicals. Mysticism and Eastern Philosophy have been his private study for many years and he intends to specialise on these subjects in future writings. Mr. Brunton travelled widely in India during 1930 and 1931. He spent much time in investigating at first hand the present day lives and teachings of the Yogis, and in gathering literary material. Since his return to England he has been working on a book dealing with the subject of the present article, to be published this year under the title of "Secret India".—EDS.]

A Westerner once came down into the Punjab plains on a mission of conquest but some folk he encountered there caused him to strike off at an unexpected tangent, until he came dangerously near to forgetting his primal purpose. Alexander the Great was looking for a vaster land than his own to put under his sceptre, but if he came as a soldier he was forced to finish as a philosopher. His swoop across icy mountains and parched deserts gave him not an extra square inch of soil in the sequence, but it gave the Greek and Roman scribes new subjects for their pens.

I have often speculated about the thoughts which were running through Alexander's brain as he drove his chariot up the streets of Taxila, ancient city of learning, but now almost faded off the map of India. I have likewise wondered what would have happened to the spiritual history of later Europe if his troops had not been broken in will by the intolerable heat of India's summer, and if they had not refused to cross the seas and march on to further victories. It is not difficult to perceive that the Macedonian king who fell under the spell of the Yogis he encountered, who spent days at a time eagerly questioning them and warmly discussing their philosophy, needed only a few more years' sojourn in their midst to startle the West with new departures in policy.

The men he met hardly differ from some who can be met today, except that real Yogis are now very rare and require more than a little search before they can be found. There exist, however, a class of men who might be called their degenerate descendants, if the qualifying adjective be accepted in its strictly philological sense rather than in its current insulting connotation. I refer to the sadhus and faquirs, who still abound and form a five or six-figure population.

Much nonsense has been written in the West about these little known people. Europeans in India usually regard them as humbugs, hypocrites, madmen, thieves, beggars, idlers and what not, and finish up by calling them "a burden on the country". At least, this is the impression I gained from my interviews with members of the official and non-official communities. Europeans

who have never left Europe but have heard of the sadhus, usually regard them with mingled awe, fear and curiosity.

Many of these "holy men" will answer to the first description and are fit only to be put in jail. Some, however, are quite the reverse. I have met really noble men among them. If the former are indeed a burden, the latter are a blessing and have done much to keep alive what there is of idealism and spirituality in the country. That the undesirables are in the majority is plainly evident; this is the sad result of time's inevitable activity, but it need not blind us to the presence of the saving remnant who shine out all the more.

An ascetic, recluse, or wandering monk is called a "sadhu" if he follows some Hindu religion or philosophy, and he is called a "faquir" if he holds an Islamic belief. The Yogi represents the cream of the sadhus, which is precisely why the genuine kind is so rare.

The sadhus usually belong to different groups or societies; perhaps the most respected are those like the Sanyasis of the Order of Sri Sankara Acharya, who go about to proclaim the teachings of their famous Patriarch exactly as they did over one thousand years ago, and those like the Monks of the Ramakrishna Mission, who engage in useful social services but form an association which is quite modern.

Most of the holy men wear a salmon-coloured robe, others are almost naked save for a loin cloth; many shave their heads while others wear their hair long and unkempt. Some spend an entire lifetime in one place, but the majority wander like gypsies all over the country. The wandering and begging monks of India have their historical correspondence in the wandering and begging Dominicans of Europe. But the important difference is this: you can meet these monks anywhere in India to-day, but you cannot meet a begging friar anywhere in the West nowadays. I mention this contrast to emphasise that the spirit of religious asceticism has, among ourselves, become enclosed within the walls of monasteries and churches, whereas it still penetrates and affects Hindu homes of to-day.

One meets such a bewildering variety among the sadhus that one hesitates to affix a label either of praise or blame upon the whole race. I completely understand and sympathise with those hot-headed Indian students of the Presidency capitals, who assured me that the extermination of all these "parasitic sadhus" would constitute a great blessing for India. I equally understand and sympathise with those milder spirits who, older in years and residents of quieter towns, informed me that if Indian society ceases to find a place for its holy men, a noxious materialism will be its inevitable doom.

It is a problem not without its importance in other directions,

for in modern India economic distress is compelling certain revaluations. Those who emit diatribes against the Sanyasi because he fulfils no useful economic function in India are justified where reference is made to the man who takes up this rôle as a substitute for a more laborious avocation; but where the call is perfectly genuine we must replace recrimination with respect, if not with reverence. The real difficulty lies, of course, in our inability to judge the hidden motives of other men.

We need to remember that loss on the material side of a nation's balance sheet, may be compensated for by gain on the spiritual side. Are there to be only men of the plough and no men of the spirit? Are none to be given the opportunity to make a whole-time search for the Truth? Does not a true saint repay us a thousandfold for the bit of bread or plate of rice we give him? The average Westerner in India has rarely sought to understand the deeper motives of the *genuine* sadhu but is content to judge by surface appearances. Perchance, beside some well he sees such a man. Years of austerity reveal themselves in an emaciated body, a lean face and ashen skin. The European turns away disgusted. He has not perceived the heart-eating love for things divine which has swept this unattractive man out of the currents of humanity's normal existence. He has not seen the same vision in the night which revealed to this poor sadhu the presence of a higher power, and which drove him out to tread an unconventional path. Even where the Westerner is not repelled, he fails to understand the Oriental mystic and looks upon him as a lethargic creature, dreamer in and of a different world to his own.

I have met real saints among these sadhus. They live as Jesus and the apostles lived, wandering the land from village to village, carrying neither scrip nor purse, but carrying always the benediction of spiritual serenity. Since these men have theoretically renounced the world in order to find God, they are presumed to possess no money and have to live by soliciting their food and shelter. A teaching monk once said to me: "We have struck a bargain with the world. We say: 'You support our bodies and we shall support your souls; we shall carry spiritual comfort and teaching wherever we go. Give us in exchange a place where we can sleep and fill our begging bowls with food.' Since we have ceased all efforts to acquire worldly riches and devote our thoughts and lives to God and His service among men, is it not a fair bargain?"

There is an unpleasant side to this picture. Because some fine men have donned the orange robe, we need not forget that there is more chaff than wheat among the rest. Who can estimate the exact proportion of lazy tramps who peregrinate India and live upon the gullibility of illiterate people,

though in the cities they are frequently recognised for what they are? Swarms of ignorant and untaught sadhus wander through the villages and attend the periodic religious fairs in certain cities; they cannot teach because they have learnt little themselves; they cannot uplift others because their own characters are of a low order. One sees repulsive men, smeared with mud, ashes and dirt, in the streets of those towns which have become centres of pilgrimage. They are bogey-men to the children and impertinent, importunate beggars to adults. They do not hesitate to abuse those who refuse them money. They have the impudence to call themselves Yogis, and since the real Yogis are mostly recluses and rarely met with, a slur has been brought upon what was formerly an honoured title.

So one learns that one must strip the spiritual skin off a man, whether he be vain humbug or saintly hermit, if his real worth is to be estimated. Just as the single classification of "Writer" covered both Shelley and the miserable Grub Street hacks who ground out political verses for a pittance, so the term "Yogi" has covered both Ramakrishna and the lazy beggars who persistently solicit alms from the industrious.

A further confusion arises in the Western mind because of the existence of so-called Yogis who practise extereme forms of asceticism. Indeed, I find that the popular idea of a Hindu Yogi, so far as I have made inquiries among several persons, is that of someone sitting on a bed of sharp spikes and pretending to enjoy himself; or of a man holding one arm aloft in the air until he grows nails half a yard long. The popular idea is both right and wrong, because the lowest order of Yogis are truly of this kind, yet all the other orders are entirely different. These self-torturing ascetics are simply ignorant men who have mistaken the means for the end. In other words they have adopted and greatly distorted certain ideas of body-control which belong to the science of Hatha Yoga.

The real Yogis, who have a proper understanding and due appreciation of their mysterious science, are rare figures in India nowadays. I fear that the globe-trotting tourist never meets them. Only the sincere lover of wisdom is likely to contact them for he alone, of resident or visiting Europeans, will think it worth while to search the land until he locates them. Whether it be in the solitude of some hidden sanctuary or amid the turmoil of a crowded city, their discovery will amply repay the trouble. Such men carry their credentials on their faces, for there is a perennial benignity and spiritual grandeur about them which is unmistakable.

PAUL BRUNTON

SPINOZA AND THE UPANISHADS

A COMPARISON IN ETHICS

[**M. S. Modak, M. A., Ph. D.** is an Assistant Inspector of Schools in India. The following is part of a chapter in the writer's thesis for the Doctorate degree of the University of London.—EDS.]

Critics have questioned the possibility of an ethics in the Upanishadic philosophy, and it is noteworthy that the same objection should have been raised against the system of Spinoza. A familiar argument of these critics is that no room can be found for ethical doctrine in a system that does not postulate a personal God as the ultimate reality. Neither in Spinoza nor in the Upanishads, has Reality been conceived in a way that would admit of personal attributes. Further, it is generally believed that both these teachings are pantheistic. The contention therefore that ethics must be impossible in such a case is freely asserted. If all is one, it is asked, how can we have moral relations? So also, if Reality is through and through determined with an immanent necessity, where is the room for ethics in Spinoza's system? What right has Spinoza to talk of an ideal life or an ideal human nature at all? If the Upanishadic hypothesis that God is in man is accepted, where is the room for ethical endeavour?

When Reality is taken in its total being it is completely real and perfect. So the Upanishadic position is that the Absolute is perfection. The modal apprehension of reality admits degrees of perfection. Although all things follow with the same inevitable necessity from God's nature, they differ from one another in degree of perfection or reality. And this moreover is a specific difference. In a letter to W. Van Bleyenberg, Spinoza writes:—

> . . . . It is indeed true that the ungodly express the will of God according to their measure, but they are not therefore to be in any way compared to the pious. For the more perfection anything has the more does it participate also in Deity and the more does it express the perfection of God. Therefore since the pious have incalculably more perfection than the ungodly their virtue cannot be compared with that of the ungodly.*

Spinoza's metaphysical position is that all things, in and for themselves, are of necessity as real as they can be. But all things in and for themselves are not *equally* and completely real or *equally* and completely perfect. The conception of degrees of reality therefore is the basis of Spinoza's ethical doctrine. Now this conception of degrees of reality is also applicable to human life.

> We conceive as completely and adequately as possible all that man, so far as follows from within the four corners of his essential nature, of neces-

* p. 151. *Correspondence of Spinoza*, A. Wolf.

sity is and does. This conception serves as a pattern by which we estimate the goodness or badness—the moral value of everything which comes under the scope of our ethical investigations.*

The terms " good " and "bad" do not express the nature of things as they really are in and for themselves, but " they express that nature as it is *for us*, under the determinate circumstances of the task in which we are engaged".† And that task is our endeavour to form an ideal human nature, a pattern for our life and conduct.

A conception of degrees of reality is to be also found in the Upanishads whenever phenomenal aspects of reality come under discussion. " Monism does not mean an obliteration of the distinction between good and evil."‡ True, that so far as the Absolute is concerned there are no degrees at all. The conception of degrees has meaning only for the finite intelligence which distinguishes things—or to use Spinoza's phraseology—which resorts to modal apprehension. Besides this conception of degrees of Reality, there is another aspect of the Upanishadic teachings that provides for practical ethics. The goal of self-realisation is to be attained by means of a moral life, conducted in accordance with a prescribed code. It is obvious therefore that both the systems have made a legitimate provision for ethics.

The ethical categories made use of are not, however, given a supreme position, and their inferiority as compared with the metaphysical categories is stressed quite distinctly by Spinoza and the Upanishads as well. " The moral categories are not ultimate; not valid as metaphysical categories. But they are valid and objective within the limits of human conduct and life."§ The philosophical structure erected by Spinoza is based ultimately on his metaphysical categories and the thought of the Upanishads also exhibits a similar structure. The validity, therefore, of ethical categories is not ultimate in the philosophy of Spinoza and in that of the Upanishads. Morality is the preparation for the ultimate goal of " knowledge and love of God " in the case of Spinoza, and of " self-realisation " in the case of the Upanishads. In the Upanishadic philosophy Ethics are taken for granted. This is a fact that is often lost sight of. Ethics seem to have been pushed to the background in all systems predominantly metaphysical. But the Upanishads make morality a necessary preliminary to religion. The *Katha-Upanishad* asserts that " he who is always impure fails to reach the highest good." Another runs: " He who has not ceased from immoral conduct cannot realize the Self through

* p. 243. *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* ; Joachim.

† p. 243. Vide Supra.

‡ p. 208. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Radhakrishnan.

§ p. 250. *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* ; Joachim.

the intelligence." A third passage says: "One cannot get to the Self if one is not self-restrained." Pure moral categories are not made the pivot of their systems of thought by Spinoza and the writers of the Upanishads. "Whatever else one may have to say of the ethical thinking contained in the Upanishads, this at least must be admitted at the outset that it is conducted in full view of the wider implications of human existence."* The realisation of the one-ness with Deity is the ideal of man set forth in the Upanishads. Morality is valuable only as leading to this highest perfection. So, also, the goal and consummation of moral life, in Spinoza, is "intellectual love". It might be inferred that the perfection or the goal towards which morality is said to lead ultimately is something devoid of ethical nobility. Such, however, is not the case. For, as Dr. Caird says " . . . . . the ethical in Spinoza's aim and intention was the goal to which the metaphysical part of his philosophy pointed,"† and it is none the less true that the ethical part of Spinoza's philosophy is based on the metaphysical. So, also, the goal of life laid down in the Upanishads—*viz.*, the realisation of the one-ness with God, does not only possess ethical nobility, but is in addition given a practical aspect by those thinkers on the strength of their personal spiritual experience.

When we compare the Hindu (the Upanishadic) view of life with the one indicated by Spinoza's philosophy, we find very remarkable resemblances. Just as in his thinking about the nature of reality Spinoza was actuated by the desire to discover something which would give him "a joy continuous and supreme to eternity"; so the writers of the Upanishads were actuated by the desire to find "that which, being known, there might prevail eternal bliss".

> There was the same desire for release from the meshes of the lower and for escape to the highest and the quest had the same religious character. With the thinkers of the Upanishads the quest was pre-eminently a practical one and with Spinoza it was an ethical one.‡

Religion, to the writers of the Upanishads, was not so much correct belief as righteous living. Compare the following words of Spinoza—"Religion is universal to the human race; wherever justice and charity have the force of law and ordinance, there is God's kingdom." This characteristically tolerant spirit is the pre-eminent feature of both the systems.

> He [Spinoza] assured the Van der Spycks that their religion was quite good and that they need have no misgivings whatever, so long as their conduct was good and upright. Good conduct and pure motives, these were the most essential things and devoted as he (Spinoza) was to truth, he maintained that Turks and heathens who did their duty and loved their fellowmen were filled

* *Hindu Ethics*, Mackenzie.
† p. 223. *Spinoza*, Caird.
‡ p. 68. *Hindu Ethics*, Mackenzie.

with the spirit of Christ, whom Spinoza regarded as the highest type of manhood.*

He was an intellectual religionist and so were the sages of the Upanishads.

It has already been said that morality has been treated in the Upanishads as a preliminary to the mystical goal of self-realisation. Moral values therefore cannot be judged apart from the mystical values. The moral and mystical are invariably linked. The Upanishadic mysticism is based upon the sure and explicit foundation of morality and so also it might safely be said that according to the Upanishads morality in the end culminates in a mystical attitude. With Spinoza, too, morality must lead finally to the intellectual love of God. There is a divergence of opinion as to what this intellectual love of God actually connotes. It must be said, however, that after an unprejudiced study of Spinoza one finds it difficult to resist the conclusion that his philosophy is clearly tinged with a mystical element. There is a spiritual glow in his teachings, that cannot be denied. His "substance" has infinite attributes, although only two of them can come under human apprehension. His inner vision was, therefore, wider than the external, or, as Professor Wolf puts it, "he felt more than he saw". The fact that he was out and out of a rationalistic and scientific temperament need not hamper the above conclusion. Rather, it would make it more convincing that that mystical element about Spinoza was of a *higher* type. His religious language which was the outcome of this mystic feeling and the charm of his personality further prove that his intellectual love of God means something more than mere intellectual contemplation of a moral man. "His moral ardour seems almost aglow with this mystic fire."†

Discrimination is made between the good and the pleasant, as in the *Swetaswatara-Upanishad*, it is said that—

> The good and the pleasant approach a man, and the wise man discriminates between them choosing the better, not the more pleasant, the fool chooses the more pleasant.

The good is recognised to be more permanent and helps man to attain his aim. The Upanishadic ethics teach us to avoid all extremes. The *Taittiriya-Upanishad* advises that, when in doubt, man is to take as his authoritative model what is done in similar circumstances by wise men "who are competent to judge, who are apt and devoted *but not harsh lovers of virtue*".

All emotional excess is deprecated by the Upanishads. Philosophical serenity can be said to be the main object of Upanishadic Ethics. The ideal, however, is yet completely ethical. To quote Hopkins :—

> It is one that discountenances as inimical to the soul's welfare, cowardice,

* p. xcix. A. Wolf.—*Spinoza, His Life and Treatise on God and Man.*

† p. cii. *Ibid.*

sloth, wrath, jealousy, cruelty, meanness, pride, envy, lust, etc.*

That which increases the "vitality" of the whole being—not of one part at the expense of the rest—is good according to Spinoza. What an amount of stress is laid on reason and understanding in the realisation of ethical life is evident from the following metaphorical description of mind and the senses. A similar metaphor occurs in Plato.† The *Katha-Upanishad* says:—

> Know the Self or *Atman* as the Lord who sits in the chariot called the body. Buddhi or intelligence is the charioteer, mind is the reins, the senses are the horses, and the objects are the roads. The Self, the Senses and the Mind combined, the intelligent call the enjoyer. But he who has no understanding, but is weak in mind, his senses run riot like the vicious horses of a charioteer. He who has understanding and is strong-minded, his senses are well controlled, like the good horses of a charioteer. He who is without understanding, who is thoughtless and impure, never reaches the immortal state. But he who has understanding and he who is thoughtful and pure reaches the state from which there is no return.‡

Spinoza has no admiration of asceticism.§ He holds that there cannot be anything in the nature of man's interest, which is anti-social. Man's "conatus" is the ground of his virtue. It is his "self-assertion" that constitutes virtue.

It is the spirit of disinterestedness that is conveyed by *Tapas* and *Tyaga*. "By renunciation, thou shouldst enjoy"—says the *Isa-Upanishad*. This spirit of renunciation did not degenerate, in the Upanishads, into the insane asceticism of a later day, which revelled in the burning of bodies and such other practices. The *Mundaka-Upanishad* enters a strong protest against asceticism.

The Upanishads require us to work disinterestedly. When once we have the right vision, we may have wealth (*Taittiriya*). And Sankara points out that wealth is an evil to the unregenerate, but not to the man of wisdom. There is no indication in the Upanishads that we must give up life, mind, consciousness, intelligence, etc. On the other hand, the doctrine of divine immanence leads to an opposite conclusion. The false asceticism which regards life as a dream and the world as an illusion,—which has obsessed some thinkers in India as well as in Europe,—is foreign to the prevailing tone of the Upanishads. A healthy joy of the ethical life in the world pervades the atmosphere. The *Isa-Upanishad* says: "Only performing works one should desire to live a hundred years." The call is not to forsake the world; but it is only to give up the dream of separate reality.

M. S. MODAK

---

* Translation quoted from Radhakrishnan's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 8.

† *Phædrus*.

‡ Vide p. 76 *Ethics of India*, Hopkins.

§ Vide p. 87 *Spinoza*, Duff.

WORLD-LEADERSHIP IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE

[**R. G. Collin Smith** is only in the middle twenties, but he has managed to do a good many things during a short time. He was at the London School of Economics, and has travelled among and studied the peasants of most of the European countries. For two years he worked as assistant editor to the *Toc H. Journal*, and as a writer he has to his credit a travel book and several articles and short stories. In this article he foreshadows a *rapprochement* between physical science and spiritual science.—EDS.]

The heaith and strength of a society may be judged by the degree in which its acclaimed leaders are also truly great men. To-day those nominally in charge of world-government are men of small philosophic and spiritual stature. The great are available, but they are neither acknowledged leaders, nor is material control in their hands. For the first reason the world presents a scene of anarchic confusion; for the second, it holds the highest potentialities.

At all periods great men appear. Like others, they must manifest their philosophic and spiritual gifts in one or other profession. With changing conditions, the professions which provide the greatest scope for their genius vary widely.

In the earliest past, the only position which obtained the ear of the people was that of tribal prophet-king, combining material and religious leadership. Later, men settled in fertile lands and great cities, building up stable and prosperous civilisations. To the great men were opened new professions—kingship, warriorship, statesmanship, priestcraft. In the course of time, the ethical and religious sense of the masses became more developed, and could be appealed to directly. With the coming of Christian teaching into the Western world, many great spirits undertook leadership in the Church, and in the first fifteen centuries of the Christian era, this constitutes perhaps their most important opening.

Before the year 1500 A. D., therefore, a very large proportion of the great of each age were men of action—kings, generals, statesmen, missionaries, administrative priests. They were the direct, and often the political, leaders of the people and, as such, were usually recognised and respected.

Meanwhile, the theories of individuality and democracy were gaining ground, and men no longer acknowledged or submitted to the great ones to the same extent. The great no longer controlled material power, nor put their ideas into practice by law-giving and administration, since the people was of an age to experiment by itself with the reins of government. The invention of printing introduced a period of conscious mental influence unsupported by force—a tremendous advance for individual

responsibility. The great ceased to rule and were content to influence.

In the twentieth century, the exaggeration of this lack of balance between culture and action produces the conditions which we have stated. Thanks to the good influences of individual men—authors, philosophers, doctors, artists, scientists—each with his many followers, the world to-day is full of intellectual power and spiritual aspiration of the highest kind. At the same time, its government and economic control, being almost entirely in the hands of men of small vision, have either become dominated by purely material standards, or have collapsed into complete unreason.

Hence the anomaly of a world in part passionately struggling towards light, in part surrendered to complete materialism, the whole saddled with unprecedented material chaos and moral confusion.

Men must yield themselves to their real leaders, it is true, but now in knowledge and no longer in ignorance. To become like the old peasants, and renounce the gift of responsibility, is to go backward. Men must use their responsibility to choose out consciously the great men to lead them. And that is a question of their daily values.

I believe that there are signs of such a new regime to-day, and that it is to be sought in the *rapprochement* of physical and spiritual science, and in a resulting race of accepted world leaders who shall be scientists in both senses.

It is physical science which, since about 1750, has given the world the powers over nature upon which twentieth century civilisation is based. The statesman, the financier, the merchant, are merely administrative officials using the inventions and discoveries of the scientist.

Now the old scientist was churchman first, and scientist after. But by the second half of the nineteenth century, the mechanical approach to the macrocosm and the microcosm led researchers to believe that all life was ultimately explicable in terms of balls and wheels and weights. At that same period, the Church had fallen into a rigidly dogmatic and unimaginative interpretation of its message, which made ecclesiastical sentiment seem wholly irreconcilable with the clockwork universe of the physicists.

Since that time, both physical and spiritual science have been modified and developed greatly. The opening up of Eastern Wisdom, and its reinterpretation with an infusion of Western vitality; an intelligent study of comparative religion; the popular growth of such movements as theosophy; unprecedented intellectual freedom and a tremendous individual search for truth—these things have produced a wider and more universal spiritual science, which has come to influence the thought of our whole civilisation.

Science, meanwhile, has broad-

ened as much. Passing from the mechanistic thesis, it entered, with investigations of universal wave motion, into a wholly mathematical realm, and is now pausing, on the further confines of that conception, before still inexplicable mysteries beyond. It seems that both mechanics and mathematics will fail in the last analysis to provide a life-principle for the universe. What then is to be expected from scientific research in the near future?

Here we gather a clue from the writings of the great physical scientists of the day, where the broader physical science and the broader spiritual science have come into unexpected contact. Lord Morley said, in the hey-day of a science flushed with youthful pride: "The next great task of Science is to create a religion for humanity." The scientists of today are not so arrogant. It is no longer the creation of a religion which is in question, but the gradual unveiling of a larger truth which will reconcile all the fragments which religion and science have separately discovered. The Universe is too planned and perfect to be regarded any longer as "a fortuitous concourse of atoms".

Sir James Jeans, for example, almost against his will, finds himself moving towards the idea of a Universal Mind, and voluntarily aligns himself with the mystic, Berkeley.

Julian Huxley, too, after a minute examination and criticism of superficial religious thought, defines God as "the sum of the forces acting in the cosmos, as perceived and grasped by the human mind". If he had had the courage to leave out the qualification, he would have agreed wholly with spiritual science as revealed in all the great books of religion. He concludes an essay on the subject with a sudden flash of truth that illuminates the outlook and hope of the future:—

> The moulding of matter by spirit is, under one aspect, Science; under another, Art; under still another, Religion. Let us be careful not to allow the moulding forces to counteract each other when they might be made to co-operate.*

J. B. S. Haldane approaches the problem from another angle. He denies the possibility of supernatural manifestations, but then goes on to postulate the illimitable extension of that which is to be regarded as natural. He thus throws open the scientific mind to the acceptance of superphysical planes, and admits that physical science as such is concerned only with the external manifestation of principles which go much deeper. He explains in one place:—

> The argument of these lectures is that the physical world is not the real world, but only an ideal and quite insufficient representation of it. The real world is the spiritual world of values, and these values are in ultimate analysis nothing but the manifestation of the Supreme Spiritual Reality, called, in the language of religion, God.†

This, using the terms *Maya*,

* *Essays of a Biologist*, Julian Huxley, p. 304.

† *The Sciences and Philosophy*, J. B. S. Haldane, p. 297.

Buddhi, and *Brahman*, is the most orthodox Hinduism.

It is clear from these quotations that the most advanced school of physical science has accepted a spiritual explanation of the universe. It has reached extremely pure spiritual conceptions, based upon direct observation and unhampered by ritual and dogma. These conceptions (though undeveloped in detail) accord with the Occult teaching of all ages.

The characteristic of our age, as we have seen, is progress in physical science. Our particular approach to truth probably lies along the lines of intellectual and scientific conception as opposed to the religious approach of the first fifteen centuries of the Christian era. Our scientists, upon whose work the physical and economic ordering of our civilisation depends, are clearly making rapid progress along the former path.

With this in mind, let us return to our original problem of leaders for the present world-order. In ten or twenty years, it seems safe to say, the progress of scientific thought from the physical side, will have reached fairly complete understanding of the spiritual and esoteric principles of which the physical world is a manifestation. To-day, there is more *detailed* knowledge of physical science than ever before though in many ancient civilisations the principles have been better known and generally applied. In a short time it seems likely that such detailed knowledge will be linked up with these principles, knowledge of which has been largely lost. When that occurs spiritual science (as expressed in the esoteric side of all religions, in mystic philosophy, in theosophy) will be united with physical science (as expressed in the mechanical, astronomical and biological knowledge which rules the external world to-day).

From such a union, a new school of scientists will grow, having detailed knowledge of the working of our material and economic world, and at the same time the spiritual development essential to all great men. With such qualifications, they might well become the acclaimed leaders of the people also, and it is easy to imagine a world, no longer administered by statesmen and politicians, but by such as these. "If a ruler or a king could hold the Tao," said Lao Tse, "all things would of their own accord assume the desired shape." That condition would once more be possible to a weary world, and a mechanically minded age could return to contact with the spirit.

R. G. COLLIN SMITH

RELIGION A HELP AND A HINDRANCE

[**Alban G. Widgery** was once the Editor of *The Indian Philosophical Review*: also, he was the Stanton Lecturer in Philosophy of Religion at Cambridge University; at present he is the Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, U. S. A.—EDS.]

Devotees of religion are strongly convinced of its aid in the art of satisfactory living; opponents have emphatically urged on the contrary that it is a hindrance. There is truth on both sides of this opposition. An attempt to analyse the situation with which we are here faced may suggest the principle of advance by which both sides may gain, and indeed eventually the opposition be overcome. A fundamental essential for any such advantage to accrue is that those on both sides shall be sincerely anxious to find the truth and be willing to conform their attitudes with it.

In what is religion an aid to life? An exhaustive answer to that question would include a number of specific ways in which individual religions through their individual practices and their support of ethical convictions help to mould the conduct and influence the thoughts and feelings of their adherents. No such detailed consideration can be given in the little space available here: nevertheless these specific aids constitute a large part of the religious life of the member of any religion. As striking examples may be mentioned the Muslim practices of prayer, Buddhist forms of meditation, Christian hymn-singing, and Jain self-examination. Here something more general and profound which lies at the heart of all genuine religion needs to be brought into view. Ultimately, the aid which religion seriously gives in life is the feeling, the conviction, of the relation of the good in one's emotions and efforts with a reality wider and more fundamental than the individual feels himself at any moment to be, something transcending the social group of which he is a member whether church, nation, or humanity; something which has characteristics different from those of external nature. Different religions and diverse sects of religions have expressed the implications of this in different, and sometimes in apparently contradictory ways. Many oriental forms of expression represent this wider, deeper reality as not something other than one's self, but as its own truer and complete reality. *Jivatman*, individual soul, is in its essence fundamentally one with *paramatman* or the universal soul. Other, especially occidental, forms of expression have described the wider transcendent reality as a deity. But whatever the form of the expressions, the experience is essentially this, that in religion, by realising contact and harmony with this infinite self, or this deity, life receives a sense of confidence,

a courage in face of difficulties and sufferings, a peace and an ability to overcome superficial discontent. Religious ritual, whether public or private, tends to cultivate this attitude of mind.

In what is religion a hindrance to life? Here, again, a complete answer would involve a consideration of particular ways in which individual religions and different sects present obstacles to full and harmonious experience. These may, however, all be brought in one way or another under certain general statements, which alone are possible in this treatment. In the first place, these hindrances are all due to forms of theoretical or practical dogmatism. It is this that constitutes the main ground of those conflicts of religious groups which have sundered mankind into opposing factions, and been a hindrance to their co-operative activity for the greater production and the wider distribution of the physical and cultural goods of human existence. The different groups have each maintained that their form of theoretical creed is true, and those of the others false, and with open hostility or veiled friendship have fought one against the other. Similarly with regard to ritualistic practices and allied ethics; each has tended in some measure to condemn those of the other. The maintenance of attitudes of rigid conformity to the ideas and maxims of traditional forms of particular religions often tends to the persistence of moral practices of a lower order than those towards which mankind in general may be striving. Consequently, religions are frequently opposed not so much with regard to their fundamentally religious implications but because they are associated with an ethic of a bygone age and condition of society. In the second place actually the adherence to one set of beliefs and practices has led to so great a formalism that the individual person and the particular community have become shut up, as it were, within a narrow circle of ideas, activities, and sympathies. The broadening and deepening of life is thus seriously hindered. This leads to the third type of hindrance. The attitude is cultivated in religious communities that not merely some truth of religion is apprehended by their particular sects or religions, but all truth: consequently, advance both of religion and of life in innumerable aspects is checked.

With that one may perhaps be led to a consideration of how the opposition with which we began is to be overcome. The hindrances are to be eradicated only by a fuller and more profound understanding of the character of religion as an actual aid. None, except perhaps those orientals who have claimed, or had the claim made for them, that they have completely attained *moksha* or *nirvana*, would contend that their experiences of their relation with the wider whole are at any time perfect. Attainment is a matter rather of gradual advance, and it is such

advance in the individual and the community which constitutes spiritual history. The whole in contact with which the mind is to be in harmony is seen not to exclude but to include all that is worth while in empirical existence; in contact with it one is to be able to find an increasing richness in life in every possible way, in the understanding and enjoyment of nature, in the cultivation and appreciation of the arts, in the expansion of social friendship and love. Once this is realised, and salvation is understood as a process in which we are involved, without present complete attainment, the essential hindrances will be in course removed. It will come to be seen in most instances that the divisions and conflicts caused through theoretical and practical dogmatisms are due mostly not to what is asserted but to what is denied. What one religionist urges of his religion may be true: what he says is wrong in another may not be wrong. Both may have grasped essential aspects of the whole: both are impoverished in excluding what the other has discovered. The proper appreciation of the character of religion as a help should lead to a notion of unity, to be arrived at not by reduction of all to the common measure of their similarities, but through a harmony built up out of the widest contributions. From this standpoint the religious motive should be a driving force for the cultivation of the good in all its forms whether that of truth, beauty, moral character, or religious peace and ecstasy. The basal character of the experience of religion as an aid to life is thus at one and the same time the source for a progressive movement in an ever-enriching historical life of mankind and it reveals the character of its ultimate goal. In this process the fundamental essence of religion is itself able to overcome all hindrances which partial and incorrect representations of religion may have generated.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

TWO ENGLISH ALCHEMISTS

GEORGE RIPLEY AND THOMAS NORTON*

[**E. J. Holmyard's** writings on alchemical subjects are authentic and valuable. In this article besides matters of alchemical interest is the story of teacher and pupil which has its own moral for students of esoteric philosophy.—EDS.]

The art of alchemy, brought to a high level of philosophical theory and technical proficiency by the medieval Arabs, was transmitted bodily to Western Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. There it met with its customary fortune and misfortune: fortune in engaging the attention of profound and brilliant thinkers such as Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus, and misfortune in attracting a horde of unscrupulous charlatans eager to enrich themselves by false pretensions to the magistery. These rogues quickly became so numerous that Chaucer, in the second half of the fourteenth century, felt it necessary to administer a severe castigation of the very real abuse; though a careful reading of the *Tale of the Chanoun's Yeoman* seems to show that he had no scepticism of the genuine Art, and may probably himself have been an adept.

It is difficult to gauge the effect of Chaucer's bitter satire, but there can be no doubt that the century succeeding his death witnessed the zenith of alchemy in this country. Chief among the English initiates was George Ripley (*circa* 1415-1490), a native of Yorkshire (or perhaps Surrey), who became a canon-regular of St. Augustine at Bridlington and there pursued the study of alchemy with such experimental vigour that he is said to have caused no small discomfort to the other members of the fraternity. Dissatisfied with his progress, he travelled widely in France, Germany and Italy in search of fuller information, and had the good luck to witness a transmutation at Rome. This event determined him to settle in Rome for a considerable time, and there in 1477 his friendship with Pope Innocent VIII culminated in his elevation to the rank of chamberlain. In the following year, having acquired a complete mastery of the Divine Art, he returned to Bridlington; but he found the conditions irksome and unfavourable, and the Pope granted him an indulgence to live in retirement, exempt from cloistral observances, in the Carmelite monastery of St. Botolph at Boston (Lincs.).

* *Enquiry into the Authorship of the Ordinall of Alchimy* by M. Nierenstein and P. F. Chapman. Isis XVIII, 290-321 (1931); *A Facsimile of Ashmole's edition of the Ordinall*, with an introduction by E. J. Holmyard. (Edwin Arnold and Co., London, 1928.)

According to tradition, Ripley's skill at transmutation was such that he was able to provide vast sums of money for the defence of Rhodes by the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. However this may be, it is at least certain that his two books, *The Compound of Alchemy* and *The Bosome Book*, established his reputation as the greatest adept of his age, and inspired a young man of Bristol with a burning desire to sit at his feet.

This young man, whose reputation was to eclipse even that of his master, was named Thomas Norton. Until the last few months, very little was known of Norton's life beyond the traditional facts that he belonged to a substantial Bristol family, and that he was the grandfather of another alchemist, Samuel Norton (1548–1604?)—a less shadowy figure who became Sheriff of Somerset, muster-master of Somerset and Wiltshire, and rector of Abbot's Leigh, a village on the outskirts of Bristol. Recently, however, an investigation of the records of the Bristol Nortons has been made, and though complete certainty has not been attained, it seems likely that Ripley's disciple was Thomas Norton, Customer of Bristol and a gentleman of the household of King Edward IV, whose will was dated 26th November 1513 and who probably died shortly afterwards.

From the scanty records still remaining, Thomas Norton's character does not emerge to his advantage. In 1458 his father, Walter Norton, applied to the Courts for the transfer of his property to his younger son, "in order that he should not be vexed or troubled by Thomas, his elder brother"; while at his death six years later he left Thomas no more handsome a bequest than "a silver cup, some hangings and cushions in the hall of his dwelling, and the standing bed in the great chamber with its tester and curtains". Thomas, indeed, appears to have been a thoroughly disreputable and quarrelsome person. In 1477 he was in trouble over irregularities in his customs accounts, but was pardoned by the king. Shortly afterwards, he accused the Mayor of Bristol of high treason, but apparently the accusation was not taken seriously from one who was described as "a common haunter of taverns, where he drinks and rails with his followers till midnight, not associating with honest company; lies in bed till nine or ten daily, avoiding divine service; spends sermon time in the afternoon at tennis and frivolous sports, and generally promotes mischief". It proved, in fact, that the incident with the Mayor was merely an act of revenge for having been discovered as the retainer of thieves who assaulted one of the Bailiffs of the city and left him for dead.

Thomas added to his other misdemeanours a vicious persecution of his younger brother, whom he deprived of the family estate, imprisoned, and finally drove out of

the country to Spain, on the voyage to which he was drowned.

Such facts have led to a doubt whether the celebrated *Ordinall of Alchimy*, the classical alchemical work of fifteenth-century England, can justifiably be assigned to its reputed author, "Thomas Norton of Bristol". It is, however, no uncommon thing to find a literary masterpiece falling from the pen of a profligate, and in this particular instance we may imagine without difficulty that the art of alchemy had much to attract a man who obviously spent money as fast as he could acquire it. According to his own account, he began to study alchemy at an early age, and, fired by enthusiasm for his subject, rode the length of the land to receive instruction from the lips of Ripley himself. After studying with the Master for forty days, he returned to Bristol and succeeded in arriving at a knowledge of the great Elixir when he was twenty-eight years old.

His first specimen, prepared after much labour, was stolen from him by a dishonest servant: a misfortune which so discouraged him that, for a time, he would have "noe more of Alkimy". However, he recovered his optimism before long, and prepared the Elixir a second time—only to find that ill luck still dogged his footsteps, for "a merchant's wife" robbed him of the precious substance as soon as it was made. A third attempt meeting with a similar fate, Norton relinquished his experiments, to his "greate paine and much more woe," but resolved to commit to paper the knowledge so fully, if so laboriously, acquired.

His chief work is the *Ordinall of Alchimy*, which exists in manuscript and has also been published by Elias Ashmole in the *Theatrum Chemicum Britannicum* (1652). Latin versions were published by Michael Maier in his *Tripus Aureus* and by Manget in his *Bibliotheca Chemica Curiosa* (1702). The authorship of the *Ordinall*, which is written in English verse, is revealed in a curious way. "From the first word of the Proeme," says Ashmole, "and the initiall letters of the six following chapters—we may collect the author's Name and place of Residence: For those letters, (together with the first line of the seventh chapter) speak thus:

Tomais Norton of Briseto,
A parfet Master ye maie him call trowe."

The poem opens with the "proheme," in which Norton explains his reason for writing the book, and laments the foolishness of both "clerks and laymen," in attempting to follow the enigmas and dark sayings of his predecessors. Even

. . .Common workemen will not be out-laste,
For as well as Lords they love this noble crafte;
As Gouldesmithes whom we shulde lest repreve
For sights in their craft moveth them to beleeve:
But wonder it is that Wevers deale with such warks,
Free Masons and Tanners with poore Parish Clerks;
Tailors and Glasiers will not thereof cease,
And eke sely Tinkers will put them in the prease
With greate presumption.

As masters of the Art, Norton mentions Hermes, Rhazes, Geber, Avicenna, Merlin, Hortolanus, Democritus, Morienus, Bacon, Lully, Isaac (Judaeus) and others, but complains that, to use his own delightful expression, "their cloudy Clauses dulled many men". His advice to the novice is not to trust these men and their books, but to "give Credence to this booke and mee," and "to lerne well this Clause, Nothing is wrought but by his proper Cause". He was not devoid of the scientific spirit, and remarks that—

With due proofe and with discreet assaye.
Wise men may learne new things every day.

but his general system of thought is often confused and illogical. In spite, however, of various shortcomings as a practical treatise, the *Ordinall* is more than a mere sprightly and attractive alchemical poem: for the attentive reader will soon discover that Norton's acquaintance with esoteric doctrine, though by no means complete, is considerable enough to be of great value to those who have sufficiently advanced to read between the lines.

E. J. HOLMYARD

A NOVELIST WITH A MESSAGE

[**Geoffrey West** is a biographer and a critic, possessing insight and idealism, and in the following article he offers some valuable thoughts which need to be more thoroughly discussed. For example—novelists as teachers and priests; or the relation between religion, art and spirituality. Accepted definitions are traps; different people have different concepts, when they discuss about art or religion or teachers; there is need to clear the ground by adopting definite names for definite things.—EDS.]

Claude Houghton is one of the most significant of the younger English novelists writing to-day. In a special sense, he presents a type of novelist the world of the West *needs* to-day. His books are an innovation at least in contemporary English fiction. The modern novel, it is often said, stands at a crisis of life or death. For half a century or more it has been progressively dominated by a materialistic realism finally deepening to an unqualified naturalism, a transcription of experience devoid of beauty, value, or meaning. The cold disgust of an Aldous Huxley facing a world without spiritual colour, the horrified and horrifying engrossment of a William Faulkner in morbid psychologies as inescapably determining existence—these are its logical conclusions. They are, of course, in large degree little more than reflection or echo of the general trend of Western thought and feeling. The novelist and the novel are to-day in Europe and America the most sensitive and faithful record of prevailing mental states. Who would understand these lands should read their novels! In the phrases of

Mr. Ludwig Lewisohn, as the sacred scriptures have been secularised to the status of literature, so literature, "the fullest and most continuous expression of the totality of man's life," has acquired something of the rank of scripture. Literature in general, the novel in particular, in denying, in freeing itself from, the moralistic domination of dogmatic religion, but followed the centuries-long movement of Western thought towards a vital emancipation. It was a necessary movement, it had to be made, so long as Christianity clung—and it still clings—to the letter of its teaching as its unchangeable essence. But there is danger, worse than danger, that the good has been thrown away with the bad, the gold with the dross, the very taproots of spiritual life severed in the endeavour to save them from being strangled. Reacting against the false claims of religions, we are apt to deny religion altogether.

That surely is in no small degree the situation to-day of Europe, of America, of all the world West and East (including Russia) that accepts the so-called Western civilization. Without vision the people perish, and for lack of vision, a sense of spiritual values as *real*, the world is falling into chaos, into conflict and self-destruction. What can save it? Where lies the hope or even possibility of spiritual re-awakening? The Churches cry in vain to the people while still clinging to their creeds as ultimate truth; the day of such dogmatic religion is over. Men demand a wider, a more universal truth. But what, and whence? Who shall be their, our, teachers? If spiritual renaissance there is to be, is it absurd that some of us should look to our writers, even our novelists, for inspiration? Certain it is that the West must have its own prophets, to cast their rarer knowledge into familiar forms. Men must be made to meet the truth on, as it were, their own doorsteps. A generation, an age, sunk in materialism, cannot, if it would, suddenly fling away the body of this flesh for a life in the spirit. Being what it is, it must be made to know the spirit in the flesh. Its teachers must be not priests withdrawn from experience, denying the flesh, but those whose knowledge is deeper as well as higher, who can show us the flame of the spirit burning within the bowl of the body with a power and verity not all our wilful blindness can deny. It is our artists, our novelists, most sensitively attuned to the needs and longings of the soul and body of mankind, who must be our teachers, our priests, to-day. Perhaps too few accept, or even discern, the responsibility, but only those who fulfil it, however unconsciously, are truly significant.

Houghton discerns, accepts, and—in his degree—fulfils. He has vision, and declares it, at least in his novels, in terms native to the West. He believes, absolutely, in the need for a new religion, a revival of and through

spiritual values. The only possible alternative seems to him the collapse of civilisation into deeper and deeper chaos. The phrase, "a new religion," is his own, but his writings in general, and in particular his exposition of his belief, *The Kingdoms of the Spirit*, make it quite clear that he has in mind a freshness of rediscovery rather than of innovation. For in *The Kingdoms of the Spirit* he consciously recognises his faith as the oldest religion in the world—or, perhaps one should say, as the unchanging basis of all religions. He believes, he says, in the final spiritual nature of being. He sees each man's life, if only potentially, as a pilgrimage from the limiting slavery of self to the infinite freedom of total spiritual awareness. He holds "that each individual life is one link in an eternal sequence, that its importance is not restricted within the limit of physical duration, that the measure of its significance is related to eternity and not to time." These three affirmations he declares to be "common to all comprehensive creeds," but beyond that asserts no dogmas, regarding such as no more than the expression of eternal realities in temporal terms conditioned by the degree of spiritual growth, and by the physical environment, of their worshippers. He quotes Lao-Tzu: "The Tao which can be expressed in words is not the eternal Tao; the name which can be uttered is not its eternal name." Every man, he would say, must seek his own truth in his own way.

> There are [reflects a character in *Crisis*] as many truths as there are persons on the earth. A vision of absolute truth is not obtainable in this world, where all things are relative. But if each individual would seek the truth that belonged to him or her, valuing it above all things, and seeking to serve it when found, then, and then only, life would cease to be a series of tricks, evasions, and facile observances. It would attain its true stature and become reality. And if the truth that one man discovers is not identical with that of another, nevertheless there will be a vital relation between these truths, for each will be a reflection of that ultimate Truth from which every truth proceeds. Each of us casts a different shadow, yet there is only one sun.

Here is the root of a wisdom the world needs to-day as never before, and one moreover that men *will* accept, for the whole trend of modern thinking predisposes them to it in the degree that it can be made real to them in the terms of their daily lives.

This is the achievement that Houghton's novels not merely point to but verge upon. He is in fact the author of two volumes of poems, two plays in verse, *The Kingdoms of the Spirit*, and seven novels (written in that order). To the poems and plays I do no more than call attention; they contain some fine if rhetorical writing, and the plays in particular, *Judas* and *In the House of the High Priest*, high imaginative elements; they reveal also the development of that illumination of which *The Kingdoms of the Spirit* is the explicit record, a record notable for and convincing in the freshness and vitality of its

statetment of ancient truths. It is a book containing much more than has been indicated, describing as it does the spiritual kingdoms of self, belief, vision, law, imagination, love and the rest, which are the pilgrim's stepping-stones to the veritable Kingdom of God.

> We rise from self to sainthood: through the discipline of law we rise from the slavery of self to the freedom of love, and consequently we pass from illusion to illusion until we obtain a glimpse of the shadow of Truth itself.

If in one sense it says nothing that is new, it bears upon every page the authentic signature of genuine individual experience; Houghton has made these truths his own, even if he is but one among a million—or million million—wayfarers!

Always, even in his novels, he is concerned with that Truth which is eternal. Yet in another sense his novels are so absolutely contemporary that they might almost be described as topical. They dissect and crystallise in dramatic form the deepening distress year by year of the Western world. Merely for their social criticism they deserve to be read. Even in an isolated couple of sentences from his latest novel, *Julian Grant Loses His Way* there is a profound truth, declared with a brilliant succinctness:—

> If you're not hypnotised by a pseudo-technical jargon, you'll discover that our famous economic problems are created by one fact. The age of expansion is ended, and so there's no longer any loot. We're gangsters without victims.

In *Crisis, I Am Jonathan Scrivener, Chaos is Come Again*, and *Julian Grant*, at least, such criticism is implicit and explicit. It is integral to them all. And necessarily. For they—all seven—are essentially dramatisations, from varied angles, of the essential realisation of *The Kingdoms of the Spirit*. They are stories of men and women to whom the world becomes meaningless save as they can "discover the features of the Eternal beneath the masks and deceptions of Time". And that seems to him precisely the world's case. Losing its sense of the spiritual, it *has* become chaos, babel. Of his novels as a whole, it might be said that they show a society in disintegration, with promise of new life, of constructive order, residing only in those who have made discovery of values higher and more vital than a materialist despair or selfishness. Such discovery is never presented as easy. A man must pass through Gethsemane to attain crisis and illumination. (How much more then a world!)

In some respects *Neighbours*, the first of his novels, is the type of them all. It is the story of a man living alone in an attic who listens through the wall to the conversations of a young man, Victor, with his friends. More and more Victor's personality and words obsess him, emptying his own life of value and meaning yet giving him nothing of the other's secret knowledge and strength. At last he breaks in upon Victor to kill him, only to realise that he himself is Victor, that all he has heard has been but his own in-

terior drama of progress towards spiritual understanding. The later *I Am Jonathan Scrivener* is a richer and stronger book, but its theme is essentially the same—the narrator's discovery of himself in others, his realisation of the illusion of appearances, of the nature of truth as vested only in the eternal. In *Chaos is Come Again* the reference to the exterior world is much more direct; in the family of the eccentric Petersleys are symbolised the mental outlooks dominant in the Western world to-day, and with an extraordinary, a haunting, success, but attention centres less upon Adrian, the reborn man, than, in their books, upon Victor and Scrivener. *Julian Grant Loses His Way* might be said to show, in the epitome of a single man's life, how the Western world has lost its way, taking like Julian, the path of pure intellect to emotional death, setting logic, curiosity, greed of experience above love and pity, a blinding pride before a true spiritual humility. It is perhaps Houghton's most ambitious piece of work, and certainly remarkable if not entirely successful.

These are the outstanding novels. The other three, *The Riddle of Helena*, *Crisis*, and *A Hair Divides*, are books of merit and insight, often of a flashing, dazzling, iridescent beauty, but they are, I think, definitely slighter in content and interest. Yet nothing that Houghton writes lacks a high degree of vision, vividness, brilliance, wit, dexterity.

Quite recently that discriminating critic, the editor of the London *Bookman*, referred to Houghton as "one of the very few novelists from whom a great book can confidently be expected". This is praise indeed! For myself, I cannot deny him the potentialities of greatness, though I think he has yet to realise them. He has the range but lacks something of stability; he sways at times precariously between profundity and triviality. While in all his books the metaphysical element is very real, there is a certain failure to embody his vision *fully* in the terms of this world of time. He tends to give us characters in the flat rather than the round, in the spirit more than the flesh, so that they lack that final inescapable reality which must compel belief in the truths of which they are the vehicles. The novelist for whom we wait, it has been suggested above, is he who can descend into and evoke the full presence of the flesh with a Tolstoyan vigour, to inform *that* with the irresistible conviction of spirit-presence. It is another aspect of the same failure that makes so many of his books end where they should really begin. What, we ask, followed the realisation of the narrator of *Neighbours* that he was Victor, the instant when he achieved illumination and "a certainty deeper than the foundations of the world"? Of Scrivener we have a complete analysis; the instant the man himself appears, the book precipitately ends.

If Houghton would but show us a Scrivener in the flesh, a Julian Grant who did not lose his way, then indeed we might have something to challenge Dostoevsky's embodiment of "the new man" in Alyosha Karamazov. For that we look to him. If he cannot, then another must, if the novel —literature—is to sustain its prophetic function.

GEOFFREY WEST

RED PHILOSOPHY AND RED POLITICS

[Here are two criticisms by thoughtful and earnest men who desire betterment of the human race; they have a different outlook and yet they are one in pointing out the most unspiritual and therefore the most dangerous aspect of the great experiment in Russia.

Mr. Hugh de Selincourt says :—

The pity is that the Communist Ideal is the highest ideal possible to man, and just so far as a high ideal is enforced is the enforcement mischievous.

Mr. C. Delisle Burns says :—

The Communist Party is now following exactly the same authoritarian, highly centralised policy as the Roman Church followed in the European Middle Ages. Local differences are allowed so long as the Faith is the same in all localities.

Will Russia succeed and establish a civilization of Robots? Or will the human will rebound because of outer control and assert its own divine freedom?—EDS.]

I*

This book is rather disappointing. The dialogue form is not easy to handle, though it is easy to make seductive: the American group—the Humanist, the Banker, the Rotarian, the Leader, the Reformer and the Professor,—are not worthy opponents for Sokrator, the Communist advocate; from the moment of his entry upon the scene—"Enter an unpretentious-looking man of about fifty, whose simple white Russian blouse and black leather belt distinguish him from the elegantly-dressed tourists" —they appear like schoolboys with a kindly superior, never for a moment as human beings of equal right to existence and opinion, who have met to discuss a burning question with another. One experiences the odd and exasperating sensation that many have experienced in speaking with a convert, who at one moment appears as a martyr, willing to die at the stake for his faith, and at another as a generous soul full of pity for any who are outside his pale. This is a very great pity, as every thinking man must have enormous sympathy with the effort being made in Russia to found a happier way of life than that which we have inherited from the long crime of the war.

In talking with the average communist it is difficult to get beyond abuse; the atmosphere is heated as at a political meeting: in which the words *bourgeois* and *capitalist* are flung at one's head like missiles, and *toiling masses* are extolled. These rough and ready generalisations are effective at a political meeting; but when one quietly looks at the infinite variations of human activity they very soon cease to be satisfactory: and the difficulty is rendered more confusing by the fact that though the

* *Moscow Dialogues: Discussions on Red Philosophy.* By JULIUS F. HECKER. London. (Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London. 8*s.* 6*d.*).

speaker himself claims to represent the toiling masses he rarely, if ever, himself toils. Class warfare is proclaimed. You must don a black shirt or a red shirt. If a black shirt, Jews are boycotted, socialists beaten and chivied out of the country: if a red shirt, the bourgeois and the capitalist are eliminated: and any one who cannot squeeze into the ranks of the Communist Party and remain there. It is a depressing outlook for the average citizen who wants order and a quiet life. Force breeds force, hatred hatred.

One hoped that in a book of this kind fundamental questions would be touched, which must trouble the heart of every honest man. First and foremost the question how far a person can remain a member of any political party and retain his own personal integrity. Which must take prior claim? What useful contribution can a man who is not whole-hearted make to any party? What gives life to a party if it is not the integrity of its members? Where does the gradual paring down of personal integrity for party purposes lead?

The truth is that the distinction drawn between Individualist and Socialist is entirely arbitrary and fit only for the shallowest platform oratory. One is inconceivable without the other, as Havelock Ellis shows with perfect clarity in the last chapter of his admirable book, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, in which the whole matter is thoroughly and profoundly discussed.

There is another point of vital importance which is not raised. Life is not possible without discipline: but discipline applied from without is injurious. This is a known fact, even with regard to the body. An officer in command of a regiment in an unhealthy district in India obtained a clean bill of health by waiving military regulations and allowing his men to perform physical exercises taking their own time, and not in unison, taking their time from an instructor. It is truer with regard to the mind. Educationists now realise that their job is not to fashion the growing child to a particular shape, however good, but to allow him to grow to his own shape. It is slowly and ever more widely recognised that *Don't* spoken to a child from an elder is really a confession of ignorance on the elder's part. What good results then is the iron discipline of a party likely to obtain? The pity is that the Communist Ideal is the highest ideal possible to man, and just so far as a high ideal is enforced is the enforcement mischievous.

Neither the Humanist nor the Reformer nor the Professor nor the Rotarian is permitted to raise any of these points in the discussion which is accordingly robbed of its vitality and degenerates into a kindly discourse and an easy scoring over the uninitiate. Such puppets are they that no objection is made to bringing in Spinoza as almost the founder of the philosophy of communism, known as dialectical materialism. This is an extraordinary omission. For no one has ever been clearer or simpler in showing how a man may become free. His whole philosophy is opposed to force of any kind. Spinoza wrote:—

> Minds are conquered not by arms but by love and magnanimity. It is above all things useful to men that they unite their habits of life and bind themselves together with such bonds by which they can most easily make one individual of them all and to do those things especially which serve for the purpose of confirming friendship. But for this skill and vigilance are required. For men are varied . . . and moreover they are generally envious and more prone to revenge than pity. It is a matter, therefore, of considerable force of mind to regard each one according to his disposition and to contain oneself and not imitate the emotions of others. But those who cavil at men and prefer rather to reprobate vices than to inculcate virtues, and who do not solidify but unloosen the minds of men—these, I say, are a nuisance both to themselves and to others.

HUGH DE SELINCOURT

II*

This is an interesting and valuable book. It deals with one of the most important aspects of the experiments in government now being made in Russia. Nationalism is now prominent in the whole world; and in most countries it is a force tending to destroy the political and economic structure which we have inherited from the nineteenth century. It was Nationalism which severed the Western part of the Tzar's Empire from the territories now ruled by the Soviet Government. Finland and the Baltic States and Poland came into existence at about the same time as the Bolshevik Party seized power in Russia. But the chief purpose of the Bolsheviks had nothing to do with Nationalism. They began with the Marxian assumption that national differences were negligible by comparison with the conflict of economic "classes". Now, however, as Mr. Kohn admirably shows, the Soviet Government has to reckon with the very great diversity of races, religions and forms of culture among the peoples whom it rules. There was a danger that the Russian Communists would inherit the "Pan-Russian Chauvinism" which had been the basis of Russian policy for generations, in the crushing of local cultures. The Soviet Government, however, has decided to develop differences of culture and to help undeveloped groups to discover their own separate traditions. Thus the Soviet Union is a federation of Republics which have different "nationalities". Mr. Kohn's book has valuable appendices showing the national composition of the U. S. S. R., and of the Communist Party. Fifty-three per cent of the whole population is Russian: and twenty-one per cent Ukrainian. But the other national groups are small. On the other hand, only 72 out of 10,000 of the Russians are Communists and 868 out of 10,000 among the Letts. The theory is that each population will have a right to its own language and culture, so far as this is in the hands of the local proletariat. And when there is no Communist proletariat, it will be developed by aid from Moscow. Moscow dictates the form of Nationalism allowed.

Mr. Kohn rightly shows how wise the policy of the Soviet Government is, in the existing circumstances. But his book is short; and there is no space for him to explain the relation of Soviet policy to other policies, which have been used in the past in Europe. The situation in Soviet Territory, except in Ukrainia and in the Western parts which have been affected by Europe, is as primitive as it was when the Roman Empire and later the Christian Church dominated Western Europe. Nationalism in our modern sense has not yet developed in Soviet Territory. The Communist Party is now following exactly the same authoritarian, highly centralised policy as the Roman Church followed in the European Middle Ages. Local differences are allowed so long as "the Faith" is the same in all localities. But policy and the line of local development is strictly controlled by the dominant group in the Communist Party in Moscow. There will probably be no trouble in combining an universal Faith with some small local developments of culture, until modern Nationalism troubles the serenity of the Faith. But at present there is so little danger from Nationalism within Soviet territories that the Soviet Government can afford to support the extremest forms of Nationalism outside its territory, as means of disturbing the control of foreign capital in any area. For most Russians, even before the Great War, capital was something foreign, and therefore objectionable on nationalistic grounds.

C. DELISLE BURNS

Nationalism in the Soviet Union. By Hans Kohn. (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

Guide to Modern Thought. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 6s.)

This is what the French call an *œuvre de vulgarisation.* Its object is to state in simple and untechnical language the way science is going. Though it purports to be a guide to "modern thought," it is concerned only with biology, psychology and physics, these alone being considered relevant to the great problems of human life and destiny. Mr. Joad, a teacher by profession, has a quite exceptional gift of clear exposition, and uses it in this work to considerable advantage. There are indeed some obscurities; and one might feel that he ignores the views of such important writers as Professors Hogben and Levy; but he does on the whole give the lay reader an intelligible account of the theories now current as to the nature of life and the constitution of the universe. It is when he discusses their significance, how they are to be interpreted, that he lays himself open to challenge.

If there is any conclusion to be drawn from the book it is that, while we may have a guide to modern thought, modern thought itself is incapable of offering any guidance. For modern thought is not a coherent organon. It is a manifold enterprise: an eager and hopeful campaign of exploration marching, at unequal pace, along a number of fronts simultaneously. And the findings of the different armies of research do not always tally. In particular, there is today a marked disparity, as Mr. Joad points out, between the results reached by the physicists and biologists on one hand and the psychologists on the other. Physics has gradually been compelled to abandon the view that nothing exists in the universe except what can be reduced to a collocation of atoms. Pursuing Matter indefatigably, it has at last arrived at a conception of it as so tenuous that no effort of visualisation but only an abstruse mathematical formula can present it to our thoughts. In biology likewise there is a growing recognition that life is a unique category, and that its manifestations are not to be completely explained by physico-chemical formulæ. On the contrary, the tendency in psychology appears to be to see the human organism as a set of mechanical arrangements; though even here we witness a serious conflict —Pavlov and Watson as against Freud and the psycho-analysts. Mr. Joad has added to his discussion of these subjects an admirable résumé of the pros and cons of spiritualism, and a final chapter on the influence of scientific ideas on current fiction.

The book however leaves one with a sense of dissatisfaction because the author fails to establish a connection between his analysis of the scientific method—interpolated in the chapter on physics—with those religious and ethical questions which, as he observes at the outset, have for ages perplexed mankind. Sufficient prominence is not given to the consideration that if we admit that science only deals with the quantitative and numerical aspects of things, we admit implicitly that it is incapable of providing a solution for problems of a different kind. It is therefore scarcely worth examining whether its alleged answers to these problems are right. The error of the nineteenth century lay in its hasty conclusion that the light of science was bound sooner or later to dispel all darkness; since then thinkers such as Mach and Pearson have propagated a more cautious view of the nature of scientific inquiry. There is no need to be unduly perturbed at the contemporary divergence between physics and psychology; the method of each, in so far as it is scientific, is identical; and if one of them seems to enforce idealism and the other materialism, the reason must be sought in their uneven development: it is not to be inferred that their differing interpretations of Reality are authoritative. Neither of them can pretend to offer more than tentative and restricted generalisations, but the popular mind persists in attaching to them the immutability of an ultimate revelation. It cannot be too often repeated that Truth

—as a brilliant exponent of the scientific method has recently said—Truth, with a capital T, the eternal and indefectible Verity has no place in the vocabulary of science.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

From Faith to Faith: An Autobiography of Religious Development. By W. E. ORCHARD. (Putnam, London. *7s. 6d.*)

The story of any man's inner life is always of value to others, provided it be told with sincerity; and when such a story is narrated in good English by a man of wide humanitarian sympathies like Dr. Orchard, it should be of very great interest indeed. In the reading, however, *From Faith to Faith* scarcely fulfils its promise, because the range of religious ideas in which the author's mind moved was, except for a brief period, confined within the limits of Christian orthodoxy. Most of the book is devoted to a statement of the reasons which induced Dr. Orchard, and in his opinion should induce other Protestants, to enter the Roman Catholic Church. Granting the writer's premises, his arguments might be quite impressive; but nowadays, even among Christians, comparatively few actually do accept the Evangelical creed on which he builds his reasoning. To a Modernist, or non-Christian, the whole structure, which Dr. Orchard erects with so much pains, is as unreal as would be a mathematic built up on the initial proposition that two and two make five.

Having accepted Roman Catholic beliefs and practices while still a Congregationalist minister, it was inevitable that sooner or later Dr. Orchard should join the Roman Church outright. When a sane man has adopted an irrational and artificial form of belief, it is as difficult for him to maintain his position *alone* as it is for a pyramid to stand balanced on its apex; but when a number of inverted pyramids are contiguous, they serve to prop each other up. In like manner believers in the impossible find reassurance in association with each other. Would any one of the citizens of Ephesus have had the pluck to stand in the market place by himself shouting "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" for two hours on end? Such an exploit, however, presents no difficulty when one is surrounded by a multitude of like-minded enthusiasts.

Would any single human being accept the Creed of the Council of Trent on its own inherent merits if there were no great ecclesiastical corporation to give it sanction? But the man, in whose mind intellect and intuition are harmonised in a theory of life that is at once spiritual and rational, may be compared to a pyramid standing on its base. He can hold his position, unshaken and unperturbed, even though all those around him are carried off their feet by some collective folly or delusion.

Those who have admired Dr. Orchard's fine work in the past as the champion of humane causes, will be saddened to read some of his present conclusions, as for example, when he writes:—"How can anyone who seriously rejects Christianity be anything but tragic?"

There will be many who will see tragedy in the expression of such a sentiment by such a man. Again, when summarising his arguments at the end of the book, he writes:—

> If one rejects the Roman claims one must, eventually, reject Catholicism; if Catholicism is rejected, then gradually go doctrine, sacraments, scripture, Christ, God, man; hell, then heaven; the next world, then this; faith goes, then hope, then love. This is the logic of denial, darkness, death.

So faith, hope, and love are dependent on acceptance of the Roman claims! That he can seriously put forward such an inhuman doctrine is not likely to encourage his readers to follow Dr. Orchard's example in accepting those claims.

R. A. V. M.

Spices and Condiments. By H. S. REDGROVE. (Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, London. 15*s.*)

It has been asserted that, with advances in scientific knowledge, meals as we understand them will be abolished, and instead of eating food we shall just swallow a daily tablet. This notion is a pure dream, divorced from reality and without any scientific basis.

Even if it were possible to compress sufficient body-building and energy-supplying material into minimal form for consumption, it would lack those "accessory food factors," the vitamins, without which health could not be maintained. Moreover, as man is constituted, he needs bulky food and, what is perhaps most important, he prefers to eat the things he likes most. A tablet diet would be flavourless and, as Mr. Redgrove points out, an attractive flavour in food stimulates the secretion of gastric juices. Hence well spiced food is more easily digested than that which is insipid, and whilst in Europe spices are not appreciated as much as they should be, their importance to the peoples of India can hardly be over-estimated.

The line of demarcation between spices and foodstuffs is not a very definite one. In France, we are reminded, the grocer is still *l'épicier*, or dealer in spices. Few of the foods we eat for their energy-producing or body-building properties are devoid of flavour, though they may often gain much in palatability by the addition of suitable herbs or spices.

Some dishes are best flavoured by one particular spice but others require well-balanced mixtures of several ingredients which are best used for instance as sauces, ketchups or curry. In his able work Mr. Redgrove has ventured to give a classification of spices and condiments. He then proceeds to describe rhizome and root spices (ginger, turmeric, zedoary, angelica, etc.), those from barks (including cinnamon and cassia) those from flowers (*e.g.* cloves, saffron, capers), the fruit spices (vanilla; the peppers; capsicum; cummin, dill and caraway; anise and fennel; pimento; star anise and juniper berries) and the seed spices (including cardamoms, nutmeg and mace, the three mustards, almonds and pistachio nuts).

It should be mentioned that spices, like odorous plant products generally, contained volatile "essential oils," so-called to distinguish them from the fixed oils, such as olive, castor and almond oils. In addition to being pleasantly aromatic these essential oils are, in general, excellent carminatives and antiseptics, and the medicinal virtues of spices have been recognised from earliest times.

To afford an indication of the range of the book, reference may be made to the author's account of poppy seeds which he classifies among the miscellaneous seed spices. Poppy seeds are perhaps a food rather than a spice. The oil is edible and in Czechoslovakia a fascinating form of pastry, containing a filling of honey and poppy seeds, is deservedly popular; and poppy seeds are much employed in cake-making in India. The plant is, of course, primarily cultivated in India for opium, which is the dried latex exuding when incisions are made in the unripe seed capsule. The seeds form an important secondary crop.

Spices and Condiments is profusely illustrated and contains much information concerning each spice, its sources, characteristics, history (Mr. Redgrove is also an authority on Alchemy), cultivation, uses and its constituents and their chemistry. Judging from the bibliography and the three indexes (botanical, chemical and general), it can only be inferred that the author has made his work as inclusive and useful as possible and it should appeal to a wide circle of general readers. He is indeed attempting to cultivate a greater interest in spices and condiments among European and American peoples.

GERALD DRUCE

Scientific Theory and Religion: The World described by Science and its Spiritual Interpretation. By Ernest William Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham. The Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen, 1927–1929. (Cambridge University Press. 25*s.*)

Bishop Barnes is one of the leaders of the Modernist section of the Anglican Church. He is also a distinguished man of science. In the present work he reviews very ably the whole field of scientific fact and theory, and tries to show that the result is not inconsistent with monotheism.

Without disrespect to the Bishop we may say that he is scientist first, and theologian afterwards. He is, for example, acutely aware of the difficulties inherent in his theological theories, but jumps without hesitation over the stumbling-blocks which Nature has scattered so freely on the path of the Darwinist. But for him indeed Darwinism is no longer a theory but a plain statement of fact.

"Eight hundred million years ago," he affirms categorically, "the ancestor of the modern leader of thought and aspiration was a worm in the sea-mud." Such natural facts as the infertility of hybrids, which made many shrewd biologists of a past generation hesitate to accept Darwin's hypothesis, Bishop Barnes waves aside with a gesture of reassurance; and in his chapter on "Man's Origin and Past," he sets forth only those data which appear to fit in with the theory of the gradual evolution of man from an ancestral ape, while passing over without mention such extremely significant discoveries as that at Ehringsdorf of a Neanderthal skull, vastly more ancient than any other known specimen, and yet much less simian and primitive than its later congeners—which may possibly mean that Neanderthal man was, not the ancestor, but the degenerate descendant of *homo sapiens*.

The Bishop's object in giving us his very able résumé of the sciences he tells us, is that he may point to them and say: "Such is our world. Such is its past development. Such is man's place within it. Is it reasonable or necessary to believe that the Christian God whose character is goodness and truth is alike its Creator and Ruler?" While he replies to this question in the affirmative, Dr. Barnes's answer lacks the complete assurance and certainty of his scientific pronouncements. A creator God? Yes; but how of "the far more fundamental source of perplexity in the fact that the whole process of creation now appears to be non-moral?" No "revolt of Angels," no theory of a "Fall," he goes on to admit, "will account for such facts. *In the end all attempts to take from God the responsibility for the nature of his creatures must fail* . . . . . So far as I see the situation we are confronted by a dilemma from which there is, at present, no escape . . . ."

The effect of which admission is to turn the Bishop's would-be affirmative reply into a virtual negative: there is no evidence in the facts of external Nature pointing to the existence of a benevolent Creator-God. So the Bishop is forced to turn to inner experience for the proof he seeks. In Man, he asserts, is the "Christ-Spirit". "The Christ-Spirit must be of God; and, if it also reveals God, then God is our Father."

Now, while the inner experiences of the mystics of all times are one in kind (though not in degree, be it noted) yet their attempts to explain and interpret those experiences in terms of philosophy or theology, differ very widely indeed; and it does not in the least follow that, because the experience is valid, the theory built on it is sound. What Dr. Barnes calls the Christ-Spirit is known elsewhere as the Buddha-nature: its existence in Man shows that there is a divinity in him; but it does not prove the truth of Christian theology, even in its most sublimated form.

It is difficult to understand how a man of such brilliant attainments as Bishop Barnes can exhibit an extreme parochialism in his attitude to the great religions of the East. He seems in fact to be scarcely aware of their existence.

To Buddhism he refers only once in the following words: "Popular Buddhism in China is recognised as degenerate by all who have studied its origin."

We cannot help wondering whether the Bishop would be satisfied if a Chinese writer of an important book on religion and science could find nothing more to say about Christianity than "Popular Christianity in Portugal is recognised as degenerate by all who have studied its origin"!

Perhaps the most interesting paragraph in the book is that, on page 620, in which Dr. Barnes describes the flashes of mystic illumination which came to him at intervals between the ages of 14 and 33. He writes:—

> I have felt, enjoyed and wondered at a sudden exaltation which seemed to carry with it an understanding of the innermost nature of things . . . . Time seemed to stop. A sense of infinite power and peace came upon me. . . Nothing happened: yet existence was completely full. All was clear. I was in a world where the confusion and waste and loss inseparable from time had vanished. At the heart of the world there was power and peace and eternal life . . . The memory remains. And it is because an inexplicable quality of supreme significance attaches to it that it remains precious.

R. A. V. M.

The Interpretation of Dreams. By SIGMUND FREUD. Translated by A. A. BRILL. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. 18s.)

The Interpretation of Dreams is Freud's *opus magnum.* When the first German edition appeared in 1900 "it aroused the scientific world from its lethargic indifference to the problem of dreams. Psycho-analysis became a fashionable cult, our dreams something to conjure with and not laugh at or dismiss. We talked a little vaguely about libido, neuroses, psychotherapy and the Œdipus complex. These sensational revelations were treasure trove to the writer. There was a spate of novels due to their influence, and the famous and infamous were put through the mill of psycho-analysis. In the first flush of excitement we liked to think that dreams were often unfulfilled desires in the waking state. It was a comforting and exhilarating thought to capture at night something elusive and forbidden during the day. Pepys's phrase, "and so to bed," was not enough. Nor did it suffice to indulge in heavy slumber. We were anxious to dream of something vivid and vital and intensely pleasurable. Freud, we said, was a complete master of the subject, and if he emphasised the immense importance of sex in dreams, we did not question his authority for so doing. We preferred to dream of Apollo or Aphrodite, and if we saw only a piece of sealing-wax or small cleft in a tree, they were erotic symbols.

The present issue of this classic work is based upon the eighth and latest German edition. It is a new translation by Dr. A. A. Brill and contains Freud's most recent formulations and psychoanalytic terminology which has come into existence since the publication of the first English edition. In the opinion of Freud it remains essentially unaltered. "It contains," he writes, "even according to my present-day judgment, the most valuable of all the discoveries it has been my good fortune to make. Insight such as this falls to one's lot but once in a lifetime."

Dr. Brill considers that *The Interpretation of Dreams* has stood the test of thirty-two years. Actually the book, outstanding though it be, has been severely challenged in certain respects. Freud has not seen fit to modify his interpretation of certain dreams, but other writers have done so to some purpose. Freud has always been considerably obsessed by what he considers to be phallic symbols, and on that particular subject many will seriously question his curiously biassed interpretation. He still solemnly asserts that a straw hat, when seen in a dream, "is really a male genital organ". Here his analysis is absurdly strained. We can dream of petrol pumps, small stalactites or stalagmites, the spout of a

teapot, pillar boxes, carrots, noses, and find in these symbols a much more rational meaning or even be prepared to take them at their face value.

If Freud stressed too much the importance of sex in the dream world, he rendered great service in discovering that dreams are often a key to character, mentality, health or sickness of the body. It is now recognised that a physician cannot employ therapeutic methods successfully when his patient is afflicted with phobias, obsessive and delusional ideas. He can only deal adequately with such a case by correctly explaining the origin of his patient's dream images.

Students of the occult and theosophists will realise that this dissector of dreams leaves unrecorded meetings on the astral plane.* His point of view is definite. To see the odd and fantastic figures which stand upon his study table is sufficient to indicate his own sex complex. Strümpell considers that "the flying dream is the adequate image employed by the mind to interpret the quantum of stimulus emanating from the rising and sinking of the pulmonary lobes when the cutaneous sensation of the thorax has lapsed into insensibility" (p. 53). Many dreams are no doubt induced by some physical condition, while others embellish or distort some experience in the waking state. But that is not all. There are dreams of the body and of the spirit, and neither Freud nor anyone else can probe the inner secret of all that happens while we sleep. [How can our reviewer be sure of the limitation of "any one" other than himself? —EDS.]

HADLAND DAVIS

The Symposium of Plato. By R. G. BURY. (W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., Cambridge. 7*s.*)

Mr. Bury's Symposium, first issued in 1909 and now brought up to date, is a scholarly edition which fills up a real lacuna in English commentaries. Besides textual criticism, which is the scholar's chief concern, it also deals with some of the obvious problems in the work, leading up to the important conclusion, tentatively advanced, that it was written to rehabilitate Socrates against a Symposium composed by Polycrates the rhetor. The movement of the dialogue, built up on the speeches of the various "guests," Phaedrus, Pausanias, etc., culminates in the sublimity of the Socrates-Diotima discourse and concludes appropriately enough by descending to earth in Socrates himself, praised by Alcibiades as the incarnation of Eros. Certain structural features, the way in which the serio-comic speeches of Aristophanes and Alcibiades are made to balance each other and the relation of Socrates to the other speakers, are well brought out, leaving no doubt that Socrates, as the philosopher pure and simple, is superior to the unphilosophical speakers who precede him. Love in the end is shown to be the dialectic process, and also the goal of that process, the desire which creates desire and also the contemplation, completely satisfactory, which ultimate truth provides.

The dialogues of Plato are a mirror in which Europeans, of whatever race, can recognise their common intellectual ancestry, and the importance of Plato, to a world which is rapidly being Europeanised, is therefore one of the highest degree. The intense dualism of the dialectic process, the struggle of the spirit out of its walls of matter, and the emphasis on pure thought, the sheer untrammelled thinking which accompanies it are both European in origin and are bound up in some curious way with each other. The first, albeit æstheticised and refined intellectually, reveals the same underlying rhythm as the European tragic drama and Christian crucifixion, while the second, a creation of the same area, has given birth to the

* This is a pseudo-theosophical belief. For the Occult and Theosophical explanations See *Transactions of the Blavatsky Lodge*, pp. 59–79.—EDS.

body of western philosophy and, in the last analysis, to modern science. What binds the two together in Plato is, of course, the obsession with transcendental unity and the magic of that formula, "thou shalt, of a sudden, see something wondrous," which overshadowed European thought for so long. To-day we are Europeans in thought but no longer in feeling, and there is reason to believe that the tragic movement from dualism to mystical unity is in process of atrophy. The development of modern thought, beginning with the Italian philosophers and popularised by Bacon, has been to shift the direction of the mind from the (apparently) remote to the apparently immediate, and the consequences in feeling and thought, are beginning to make themselves felt. Hence the lack of catharsis in the modern mind and the activity, febrile but impotent, which seems to characterise it. In conclusion it is worth noting that a study of the Symposium on the lines of the Golden Bough, but without the naturalistic assumptions, might reveal some remarkable logical preconceptions and an analogy, dimly apparent even now, with the Greek tragic drama.

F. McEACHRAN

An Introduction to Buddhist Esoterism. By BENOYTOSH BHATTACHARYYA. (Oxford University Press. 15*s.*)

The title of this work is definitely misleading. A far better description of it is given by the author in his preface, where he says that his latest work "represents the first instalment of a series of investigations into this fascinating branch of study [Tantra], and an attempt to place before scholars a dispassionate account of the Tantras in general, and Buddhist Tantras in particular". In his opinion the Hindu population of India to-day is in the grip of Tantra and the time is therefore ripe for someone to study the origin and treatment of this "disease". The author, however, fails to maintain this laudable point of view, and by the time he reaches the last page has arrived at the amazing opinion that "Tāntric culture is the greatest contribution made by India towards the world's civilisation".

It may be that the author's opinions are affected by his views on the origin of Tantra, for in stating, as he does in the opening statement of the book, that "Tantrism originated from primitive magic," he seems to represent that strange anomaly, a son of Aryavarta who is ignorant of his country's spiritual heritage. Still more strange is his attitude to Buddhism; and his patronising statements about the Buddha,—for example, "he was not entirely free from the superstitious beliefs current in his time"—necessarily vitiate the value of his study of Buddhist tantrism.

With Chapter IV, however, we pass to more valuable material in the form of an outline of the purer principles of Buddhist Tantra, but even this is marred by the fundamental fallacy that magical practices grew up instead of having degenerated down from genuinely esoteric Buddhism, or as it might be more accurately written, Budhism or Bodhism the arcane Wisdom of the Ages.

That true teachings are to be found in Tantra is beyond question, but truths are only of value when rightly applied; and when even cosmic principles are interpreted in terms of sexual orgies the fair face of Truth is shamed indeed. That sexual union is a physical and carnal presentation of the union of cosmic forces, we may grant; but no man ever learnt the reality of sacred truths by making them an excuse for self-indulgence, and the literal and materialistic attitude of mind that pervades all Tantra is the answer to any claim on its behalf to bear the name of Buddhist Esoterism.

We respectfully commend to Mr. Bhattacharyya a study of the Teachings of which Tantra in all its forms is at the best a degraded parody.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

Peace at Eventide. By HELEN KELLER (Methuen & Co., London. 1s.)

"O wondrous alchemy of pain transmuting loss into golden harvests of good." Thus writes Helen Keller who has "suffered many a bereavement and many a sorrow," yet lives a useful happy life, because of the recognition that "suffering and death are the great teachers of Humanity". Helped by her faith "in the goodness of Life, in the recreative power of the Spirit," many are the truths that she has extracted from her experiences. We learn that if sorrow enervates, it can also ennoble; also that birth and death, corresponding to day and night, are the two manifested aspects of the One Eternal Life which is beyond both.

The book is chiefly addressed to the bereaved, "the largest company in all the world". It is more an appeal to the intuitive than to the reasoning mind. The realisation of the existence of the spiritual world, showing that "here we play with shadows, there we live the reality" will surely bring us "peace at eventide". Every evening at twilight the soul can bathe in the peace that flows from the Regenerate Souls; at the hour of bodily death the personal self can feel the peace that flows from the Divinity within; but in both instances that eventide experience comes only to him who has controlled and purified the self of passions and prejudices.

N. K.

Humanity's Greatest Need: The Common Message of the World's Great Teachers. By HUGH MCCURDY WOODWARD, Ph. D. (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. $ 2.50.)

"Religions," said Confucius, "are many and different, but reason is one. The broad-minded see the truth in different religions, the narrow-minded only see the differences." These words of the great Chinese sage have been adopted by the author as the motto for his book, which he has dedicated to "the increase of tolerance, to a better understanding between peoples and races and to the rising tide of world unity". Professor Woodward is a student of the great religions and is convinced that many difficulties would disappear if men and women would cultivate real tolerance and faithfully apply in their everyday lives the teachings of the ancient prophets and sages. Taking six of these great prophets, namely, Krishna, Lao-Tze, Zoroaster, Buddha, Confucius and Jesus—the author points out that cults and creeds, dogmas and rituals, have grown up about their philosophies and teaching, but when divested of these accretions it is found that a great common message runs through them all. This common message is discussed in this volume with a wealth of quotations from all the sacred books.

There are signs that an increasing number of thinking men and women are turning to the great religions as affording what our author calls "a unified and adequate philosophy of life"; and those who look askance at the great religions as unsuited to the needs of the present century will find reason to modify their views appreciably on perusing Professor Woodward's book.

The author, who is Professor of Philosophy of Education in an American University, pleads eloquently in his last chapter for a combined organization of educators in the more advanced countries to propagate true culture and enlightenment in the backward countries.

We would venture to draw Professor Woodward's attention to the works of Madame Blavatsky, which are not included in the "books suggested for reading," but which many years ago showed the essential unity of all the great religions of the world when freed from the accretions and distortions caused by ignorance and priestcraft. We are sure that *Isis Unveiled* and *The Secret Doctrine* would prove of great interest to the author.

J. P. W.

A Daughter of the Samurai. By ETSU INAGAKI SUGIMOTO. (Hurst and Blackett Ltd., London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Much has been written in praise of the Japanese women before Japan threw over the culture of China and imitated the greed and ugliness of the West. She represented femininity in perfected form. She was modest, charming, intelligent, loyal to her ancestors, and in native dress was as good to look upon as a bright butterfly or flower. It has been written: "In the eternal order of things, which is the higher being,—the childish, confiding, sweet Japanese girl, or the superb, calculating, penetrating, Occidental Circe of our more artificial society, with her enormous power for evil and her limited capacity for good?"

Those who read *A Daughter of the Samurai* will know how to answer that question, for in that book will be found the autobiography of a Japanese lady who reflects in sensitiveness to beauty, in courage and restraint, in tolerance and true piety, the very flower of Japanese womanhood at its best. Not since the far away days of Lady Murasaki has a woman written so finely about her own country.

Mrs. Sugimoto describes life in her old Samurai home in the province of Echigo at a time when tremendous changes were taking place in Japan, when even the Emperor might be seen of all men and the Samurai were no longer an integral part of the country they had once served so well. It was a most difficult time, especially in an impoverished home where the Buddhist faith was strong and where its members still clung tenaciously to old traditions. That life is described with minute and fascinating detail, a valuable record of something exceedingly good which has since passed away.

Sent to a school in Tokio, Mrs. Sugimoto became a Christian. She does not tell us what led her to adopt that faith; but with a foreign religion, an excellent knowledge of English literature, and a few years of married life in America, she still most happily remains a Samurai's daughter. She did not relinquish the old customs of her country. She was not ashamed of them as so many modern and so called progressive Japanese claim to be. She revered the past. She delighted to narrate to her children certain legends which will be new to most readers. How well she told the ancient story of "Lady Moon and Her Enemies," and with what skill she described the *Ura Bon*—A Welcome to Souls Returned. We share something of her pleasure when she found in one of the family godowns a bloodstained coat, Masamune sword, a rod of lacquered wood which once belonged to Tokugawa Ieyasu—and were presented by him to Mrs. Sugimoto's ancestor on the battlefield of Sekigahara.

A servant once said to Mrs. Sugimoto when she was a little girl: "I am thankful to the gods that I am lowly born and can cry when my heart is filled with ache and can laugh when my heart sings." Such emotional relief was not for Mrs. Sugimoto. It was part of her rigid Samurai training to face life bravely. Much trouble came her way, for there is more shadow than sunshine in this revealing book, but she met it with courage and fortitude. We are conscious of a fine spiritual quality, a rare tenderness and tolerance toward humanity. In a book that seems compact of steel and fragrant blossom, of wisdom and beauty, kindness and endurance, we like to recall Mrs. Sugimoto performing Buddhist rites after the death of her mother, love making her serve Buddha and Christ from a full heart.

Now that Jehol is taken by the Japanese who have definitely renounced the treasure of the past and accepted in its place unworthy greed, it is good to record these words from a daughter of a Samurai: "To degrade one's pride—to loose one's hold on the best, after having had it—is death to the soul growth of man or nation." In this book is enshrined the very spirit of Old Japan. It is a tragedy that it is no longer a living force in the Far East.

HADLAND DAVIS

CORRESPONDENCE

FROM RELIGIONS TO RELIGION

[We print two contributions, similar and yet different, one written by a Hindu, the other by a Parsi, both pleading for an attempt to educate the race mind which is so puzzled and confused. Their plea reminds us of the words of H. P. Blavatsky written in 1877 :—

"We would that all who have a voice in the education of the masses should first know and then *teach* that the safest guides to human happiness and enlightenment are those writings which have descended to us from the remotest antiquity; and that nobler spiritual aspirations and a higher average morality prevail in the countries where the people take their precepts as the rule of their lives. . . . . The world needs no sectarian church, whether of Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Swedenborg, Calvin, or any other. There being but ONE Truth, man requires but one church—the Temple of God within us, walled in by matter but penetrable by any one who can find the way; *the pure in heart see God.*"—*Isis Unveiled* II, 635.]

HARMONY OF RELIGIONS

[**Swami Jagadiswarananda** of the Ramakrishna Mission suggests that time has come for a League of Religions to seek the common principles underlying all religions. He refers to the Eternal Religion of which all creeds are partial expressions, and his plea is reminiscent of *The Secret Doctrine* (II. 794) in which H. P. Blavatsky wrote :—

"If coming events are said to cast their shadows before, past events cannot fail to leave their impress behind them. It is, then, by those shadows of the hoary Past and their fantastic silhouettes on the external screen of every religion and philosophy, that we can, by checking them as we go along, and comparing them, trace out finally the body that produced them. There must be truth and fact in that which every people of antiquity accepted and made the foundation of its religions and its faith."]

In 1893 at the World's Fair in Chicago a Parliament of Religions was held and it has had epoch-making consequences. This year again, in the same city, a Parliament is going to be convened and so the ideals and hopes underlying its work should occupy our minds.

Humanity is weary of religious rivalry. A sweet breeze of liberalism and universalism is blowing—a holy omen. The magic of the heavenly Malaya (monsoon) is at work. The religions are out-growing their creedal limits. The leaders of religions are engaged in universalizing the doctrines of their faiths. Science, the great disinfectant of human thought, is mainly responsible for this. The religious reformer desiring a new lease of life for his creed must seek a common ground where all religions meet; a creed satisfied with its own "doxy" is doomed. Universalism is the spirit of the age, and no religion is immune from this influence of the time-spirit. Look at the rigid faith of Islam. The Bahai and Ahmadiyya movements, are liberalising it. Of course the former is wider and broader in scope than the latter, but as far as Islam is concerned both are liberalizing influences. In the Buddhist world too this spirit is at work and tangible changes are evident in Japan, China and Ceylon. In Christianity a manifold reformation is freeing all church denominations. In Hinduism the spirit is most manifest in the forms of the Arya Samaj, the Brahmo Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission. The Theosophical Movement is the brightest result in the direction. I am but chronicling the truth if I say that Theosophy has

pointed out and proven that all religions spring from one source and are esoterically and essentially the same, though exoterically and externally they are diverse.

But unfortunately a very crude and quixotic idea of religion prevails which is the most obstinate stumbling block in the emergence of the Universal Religion. Religion is not a belief in doctrines and dogmas. It is not church-going, temple-worshipping, mosque-attending or vihara-visiting. It is not an intellectual assent or dissent. It is emphatically a becoming. It is the realization of the Deepest Truth, Eternal Wisdom and Everlasting Bliss. It is not only an elimination of vices but an illumination of Virtue.

"Religion is the manifestation of the divinity already in man. Manifest this divinity within by controlling nature internal and external. Do this either by work or worship, psychic control or philosophy; by one or more or all of these and be free—this is the whole of religion. Doctrines, or dogmas, rituals or forms, books and Churches are but secondary details."

All religions are unanimous about the present state of man on earth—that of servitude and suffering, bondage and bewilderment. All religions are also one in their affirmation that man has power latent within himself to transcend his limitations and to attain the supersensuous and superconscious state. For religion is the rejection of the finite and the pursuit of the Infinite. True religion can lead man to the Celestial City, of which Kashi and Lhassa, Rome and Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina are but earthly reflections. Religion comes from the root 'Ligo,' *i.e.*, to bind or unite, and implies the reunion of the Human and the Divine.

How can a harmony of religions be made practicable? The solution is a simple one. If we make a comparative study of the *original* teachings of the world-teachers we shall find to our surprise that they have a fundamental unity; for "Truth" says the *Rig-Veda*, "is one but Sages call it variously". Truth perceived by them in the superconscious is one, but they had to explain it in different ways to suit the needs of the place and the time. The human mind varies to a certain extent according to soil and century. So the teachers had to modify their message and speak in the language of the people; for that is the mission of their life. Scriptures are nothing but the meagre and minor records of their spiritual experience. Spiritual laws like the material ones have a basic uniformity. So scriptures too are essentially one. Difference is only in name and form. Man has labelled their simple but profound teachings as Christianity, Buddhism etc. Difference created by these different religions is man-made. Christ was not a Christian, Buddha was not a Buddhist, Mohomed was not a Muslim, nor was Krishna a Hindu. They lived and taught what may be rightly called the Eternal or Absolute Religion as they were the members of one Invisible Church, Masters of one Great School, Maha-Shala. So different religions are but local and partial manifestations of the one Universal Religion. As W. Wilson said, "There is a greater thing than the spirit of the age and that is the spirit of the ages."

Every religion has three essential divisions: ritual, mythology and ethics-philosophy. The last one contains the eternal principles which are identical in all religions. Purity, self-control, unselfishness and renunciation are not the monopoly or exclusive possessions of any particular religion but are common properties of all religions. Mythology is illustration of the ethical and philosophical principles. And rituals are concretized or dramatised philosophy. There are different grades of human competency—hence this modification and simplification. Everybody cannot grasp the high philosophy of a religion. So the other two become necessary. Ritual and mythology may be called the Kindergarten of religions. They are like nurses indispensable in spiritual childhood. They have their place in life but man must transcend them to

understand higher religion. Many fall short of the ideal and the displacement of the search for truth frequently occurs. Aspirants are bound down to forms and ceremonies. Hence the darkness of the discord and disagreement. How then can the harmony of religions be given a true shape? We say it already exists. Only our eyes are out of focus and cannot see it. Every religion is potentially a Universal Religion. And what is wanted to realize Universal Religion is a *reinterpretation* of religions; brings to the forefront the common basis, and gives it prominence and importance. Let me give an example. Take the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. The orthodox Christian claims that this doctrine is special to his religion but a student of comparative religions finds it in every creed. According to Christian doctrine there is God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost or Spirit. In Buddhism, particularly in the Mahayana School, the Doctrine of the Divine Trinity does exist—Dharma Kaya, Sambhoga Kaya and Nirmana Kaya. It exists in Taoism as Tao, Ti and Laotze and in Hinduism Brahman, Iswara and Avatara or Krishna, Sankara etc.

Then every teacher has emphasized that his followers can attain the stage he has attained.* Every Christian is a potential Christ. Buddha emphasised that Buddhahood is the goal, and that every Buddhist is a potential Buddha. The same is true of the followers of other religions. Logical is the deduction—Christ is not the only son of God, Mohomed is not the only Prophet, Buddha is not the only enlightened one, Krishna is not the only Avatara and Moses is not the only Messiah. The truth is that great souls are the manifestations in flesh and blood of what is called Allaha, Heavenly Father, Adam Kadmon, Shiva and Vishnu and by other names. Besides these there are many more points of contact between the religions. All the religions owe allegiance to Holy Men, Holy Books and Holy Places. Whether Supermen or Siddhapurushas, Mahatmas or Adepts, Nirmana Kayas or Bodhisattwas, every religion pays respect to perfected souls. So also Holy Books. Symbolism is common to religions. The Cross to a Christian, a Chest with two Angels on both sides to a Jew, the Divine Image to a Hindu, the Kaba and Crescent to a Muslim and the Swastika and Lotus to the Buddhist are holy symbols. Symbols are part and parcel of religion. Why then run down one and praise another? Water of Zimzim is holy to Muslims, that of Gunga to Buddhists and Hindus, that of Jordan to the Christians; why then say that one is superior to another?

The religion of the future will be that Eternal Religion of which these religions are partial or modified manifestations. The first step is not only tolerance but appreciation of all religions, all scriptures, and all prophets. We may have one chosen ideal but we should adore and reverence all teachers. We may have one favourite scripture-book but we must expand and deepen our outlook by comparative study of religions and by assimilation of all true teachings. This is what is called *Ishtānishta* in India, known to the Hindus from hoary antiquity. No particular scripture will have a singular sway over the world, but the Eternal Wisdom hidden in all scriptures will—and that is the Religion of Man. No more will one teacher be adored in the shrine of human thought. All the world-teachers will be worshipped in the Temple of the Future. America, next to India, has taken the lead in this. In a Baptist Church at Riverside in New York, Confucius, Buddha, Christ, Mohomed are installed along with other God-men. In the temple of the Universal Spirit of the Ananda Ashrama at California, the founders of all religions are installed and worshipped, as in some Shrines of the Ramakrishna Mission in India. But in Hinduism through the ages this spirit of cosmic synthesis is most manifest.

*According to an Eastern proverb a learned Rabbi said, "You are also Israel, for any one in quest of light is Israel".

The modern world is disillusioned of Geneva. The League of Nations has failed to effect a world-unity based on politics. This cannot be but so, for politics is founded on self-interest and exercise of rights. Religion, the most significant of race experiences, can almost prescribe a remedy for the defeatism of the modern age. America has been pioneer in recently starting a World-League to create a cultural unity. Will America again lead the nations to start a League of Religions where leaders of religions will devise practical steps to expand, universalize and internationalize religions and save mankind from imminent ruin?

Colombo SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

WISDOM-RELIGION: THE SOLUTION OF OUR PROBLEMS

[**Student's** arguments carry us a step forward. He shows that Wisdom-Religion, Bodhi-Dharma, expounded by H. P. Blavatsky affords an excellent basis for practical work.]

An interesting discussion took place at a meeting of the East India Association held in March last when Sir Albion Banerji read a paper on "India's Social and Religious Problems and the New Constitution" (*Asiatic Review*, April). The multiplicity of castes, creeds and religions which divide the people of India was the main theme of discussion and it was held by several speakers, including Sir Albion, that it would be inadvisable to create self-governing institutions in this country until there was social and religious unity among our people, leaving alone the question of India's fitness for complete self-government. I propose to deal briefly with the suggestions made by the different speakers at the meeting of the East India Association for evolving social order out of the existing chaos.

Sir Albion thought that in view of the conflict of innumerable factions rooted in religious sentiments, customs and practices, religion itself stood in the greatest possible danger of being wiped out in India; he feared that this country, like Russia, would find itself in the throes of an anti-religious movement. Such a result would rejoice the heart of Sir Albion's distinguished fellow-countryman, Mr. R. P. Paranjpe, who in his little book the *Crux of the Indian Problem* advocated the overthrow of all religions and the adoption of pure rationalism to ensure India's progress on sound lines. In the opinion of Sir Albion and other speakers such a result would be a disaster. Sir Albion's panacea for averting this disaster may be set out in his own words:

> India is at the parting of the ways. What is needed to-day is a new Brahmo Samaj movement, call it what you will, embracing all religions and communities and having social service uplift as a main purpose. It is through such a movement that the true idea of nationalism can grow.

But how is the new faith to be brought into existence? Obviously Sir Albion seems to hold that the strong hand of the British is necessary until such time as a great religious leader shall arise and establish a new faith calculated to unify the conflicting sects and creeds and religions existing at the present day. Another remedy advocated was the conversion of the people to Christianity, but Sir Albion rightly brushed this aside. Yet another speaker seriously suggested the creation of a special European Police Reserve to meet emergencies that might arise owing to religious and communal feuds. Indeed, there was an air of unreality about the whole discussion, and no constructive proposals came forth. Let us see whether we can make some useful contribution to the discussion.

In his *India and the Future*, published during the war, Mr. William Archer pictured this great country as being steeped in barbarism; the Hindu religion and culture came in for much

misguided adverse criticism. Mr. Archer's fallacies were smashed by Sir John Woodroffe, a former Chief Judge of the Calcutta High Court and a profound scholar of Hindu philosophy and religion. In his *Is India Civilized?* he pointed out that Mr. Archer's generalizations were based on very imperfect knowledge, for he—

> lumps together indiscriminately matters which are contrary to the eternal Dharma; matters unconnected with or unessential to it and of comparatively recent development; and matters sanctioned by religion but which had in some degree been misunderstood or misapplied and had thus become an abuse.

Sir John Woodroffe added :—

> It has been well said that the tree of Indian Dharma is very ancient and it is not therefore surprising if in the course of the ages, some parasites have gathered on its trunk.

Sir John went on to differentiate between the principles of the Hindu religion and the accretions that had gathered round them. He stressed the necessity of removing the accretions so that the principles might be observed in their pristine purity. Those who like Sir Albion Banerji are bewildered at the endless divisions and sub-divisions in Hindu society will find serious food for reflection in these observations :—

> To many a foreigner therefore Indian beliefs and practices seem a " jungle " in which there is no path. There is a path. Meanwhile those who have not found it will save their credit if they avoid generalization on a subject which they do not understand. As I show later India does possess *a spiritual unity* for it possesses certain common fundamental beliefs. It also displays a wondrous variety of belief and practice suited to the capacities and temperaments of men. One of the most interesting enquiries is that which seeks the Theme of which there are the variations. The Theme will endure whilst their variations may either alter or pass away.

Indeed, a perusal of the book will prove an excellent corrective to the fallacies and misconceptions which appear to have found abundant expression at the meeting of the East India Association.

Now the task of unravelling the fundamental unity underlying all religions has been already performed by the great founder of the Theosophical Movement, Madame H. P. Blavatsky. She emphasised in her monumental works, *The Secret Doctrine* and *Isis Unveiled* the absolute unity of nature, and taught that this unity implied and justified a belief in the existence of a knowledge at once scientific, philosophical and religious, showing the necessity and actuality of the connection of man and all things in the Universe, and to this knowledge in its integrity and universality she gave the name of Wisdom-Religion, (Bodhi-Dharma). She wrote :—

> It is from this WISDOM-RELIGION that all the various individual " Religions " (erroneously so called) have sprung, forming in their turn offshoots and branches, and also all the minor creeds, based upon and always originated through some personal experience in psychology. Every such religion, or religious offshoot, be it considered orthodox or heretical, wise or foolish, started originally as a clear and unadulterated stream from the Mother-Source. The fact that each became in time polluted with purely human speculations and even inventions, due to interested motives, does not prevent any from having been pure in its early beginnings. There are those creeds—we shall call them religions—which have now been overlaid with the human element out of all recognition; others just showing signs of early decay; not one that escaped the hand of time. But each and all are of divine, because natural and true origin; aye—Mazdeism, Brahminism, Buddhism as much as Christianity. It is the dogmas and human element in the latter which led directly to modern Spiritualism. (*Is Theosophy a Religion, U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 1.*)

A study of the Wisdom-Religion as given to the world during the last century through the instrumentality of Madame Blavatsky is the only true and safe remedy to stop the ceaseless disputes and wrangles and even bloodshed that take place in the name of religions. Individual religions in the form in which they exist to-day must repel all thinking men and women. As Madame Blavatsky said in her *Isis Unveiled* :—

> Our examination of the multitudinous religious faiths that mankind, early and late, have professed, most assuredly indicates that they have all been derived from one primitive source . . . Combined, their aggregate represents one eternal truth; separate, they are but shades of human error and the signs of imperfection. —(Vol. II. p. 639.)

Sir Albion's complaint about the Theosophical Society and some other bodies

named is that their adherents spend their energies and use their organizations largely for political ends. It may be here mentioned that in 1883 Col. H. S. Olcott, the President of the Theosophical Society, issued a statement to all members warning them against meddling in politics. In the course of that statement, Col. Olcott said :—

> That our members, and others whom it interests, may make no mistake as to the Society's attitude as regards Politics, I take this occasion to say that our rules and traditional policy alike prohibit every officer and fellow of the Society, AS SUCH, to meddle with political questions in the slightest degree, and to compromise the Society by saying that it has, AS SUCH, any opinion upon those or any other questions.

This had the full support of H. P. Blavatsky, who, in a letter addressed to the American Theosophists, in 1888, said :—

> Theosophists are of necessity the friends of all movements in the world, whether intellectual or simply practical, for the amelioration of the condition of mankind. We are the friends of all those who fight against drunkenness, against cruelty to animals, against injustice to women, against corruption in society or in government, although we do not meddle in politics. We are the friends of those . . . who seek to lift a little of the tremendous weight of misery that is crushing down the poor. But in our quality of Theosophists, we cannot engage in any one of these great works in particular. As individuals we may do so, but as Theosophists we have a larger, more important, and much more difficult work to do. (*Five Messages*, p. 8)

Obviously, when Sir Albion spoke of the Theosophical Society he had in mind the Adyar organization at present presided over by Dr. Annie Besant. This body has taken a part in political agitation, but it should be noted that in this as in numerous other respects the teachings and activities of the Adyar organization and those of the original Movement of Madame Blavatsky are poles asunder. The pages of THE ARYAN PATH bear witness to the fact that many turn to the Wisdom-Religion expounded by Madame Blavatsky as affording the best and the most satisfactory solution of the many conflicting problems of the day. Only by the spread of this Wisdom-Religion will the communal feuds and caste strifes in this country and elsewhere be brought to an end.

Bombay STUDENT

THE VALUE OF THE AYURVEDIC SYSTEM OF MEDICINE

The English who came to India in the eighteenth century came with a preconceived notion that Ayurveda was quackery and that Hindu works on the subject were nonsense. This contemptuous view, arrived at without previous investigation, has had the effect not only of keeping the English up to the present day in great ignorance regarding this famous medical system, but also of injuring in some measure the progress of the system itself.

The medical educationalists and administrators have made every effort to glorify Allopathy at the expense of Ayurveda. But Ayurveda is not so easily killed, and even in this "scientific" century claims notice. Ridicule and opposition have failed, and its value is now beginning reluctantly to be recognized. And indeed the time is ripe for this. We should no longer be in ignorance of the value of our indigenous system.

Ayurveda has eight branches :—

1. *Shalya*, or Surgery and Midwifery together.
2. *Shalakya*, or Surgery of the Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat, etc.
3. *Kayachikitsa*, or Practice of Medicine.
4. *Bhuta-Vidya*, or Treatment of Mental Diseases (including so called obsessions).
5. *Kaumara-Bhritya*, or Hygiene and treatment of children.
6. *Agada-Tantra*, or Diagnosis and Treatment of Poisons—vegetable, mineral and animal, including snake-bite, rabies, etc.
7. *Rasayana*, or Hygienic and Preventive Medicine for the attainment of longevity and the rejuvenation of old age.
8. *Vajeekarana Tantra* or Sexual Science including sexual hygiene and treatment of sexual diseases.

It will thus be seen that Ayurveda includes almost all the branches known to the present-day Western medical system. As Western medicine, Ayur-

veda has its medicine, surgery, midwifery, hygiene, bacteriology, chemistry, materia medica, physiology, anatomy, and so on. The late Chief Justice of Bengal, Sir John Woodroffe says :—

> The country abounds in valuable herbal and other remedies. Ayurvedic remedies are effective, as I personally know in respect of those which I have tried. They do not harm as some allopathic drugs do. Like all Indian things they are gentle and natural in action; they are cheap, easily available, to be had almost for the cost of gathering them.

The testimony of this erudite man and of scholars of his way of thinking is brushed aside by the "all knowing" I.M.S., as is evidenced in the remark of Major-General Hehir :—"You can fool judges and barristers and not us." So obediently banning judges and barristers as persons likely to be fooled, I shall attempt to establish the value of Ayurveda by culling from the Report of the Madras Government Committee on the indigenous system of Medicine :—

> The indigenous system of medicine is perfect, logical and scientific from the standpoint of science and art and it is quite self-sufficient and economical. The committee is of opinion that it is only through the promotion of the Indian system that the Government can help to achieve the idea of medical relief in the reach of all people.

A better testimony to the value of Ayurveda one could not wish for. But who can wake up those who insist on sleeping? Despite Government apathy, however, its popularity is testimony to its value as a medical system and its worth as a mode of cure. Ayurveda is believed by many to be a moribund science and some have asked why we should try to revive it. This shows to what depth of degradation we have descended. A man or people who have no faith in themselves will not, and do not, deserve to succeed. For he who has no faith in himself must lean upon another.

Ayurveda, a dead science! Let me venture to adapt, making the necessary changes, the reply of Sir John Woodroffe to his friend's statement that India is a dead country.

> Only those are dead who believe themselves to be so. Ayurveda is not dead. It is yet alive, though not fully awake to-day. It is precisely because it is a living force that it provokes antagonism from those who dislike or fear its culture. Does any one now fume against or ridicule the medical systems of Greece, Egypt, Persia or Arabia? They are left as things which are dead and gone to the scientific dissection of the cool historian. But while touching Ayurveda even the scholars could not be impartial. Why? Because Ayurveda is not the mere subject of academic talk, but is a living force. Ayurveda is still feared where it is not loved. Why, again? Precisely because it lives, because it is still potentially powerful to impose its ideas upon the world. It is still an antagonist to be reckoned with in the conflict of medical cultures. Why has it, with its pathology so different from any other of the West and yet so unique, been preserved? Ayurveda lives because of the world purpose which it has to fulfil; because the world can be enriched by what it can give to the other medical systems.

It is not possible in a short space to do justice to the vast theme of Ayurveda, but let me sum up by saying that Ayurveda is the flower of Indian culture and Aryan civilization as much as Western medicine is the flower of modern civilization; but to mutilate one fragrant flower for the glorification of another is bad horticulture and heart culture too!

Bangalore M. R. SAMEY

SHAKESPEARE THROUGH EASTERN EYES

Having previously enjoyed reading Dr. Ranjee Shahani's stimulating book, when, in your May issue, I came upon the letter over the initials "J. S," I was reminded of a performance of Hamlet I saw at Benares. No sooner had the Ghost appeared than a terrific hailstorm made such thunderous clamour on the iron roof of the theatre that the audience were quite unable to follow the speeches on the stage.

When your reviewer, Prof. G. Wilson Knight, said "wide knowledge," he probably referred to the Shakespeareology and philosophic problems and not to the Indian vernaculars, about which I daresay he cared little. Of course it *is* a pity that Dr. Shahani did not know that Indian students are made to read Hamlet in a Mahrathi version for examination purposes! It would have given him an opportunity

for extending the evidence adduced in his first chapter against the current methods of education. But it is sheer pedantry to dwell on such trivial items.

And when J. S. disputed Dr. Shahani's statement that religion is so vital with the Oriental "that it becomes the very basis of his literary criticism," and suggests that the dicta of Swami Vivekananda are not a near approach to Eastern standards, he surely confuses the issue in adding, though obviously himself no Vedantist, that "everything, including our Doctor's thesis, is Brahma —or Maya."

It is true that Indians appreciate the æsthetic emotion in literature as much as any other people but the dominant quality in their artistic creations is religious: not in any sectarian sense of the word but in its wide fundamental aspect which is nothing but mysticism in spite of J. S.'s contention that mysticism is essentially incompatible with the spiritual atmosphere of "classical" Sanskrit literature. But J. S. says not a word about the most pregnant chapter in the book, the one called "The Great Disillusionment" which, in discussing Shakespeare the thinker, develops further the previous chapter dealing with religion.

Again, J. S. is unpardonably misleading when he says "The Doctor has every right to call Shakespeare a third-rate poet." Nowhere in his book does Dr. Shahani either say or imply any such disparagement.

The author declares in his preface that he has striven to be purely objective, expressing the appeal Shakespeare makes to the Eastern consciousness. He insists emphatically that he has tried to avoid any mere personal judgment of his own. This does excuse some suspicion of irony and makes at least one appreciative reader eager for a sequel in which Dr. Shahani *will* give us his own personal judgments. Mr. Kanyalal Vakil of Bombay is reported in the *Bangalore Mail* of March 18 as having said that Shakespeare does not touch the Indian life and as such cannot be said to possess the elements essential for the national reconstruction of the Indian theatre.

London A. HUGH FISHER

As a British-born Shakesperean student, may I be permitted to make a few comments upon the letter signed "J. S." (Bombay), which appeared in your May issue.

Concerning the accuracy, or otherwise, of Dr. Shahani's comments upon "Shakespeare," in relation to the Indian stage, and to Indian thought in general, I can express no opinion, since the subject is one upon which I am not well informed; but "J. S.'s" letter strikes me as being too much concerned with small points of criticism, *e. g.*, Dr. Shahani's "Marahti" instead of the correct "Marathi"—and too little with the wider and more important issues that are raised in the book under discussion. "J. S.," in my judgment, displays a personal bias unworthy of so large a subject, and is more ready to represent Dr. Shahani as eager "to score off," and "to demolish Shakespeare and thus appear original," than he is willing to judge righteous and impersonal judgment. "J. S.," for example, makes no direct mention of the chapter upon "Shakespeare as a Thinker," which, when I read the book, seemed to me to contain its central point.

To an ever-increasing number of thoughtful students, the world over—among whom I would wish to be numbered—"Shakespeare," while maintaining intact his reputation as poet and dramatist, is rightly losing the exaggerated and uncritical respect hitherto accorded to him as an original thinker; and I, for one, am wholly with Dr. Shahani, when he opines that our great national dramatist has never voiced the noblest experiences of the human spirit, namely those that we entitle religious.

It is time that the truth was told about "Shakespeare"; and the truth is that he was no deep thinker. The philosophy of Hamlet, even—and Hamlet, by common consent, is nearer

to "Shakespeare" himself than any other character in the plays—is, I am confident, borrowed mainly from contemporary books of popular philosophy, especially from Bedingfield's "Cardanus Comfort" (1573).

George Chapman, the "rival poet" of "Shakespeare's" Sonnets, and a far deeper thinker than "Shakespeare" himself, attacks his fellow dramatist openly, in III. 4. of his tragedy, "The Revenge of Bussy," which is an obvious counterblast to the revenge of Hamlet; and it is a most interesting fact that Chapman charges Hamlet-Shakespeare with superficial thinking, in a fashion very analogous, at bottom, to that employed by Dr. Shahani, more than 300 years later. These points I have elaborated in a book, "Plays of Shakespeare and Chapman in Relation to French History," which will soon be published, in London, by Mr. Denis Archer.

That certain of "J. S.'s" criticisms of Dr. Shahani's book may be well justified, I will not presume to deny; but my plea is that, in endeavouring to determine the truth about Shakespeare, we had best keep, primarily, to the finer, larger, more impersonal issues that underlie this compelling subject.

London PERCY ALLEN

I thank the Editors for their courtesy in sending these letters to me before publication. Mr. Fisher's epistle calls for no remarks; it must be enjoyed as it is.

As for Mr. Percy Allen's more thoughtful indictment of my criticisms, I must state that I have never met nor have known anything about Dr. Shahani. How then can I have any "personal bias" against him?

As for the other counts: my reason for pointing out Dr. Shahani's numerous mistakes of fact should be plain to one who has read his book and my criticism of it. The author claims to base his "thesis," as to how the Indian mind reacts to Shakespeare, firstly, on his own notions of Eastern and Indian criteria and canons of literary and artistic criticism, while his book shows that he has no first hand acquaintance with these canons and criteria; secondly, on the renderings and stage representations of the Poet-Dramatist in various vernaculars of India,—the bare facts I have enumerated show that Dr. Shahani has no direct knowledge of these renderings and representations or even of the vernaculars he mentions. Hence the stress I have laid on the fact that Dr. Shahani does not seem to know even the correct spelling of the name of the vernacular, "Marathi," about renderings and representations in which he professes to enlighten his readers. I may incidentally point out that the reviewer of the book in *The Modern Review* (Calcutta) has also criticised the Doctor's thesis on almost parallel lines.

As for the dead set made against poor Shakespeare by these learned critics because he does not satisfy their serious minds as a thinker, a philosopher, a mystic, and a religious teacher, may I ask why they go to a mere player-poet-dramatist for deep thinking and philosophy and mysticism and what not? With Shakespeare, "the play's the thing"—and also the poetry. And if we get both these good things in such rich measure, shouldn't we thank Heaven fasting for what we do get, instead of making ourselves unhappy (and perhaps, ridiculous) because the swan ("or goose") of Avon does not give us these superior things which are undoubtedly soul-satisfying but which are rather irrelevant on the Stage?

I have no doubt that in his forthcoming book Mr. Allen will prove to the hilt Chapman's superiority over Shakespeare as a thinker or philosopher. And yet, while this half-literate poacher and plagiarist of Stratford is read and asked for and *enjoyed* to-day—in spite of his poor intellect and tiresome quibbling and atrocious ribaldry—three hundred years after his death, who even *reads* Chapman?

J. S.

[This Correspondence is now closed. —EDS.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The devil cannot only cite Scripture for his purpose, but he can also use the device of holy magic for his nefarious ends. We are not concerned with the political programme of Hitlerism, but we cannot forgo the duty of expressing our sympathy with the sufferers in Germany and our abhorrence of the immoral deeds perpetrated against the ideal of Brotherhood, in the name of Aryan Culture. The latter is the Culture of Nobility, the robe ever donned by the Noble Souls—one of whom was Jesus, the Jew. The evil displayed in Germany to-day is an expression of the same spirit which animated of old the Jews in Judea and against which Jesus fought. These German evil doers are enemies of Aryan Culture—enemies of Krishna and Buddha. Using the Svastika as a design, they have smirched a noble and spiritual symbol. The Svastika represents the conjoint action of Pramanthâ and Arni, the Sticks and the Censer, which the Magicians of old India used in order to produce Agni, which became *Ignis* with the Latins—Fire of Wisdom. But the Fire scorches as well as warms, and who knows how soon the insulted Svastika will not, as a boomerang, return and destroy the destroyer?

———

Reflecting on the self-destruction of two publicists, Miss Dorothy Massingham, the dramatist-actress, and Mr. Justice McCardie, a writer in *The Manchester Guardian* concludes thus:

> Suicide is becoming increasingly common and is surely a symptom (if yet another were needed) that all is not well with our modern civilisation. It seems useless to demand that we should return to the simpler life of our ancestors; rather it suggests that our leaders of thought should provide us with a philosophy which will enable us to support more patiently the ills of the common round, to maintain throughout that zest for life which is our heritage at birth. Perhaps only that religious revival of which some think they see the signs will supply the remedy for this sickness of the soul, will give the courage necessary to face the burden of life to our nerve-ridden generation of to-day.

A new philosophy or a religious revival for the soul-sickness of this nerve-ridden generation! Philosophy implies knowledge; religion implies belief; the two combined may produce a rational scheme of life. People need such, but do they want it? It is not that people do not know what the ideal of life is; nor is it that they cannot learn if they choose how to live and realise the ideal. Our long Theosophical experience is that individuals who *want* to transform their lives succeed in orienting themselves. Such go for-

ward, contented in their virtue-power and its further unfoldment, while not neglecting to strive against weakness and vice. No, the trouble is not lack of perception, but the lack of will to act up to that perception. And then, the greatest enemy of those who strive—" fortune's favoured soldiers," the *Gita* calls them—is our civilization. In the form of friends and kin, in the shape of customs and conventionalities, they meet their tempter, who coaxes and cajoles, then remonstrates and denounces, then ridicules and ostracises them, and, finally, if they resist all that,—*abandons* them. The injunction of St. Paul holds good to-day—" Come out from among them and be ye separate." Those who aspire to *live* as Jesus and Gautama and Krishna taught and exhorted their public to live, have to recognize that our civilization is a spiritual desert over which a mighty simoom is blowing. No wonder that *The Manchester Guardian* remarks that " there are few quiet spaces for the brain-worker to-day "—and fewer still, we may add, for the soul-creator. He has to contend against " our mechanical age, its noise, its ceaseless activity ". He has " to make himself an island which no flood can overwhelm," as the Buddha taught.

Apropos of noise, a district justice in Dublin once made the remark that " there will be a particular department in Hell, and there will be nothing in it but jazz bands, gramophones, loud-speakers, and motor horns, all going at the same time ". We agree. And certainly he describes one sub-plane of hell; this hell is our earth—the only hell there is, and it is of our own making. The presence of jazz and other cacophonous sounds in our midst is not an expression of lawlessness in Nature, but an outcome of man's own doing. History repeats itself. The law of periodicity is ever at work, bringing forth good from ancient good and ill from evils of ages gone by. Mr. Ernest Newman wrote last year in *The Sunday Times* that eighteen hundred years ago Lucian related a story about " what happened when that half-wit Dionysus, accompanied by other Bright Young People of his epoch descended upon the old civilization of India ". The Hindus, it would appear, underrated the insidiousness of the then jazz music. " Sure of their ancient strength, they were reluctant to go to the trouble of taking the field against this strange and essentially comic army." They had no other weapons except their ancient culture and their elephants, but these were " no use against a poison in the veins ". Underlying this fantasy of Lucian, in which Dionysus and his crew are made to invade India, there is sufficient justification for Mr. Newman's remark that " the jazz hordes are clearly the reincarnations of certain primitive forces of old ".

Lady Astor, M. P., must appear old-fashioned to these bright young people. She did not hesitate breaking their idol of self-expression at the Foyle Literary Luncheon. *Everyman* of May 6th prints in part her speech. Lady Astor deplored the "sex bat" of modern literature, and had little faith in "the youthful movement of self-expression". She said: "It has been my experience that whenever a man or a woman say they want to express themselves, they want to do something they do not want anyone elso to see." The younger generation will repudiate such an interpretation, but this will not perturb Lady Astor. She does not believe "that the young people of the world can make the world right," and is herself "young enough to know they cannot do it". But who or what is responsible for this state of moral chaos among the young of which Lady Astor complains? In *Time and Tide* for May 20th, we read:—

> Daily from stage and screen and the printed page, this generation is subjected to a cumulative influence suggesting that the flesh controls the spirit, and that, if physical needs are satisfied, all will be well.

That flesh controls spirit is a maxim of destruction; it is heard in jazz music, and it is receiving added approbation, as the above quotation suggests. *Facilis descensus Averni.* To what people does Lady Astor look for salvation?

> It is the old men and women who ought to have the courage of their convictions, and have convictions, and stand up for them whether popular or not. These are the people that are going to lead us into the paths of peace and sanity.

The young people would accept a spiritual lead but they will no longer have anything to do with "the false gods of the old theology". Lady Astor goes on:—

> I believe the young people are thinking and they are testing us, not by what we say but by what we are. If they feel that we have failed, it is because we have given them so little substance of what God is.

But does Lady Astor—or do any of the old and young people—know what God is? If they do, then why not spread broadcast the glad tidings? "The false gods of the old theology" have been overthrown—so much the better—but what has been set up in their stead? For the most part, the gospel of self-expression. To find out what God is *not* is an easier task than to find out what God is.

But we need not despair. Centuries of subjection have not yet congealed the life-blood of men into crystals around the nucleus of blind faith; and the twentieth is witnessing the struggles of the giant as he shakes off the Liliputian cordage and rises to his feet. What is needed is the strength to seek the Light and to resist the temptation to succumb to mental laziness, the mother of every vice. Courageous seeking ever brings its reward. Two ever-recurring questions oppress the minds of men to-day: Where, Who, What is God? Who ever

saw the Immortal Spirit of Man so as to be able to assure himself of man's immortality?

What answers can our civilization make? In our next number will appear an article on "Man and His God," by Mr. J. D. Beresford, dealing with this subject, which will also be considered in the editorial.

In *Everyman* (April 22nd) attention was drawn to a correspondence between the late Mr. Galsworthy and the Rev. John Hedley. The latter, reading in serial form, *The White Monkey*, wrote to the author protesting against his use of the name "Confucius" for a pug dog. He wrote:—

> I think I know the Chinese people fairly well, and I am sure that they will resent the use of that name for a dog. Don't think me extravagant if I say that I would as soon think of naming a dog after the Man of Nazareth as after the Sage of China.

Mr. Galsworthy, on receipt of this letter, immediately took steps to rectify his mistake. He had called the pug "Confucius" because in his book he was giving a picture of "modern youth in all its irreverence," but he had not realised that his book might reach China, and give offence. "The last thing I would wish to do," he wrote, "is to hurt the feelings of the Chinese, for whom I have a great admiration." But although in his own case Mr. Galsworthy righted the wrong, the irreverence not only of youth but also of trade has extended to wider fields. The feelings of the ancient nations are often ruthlessly flouted, and one may see a picture of the Buddha engraved on cigarette cases, or even an image of Him on an ash tray. This is sheer blasphemy and is partly due to the ignorance of materialism rather than wilful insult. But for the most part the Christian religion is to blame, for it has inculcated the idea that all Gods save its own are false Gods, and all prophets, save those that adorn the pages of the Old Testament, are false prophets. This narrow-minded and false conception, entirely contrary to the spirit of Christ's teaching, has become part of the race-mind of the West. A lack of brotherly feeling and of imagination blinds the Western mind to the religious sensibilities of Eastern nations. It is pleasant to read of Mr. Hedley's protest—that is Christianity of the right kind. As to Mr. Galsworthy—nothing less could have been expected of a mind so generous.

We are glad to see from its June number that *The Adelphi* has completed its ten years of useful career. It was started by one of our esteemed contributors, Mr. John Middleton Murry.

卐

"Man is sacrifice. His first 24 years are the morning, and the next 44 years the midday, Libation."

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IV SEPTEMBER 1933 NO. 9

WHAT IS GOD?

There dwelleth in the heart of every creature, O Arjuna, the Master—ISHWARA—*who by his magic power causeth all things and creatures to revolve mounted upon the universal wheel of time. Take sanctuary with him alone, O son of Bharata, with all thy soul; by his grace thou shalt obtain supreme happiness, the eternal place.*

—BHAGAVAD-GITA, XVIII. 61–62

In our last issue (pp. 582-83) we referred to the interest of many people in the subject of God as a basis of life and conduct. We revert to it here, drawing attention to an article by Mr. J. D. Beresford appearing elsewhere.

There are two directions in which men have sought for God: outward and inward. We look outside ourselves, and ask what is the reality that must lie behind the ever changing appearances of the phenomenal world, in which all things are extended in space, are constantly arising and passing away in time, and in which each event is at once an effect and a cause; and the great question has found many widely differing answers. Some men have seen a reflection, as it were, of their own personalities behind the various forces of Nature and have dreamed of pantheons full of gods; others have conceived that, just as on a small scale a weapon or a cooking pot needs a human

artificer to bring it into being, so the universe must have owed its existence to a creator—a sort of cosmical mechanic, of vast power, but still man-like. Thus both polytheists and monotheists have made for themselves gods in their own image, and have regarded deity as a personal being outside themselves, outside the universe. Other, and more philosophical thinkers have looked deeper into the heart of the mystery, and have postulated a reality at the back of appearances unknowable and inconceivable by the human mind—a permanent substratum underlying this universe of constant change. This ultimate principle has been called by various names: the primordial substance, "the thing-in-itself," "the One Life," "the Rootless Root," "the Absolute"; the Christian mystic Eckhart spoke of it as "the Godhead"; Indian thinkers called it *Parabrahm*—that which is beyond Brahma; some of the Northern Buddhists, anxious to avoid even the shadow of anthropomorphism, have denoted it by a word for which the nearest English equivalent is "Suchness". Being, by hypothesis, unconditioned and absolute, all speculation about It is useless.

The second way by which we may approach the problem of God, is the inner or subjective way. When a man begins to wonder about himself, his first naïve and superficial impression is that he is identical with his physical body; then further reflection convinces him that this theory is fallacious, for he discovers in himself much that is obviously not the body, nor of the body: in fact as soon as he forms the conception "my body," he is implying a distinction between that body and himself. His next idea is that he is a soul inhabiting the body; and by soul he conceives of a subtler form in the likeness of the physical; and then he finds that behind that subtler body is his mind, or thinking principle; and for a time he identifies himself with that. But with still deeper reflection, he discovers that, just as he can say "my body," so he can say "my mind," thus distinguishing between himself and his mind. In this manner we can think away, or rather objectivise, one constituent after another of our very being; but always there is left an ultimate, irresolvable element, that can never be thought away nor objectivised for it is the subject of all thinking—the real essential SELF, about which reason can say nothing save that It Is. But while reason cannot help us, experience can; and for this we have the united testimony of the mystics of every age and every clime. They may give us different explanations of the lofty states of consciousness to which they have attained; but as to the nature of their inner experience they are substantially at one. Some have called it "union with Christ," others "union with the inner God," others still, "realisation of the SELF". All are agreed that the state in question brings,

with an enormous expansion of consciousness, a burning love for all beings, a vision of truth unveiled, and bliss that is unspeakable.

This reaching up to the ultimate principles of the outer and inner worlds is older than any written history, for nowhere is it more clearly and nobly described than in the Upanishads, which are among the oldest of books, and have been thought by some to have been translated into their present Sanskrit form from an unknown original some time back of 1000 B. C. The sages, whose teachings are recorded in the Upanishads, sensed at the back of the Universe an ultimate principle; and they discovered in themselves an ultimate principle; and then by a sublime intuitional leap, they bridged the gulf between these two ultimates. There cannot be two Absolutes, they said in effect, but One. The innermost SELF in man is one with the fundamental principle of the Universe. Man—the essential man, and not his outer garments of body and mind that seem to separate him from his fellows—is literally one with God and with all other men; and it is at once his task and destiny to realise to the full all the implications of that unity.

When, years ago, we first travelled over the East, exploring the penetralia of its deserted sanctuaries, two saddening and ever-recurring questions oppressed our thoughts: *Where,* WHO, WHAT *is* GOD? *Who ever saw the* IMMORTAL SPIRIT *of man, so as to be able to assure himself of man's immortality?*

It was while most anxious to solve these perplexing problems that we came into contact with certain . . . sages of the Orient . . . They showed us that by combining science with religion, the existence of God and immortality of man's spirit may be demonstrated like a problem of Euclid. . . The Oriental philosophy has room for no other faith than an absolute and immovable faith in the omnipotence of man's own immortal self. . . This omnipotence comes from the kinship of man's spirit with the Universal Soul—God! The latter, they said, can never be demonstrated but by the former. Man-spirit proves God-spirit, as the one drop of water proves a source from which it must have come . . . prove the soul of man by its wondrous powers—you have proved God!

In our studies, mysteries were shown to be no mysteries. Names and places that to the Western mind have only a significance derived from Eastern fable, were shown to be realities. Reverently we stepped in spirit within the temple of Isis; to lift aside the veil of "the one that is and was and shall be" at Saïs; to look through the rent curtain of the Sanctum Sanctorum at Jerusalem; and even to interrogate within the crypts which once existed beneath the sacred edifice, the mysterious Bath-Kol. The *Filia Vocis*—the daughter of the divine voice—responded from the mercy-seat within the veil, and science, theology, every human hypothesis and conception born of imperfect knowledge, lost for ever their authoritative character in our sight. The one-living God had spoken through his oracle—man, and we were satisfied. Such knowledge is priceless; and it has been hidden only from those who overlooked it, derided it, or denied its existence.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY in 1877.

RAJA RAM MOHAN RAI

"No country can boast a purer or holier son than was this Indian reformer."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY.

[On the 27th of this month, in 1833, this great Indian religious reformer died in England, and was buried at Bristol on the 18th of October.

On the occasion of this Centenary we print two articles, the first dealing with the Founder of the Brahmo Samaj, and the second with his influence on the religious mentality of the United States of America.

In introducing these two articles we reprint an appreciation by H. P. Blavatsky of Ram Mohan Rai* from *The Theosophist* for March 1881.—EDS.]

I

AN APPRECIATION

The Brahmo Samaj, as is well known, was founded by the late Rajah Ram Mohun Roy, a Rarhee Brahmin, son of Ram Khant Roy of Burdwan, and one of the purest, most philanthropic, and enlightened men India ever produced. He was born about 1774, was given a thorough education in the vernacular, Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit, and, later, mastered English thoroughly, acquired a knowledge of Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and studied French. His intellectual power was confessedly very great, while his manners were most refined and charming and his moral character without a stain. Add to this a dauntless moral courage, perfect modesty, warm humanitarian bias, patriotism, and a fervid religious feeling, and we have before us the picture of a man of the noblest type. Such a person was the ideal of a religious reformer. Had his constitution been more rugged and his sensitiveness less acute, he might have lived to see far greater fruits of his self-sacrificing labours than he did. One searches the record of his life and work in vain for any evidence of personal conceit, or a disposition to make himself figure as a heaven-sent messenger. He thought he found in the elements of Christianity the highest moral code ever given to man; but from first to last he rejected as unphilosophical and absurd the Trinitarian doctrine of the Christians. The missionaries, instead of hailing him as an ally to win the Hindus from polytheism, and bring them three-fourths of the way towards their own standing-ground, bitterly attacked his unitarian views, and obliged him to publish sundry pamphlets showing the weakness of their cause and the logical strength of his own. He died in England, September 27, 1833, and was buried on the 18th of October, leaving behind him a circle of

*In *The Theosophical Movement* for 17th August 1933 other extracts from articles on the Brahmo Samaj are reprinted from the same journal conducted by H. P. Blavatsky.—EDS.

sorrowing acquaintance that included some of the best people of that country. It is said by Miss Martineau that his death was hastened by the anguish he felt to see the awful living lie that practical Christianity was in its stronghold. Miss Mary Carpenter does not touch upon this point in her Memoir of his Last Days in England, but she prints among other sermons that were preached after his decease one by the Rev. J. Scott Porter, a Presbyterian clergyman of Belfast, Ireland, in which he says that "Offences against the laws of morality, which are too often passed over as trivial transgressions in European society, excited the deepest horror in him." And this is quite enough to give the colour of truth to Miss Martineau's assertion, for we all know what the morals of Christendom are.

H. P. BLAVATSKY

II

INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO THE WEST

[**Ramananda Chatterjee**, the venerable Editor of *The Modern Review*, gives in this article a good picture of the learning and the sterling character of Ram Mohan Rai.—EDS.]

An accredited political ambassador carries with him credentials from the State he represents. Whatever his capacity for the office, it invests him with the authority necessary for the performance of his duties. A spiritual ambassador from one country to another does not hold any formal office and cannot expect to have credentials from any earthly authority. His only credentials are his *sādhanā* and *siddhi*, his spiritual endeavour and attainment, his character and spirituality.

Raja Rammohun Roy went to England as an ambassador or envoy from the Court of the Emperor of Delhi, such as it was in 1830. At first, the East India Company refused to recognise him either as a Raja or as an Envoy. The ministers of the British Crown, however, recognised his embassy and his title of Raja. But, what is more significant, "the people of England, in their own spontaneous way, acknowledged him as ambassador from the people of India". Their subsequent cordial and enthusiastic appreciation of Rammohun Roy, the man, showed that, consciously or unconsciously, they had found in him India's spiritual ambassador to the West.

Mysticism, asceticism, and *sannyāsa* or renunciation of the world are generally associated with Indian spirituality.

Rammohun Roy was a mystic. His mysticism has not been perceived even by many of his admirers and *bhaktas*, on account of the rational cast of his mind, the polemical character of the bulk of his writings and the fact that he was the first political

agitator in modern India. But he was in reality "above all and beneath all a religious personality. . . . The root of his life was religion. He would never have been able to go so far or to move his countrymen so mightily as he did but for the driving power of an intense theistic passion." His Bengali hymns give some indications of his mysticism. Poetry springs from a deeper source in the soul than anything that is merely didactic, controversial, doctrinal, or philosophical. Referring to an article in *The Modern Review* for October, 1928, on *Rammohun Roy the Devotee*, by Dhirendranath Vedāntavāgīs, Romain Rolland has observed that therein—

> The mystic side of his genius has been brought to the fore. . . . The freedom of his intellect would not have been so valuable if it had not been based upon devotional elements equally profound and varied.

Possessing a comprehensive view of human nature, a faith in its varied elements—intellectual, imaginative, emotional and æsthetic, and in the utility, interrelation and inter-action of all of them, he could not become a *sannyāsi*, an ascetic, renouncing the world and mortifying the flesh as almost an end in itself. This was not because the world and the flesh had superior attractions for him.

Dr. Alexander Duff's biography gives some idea of the Raja's mode of life in India :—

> In a pleasant garden-house in the leafy suburbs of Calcutta the Raja Rammohun Roy, then 56 years of age, was spending his declining days in meditation on divine truth, broken only by works of practical benevolence among his countrymen, and soon by preparations for a visit to England.

Dr. Carpenter wrote in his biography of the Raja after his death :—

> Possessed of the Raja's unbounded confidence, acquainted with all his movements and enabled to judge with complete accuracy of his habits and dispositions, the unhesitating and unequivocal testimony of this [the Hare] family, one and all, to the unvarying purity of his conduct and the refined delicacy of his sentiments is as decisive as it is valuable.

In the earlier part of his life, Rammohun Roy had undergone austerities as a part of his spiritual endeavour and discipline. Early in life he wanted to become a *sannyāsi*. His mother dissuaded him from adopting that course. As a boy he made bricks with the mystic syllable *Om* imprinted on them, and with these built a *vedi* or platform, on which he would sit for hours together engaged in spiritual exercises. It is related that years later, when he had grown up to manhood, he performed *puraścharaṇa* twenty-two times. *Puraścharaṇa* consists in taking a *mantra*—the name of a god or an attribute of God—for mental repetition, and concentrating the mind on the name in such a manner that at every repetition the thing connoted by the name may be perceived by the *sādhaka* or devotee as present. If there is no such perception, the mere repetition of the name is considered invalid. The *sādhaka* is to rise early and, tak-

ing his seat with the rising of the sun, he should go on repeating the *mantra* till the sun reaches the meridian. While so engaged, he must not allow his attention to be diverted. If concentration fails but once, the whole thing is spoiled and he must begin anew. Through the whole of this spiritual exercise, one is required to strictly observe twelve rules of austerity, such as the vow of silence, sleeping on the ground without a bed, *brahmacharya* proper, etc. The devotee must complete the prescribed number of repetitions of the name, which may be "ten, twenty or thirty thousand, culminating in thirty-two thousand of the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*". (D. Vedāntavāgīs.) That Rammohun performed *puraścharaṇa* twenty-two times shows what great concentration of mind he was capable of and what austerities he underwent.

In the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* (vii, II) Prajāpati teaches Indra of "a state of supreme enlightenment, the highest state attainable by the Self even before death, when it is not necessary to separate itself from the mundane existence, nor even to deny itself the enjoyment of mundane pleasures." By his spiritual exercises Rammohun Roy had attained to this state, he had achieved direct apprehension (*aparokshānubhūti*) and vision of the Oversoul (*Atmasākshātkāra*). These he held to be equivalent to *samādhi*. And he taught (in Bengali), "When *samādhi* is attained, it is to be realized that all things are in God and God is immanent in all." This makes it clear why his God-vision and God-realization did not lead him to renounce the world, but led him rather to engage in all mundane activities for *lokaśreyas* or the good of the world. This *Brāhmī-sthiti* ("dwelling in God") of the Raja explains his habit of constant prayer noted by his close associates in England. His multifarious activities do not conflict with his acceptance of the Vedānta. He accepted it according to his own interpretation, *not* according to the interpretation to which reference is made in the following sentence in his *Letter on English Education* to Lord Amherst:—

> Nor will youths be fitted to be better members of society by the Vedāntic doctrines which teach them to believe that all visible things have no real existence, that as father, brother, etc., have no actual entity, they consequently deserve no real affection, and therefore the sooner we escape from them and leave the world the better.

That so great a *sannyāsi* as the Swāmi Vivekānanda did not see any conflict between God-realization and activities for *lokaśreyas* (good of the world) appears from the following passage in Sister Nivedita's *Notes of Some Wanderings with the Swāmi Vivekānanda*, p. 19:—

> It was here, too, that we heard a long talk on Rammohun Roy, in which he [Swāmi Vivekānanda] pointed out three things as the dominant notes of this teacher's message, his acceptance of the Vedānta, his preaching of patriotism, and the love that embraced the Mussulman equally with the Hindu. In all these things, he claimed himself to have taken

up the task that the breadth and foresight of Rammohun Roy had mapped out.

That Rammohun Roy's view of the relation between the world and spirituality is not necessarily in conflict with the ideas of the very orthodox Hindu householder is evident from the following passage in the speech delivered by the late Sir Gooroo Dass Banerjee as Chairman at the Rammohun Roy Anniversary, 1889:—

> But one thing, I believe, we all will be agreed upon—all sects, whether orthodox Hindus or progressive Brahmos, whether Mahomedans or Christians—that to Rammohun Roy is due the credit of forcibly pointing out to learned Hindus that religion does not require one to be a *yogi*, a *suttee*, or to go to the forest, but that home and society are the best surroundings of appropriate worship.

The manner in which Raja Rammohun Roy prepared himself for his comprehensive mission in life makes it clear that he was the spiritual ambassador to the West, not merely of Hinduism, but of all the main religions prevalent in India, whether indigenous or not.

Born in an orthodox family, Hindu culture was his earliest social heritage. But it was Islamic culture which first woke his mind in boyhood. The foundations of his Persian and Arabic studies were laid at Patna. It was then that he became acquainted with Euclid's geometry, Porphyry's logic and the philosophy of Plato ("Aflatun") and Aristotle ("Aristuh") in an Arabic guise. And then also it was that he felt in his blood the raptures of Persian 'ghazals,' though in those years of his boyhood he could but dimly apprehend them. Later in life he studied the Koran and other Muhammadan scriptures and became well versed in Muhammadan law and jurisprudence and in the polemics of all the seventy-three schools of Muslim theology. The free thought and universalistic outlook of the Muhammadan rationalists (the *Mutazilas* of the eighth century) and the Muhammadan unitarians (the *Muwahhidin*) contributed their share of influence to his mental growth.

His acquaintance with Sanskrit learning followed by some years his introduction to Persian and Arabic letters. He had a general knowledge of the Vedic *Samhitās*, though probably he never made a scholarly study of them. But he very carefully studied and mastered Hindu *Smriti*, including Law, Jurisprudence and Social Institution, the *Darśanas* or Systems of Philosophy, and the entire body of religious literature including the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Purāṇas* and the *Tantras*. It was, however, the *Upanishads*, the *Brahmasutras* and the *Gītā* that influenced him most profoundly and shaped his personal religion and his philosophy of life.

The Jaina scriptures and the Buddhist tradition in the *Mahāyāna* version were also known to him, but more through his travels and personal contacts than through closet studies. He was

also familiar with the cults, practices and doctrines (and perhaps also the literatures) of the various mediæval Indian religious movements of reforming sects like the Kabīr-panthis, the Nānak-panthis, the Dādu-panthis, and the Rāmāyat sects of north India, with all of whom he claimed fraternity as a fellow-monotheist.

The study of the Jewish and Christian scriptures came last of all. He mastered Hebrew, Syriac and Greek in order to study the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek, and the Talmud, the Tarjum, and the Syriac versions, both for exegetical purposes and for tracing the development of Jewish and Christian doctrines and thus laying the foundations of Comparative Religion.

His Semitic studies had been preceded by those "directed to the literature of Rationalism in Religion and Liberty in Politics. He accordingly cultivated the literature of empirical philosophy and scientific thought from Bacon to Locke and Newton, as well as the propaganda of free thinking and 'illumination' in Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, Volney, Thomas Paine and others among the Coryphæi of Rationalism and Neotheophilanthropy."

Thus the Raja's mind was enriched with the highest and best in Semitic culture in both Hebraic and Arabic traditions, and above all he imbibed in an unbiased spirit the Christian culture, which he traced to a blend of a Hebraic stock with Greek, Roman and heathen grafts. But true to his first initiation, he always maintained against the missionaries that modern Western civilization had another basis besides the composite Christian tradition. This was the scientific and economic basis which he traced to the Advancement of Science and the application of scientific knowledge to arts, industries and machinery for the expansion of man's prerogative and power over Nature, a movement associated with the Baconian revolution in the seventeenth century. In later life he more and more directed his studies from doctrines to institutions, and his efforts from Polemics to Reform, and with the help of economic, juristic and political literature made a comparative study of social institutions with the same easy mastery that he had shown in the comparative study of Religions. (B. N. Seal.)

It would be entirely wrong to assume that the various kinds of knowledge and culture which Rammohun Roy acquired were merely juxtaposed and mechanically combined in his mind. No. The unity of the human race had been already borne in upon him. And he had a highly synthetic genius. In his day he found in India a conflict of three bodies of culture, three civilizations, the Hindu, the Moslem and the Christian or Occidental. He mastered and assimilated the three and made a harmonious blending of their many excellences in his unique personality, thereby pointing " the way to the solution of the larger problem of international culture and civilization in human history, and became a precursor, and archetype, a prophet of coming Humanity. He laid the foundation of the true League of Nations in a *League of National Cultures.*"

It is only necessary to add that he included not only Hindu, Moslem and Christian theists in one theistic fraternity as brothers in faith; he extended this fellowship and co-operation to those who by whatever name would acknowledge some Principle of the universe, the need of meditation on that Principle as good, and the love and service of man as the guiding principle of the conduct of life. Buddhists and Jainas and believers in a Law of Nature he would therefore acknowledge as not against the theistic fraternity but with it. (B. N. Seal.)

So, had he been living in our day, non-theistic humanism and philosophical communism would have been included within the wide sweep of his fraternal monotheistic sympathy.

The more a political ambassador sincerely appreciates and respects the polity, civilization and culture of the country to whose Court he is accredited, the greater is his real success. This is much more true of a spiritual ambassador. From what has been written above about Rammohun Roy's conscious and unconscious preparation for his life-work it would perhaps be easy to understand that he was in a position to appreciate and respect the religion and culture of all civilized peoples of the East and the West. His attitude in the West was not that of a teacher standing on a high pedestal. Though he was really a superman, he felt and conducted himself sincerely as a brother. For, he had found that " the core of religious truth, comprehending the Unity of God as Spirit, His worship in spirit and in truth, the immortality of the soul, and the ethical discipline as the basis of spiritual life, formed the central teaching of the canonical scriptures of the historic religions (the Hindu, the Moslem and the Christian)". To him at first,

There was only one Theism with certain historical varieties, *e.g.*, a Hindu Theism, an Islamic Theism, and a Christian Theism, each variety being centred round a particular scripture,—whether it was the Veda and Vedānta, the Koran, or the Bible.

Later,

He perceived that the universal Truth was stressed in different ways, had different accents and different historic utterances. The Vedanta he always considered as strongest in Jnāna, the knowledge of the Unity of all souls and of the world in Brahma;—Islam he considered as strongest in the sense of the divine government and a militant equality of man with man; and Christianity he considered as strongest in ethical and social guidance to peace and happiness in the path of life..... each in his view was to preserve its historic or traditional continuity, though each was to grow *by mutual contact and assimilation and by convergence, to a common ideal.* (B. N. Seal.)

The Raja's views underwent still further evolution, but that is outside the scope of this article.

It has been stated above that it was the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-sutras* and the *Gītā* that influenced Rammohun Roy most profoundly and shaped his personal religion and his philosophy of life. Hence, though his was a synthetized multiple personality, his spirituality was racial of the soil and Hindu in character in its essence. For,

The victory of *ātman*, of the higher

self of man, has never been proclaimed from the heights of manhood anywhere except in India with such an unhesitant voice. It was this message that Rammohun Roy brought anew, when in the India of his days it had become narrow and perverted, disclaimed in practice .... The strange thing is that Rammohun Roy was eager to invoke the message of the spirit not merely within the narrow boundaries of his own self-forgetful land; he assayed, by the test of the spiritual ideal, every great religious community which had in any manner obscured the true form of its own inner self in mere external forms and in irrational rituals. (Rabindranath Tagore.)

It remains now to give some idea of the impression produced by his personality in the West. Miss Sophia Dobson Collett writes in her biography of the Raja :—

Rammohun Roy's presence in this country made the English people aware, as they had never been before, of the dignity, the culture and the piety of the race they had conquered in the East. India became incarnate in him, and dwelt among us and we beheld her glory. In the court of the king, in the halls of the legislature, in the select coteries of fashion, in the society of philosophers and men of letters, in Anglican Church, and Nonconformist meeting-house, in the privacy of many a home and before the wondering crowds of Lancashire operatives, Rammohun Roy stood forth the visible and personal embodiment of our Eastern Empire .. We can hardly fail to see in Rammohun's visit a landmark in the general history of modern civilization. The West had long gone to the East. With him the East began to come to the West. India has followed in his wake, and Japan and China have followed in the wake of India. Leading scions of the hoariest civilizations are now eager pupils in the schools of the youngest civilization.

As a consequence, the East is being rapidly occidentalized, and there are signs not a few of the gradual orientalizing of the West. This movement towards the healing of the schism which has for ages divided mankind and the effort to intermingle more thoroughly the various ingredients of humanity are rich in promise for the humanizing and unifying of man. The rôle which Rammohun had played in this world-drama among his own countrymen was fitly crowned by his appearance in the chief city of the globe.

According to Miss Mary Carpenter :—

The highest honours were publicly accorded to him, and a place was awarded to him among the foreign ambassadors at the coronation of the sovereign; persons the most remarkable for their social standing and literary eminence sought his society, and highly esteemed the privilege of intercourse with him;—he was received into our English homes not only as a distinguished guest, but as a friend; and when he was prostrated on the bed of sickness and death in a foreign land, he was surrounded with the most loving attentions, tended with the most anxious solicitude, and finally laid in the grave surrounded with true mourners who felt him akin to them in spirit, if not connected with him by the ties of earthly relationship.

Mr. Sutherland says :—

The scene at Manchester when he visited the great manufactories was very amusing. All the workmen struck work, and men, women and children rushed in crowds to see "the king of Ingee". Many of the great unwashed insisted upon shaking hands with him.

At a special meeting of the Unitarian Association held in his honour, Sir John Bowring observed :—

They have endeavoured to imagine what would be their sensations if a Plato or a Socrates, a Milton or a

Newton were unexpectedly to honour them with their presence. I recollect that a poet, who has well been called divine, has drawn a beautiful picture of the feelings of those who first visited the southern hemisphere, and there saw for the first time, the beautiful constellation, the Golden Cross. It was with feelings such as they underwent, that I was overwhelmed when I stretched out in your name the hand of welcome to the Raja Rammohun Roy.

Miss Lucy Aikin wrote in her letters to Dr. Channing of America :—

With very great intelligence and ability he unites a modesty and simplicity which win all hearts.

He is indeed a glorious being—a true sage, as it appears, with the genuine humility of the character and with the genuine sensibility, a more engaging tenderness of heart than any class of character can justly claim.

Miss Carpenter has recorded the following little incident :—

The infant son of the Rev. D. Davison, M. A., was named after him "Rammohun Roy". The Raja subsequently evinced a lively interest in the little fellow. Mrs. Davison wrote :—

"His visits to me were generally paid in the nursery, as he insisted on coming up, so as to visit his namesake at the same time, and not to interrupt me. For surely never there was a man of so much modesty and humility. I used to feel quite ashamed of the reverential manner in which he behaved to me. Had I been our Queen, I could not have been approached and taken leave of, with more respect."

The Raja's English biographer beautifully observes in reference to this trait :—

This glimpse of the stately and courtly Brahmin in the nursery, eager to see the baby and thoughtful of the mother's convenience, will be treasured up by his followers to the very last of them as one of the sweetest and most beautiful memories of their founder. Probably no index of character is so decisive as the attitude assumed to mother and child; and specially of religious leaders does this rule hold.

This reminds one of Christ's love of little children, and of Gandhi's in our day.

Dr. Boot, an American physician of London, wrote in a letter to Mr. Estlin on November 27, 1833 :—

To me he [the Raja] stood alone in the simple majesty of, I had almost said, perfect humanity. No one in past history, or in present time, ever came before my judgment clothed in such wisdom, grace and humility. I knew of no tendency even to error.

Calling himself "a sincere follower of Rammohun Roy," Professor Max Müller has observed :—

The German name for prince is *Furst*, in English first, he who is always to the fore, he who courts the place of danger, the first place in fight and the last in flight. Such a *Furst* was Rammohun Roy, a true prince, a real Raja, if Raja also like *Rex*, meant originally the Steersman, the man at the helm.

Miss Lucy Aikin has left on record the following significant story :—

An interesting conversation took place between the Raja and a Scotch gentleman. The question happened to arise, "if two persons were drowning of whom you could only save one and one were your countryman, would you not save him in preference?" "Certainly I should," said the Scotchman. The Raja reprobated the idea of making a choice between the lives of any two fellow-creatures at such a moment—he should save the nearest. But, after a pause, he added :—"No; there is a case in which I should make a choice. If one were a woman, I should rescue her."

I conclude with the following passage from the Raja's biography by Miss Sophia Dobson Collett:—

> We stand on the eve of an unprecedented intermingling of East and West. The European and Asiatic streams of human development, which have often tinged each other before, are now approaching a confluence which bids fair to form the one ocean-river of the collective progress of mankind. In the presence of that greater Eastern question, with its infinite ramifications, industrial, political, moral and religious, the international problems of the passing hour, even the gravest of them, seem dwarfed into parochial pettiness. The nearing dawn of these unmeasured possibilities only throws into clearer prominence the figure of the man whose life-story we have told. He was, if not the prophetic type, at least the precursive hint, of the change that is to come.

RAMANANDA CHATTERJEE

III

EMERSON'S ORIENTAL READING

[**Arthur Christy** is the author of *The Orient in American Transcendentalism* and is at present engaged in investigating the extent of the oriental influence on American men of letters. To our June number he contributed "Whittier and the Brahmo Samaj," and in the following article he writes about Emerson whose outlook was affected by numerous currents of Oriental thought, one of them being the influence of Raja Ram Mohan Rai. We hope to publish further results of Mr. Christy's interesting line of research.—EDS.]

In the review of Mr. Van Wyck Brooks's *The Life of Emerson* which appeared in a recent number of this Journal are these words:—

> Mr. Brooks shows him [Emerson] as a leader of men whose strength lay in the magnetism of his nature which all felt, but few appreciated or understood. How this came to be we are not told, though Emerson himself left a record of his indebtedness to the philosophy of the Ancients. Disgusted with church and dogmatic religion, Emerson turned Eastward and lit his lamp from the ever brilliant fire of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Upanishads* as well as the Greek philosophers. It is pre-eminently to India that we must turn to find the inspiration of the *Over-Soul*, and *Cycles*, of *Spiritual Laws*, and *Compensation*.

I quote this passage because it serves as an admirable indication of the fact that the Oriental world is not blind to Emerson's indebtedness. I would only supplement it with very pertinent sentences from Protap Chunder Mozoomdar's eulogy, delivered in Concord not long after Emerson's death: "He seems to some of us to have been a geographical mistake. He ought to have been born in India. Perhaps Hindoos were closer kinsmen to him than his own nation."

The space at my disposal precludes discussion of the implications of these statements and the degree to which Emerson's philosophy was tinged by the Orient. I have attempted to examine these subjects fully in a doctoral dissertation entitled *The Orient in American Transcendentalism* which appeared under the imprint of the Columbia University

Press. In this essay I propose only to present the bibliographical sources of Emersonian thought so that informed Theosophists and Orientals may determine for themselves with some degree of accuracy the extent of Emerson's indebtedness to the Vedanta. Evidence of these sources was found in an examination of Emerson's personal library as it exists in Concord to-day, in the published writings, and in the loan-records of the Harvard College Library and the Boston Athenæum.

I shall omit mention of Mohammedan and Confucian literature as well as descriptive books about Persia and China, which Emerson read. These exerted some influence on his poetics and politics, the Sufi poets influencing his theories of verse and Confucius's ideal of government seeming to him admirable and worthy of emulation. But it was the literature of the Vedanta in which Emerson found his own intuitions most clearly stated, and this was the reason he read it so avidly. It is my conviction that the close student of Emerson who is guided by facts will come to the conclusion that no system of thought, no man, and no body of literature ever really influenced him in the usual sense of the word. It was only when Emerson recognized a personal affinity with the spirit of a literature that he turned devotedly to it and adopted the things in it that agreed with his own beliefs. This is the explanation of the constant interweaving of allusions to and quotations from the Vedantic books in his prose. He frankly admitted this fact in his *Journals*: "For good quotations, then, there must be originality in the quoter, —bent, bias, delight in the truth and only valuing the author in the measure of his agreement with the truth, which we see, and which he had the luck to see first." Here was Emerson's starting point frankly stated. With it in mind, let us take note of the Hindu books which it is known passed through his hands.

Arbitrarily accepting the classifications of histories of Sanskrit literature, we commence with the Vedas. Of these, it is known that the *Rig Veda* and the *Sama Veda* passed through Emerson's hands. The former was in the English translation of Horace Hayman Wilson, published in London in 1850; the latter in John Stevenson's translation, which appeared under the imprint of the Oriental Translation fund in 1842.

So far as I have been able to ascertain, Emerson read none of the Brahmanas. Even if they had become accessible to him, it is improbable that he would have been attracted. The situation was entirely different, however, when he came to the Upanishads, for in these he found most congenial thought.

The earliest translation of any Upanishad that came to Emerson's hand was probably Rammohun Roy's *Translation of the Ishopanishad* (Calcutta, 1816). It

is generally known that Rammohun Roy aroused a tremendous interest in New England when he lectured there, and that an aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, had in correspondence mentioned Roy's work to her nephew. But definite information exists that a more important work by Roy was known in Concord—the London, 1832, edition of his *Translation of Several Principal Books, Passages, and Texts of the Veds, and of Some Controversial Works on Brahminical Theology.* Readers acquainted with this work will be aware that it contained the best portions of the *Kena* and the *Katha Upanishads*, besides several excellent expository essays on the Vedanta. As a leader of the Brahmo Samaj, Rammohun Roy wrote for the explicit purpose of defending the eclectic's attitude and position. Himself an eclectic, Emerson could not have failed to be sympathetic with Roy's purpose and to read his work with supreme interest.

It is also definitely known that Emerson read Anquetil Duperron's *Oupnek'hat* as early as 1830. This was the Oriental work which Schopenhauer designated as having been of great influence in shaping his own beliefs. Its importance for Emerson was that, besides other valuable material, it contained translations of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya Upanishads.*

The chief medium of Emerson's Upanishadic information, however, was an 1853 volume of the *Bibliotheca Indica* which contained E. Röer's translations of portions of nine Upanishads—the *Taittiriya, Aitareya, Svetasvatara, Kena, Isa, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka,* and *Mandukya.* It was in this volume that Emerson found the model for his poem "Brahma" and the long, beautiful quotation which so appropriately concludes his essay "Immortality," an essay no student of his Orientalism can afford to overlook.

That Emerson read portions of the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* is certain, although it is difficult exactly to determine the translators and the editions. More definite information exists, however, with reference to the classic interlude of the former epic. It is said that Emerson's personal copy of Charles Wilkins's translation of the *Bhagavadgita* (London, 1785), which came into his hands in 1845, was more widely read than the copy in the Harvard Library. J. Cockburn Thomson's translation (Hertford, 1855) was also in Emerson's personal library. Perhaps we should not leave the *Gita* without quoting Emerson's beautiful tribute to the book, written in a letter to a friend: "I owed—my friend and I owed—a magnificent day to the *Bhagavat Geeta.*—It was the first of books; it was as if an empire spoke to us, nothing small or unworthy, but large, serene, consistent, the voice of an old intelligence which in another age and climate had pondered and thus disposed of the same questions which exercise us."

Sir William Jones's classic translation of the *Laws of Manu* (London, 1825) was on the shelves in the Emerson library. How it came there is not known, but next to the *Gita*, it probably exerted the most profound influence of any Oriental work on American transcendental thought.

Another extremely important work was H. H. Wilson's translation of the *Vishnu Purana* (London, 1840), for it served as the contextual basis of the essay " Illusions, " and the poems " Brahma " and " Hamatreya, " the latter containing lines which paraphrase the famous sentiment: " the words *I* and *mine* constitute ignorance."

Space forbids extended discussion of Emerson's use of each work and the significance of such statements about Eugène Burnouf's *Bhagavata Purana* (Paris, 1840) as: " Ah! there is a book to be read on one's knees! "—or Henry Hart Milman's *Nala and Damayanti* (London, 1835): " Thus Milman's translation . . . is nearer to my business and bosom than is the news in to-day's *Boston Journal*. And I am admonished and comforted, as I read. It all very nearly concerns me."

Any complete list of Emerson's Oriental reading must also contain H. H. Wilson's *Megha Duta* (London, 1814), of Charles Wilkins's *The Heetopades of Veeshnoo-Sarma* (Bath, 1787), an anonymous translation of Jaimini's *Aphorisms of the Mimansa Philosophy* (Allahabad, 1851), another anonymous translation, *The Bhasha Parichchheda* of Bhatta (Calcutta, 1851), and two renderings of the *Sakuntala*, that by Sir William Jones (London, 1790) and that by Monier-Williams (Hertford, 1856).

Among the books of the specimen and commentary type which came to Emerson's hands were H. H. Wilson's *Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus* (London, 1835), Thomas Erskine Perry's *Cases Illustrative of Oriental Life* (London, 1853), the *Complete Works* of Sir William Jones himself (London, 1806), Eugène Burnouf's *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien* (Paris, 1844) and *Le Lotus de la bonne loi* (Paris, 1852). H. T. Colebrooke's *Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance* (Calcutta, 1810) should also appear on the list, although it might seem foreign to the interests of a mystic.

Emerson did not read the Oriental translations alone; he also had the benefit of handbooks and general studies. Conspicuous among these was George Small's *Handbook of Sanskrit Literature* (London, 1866), William Ward's *View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos* (Serampore, 1818), and J. H. Garcin de Tassy's *Histoire de la littérature hindoui et hindoustani* (Paris, 1839). He also read the following pamphlets: J. R. Ballantyne's *A Lecture on the Vedanta* (Allahabad, 1851), William Brockie's *Indian Philosophy* (London, 1872), and David

Urquhart's *The Sraddha* (London, 1857).

Of Buddhist literature as a whole Emerson read very little. This is easily understood. A happy, optimistic individual, living in the first bloom of the new American civilization, there was little reason for him to be touched with world-weariness. The outstanding Buddhist work, containing Max Müller's translation of the *Dhammapada*, was T. Rogers's *Buddhagosha's Parables* (London, 1870). The London, 1850, edition of Spence Hardy's *Eastern Monachism* was also well known in Concord. But these works, together with Eugène Burnouf's which have already been mentioned, left practically no precipitate in the mind and writings of our sage. His interests were those of the Vedantist, not the Buddhist.

It may be profitable, for the sake of giving a semblance of completeness to this list, also to mention that Emerson read the standard histories of India written by James Mill, John Clark Marshman, J. Talboys Wheeler, and the reminiscent biographies of soldiers, such as those by W. H. Sleeman and W. E. R. Hodson.

Finally, it need only be pointed out that Emerson's Oriental interests were far from those of the professional scholar. It is a singular fact that when in 1842 the American Oriental Society was founded in Boston, the event seems not to have even been noticed in Concord. Nor does Emerson's name appear on the list of charter members. And this at the time when his Oriental enthusiasm was white hot! The explanation may have been that he knew no Oriental languages. Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation is suggested by a sentence from the essay "Books":—

> There is no room left,—and yet I might as well not have begun as to leave out a class of books which are the best: I mean the Bibles of the world, or the sacred books of each nation, which express for each the supreme result of their experience.

Except for this humane interest in the spiritual experience of the race, Emerson's Orientalism would be as dead to-day as that of the founders of the American Oriental Society. Instead, it is to-day widely regarded as one of the most influential factors which have determined the religious mentality of the modern United States, infused as it has been with the theosophic teachings of the Vedanta.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

MAN AND HIS GOD

[This article of **Mr. J. D. Beresford** would prove more interesting if read in conjunction with the opening editorial in this issue.—EDS.]

All the false and misleading ideas about God are begotten from our ever present illusions concerning the reality of matter, and no one who is in bondage to that illusion can have any true concept of such words as God and Spirit.

Mr. Shaw amused himself recently, in a little work entitled *The Black Girl in Search of God*, by tracing the Evolution of the various aspects of Him, presented in the Bible. He did the thing clumsily, in the manner of the cartoonist, and at the end of it we were given nothing to replace the various idols he had satirised. But anyone who set out to write of the *aspects* that God has taken through the centuries, could do no more than Mr. Shaw has done.

Wherefore by way of introduction to any understanding of the nature of God, I want to say something of the aspects of what we regard as matter. Our approach to it is necessarily by way of the physical senses, and the corroboration of these senses by one another leads to the conception of an idea. For most of us the more important of these senses is that of sight. Light is reflected from all material surfaces in varying degrees, and produces certain reactions in the mechanism of the eye which we translate into ideas of form and colour. If all the light were absorbed by the objects on which it fell, the whole material world would be wrapped in darkness and we should see nothing. If all the light were reflected we should still have no sense of either form or colour. The only information regarding the nature of matter that reaches us through the eye is dependent upon the relative degrees of light's reflection and absorption, and it is probable that no two people register precisely the same impression.

Our next important approach is through the exercise of touch, taste and smell, the first of these being that most frequently used to check an ocular inference. The combined exercises of these four senses enable us by association to build up certain concepts with reference to the nature of material objects, concepts that serve us reasonably well in the conduct of ordinary life. We are, it is true, liable to error as a consequence of the too rigid application of these associations. In any new experience, there may be apparent discrepancies between the evidence of the sense impressions. The perfect imitation of a flower, for instance, may confirm previous associations by its appearance or even by its texture when handled, but fail to

produce the expected reaction by its smell; and in such cases a new concept has to be formed in the mind to distinguish between natural and artificial flowers. But the majority of the images of material objects conceived by the mind are so steadily confirmed by experience that we commonly think of them as presenting a fixed reality.

The fifth sense, the sense of hearing, is somewhat isolated from the other four. The external means for translating sound,—that is to say a succession of air-waves,—into an idea, is by way of an ingenious but relatively simple mechanism, and the loss of it would not have any far-reaching effect on our inferences with regard to the nature of matter. Thus, apart from its æsthetic value in relation to music, hearing would appear to be, in most connections, the least essential of our approaches to material reality.*

Lastly, and most importantly, we have to deal with our method of translating sense impressions into ideas by the means of memory and reason. The former provides the necessary associations, the latter the conclusions to be drawn from them. Memory, in this operation, has some analogy to an automatic telephone exchange, connecting almost instantaneously the various lines of the sense impressions and registering the result in the form of an association. In this process it may happen that a line of sense impressions may be automatically connected although it has not, in fact, been stimulated. The sight of that perfectly imitated flower, for instance, may produce the illusion of its distinctive smell; this element being so necessary to complete the association, that we are momentarily unable to distinguish between a present and a past experience.

Practically all our inferences and decisions, however, are ultimately submitted to the test of reason which, guided by memory, is then able to form an interpretation of the impressions conveyed by the senses. Retaining the illustration of the flower, we might in that case proceed to convince ourselves of its artificiality by applying further tests. If, for example, its appearance and texture had been perfectly imitated and it had been artificially scented, we could, in the last resort, examine the structure under a microscope when our memory of older associations connected with the structure of natural flowers would demonstrate differences only to be accounted for on the grounds that the specimen under examination was not a natural growth.

This, in the briefest summary, presents an inclusive account of our contact with the objective world. Such knowledge of it as we may add by reading is in the same category, since it is but a second-hand experience of something recorded by another ob-

*The peculiarly important part played by the ear in occult training was explained by B. M. in an article " On Hearing " in our May Issue, to which attention is drawn.—EDS.

server, to be accepted or rejected by applying the touchstone of our own reason and personal experience. Thus the single test of truth that we have in this connection, is that of probability. If like causes have invariably produced like effects during the whole history of human knowledge, we are justified in recording those effects as the inevitable consequence of the antecedent causes.

And from the premises afforded by these instances of high probability, man has built up the whole body of his learning and beliefs. There are no other grounds for what is known as "exact knowledge," which is founded solely upon these records of fallible sense impressions, none of which can be proved to correspond with any absolute reality. To take an instance from modern physics, we now believe as the outcome of a long train of observation and reason that matter, the thing in itself, corresponds in no particular with the concepts of it signalled by the senses. It has no colour although it reflects certain colours to the eye; it is not hard and impenetrable although it conveys that impression to the touch; it is not inert although for all practical purposes we may so regard it.

But when we seek God, we are, *ex hypothesi*, searching for that absolute reality of which, as we have seen, we can obtain no proof by the means of the physical senses; and the cartoons of Mr. Shaw, referred to at the opening of this article, provide us with an outline of the kind of god inferred by man from his sense contacts with matter. His primitive aspect is that of the tribal chief, a jealous, bigoted creature to be propitiated by gifts and sacrifices in order that his favours may be extended to his worshippers. And although with the extension of the "exact knowledge" defined above, such qualities as mercy and love have been increasingly attributed to him, the primitive conception of the tribal chief can still be traced in the god of the Christian churches. Their congregations are taught, for example, that he is a god of love and that "perfect love casteth out fear," but at the same time, since the authority of the modern priesthood not less than that of the savage "medicine-man" can only be upheld by a threat, emphasis is continually maintained on the precept that we must "*fear* God".

There are obviously many other anomalies and contradictions in the creeds of all formalised religions, but the above instance will serve as a type. What concerns us here is the evidence provided that all these conceptions of God are derived by reason working upon the data provided by sense impressions, and that such conceptions cannot correspond to any absolute reality. This god of the Churches, in fact, is the Eidolon of Epicurus, an atomic emanation, subsequently rationalised so far as may be within the limits of a philosophical and ethical system. And

since all such systems are founded upon premises unsusceptible of any proof save that of the greatest probability, none of them can have more than a relative value.

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion not that reason itself is an imperfect instrument, but that so long as its workings are confined to the material provided by sense experience all its deductions are open to question. The principle of probability is of no service when we are seeking an absolute which must include every "rule" and every exception. And although observation may show that within human experience certain causes have followed certain effects any conceivable number of times short of infinity, we still have no final ground of proof that an exception is impossible, so long as all our instances are derived from this fallible source of sense impressions.

The first deduction to be made from this argument is that God is unknowable; and that, within the material restrictions so far considered, is undoubtedly true. He may be inferred in various contradictory shapes from the data at our disposal, and the majority of mankind has so inferred Him. But from the same data many able minds have rejected that inference. In either case it is impossible to *know* Him unless we are willing to postulate that God is only a greater kind of man. Indeed if we were to go a step further and claim that God was the summation of all human knowledge and experience, including that which is still to come, it would be absurd for the most gifted human being with an experience of a few thousand years behind him, to claim any understanding of One who was eternal and all-knowing, even in the material sense.

Nevertheless there is a way of approach to the outskirts of such an understanding, which cannot be found by the route of sense impressions. In the first part of this article, I endeavoured to produce the picture of an essential being inhabiting a limited material body through whose imperfect mechanisms he receives, and then tries to collate, a long series of disconnected pieces of information relative to the objective world about him. And the first and by far the most important implication of this picture is that there must be an essential being to do the work of reception and collation. Indeed here for the first time in this essay do we come upon *a piece of knowledge, common to every human being, that is not received in the first instance through sense impressions and is not dependent upon them for verification,—the knowledge embodied in the statement "I am".*

This, the single premise of conscious life, is never learnt in the ordinary sense and cannot be forgotten. It is not the outcome of experience and therefore precedes all other knowledge. There may be moments when it does not appear to be present in

thought, but this "I am" is a perpetual affirmation whatever form such affirmation may take. And since this single piece of knowledge derives from a source demonstrably different in its nature from any other, none of the arguments so far brought forward can apply to it.

Nevertheless having decided that matter is the agent and not the principal, that there is an individual consciousness which is other than matter and antecedent to it, we have to reckon with the belief,—towards which science, also, is now tending,—that every atom in the universe is endowed with a measure of life and consciousness. And if we accept this belief, though we may still maintain our contention that consciousness is the antecedent, motivating force, we are driven to the conclusion that matter is derived from it and partakes of its essence. Nevertheless we may still assume that whereas spirit may know itself, its derivative, matter, cannot, seeing that it is but a temporary, ever-changing expression of consciousness, life, spirit, or if we may give it an inclusive designation, God.

God, in this sense, therefore, can only be conceived as the Universal, "unrelated and unconditioned,"* the All-thing, present in every expression, and gaining a small measure of Self-awareness in Man; and although "a man can have no god that is not bounded by his own human conceptions, the wider the sweep of his spiritual vision, the mightier will be his deity."†

And it is this conception of God, alone, that I personally can accept, a God that is in His nature unknowable, but who must continually increase in wonder and glory with the development of the human spirit. God may never be defined save in the terms of our own limitations, but by the development of those terms is registered the evolution of consciousness and the growth of our independence of matter.

J. D. BERESFORD

द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तं चैवामूर्तं च
मर्त्यं चामृतं च स्थितं च यच्च सच्च त्यंच ॥
—बृहदारण्यक अ. २ ब्रा. ३,१

There are two modes of Brahman,—the manifest and the unmanifest, the mortal and the immortal, the static and the dynamic, the one we know as existence—Sat and the other we say is beyond—(tya)

—BRIHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD II, 3, 1.

* *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 295, footnote.
† *Isis Unveiled*, ii. 567.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT

EXPLORING THE INFINITELY GREAT

[**Edmond Holmes** concludes his study of the methods of approach to the understanding of the minute and the vast in Nature and in Man.—EDS.]

Shall we find the wider field of experience in the inner world, the world of self or spirit, the world which self-consciousness reveals to us, the world to which, as we have just seen, the outer world owes its semblance of reality? Perhaps. But how is speculative thought to pass from the one world to the other? The transition from sense-experience to self-experience is so abrupt that premature attempts to bridge the intervening gulf may well lead, as they have often done in the West, to a barren word-bound idealism, which, having no field of experience to interpret commensurate with the range of its thought, tries to realize Aristotle's dream of finding a central metaphysical principle from which the whole constitution of the universe can be logically deduced and duly formulated in human speech. Is there no better way than this of exploring the Infinitely Great? No better way of guessing the Supreme Riddle which is ever challenging and ever baffling our thought?

Is there no way of passing from sense-experience to self-experience, which shall bring the two fields together and make them one? The riddle of the universe cannot be solved within the limits of the normal experience of the normal or standardized man. The attempt to do so leads at last to two comprehensive dualisms,—the dualism of sense-experience and self-experience; and—as a reaction from this—the dualism of nature and the supernatural world. Of the latter I need not speak in this paper. By dividing the universe into two dissevered worlds between which natural intercourse is impossible; by subordinating speculative thought, nominally to Divine, actually to ecclesiastical authority; by teaching us that the truth of things has been miraculously revealed to us and must be accepted as given, and therefore that the free exercise of thought is disloyalty to God—Supernaturalism places an absolute veto on the supreme adventure of the human spirit, the quest of ultimate reality, the attempt to understand the universe. But the dualism of sense-experience and self-experience may correct itself, if the word "sense" is given a fuller meaning than it usually bears, and the field of sense-experience is correspondingly enlarged. Can this be done?

Here we come to a question which is of vital importance and opens up new and far-reaching vistas of thought, but which philosophy in the West, perhaps for that very reason, persistently

ignores. May not sense-experience be *supernormal* as well as normal? May there not be senses dormant or at least latent in all of us, which are awake and active in some of us, whether as the result of natural endowment or of systematic self-discipline, and which reveal to us new vistas of experience, new aspects of existence, new planes of being, new conceptions of the range and resources of nature, new forces, new laws? That there are such senses is no longer doubtful. The evidence for them is overwhelmingly strong and is accumulating from day to day. Telepathy,* television, clairvoyance, clairaudience, spiritualism, occultism, mysticism, magic—are these all empty names which have nothing behind them but hallucination or imposture? No one who has seriously studied the evidence for supernormal happenings, evidence which has an immense and ever-growing literature of its own, will rule it out in its totality as inadmissible, and meet with a sweeping negation all reports of the existence of fields of experience which lie beyond the horizon of sense-bound—*physically* sense-bound—reason. Yet so well content is philosophy in the West with the world which is bounded by that narrow horizon, that tidings of other worlds are usually met by it with blank incredulity and contemptuous refusal to examine the available evidence.

But it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative. And the value of positive evidence is not impaired by refusal to examine it on the part of those whose peace of mind the mere report of it disturbs. The thinker who rules out the supernormal, whether by denying it on *a priori* grounds or by ignoring it, builds on a perilously insecure foundation. And his structure, when built, will lack the strength and stability which inward harmony and coherence alone can give it. The abrupt transition from sense-experience to self-experience involves, in the last resort, the denial of validity to one or other of the two kinds of experience, and the consequent denial of reality either to the outer or to the inner world. If this dualistic *reductio ad absurdum* of speculative philosophy is to be avoided, a way must be found for the two fields of experience to merge in one; and the supernormal is the only causeway along which speculative thought can travel in safety from the one field to the other. For supernormal experiences, as they unfold themselves, lead by degrees from without to within, the world which they reveal becoming increasingly spiritual as they explore it, till at last, in the mystic's vision of his own innermost reality,

*When telepathy, or thought-transference, first began to be talked about, Professor Helmholz, one of the leading scientists of the day, said of it: "I cannot believe it. Neither the testimony of all the Fellows of the Royal Society nor the evidence of my own senses would lead me to believe in the transmission of thought from one person to another. It is clearly impossible." Since then telepathy has been worked to death, as a means of explaining away evidence for personal survival, by persons who have made up their minds to remain unconvinced.

sense-experience and self-experience find the vanishing point of their respective movements, and speculative thought finds fulfilment in oneness with its ideal goal.

But whatever may be the thinker's attitude towards the supernormal, he must realize that if his attempt to understand the universe is not to abort at the outset, it must be preceded by a provisional assumption—whether instinctive, reasoned, or accepted on authority—as to what is meant by the universe; and that in committing himself to that assumption, implicitly or explicitly as the case may be, he does in some sort predetermine the issue of his enterprise.

Hence the futility of the dream of which I have already spoken —the dream in which Aristotle indulged, and which his followers in all ages have shared, —the dream of finding a central principle, from which the whole constitution of the universe can be logically deduced; and therefore of arriving at an interpretation of the universe which, when formulated in human speech, shall be true in itself, true, whatever those who formulated it may have meant by the words that they used, true, whatever meaning those who read it or recite it as a creed may find in those words.

The dream is futile, for the simple reason that it is impossible to eliminate personality from speculative thought, when the latter is engaged on the higher and more arduous of its two main tasks—that of exploring the Infinitely Great. If a man's philosophy, in this sense of the word, is his own, if it embodies a serious attempt to understand the universe and is not a mere echo of what he has read or heard or been taught, it will, as I have said, be preceded by a preliminary outlook on the world, in which the thinker subconsciously sets himself his task, and, in doing so, goes far towards predetermining its issue.

Here personality comes in. And not here only. If a man's philosophy is his own he will inevitably react, as I have already suggested, in conduct and character to the general conceptions that he forms; and in doing so he will, in some sort and some degree, transform himself—transform himself as a thinker, transform his paramount conceptions, transform his standard of inward satisfaction, transform his whole outlook on the world. And in this interaction between thought and life there is no finality. Here the faith of the independent thinker about great matters differs profoundly from that of the "orthodox believer". The former is—or at least may be and should be—active and self-transcendent; the latter is stagnant, if not dead. If a man's philosophy is not his own he will react to his faith in it so far at least as he takes it seriously; but his reaction will probably be final. If he refuses to think for himself, he has committed himself to a life of tradition and routine; a life

which may be well-regulated and even virtuous, and to that extent formative of character, but in which there will be no return to that free exercise of speculative thought which plays so vital a part in our spiritual development, releasing us, as it does, from imprisonment within the fixed horizon of thought and purpose that has its counterpart in the life of tradition and routine, the life of lowered vitality, of arrested growth.

We are now in a position to compare with one another, in respect of the conditions under which they are carried on, and of their leading features, the two great tasks which speculative thought sets itself. The function of speculative thought is to explore what I may call the circumpolar regions of existence, the regions which surround the negative and the positive pole respectively, the pole of the Infinitely Little, and the pole of the Infinitely Great. In its approach to the former pole speculative thought can afford to be purely intellectual, purely impersonal, wholly impartial, wholly unemotional; for (to make a general statement) it is sure of its base of operations, sure of its methods of working, sure—if it does not go too far—of its results. In a word, it is *scientific.* Its starting point is acceptance of the material world as being at least provisionally real. This is what the scientist, as a scientist, means by the universe. He does not necessarily limit his own outlook on the universe to the material world. But analysis of the material world—the world which is woven by sense-experience on the space-time framework—is the task which he sets himself; and until he has arrived at the ultimate elements in that world, at the ultimate constituents of matter, he will regard his task as incomplete. His task is as yet incomplete; and it looks as if it would never be completed, at any rate along his line of approach. For as we have seen, he cannot carry his analysis of matter beyond a certain point without changing what he is observing, with the result that his ultimates, just as they seem to be within his reach, "quicksilver-like, elude his grasp". There we must leave him for the present—baffled by the instability and indeterminacy which seem to be characteristic of the region into which his intrepidity and ability as an explorer have led him. What the future may have in store for him we cannot say.

What of his fellow-worker, the explorer of the Infinitely Great? If the scientist, with everything in his favour, cannot accomplish his self-imposed task, what chance is there of the *philosopher*, as we may now call him, arriving at a final understanding of the universe as a whole? From first to last he will have nothing in his favour. He cannot, if he would, be impersonal, impartial, unemotional. And the more he is in earnest about his work the more difficult it will be for him to divest him-

self of his personality, with all that this implies.

He has no fixed base of operation. His starting point is his preliminary assumption as to what is meant by "the universe"; in other words, as to the boundaries (if any) and the general character of the field of experience which he is going to explore. The conventional conception of the universe which the scientist accepts as provisionally valid, he must either accept as absolutely valid, or reject as inadequate. In the former case he will make the conception, whether his acceptance of it be conscious or merely instinctive, his own. In the latter case his preliminary assumption, whatever form it may take, will obviously be his own. In either case his choice of a starting point will go far towards determining the issue of his quest.

If his method of investigation is to be effective it must not be dictated to him; it must be his own. This means that it will be intuitional rather than logical, emotional rather than intellectual. For our thoughts about the higher realities that challenge us are necessarily "steeped in feeling"; and if they are to find adequate expression they must free themselves from the trammels of a word-bound logic and a quasi-scientific terminology, and choose their words, as best they may, for themselves.

Above all, if the scientist, in his quest of what is ultimate in analysis, fails on the very threshhold of success, because he cannot carry his researches further without changing what he is observing, what hope is there of success for the philosopher, who cannot think, deeply and earnestly, about what is ultimate in synthesis without changing himself—changing himself as a man, and therefore as a thinker, changing, with reciprocal interaction, the general trend of his conduct and the general trend of his thought? If the scientist is baffled, in the last resort, by instability and indeterminacy in the objects of his study, how much more will the philosopher be baffled by instability and indeterminacy in himself.

A French moralist has well said that "our taste declines with our merit". He is using the word "taste" in its widest sense. What is true of our taste is true of our judgment, our insight, our vision of reality, our standard of values. If these decline with our merit, they will also advance with it, so that the better we become the more we shall know and the more ***really*** we shall know it.

Thus the attempt to understand the universe in its totality resolves itself into a process of self-transformation, in which, as in the attempt itself, there can be no finality. It is the self, the whole man, who is the explorer of the approaches to the positive pole of existence; and the nearer he is to finding his own real self the nearer he will be to the goal of his great adventure. Ultimate truth will not allow itself to be imprisoned in a theory, or a

system, or a formulated creed. If we are to win it we must live our way into the heart of it; and, instead of deluding ourselves with the idle dream of possessing it, we must be content to be possessed by it and enfolded in its light. And the more closely we are enfolded by its light the more intimately will it be our own. To him who has wearied himself with much thinking, and who asks despairingly where the key to the riddle of existence is to be found, there is an answer which is at once a consolation and a challenge:

" Go seek it in thy soul. "

EDMOND HOLMES

THE CHRISTIANITY OF THE CHURCHES

Jesus taught the law of mercy and forgiveness, but the leaders of the Church more often show themselves ardent followers of the distorted Mosiac law of punishment. The Bishop of Durham, in a lecture on "Ethical Conditions of Scientific Method" (*Times* 16th June 1933), after dealing with the question of animal vivisection, said:—

> Putting the question whether in no case might man be subjected to vivisection in the interest of science, Dr. Henson asked if there was any moral objection to the vivisection of criminals who by the laws of their country had been condemned to death. In their case the issue of inherent human rights could not be raised, for these had already been cancelled. We said, very justly, that the criminal by his crimes had forfeited his rights, and we dealt with him penally on that hypothesis. Why should not his punishment take a form which was serviceable to the community? Why should he not at least be given the opportunity of making in this way some atonement for his sins against society? In the case of the criminal whose natural rights had been cancelled much might be legitimate which in the case of innocent persons like the slave and the child would be altogether inadmissible.

Ethically and scientifically, both vivisection and capital punishment—indeed any punishment *qua* punishment—are wrong. A little more scientific knowledge about the actual destructive and constructive power of thought and feeling would lead to an understanding of the dangers to which such practices expose society. A little more ethical brotherliness would bring about the compassion that sees it has no right to punish, but only to restrain when necessary, and to educate rightly both the criminal who has been found out and society in general. Only then will we have the right to call ourselves Christians.

W. E. W.

RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA

[Below we print two articles both written by New Yorkers. In that large and influential centre of civilization, the ideal of a good life fashioning a great society is being discussed. Economic depression has forced many to consider why plain living and high thinking go together.—EDS.]

I

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN AMERICA

"The wisdom long known in the East, is beginning to be heard in the West."

[**Irwin Edman,** Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, New York, draws the above conclusion in this article in which he examines the moral influence of the economic crash which began in 1929.—EDS.]

The spiritual life is the same in all ages, if it is genuinely spiritual, and the economic crisis is, save in detail, for the moment the same all over the world. That sustained absorption by timeless and immortal things in which the spiritual life consists is impeded, menaced and even paralyzed by the " poverty amid plenty " which is being experienced in all lands facing all seas. The nature of spiritual interests is no different in essence in America than it is in India or Norway, nor are the financial and industrial ills it faces altogether unique. But an observer in America is perhaps placed at an especially advantageous position for observing what the crisis has done to the nobler preoccupations of the race, and what hope the crisis holds forth for their renaissance. For the fact is that America, by virtue of its almost fantastic economic triumphs and equally fantastic economic debacle, both in prosperity and in poverty offers a cardinal case of the relation of material conditions to ideal interests. And though contemplation and aspiration have no local frontiers, the life of the spirit, like other lives, has native lineaments; though mind be invariable, the language of the mind varies in different corners of the earth.

It is to some degree surprising that spiritual interests should have had as much of a career as they have had in America. The frontier is no place for leisure, for the brooding that turns into poetry and the dreaming that turns into thought. The frontier has passed away from American life but only within a generation or two, and the temper of physical conquest and material success until very recently dominated the American scene. Yet the very ardours and endurances of pioneer life contributed elements to the life of imagination and thought. It is impossible to appraise with exactitude the amount that the necessary individualism and adventure of a frontier civilisation contributed to the thought of

Emerson and Thoreau, nor how much being an American in the nineteenth century made Whitman the poet that he was. The very absence of distraction by tradition and luxury made it not only possible but imperative that gifted Americans should very early have learned to live in the mind and to dare with it as so many of them had perforce to dare with the body. The simplicities of a pioneer civilization, in so far as that civilization permits leisure at all, are no enemies of the soul. Rather they teach it that "self reliance," those "spiritual laws," and that converse with the "over soul" about which Emerson was so eloquently to discourse. They save it from corruption by matter and involvement in snobbery and success. Plain living and high thinking have not for nothing been hailed as natural adjuncts of each other. The enemies of the soul in America came later. They rose when the ardours and endurances were ending and when America was beginning to stand to the world as a symbol for the unparalleled triumph of mechanism in things and of materialism in the way of a philosophy of life. Ingenuity in America by the beginning of the twentieth century had come to take the place and the honours more properly belonging to wisdom. Whatever lip service might be paid to traditional religion, the animating religion of most people, those who were successful and those who wished to be so, was Success itself. Nor was Success very much more generously or beautifully conceived than pecuniary gains or narrow social distinction. Indeed in America the two went until very recently hand in hand, the successfully acquisitive were the respected and honoured. Possibly nowhere in the world, not even in thrifty France, would a man be the subject of full and fulsome obituaries simply because he was a multi-millionaire.

Nor was it only the very rich who were corrupted by the temper of a mechanical civilization and of material gain. For it was one of the illusions, long cherished and only recently exploded, that ingenuity might make anyone wealthy and that wealth, the fruit of ingenuity, was the only and the final goal. The hopes of the frontier lingered after the frontier had passed away. The summit of success in life in America was bare and bleak enough but it was ardently supposed that anybody could reach that summit. And there were enough true stories of magical rise from poverty to riches to nourish that belief and make it plausible.

It was beginning to be apparent even before the Great Depression set in, in 1929, that the financial as well as the physical frontier was closed. It is unimportant for our purposes to trace the well enough known story. But increasing numbers of Americans were discovering that consolidations of wealth and industry were making gold a very precious metal indeed

and material success, however dearly and exclusively desired, a prize as romantic for most citizens of the commonwealth as any dreamed of Paradise. Yet the delusion persisted, and during the period of speculative boom and prosperity, there was, if not the hope in the mind of the average American that he might become rich, at least the prevalent impression, expressed by no less a public figure than the President that Americans were destined to know the highest standard of living that had ever been known in the world. The highest standard of living, of course, meant the imitation on a small scale on the part of the man of small income of the standards of comfort and luxury and display set in advance by the very rich. Comfort meant not, on the whole, what it still means in Europe, a certain graciousness and mellowness in the details of life, an English tea in an English garden or a long quiet evening with a book before a fire. It did not mean a ramble on a country road or a leisurely cycling trip over hills and moors. It meant mechanical contrivances, it meant the thrills of change and of speed. One of the most revealing symptoms of the direction of American life was the fact that even in the peak of prosperity, there was little leisure and even where there was leisure there was no sense of it. The American in his freedom had to depend on mechanical devices for his pleasure as he depended on mechanical devices for his work. His pleasure, too, had to be marked by the same physical tenseness and excitement that marked his work. He had lost the capacity and the desire for peace of the soul.

It is conceivable that American prosperity might have continued at least another decade. It is conceivable, too, that Americans, like other children, might have wearied of their toys and their trivialities, and out of the generosity of their material resources might have generated a moving art, convincing religion, and absorbing thought as the preoccupations of their lives. It is certainly true that the classic period of Greece coincided with Athenian economic prosperity and that the Renaissance flourished æsthetically on the basis of the wealth of Florence. But the prognosis in America seemed to be different. For all the endowments of education, music and art, the direction of American life was all in the direction of material grandeur and physical comfort and excitement. The American Dream was expressed in motor cars and skyscrapers, not in altitudes of feeling and thought.

It is useless to speculate on what might have happened if an impossible prosperity had not so soon proved itself impossible. By virtue of the grimmest of facts, economic disaster, millions of Americans have learned, if not to seek their treasure outside of material success, at least to see they can no longer seek their treasure in material things with the old

easy assurance. It is the fashion to say, therefore, that a great chastening has come upon the American people, and that in their adversity they have learned to disprize the material values they can no longer so easily encompass. *It would be absurd to pretend that three years of economic disaster have turned America from the ingenuities of the West to the enduring wisdoms of the East. It would be fantastic to assume that a nation marked so deeply by a pragmatism in action and a restlessness of imagination should overnight have turned into a commonwealth of aspiring saints and seers. Having given up hope of a transfigured earth, they have not turned to a remembered Heaven.* But slowly the symptoms of a change of heart and mood are becoming apparent. There has been bitterness, their has been cynicism, there has been delusion. But there has also been a chastening of the whole temper of life. Simplicity has of necessity been restored to the lives of thousands who would a decade ago have despised it. In the midst of a civilization whose basic conditions of life are in a state of precariousness obvious even to the most comatose, the imagination has turned to consideration of a newer and better order of life. Speed, invention, luxury have led, it is now apparent even to the congenitally optimistic American, to physical suffering and moral disillusion. Even those who would long to return to the old orgy of material hope and excitement are realizing that even in America such a prospect is very dim.

Attention has turned, therefore, where the mind and heart have not been altogether paralyzed and sickened, to a reconstruction not simply of society but of the life of the individual. The quiet voices of traditional wisdom have begun to be heard again now that the tumult of action has been almost shockingly stilled. The inner voices of feeling and thought have had in the individual time and provocation to reassert themselves. There has been much heard of the reconstruction of society along lines in which acquisitiveness would give way to co-operation, of a reconstruction of morals and religion and education so that the values of life would be more generously liberated. But such considerations, often limited to surface political and economic issues, have often gone deeper. *If there is to be a Great Society it will be in the interests of the Good life.* Once again, as in the case of Socrates and Buddha, suffering and scepticism have led to an examination of what the Good life is. Where that searching of hearts has taken place, the Good life, even in America, is seen again to contain elements that the haste and maelstrom of American living had obscured. There are symptoms that even in America, the age of topless towers, of insanities of luxury and speed, of a riotous carnival of the flesh among things is over. It is at least the opinion of this ob-

server that America, the quintessence of the West, has gone as far in the direction of a civilization of Things as is possible. It has found that where Things are in the saddle, civilization is doomed to disaster. The wisdom long known in the East, is beginning to be heard in the West. The spirit of man, never altogether smothered, is turning even here to contemplation of dateless and deathless things.

IRWIN EDMAN

II

THE FLIGHT FROM ETHICS

"More than a change of system, we need a change of heart."

[**Helen Bryant** recommends the man in the street to do his bit by retaining faith in honesty and strengthening its practice.—EDS.]

As I sit here writing on an evening in late May, millions of people all over America are hurriedly turning the leaves of their newspapers in avid quest and certainty of sensation. For some months this country has experienced a hailstorm of extraordinary disclosures—revelations of conduct so flagrantly unethical, so fantastically far-reaching, that no fiction writer would have dared to invent it. Not one, but a legion of the country's most prominent men stands revealed as having been utterly callous to the dictates of honour—or even the simplest forms of honesty. Great bankers, great industrialists, great officials, we discover, can be nothing more nor less than great rascals. And the uncovering of their misdeeds has been attended by the uncovering of those of innumerable lesser luminaries. Of course, anyone who has owned property, be it in a big city or a small village, or anyone who has sought a job of any importance, has been well aware for years of the prevalence of graft and favouritism, but how complete a flight from ethics this country is embarked upon we are only just beginning to realize.

The men involved in these recent disclosures, it must be clearly understood, do not by any means regard themselves as lawbreakers. They regard themselves as good fathers, good citizens, good fellows. They have only done "what everyone else has done". "Everyone" has evaded income tax, taken bribes—or given them—with no stigma attached. This means that the whole conception of honour—brought over by those early gentlemen settlers—has changed. We have revised not only our tempo but our temper, to our discredit—and now to our dismay.

How did this come about?

It began to happen, I think, when our controlling class changed from gentlemen to business men. The sense of honour—often

narrow and distorted, but possessed of a valuable rigidity—of a lady or gentleman, waned with the waning of the species, to be replaced with the more flexible and dubious code of business. This code, we see now, was the code of the horse deal—the more successfully one cheated the other fellow, the greater one's pride in the achievement. Meanwhile the great class of the "poor but proud," who were moral partly because they were religious and partly because they tried to copy the code of their "betters," became less proudly honest as they became less religious and less poor and as their models changed. They made the successful business man their god, and reached his estate as fast as they could. This emulation of the controlling class was the first process that sapped the morale of the working class. Then came economic stress clamping a strangle-hold upon them, and shattering the loyalties and honesties that had been rendered fragile. Any landlord will tell you that in these times it is the rare tenant who considers his lease binding, should he meet with even a slight financial mishap. Any gas or telephone or electric bill collector will tell you that the last bills of the tenant's year (when he changes to another apartment) are almost uncollectable. Any employee will tell you that in the struggle to hold jobs, even "nice" people will fight metaphorically tooth and nail. And to-day a third factor is breaking down the few who have withstood temptation and misfortune . . . this recent enlightenment as to the complete lack of honour of the rich. "Anyone who has played fair has just been a sap," is the general verdict. "An honest man hasn't a chance. The system's rotten all through. . . ."

Rotten all through. That's how it seems. As business spread its tentacles round government, art and even friendship, imperviousness to ethical procedure spread with it. Graft corrupted government, ballyhoo and favouritism corrupted art; self-interest murdered altruism, sensitiveness, sympathy and all the spiritual progeny of human intercourse. Even the flourishing practice of generosity and hospitality drew its sap, in those pre-retribution days, from poisoned soil.

But there is still one class, you will say, unaccounted for—the thinkers, the intellectuals. And in the last analysis, ethical conduct is rational conduct—shall we not, therefore, still find a stronghold of ethics among those who really think?

The answer is still in doubt, but it promises very soon to be a negative. For the intellectuals also are on the verge, after deliberately weighing pros and cons, of discarding honour. They have been disheartened in two ways. First, by the difficulty of maintaining themselves ethically in a commercially corrupted world. "What steps should one take to get a teaching job at such-and-such a university?" I heard one

ask. "One gets to know someone of importance there, I am sorry to say," was the answer. And after certain revelations of "managed" criticism and publicity in the book world, the general conclusion among a group of writers was: "Recognition of really good work cannot be won on the merits of that work alone. Recognition can hardly ever be won by strictly honourable methods. We live in a jungle and must fight with jungle weapons. There is no room for honour in modern life." Second, the intellectual is disheartened by the seeming impossibility of reforming the capitalist world through non-violent means, owing to capitalist control of key positions. Therefore he is becoming more and more inclined to advocate throwing away old-fashioned notions of what is "right," and using any means to bring about a needed change. If he is very radical indeed, he will maintain that it is legitimate to lie and cheat and even kill to "further the cause".

This desertion of ethics by the intellectuals is doubly regrettable because they have suddenly become much more powerful in our national life. Having plunged downhill into chaos we are now turning more and more to the intellectuals and asking them to tell us how to get out. If *they* see no ethical way out, if *they*, in profound weariness and disillusion, see no good reason for clinging to and reinforcing our splintered standards of honour, the future bids fair to be even more chaotic than our present condition.

Meanwhile, something has to be done. There seem to be two main proposals as to what this something should be. The first proposal is completely to change the system. The second calls for modification of the present system. The objection made to the first procedure is that it will be exceedingly painful, involving whole generations in misery. The objection made to the second is that while it may be temporarily less painful, in the end it will be disastrous because—as the man in the street declares and the intellectual tends to agree—the system is "too rotten" to modify.

Whichever proposal is finally adopted (in Russia they are trying to enact the first, in America, the second, but these choices may be revoked) success it seems to me will depend, not so much on the choice, or even on the cleverness of the new mechanisms set up, as on the principles of the men who devise, operate and obey them. A communist system can be fatally clogged by bureaucracy and sabotage, a capitalist system can be ruined by greed. There are other factors, of course. I do believe that a great deal depends on the system, I do happen to believe that a capitalist democracy still offers—with its regards for individual rights and its machinery for bringing wrongdoing to light—more opportunity for happiness and sane human development than the communist system with its denial of the individual and its autocracy. But the system

alone cannot do everything. More than a change of system, we need a change of heart. *We need all of us to believe again in "being good". We cannot expect to find honest men to administer our affairs if the majority of us have lost faith in honesty and ceased to practise it.* A renewed faith is not a fantastic idea, a change of heart is not impossible. Man's sense of values is always changing. Innumerable times he has placed such things as chivalry, loyalty, chastity, physical courage, religious belief above money, above life itself. By "man," I do not mean a solitary individual, but great masses of men. And to-day the fact that a little band of men in our midst has succeeded, against tremendous difficulties, in laying the rottenness bare, the fact that they cared enough to do so, should make us hopeful and persistent. *This is no time for the man in the street to throw up his hands in despair, it is the very moment when he should determine to do his bit to recover the code we have temporarily laid aside.* A code of honour is, in a sense, the crystallization of the truths we have slowly learned through long centuries of barbarism and semi-civilisation—that to trust each other, be honest with each other, help each other is the only way the human race can truly progress, the only way it can survive. The bedrock of any system must be a bedrock of ethics, of "good old-fashioned morals". The moment we call our society a jungle and use jungle practices we lose what we have so painfully, slowly gained. The forest stands always ready to engulf the clearing. With immense effort we have beaten it back, though our weapons have often broken in our hands. Religions, inventions, systems, they have broken. Only one weapon in our hands is imperishable, our moral sense, and we are lost if we finally cast that aside.

HELEN BRYANT

[These two articles deal with U.S.A.; the following treats of the all-world problem of War, in which the British author recommends the same remedy and looks to the East for some effective inspiration.—EDS.]

A SOLDIER-PHILOSOPHER'S REFLECTIONS ON WAR

[**C. B. Purdom** is the Editor of *New Britain.* He has published *The Swan Shakespeare*: *A Player's Edition*, and is the author of *A Plan of Life.* In this article he points out that there can be no deliverance from war except a spiritual one; the failure of the League of Nations lends support to this view and proves correct the statement H. P. BLAVATSKY made in 1889: "Peace Societies are Utopian, because no amount of argument based upon exoteric considerations of social morals or expediency, can turn the hearts of rulers of nations away from selfish war and schemes of conquest." *Lucifer*: Vol. V, p. 6.]

The soldier-philosopher is rare, for the soldier is above everything the man of action. Yet the soldier can arrive at the goal of wisdom by following his own path as surely as the ascetic by following his, as that great fighter Arjuna was taught when he sank down in the midst of the battlefield overcome by sorrow and was told to perform his allotted task. The soldier must fight, for that is his mission; but he must also reflect on the results of his fighting, for only through reflection can the light of wisdom be seen.

Such a soldier is Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C. B., whose book *War and Western Civilization* (Duckworth, 10s.), was published towards the end of last year and should be read and pondered by every serious student of life. In this book General Fuller invites the reader to reflect on the experience of war in the Western world during the last hundred years. He presents a summary and interpretation of a hundred years of history up to the wars that followed the Great War. His book is important because he has an eye for the inner meaning of events and draws out their significance.

The pivotal fact of the nineteenth century was, he says, that the idea of "liberty" was driven from "the heads of the philosophers into the hearts of the people, and it intoxicated them". Under the influence of that intoxication the spirit of nationalism inspired all political institutions, "it emotionalized war and, consequently, brutalized it," and at the same time the growth of science and industry "delivered into the hands of the masses more and more deadly means of destruction". In the eighteenth century wars were largely the occupation of kings; in the nineteenth century national armies fought nations: "The herd coupling with finance and commerce has begotten new realms of war." Thus he sees "the engine of Western civilization, speeding along the lines of narrow thoughts, roaring towards the abyss," unless we in the twentieth century learn how to control the machine and make wars impossible.

General Fuller gives a sketch of the wars waged between 1832 when the French laid siege to

Antwerp until 1932 when the Japanese bombarded Shanghai. Every year there were wars including, apart from the Great War, some of the most bloody in European history. He shows that the experience of these hundred years proves the futility, waste and inconclusiveness of war as a means of national intercourse. What one gets from his survey is the idea that the military machine seems to have a paralysing effect upon human intelligence, though some of the finest brains have been devoted to its interests from the time of the god-like Napoleon to the English idealist-philosopher, Haldane. War has always been out of date. "As far as war is concerned, statesmen and soldiers are generally two generations behind their time," asserts General Fuller. He gives evidence in support of this statement from French, German and English military practices. The Crimean War, in which "generalship was beneath contempt," should have taken place in the eleventh century not the nineteenth, he declares. In the Indian Mutiny, "the condition of the Army was normal, that is to say it was rotten". "Warfare is closely related to lunacy" is another of his statements, and to show that military mentality never changes he relates that, "In 1930 I knew of a Major-General, aged 53, being adversely reported on for not playing field-games."

War has become inane; but it "cannot be charmed away". Its causes must be removed—poverty, selfishness, nationalism. There is no other way. To escape the paralysis of war, mankind must create those institutions through which society can function. Until that is done, disarmament would be useless even if it were practicable, for "the peace potential of a nation is its war potential". All the talk about defining "offence" and "defence" in war is waste of time, for "defence is but offence reversed". It is equally idle to try to settle who is the aggressor, for no nation will admit having taken the first step in war. And to attempt to humanise war by prohibiting the most highly developed scientific apparatus of war, such as tanks, gas, and submarines is the most foolish proceeding of all, for it condemns the soldier to the employment of obsolete weapons.

General Fuller devotes a good deal of his book to showing that the increasing bloodiness and destructiveness of war is due partly to inefficiency and lack of ability in the direction of war, partly to the refusal to make the means of war scientific, and partly to the fact that wars are waged under democratic conditions. When entire peoples fight as they do in the present day, nations as a whole devoting themselves to war, not leaving it to the armies in the field, all the evil passions of men and women are aroused, for into the "monstrous organization" of a democracy in arms the Press breathes "the breath of lying fury". That is what one

saw in every country engaged in the Great War.

Until wars as a method of international action are eliminated, the only wise course, says General Fuller, is for statesmen and soldiers to devote themselves to the problem of how " to shorten their length". That means the adoption of scientific methods and mechanization, which is the reversal of the policy put forward by the British Government at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Science can save lives in war because it hastens decision. " To scrap the newer weapons is to prolong wars," says General Fuller, and he shows how in the Great War the use of tanks saved solidiers' lives and helped to bring the War to an end. Quantitative disarmament and qualitative disarmament are equal follies. To adopt either would not tend to prevent wars but merely to make them longer and therefore more disastrous. The only way in which to end wars is to remove their causes. Until that is done, the soldier must be equipped with the most efficient weapons. Like Arjuna, he must fight and falter not.

That is the teaching of this English soldier. He urges us not to deceive ourselves. We talk about disarmament and peace, but will not take the necessary steps to bring them about. "Fear remains as deep-rooted as ever," he says; and fear is a main cause of war. Fear is created largely through economic uncertainty, which forms a public opinion which can easily be lashed into war fever. Through the past hundred years wars have been used to make good economic deficiencies. The economic difficulties of Germany in 1914 were one of the primary causes of the Great War. The economic distresses of the present time provide a situation in which war may break out at any time.

Until mankind learns wisdom, " War is a God-appointed instrument to teach wisdom to the foolish," says General Fuller. The transformation of the last hundred years was almost entirely material; *we now wait for a transformation of the spirit of man.* Until that takes place our rapid material advance serves only to increase the insecurity of life, the instability of societies, the destructiveness of war, and economic disturbance, all of which are reflected in the present world chaos. *There can be no deliverance except a spiritual one*, in which material power is subordinated to conscious spiritual ends. All advance is illusionary until there is spiritual illumination.

" This age to my mind is an age of spiritual decay," says General Fuller; but it is a law of nature that decay precedes all new life, the old being destroyed to make way for the new. That a new life and a new order of society will take the place of the present rotting civilization is certain; the only questions are how it is to be brought about, the degree of suffering that will have to be endured, and the time it

will take—time which is so important to individual men and so unimportant in history. Will the catastrophe of war end the old and bring in the new ? It is very near. Or will man consciously form his destiny ? Man's life depends on forces beyond his control ; but room is allowed for choice. A wrong choice means suffering through which we gain wisdom ; a right choice means the opportunity to choose again. At present mankind is drifting, there is no leadership capable of accepting responsibility. The law of spiritual life is that responsibility must be accepted and the necessary effort made. *The nations are drifting ; but individuals who see their own duty and do it may save them.* Five righteous men can save a city, though their names and what they do may not be known. Thus responsibility is thrust upon us all, though there may be no leadership, and the world seems to be at the mercy of " blind forces and blind men ".

" If, in 1832, the world could have seen clearly the progress between that date and 1932, all wars could have been avoided," is one of General Fuller's concluding remarks. Only illumination can cure blindness, and illumination is the reward of disinterestedness, discipline and acceptance of duty. These are within the power of the individual and a society that sees clearly must be formed of individuals that are illumined. With clear sight we can avoid war. With clear sight we should have real disarmament, because we should no longer need weapons. Armaments are part of the structure of existing political institutions and cannot be abandoned until these institutions are replaced. The narrow nationalist spirit must be transformed. That is the lesson the West is learning.

What is happening in the East ? Will the East, descending into matter, have to pass through the fiery furnace of Western experience, while the West ascends to a more spiritual understanding of the relations between nations and the meaning of life ? The coming years will test the wisdom of the Eastern peoples. They are discovering the uses of the machine ; if they allow the spirit of nationalism to dominate them, as seems likely, they will use the machine blindly, as the West has hitherto done. *If, on the other hand, the East retains its spiritual vision, there is a chance that East and West will at last be able to co-operate in the creation of an International Society or World Order* in which the animal life of man will be governed by wisdom. Then there will be peace, and the soldier's task will be ended.

C. B. PURDOM

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIAN REACTION TO JAPANESE POETRY*

[**J. S.** is a comparative student of literatures and especially proficient in those of Indian Vernaculars—EDS.]

Appreciation of poetry in any language is not an easy matter even for persons "to the manner born," whose mother tongue the language is. To speak nothing of the necessary amount of education and culture, one has to be by nature attuned to the poet's music in order to enter into the very spirit of the poetry and get the fullest value out of it. For many of us Indians who have since early childhood been reading, writing and speaking English and have almost adopted English modes of thought and expression, the whole house of English poetry has been thrown open. But even for such adopted children of the English language, not every mansion out of the many in that house is easy of access. Our heredity, our *milieu*, our race personality, moulded by numerous influences of which we may or may not be conscious, prevent us from the fullest appreciation and enjoyment of individual kinds of English poetry or individual English poets.

This difficulty of poetic appreciation increases a hundredfold when we are face to face with poetry in a language which is not only foreign to us, but is also foreign in spirit and culture to any language known to us. It is true that human nature is ultimately the same everywhere, that the elemental and basic facts of life evoke similar if not quite the same thoughts and passions all over the world. But it is no less true that every developed language has its own historical and cultural background, and that every literature worth the name evolves its own modes and conventions which are rooted in this racial and traditional background. Hence the common human failing of inability to appreciate an alien literature, even on the part of earnest students and professors of that literature. Matthew Arnold, who knew French better than most cultured Englishmen of his time, found it difficult to enjoy the fullest aroma of French poetry; and a highly educated Hindu Professor of Persian (himself something of a poet in his own vernacular), who has expressed scarcely veiled contempt for the poetry of Khayyam and even Firdausi, is the most outstanding instance of this human failing this side of the country. Perhaps the Germans are right—in assigning the ability to enter into the spirit of a foreign language and literature to a special aptitude of the mind called "language-sense". For in passing from one language to another,—even when so closely allied as are the Sanskritic vernaculars of India,—one has at it were to "tune in" to a different wave-length. Naturally a far greater effort at adaptation is necessary when the mind turns to a totally foreign culture and literature.

It is natural then if we start upon the appreciation of this bulky volume of highly conventional poems called *haiku* in an utterly foreign language like the Japanese, as upon a perilous adventure in an unknown territory without any of the familiar landmarks that we have learnt to look for in the three or four literatures that we may be tolerably acquainted with. When we turn to the elaborate introduction for guidance, we learn to start with that "the absence of metres and rhyme is what distinguishes Japanese from European verse". This is the first shock to a mind that is familiar with the rich resonances of the best English verse, or with the musical

* *An Anthology of Haiku—Ancient and Modern.* Translated and annotated by Asataro Miyamori (Maruzen Co., Ltd., Tokyo.)

Sanskrit and Persian metres which literally ring themselves. Next we learn that the *haiku* itself is a highly conventional form of verse-writing in this language that has no metre and no rhyme. Every *haiku* must have three lines and seventeen syllables all told, no more and no less; it must have some reference (oftener than not highly conventionalised) to the seasons, *e.g.*, the mention of blossoms or insects or natural phenomena restricted to particular seasons; and it must contain what is called a "cutting word" *e.g.*, *Ya* or *Kana*,—words which have a very important evocative value varying with the context, but a value so elusive that, as the editor puts it rather naïvely, "opinions differ as to their significance," so that "it is often better to ignore the exclamatory sense of *Kana* and *Ya* in translations".

In view of all these restricting rules one can at once agree with the editor, when he says that "pregnancy and suggestiveness, brevity and ellipsis are the soul and life of a *haiku*". The poet actually sees or experiences a seemingly ephemeral natural phenomenon or occurrence, and he puts down, in artistic short-hand so to speak, the bare suggestive notes of the emotion or æsthetic sensation evoked by his transient experience. To turn once more to our trusty guide, "in the *haiku* an objective description is given, . . . and the poet's subjective sentiment is left to the reader's imagination." And that is the final ditch that the unfortunate foreign reader has to face after jumping all these hurdles and obstacles of convention and form and content,—he has to exercise his unaided imagination and interpret as best he can what the poet intends to convey by his short-hand notes. The editor has supplied in scores of cases these imaginative interpretations, but even with such obliging finger-posts a very large number of the 973 *haiku* in this volume leave an uninitiated foreign mind unimpressed or weakly wondering. For after all, one cannot, even with the best of wills, get over conventions of one's own and over poetical prejudices, instilled by a different usage and by a different æsthetic education of the imagination.

For instance, take the following *haiku* (159) on the cricket's "wail," by the poet Kikaku:

> Perchance the cricket is bemoaning
> Her husband eaten by a cat.

Now a cricket eaten by a cat is, according to *our* rules of the game, a rather comic subject. So one feels a bit disconcerted to find the editor's note calling it "a touching fantasy". Again in *haiku* (322) the poet's rapturous gaze at a high soaring skylark is cut short by "a sneeze". And one wonders with something like an æsthetic shudder if a sneeze is a proper thing to bring into highly emotional verse. "Nose," again, is another word which is very charily employed by English poets. And starting with such a poetical prejudice, a mere outsider can only wonder if it is a really poetical moment that the famous *haiku* poet Issa has caught and recorded on seeing a swallow flying out of "the nose" of the great Buddha statue at Kamakura. But we Indians at least are on less uncertain ground when we come to fairly numerous references in *haiku* to the frog as almost a beautiful thing and its drone as a positively beautiful sound, though the editor rightly warns Western readers to "remember that all frogs are considered by Japanese poets to be sweet to listen to and beautiful to look at".—Note to (168). For us the monotone of the frog as a profoundly moving sound of nature in the rainy season has for long been an admitted poetic convention, as we find from hundreds of well-known Hindi songs.

Thus we pass from unfamiliar poetic conventions to familiar ones, and from these again to essential poetry that rises above all convention and has its root in the common human love of the beautiful in nature. A large number of *haiku* in this collection contain merely pictorial sketches appealing to the imagination by their objective truth and beauty alone. A solitary crow perched upon a bare branch on an autumn eve, the water-

fowl that "pecks and crushes," the moon reflected on the placid waves, the dragon-fly "flitting after its own reflection in the running water," the water rippling in the evening breeze against the blue heron's legs, the fascinating spring sea that gently heaves and "undulates the whole day long,"—there are scores of such exquisite sketches in this golden treasury of *haiku*. And from such purely pictorial sketches we come to pictures which have also an emotional content; either the vague nostalgia evoked by beautiful sounds and sights and scents, or haunting memories brought back by them, or the essential pathos and melancholy underlying all evanescent glimpses of natural beauty. Thus Basho, the greatest *haiku* writer of Japan, sees "the summer grasses waving" on the historic ruins of a fort, and he adds the haunting cryptic line:—

The warriors' brave deeds were a dream!

The same poet achieves almost mystic rapture in this magnificent picture of a stormy night:—

The sea is wild! The Milky Way extends
Far over to the island of Sado.

It is the great Basho, again, who gives us unexpected glimpses of mystic symbolism in some of his *haiku*. While worshipping at the most sacred Japanese shrine, he feels that some ineffable grace has passed into him, and he sings:—

I cannot tell what flowers it came from,
But an unnameable fragrance filled me.

But it is not famous poets alone, like Basho and Buson and Issa, that have written great *haiku*. Japan is a land of systematic lovers of nature and poetry, and unknown persons and even children have written beautiful verse. What a world of tragic pathos lies in this simple and anonymous "swan-song" of a prisoner under sentence of death:—

Cuckoo, I'll listen, in the other world,
To the rest of your song.

And how moving in its simple belief in a duplicate spirit world is the cry wrung from a mother's heart on seeing the beautiful dragon-flies flitting about, which her only little boy now dead was so fond of chasing:—

How far may he have gone to-day
My little dragon-fly hunter!

The wistful melancholy which is never far away from the true poetic sensibility in any clime is unmistakably reflected in scores of *haiku* in this collection. Issa sees people "enjoying the evening cool" in summer, and just then the evening bell tolls. So the poet sings mournfully:—

Unaware 'tis their life's curfew,
They enjoy the cool of evening!

Soseki, lying on a sick-bed, hears the wind rustling among autumn leaves, and writes:—

O leaves, ask the wind which of you
Will fall off earliest.

Here we are again on familiar ground. The idea of falling leaves being symbolical of man's mortality is to be found in many literatures; it is evidently part of the poetic currency common to humanity in general.

In our venturesome survey of this strange and unknown poetical domain, we have undoubtedly come across much to baffle and mock our æsthetic and poetical ideas, since it is literally outlandish and foreign to our accepted modes of poetic expression. Our very approach, imaginative approach, differs from that of the intensely artistic but equally intensely concrete Japanese genius. Hence, each one of the 973 *haiku* in this fascinating volume is, first and foremost, the record of a real event, an actual occurrence, something literally seen and experienced by the poet. And what the poet feels, what his imagination sees in and beyond the bare experience, is scarcely even suggested; it is mostly left to the sympathetic imagination of the reader. That is where the *haiku* differs profoundly not only from the western epigram as the editor aptly points out, but also from the Sanskrit *Subhāshita* or the Persian stray "couplet". Japanese *haiku* poetry, with all its strict rules and conventions, is much less conventional than the vast mass of Sanskrit and Persian poetry which almost disdains to record mere facts of phenomenal experience. Thus it is that this

great collection of *haiku* throws open for us as it were a new and strange mansion in the house of Poetry. But much to our delight we have found that everything in this wonderland is not so topsy-turvy as Alice found to her distraction in *hers*. In numerous cases we have come across lovely pictures that we can enjoy for their objective truth and beauty alone. And in the greatest of *haiku* poets we have seen the same spiritual yearning, the same reaching out for some eternal truth hidden behind the merely actual, and the same realization of the human spirit's tragic loveliness as it voyages through the strange and stormy seas of phenomenal experience, that characterise all great poetry the world over. So does our argument come full circle, and, to quote Shakespeare in the accepted wrong sense, we find that after all

"One touch of nature makes the whole world kin."

J. S.

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S DARSHANA*

[**Rasvihari Das, M.A., Ph.D.**, is Professor of Metaphysics and Indian Philosophy at the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner.—EDS.]

Philosophy in the West, and in the Indian Universities which draw their inspiration from the West, is regarded nowadays largely as an intellectual game, a matter of logic and dialectics. In ancient and mediæval India, philosophy, as its name *darśana* implies, was supposed to provide an insight into the ultimate truth. There was enough of logic and dialectics, but only as a means of guarding the revealed truth against the attacks of heretics and sceptics. This is the prevalent view of philosophy even now among people who are definitely Indian in their outlook. It is interesting to find that so great a Western thinker as Whitehead has come to realise the supreme value of intuition (insight) in philosophy. Whitehead emphasises intuition but does not discard intellectual analysis. Unfortunately he is not an easy writer and it is difficult at times to understand what he actually means. We are convinced he thinks clearly, and that our difficulty to understand him proceeds from the novelty of his thought and the manner of his writing. At any rate so far as the greater portion of his present work is concerned we cannot complain that it suffers from obscurity.

The title of the book is designed to have a double significance. It stands first for the effect of certain ideas in promoting the slow drift of mankind towards civilisation and secondly it expresses the author's "adventure in framing a speculative scheme of ideas which shall be explanatory of the historical adventure". The book is divided into four parts. The first two parts are distinguished by clear writing and penetrating thought. They are devoted to a discussion of ideas about man (sociological) and about nature (cosmological). The author has shown how these have evolved and have influenced civilisation and culture. It is to be noted that Whitehead is concerned with Western civilisation and he has shown how it has progressed from a basis of slavery to its present condition, in which freedom is its fundamental keynote. This has been the work of the Platonic and Christian conceptions of the human soul. Progress in cosmology has consisted in passing from an absolutistic to a relativistic view. In this, as in many other things, the world has progressed by developing the ideas inherent in Platonic philosophy and by discarding

* *Adventures of Ideas*. By ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD. (Cambridge University Press. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

the Aristotelian and Lockian conceptions which ruled common sense and science for centuries.

Part III begins rather abruptly and moves on a different plane. Apparently the story that is told in the first two chapters does not seem to be directly related to the metaphysical scheme developed in this part and continued in the next. It seems we have the adventure of ideas in the first two parts and the author's adventure in developing a scheme of ideas in the last two parts. But the want of connexion between them is only apparent. Broadly speaking the book attempts to interpret history and culture in the light of a metaphysical system. And we cannot understand the interpretation unless we know the system. Thus the philosophical part of the book, in which Whitehead's philosophy is explained, is essentially related to the rest of the book.

We cannot pretend that we have mastered every detail of his system, but there is little doubt as to its main outline. What is ultimately real according to Whitehead is occasions of experience. He accepts the subject-object structure of experience, but the relation of subject and object is not for him the relation of knower and known. Knowledge as conscious discrimination is only an additional factor in the subjective form which is primarily characterised by an effective tone. The basis of experience is not intellectual but emotional. The occasion as subject has merely a "concern" (divested of any suggestion of knowledge) for the object. This concern is expressed by a special activity which is called "prehension". Every occasion enjoys its moment of self-attainment and then perishes into the state of an object for other occasions. Every occasion is big with an urge to go beyond itself. In the initial situation there is a factor of activity which is the reason for the origin of that occasion. The initial situation can be called the actual world relative to that occasion (p. 230). We have thus a process creating itself but no static entities undergoing process. The process itself is the actuality. The continuity of the process is guaranteed by the doctrine of the Conformation of Feeling. It means that the subjective forms of the immediate past are continuous with those of the present. When an occasion loses its subjectivity, it becomes an object for the next occasion. If the previous occasion has the subjective form of anger, then it will itself be felt by the next occasion with the subjective form of anger. This continuity of subjective form is the primary ground for the continuity of nature. The past is thus immanent in the present, and efficient causation is a form of this immanence. The future too is something for the present, and the present prescribes the necessities to which the future must conform. So the future is also immanent in a sense in the present. The contemporary occasions are indirectly immanent in one another through the past and the future. There is thus universal immanence. So the reality is organic as well as a process. If we add to it the conception of Eros which is the straining of the world process towards Perfection, we get the main characteristics of Whitehead's philosophy.

Whitehead explains how physical science is an abstraction, because "the notion of physical energy which is at the base of Physics must be conceived as an abstraction from the complex energy, emotional and purposeful, inherent in the subjective form of the final synthesis in which each occasion completes itself." (p. 239) By insisting on a common basis Whitehead may seem to plead for monism, but he expressly favours dualism. "Each occasion," he says, "has its physical inheritance and its mental reaction, which drives it on to its self-completion." (p. 244.) "The Universe is dual because each final actuality is both physical and mental." (p. 245.) Here we have an echo of the Sankhya view of reality according to which in every fact of experience both *puruṣa* (spirit) and *prakṛti* (matter) are present.

By his theory of appearance as the

product of the activity of mind, and especially by his view of sense as primarily "qualitative characters of affective tones inherent in bodily functionings," Whitehead reminds us of the well-known Vedantic doctrines of illusion and *adhyasa*. But in spite of these similarities and his emphasis on intuition, we should be wrong in suggesting that there is any fundamental affinity between Whitehead's philosophy and Upaniṣadic thought. In the first place the dominant note in Upaniṣadic as well as in later Indian thought is subjective, while the point of view of Whitehead is mainly objective. The spiritual realisation in Indian thought is in subjective withdrawal, not in objective unfoldment, as it seems to be in Whitehead. The subordinate place he gives to knowledge, as merely an "additional factor" and not essential to reality, not even to subject-object relation, distinguishes Whitehead's philosophy from Upaniṣadic thought. It is difficult to see how we can understand this relation when all reference to knowledge is eliminated from it. The subjective "concern" without any suggestion of knowledge seems to be no more than mere physical reaction. True, even Indian philosophy does not assert that knowledge as conscious discrimination is present in all facts of experience. But where such knowledge is not present, some non-discriminate (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge is postulated. We cannot testify to any fact of experience, unless some knowledge is presupposed.

The last part deals with civilisation. A society is civilised when it exhibits the five qualities of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace. These are discussed in different chapters. The last two chapters, dealing with adventure and peace, pregnant with highest philosophic wisdom clothed in noble language, beautifully conclude this highly significant work. We may or may not understand or accept the philosophy of Whitehead as a whole, but we can have nothing but admiration for the amazing learning, penetrating insight and breadth of culture, exhibited throughout the book.

RASVIHARI DAS

ABOUT ETHICAL SUPREMACY*

[**J. M. Kumarappa, M.A., Ph.D.,** is the Professor of Philosophy of Maharaja's College, Mysore.—EDS.]

In view of the fact that ethics so far has been an indiscriminate hotch-potch of categorical imperatives of character, Prof. Hartmann's three volumes must be regarded as a very significant contribution to ethical literature. Indeed, almost for the first time in the History of Ethics has Prof. Hartmann made ethics conscious of the distinctness of the two problems involved in it,—the problem of character or the moral law, and the problem of values or concrete goods. The "goal" of "the New Ethics," he maintains is "to bring man into the conscious possession of his 'moral faculty' and to open to him again the world (of values) which he has closed against himself". (Vol. I, p. 45). Being fully convinced of the fact that the question of values is the more fundamental, more insistent problem which must be solved before questions of morality can be properly tackled, he devotes the major portion of the three volumes to what may be called the metaphysics of values in general.

When the author is thus prejudiced in favour of moral values in particular, how is it possible for him to escape the warping of his conclusions regarding the larger science of values in any discussion of them within the narrow limits of

* *Ethics*: Vol. I., *Moral Phenomena*; Vol. II. *Moral Values*; Vol. III. *Moral Freedom*—By NICOLAI HARTMANN. Authorized translation by Stanton Coit, with an introduction by Prof. J. H. Muirhead. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London.)

"ethics"? Such a warping does appear in Hartmann's discussions of value, in the theory that values possess an independent objective self-existence. Value as such is intrinsic, it is the good-in-itself which should never be identified with the merely "useful" or "utilitarian". Values are neither subjectively determined by consciousness nor objectively emanated from things; they are "materials," structures which constitute a specific quality of things, relations or persons. They are, like Plato's "ideas," essences, absolute principles, which are discerned *a priori*, not indeed by reason but by sense or intuition ("sensing of value"). Criticising Kant in this respect, Hartmann asserts that the *a priori* of feeling is as universal, necessary, objective and pure as the *a priori* of reason. Values, while holding good only "for" persons are still relative to persons or their needs. And yet while they are real and possess an ideal self-existence, they cannot, as the ontological categories can, exercise an unconditional compulsion over the actual.

Nevertheless, values have a definite categorical conformation or structure whose analysis reveals the interlacing of the finalistic and the causal nexus in a three-fold process of the setting up of the end by the subject, the determination of the means by the end and the actualization of the end through the series of the means. In the first and second process Hartmann sees man exhibiting the divine attributes of providence (foresight) and pre-destination; hence human teleology is considered by him to be the right one. But Cosmic teleology, usually indulged in by religious philosophies, is to be condemned as it implies an abrogation of human freedom, while the postulation of a Divine Being with purposes of His own is to be regarded as a sheer perversion of the facts of human moral agency.

Such is the thesis of the first volume, —decidedly the most metaphysical and difficult of the three volumes. Nevertheless, the thesis that value has no fundamental relation to human interest or desire is essentially a vulnerable one. If moral values, for example, are in every respect as objective and universal as mathematical and logical laws, (as Hartmann asserts them to be, *ibid*, pp. 124-5), why is there such diversity of belief and practice regarding them? We are not now concerned with the non-perception of value by the ethically uncultured, but only with different valuational estimates of the same moral situation by persons of equal culture and education. Surely no educated person would ever think of contesting the truth of the mathematical judgment $a^2=(a+b)\ (a-b)+b^2$, asserted by another? As for our author's contentions regarding teleology, it must be pointed out that he places too great a faith in human possibilities. Man may set up ends and pursue them, but are they not, alas, only too often thwarted and nullified by natural agencies of the causal nexus over which he has no control whatever? This dead-lock is the inevitable product of the obsession of the European mind that man and nature, the finalistic and the causal series always fight against each other (p.297) for conquest and mastery. The thinkers of India, on the other hand try to overcome this difficulty by maintaining that man must seek to conciliate rather than coerce nature and that such conciliation can be brought about only through the recognition and more the realization, of the fundamental unity of man and nature in the self which underlies both, and whose purposes,—freely chosen by man, as his own,—are realized both by man and nature.

The second volume deals with moral values proper, although even here the metaphysics of values continues in several sections in which the problem of gradation of values and the criteria for determining grades, the various kinds of polar opposites that subsist in what is happily called "the valuational space," the several laws of value,—of which the principle of the multiple stratification of the world is the most interesting and novel,—are all discussed in a strikingly original manner. Here again one is struck by the profound

metaphysical insight and interest of the author though he all along professes to be dealing only with "ethics". But a greater part of the interest and importance of this volume should be ascribed to the exhaustive and luminous treatment of the fundamental moral values such as goodness, nobility, purity etc., and of the concrete virtues like justice, love, truthfulness and so forth. It can be safely hazarded that no philosopher since the time of Aristotle, (not forgetting writers like Wundt, Paulsen, Sidgwick), has until now given us such a masterly survey of the concrete virtues of moral life on so vast and comprehensive a scale.

In discussing the apriorism and metaphysic of the "Christian virtue" of brotherly love, Prof. Hartmann refers to Vedantic teaching, (the only reference to Indian thought in all the three volumes), and says that the metaphysical justification offered for it in Vedanta, (admired by Schopenhauer, Max Müller, Deussen and others as the only satisfactory solution of the problem), namely, that you should love your neighbour as yourself because both of you are ultimately one in the unity of primal Being, is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the phenomenon, the mystery of self-transcendence involved in intuitive sympathy, caused by a simple proposition of identity. But he himself does not supply any more adequate basis for it. Things are valuable, says Prof. Hartmann, not on account of themselves but because they "participate" in value (Vol. I, p. 185). He might as well have converted "value" into the "Atman" of the Upanishads and said that the husband loves the wife and the wife the husband, not because of the wife or the husband, but because of the Atman or the Self.

Little need be said about the third volume which is entirely devoted to the discussion of the metaphysical foundation of moral freedom,—a subject which students of philosophy will find to be of enthralling interest especially as the argument develops through three antinomies instead of only the one (causal) made familiar to us by Kant.

Here again, had Prof. Hartmann been familiar with Indian thought, he would have seen that there is no real difference between human and divine teleology, philosophically considered, for it is the totality of the Karma of Puruśas or Selves themselves that determines the course as well as the progress of cosmic evolution.

However, we must say that Hartmann belongs to the "Great Tradition" in philosophy. Only Kant's *Critique* and Hegel's *Logic* convey to the reader's mind the same impression of vastness of achievement. Hartmann's thesis is a spirited defence of the ethical supremacy of man as against the non-ethical factors of the world, and who shall say that he is wrong in upholding it whatever one may think of the finality and adequacy of the status assigned to man?

J. M. KUMARAPPA

The Festival of Adonis, Being the XVth Idyll of Theocritus, edited with a revised Greek text, translation and brief notes, by E. H. BLAKENEY; to which is added a rendering in English verse of the "Lament for Adonis" attributed to Bion. (Scholartis Press. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

We have been favoured with one of the 240 copies of this handsome edition printed at the Alcuin Press, Campden, England. Exquisite is the beauty of the original and it is no exaggeration to say that the translation is equally so. We can only refer to its merit as a piece of literature—it is like a joyous, fresh breeze, that exhilarates heart and freshens the mind; for the philosophical and mythological speculations it arouses there is no space here.

O.

PHILOSOPHISM*

[**Max Plowman** himself a lover of mystical wisdom examines the work of seventeen Doctors of Philosophy and finds most of it dull.—EDS.]

This volume consists of a series of philosophical essays by younger graduates of the University of Chicago and the contributions are offered as a tribute of veneration to four senior doctors of philosophy in the same university: James Hayden Tufts, George Herbert Mead, Addison Webster Moore and Edward Scribner Ames. The interest therefore is necessarily somewhat localised and at times the contributions suggest an effort on the part of junior men to be complimentary to their seniors in the same school of thought rather than the urge of original thought or achieved understanding. Respect and veneration are, of course, admirable qualities, but the realm of philosophy is a very free country where respect for tradition is apt to look like a badge of servitude and where the disciple is likely to receive scant attention if he is not greater than his lord. Moreover it is difficult to convey personal regard through the medium of abstract philosophy, for the thinker necessarily thinks for himself, and whenever he does this it is more by divergence from his preceptor than by accord that he is likely to show his sincerity. So that while we appreciate the fraternal good feeling which prompted this collection, we must not expect to find any very profound or original contributions to thought in it.

It may be accepted as a matter of personal prejudice on the part of the present reviewer that he finds the purely scholastic essays of philosophical thought as among the most uninteresting of contributions to literature, holding as he does that philosophy is without validity except on the basis of experience denied to youth. No doubt it is necessary to serve an apprenticeship and thus to become acquainted with the historic schools of philosophy and the latest trends of thought, but until these have been assimilated and relegated to the background, the stage is not set for the drama of experience which alone can give the philosopher the means for true addition to the sum of human wisdom, which if philosophy fails to present, it is the merest dust and ashes. Without this experience the study of philosophy tends to become very much what the study of verse-forms is to the versifier—an endless labyrinth of abstraction in which points of difference with past authority become matters of supreme interest and definitions change and disappear in processes of abstraction which lose all touch with reality and finally fade into conflicts in the empyrean between invisible duellists.

The temptations to such abstraction have not been greatly resisted by most of the contributors to this book: the habit is most apparent in the essays which deal with subjects in which a generalisation is put forth as a starting-point to all directions of the compass—a mode of address that inevitably leads to thinking for thinking's sake. The essayist seems to be engaged in covering the ground, and conclusion is attained only by arriving again at the point of departure. Thus Dr. Kate Gordon and Dr. V. M. Ames treating respectively of "Art as Expression" and "Aesthetic Experience" add little to common knowledge of their subjects because they write as those whose mission it is to go "about it and about". Dr. W. K. Wright discussing "The Relation of Morality and Religion" shows that he is a careful, shrewd and consecutive thinker who knows the rules of logic and keeps them, but we have the unavoidable sense that he is "playing the game" within the prescribed rules for lack of any individual urge to serious conviction, when his thinking lands

Essays in Philosophy. By SEVENTEEN DOCTORS OF PHILOSOPHY of the University of Chicago. (Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. $ 3.50)

us in such conclusions as "The fact that progress has been so largely continuous gives us hope that it will go on indefinitely in the future"—a conclusion American history at the moment seems painfully to belie. Dr. Crawford in discussing "Meaning and Reality" keeps himself ably suspended in the realm of pure metaphysics, but adds nothing vital to our conceptions of either Meaning or Reality. And so it is with most of these philosophers: they are obviously exercising their intelligences upon points of philosophic discussion which are removed from practical interest by being elevated to the point of verbal abstraction where terms are of more interest than the matters they represent. Only the great mind can profitably soar to heights of great abstraction, and because our authors are confessedly learners rather than teachers, their efforts upon high altitudes produce fatigue. Of course in their journeys one has the pleasure of nodding acquaintance with old philosophic friends, but such contact is not enlarging, and at the end of the journey one has the sense of having been far and met little.

The best matter in the book is provided by essayists like Dr. C. H. Hamilton and Dr. J. Wild, the former because he tackles a subject of direct interest in "Buddhistic Idealism in Wei Shih Er Shih Lwen," and the latter because he really makes a personal adventure of his "Grand Strategy of Evolution" and arrives somewhere, even if it be a ground of conclusion that is only temporary; but the book as a whole has not very much of interest to any beside professional scholastic philosophers.

MAX PLOWMAN

The Existence and Immortality of the Soul. By H. T. BUTLER. (Lincoln Williams, London.)

Put briefly, Mr. Butler's main line of argument is that instinct is universal in the animal kingdom, and is infallible; that all, or nearly all, men have an instinctive belief that they possess an "immortal soul"; that God would not endow animals with true instinct and men with false; therefore man *has* an immortal soul.

As to the exact significance of the word "soul," Mr. Butler is somewhat vague; but he seems to regard it as a miraculously produced, eternal, indivisible, separate entity, which comes into existence *pari passu* with the body, but once created, endures for ever. This theory, which is held by most Christians, contrasts with the Eastern belief that the innermost self of man is identical with the ultimate reality of the universe. Moreover the idea that an entity, born in time, could endure eternally, would not be admitted by any serious thinker of East or West.

The most interesting feature of the book is its account of the working of instinct among animals, although some of the instances given would be more impressive if the author had mentioned his authority for them. The alleged fact is so improbable as to need unimpeachable evidence before one could accept it.

Mr. Butler has an irritating trick of making such doubtful statements as that the Fulani of Northern Nigeria are one of the "lost tribes of Israel," because they, like the ancient Jews, have a law that, when a man dies, his brother should marry the widow! Again that,

> Hypnotism, telepathy and the rest prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that there is a part of one's personality that can leave our brains ... that can travel to another individual and enter his body and brain. ...

of which singular theory no proof is attempted.

But, despite its doubtful facts and weak logic, Mr. Butler's book contains much interesting information destructive of the materialist theory; and the sentiment with which it concludes is unexceptionable:—

> My whole book insists that *man* is not his flesh and blood, but is his inner self.

R. A. V. M.

Psychology of Sex By HAVELOCK ELLIS (William Heinemann [Medical Books] Ltd., London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

When one contemplates the fact that the scientific literature on Sex and Sexology emanating from the West ranges from an account of anatomico-physiological details to highly coloured descriptions definitely verging on pornography, it is gratifying to note that Havelock Ellis who has devoted a lifetime to the task of scientification of sex-studies and who is *facile princeps* among those who have made distinctive and highly valued contributions to a systematic study of the problems of sex normal and morbid, has published the volume under notice, setting forth in brief yet bold and clear outlines his considered views on the "psychology of Sex" in the course of eight chapters. The present work although primarily intended for medical readers and students will also make a ready appeal to lay readers, and it does not supplant or supersede the seven volumes of the author's *Studies in the Psychology of Sex.*

Perhaps the most significant and fundamental question is: What is the irreducible and distinctive psychological element in sex-relation? As the orthodox Western Psychologists have refused to admit the existence of any spiritual entity like self or soul, psychology of sex must mean just the Behaviourism of sex. Indian psychology on the other hand not only postulates the existence of a spiritual entity embodied in each nervous or neuro-muscular mechanism but studies the mind or *manas* (*Antah-karana*—internal sense) under the four aspects of *Manas, Buddhi, Ahamkara,* and *Chitta.* Vathsyayana, the celebrated author of the *Kama-Sutras* isolates the distinctive psychological elements of sex-life. It is no exaggeration to state that anticipations of Havelock Ellis are contained in Vathsyayana.

The sex-problem has a philosophical basis. *Prakriti* is the female principle. *Purusha* is the male principle. Cosmic multiplicity is the outcome of the union between them. Heterosexuality and reciprocity of sexual attraction are normal features of life. "*Aahara-nidra-bhayamaithunam-cha--samanya-metat—pasubhih—naranam*" —Food, sleep, fear, and coitus are shared by animals and humans alike.

In the concluding section of his work, Havelock Ellis speaks of the sublimation of the sex-craving. Violent repressions of the sex-urge result in more violent reactions. A free-lance sex-life results in an ultimate extinction of the organism. The *Gita* recognises this and advocates pursuit of the golden mean. (*Vishayanindriyaischaran . . atmavasyaih . . . Prasadamadhigacchati . .* ii—64.)

It is on an aspect of the sublimation of the sex-urge that supreme stress is laid by the Yogic discipline. Sex-indulgence is condemned and a sublimation is suggested. The life of systematic sublimation of the sex-urge is not meant for all. But the Yogic discipline involved in the sublimation of the sex-urge opens new lines of investigation which are yet to be followed. Christian Mystics recognised the truth of the said sublimation and tabooed *in toto* all association with Eve.

An average Hindu regards marriage as a sacrament. Not merely that. He should beget a son to save his ancestors. This may sound a strange doctrine in these days of eugenic marriages, birth control, and childless companionate marriages. The cultured and educated Hindu regards his wife as the presiding deity of the house (*Grihesvari* or *Grihalakshmi*) though under the storm and stress of modern conditions of existence wife-beating and actions for restitution of conjugal rights are not unknown.

A purely disinterested psychological study of sex problems must take note of the sublimation indicated by the Yogic discipline. The apparently interminable cycle of births and deaths is due to the contact between the male and female principles—*Purusha* and *Prakriti.* Unless a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* is effected between *Purusha* and *Prakriti*, it would be impossible to

get rid of the ills of existence. This is the message of the Vedanta, worth contemplating upon. Many of the features of normal and morbid sex-life depicted by Havelock Ellis are embodied with astonishing accuracy of detail in the Sanskrit text of the well-known writer on Hindu Erotics—Vathsyana, to which readers of THE ARYAN PATH interested in comparative study must turn.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

[We are glad to see the following note of protest in *Everyman* for 10th June.

"The obscurantism in regard to sex which Mr. Ellis has fought so valiantly for many years has certainly been a great evil, but we are inclined to think that the 'new freedom' has its dangers too. To promote their own theories the psycho-analysts, for example, have accentuated sex all out of proportion to its biological significance.

"Pornography as such is dull, but when promoted under the guise of science it is disgusting. There are scores of books of this type which one can buy at news stalls and elsewhere. In their frankness of detail they are as abnormal and one-sided as were the evasions of past generations."]

An Examination of the Mystic Tendencies in Islam in the Light of the Qur'an and Traditions. By M. M. ZUHURU'D-DIN AHMAD, M.A, L.L.B. (Published by the Author, Pali Road, Bandra, Bombay.)

"The aim of this book," writes Professor Ahmad, "is to explain how mysticism originated and developed in the Islamic world. The author has made an attempt to analyse the chief elements of the so called Islamic mysticism and to show in what way its basic principles are related to the fundamental tenets of Islam. It was necessary for this purpose to give a brief account of the founder of Islam and his companions, and to show how their life could have helped to suggest and develop the chief mystic theories among the Muslims, in the light of the Qur'an and Traditions of the prophet, the two chief sources of knowledge about Islam."

Professor Ahmad considers that Western orientalists are inclined to depict Sufi saints following a path divergent from the way set forth in the Qur'an and Traditions, a path so excellent that it "made amends for the inherent defects of Islam as a theory of life". Are Western scholars wrong in taking such a point of view? They could hardly take any other if love is greater than fear, tolerance of more account than intolerance. Professor Ahmad is emphatic in stating that Sufism had its origin in the Islam faith, but such a conception is at least debatable. Sufism may have had an independent origin. Something may be said in favour of Aryan reaction or Neo-Platonist origin. Although we cannot deny that Muhammad was a mystic if we attach any importance to his visions, he was a militant type far removed from the quietism of the Sufis. He was so essentially practical that it is not easy to believe in what is known as the "Esoteric Doctrine of the Prophet". There was no "Hidden Treasure," no "Cleave the stone and there am I," in Muhammad's Allah. Though there are a few mystical verses in the Qur'an and more than forty explanations as to the meaning of "certain separate letters outwardly unconnected with the chapters and separate from one another if more than one," careful readers will form the opinion that there was too little of a mystical nature in the Qur'an and Traditions to form more than a most rudimentary beginning of the Sufi cult. Mysticism is almost invariably associated with asceticism in some form or other, and we know definitely that "There is no asceticism in Islam". More than that, the Sufi was primarily concerned with the

soul or spirit in relation to God. It was an intimate relationship, that of lover and the Divine Beloved, and culminated in the extreme ecstasy of union. Nothing of the kind is suggested in the Qur'an or Traditions. Professor Ahmad writes :—

> According to Islam the Creator and the creatures remained eternally different realities. Even the apostles, though the most perfect of creatures, ever remained humble slaves to the Creator, content with the humble dignity of prophethood.

It was a meagre conception compared with that of the Sufi who, quickened by love, drew ever nearer toward God and was finally absorbed in Him.

It must be frankly admitted that Professor Ahmad is a staunch and uncompromising upholder of the orthodox Islam faith. For him there is no other that is worth while. He sounds that note repeatedly, and the note is a little strident to those who differ from him. There are other religions and the spirit may be led in many ways. He is wrong in his interpretation of Nirvana and we may question his assertion that "the Christian world has lost all religious consciousness". While admitting that Sufism originated in Islam, it is perfectly clear that he is strongly opposed to the Sufi cult because in its later form it was contrary to the teaching of the Prophet. Professor Ahmad has not written this book from an impartial point of view. While extolling Muhammad and the Muslim faith, he is at pains to discredit what many will consider to be the lofty teaching of Sufism. He uses the ugly word merger in reference to the Divine Union and is not in sympathy with such a conception.

He writes :—

> Islam was the only religion that gave a real and comprehensive interpretation of life and used all the facts of life to support its doctrines of reality and moral reformation. . . . . But the Sufis, carried by the flood of reaction against the secular struggle, became supporters of the opposite and pernicious elements of the neighbouring faiths.

"All movements," writes Professor Ahmad, "that claimed to establish a universal religion, or a religion of humanity were nothing but so many less successful imitations of the original example set by Islam." The Sufis had not only strayed from the Islam fold but had been guilty of heresy. They had broken away from the thunder and lightning of the Prophet and dared to conceive an approachable God of Love. But Professor Ahmad does not like them. He writes: "Sufis as a class are no more than parasites living upon the income of Muslims." Rather grudgingly he admits there are some "of real saintly nature." We no sooner welcome this word of praise than our pleasure is shattered by the following amazing reservation :—

> It should be remembered, however, that they have achieved all this not by following the mystic practices of the Sufi writers, but by a simple childlike faith in God as Creator, Muhammad as His last apostle and the best guide, and the Qur'an as the last and most complete message of God to humanity.

Students of oriental mysticism will not find in these pages the author's contention that Sufism was closely associated with the chief sources of the Islam faith. Those who are free from religious bias will have good reason for expressing a contrary point of view. There was much that was crude and harsh in Muhammad's message: the upholding of war and slavery, an attitude towards women far removed from that of Buddha's teaching. Perhaps if this book had been a less pious affirmation of Islam it would have dealt a little more fairly with Muslim mystics.

HADLAND DAVIS

The Blavatsky Bibliography. (The Blavatsky Association, London, W. 8. 1s.)

We must congratulate the editors in welcoming the first number of this useful compilation, which we are informed "is not entirely comprehensive of everything that has yet been written; but a commencement has been made"—and it has been well made. The Bibliography has been divided into four sections: (1) Books originally published and correctly reprinted; (2) Reprints of books not faithful to the original editions; (3) Miscellaneous writings reprinted in pamphlet or book form, and (4) Biographical data. The editors promise to continue their valuable work every year. "The Bibliography discloses in a manner astonishing even to students familiar with the subject, the enormous interest which Madame Blavatsky aroused during her life-time, and which she must continue to arouse in an ever-growing degree."

B.

Music: Its Secret Influence throughout the Ages. By CYRIL SCOTT. (Rider and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

The Vision of the Nazarene. Set down by the Author of *The Initiate.* (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Watchers of the Seven Spheres. By H. K. CHALLONER. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

Through the Eyes of the Masters. By DAVID ANRIAS. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

During these last years there has been a gathering flood of literature which, one supposes, would call itself "occult," although in our opinion the term "psychic" would be more correct. These books are given out as inspired by Spirits and Gods and Angels and Masters, and deal with secrets of initiation in Shambhalla or on Sirius, with past lives of living people, words heard at the feet of Masters, disquisitions on the consciousness of the atom, letters on occult meditation, and the personality of the Absolute, and such like — twaddle. Among them is a series of three on an Initiate by his pupil. This "pupil" who has now published *The Vision of the Nazarene* confesses that "to a certain extent" his "anonymity has already been pierced," but he "has no desire to advertise to the world or to my acquaintances that the Master has done me the great honour to accept me as one of his pupils." Now the writer of the "Initiate" series, whoever he be—and we must respect the anonymity however thinly veiled—is obviously connected with a coterie which contains the well-known musician, Cyril Scott, one David Anrias (a pen name drawn from a character sketch in *The Initiate of the Dark Cycle*) and a Mr. H. K. Challoner. These last three, in conjunction with the shadowy author of *The Initiate* are working in combination.

Let us begin with Cyril Scott's book on *Music: Its Secret Influence throughout the Ages.* We are, alas, no musicians, but Mr. Scott is one, and he should never have provoked a critic of the calibre of Ernest Newman to write a scathing criticism of the inspirer of Mr. Scott, who is given out to have been Pythagoras in a previous incarnation. Mr. Newman's criticism of that inspirer also reflects on the standing of the medium-musician. Mr. Scott's talent is undoubted, but under the influence of his teacher, to whom he dedicates the book, his opinions and inferences are laughable and negligible. He dedicates his book to this inspirer by name, which name by the way has a story of its own, of which Mr. Scott evidently is unaware. This "name" was brought into vogue by the late Mr. A. P. Sinnett, as that of one of the Theosophical Masters, in the days of H. P. Blavatsky, who knew the Personage bearing that name very well. Now, Mr. Scott makes that Personage responsible for the "inspiration" of this travesty, aided by Mr. David Anrias, who, claiming the talent of being psychically impressed, produces pencil portraits which correspond in quality with

the mentality of the text. Mr. Scott has, in our opinion, quite unwittingly but nevertheless certainly, profaned a Personage whom every true Theosophist reverences, and whose writing (in the days of H. P. Blavatsky) as we can see in *The Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett* is that of an eminently sane man, if nothing more.

Quite frankly and unequivocally we disbelieve in the alleged sources of Mr. Scott's inspiration, and see neither art nor cleverness in Mr. Anrias's psychically impressed portraits. The latter's portraits again decorate (?) *The Vision of the Nazarene*, a book which depicts (according to the book-jacket) "Christianity seen, as it were, through the eyes of Christianity's own founder," and which was written inspirationally by the Author of *The Initiate*. The alleged inspirer has obviously suffered in genius since the days of his sojourn in Palestine. The psychically impressed portrait of one whom we hesitate on considerations of blasphemy to term either Jesus or Christ, certainly exhibits signs of degeneration. Mr. Challoner's *Watchers of the Seven Spheres* contains poems, and these are accompanied by coloured plates—the author being the artist also. One of these plates purports to be a Master in Deva form, another the Solar Deva, still another the Builder of Form, etc., etc. They are fantastic in design, and did they not claim to be taken seriously, they would be interesting enough. However, this book should be immune from criticism, for has it not the imprimatur of the Author of *The Initiate* (who writes a preface) and Mr. Challoner expresses in a foreword his "great indebtedness to Cyril Scott and David Anrias"!

The last book we shall note is *Through the Eyes of the Masters*, by David Anrias (with the necessary introduction from the pen of the Author of *The Initiate*). This book contains "nine pencil drawings of the Masters" which were mentally impressed upon the author, who also received telepathically communicated self-descriptive statements from the originals. *The Occult Review* is quoted on the book jacket as saying that "This volume deserves to be read by all Theosophical students". We must differ, alas, from our well-known contemporary. We have no hesitation in saying that *none* of the volumes under review deserve one moment's serious attention from Theosophical students—unless to guard the unwary from their perusal.

What is the genesis of such volumes?—we ask ourselves.

To us it seems perfectly obvious that Mr. Scott and Mr. Anrias, who have both been—and may still be, as far as we know—connected with the Adyar Theosophical Society, have been much influenced by the stream of psychic literature emanating from that Society during the last twenty years. And not only literature! Mr. Anrias, at least, must have had opportunity of seeing several of the more recent psychically impressed portraits of so-called adepts, manus and chohans, and whether consciously or unconsciously to himself the influence of these has made, it appears to us, a very strong impression on his own psychic nature. The "Deva" influence we think, has its source in the fantastic *Science of the Sacraments*, *Fairies at Work and at Play* and other outcomes of similar parentage. Messrs. Scott, Anrias and Challoner are the natural products of the teaching of pseudo-theosophy with all its psychic accompaniments. With Scientific Sacraments, Cosmic Fire, Solar Initiation, New Christ and World Mother—what else was to be expected?

However, we must do the writers the justice to say that these volumes are not put forth specifically as Theosophy, but the Personalities of more than one of the Adepts mentioned were certainly known to Theosophists in the earliest days of the Movement. This Mr. Scott recognises, for he is kind enough to tell us in *Music* (p. 36) that the appearance of the *Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett* and *Through the Eyes of the Masters* of David Anrias bears testimony that "these mysterious Sages were *not* the invention of the much-maligned occult-

ist, Madame Blavatsky". In such connection the juxtaposition of these two books does little credit, we feel, to Mr. Cyril Scott's intelligence. We may mention in passing that in the bibliography at the end of Mr. Scott's *Music*, not one of the works of Madame Blavatsky is included, but many volumes of pseudo-theosophy find their place there, and have been consulted—a fact we could have well divined without the aid of a bibliography. No student of genuine Theosophy with even a theoretical knowledge of what are devas, who are Masters, what makes a man a Disciple, would entertain the ideas expressed in words or pictures by these three authors. We doubt not that the writers of the books under review feel themselves to have been inspired. Possibly the artists imagine that they were psychically impressed. But where has their discrimination gone? Have they not become the prey of the visions and phantasies of the Astral light, and their own lower nature against which H. P. B. has warned the world? There is, alas, a great danger that many people, uninstructed in the true teaching of the Wisdom-Religion, and attracted by the glitter of psychism and loudness of claims, may fall for these books—and for the supposed wonderful gifts of their writers and illustrators. It is charitable to think that these writers and illustrators believe in themselves and their "inspirers," but it is inevitable to forecast that they will convince in good faith many others. There lies the danger, a danger which only a careful study of the teachings of pure Theosophy can counteract.

B. A. (Oxon)

West-East. By W. J. STEIN. (Anthroposophical Publishing Co., London. 1*s*.)

In human geography there are four cardinal points but in human history there seem to be only two—East and West, now juxtaposed as conflicting and then as co-operating entities. In history, the north and south points gain occasional publicity as the theatre of adventures in the Arctic or the Antarctic zones, and recently because of scientific polar expeditions. But the East and the West, embracing practically all the important races of mankind, have been pushed almost to the plane of notoriety, as much by cheap mutual vilifications as by pedantic sweeping generalisations. Henri Massis staged a few years ago a spectacular debate on the East and West challenging the interpretation of Spengler in *The Downfall of the West*. Massis, by the law of contra-suggestion, was driven to the other extreme, asserting that the West alone counts and must defend itself from the contamination of the decaying East. The writer of the pamphlet under review belongs to the cult of anthroposophy started by Rudolf Steiner whose opinions and theories are lavishly quoted in this somewhat hasty "study in national relationship". From the *quantitative* computation of the *nationals* of England and France, Germany and America etc., he comes to a strange sort of *qualitative* evaluation, *e. g.*, soul world passions=Japan; life aether=India; earth=England; sub-earthly forces=America. It is difficult to guess the reaction of the different countries concerned to these supra-psychological complements. The linking up of England and India, of France and China, of America and Japan is suggestive, and here and there are indications of a sincere attempt to make the two historical hemispheres behave in a friendly manner. But neither intellectual nor spiritual justification for considering the West to be the superior and the East to be the inferior partner has been given. We in the Orient would like less of theory and more of practice in fellowship and equality, justice and equity, to build up an abiding bridge of international understanding.

KALIDAS NAG

Calvin. By R. N. CAREW HUNT. (The Centenary Press, London. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Carew Hunt's biography is learned and painstaking rather than inspiring. Could it, one wonders, have been otherwise? Calvin had, as Mr. Hunt shows, many virtues—courage, devotion, loyalty, integrity, a penetrating intelligence. But his case was anticipated a millennium and a half before his time by St. Paul in a famous passage: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." Misanthrope he may not have been as an individual, but for that profounder, abiding love which was the heart of the teaching of Jesus one looks to him in vain. And he was, by that token, essentially uncreative.

He lived in a period of the sickness of the Catholic Church, when it was ripe either for death or new life. He could bring neither. He led his followers, not out, or back, into the eternal temple of living religion, but only from one sectarian cell to another. Perceptive spiritual imagination died within the cage of his unyielding dogmatism, his stress upon belief and not being, his harsh teaching of "particular redemption"—the salvation of the predestined elect. What do we care to-day for either supralapsarianism or infralapsarianism? We realise truly enough that it is not worth our while even to discover what the terms mean! The root of religion is not in them, nor was it in Calvin himself. He was blind to the personality, the whole significance of Jesus—his God was Jehovah. He experienced Divine Being not as Love but as Power; he was not a mystic but a theological lawyer—he clung to the letter of the Law (as he read it) like a veritable Sadducee. The harsh Puritanism he fathered upon the world has proved in practice an almost unmitigated evil, based as it was upon physical repression, and denying the truth that all real development is personal and spontaneous. When he lacked power he could hold it as "his deep conviction that the cause of religion could never be advanced by means which were contrary to its spirit, and he always told the Protestants that their only lawful weapons were prayer and patience." But when power was in his hands he used axe and torture and fire against his enemies. Servetus, student of Neoplatonism and the Hermetic writings, he persecuted to death by burning (that "he had tried to secure for the prisoner a less painful death" is not much to the point!), blind to a wisdom deeper and more ancient than any of his own.

Calvin belonged to his day. He was imprisoned within it. He lacked absolutely that insight of real spiritual greatness necessary to lift him above its confining walls. Necessarily he remains a landmark—if an ugly one—in the religious history of Europe (and, through Puritanism, of America), but he has no message for the world to-day. Mr. Carew Hunt, it may be said, hardly tries to persuade us that he has.

GEOFFREY WEST

The Menace in our Midst. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS with some criticisms and some comments relevant and irrelevant by R. E. DUMMETT. (Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

With ability and sincerity Mr. Humphreys has brought home the alarming increase of criminal violence in England. A son of a prominent Judge, and a practising Barrister, he has been trained in the fine traditions of law with an equal experience of prosecution and defence; he is well qualified to view the menace of his "crime-ridden" country from the standpoints of the community and of the criminal. He analyses particularly the cases of juvenile raiders and bandits between the ages of 18 and 30 and suggests proper remedies. The array of facts and conclusions justifies his urging of the British public to take immediate steps.

Mr. Humphreys fears that the appalling larceny and licence of youth may stride, with ever-increasing speed, towards the bottomless pit of Chicagoism, and it is his opinion that this state of affairs is attributable in a great measure to the leniency of their courts towards the young and first offenders. Apart from environmental and abnormal factors, the general causes of the making of criminals are after-effects of the war, unrest and uncertainty; communism and revolt; the romantic reaction to machinery; educational systems; and psychism. Special causes are unemployment; books, articles and films that glorify crime; and want of moral sanction in the home, the school and the society. His critic and commentator Mr. Dummett, the Metropolitan Police Magistrate of London, differs from him in the above tabulation of cogent causes, for, to his mind, by far the most serious and effective reasons are environment and opportunity provided by the slackness and complacency of the average citizen which extend an open invitation to crime.

While suggesting preventive and curative measures for prevailing lawlessness and hooliganism, the author criticises the moral flabbiness and irresponsibility of his "conservative" countrymen and exhorts them to make a "sharp-pull-up," to recreate a strong sense of mass morality and to adopt other reformatory means to erase this menace. Besides abnormal types of hardened criminals that need abnormal treatment, he appeals to the Benches to be equal to the occasion and handle the recidivists and their escapades with severe justice free from "fatuous sentimentality," making it clear to the professional youngsters that their prized profession of crime no longer pays. Then he pleads for the introduction of a modified form of the American system of indeterminate sentences to ameliorate and reclaim the young criminals as faithful citizens.

So far so good. But in attempting "to find out why a man does wrong and make it not worth his while" Mr. Humphreys, who is a professed Buddhist and the president of the Buddhist Lodge of London, should have applied the Indian doctrine of reincarnation. How can prisoners who are also human souls be understood without a basis of their past? As heredity fails to fully explain or to find a remedy, a more philosophical understanding is necessary. What is a prisoner-soul? How does he come into being and why does he persist? Indian doctrines of reincarnation and karma offer a very satisfactory solution. Criminology and penology will become better and more perfect sciences if their principles are formulated in the light of these two doctrines. Then and then only, radical and permanent reform is possible. No human soul is totally incorrigible; only owing to the predominance of some past evil karmas he is what he is. Arouse the dormant samskaras (tendencies) of good karmas and he will grow into righteousness. Who knew that a saint was asleep in the Jean Valjean of Victor Hugo! Let us not forget the glory of human nature and the potential divinity of the human soul. No crime or vice can eternally soil or spoil the divinity of man. When all other methods are proving futile, will the West give a chance to the tried doctrines of the ancient East?

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

Christian Mysticism: With A New Preface. By W. R. INGE, Dean of St. Paul's. (Methuen and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

Mysticism speaks in terms of direct experience and finds the hidden treasures of the soul. In these days when behaviouristic and sex psychology interpret the fine currents of the soul in terms of instincts, a book on Mysticism with the analysis of super-conscious experiences is welcome indeed. The credential of religion is ultimately to be found in the psychology advanced by the mystics;

for they claim to have discovered stretches of consciousness not accessible to all. Philosophy cannot long afford to neglect the experiences of the mystics if it is to fulfil her vocation as the interpreter of experience. It is a unique feature of Indian Philosophy that it has not ignored the deepest experiences of the soul in formulating its schemes of thought.

The conflict between religion and science is absent in some of the Indian systems, for they have long ago dematerialised matter and interpreted creation as the Lila of Brahman. The original energy is polarised into two forces, centripetal and centrifugal; and the entire manifestation including that of the Gods is the resultant of these two forces.

Dr. Inge in his learned chapter on Platonism and Mysticism gives us the impression that he is not much in love with the kinds of mysticism which try to "gain infinity by reducing self and the world to zero". He considers this as the effect of the influence of the oriental philosophy of the Indian type. He is opposed to the doctrine of the "blank" absolute. We may put a question rooted in the very nature of mystical experience—is there not at times a loss and a fall of self even in love consciousness and is not the soul informed in this height of a unique aspect of our spiritual life? There is in the soul the unfathomable deep where nothing can enter, but what, for that account, cannot be said to be empty or blank. Life oscillates between love and silence; if the Indian mystics have appreciated silence it is only because they find in it the full face of Truth.

The book reproduces in a short space numerous systems. Their treatment at times appears to be sketchy. Among the English poets Wordsworth and Browning have been selected for study. The mysticism of Wordsworth does not appeal to the Dean, because the poet's love for nature was deeper than his love for humanity. Browning's love of life and character perfected "in the stream of the world"—in short "the friction of the active life and the experience of the human love"—has a greater appeal for the author. To him love is "the meaning of life." We feel that a more exhaustive treatment of the mysticism of the English poets and of Carlyle and Emerson would have been more welcome. And what seems to be necessary these days in the study of mysticism is a thorough psychological analysis of the mystical flights of consciousness—and their place in the total setting of life.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

ERRATA

In our June number (p. 413) the name of the London publishers of *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing* had been given; but the American publishers of the same book are Ray Long and Richard Smith.

Also in the same number, (p. 417) only the London Address of the Open Court Publishing Company was given in reference to their publication, *Philosophy of the Present* by George Herbert Mead. Chicago is the head office of the Open Court Publishing Company.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[**A. E. Waite** is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

It is said that Mr. H. G. Wells, in the course of a recent "broadcast talk," affirmed his belief that "the race goes on but the individual is blotted out". On the other hand, Dean Inge—who regards Spiritism (1) as "the cult of Necromancy"; (2) as "Spurious Mysticism"; and (3) as confined to the "masses of the half-educated" —contrives to believe in a life to come for humanity, Mr. Wells notwithstanding. He maintains, however, that the "popular notion" of progress or "further probation in a future state" is equally unsupported by the New Testament and by "traditional Christian teaching".* One of our contemporaries calls this "doleful theology,"† remembering perhaps that it comes from him who was once denominated "the gloomy Dean," but forgetting that after all the preacher of St. Paul's Cathedral was concerned with a point of fact. The New Testament assuredly offers no prospect of evolution in the scale of being for surviving souls of men. As regards "traditional Christian teaching," we know that "the common people heard Him gladly"—meaning the teaching Christ —and we may infer that others who came after, "masses of the half-educated" included, knew and could conceive little about disembodied souls. But the resurrection of the body was a clear and intelligible issue on which they might pin their faith, as well as on a life everlasting to follow therein. So also the doctrinal picture of a Risen and Ascended Christ, seated "at the right hand of God the Father Almighty," yet destined to return quickly and "judge the quick and the dead," was an image in their own likeness, however changed, and a tangible ground on which to base their hopes. That which was glorified in Him was to be glorified also in them and was either to ascend with Him or in the millennium of a transfigured earth the men of redemption would meet with the Son of Man "in a kindly life and free". These are the dreams that took shape in the Apostles' Creed and pledged the Church, *ab origine*, not to a "shadowed home"—whatever the fabled "light beyond"; not to a world of the departed; not to a "serene and solemn Spirit Land" of Greek Mysteries; but to one of

* *The Daily Telegraph*, May 12, 1933.
† *Light*, May 26, 1933, p. 328.

embodied life, led in perpetuity, when all enemies should be overcome and death itself be dead. It happens in consequence that no Creed of the Church has anything to tell us of discarnate states. Outside such formularies, it was held in all simplicity that those who "die in the Lord" are blessed, while Sheol and perdition are the part of the wicked and of unbelievers, as the worst of these. The Church has no escape from these doctrines, and what part therefore has it in the revelations of Spiritism, veridic or not? The latter has searched its Summer Land, and all adjoining spheres, but has found neither the Paradise of Dante and its rapture of the Blessed Vision nor the bottomless pit of orthodox Theology.

To understand the logical position of priests and ministers who think it possible to reconcile spiritistic "news from the invisible world" with the faith "delivered to the saints" is therefore difficult, though it happens to be a point of importance for current speculations on the hither and further hereafters of supposed disembodied life, and for the desired recognition of their claims at the hands of Churches. Some seventy years since, Dr. Eugene Crowell wrote two serious volumes on the "Identity of Primitive Christianity and Modern Spiritualism". He did not prove it then and no one has proved it later—least of all the amiable Mr. Vale Owen, with his reams on the "Highlands of Heaven," its "Outlands" and the "Life beyond the Veil". Primitive Christianity is the Pauline hypothesis of Atonement by Blood and no salvation otherwise; but it is to be questioned whether one "spirit message" has testified hereunto since Rochester knockings crossed "the edge of the etheric". The truth is that no reconciliation is seriously in view on either side. The Rev. A. F. Webling,* having become a "convinced Spiritualist," would adjust the Church and its teachings to the new evidences by (1) "a simplification of religion" (2) the release of fundamental Christian truths from the "grave-clothes" of doctrines enshrined in Church formularies. He is followed by the Rev. G. Maurice Elliott,† for whom the Church's attitude towards psychic phenomena seems to pass into the limbus of things that carry no consequence, though the Church itself is recommended to pursue their investigation with reverent and patient care because the New Testament abounds therein. But the fact remains that the after-life of Spiritism, on the faith of all its findings, bears no relation to Christian teaching, either on the state of the departed or the so-called fundamental truths of Church teaching. It can find Church acceptance only at the expense of these. The loose thinking of lay people and incautious clergy may fail to realise this; but there

* *Light*, April 14, 1933, pp. 225, 226.

† *Ibid.*, p. 260.

is logic enough at the Anglican headships—at Canterbury and York—for the issues to be unmistakable there. Were it otherwise, there is the great dominating centre at Rome, fortified by unflinching and exclusive claims as the one divinely appointed teaching authority on all the things of Religion. What chance of toleration would be granted there to the witness of a new revelation? Indubitably, believers in Spiritism are wasting time on their ever-recurring appeals to Christian Churches: it is a foregone conclusion that the cause is lost.

There is meanwhile that other aspiration of the several psychic communities which court recognition by authorised science; and it is not to be denied that some progress is being made in this direction: witness, for example, the latest contribution of Sir Oliver Lodge to the links between physical science and the survival of the soul of man. *My Philosophy* has been called epoch-making by one of the lay reviewers and is the considered testimony of an expert who, after investigations prolonged through fifty years, affirms that "we are spirits incarnated in matter"; (2) that "our existence does not depend on the material body"; (3) that our permanent part is spirit; and (4) that a spiritual world interpenetrates this which is called physical.

Turning to current events, there is a tempered satisfaction in learning from the American Society of Psychical Research that its report on the "Margery" charges in respect of finger-prints is now on the eve of publication, and that it will be issued as a volume of "Proceedings" and not in the Society's "Journal". An end is therefore in sight for the prolonged period of suspended judgment commended and practised by leading psychological periodicals in England. Dr. W. F. Prince, however—who is Research Officer of the Boston S. P. R. and a former President of the parent Society which has worked so long among us in this country—has by no means followed the counsel and has contributed recently to the "Scientific American" his version of "the Case against Margery,* namely, that it is she and no other who secured from a living man the impression of his thumb on wax and that the subsequent prints obtained at her Séances "were fraudulently reproduced from this original by means of dies". We are no longer dealing therefore with the fantastic suggestion that there was trickery on the part of an alleged control who passed off as his own the prints of a living person, but with a formal charge against the famous medium herself. On a later occasion, Dr. Prince comments on the "paralysis" which has befallen the Crandon case.

It is otherwise with that of Rudi Schneider, the exculpation of whom from the accusations of Mr. Harry Price has been the

* Cf. *The Two Worlds*, May 5, 1933, p. 350.

chief feature of the psychical press during the last three months. There may be noted successively (1) that six Council Members of the "National Laboratory," who were present at the Rudi Séances, disassociated themselves emphatically from the Price report and its charges; (2) that Lord Charles Hope, another and prominent Member, resigned from the Council; (3) that Dr. Osty, President of the Paris Metapsychical Institute, issued a very critical pamphlet which challenged the conclusions drawn by Mr. Price from the "automatic photographs"; (4) that Dr. W. F. Prince has issued another challenge,* proposing a supplementary Report which should furnish answers to 44 questions arising out of Mr. Price's original statement of his case. Lastly, and of all most recent, the English S. P. R. has published a Report by Lord Charles Hope and others on "a series of experimental sittings held with Rudi Schneider in London" between October and December, 1932.† Being subsequent to those out of which the impeachment originated, they are mentioned here because Lord Charles Hope reviews Mr. Price's "Account" and things connected with or arising therefrom. It must be said that it contains a grave indictment on points of fact and of method. The conclusion reached is that neither the evidence adduced nor its presentation is such as to make the charges "count for anything against a medium with Rudi's record". An addendum by Mr. Theodore Besterman, officially connected with the Society, expresses cordial agreement, adding that in his opinion Mr. Price's Report appears "quite worthless as an exposure".

The Land of Psyche at the moment is more especially a Land of Debate, resounding also with other feuds than those mentioned here; and it cannot be said that direct voices come to us from the Land of Nous; but there are casual echoes to remind us of that desirable realm. When Sir Arthur Eddington, F. R. S., suggests that, "so far as is known, our future is not wholly prearranged by physical law," he is not opening a vista into mystical regions that some of us long to travel: he is moving in another direction.‡ And yet the far-off rumour stirs the heart. Mr. Gilbert Thomas, writing on George Herbert, awakens intimations deeper than those on the surface when he quotes a confession of the seventeenth-century poet concerning "many spiritual conflicts that have passed betwixt God and my soul," and the testimony that it had at last found "perfect freedom" in doing the will of the Master.§ Principal A. W. Harrison, in his examination of an affirmed "borderland country between Romant-

* See Bulletin XX of the Boston S. P. R.
† *Proceedings* of the S. P. R., Vol. XLI, June, 1933, pp. 255-330.
‡ See "Physics and Determinism," *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1933, p. 723.
§ *The Contemporary Review*, June, 1933, p. 709.

icism and Religion," proffers an unlikely subject for our purpose; but he tells of the Wesleys and of the epoch marked by their great religious revival.* We might do well to know more of those 34 "lay preachers" who lived and walked in the Wesley light and whose memorials are in certain "Lives," full of "rich material" and "deep experience of religion". A Yorkshire clothier relates how his heart "melted into the hands of God". A burly stonemason was so filled with "the manna of redeeming love" that he had no need for "the bread which perishes". A third testifies that "my every meal was a kind of sacrament," bringing "life to my soul as well as marrow to my bones". Here too was no fever of a moment, for these men and the others "worked by night and by day for periods of thirty, forty, even fifty years". Principal Harrison says, a little coldly, that they "seemed to have discovered reality through their religion". The truth is that they had opened a way of approach towards the deep centre behind all forms of faith, and the abiding reality of the Presence.

A. E. WAITE

SIR HERBERT SAMUEL AND SIR SARVAPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

[**B. K. Mallik, M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon.)** is a metaphysician who examines western points of view by the light of eastern canons.—EDS.]

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH have invited me to examine a review of Sir S. Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life* in *John O'London Weekly* by the Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel who is keen on a free interchange of ideas and views between Eastern and Western thinkers. Nobody could be more generous in his praise of Sir Radhakrishnan:—

> We have long had writers in Europe and America who have interpreted to the West the thoughts of the East; and writers in Asia who have interpreted to the East the thoughts of the West. Now there comes from India a philosopher who surveys the two and combines them.

Sir Herbert details the grounds on which his judgment is based:—

> The writer takes, indeed, all thought as his province not only eastern and western, but ancient and modern, scientific and philosophic; and he has the learning that qualifies him even for so wide a range.

But this high praise is followed by an earnest criticism which is mainly directed to two important topics that Radhakrishnan discusses: (1) Determinism and Freewill, (2) Intellect and Intuition. As regards the first, Sir Herbert is positive that Radhakrishnan has failed to give the quietus to the problem of freewill:—

> He leaves us puzzled as to his own conclusion. He does not seek, where it can best be found, the reconciliation between the fact of the human power of choice, and the fact that all events are determined by prior causes. That reconciliation can surely be discovered in the doctrine that each human personality, as such, chooses freely; but that the personality itself—with its physical nature, and its mental characteristics, its will, its power of choice, and the kind of choice it will make—is itself determined by prior causes. Or, as Schopenhauer expressed it, "A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills."
>
> He states categorically that "undetermined beginnings, upstart events are impossible, either in the physical or human world." Yet he is tolerant of the opposite view, for he adds,

* *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1933, pp. 582-594.

"life is a growth and a growth is undetermined in a measure . . . . . If there is no indetermination, then human consciousness is an unnecessary luxury".

We sympathise with Sir Herbert in his failure to understand these statements. If "undetermined beginnings" are inconceivable, if events and existents must necessarily be determined, how then could "human consciousness" be an exception to this rule? No doubt Sir Radhakrishnan suggests a departure from this Law only in the case of human consciousness; but this is practically suggesting two incompatible laws for the self-same reality, because human consciousness belongs to the same reality as the non-human. Besides, for the idealist at any rate, there is nothing essentially discrete or plural in the nature of Reality. Reality must be a systematic whole, an Absolute which is all comprehensive, so that if the law of Determination is to prevail, it must prevail for good and all. Only if Radhakrishnan split up the Absolute in a mood of philosophic anarchy, might he provide for both the laws operating successfully in two different spheres of existence, Human and non-Human. But that would be killing the goose for its eggs; and Sir Herbert evidently was more for the goose than for the eggs. But Radhakrishnan probably was not interested in solving the problem of indeterminacy; he was stating the position the problem occupied in our philosophical world. He was dramatising as a historian of philosophical problems rather than attempting to solve the difficulties. It is a queer position, for we cannot decide: we cannot choose, between alternatives, which is indeterminacy; we cannot deny that the law or necessity rules the events, which is determination. We always end up in these inquiries with a problem on our hands as if experience was destined to finish up with a doubt.

Sir Herbert's point in his criticism of Radhakrishnan's enigmatic position incredibly suffers, as he chooses to overlay it with an attempted solution of his own. For what he offers as a solution, *viz.*, the notion of personality, is really only another name for the human consciousness on whose behalf Radhakrishnan was prepared to commit even a logical breach of peace! If freedom can be secured and preserved within the range of human personality, why not apply the doctrine to "human consciousness" as well? For, after all, personality is only a phase of that consciousness. Besides, even if one granted a distinction between willing and doing, that is to say, between choosing and carrying out a choice, one has still to face the danger of allowing two incompatible laws (1. Indeterminacy and 2. Determination) to rule what, after all, were phases of the same personality. You have either to split up your personality or create a situation of alternatives each of which must be equally fatal to its integrity.

Turning to his criticism of intellect and intuition, we run into the same kind of difficulty. He writes:—

The eastern element in Radhakrishnan exalts intuition, and the western element insists upon intellect.

The one assumes that intuition is to be regarded as above reason, the other argues that it must reconcile itself with reason.

We wonder if Radhakrishnan relishes such a crisis in his career—a dissociation of personalities! In the age in which he saw the light of philosophy and which helped him so magnificently to nourish his ideas, a queer mixture of both the Western and the Eastern traditions prevailed. Sir Herbert, however, suggests that while Radhakrishnan's career as a thinker was moulded by both the Western and Eastern traditions, it was the Western alone which ultimately dominated his maturity; as evidence he suggests the fact of Radhakrishnan inclining more towards the intellect than intuition.

The religious intuition, he says, requires to be reconciled with the scientific account of the universe. And again, it is essential that we should subject religious beliefs to the scrutiny of reason. He condemns "confused irrationalism and irresponsible mysticism". Great

intuitions, he says in a noteworthy phrase, "arise out of a matrix of rationality". This gives Sir Herbert an occasion for rejoicing; for he pointedly traces all the troubles in the human order to the pernicious influence of "intuition" on the human mind.

> The world has suffered too much through all its history from "confused irrationalism and irresponsible mysticism". A great part of the antagonisms, conflicts, wars, which make up so much of the annals of mankind, and have brought untold miseries to countless millions through long ages, is due to nothing else than to the clash of opposite ideas, faiths and loyalties. Each claims supreme authority by virtue of the intuitions of its founders and prophets, and so long as these are held to be unchallengeable there can be no finish. The intuitions of a Mahomet contradict those of a Buddha or of the authors of the Vedas. Each are held to be valid in their own right. The outcome is seen in the antipathies between Moslems and Hindus; and the philosophic doctrine of the supremacy of intuition ultimately finds concrete expression in the lootings, burnings, and murders of the religious riots of Cawnpore.

All this is perfectly true; but Sir Herbert overlooks the fact that the world which runs on straight logical lines is hardly less wild if not more erratic at times. There is nothing in the rational procedure which provides for security or stability or universal agreement as a matter of course, any more than there is inevitable peace and understanding in the intuitional way. No doubt the clash of intuitions takes the form of the clash of authorities, or burning faiths; but it is a mistake to conceive the intellectual procedure as unauthoritative and equalitarian. When philosophers argue, they are supposed to do so within the strict limits of definite assumptions, namely, all that goes to establish the universe of discourse. But when a Protestant argues with a Roman Catholic or a Hindu with a Mohammedan, there appears to be no universe of discourse, but only one of discord. In strict logical terms the religious combatants behave like "absolute differents" seeking to demolish each other ruthlessly, while the philosophers are mere rivals with a good deal of common seeking to persuade each other. But this is certainly not the whole story about the philosopher any more than it is a fair account of the religious people. It is not a fact that the Hindu and the Muslim meet only to quarrel and fight to the finish, precisely because they agree possibly as many times as they differ. Similarly the philosophers have been known to differ as often as not when their universe of discourse tumbles down and they are left as naked swords clashing. A clash is a clash and it makes no difference whether it is the intuitions that supply its terms or the logical certainties. What determines its course and procedure is not its constituent but the nature and claim of the conflict itself. What it is and how it arises is another story; but it is a traditional misconception to claim for the rational procedure that it invariably produced order and agreement in the human economy rather than disagreement and disorder. If we are really prepared to go a little deeper into the discussion we may add that the rational procedure may well be supposed to begin with a prejudice and the intuitional method with a superstition. A discussion on rational lines invariably suffers from the deficiency of the major premise. In seeking to remove the differences between two competing positions, it only eliminates the differences or immolates them in the previous agreements. Its total output is only a discovery of the deviation or its absence in the competing positions from the original assumptions. And if it is liable to be prejudiced, it is because it has to make a fetish of either universals or fixed standards which necessarily cut out the alternatives and push back the course of thought to its foundations. What results is not a discovery of truth capable of removing the differences and disagreements but a smothering of them by what one may call a logical strategy. Then the disagreements revive perhaps with redoubled force, and we get not a discussion but a clash of competing views, a very different phase of the rational procedure. The original assumptions are sought to be disowned, and

issues are joined without qualms of conscience or associations or traditions. It is difficult to distinguish the rational procedure in this phase from the intuitional, unless we choose to emphasise their technique and constituents. A clash of intuitions is a clash of *ex-cathedra* claims while a clash of opinions is a clash of judgments and theories. In the one case, the opponent is the devil-incarnate without any rights and privileges at all, while in the other he is politely conceded the claims of a rival who still may be persuaded to see the mistake of his ways. Besides, the Divinity and the Supernormal Dignitaries are not invoked by the intellectualist as they invariably are by the intuitionist, though the laws or the mysterious impersonalities called universals which are put in their place are hardly less formidable. And further, when actually they finish up, they finish up with an impasse: and it makes no difference whether it is one of doubt or of suspense of activity altogether.

But we do not mean to suggest that Sir Herbert is not aware of the distinction between the common assumptions and agreements which seem to underlie all disagreements and the disagreements themselves. He writes:—

> It is possible indeed to pick out points of fundamental agreement among all creeds. That is the essential purpose of the Bahai religion, the foundation and growth of which is one of the most striking movements that have proceeded from the East in recent generations.

Sir Herbert is appreciative of the Bahai religion, a fresh mark of his sincere anxiety for peace and goodwill among men. But he is equally alive to the fact that "the creeds also contain doctrines which are mutually incompatible". And he is frankly anxious for their elimination. And naturally the whole of his almost innate prejudice against Intuition returns as soon as he seriously faces that need. He is positive that the "ultimate world-harmony of religious belief" cannot be reached if we assume that "Intuition is . . . . supreme".

He is right. If the question is entirely one of eliminating the incompatible doctrines instead of solving the difficulties they have raised, it is most unlikely that intuition will be of any use to us. On the contrary it is the intuition alone which is responsible both for the discovery of the competing claims and a steady insistence on them. It implies a frank departure from the universals or the agreements which preceded the origin of their claims. Here is a stand for the unique, the novel and the original in spite of the fact that the novel never comes to its own except in the throes of a conflict of incompatibilities.

But Sir Herbert must be equally aware that a considerable body of opinion will not be satisfied with a mere elimination of the incompatible doctrines. What it most emphatically wants is a solution of the difficulties they have raised. And if it so happens that they could not be solved, they would much rather dwell in the abode of the irrational or the incompatible than seek a false security or artificial peace in the land of the rational. Here is a clash of objectives which Sir Herbert cannot overlook. And it is not mere "atavism" as he suggests that is responsible for the reluctance of Radhakrishnan to abandon the doctrine of intuition altogether. Not that we entirely disagree with him when he says that Radhakrishnan sounded rather ambiguous when he discussed the doctrine of Intuition in its relation to Reason. But is it not better to leave with a note of a frank enquiry and an open mind when a steady light of co-ordinated reasoning is absent than to persuade people into a mood of certainty and faith? If Sir Herbert chose to go deeply into the real position of the Hindu which Radhakrishnan has been all the time imperceptibly building up, Radhakrishnan would have enjoyed even a sounder appreciation at his hands. For what Radhakrishnan advocates all the time is not either Intuition or Reason, nor Freewill or Determinism, but what is known as the doctrine of toleration or degrees of reality. We had already an

occasion to suggest that he was a dramatising historian in the garb of a Philosopher while he was seeking to unite the incompatibles of thought; we may go one step further and suggest that he was stating the problem instead of foreclosing it with a positive solution. He was upholding that the incompatibles were not compatible; they were degrees of reality. Intuition and Reason are not really antagonistic to each other essentially. If properly understood they are complementary and harmonious. And if we descend from these logical heights to the more concrete issues of life, for instance, religious faiths, social customs, racial claims, etc., we would come across exactly the same kind of relationship amongst them. A Hindu and a Muslim, a European and an Asiatic are essentially and fundamentally unique and independent. So that if differences arise among them, we need not consider them as at all incompatible but must take them as differences of degrees which under no circumstances should be allowed to interfere with their uniqueness. The question is not one of smothering the differences by tracing them to the fundamental assumptions or agreements. That way lies the Intellect which Sir Herbert, true to the old Greek tradition, upholds. The real issue is one of setting the differences against the background of individuality. The Protestant and the Catholic, for instance, may differ and quarrel as much as they like; but no differences that might arise between them need impair or embarrass the uniqueness of their individuality, so that if they have to quarrel they have to do so within strict limits. In other words, they might compete with one another but not behave as combatants do in warfare. And it is this method of dealing with differences that is called by the name of toleration, a concept which has been systematically misunderstood by the European except in stray instances of deeper appreciation. Even Sir Herbert did not quite succeed in escaping the wholesale misunderstanding; for his very first note of criticism appeared in the shape of a complaint that Radhakrishnan was not always clear enough in his statements and assertions though he frankly appreciated his style as extraordinarily lucid and vivid. We shall quote:—

> But the one criticism of the book which I would make, so far as presentation is concerned, is that the reader is often left uncertain whether a particular passage is the author's expression of his own view or his summary of the views of the school he is discussing. There has always been an eclecticism about Indian thought, an easy tolerance of varying doctrines, which has been a strength to Hinduism as a popular religion; and it is this disposition, I suspect, which has led Radhakrishnan, bred in that atmosphere, not to mark too clearly any definite frontiers between his own conclusions and those of the several schools whose tenets he examines.

We have no space here to discuss Hinduism, but we may just point out, that what appeared to be "Eclecticism" to him was after all a very systematic and consistent position, and if only Sir Herbert cared to acquaint himself with the doctrine of the degrees of reality, he would not have found Radhakrishnan vague and ambiguous, much less Hinduism an abode of the contradictories.

Calcutta B. K. MALLIK

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

It is a coincidence (we prefer to call it Karma) that just as we finished reading the MS. of the preceding contribution which examines the criticisms of Sir Herbert Samuel of the oriental points of view of Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, we received the latest pronouncement of the same British philosopher and politician. *The Tree of Good and Evil* (Peter Davies, London. 2*s.* 6*d.*) is Sir Herbert's Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy. It is a fine piece of optimism which recognizes that evil and suffering are co-eval with good and joy and that the former are the necessary bases for the manifestation of the latter. "There is no 'Problem of Evil'; there are problems of evils," says Sir Herbert. He shows that "there is no such thing as a principle of of Evil"; "Death is a condition of birth . . . . . We can conceive a world with neither; but there cannot be birth without death any more than there could be death without birth." Sir Herbert's address may be described as an excellent commentary on the Avesta conception of Good and Evil, as a pair "one the maker of life, the other to mar it, and thus they shall be unto the last." (Yasna XXX—3-4) He voices truly the pure Zoroastrian view when he affirms :—

> Evil conditions, like all else, are to be regarded, not only as what they are, but also as what they may be in course of becoming. The stream of time carries them along with the rest, out of the past into the future ; they may be changed or stopped as they pass.

Not only in the individual, attaining control and perfection but more particularly in corporate endeavour, national and international, Sir Herbert sees "the gradual improvement and transformation of society". But in the process of becoming "new evils will arise"—what of that! Sir Herbert pictures Time as a youth with a spade and a basket of seed rather than an ancient with a scythe, and he concludes :—

> We may believe that those whose ears are really in tune with the chant of Nature can hear a music swelling from her innumerable voices which is not a dirge, but a pæan, a song of life abounding and triumphant. And if in our world there are vales of tears, there are hillsides also of joy and laughter, and peaks of splendour shining in the sun.

While we are glad to see a reiteration of the teaching that good and evil in nature, egoism and altruism in man, work the miracle of progress, we must say that not only the why of the problem, but also the how of the problem remain unexplained. Even a little

familiarity with the true and ancient Eastern views would fill the gap in Sir Herbert's popular exposition which no doubt will cheer up many in these hard times. Our readers will find that the following extracts from the luminous *Secret Doctrine* of H.P. Blavatsky not only further explain the main propositions of Sir Herbert Samuel, but also make the treatment more, if not wholly, complete.

Good and Evil are twins, the progeny of Space and Time, under the sway of Maya. . . . Neither exists *per se*, since each has to be generated and created out of the other, in order to come into being; both must be known and appreciated before becoming objects of perception, hence, in mortal mind, they must be divided. (II, 96).

Demon est Deus inversus, is a very old adage. Indeed, evil is but an antagonizing blind force in nature; it is *reaction*, *opposition*, and *contrast*, —evil for some, good for others. There is no *malum in se*: only the shadow of light, without which light could have no existence, even in our perceptions. If evil disappeared, good would disappear along with it from Earth. (I, 413.)

A thing can only exist through its opposite—Hegel teaches us. . . . The Magians accounted for the origin of evil in their exoteric teachings in this way. "Light can produce nothing but light, and can never be the origin of evil"; how then was the evil produced, since there was nothing co-equal or like the Light in its production? Light, say they, produced several Beings, all of them spiritual, luminous, and powerful. But a GREAT ONE (the "Great Asura," Ahriman, Lucifer, etc., etc.) had an *evil thought*, contrary to the Light. He doubted, and by that doubt he became dark.

This is a little nearer to the truth, but still wide of the mark. There was *no* "EVIL thought" that originated the opposing Power, but simply THOUGHT *per se*; something which, being cogitative, and containing design and purpose, is therefore finite, and must thus find itself naturally in opposition to pure quiescence, the as natural state of absolute Spirituality and Perfection. It was simply the law of Evolution that asserted itself; the progress of mental unfolding, differentiated from spirit, involved and entangled already with matter, into which it is irresistibly drawn. Ideas, in their very nature and essence, as conceptions bearing relation to objects, whether true or imaginary, are opposed to absolute THOUGHT, that unknowable ALL of whose mysterious operations Mr. Spencer predicates that nothing can be said, but that "it has no kinship of nature with Evolution"—which it certainly has not. (II, 490).

In human nature, evil denotes only the polarity of matter and Spirit, a struggle for life between the two manifested Principles in Space and Time, which principles are one *per se*, inasmuch they are rooted in the Absolute. In Kosmos, the equilibrium must be preserved. The operations of the two contraries produce harmony, like the centripetal and centrifugal forces, which are necessary to each other—mutually inter-dependent—"in order that both should live." If one is arrested, the action of the other will become immediately self-destructive. (I, 416).

Lucifer, or "Light-Bearer" is in us: it is our *Mind*—our tempter and Redeemer, our intelligent liberator and Saviour from pure animalism. Without this principle—the emanation of the very essence of the pure divine principle *Mahat* (Intelligence), which radiates direct from the *Divine mind*—we would be surely no better than animals. (II, 513)

We produce CAUSES, and these awaken the corresponding powers in the sidereal world; which powers are magnetically and irresistibly attracted to—and react upon—those who produced these causes; whether such persons are

practically the evil-doers, or simply Thinkers who brood mischief. (I, 124).

Karma-Nemesis is the synonym of PROVIDENCE, minus *design*, goodness, and every other *finite* attribute and qualification, so unphilosophically attributed to the latter. An Occultist or a philosopher will not speak of the goodness or cruelty of Providence; but, identifying it with Karma-Nemesis, he will teach that nevertheless it guards the good and watches over them in this, as in future lives; and that it punishes the evil-doer—aye, even to his seventh rebirth. So long, in short, as the effect of his having thrown into perturbation even the smallest atom in the Infinite World of harmony, has not been finally readjusted. For the only decree of Karma—an eternal and immutable decree—is absolute Harmony in the world of matter as it is in the world of Spirit. It is not, therefore, Karma that rewards or punishes, but it is we, who reward or punish ourselves according to whether we work with, through and along with nature, abiding by the laws on which that Harmony depends, or—break them. (I, 643)

According to the views of the Gnostics, these two principles are immutable Light and Shadow, Good and Evil being virtually one and having existed through all eternity, as they will ever continue to exist so long as there are manifested worlds....Shadow is not evil, but is the necessary indispensable corollary which completes Light or Good: *it is its creator on Earth.*

As a Unity, Ennoia and Ophis are the *Logos.* When separated, one is the Tree of Life (spiritual), the other, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil...

The serpent, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and the Tree of Life, are all symbols transplanted from the soil of India. The Arasa-Maram, the banyan tree, so sacred with the Hindus (since Vishnu during one of his incarnations, reposed under its mighty shade and there taught human philosophy and sciences), is called the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. Under the protecting foliage of this king of the forests, the Gurus teach their pupils their first lessons on immortality and initiate them into the mysteries of life and death. (II, 214-15)

Professor A. R. Wadia who is not unknown to our readers arrives at the same conclusion as Sir Herbert Samuel in his *Civilisation as a Co-operative Adventure* (The Principal Miller Lectures for 1932). As an idealist he "seeks to fathom the one increasing purpose in human history"—there is persistence with which good overcomes evil in the world-process and makes progress inevitable. We have space to quote only his creed and his conclusion, which reveal the basis and the culmination of his thesis, both of which are Theosophical :—

Reality is spiritual and in the world of our experience this spirituality expresses itself best in the world of human souls. Men may differ from one another in the range of their capacities, but it is the birthright of each human soul to realise itself, and a human society is good or bad to the degree to which it enables each constituent member of it to fulfil his humanity. This is democracy in its broadest sense. It is not a mere matter of political machinery, of votes and electorates, but of the conditions under which man can become what he has it in him to become. That is why under an Asoka or an Akbar, under a Napoleon or a Mussolini men may be enjoying real liberty more than under a corrupt and mediocre political democracy.

Wherever they are born, men must learn from one another, or else go under. The highest goods of lief : beauty in art, truth in thought, goodness in life are human, not national possessions. They know no East and West. Their home is in the limitless depths of human heart.

Professor Wadia is outspoken about the religious and social weaknesses of India as of the West. Here there is orthodoxy and hypocrisy, demoralizing fatalism, and the need of " that zest for social service which scorns individual peace of mind when there is a cry of suffering near by". In the West there is worship of money, judgment by mere appearances, empty round of pleasures, a void as to the deeper meaning of life. Let East and West get together, to fulfil the purpose underlying their history, for " co-operation is the basis of life; it can be international and not merely national". But how? There must be similarity of aim and of principles of life and action. Perhaps these can be evolved out of the following words of Professor Wadia :—

> The East with its age-long conservative traditions is more cautious, perhaps too cautious, and suspicious of any change, but to its credit it must be admitted that behind its conservatism there is an abiding consciousness that the life of wealth and giddy pleasures does not bring out the best in man, that life is too serious to be reduced to a round of hectic pleasures, and that money cannot measure the depths of life. This consciousness is inborn in India and is the most relieving feature of Hindu civilization.

The tempting devil of Egoism is not only present in the life of hectic pleasures; but there he is even in the life of service prompted by altruism. Mr. John Middleton Murry describes him in *The Adelphi* for July thus :—

> Individualism is good; but economic individualism is the devil. Marxism is good; but rigid Marxism is the devil—it makes for supine superiority or insensate fanaticism. Parliamentary democracy is good; but the parliamentary game is the devil. And all these devils are forms of the devil of egoism. Of how many nominal Socialists to-day is it true that it is far more important to them that they personally should be in Parliament or in office than that the cause of Socialism should prevail? Of how many rigid Marxists is it true that their creed flatters their own vanity, by enabling them to dream of themselves as "dictators of the proletariat," or, more subtly, to believe that they have been through everything? Of how many liberal individuals is it true that their high valuation of "individualism" derives from their unconscious determination to justify their own position of privilege?

Mr. Murry would exorcise the devil from the socialistic body he is labouring for. But egoism is the raging disease which has to be purged out from every sphere of life. It has poisoned and weakened not only religious, political and social spheres of action, but also those labelled spiritual.