

# THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,  
and lost among the host—as does the evening  
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XVIII

MARCH 1947

No. 3

## PACIFISM AND POLITICS: 1946

[In this thought-provoking article Mr. John Middleton Murry completes, from an Englishman's stand-point, the trilogy of articles on Pacifism, the other two of which, from an American's and an Indian's points of view, appeared in our issue for November 1946. Mr. Murry makes out a quite strong case for the reorientation of pacifist thinking, although he weakens it somewhat by his appeal to the death penalty as precedent for war to force aggressor nations to obey world law. Alternatives to legal murder do exist and the arguments against the barbarous practice are numerous and cogent and are gaining ground.—ED.]

Mr. Hervey Wescott's interesting essay on "Pacifism, Politics and America" is concerned with possibilities of a new type of political action which, at the present moment, are real for America alone. They do not exist for Britain. Indeed, the beneficent economic policy which Britain has at last, in concert with America, decided to apply to the British zone of occupied Germany is possible—if it is really possible—only because of the American loan to Britain. We are merely passing on to Germany the American charity to ourselves—a real and present sacrifice for Britain, no doubt, but one which can be effectively made only at the price of an eventual default on the American loan.

Mr. Wescott advocates this benevolent economic policy as a relevant form of the practical politics of non-violence. I do not dispute the justice of the claim; and I sincerely hope that the policies he recommends may come to be the official policies of the United States. Indeed, if they could be applied now—and in the particular form of generous economic aid to Russia—they might have a potent effect in easing the political tension that now exists between the United States and Russia. Whether or not they are policies of non-violence, they are certainly policies of constructive peace-making. Unfortunately, the United States, alone among the Great Powers today, is in a position

to pursue them. For the rest of the world they are Utopian. And, still more unfortunately, the domestic political situation of the United States at the present moment forbids us even to hope that these policies will be adopted for some years to come.

Yet these are crucial years. The pattern of world-politics will be shaped in them; and what is done, or left undone, in the years that must pass before Mr. Wescott's benevolent economic policy is adopted by the United States as its national policy, will determine whether the world moves towards world peace or a third world war. The tempo of events, we may be sure, will correspond to the prodigious increase of the physical energies at the disposal of mankind which has occurred in the process of waging World War II. The next four or five years will see the world either set towards war, rushing headlong down the steep place—now so vastly steeper than it was even in 1939—to world anarchy, or struggling painfully and laboriously up the mountain, away from the abyss. That ascent may take many years, before climbing humanity can reckon itself secure.

*Facilis descensus Averno;*

*Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad  
auras*

*Hoc opus, hic labor est.*

In such a situation ( whose gravity and urgency I am sure I have not exaggerated ), what is the practical politics of pacifism? What policy, or policies, can pacifists advocate, as policies of pacifism, which have

the remotest chance of success, in the very definite sense of averting the catastrophe of a third world war?

This is a question to which I have given the most searching and pertinacious thought of which I am capable. And I am bound to acknowledge that my conclusion is that pacifism, in the now accepted meaning of individual renunciation of war, has no relevant or practical policy to propose to meet the world's need today. The pure pacifist, if he may be defined as one who subscribes, in writing or in thought, to the pledge: "I renounce war and will never support or sanction another," and who intends, in whatever circumstances, to honour that pledge, must, on peril of deceiving both himself and others, withdraw consciously and deliberately from the field of politics.

I think that such a pacifist could consistently advocate to his countrymen complete and unilateral disarmament. Provided he does so with entire honesty, that is to say, without pretending for one moment that such deliberate disarmament would bring any increase of security whatever to his country, in the kind of war that a third world war will inevitably be, I see no contradiction in his advocating complete and unilateral disarmament to his fellow-countrymen.

But I myself should be unable to follow his doctrine or his example, for the simple reason that I am convinced I should be wasting my

time. There is not the faintest possibility of converting either a majority or a substantial minority of Englishmen to unilateral disarmament today. The average citizen of the British democracy makes but one political demand: a national policy which offers, or gives a chance of, security in an age when the atomic bomb has been invented, and the ideological conflicts between Communism and Capitalism on the one hand, and between totalitarianism and democracy on the other, have become immeasurably more acute than they were before World War II. Unilateral disarmament neither offers nor gives a chance of the security sought by the common man in a modern mass society. Therefore, it is not practical politics: to be practicable at all, in the simple sense of being adopted as a national policy, it would require a mass conversion of the British people to an otherworldly religion. The possibility is so remote as to be entirely negligible. •

The only policy that offers the world a real chance of escape from the catastrophe of a third world war is a form of collective security. British pacifism has a habit—it has not existed long enough to be called a tradition—of opposing collective security on the ground that, in the last resort, the international or supranational authority must coerce the recalcitrant member by war. Under pressure of the new necessity of controlling atomic energy, the form of collective security sought has

changed, and what is contemplated, by the Baruch proposals, is the formation of at least the nucleus of a world government. Many pacifists seem bent on opposing that also. The Atomic Authority which America and Britain are striving to bring into being would be one which instantly imposed sanctions on any nation which evaded or repelled the inspection and control of the Atomic Authority. The Authority would have a complete monopoly, in the territory of every nation, of the production of atomic energy, whether for purposes of war or peace. This involves the creation of an entirely new kind of supranational authority which would directly control, in every nation, overwhelming resources of power. It follows that any nation attempting to make war would have to seize the Atomic Authority's installations. Such an attempt would necessarily have to be met by instantaneous punishment: which could, in the nature of the case, only be war. Therefore, argue many pacifists, such a system must be opposed.

If it adopts this stand-point, I believe, pacifism will become definitely retrogressive. It will be publicly opposed to the only system that can save mankind from the devastation and misery of a new world war, with the appalling weapons of destruction now available. To oppose a system which is devised solely to abolish war, and has no other *raison d'être*, on the ground that there is no other way, except

war, to coerce a nation which deliberately breaks the law in order to wage war, is to be guilty of two things: first of anarchy, and second, of committing an unpardonable confusion of thought.

With regard to the first, I hold that no conscientious pacifist has any right to propagate anarchy in the political field. If war must be the ultimate sanction of a new political system designed to abolish war, the right course of action for the pacifist who believes that war, no matter for what purpose or with what motive, is an evil which he cannot countenance, is to abstain, very rigorously, from all propaganda in the political field. If he does not abstain, he suffers the corruption of the best, which is the worst.

In the second place, to refuse to distinguish, at this point in the world's history, between kinds of war—and specifically between a war waged for conquest or empire, and a war undertaken in order to compel a criminal nation to obey the public law of the world which it has broken, is, in my opinion, an intellectual and moral equivocation of the most grievous kind. To declare that those two generically different kinds of war are one: simply war, and simply evil, is a perversion of truth. The moral discrimination of the English people, seeking to establish rules of justice, has distinguished clearly between no less than four kinds of man-slaying: murder (with many degrees of extenuating circumstances), manslaughter, justifi-

able homicide, and legal execution. They range from the absolutely evil to the socially necessary, and good. To lump them all together as murder is to bid a long farewell to truth.

So with the equivocation which lumps together as mere war, the war which is a perpetuation of existing international anarchy, and the war which might conceivably be necessary to establish or to vindicate the acknowledged public law of the world. The former is evil—unmitigated evil: the latter, I do not hesitate to affirm, would be good. How good may be judged from the fact that such a war has never been fought, simply because it belongs to a stage of world order which the world has never reached, because the nations have shrunk from the sacrifice required.

And I say that such a war would be good—not absolutely, of course, but relatively to all previous wars whatsoever—in the full knowledge that it would have to be waged (if it had to be waged) with the appalling instruments of destruction which man now commands. I am morally certain it would not have to be waged, and that if the new system of world order by Atomic Authority could be established none would rebel against it—because its benefits would be so manifest and so immediate. But that I should oppose and resist such a world order and public law because it might be necessary to make war on a nation that rebelled against it, would be, for me, stark insanity or, worse, a moral

irresponsibility which would be unpardonable.

If I am told that I have ceased to be a pacifist ( as I probably shall be ) I shall reply quite simply that if to be a pacifist means accepting an obligation to oppose and resist the establishment of a public law for the world, I never was one ; and if people have imagined me to be one, I welcome the opportunity of correcting their mistake. I was a pacifist precisely because there was no acknowledged public law in the world, and wars were the expression of its anarchy. This anarchy culminated in the hideous demand for " unconditional surrender " made upon Germany in the last war: a demand made because even the vestiges of public law in the world had finally disappeared.

The distinction between such a war and the war which might conceivably have to be waged to compel a nation to obey the public law of the world against which it had rebelled is, to my mind, as absolute as the distinction between murder and legal execution. And the distinction would be immediately apparent in that the conditions of surrender would be public from the beginning. All that the rebel nation would have to do would be to declare its willingness to submit to the law, and to such punishment—by way of reparation for damage caused—as the law would prescribe.

Furthermore, it is obvious that, in the system presupposed by a supranational Atomic Authority,

the first act of war would be undertaken not by the Authority itself but by the rebel nation, which would have to attempt to seize the installations of the Authority. The act of aggression would be palpable and flagrant. In so far, therefore, as pacifism has any relevance in such a system, it would lie in the effort to dissuade the rebel and aggressor nation from its crime. For pacifism to be employed first in preventing the establishment of such a system, then in dissuading the Authority from compelling the aggressor nation to submit to the Law, is fantastic and perverse.

Such an attitude can be defended only if pacifism is a creed of complete anarchism. If pacifists are people who believe that all public law, whether within the national society, or between the nations, is an evil which should be abolished, and that the only valid law is that which the individual, in circumstances of absolute ( and unimaginable ) freedom would impose upon himself, then, and then only, can they rationally defend such a refusal to establish or support a public law for the world. If pacifists are people who believe that men and women are so good that they have only to be given absolute freedom in order to be perfect ; if they believe that no man, and no nation, if left to its own uncontrolled devices would ever dream of actually using the dreadful instruments of man-destruction that now exist ; if they believe that atomic bombs and controlled rockets

were invented merely as exercises in human ingenuity and as objects for æsthetic contemplation, and that all we have to do is to let everybody who wants them have as many as he wants to play with, and then the world will be at peace—then pacifists are justified in objecting to a system which aims at abolishing war by threatening war on those who attempt war. For they object not to all war, but to all Law.

I have not met any such pacifists. If they really exist, they are an utterly insignificant handful of people. But I have met many pacifists who simply refuse to think out the reality of the human situation at the present time, or even to consider the flagrant contradiction between their acceptance and support of the Law in the domestic society to which they belong and their refusal to accept or support the attempt to establish a Law between nations. They persist in being blind to the fact that in the name of peace they support Law at home, and Anarchy abroad. They support Law where we might possibly do better with less of it, and oppose it where its establishment is obviously necessary to the survival of the human race.

I do not think the honourable name of "pacifism" should be used to dignify such lax and equivocal thinking as this, which will bring the name into deeper disrepute as the crying need of the world for Law becomes more manifest. I think pacifism can legitimately include two

sorts of people who equally abhor violence: those who refuse to be instrumental to the use of violence, for any purpose and with any motive; and those who believe that it may be rightly used to compel obedience to Law, Law being understood as that which commends itself to the common reason and conscience of mankind. Whether the first can honourably accept the conditions of existence in an ordered domestic society, where obedience to law is enforced, in the last resort, by violence against those who transgress it, is a matter for their conscience. Since, however, as things are, they cannot avoid being members of a domestic society governed by law, even if their consciences are uneasy they cannot escape to a society without Law. And intellectual and moral integrity surely requires of them that, just as they silently acquiesce in the sanctions behind the law of the civil society, they should silently acquiesce in the sanctions that must be imposed if any Law for the society of nations is to be established. They will maintain their refusal to be directly instrumental in the exercise of violence to maintain the Law, since they are themselves prepared to take the risk of living in a society which relies for its order solely on the laws written—often illegibly—in the individual human heart. They are citizens of another city: governed only by the Law of Love.

Those others may legitimately be called pacifists who, desiring just as

ardently to found the city whose law is Love, but, knowing how terribly far they themselves at times fall short of its demands, are convinced that the establishment of the Law of Justice is the necessary preliminary to the establishment of the Law of Love. They would render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's; and unto God that which is God's. They realise that the dissolution of the world is threatened not through its failure to live by love, but its failure to live by justice. Love, which is the fulfilment of the Law, cannot begin to be operative where the Law itself does not exist. They will therefore not merely acquiesce in, but actively support the use of violence when it is employed for the vindication of the Law which commends itself to the reason and conscience of mankind. And they will not shrink from being directly

instrumental to the use of violence for this good end. They will say, in my opinion quite truly, that the war which they may conceivably be called to support to maintain the Law would not be "war" at all. For all its horror it would be beneficent. It would be the price paid for the defeat of anarchy and the establishment of Justice: the war to end war of which in the past so many lying statesmen have spoken. It is the willingness to pay the price which matters, for, in so far as that willingness exists, the price may not have to be paid. They will say the time has come when pacifism must be prepared to lose its life to save it: for the life of pacifism lies in world peace. The pacifism that preserves its orthodoxy at the cost of world anarchy and a third World War has ceased to be a humane creed.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

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## THE DREAMER

A golden star in either hand,  
 A silver star upon your brow,  
 Between your lips a crimson rose,  
 Beneath your feet a gleaming prow:  
 Sail out across the tranquil sky,  
 Steer for the moon's pale harbour-bars,  
 And hang upon her ivory horns.  
 Your treasured pair of golden stars.  
 Leave your white boat beside the shore,  
 With silver star to guard it there;  
 Swing from Orion's belt, and dive,  
 Bird-like, through glimmering gulfs of air.

Alight upon the Milky Way,  
 Explore her potent mysteries,  
 Her secret rivers, diamond sands,  
 Lone islands in her foamy seas,  
 Till the moon vanishes, and morn  
 Steals from your lips the crimson rose:  
 Then through ethereal dawn-mist turn  
 Back to the house of your repose.  
 There you shall find your silver Star,  
 Your Boat safe-moored beneath the height,  
 Your golden Stars in either hand  
 Clasped—and the Rose of your Delight.

EVA MARTIN

## SCIENCE AND HUMAN MORALS

[**Dr. Joan Coons**, the young American writer whose first novel, *Without Passport*, was published four years ago, while she was still in her twenties, writes here of the widening scope of ethics, of collective behaviour and collective responsibility. But she does not lose sight of the individual in the group. She writes with a clear-eyed perception of the danger of man's tools becoming the end instead of the means of his existence, and of the need for "a true concept of the spiritual greatness possible for man."—ED.]

Science has become the great dominant power today. Through it we have the means of attaining a richer materialism and an economically secure future. It is a power that is changing our world whether we like it or not; for we may hinder the progress of science but we cannot stop it. The effects of science spread slowly at first, but with ever-increasing rapidity, until its impact has shaken the universe. In its expansion it has speeded up evolution to an awe-inspiring degree. We are acutely aware of its force, and our awareness has made us fearful; for science has also become the weapon of political bargaining. In turn we have become apprehensive of our morals: Man's behaviour to man has suddenly taken on a new, greater significance, and we seek in his sense of morality a safeguard against the dangers of his scientific achievements.

In writing of science and human morals, I would define "morals" as tradition, and "science" as examination or analysis, and therefore, the breaking with tradition. At birth man's mind is void, is slowly filled with concepts which form the mind-

to-be. Some of these are sensory or first-hand experiences; some are taught, traditional, or second-hand. All tradition is taught, but was also, in the beginning of man's memory, first-hand sensory. Every human concept was once in evolution and will continue to develop and alter in the years to come. Thought is built up, as cellular tissue is built up from cells, from individual sense concepts from the outside. The matrix of a mind is formed principally by education, so few, if any of us, are ever quite free of the induced psychosis of childhood—each has a more or less hypnotized life. The pity is that we are saddled in defenseless childhood with concepts which may or may not be verified by subsequent experiences. These concepts form a weight about the neck; on the whole, a millstone about the neck of civilization. Yet they are the basis for man's evaluation of his morality as an individual and as a people; for the morals of a nation are, after all, neither greater nor weaker than those of its people. Nor are they the sum of its people's morality, but rather the standard developed by the class in power. Circumstance is

the final determining factor allowing either good or evil to dominate.

Since all morals are traditional, and may or may not become obsolete in evolution, they must be examined by science in the light, not of the past, but of the future; for the present has no duration, does not exist. It is essential, however, that the scientific mind examining morals be itself freed from all induced psychosis. We cannot expect mankind's morals automatically to keep pace with science. An adequate morality always lags behind the innovations outmoding the existing standards and demanding newer ones. It is up to the scientist to show the way, to re-educate mankind, equipping him with concepts required for the intelligent utilization of the very forces of science itself.

The two primal urges are self-preservation and hunger. All others are secondary. So it would seem that the functions of science are largely economic and materialistic. But this is not enough. We have too long neglected the science of human relationships. We cannot create a new and better world merely by creating new and better implements for the advancement of our material civilization. Neither can we accomplish this by inventing greater and more terrifying tools of destruction. To say that we, mankind, must behave better or be obliterated by our own creations is a futile warning. It is as if one were to explain the horrible results of excessive drinking to a group of

alcoholics, and expect them all to set down their glasses. Some would heed the given advice; some would not. It depends on the individual.

Man has yet to learn a collective behaviour. He thinks of behaviour as the actions of individuals, and of the responsibility for this behaviour as the responsibility of individuals. Such a concept is no longer possible. Man must be educated to understand and accept the responsibility for the behaviour of mankind as a whole. No longer can ethics deal with man's relation to man as individuals alone, but as people. Today we need not a greater morality but a collective rather than a personal morality. Such a collective morality must be acceptable by the people as a whole. The true morality conforms with the needs of the overwhelming majority. But in the planning of this collectivism we must not completely forget the individual; for there is no gain in any human endeavour where man as a mass is supreme without any thought of the individual. Both are essential. They cannot exist separately, but one within the other, an integral part of it. It is not that man has got to behave better, but that he has got to behave differently.

Man needs most of all to be given an insight into himself as man, as he really is, not as the illusion we create. As Sigmund Freud has pointed out in his *Reflections on War and Death*, man's illusion becomes worthless if it demand that he live psychologically beyond his means. It is asking too

much of human beings to ask them to accept, utilize and enjoy the benefits of any new power, demanding that they automatically adopt the wisdom and morality which the use of that power intelligently and safely requires. An awareness of the dangers of a power is not enough. Neither is the desire or wish to use it wisely. These are only the beginning. Wisdom and morality do not spring up, but are acquired, must be taught. Education is essential. Here the bond between science and human morals is strengthened every day; for science has made necessary a collective behaviour for man and made the results of his behaviour world-wide in consequences. Our world cannot withstand the dangers of this collectivism if bad. Society must look to science for the answer to its problem, for its very existence. As science departs from the accepted conditions and beliefs of its day, it becomes the duty of the scientist to educate the world in the newer ideas, to give us a newer morality. Morals do not keep mankind alive. They only preserve his present existence, and so must change with the changes wrought by science.

In every age there has come to its people a time for decision, a challenge to a new way of life. Each time man has accepted, perhaps as bewilderedly as we. We cannot help being confused by the terrifying tempo of life today. And yet, for perhaps the first time in the history of his existence, man has it within his power to secure the material

conditions for a better life, a good life, for all the people of the world. It remains for him to use this power to such an end, rather than as the cudgel for whipping parts of mankind for the advantage of the few. Such a world can no longer endure. Our problems have ceased to be technical and now are political. In being political, they become those of the intellect; for man's politics can be wise and fruitful to mankind only if they come out of man's intellectual understanding. Disaster is surely the result of political reasonings springing from his ignorance, his fear and his greed. These can only lead to war; for war is the continuation of politics by a different means. So we ask of the scientists not only the tools of our liberation but also knowledge, that we become not the slaves of our implements but their beneficiaries.

We need a true concept of the spiritual greatness possible for man. Man must be given a faith, greater than his fear, a faith in himself rather than in the strength of the things he has created. The tools of his existence must not become the reason for his existence, lest he cease to exist in the spiritual beauty of mankind, and be represented only by his own inventions. His faith must be built upon knowledge and understanding; he must have the realist sensation of being benefited by it, must be made a participant spiritually as well as materially. We must demand of science that it teach as well as create.

JOAN COONS

## THE WAY TO SELF-EDUCATION

[ Nothing is a greater handicap to human progress than the defective educational systems of the day. As **Dr. M. Hafiz Syed** of the University of Allahabad well brings out in this article, the defects of modern education are rooted in inadequate understanding of the nature of man, of the goal of human evolution, and of the contribution to individual advance which education on right lines could make.—ED. ]

In this age of advancement of learning and universal education we depend much more upon the knowledge we receive from others than upon trying to acquire knowledge of ourselves. In our zeal to amass general knowledge of every description we neglect to attach sufficient importance to self-education and self-realization, forgetting that without self-education no education worth the name can ever be complete. Education in the true sense means self-education, because it is through our own self-effort that we cultivate the mind, refine it and train it for a higher purpose.

According to ancient Indian thought, the human mind is only one of the vehicles of consciousness. The real self in man, that which abides for ever, has three aspects—*sat, chit, ananda* (existence, knowledge, bliss). The knowledge aspect of the self is revealed through the unfoldment of the power of the self inherent in it. The more we think, the more our mental faculties evolve. Knowledge is not extraneous to self; it is the manifestation of the self in its *chit* aspect. It is not to be thrust upon us from outside. It is unfolded from within.

Man's spiritual nature is divine and therefore it has all the potentialities of divinity hidden in it. Unless we have complete faith in this divinity and learn to dive deep into it, we cannot possibly know the essence of things. The whole process of life from start to finish is growth and evolution. Nothing can evolve out of nothing. There must be something within to come out and manifest itself in its various aspects. So the first essential for self-education is an abiding conviction of and faith in the reality and power of the self which, sharing the divine life, is capable of infinite progress in the course of time. This self is common to all. Everyone, high or low in the present march of evolution, moves on by virtue of this ever-abiding self.

One who believes in reincarnation will hold, with some show of reason, that the exceptional gifts and power of the ascetic and the mystic have been evolved in a succession of earth-lives and that what seems to be a short cut to reality is really the last stage in a long journey—a journey which has taken the traveller to the threshold of Nirvan, a state of being, the essential features of

which are freedom from illusion and extinction of the desires from which illusion evolves. Thus we see that there is no short cut to the goal of man's highest endeavour. Everything has to be attained by self-effort and tireless exertion. All men without exception can, if they will, walk in the path of self-realization. Self-education is for most of us a long path which we can shorten but by following it; we can lengthen it indefinitely by straying from it.

*Much of our success on the path depends upon the start we make; whether the earliest growth of a man represents a good or a bad start depends in the main on the upbringing which he receives.* We are all born egoists. For self must be affirmed before it can be denied; it must be firmly grounded before it can be transcended. The desire, the belief, the thought, the will, by means of which we are to transcend self are constituent elements of the self; and it is in the service of the individual self that they must first be exercised and evolved. It is, therefore, no matter for wonder or even for regret that little children should affirm self and assert its legitimate claim with uncompromising candour. But the time for beginning to emancipate themselves from self comes earlier to children than we, their elders, are apt to imagine. Growth is in itself an emancipative process; and young children, if normally healthy and happy, grow rapidly from their earliest days on all the planes of their being.

For thousands of years education has been dogmatic, dictatorial, repressive, devitalising. For this, there have been many reasons. Patriarchal government, tribalism, imperialism, legalism in morals, dogmatism in theology, ignorance of psychology and—last but by no means least—the Christian doctrine of *Original Sin* are among the influences which have made education what it is.

Education as it is, and as it has long been, is based to a large extent on ignorance and distrust—ignorance of the child's powers and possibilities, distrust of his capacity and his good-will. Distrust of the child both presupposes and perpetuates ignorance of his nature. No attempt is made to explore its unknown depths to help him to realize an inward ideal and to seek light and guidance from within. His baser fears are appealed to by the threat of punishment, his baser desires by the promise of material rewards. In working for the examination the child enters into competition with his classmates, whom he henceforth regards as rivals and potential enemies, his natural inclination to regard them as comrades and fellow workers having been authoritatively repressed.

What happens to the child who is the victim of this type of education? For one thing, his individuality is systematically starved and stifled. His teachers do not think of him as an individual. They think of him as a unit in a class of twenty or thirty or more children, who are all doing

the same work at the same time and are all supposed to be in the same stage of mental development. Independent action on the child's part is strictly forbidden. Independent thought is discouraged. Little or no scope is allowed him for the exercise of initiative, of judgment, of self-reliance. No attempt is made to discover his tastes, his inclinations or his aptitudes; and the idea of providing for the satisfaction of these is foreign to the whole orthodox scheme of education. The last thing that his teachers contemplate is that he should be himself, that he should become what he has it in him to be. The suppression of the child's individuality has many aspects. Suffice it to say that the general tendency of the traditional type of education is to lower vitality, to paralyse natural faculty, to weaken will-power and to pervert inward growth. The ideal of life embodied in this type of education is diametrically opposed to the ideal of self-education and self-realization.

The function of education, we must admit, is to foster growth on all the planes of our being—physical, mental, social and spiritual—and not to repress it. With this end in view, what form ought education to take? The wise teacher will base his system of education on whole-hearted trust in the child's unrealized possibilities; he will assume at the outset that the child has an instinctive desire for self-development, for knowledge, for social order. He will give him as favourable an environment as

possible. He will give him, as far as lies in his power, abundant and varied food for mind, heart and soul. He will give him the stimulus of a magnetic personality, not the unwholesome stimulus of bribes and threats. He will give him guidance—sparingly and judiciously—the guidance that attracts, not the guidance that compels. He will give him instruction when he thinks it will profit him, and will give it the more readily and the more effectively when it is spontaneously sought.

In short, the teacher will do his best to encourage self-discipline and self-instruction, for he will know that the former is the real moulder of character and the latter the real fountain-head of knowledge. If the child is one of many pupils, he will encourage a free social life among them, discouraging competition as far as possible and giving opportunities for team work in school and out of school and for other modes of co-operation, so that the spirit of comradeship with the higher love and devotion that are latent in it, may have a fair chance of development.

The child brought up under such auspices would have made a happy start in the life of self-realization. One's own self must guide one into the path which would lead one, onward and upward, into the selfless life. No other guide can take its place. Each of us differs from his fellows in numberless ways. The education which ignores this fundamental fact goes astray from the

outset. One of the defects of the orthodox type of education is that it tries to force all its victims into one conventional mould, which arrests, or at least distorts, the soul growth of each and, in doing so, closes, or at best obstructs, the path of free development and liberation from the lower self.

We think of education too exclusively in terms of childhood and youth. It is really a lifelong process,

if life is being really lived. If education ends with adolescence, life too ends with it. *The life of self-realization is a life of unceasing self-education.* What does it all mean, then? The life of self-realization is the ideal life of man. We have to achieve that goal by self-education, self-discipline, self-culture, by developing the higher side of our nature at the expense (if need be) of the lower, by trying to realize our true self.

M. HAFIZ SYED

## SLUMS AND PRISONS

That the welfare of all the children is a State responsibility, like education, a conception which Miss Katherine F. Lenroot, Chief of the Children's Bureau, U. S. A., reports is gaining ground, should be self-evident. The primary responsibility of course rests on the home, but in connection with the child's environment the State has a duty which it evades partly at its own cost.

Recent statistics compiled in the U. S. A. and released by that country's Information Service would prove beyond a doubt, if further proof were needed, the direct ratio obtaining between bad housing conditions and juvenile delinquency as well as adult crime. On the basis of a recent

survey, the American Association of Planning Officials concluded that rehabilitation of all slum areas would cost the public less in the long run than maintaining prisons for slum-bred criminals.

It cost the public, for example, in 1945, nearly 150,000 dollars to maintain prison and reformatory inmates from the City of Milwaukee's worst ward, against just 3,523 dollars in prison and reformatory costs for offenders from the same city's best developed residential district. Thus, even on the lowest level of self-interest, the need for decent housing is made plain—a lesson which, unfortunately, India is far indeed from having learned.

## TOO MUCH FAITH ?

[Miss Elizabeth Cross does well to condemn the blind faith in creed, in political shibboleth, and, in our day, in the latest hypothesis of science, which makes the thoughtless, slaves. There is another faith—the true—faith in the Higher Self and in the long line of Those who have realised and embodied It, faith in the consistent and unchanging record of Their observation and experience, checkable by the enlightened mind. Springing from vigorous, open-minded search, based on strict logic and on reason and confirmed by intuition, such faith man sorely needs; but he can never gain it while he is content to walk blindfold—a blind man who could see and choose but who prefers to follow where another leads. The world today has not too much true faith, but too much blind belief!—ED.]

Faith is a convenient commodity, from the ruler's point of view. Sometimes it is necessary to have faith in one or other god, sometimes in the leader, sometimes in a more abstract power. Indeed, like the kind of obedience required from dogs and very young children, to safeguard them from traffic perils, faith is useful and efficient. But, as in the case of the growing child, faith or obedience is not enough! We cannot always be with our children to give them the correct, safeguarding orders, so we try to teach them to use their own judgement and growing intelligence. In the same way any democratic way of life requires each person to develop his own judgement. Judgement and intelligence are, it would seem, the enemies of faith.

"Have faith in the government," cry the firm party men, "Don't criticise, don't question. They know best. All you need to do is to work and obey." The faithful heed the advice and the government goes

ahead, happily confident in its own ability. Sooner or later something happens that is too obviously mistaken to be hidden and the faithful get a nasty shock. Had they been a little less faithful, a little more questioning and critical, things might, possibly, have been managed better. Again they might not, for the critics may have as little professional knowledge of complex problems as the present rulers.

What is most serious, however, is the pathetic belief held in so many countries, that a democracy has achieved a greater and more reasonable wisdom than has been achieved by other systems. Or, more accurately, that democracy has been achieved at all. What is the fact, in most cases, is that an imitation democracy is at work. Instead of an educated body of voters capable of forming their own judgements, we have an emotional mass that can be worked upon by cheap oratory. Such a mass is good material for appeals to faith.

What is needed today is not this type of blind faith in God or the government but a determination to develop a more critical attitude. This is not easy; it means work and study. What is more, it means a farewell to day-dreaming and a more energetic outlook in general. The faithful, of whatever religion, could rest in the assurance that, whatever evils surrounded them in the present, if only they had a sufficiency of faith the future would be bright. This attitude seems to be dangerous in that it stifles effort, gives an excuse for ignoring evils and prevents real improvement both of the self and of the environment. In fact, faith in some outside power, spiritual or temporal, may destroy the necessary faith in one's own abilities and capacity for effort. It is an ironic fact that the Christian religion has developed this "faithful" attitude, often requiring a completely unquestioning belief on the part of church members, whereas the fundamental teaching of Christ may well be that of effort reinforced by faith in supernatural power. Possibly this idea is too mystical and highly developed to appeal to the majority of the conventionally religious and so they cling to the idea of unquestioning faith and a consequent lessening of their own capacities.

Blind faith is, undoubtedly, a characteristic that has been encouraged by all rulers. Witness the title of the King of England as "Defender of the Faith" (and

therefore of the faithful), while Mohammedans have also the title of "The Faithful," and Roman Catholics are also in possession of the "true faith." Christianity suffers very considerably from differences of opinion as to what *is* the true faith, although practically all religions have been fruitful of heresy. What makes it so difficult to come to terms with those who cling to a blind type of faith is that they find it impossible to believe in the good-will or morality of the "unfaithful." In spite of ample evidence to the contrary, they cannot believe that those who do not share their particular faith (either in religion or in politics) can possibly do good works. The Christian is convinced, deep in his unconscious mind, that other folk are all potential thieves, robbers, liars and adulterers, while many an earnest Communist has the same attitude towards those of a different political theory. It would seem that unless ye do it in the name of the Father (or Karl Marx) it shall not be counted unto you for virtue.

The "faithful" number countless millions of well-intentioned folk, and it is the greatest tragedy that their faith has brought the sword rather than peace. To the normal, kind-hearted sceptic, it seems impossible to believe that the cruelties practised in the name of religion (and in religion we must include some of the modern State-worship which has a religious, emotional tone) are entirely due to the fact that the devotees believe that death is the only way

of saving souls. It would seem that some of this faith is merely a convenient cover for the expression of less respectable instinctive tendencies. The crusades, sometimes led by genuine believers, attracted to their prosecution hordes of self-seekers and sadists, as did the Spanish Inquisition. We have had similar unhappy examples within very recent times and, no doubt, will continue to do so while faith and unreason are encouraged rather than a less emotional attitude.

Faith, properly, should belong to childhood, to the childhood of the individual when he should be surrounded by those kinder, wiser and more capable than himself and so worthy of trust; and also to the childhood of civilisations. As we grow up we must be led from the attitude of faith in persons and in powers to an examination and critical appraisal of life in general so that we may grow in judgement and self-reliance. Any appeal to faith today seems a step backwards, unless this appeal is to a faith in some body

which is willing to give evidence and proof of its value. In the same way no government or individual has any right to ask or require a trusting attitude on the part of followers except on similar terms. This need not be unpractical, for, although it would be impossible to publish the expert evidence collected for every action, yet a certain frankness is possible and should become still greater as education improves. What is more, it is often possible to make many matters clear by careful teaching or by the use of modern diagrammatic figures that have, in the past, been obscured by vague, large-sounding words and phrases.

We may not feel that the unquestioning faith of the old religious times is any danger today, but may it not be that a similar attitude is growing up in relation to present-day scientists? Are we not in danger of accepting their dicta, merely because we have not the specialised knowledge to question them? And may not the last state be worse than the first?

ELIZABETH CROSS

### WHO CAN TELL . . . ?

Who can tell the power and pull of a word?  
 Supreme elation, deepest despair, all  
 Conveyed in one articulate breath! How small  
 A thing; and yet what of the breath unheard.  
 That pierces arrow-swift all solid things,  
 Transferring thought? A power that might be used  
 But for our timid faith so earth-bemused.  
 Who has not known this thrill the ether brings  
 And has not felt a touch of the unseen  
 That makes him pause and wonder? What has been,  
 What is, I know not—only know that such  
 A power exists. Is this as far as we  
 With sin-smudged unresponsive sense of touch  
 And darkened glasses are allowed to see?

P. M. BACON

# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EARLY ARABIC POETRY

[ R. L. Megroz, poet, playwright and critic, in bringing out the beauty and the charm of the poetic output of pre-Islamic Arabia adds one more proof of the universality of cultural appeal, independent of the limitations of space and time. Beauty, like truth and goodness, speaks indeed a language which all men can understand.—ED. ]

T. E. Lawrence, the Irish-Englishman, did not live long enough to appreciate the long-range effect of his work among and on behalf of the Arabs during the first world war.

His ambition to see Arab civilisation reborn and all the Arabs free from foreign rule has prospered more than any observer could have expected during the years that followed the Peace Conference, when he expressed his disillusionment in his Introduction to the original edition of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. David Garnett in his edition of *The Letters of T. E. Lawrence* reprinted the whole piece as "one of the most moving things that Lawrence ever wrote," expressing "the disgust and bitterness of the generation which had fought and won the war and which found all it had fought for was betrayed." But what Lawrence had fought for was in its particular direction distinct from that of the majority, though generally speaking all the young men expected their effort would bring about a better world, but "the old men came out again and took from us our victory and re-made it in the likeness of the former world they knew," he wrote.

This therefore is a faded dream of the time when I went down into the dust and noise of the Eastern market-places, and with my brain and muscles, with sweat and constant thinking, made others see my visions coming true. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that all was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dream with open eyes, and make it possible. This I did. I meant to make a new nation, to restore to the world a lost influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundations on which to build an inspired dream-palace of their national thoughts. So high an aim called out the inherent nobility of their minds and made them play a generous part in events: but when we won, it was charged against me that the British petrol royalties in Mesopotamia were become dubious, and French Colonial Policy ruined in the Levant. I am afraid that I hope so. We pay for these things too much in honour and in innocent lives....

Many brilliant English men and women during the past hundred years have travelled the desert lands occupied by Arabs from times out of mind and have written books of personal adventure and scholarship

as a result. At the end of last century, while the scholarly poet, Charles Doughty, was slowly writing *Arabia Deserta*, the fiery champion of the Egyptians, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, was working over the English translations from old Arabic literature prepared by his wife, Lady Anne Blunt, who was the granddaughter of Lord Byron. Her daughter, Lady Wentworth, still owns in England what is regarded as the finest stud of pure Arab horses in the world, which was founded by her father and mother. We were reminded of Wilfrid Blunt's enthusiasm only last year by the publication of a book, *The Authentic Arabian Horse*, by Lady Wentworth. This also recalled what an exceptional woman was Blunt's wife, both as traveller and as Arabic scholar.

Now the student of literature and lover of poetry may not share an enthusiasm for horses, even Arab thoroughbreds, but he will soon discover that the English poet's interest in a beautiful animal was more than shared by the old poets of Arabia whom he put into English metres. And as for Lady Anne Blunt, she was but one of several distinguished Englishwomen who devoted themselves to the study of the Arabs. Among our contemporaries there is Freya Stark, an authority on the Arab countries, and during the war she might almost have been regarded as a peaceful successor to T. E. Lawrence, because of her travels in Egypt, Southern Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq.

In her book about this experience, *East Is West*, she was able to describe signs of an Arab renaissance that would have cheered Lawrence. The unofficial activities of distinguished Britons of this kind ought to be remembered by the East as some counterweight to the less admirable tendencies of official policies.

By co-operating with his brilliant wife, Wilfrid Blunt did better than any other translator to show English-speaking readers the quality and importance of the early Arabic poetry which was a reflection of Arab civilisation both before and after the coming of Islam. The only work of comparable literary importance was the translation of the *Arabian Nights* by the scholarly traveller Sir Richard Burton, who died about the same time that Blunt got to work on his wife's translations. The first-fruit of Blunt's work was the publication in English in 1892 of *The Stealing of the Mare*. This is, in spite of the alternation of prose and verse, a most effective narrative, a romance full of characteristic Arab "atmosphere," for it blends the desert Arab's two chief loves,—horses and women, with horses coming first—and the old nomadic tribes' response to the faith of Islam while they were still living in a society conditioned by long Pagan adaptation to desert conditions.

Although conditions are being rapidly modified by modern transport and the growth of a new educated and professional class of young *effendi*, Mr. St. John Philby,

among other authorities, tells us that for the majority the ancient circumstances of life in the desert still shape habit and culture. In Blunt's day the conditions which encouraged the flowering of Arab poetry could still be found almost unaffected by Western progress. The desert-dwellers lived by breeding horses, camels and sheep, and wandered from camping ground to camping ground, according to the seasons. When the tribes left the permanent wells—their base during the hot dry season—and took their herds to the pastures of the spring camping grounds, the enlarged communities enjoyed a kind of re-union—song, feast, laughter and love were the dominant tones, in contrast with the arduous and dangerous period just past or about to begin again.

In these conditions, matings of the sexes were usually impermanent, and the minstrels sang or recited their poems of the triumphs or agonies of passionate love, and of the hungers and fears of separated lovers. This was the time when the Arabs became the earliest great poets of romantic love. This, with the themes of the desert background and their horses and camels, filled the wild Bedouin's songs with a picturesque realism and a grandeur which by way of the Asiatic Greeks, like Meleager, in the East, and the Moors in the West, enriched the soil of early European literature.

In 1903 Blunt published his metrical version of *The Seven Golden Odes of Pagan Arabia*, the *Mo'allákát*,

which revealed at its best to the European the source of a continuous strain of romantic lyricism in Western literature. In these we find the realism of the desert background and the great trek of the pastoral families and the brief unions and separations of lovers referred to by Blunt in his Introduction. We also find, as in *The Stealing of the Mare*, that in spite of such favourable conditions, passionate love did not dominate the Bedouin mind. But, though a famous horse was to the Arab poet the most worthy of themes for him, a more important revelation in this poetry is the vivid picture of the social organisation. This desert people at the time of the finest extant poems, dating from about 130 years before the Flight of the Prophet, was divided into a series of kindred groups. Every member of a group was bound to it more closely than to his own family. This was a survival of an ancient matriarchal system of female kinship, originally including the primitive marriage group. In the classical age of Arabia vestiges of this tradition remained in the comparatively high social position of the free women in marriage, who could claim the protection of their own family and group as well as that of their husbands. The women belonged to their own families and travelled with them rather than with the lover met at the tribal reunion, a factor making for vivid memories in the poet. It is interesting that the poet was a highly honoured member

of the tribe, often a chief. Sir Charles Lyall in the Introduction to *Translations of Ancient Arabian Poetry, Chiefly Pre-Islamic* quotes a later writer, Ibn Ráshik, who said that the Arabs "used not to wish one another joy but for three things—the birth of a boy, the coming to light of a poet, and the foaling of a mare."

The brilliant spectacle of the tribes coming together, at the time of the *ráhla* or general moving of camps, and the woman who has borne him a son, is the theme of the fine poem by Zohéyr, in the *Mo'allakát*. Om-Aufa has left him of her free-will, perhaps by his own fault, perhaps by cruel circumstance, but he expects to see her no more. The ode, in Blunt's version, opens like this:—

Woe is me for 'Ommi 'Aufa! woe for the  
tents of her  
lost on thy stony plain, Durraj, on thine  
Muthéllemi!  
In Rakmatéyn I found our dwelling, faint  
lines how desolate,  
tent-marks traced like the vein-tracings  
on the wrists of her.  
Large-eyed there the wild-kine pastured,  
white roes how fearlessly  
leaped, their fawns beside them, startled  
—I in the midst of them.  
Twenty years abroad I wander. Lo, here I  
stand to-day,  
hardly know the remembered places, seek  
I how painfully.  
Here our hearth-stones stand, ay, blackened  
still with her cooking-pots,  
here our tent-trench squarely graven,  
grooved here our camel-trough.  
Love, when my eyes behold thy dwelling, to  
it I call aloud:  
Blessed be thou, O house of pleasure, greet-  
ing and joy to thee!  
Friend of my soul! Dost thou behold them?  
Say, are there maidens there,  
camel-borne, high in their howdahs, over

Jurthum spring?

Say, are their curtains lined with scarlet,  
sanguine embroideries,  
veiling them from the eyes of all men,  
rose-tinted coverings?

Slantwise up El Subaan they mounted—  
high-set the pass of it.

With them the new-born morning's beau-  
ty, fair-faced and fortunate.

At the blink of dawn they rose and laded.  
Now, ere the sun is up,  
point they far to Wady Ras, straight as  
hand points to mouth.

Joy! Sweet joy of joys! Fair visions, human  
in tenderness,

dear to the human eye that truly sees  
them and understands!

As the scarlet fringe of féenna seed-pods no  
lip hath browsed upon,

So is the dye of their scarlet wool new-  
fringing the camping-grounds.

And they came to the watering pool in the  
red rocks—blue-black the depths  
of it.

And they planted the tent-poles, straight  
and fairly, firm for a dwelling-place.  
They have left Kanaan on the far right hand  
—dark-crowned the crest of it.

How many foes in El Kanaan! And friends,  
too, ah, how many!

But they came to El Subaan in their might,  
impetuous, beautiful,  
they in their howdahs of scarlet wool.  
O friend, dost thou look on them?...

Lack of sufficient space makes it difficult to quote adequate specimen passages from Blunt's translations to illustrate these observations and to convey the poetic quality which has survived in the English. I have been trying, however, to persuade an English publisher to republish Blunt's translations in a new edition. The still growing interest of the West in the Arab civilisation may bring better luck before long, and I may have the privilege of being an editorial salvage workman for the benefit of new readers.

Concerning the influence on European literature of this early poetry of the Arabs, many authorities might be quoted. Many readers will remember J. W. Mackail's *Lectures on Poetry*, in which he convincingly shows the likeness between the poetry of Meleager, the Asiatic Greek, whose famous "Anthology" was the poetic soul of the Alexandrian school, and poems in the *Arabian Nights*. The importance of the Moorish influence in Southern Europe need not be stressed today. Far beyond these strains, however, it has been shown that in the Middle Ages the English and Scandinavian literatures were imbued with a new idealism and a

new sensibility of human love because of the fusion of Christian and Saracenic elements. A curiosity of this event was that the renewed recognition of the importance of women as individuals, although stamped with the Christian ideal of equality, can be traced back to memories of those pagan Arabs in a slowly changing matriarchal tribal organisation. But for this the Christian Church would have succeeded, as did Islam, in keeping up the severity of the new patriarchal society that it encouraged at the expense of women, and, we may add, of human welfare generally.

R. L. MEGROZ

## SATYAGRAHA AS A WEAPON

Dr. Clifford Manshardt spent about sixteen years in Bombay, as Director, first of the Nagpada Neighbourhood House and then of the Sir Dorabji Tata Graduate School of Social Work. His *Freedom Without Violence: India's Struggle for Independence*, published as Human Events Pamphlet No. 12, is eminently temperate and generally well-informed and fair—up to the time that he left India in 1941. While considering that "the British have done better" in India "than any other nation would have done," he admits "lights and shadows" in their record here and concedes that "good Government is no substitute for Self-Government."

Satyagraha as a political weapon appeals greatly to Dr. Manshardt, who in his opening sentence recognises the ability to eliminate war as a condition

of survival for modern civilisation, adding:—

The war-method is firmly entrenched among Western nations, but there is one great Eastern nation seemingly destined to become increasingly important in international affairs, which by tradition and temperament is strongly pacifist.

The wide-spread acceptance of non-resistance in modern India—we should prefer to call it "non-violent resistance"—he rightly credits to the life and teachings of Gandhiji, who, he says, is a symbol, uniting in himself the best of India's past "and the noblest hopes for its future." But he recognises that the idea "is rooted deeply in India's history and philosophy."

Our war-weary world needs a clear, fresh voice and it is entirely possible that this voice will come from ancient India.

Ph. D.

# SUGGESTED MECHANISM OF PSYCHICAL OPERATIONS

[ **Louis S. Vernon-Worsley**, late of the Royal Army Medical Corps, who has specialised in psycho-therapeutics and mental hygiene, does well to reject the theory that thought is the product of the physical brain. But his approach to the rationale of thought is still from the side of matter. Thought is not the product even of such etherealised matter as he describes as "Auric," but is a phenomenon of consciousness. To describe the human entity, as he does, as "a combination of walking wireless set, radio-telegraphic and photographic apparatus, plus a sound-recording unit and a loud speaker" is to describe a mechanism without an operator. Of what use is a radio transmission apparatus without a broadcaster, or a receiving-set without a listener? It is the consciousness of man that plays both rôles by turns, and no description of its instruments can obviate the need for knowledge of their operator.—ED. ]

The day may not be far distant when that hoary and misleading assumption regarding the brain as the seat of learning, intelligence, reason, will be abandoned for a viewpoint that is gaining more adherents every year, due to the great advances in brain surgery coupled with reports published by surgeons themselves on their explorations of the encephalon.

It is a mystery how this theory has persisted so long. One explanation can be sought in physiology, which is primarily concerned with the functions of the physical organism, but who ever heard of physiology of the *Mind*? The suggestion appears fantastic, and yet such a hypothesis was recently implied at a session of the Brains Trust, by a member of the medical profession. To believe such a thing possible would be bolstering up the productive theory of the brain which, Prof. William James of Harvard pointed

out many years ago, was much too superficial and tantamount to calling steam "a function of the steam kettle," which is obviously false.

The kernel of the problem is "How can a physical structure like the brain produce elusive things like thoughts, which have neither form nor substance, although we know they actually exist? Psychologists state that the repetitive process of any given idea slowly but inevitably makes a thought-track in the brain content itself, which is the basis of that which is termed memory. In effect, we possess a kind of card-index system of inexplicable intricacy covering the whole of our thought-life, and to set this in operation we despatch a "mental messenger," so to speak, to the brain headquarters, which immediately supplies us with the desired information. Admittedly this is an intriguing supposition but it breaks down under analysis of all the

phenomena, and we must not allow ourselves to be side-tracked by its ingeniousness.

It is quite understandable why we naturally think of the head and its contents when resorting to reasoning, for habit has become second nature. This is not a valid excuse, however, for regarding an alternative view-point as a heresy and as devoid of common-sense, merely because sluggish minds with preconceived ideas find themselves incapable of assimilating new facts which have the support of a number of members of the medical profession itself. At long last, it is being recognised that the human structure is but another electrical unit in an electrical universe. Scientific experiments, by such men as Ferrier, Pavlov and others, have established that human nerve force is closely related to, although not identical with, natural or synthetic electricity, and that, like every other mechanical or electrical mechanism, it needs some form of motive power or energy to actuate it. Furthermore, there has to be provided a storage chamber, battery or unit, capable of holding temporarily and providing when required, the "current" necessary for its operation. Having negotiated that hurdle we have only to identify the "instrument" capable of these actions; and there can only be one answer, the Brain.

Situated centrally, with corresponding hemispheres, it provides a distributive unit of the greatest complexity but efficiency and, whilst

it may not be possible to analyse in detail the arrangement of the central nervous system, it is nevertheless feasible to follow some of its leading characteristics. Here we have an organ composed of billions of tiny cells of physical matter, each containing a minute "charge" of electricity or, as we prefer it, electronic energy. Radiating from this remarkable structure are the nerves or "wires" of the human "circuit" along which the energy is conducted. Like all power units, it requires to be "fed" from time to time with the ingredients of refreshment or "recharge," and, in the human case, this is achieved through food, sleep and the air we breathe. There is also a considerable reinforcement of these rejuvenators by the absorption of rare elements from the atmosphere, the exact identity of which Science has not yet been able to determine; it may well be that it is one or more of such components that contains the "vital spark of life," for which man continues to seek in vain. The repetitive process of charge and discharge (the latter notified by the onset of fatigue), proceeds involuntarily throughout our lives. The mechanical and unobtrusive nature of this operation has perhaps contributed in no small measure to the unawareness of it on the part of many persons of intelligence. So long as it functions, why worry about it? That appears to be the sum total of the interest shown, hence the shock when there is some

sudden and maybe painful modification of this automatic process.

Before proceeding further, a passing reference to one possible source of the theory about the brain's being the organ of the Mind and the centre of learning and culture. It is generally recognised by the medical faculty that Hippocrates was the Father of Medicine. So, harking back to the third century B. C. and the Greek school of physiology, we discover the idea that the frontal lobes of the brain contain Learning and Intelligence. It was therefore natural for the ancient Greek sculptors to fashion their classical human figures with prominent foreheads in concurrence with this belief, which still persists. There may, of course, be earlier origins still.

Up to this point, we have been dealing with entities which are physical and therefore "always in the picture" when the human structure comes in for scrutiny. But we have now perforce to refer to the "silent partner" or Aura, the other half, so to speak, of the dual combination of somatic and psychical, but which, due to its normal invisibility to the naked eye, is discounted by many as having no reality. Its existence is, however, beyond dispute, and several scientific books have been published about it, the most famous of which is *The Human Atmosphere* by Dr. James Kilner, Radiologist to St. Thomas's Hospital, London, for twenty-five years.

At first, it was considered merely some kind of physical radiation

without special significance, but such a belief has had to give way to something far more tremendous in implication, *viz.*, that the Aura is the area or field of thought and recollection. "We are literally wrapt in thought." While it is not possible here to go into a detailed description of the Aura, we may say that it is composed of countless tiny particles of electrically charged molecules vibrating at such great frequency that no instrument capable of measuring it has yet been devised. The Aura is, however, recognised as a "magnetic field" of great sensitivity, similar to a wireless aerial, capable of "registering" impressions impinging upon it from external sources, thus setting up within the framework of the human economy an ever-expanding field of accumulated knowledge. Put in another way, it is a "mental reservoir" upon which we can draw at all hours, even during sleep, and this may account for certain types of dreams. It is the realisation of this possibility which makes for the higher development of the Spiritual Ego. With this sketchy outline we must now pass on to the more complicated sphere of its operations in the field of mental phenomena.

The association of the Aura with the eye-and-ear mechanisms constitutes a complete "cycle of events" which crystallise into what is loosely termed Mind. There are two distinctions to be made here, however, one objective and the other subjective, covering the whole field of mental

functioning. The former represents those impressions envisaged by the somatic senses, while the latter refers to the operation of those same faculties regulated by unconscious processes such as sleep, anæsthesia, hypnosis and, maybe, certain forms of automatism.

Let us take the objective phase first. Commencing with the proviso that everything is originally external to ourselves, the eye camera initially takes a picture of everything presented to it by our concentrating our gaze upon it. But, before complete recognition can be established, that picture is transmitted through the internal photo-telegraphic system of the nervous organism, to the mental zone (the Aura), the primary requirements being accuracy of focus and clarity of the visual apparatus. Delays could, of course, be introduced by such abnormal factors as unequal vision, a diseased condition of any part of the visual mechanism—for instance, the optic track—but we are not discussing abnormalities. The sensitivity of the eye to rays of light will be reflected in the action of the rods and cones on the surface of the retina, and the result transmitted through the sympathetic nervous system, the pneumogastric nerve and its great ganglia, to the Aura. The completion of this process is [immediately reflected in looks, speech or action, and it is at that precise moment that a thought is born.

Another kind of operation, this time concerned with sounds, takes

place in the ear mechanism, by which we are able to assess such things as range, tone, pitch, volume or discord, to explain which further we will again have recourse to electrical analogy. Postulating the whole human organism as a type of magnet, the physical entity representing the negative pole and the psychical the positive pole, we have a complete circuit. The Law of Attraction and Repulsion is assumed to be in operation here as elsewhere, and so there will be a demonstration of affinity on the part of certain groups of molecules whilst others will be repelled. An outcome of these differentiations will be the continual regrouping of Auric molecules according to their individual characteristics, *i. e.*, visual assemblies of "images" or Aural associations for sounds, the normal result of attention to changing events, and the very close relationship between the two areas will, at times, exert a type of conjoint effect for dual recognition. On the cessation of the need for any such exercise, there normally ensues an immediate dissolution of the assembled groups, no matter to what category they belong, thus eliminating congestion in the mental area.

The very fact of one's being endowed at birth with a "magnetic field" confirms our view that the human entity is a combination of walking wireless set, radio-telegraphic and photographic apparatus, plus a sound-recording unit and a loud speaker. Each of us enjoying

a "wave-length" of his own, it naturally follows that reception will vary enormously, according to the sensitivity or otherwise of our individual mechanism, and it is in this very fact that the seed of doubt and disbelief is sown. This is also, to our mind, the explanation of there being so many different levels of

intelligence and ability, and the whole field of scientific endeavour is narrowed down through the inability of the many to grasp the enlightened outlook of the few. This is nowhere more apparent than in the field of psychical research. Well might Aristotle repeat, "Man, know thyself!"

LOUIS S. VERNON-WORSLEY

## CHURCHIAN OR UNIVERSAL?

The Edward W. Hazen Foundation of Haddam, Connecticut, is one of the several privately endowed philanthropic agencies which play so important a part in cultural and scientific advance in the U. S. A. The recently published account of its activities since its establishment in 1925 reflects its founder's interest in young people, not only in their economic and educational advance but also, and particularly, in their character development. The Foundation has sponsored discussions and published pamphlets on the place of religion in higher education, bringing out, among other points of value, "the ethical and religious influence of the teacher, whatever his subject-matter field." It has developed programmes in student counselling and it has interested itself actively in the expansion of international exchange of students and scholars and in the possibilities of "wide-ranging and inclusive co-operation in cultural matters as a means toward more ordered international life and the advancement of

peoples." It is profoundly true that, in the educational field,

any contribution, however small, which leads teachers and administrators to see more clearly the spiritual and moral nature of their undertaking, will be at least a small constructive contribution to the building of a more orderly national and international society.

One must regret, however, the circumscribing in practice, to some extent, of the Foundation's aims by an unfortunate tendency to equate religion and morality with Christianity. Moral and spiritual education would be strengthened by promoting the comparative study of religions in a sympathetic spirit. It would strengthen the authority of conscience by broadening the basis of the moral sanctions, since all religions have the self-same ethics as part of their precious core of common truth. It would also not only help to draw the peoples of the world together in mutual understanding and appreciation but also would confirm and deepen spiritual intuitions.

## NEW BOOKS AND OLD

### HINDU LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION \*

The present judicial system of India is taken by many persons to be more or less a copy of the British judicial system, introduced since the advent of the British rule in India. No doubt, the Hindu law of person and property has been retained, with modifications from time to time. But the present law of procedure, civil as well as criminal, is supposed to be an innovation transplanted from British to Indian Courts. That it is not so, and that several wholesome features of the present system were in vogue in ancient India can be clearly seen from this comparative survey by Sir S. Varadachariar, lately a Judge of the Federal Court of India, which furnishes a very interesting and informative study of ancient Hindu jurisprudence. Sir S. Varadachariar has spared no pains in going to the root of his subject, analysing the numerous treatises of the Vedic, Sutra, Smriti and post-Smriti periods and comparing them with one another and also with various ancient juristic codes.

One striking characteristic of Hindu jurisprudence which he has well brought out is the organic unity of law, morals and religion, on which the whole structure of legal sanctions has been based. It is true that in several ancient systems the legal and ecclesiastical authorities were the same and the King was the secular as well as the spiritual head of the people, but in

none of the other ancient systems was the organic connection of law with morality and religion so clearly emphasised as in Hindu polity. The very fact that legal treatises, both of substantive and procedural law, were called Dharmasastras and propounded the duty of man in every sphere of life as based on religious sanctions, clearly proves this proposition. Both in civil and in criminal law, the emphasis was more on duties than on rights and in the matter of punishment for offences, provision was made not merely for its deterrent effect, by imposing fines and corporal punishment, but also for its reformatory effect, by prescribing penances and expiations. Yajnavalkya says: "Having punished a person according to the nature of the wrong, the king must re-establish the person in the performance of Swadharma."

This was not done by casual visits of clergymen to the jails on Sundays as at present, but by putting the wrongdoers on a life of mental discipline by means of fasts, restraints, etc., so as to change their whole outlook on life. Contrasting Hindu jurisprudence with the European renaissance which "developed a theory of law divorced from theology and resting solely upon reason," the learned lecturer observes:—

In India there was no worldwide commercial activity, no decay of the ancient faith, no new and utterly antagonistic creed to

\* *Radha Kumud Mookerjee Endowment Lectures, 1945, on The Hindu Judicial System.*  
By S. Varadachariar, Kt. (Lucknow University, Lucknow. Rs. 4/-)

destroy the unity of Religion, Ethics and Law. The dissociation of Morals from Religion has no doubt been regarded as a mark of progress; but modern thought cannot be said to be altogether happy over this. "Without religious sanctions," says a writer, "morality becomes mere calculation and every man devotes his intelligence and education to outwit the Commandments."

The ancient thinker, not burdened with knowledge of details based on experiments and discoveries, made his contact with Nature as a whole, whether it was physical or human nature. He did not lose sight of the fundamentals of life when he had to deal with any particular aspect of it. With the progress of knowledge of diverse branches of nature, its whole sphere was divided into parts and each part was studied as a whole with the result that the mental horizon became limited to the particular part or science and the all-comprehensive picture of the whole receded in the background.

In the domain of the human sciences, each aspect of a man's life became the subject-matter of a separate science and, in order to obtain a detailed picture of that aspect, it came to be regarded as a merit not to confuse it with the other aspects. Thus man as an animal being, as a social being, as an acquisitive being, etc., was, so to say, cut up and enclosed in different compartments, each governed by its own laws and principles.

As a social animal subject to the control of society, *i. e.*, of the State, he was treated as different from a human being with a conscience able to discriminate between right and wrong. His place in the Universe and his relation with its Maker came to be regarded as of his individual belief, with which society was not concerned. Thus the laws of men and the laws of God came

to acquire different sanctions. The separation became complete with the substitution of State or Nature in place of God. Obedience to the laws of the State relating to the social conduct of men came to be enforced in a different code from that which enforced obedience to the laws of their moral conduct. The result was what we witness at present—Humanity broken up into warring fragments and conflicting ideologies with lawless "laws."

To separate law from irrational dogmas not based on eternal truths of life is one thing but to divorce it from its ultimate sanction, proceeding from the fountain-head from which all human duties spring, is like cutting a canal from a river and calling it a river by forgetting its real source. In so far as Hindu jurisprudence realised this real source for the sanction of all laws by which man is governed in his outer as well as in his inner life and their observance as Dharma, it will stand the test of time and will one day come to the help of men when the failure of the present civilisation proves the mistake of isolating the different organic aspects of human life and of vainly trying to exalt a fragment of dissected human value into a self-sufficient whole.

This, however, does not mean that ancient Hindu jurisprudence was a model in all respects and for all times. Although the source of law was traced to religion, it was not rational but revealed religion, in the form of *srutis*, *smritis*, etc., which were regarded as infallible, on which it was based. The test of reason was not applied to the canons of law as they were propounded in the early treatises but, with the change in social and economic life of the people, the laws were modified,

though not avowedly according to reason but by giving even artificial interpretations to the infallible texts in order to bring law into conformity with the changing conditions of society. The result was a jumble of conflicting commentaries and hair-splitting discussions.

Another undesirable feature of the Hindu jurisprudence was that, although the observance of all laws was considered a part of Dharma, *i.e.*, religious duty, and as such would be a common duty of all men, social inequalities were enforced as a part of Dharma with the queer result that Religion, which is really a common unifying force for all human beings, became a dividing force by sanctioning different treatment for different persons merely because of the accident of being born in separate *Varnas*. Thus both in civil and in criminal law the Brahmins enjoyed special protection and privileges. Sir S. Varadachariar has dwelt on this point at some length and has observed that even in mediæval Europe the clergy claimed immunity from the jurisdiction of the temporal Courts. It is no doubt true that in several ancient systems of law, the ecclesiastical as well as the military classes had greater rights than others but in none of them was the ground of exemption from ordinary law based merely on birth as it is in the Hindu system.

Another matter in which religion, or rather religious belief, played a prominent part in the administration of justice was the mode of trial by ordeals in civil as well as criminal cases, especially where evidence was not available. It consisted in taking an oath or in undergoing an ordeal of physical torture which might even cause death but

from which the accused was expected to come out scatheless if he was right or innocent. This mode of trial was based on the theory of divine punishment and was adopted at an intermediate stage of Hindu jurisprudence. It was, however, in vogue for a long time, even after the Buddhist period.

No doubt a part of it even survives today in the form of a special oath, as when a person says that if he told a lie in Court, he would be committing a sin for which he would expect to suffer in future. But that is a different thing from actual physical torture in place of a judicial trial based on evidence. The lecturer has, on this point, quoted *Mitakshara* which says that "while other kinds of evidence can only prove a 'positive,' the ordeal can establish even a 'negative,' *e. g.*, the innocence of a person suspected or accused of a crime." The learned lecturer does not of course justify this method, but his criticism of it is rather halting. He says:—

In a system in which guilt or innocence raised a question not merely of temporal punishment but also penance, expiation, social communion etc., a mere verdict of not proven would not have cleared a man's position in the eyes of God or of his fellow-men. The ordeal was expected to establish his innocence beyond doubt.

Then, in partial justification of this practice according to the then prevalent notions, he observes:—

The practice rested on a belief in the certainty of divine intervention to punish the wicked and to protect the innocent. If today civilised nations can pray to God to intervene in their wars to give victory to the righteous cause, it was a difference only in degree and not in kind if simpler people expected Providence to take note also of the humbler affairs of ordinary men.

It is difficult to see how there is only a difference of degree between the two.

Mere prayer to God for intervention is only a wish, but an ordeal is not merely a wish or a hope but an act of causing physical suffering and that, too, not as a punishment but as a proof of an alleged crime. In fact, proof and punishment are combined in the same act. Whatever may be the sincerity of belief behind it, it is not a judicial trial.

Let it be said, however, in justice to the Hindu jurists of each succeeding generation that, although they paid formal homage to the alleged revealed character of the religious texts on which they based their law, they were practical men and sought to introduce Reason (*Tarka*) also in purporting to interpret the texts. In later times, the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya was a practical code of life based on experience and practical outlook. Even before that, the change had already begun and Brihaspati said: "A matter should not be determined merely on the basis of the Sastras; if the trial is devoid of 'yukti' (worldly knowledge or experience), Dharma may be defeated." In the same manner, custom, which is the same as the crystallised experience of generations, came to be regarded as on a footing of equality with the rules of the Sastras and sometimes even as displacing them. Thus the Hindu Code came to acquire a worldly as well as a religious aspect, although it never has departed from its ultimate religious foundation. Sir S. Varadachariar has exhaustively traced this metamorphosis by citing successive commentaries on ancient texts.

The learned lecturer has dealt exhaustively also with the machinery of dispensing justice, viz., the hierarchy of Courts, their powers, rules of pleading,

mode of proof, execution of decrees, etc. It would be a surprise to the modern lawyer to know that a number of legal rules and principles with which he is familiar today were embodied in Hindu jurisprudence.

The law of adverse possession was recognised. Unlawful possession ripening into a lawful title by mere lapse of time was likened to milk by lapse of time becoming curd. The rule about misjoinder of claims was recognised in the principle that in one proceeding between parties there can be no trial of two disputes but that, where the matter can be proved by the same evidence, the whole claim may be regarded as one proceeding.

The doctrine of *res judicata* was recognised and also the right of appeal and review. Among the grounds for reopening a case was one which is not recognised in the present law, viz., the witnesses' having committed perjury. It would be interesting to our judges to note that if a man lost his suit through the dishonesty of witnesses or on account of the fault of judges, not only the party who obtained a wrong victory was liable to punishment but the judges also were. Interim remedies, like attachment or arrest before judgment, injunction and even receivership were also provided for.

Sir S. Varadachariar has pointed out many other provisions in the administration of justice which clearly show that the judicial system in ancient India was based on principles which have stood the test of time and have survived in modern jurisprudence. Every student of Hindu Law will considerably profit by a study of Sir S. Varadachariar's lectures, which are not merely of academic interest but of practical use for a systematic study of the Science of Jurisprudence. He has taken us into the past of our ancient culture, a knowledge of which is essential to understand its present characteristics, and for this he deserves the thanks of lawyers as well as of laymen.

H. V. DIVATIA

## AN ARABIAN MYSTIC \*

*Ibn Maskawaih : A Study of His "Al-Fauz al-Asghar"* is a scholarly little work by Khwaja Sahib Abdul Hamid, Lecturer in Philosophy at the Government College, Lahore.

Ibn Maskawaih, who died in 1030 A. D., was a personality of very considerable historical importance. He held the office of treasurer to Adud-al-Dawlah (949-983), the greatest of the Buwayhid dynasty of Shiraz; but is best known as a historian. Those were the palmy days of Arab philosophy. Alkindi had lived till 870, al-Farabi till 950. Ibn Sina (Avicenna, as his name has been transformed in European languages) was born in 980 and died in 1037. Ibn Rushd (more familiar as Averroes) lived from 1126 to 1198. Coming into competition with these leaders of Arabian philosophy, it is not surprising that Ibn Maskawaih's philosophic works (as is stated by the author with whom we are immediately concerned) are not as often referred to as his historical works. The latter are, on the other hand, considered as the most important contemporary authorities for the times they cover.

Khwaja Abdul Hamid does not give us a translation of *Al-Fauz al-Asghar* but takes us methodically through its thirty sections. The arguments contained in each section are fully stated and commented upon critically and logically. These thirty sections deal with three topics: (1) The proof of the Maker, (2) the soul and its states and (3) Prophethood. To each of these topics an equal number of sections is allotted.

The questions dealt with have been the subject of philosophic discussion through the centuries and in the most widely diversified civilizations; but have not been exhausted or set at rest. Ibn Maskawaih's treatment is still interesting and often suggestive, and no greater praise is called for. It is not surprising that his methods of argument often echo Plato, since during the ninth and tenth centuries the Arabs translated into their own language the Greek Classics, having fallen under the spell of the Greeks as completely as the Romans had done after conquering Greece.

We cannot here attempt to follow out the reasoning of this little tract. It will be enough to refer to two typical passages and to resist the temptation of referring to more.

If the ordinary man, the author tells us in one place, desires direct apprehension of God's existence in all its obviousness, he should purify his reason of all sensuous associations. Reason unclouded by sense will at once reflect God's existence in all its glory and perfection.

Such a passage may be pronounced to be a platitude or may be pondered upon for its profundity. It all depends on the frame of mind in which the discussion is approached. Plato and Aristotle did not scorn to speculate about the nature of the Divine, and probably their conclusions were (viewed from one angle) almost identical with those of Professor James; but the latter may appear to have expressed them in terms making a more direct appeal to "the ordinary man" of our times who desires to reason on the subject.

\* *Ibn Maskawaih : A Study of His "Al-Fauz al-Asghar."* By KHWAJA ABDUL HAMID, M.A. (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. Rs. 2/8)

The proposition may be stated in the terms adopted by Ibn Maskawaih, or we may prefer to say that the main justification for believing in the existence of God is religious experience itself. Ought the choice of expression or the mode of approach really to make much difference? May we not indeed go the whole length and say that if any one's religious experience results in a desire to deny the existence of God ( and, let us add in an undertone, to substitute some other form of mystic communion with the Unseen, or of steeping the mind in spirituality ), does it make any difference? No doubt there are some to whom these expressions offer neither meaning nor attraction. But even that need not cause any uneasiness. They all may lead to the path of the good life. They may all result from seeking to attain the knowledge of that path. As the Sufis never tired of insisting, whither we are being led, we do not know. We are all too unworthy to know. All we can attain to, all we need, is the search.

The other passage to which reference might be made is of a very different interest. Ibn Maskawaih explains in some detail the evolution of the soul, how, stage by stage, it develops and attains higher and higher grades.

His principle of evolution is this: the Spirit or that manifestation of it which is the Rational Soul, evolves from the humblest stage of existence, the mineral, to the stage of man

and beyond. The "beyond" stands for that being in whom "manhood" receives its perfection, viz. "the prophet." The prophet represents the human race reaching its perfection. But for the ordinary man also there are similar and parallel stages of development, stages where his manhood becomes less and less corporeal and more and more spiritual.

Khwaja Sahib Abdul Hamid Khan comments on this:—

The superiority of this principle of assessment of all evolutionary progress to such principles as "natural selection," "adaptation to environment" etc. is obvious, for a stone, a plant and even a dead body are all equally good instances of "natural selection" and all are equally well adapted to their respective environments.

Superiority, he says, must consist in something that "one existent in the corporeal world...possesses and the others do not."

The language in which both the thesis of Ibn Maskawaih and the observations of Khwaja Sahib Abdul Hamid Khan are presented attracts the reader by its clearness and its dignity. The printing and the paper of the book are soothing both to the eye and the touch. But the two pages forming the index must, it is apprehended, be excepted from this praise; and the exterior of the book as a whole is rendered garish by the greenish-blue binding cloth, the bold red on the top edge, and the white of the fore and bottom edges, all contrasting with each other and heightening the painful effect. The ancient loyalty that books owe to the mind.—But that can be completely fulfilled without hurting the eyes.

FAIZ B. TYABJI

## HOME DEMONSTRATION \*

This book, describing developments in Home Demonstration Work among farm women and girls in North Carolina from 1911 to 1944, should greatly interest Indian readers, especially since the villages have become the basis of the reconstruction plans. It reveals

what home demonstration achieved in the Southern States in raising the standard of living, both economic and cultural, among farm people.

The primary idea of these demonstrations was to teach farm women and girls ways to earn an income. By 1911,

\* *When We're Green We Grow.* By JANE SIMPSON MCKIMMON. (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N. C., U. S. A. \$4.00)

Boys' Corn Clubs, an outgrowth of farm demonstration work, were in full swing and each boy's acre, cultivated on scientific lines, produced a doubled, a trebled or sometimes a quadrupled yield, thus enabling a boy to earn a good income from the land and at the same time to have some fun. Farm girls felt the need for clubs on the same lines. As a first step in the Home Demonstration work, it was decided to instruct farm girls in growing tomatoes on one-tenth of an acre and canning them for sale. Want of finances and lack of trained women for appointment as Home Demonstration agents were some of the initial difficulties.

Jane S. McKimmon was one of the first five home demonstration agents appointed and is conversant with every detail in the working out of the plan. The first lessons in canning, the difficulties in handling the tools and creating markets for the canned products, and the farm girls' efforts to advertise the canned tomatoes for sale in their home counties make a very interesting account, giving the reader an insight into the problems connected with organising a new small-scale industry in a rural area. What the "Canning Clubs" achieved within a year or two is evidenced by the fact that many of the farm girls were able to pay for their college education from the money earned. Their enthusiasm soon induced their mothers to join the canning project and that led to the expansion of the work to suit farm women's needs. By 1916, the work had expanded into a definite programme of home economics and agriculture and nearly 3,000 women were enrolled. Mrs. McKimmon states:

In Women's Clubs the members gardened and canned; they became conscious of what

constituted insanitary conditions; they improved their homes and saved time by inducing their husbands to bring the pump into the kitchen; they installed home-made sinks; they raised the height of their work tables and other equipment and increased storage-space; they made kitchen cabinets, wheeled trays, fireless cookers and iceless refrigerators; they learned to cut, fit and make their own dresses; they tried their hands at cleaning and remodelling garments and some became skilful in making very presentable hats. They learned something of the nutrition value of the vegetables and other food which they were producing and the whole family was better fed when women added good cookery to their skills.

To have achieved all these results within a short period in all the Southern States reflects no small degree of credit on the organisers. The hardships that the home demonstration agents had to undergo, and the zeal with which they trekked from county to county to organise clubs for girls and women or give demonstrations at these clubs, speak well for their devotion to their work.

As the Canning Clubs' work expanded the girls were instructed in home economics and agricultural work. Four or five times a year there were joint meetings of corn-club members and canning-club girls where members told about their projects. Later this co-operation developed excellent joint demonstrations by farm girls and farm boys carrying out in their homes what they had learnt in the clubs.

Thus the book gives a clear idea of how a rural reconstruction programme for women and girls may be worked out in any country. It is in simple language and gives a realistic picture of the gradual development. Many of the illustrations are photographs of demonstration classes at work. This is a book to be recommended to everyone interested in rural welfare work.

LEELABAI PHADKE

## THE PLANT LORE OF ANCIENT INDIA \*

In any history of the plant sciences of the world on a comprehensive scale the contribution of ancient India deserves a distinct place but in the absence of special monographs dealing with the history of each nutritive or medicinal plant, this contribution hardly gets recognition in standard books on the plant sciences published outside India. This fact was pointedly brought to my notice by Dr. Birbal Sahni, F. R. S., our famous botanist of international reputation, who happened to read with appreciation my paper on the *History of the Fig (Añjira, Ficus Carica)*<sup>1</sup> and desired me to publish similar studies on the history of other Indian plants of medicinal or nutritive value. He also brought to my notice a valuable book on the *History of Plant Sciences* by Howard S. Reed,<sup>2</sup> a review of which he published in 1942 in *Current Science*, Calcutta ( p. 369 ). While this book has two chapters<sup>3</sup>

on the history of the plant lore of the ancients where Egypt and Assyria, Greece

and Rome, China and early America are all adequately treated... one looks in vain for a bare mention of Ancient India which was certainly well abreast of the times and gave much that the West has assimilated, though not always gracefully acknowledged.

Dr. Sahni rightly observes that the " Retrogressive Period " ( Chapter IV of Reed's book ) was retrogressive only so far as Occidental nations were concerned.

Side by side with my numerous studies<sup>4</sup> pertaining to the history of different branches of Sanskrit learning, I have been studying during the last fifteen years the history of Indian medicine and allied subjects and have published about forty papers<sup>5</sup> on this history in several Oriental journals. I therefore lost no time in studying Reed's book and was convinced of the justice of Dr. Sahni's observations on it, both in his review and in his letter of 12th January 1943.<sup>6</sup> This incentive to my studies was further enhanced by inquiries about the history of Indian

\* *Anjira ( Ficus Carica or Fig )*. Hindi. ( Bharatiya-Dravya Guna Granthamala No. 2, Vijnana-Parishad, Prayag, 1943. As. 12 ); *Somtha ( Dry Ginger )*. Hindi. ( B. D. G. Granthamala No. 3, Bhargava Pustakalaya, Benares, 1945. As. 12 ); *Triphala ( Three Fruits )*. Hindi. ( Vijnana Parishad, Prayag, 2nd Edition, 1944. Rs. 2/4 ), All by PANDIT RAMESH BEDI, Ayurvedalamkara. ( Available from him at the Himalaya Herbal Institute, Badami Bagh, Lahore ( Panjab, India ).

<sup>1</sup> *Vide The New Indian Antiquary ( 1941-2 )*, Vol. IV, pp. 125-136.

<sup>2</sup> ( *Chronica Botanica Co.*, Waltham, Mass., U. S. A. 1942 ).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-30.

<sup>4</sup> See *Bibliography* of my 202 Research Papers published in 1941 : Items Nos. 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 42, 60, 96, 100, 112, 113, 131, 135, 138, 151, 165, 170, 171 and 198, pertaining to Indian medicine. Other papers published since 1941 will be included in my *Revised Bibliography*, to be published shortly.

<sup>5</sup> A complete list of these papers is given in my Introduction to an edition of the *Carakasamhita* to be published at Jamnagar by Dr. P. M. Mehta, Chief Medical Officer of the Jamnagar State, on behalf of his Ayurvedic Association.

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Sahni wrote to me : " I have read with much interest your Notes on the " History of the Fig ( *Ficus Carica* ). " I think you would be doing a great service to Indian Botany if similarly you were to work out the history of our knowledge of other common Indian plants of medicinal or nutrition value. Our own ignorance concerning this subject is colossal and we can scarcely blame the Western writers if they ignore the ancient Hindu knowledge of the plant sciences. "

crops from Dr. B. S. Kadam, then Assistant Agricultural Commissioner to the Government of India and now Director of Tobacco Research, deputed by the Government to the U. S. A. and Canada for further study of this subject. Last but not least came the inquiry from Dr. Sadgopal, chief chemist of the Hindustan Aromatic Company of Naini (Allahabad) about the history of Indian aromatics, which involved a study of the history of aromatic plants and their products. The cumulative effect of all these inquiries coming from responsible scholars was to encourage me to continue my studies in these subjects with greater zest. Some results of these studies have already been published in my papers on the "History of *Jawār (Holcus Sorghum)*,"<sup>1</sup> "History of *Canaka (Cicarietinum or Gram)*"<sup>2</sup> and the "History of Indian Cosmetics."<sup>3</sup>

My studies in the history of Indian plants on the strength of Indian sources have convinced me that so far this branch of Indology has been almost neglected by our Indologists and consequently our ancient Indian plant lore, for a systematic history of which there is abundant material in Jain, Buddhist and Brahmanical texts, has remained unnoticed in responsible Oriental journals during the last hundred years or so.

In recent years a serious attempt to meet this deficiency has been made by

Dr. G. P. Majumdar of Calcutta by the publication of his numerous papers and three important books.<sup>4</sup> Dr. Majumdar's studies are very valuable for all serious students of ancient Indian culture as they reveal this culture in plant perspective. In fact a perusal of these studies will not fail to impress the reader with Dr. Majumdar's spirit of reverence for plants, as the indebtedness of humanity to plants is too deep for words and too mystic to be understood by our present-day botanists. It is no wonder that certain plants were worshipped by the ancient Indians and are worshipped in India today.

The foregoing lines will, I believe, amply show the necessity of studying the history of ancient Indian plant lore on the strength of original sources, both Sanskrit and non-Sanskrit. For such a history the efforts of one or two scholars will be of no avail. Personally I have come to realise the importance of this study rather too late in my research career of thirty years. I am therefore glad to find that a scholar from Lahore, Pandit Ramesh Bedi, *Āyurvedalāmkāra*, has been independently working in this field and has already published the three learned monographs in Hindi under notice, for the benefit of students of Indian botany and Indian medical science.

Their author has not only studied *Āyurveda* thoroughly but has been

<sup>1</sup> Vide *B. C. Law Volume*, Part I, pp. 142-158 (Calcutta, 1945, edited by myself and friends).

<sup>2</sup> Vide *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona (1946), Vol. XXVI, pp. 89-105. Another paper on the "History of *Canaka (B. C. 100 to 1850 A. D.)*" is to appear shortly.

<sup>3</sup> Vide *Journal of the University of Bombay* (1945), Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. 41-52 and *New Indian Antiquary* (February-March 1945), Vol. VII.

<sup>4</sup> These books are (1) *Vanaspati* (Calcutta University, 1927); (2) *Upavana-Vinoda*, a treatise on arbori-horticulture. (Indian Research Institute, Calcutta, 1935) and *Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Civilization*. (Author, Calcutta, 1938)

practising it at Lahore. He has planned a series of monographs on many plants of medicinal value, of which these three give us a fair idea. Pandit Bedi was for six years Superintendent of the Botanical Gardens of the Gurukul University at Kangri (District Saharanpur, U.P.) and in this capacity he made a close study of Indian medicinal plants. It is no wonder, therefore, that his books should be very highly spoken of by professors of *Āyurveda* in the Gurukul University and the Hindu University, Benares, as also by eminent *Āyurvedic* physicians like Acharya Yadavji Trikamji of Bombay and others.

In these monographs—on *Añjīra*, *Somtha* and *Triphalā*—the last-named on the fruits of three plants, *Harad* (*Terminalia Chebula*), *Bahedā* (*Belaric myrobalan*) and *Āmlā* (*Emblic myrobalan*)—Pandit Bedi records exhaustive information on such points as the names of the plant in Hindi, Sanskrit, English and Latin and in different modern Indian languages; the plant's original habitat and where it is grown at present in India; its botanical description; its history, whether indigenous to India or imported and incorporated into the Indian *materia medica*; its varieties and their medicinal properties; its chemical analysis, showing its therapeutic value; its properties as specified in *Āyurvedic* texts; the current uses of the different parts of the plant, and the seasons at which the parts of medicinal value should be removed and stored; the proportions in which the parts of the plant are to be used in medical preparations; the processes of manufacturing medicines from the plant; the general therapeutic value of the different parts and the

effect of medicines prepared from the plant on the different parts of the human body; the testing of these medical preparations in the light of modern medical research; instructions for cultivation of the plant; its economic value and its importance in national commerce; and gives a bibliography pertaining to the plant with reference to the foregoing aspects. These monographs are prepared by Pandit Bedi to enable him later to publish an encyclopaedic work on Indian *materia medica* under the title "*Bhāratīya Dravya-guṇa*."

This is really a scholarly approach; as no lasting literary edifice can be built unless all its bricks are properly shaped and well baked in the kiln of our investigation. I feel no doubt that these monographs will prove useful not only to the students and professors of *Āyurveda* but also to laymen, whose knowledge of Indian medicinal herbs is at present much confused, in the absence of authoritative monographs on each of these herbs, fully documented with extracts from standard ancient *Āyurvedic* texts and other literature, which give these healers of mankind their proper scientific and cultural perspective.

Though written in Hindi, these monographs deserve to be translated into English for wider circulation, as medicine is not the preserve of one nation but is for mankind in general. If disease is concomitant with life on this globe, the Science of Life (*Āyurveda*) which provides remedies for disease in all its varieties, is the concern of the entire humanity. We live now in the age of atom-bombs, aeroplanes and radios and not in the age of *Caraka* and *Suśruta*. The dissemination of

useful knowledge is a sacred obligation to be discharged by the scholars of the whole world and any medium which effects the widest possible dissemination of this knowledge deserves to be used for this purpose without any pride or prejudice.

Pandit Bedi's monographs, as mentioned, have already received scholarly approbation. His *Triphalā* has won him the award of the Nawab Sir Jamālkhan Gold Medal of Rs. 250/- from the All-India Āyurvedic Congress. Let me hope that these tokens of appreciation from brother-workers in the Āyurvedic field will encourage Pandit Bedi to continue his valuable monograph series (*Bhāratīya Dravya-guṇa Granthamālā*) so that we shall have before long an exact knowledge of our ancient Indian plant lore properly evaluated in the light of modern botanical and medical writings, a list of

which Pandit Bedi has recorded in each of these monographs.

To a student of the pure history of Indian plants like myself, Pandit Bedi's monographs will prove valuable as they contain under one cover many textual data, facilitating investigation into a plant's history by bringing together the available historical sources in all countries. For some of Indian plants have migrated far from their native habitat and are recognized as respectable residents of the modern civilized world, like the human *confrères* of the present-day nations. It is the business of the historian to investigate this migration of plants, which will be as enchanting a story as that of human migrations when it is completely studied and recorded with care and patience by a band of scholars working in unison in different parts of the world.

P. K. GODE

*The Heritage of Karnataka* (In Relation to India). By R. S. MUGALI. (Satyashodhana Publishing House, Fort, Bangalore City. Rs. 4/-, ordinary; Rs. 5/-, library edition)

Professor Mugali sees Kannada culture as part of the Indian mosaic, but with an individuality of its own. He traces informatively the influences which went into the moulding of Karnataka, and describes interestingly its considerable contribution to architecture, sculpture, music and literature.

Most cultures could very profitably emulate Karnataka's ideals of bravery,

of loyalty and of self-sacrifice; its democratic tradition; the religious tolerance down the centuries, of Hindu and Muslim rulers alike; its communal harmony today; its open-minded attitude towards the new and good. Add the balanced view of life and the strong sense of social unity common among Kannadigas and the reader is ready to turn a half-indulgent eye on the faults Professor Mugali concedes—indolence, emotionalism and unsteadiness—all faults of which Karnataka, alas, has no monopoly.

E. M. H.

*B. C. Law Volume* (Part II). Edited by DR. D. R. BHANDARKAR and OTHERS. (The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 4)

To honour the scholar is one of the noblest traditions of India. In ancient times kings and nobles patronised learning and the scholars returned the honour paid them by dedicating their works to such royal or noble patrons, either by express mention or by giving the name of the patron to the work. There are cases also of scholars having collected verses in honour of a distinguished member of their own order and presented such a collection to him. Thus, for example, the *Kavindrachandrodaya* was presented to Kavindracharya, a great *Sannyasin* and scholar at the time of Shah Jahan, who conferred on him the title of *Sarvavidyanidhana* (Repository of All Wisdom). And *Nrisimhasarvasva* was presented to Nrisimhaswamin of Benares.

Dr. B. C. Law, a distinguished member of that ancient order of scholars in India, is now the recipient of such an honour from his friends, colleagues and admirers. This is the second of the two volumes in his honour. It is fitting that the fifty-odd papers in this Part should include about a dozen relating to Buddhism, on which Dr. Law is a great authority.

Conditions have changed considerably since the middle of last century, when such Oriental studies were first taken up prominently in Western countries. Now we have to consider whether there were *two separate* religions, Hinduism and Buddhism; whether Hinduism was a *religion* (in the accepted sense) or only a civilization; whether there was any conflict between two groups in India in the matter of religion

or the conflict was confined to philosophy and to the few who engaged in higher thought; whether Buddhism died at all in India; and a host of other questions.

From the description of Buddhists in the works of poets like Kalidasa and Bhavabhuti, and from the enumeration of the ten incarnations of Vishnu in the *Gita Govinda* of Jayadeva, it is found that Buddhists always occupied a highly honoured position in Indian society, even among the orthodox. It is, moreover, not only the Buddhistic philosophy that has died out in India. The followers of the White *Yajurveda* are few now; the Prabhakara School of Mimamsa has practically become extinct as a living force. In estimating the relation of Hinduism and Buddhism, there is scope for a new approach.

Again, the date of Buddha is taken to be more or less settled. There has, however, been a sort of anti-Puranic bias in all such calculations. According to the notions prevalent in the last century about the age of the world, about 500 B. C. was a safe date for Buddha. But we have new notions about the age of the world, and the earlier date suggested in the *Puranas* deserves attention.

It is not possible to discuss many of the individual papers in the collection. But mention must be made of two, on ancient Indian education. The following passages are noteworthy.

When the time for education came, they simply took their son to a teacher and after that they had nothing more to think of or do for him. (Mahamahopadhyaya Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya)

The boys were to be active members of a priestly community, living on the outskirts of the forest. (Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee)

Could the parents have been so inhuman as not to have anything further

to do with their children? Could the homes have been absolutely bereft of children? Did the educational institutions thrive in forests? These questions, too, need a more careful study.

In a paper on the calendar through the ages by Dr. M. N. Saha, there is mention of the year's being longer according to the Hindu calendar than it is now; since the year is becoming shorter, does this give an indication of the time when the length of the year in the Hindu calendar was fixed, and can this help in determining the antiquity of Indian civilization?

"Muslim Patronage to Sanskrit Learning" by Prof. Chintaharan Chakravarti and "A Note on Persian, Turkish and Arabic Manuscripts" by Mr. Fazal Ahmad Khan have great cultural value at present. Are Hindus

and Muslims two separate nations who cannot merge into a single nation? Was that the Indian tradition when Hindus and Muslims ruled over different parts of India? Are not the so-called Muslim manuscripts in Persian and Arabic as much the concern of Hindus as of Muslims? Are they not Indian?

In a volume like this, we get the latest information from experts in the various phases of research. Such a collection stimulates thought on a number of subjects of great present importance to us. The papers included in this part are worthy of the scholar in whose honour the volume is published. The paper, printing and get-up are all excellent and a credit to those responsible for the publication.

C. KUNHAN RAJA

*Hiroshima: On Prophecy and the Sun-Bomb.* By G. WILSON KNIGHT. (Andrew Dakers, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Mr. Wilson Knight considers in this book the problems raised by the advent of the Atom Bomb. We have to enlist all the creative energies of the race against this Frankenstein product of science. Against the Atom Bomb we have to pit the Sun-Bomb, the power lodged in creative imagination, the Word that is the Logos. The modern age is impervious to poetry. To rescue poetry from the "cold severities of our time, already dominant throughout religion and science"—that is the heart of the enquiry.

It is the argument of the poets,—of the imperial muse of Shakespeare, of

Milton's *Areopagitica*, of Shelley's *Defence of Poetry*, of Goethe's *Faust*, of Tennyson's Arthurian cycle, and of Hardy's *Dynasts* that is here eloquently set forth with its applicability to our times. Curiously Pope, of the *Essay on Man* and *Windsor Forest*, is honoured as of this company. The imagination of the race assumes a prophetic intensity in the poets and this alone can redeem us, not the abstractions of petrified science or the aridities of traditional Religion. *Hiroshima* is a brief contemporary restatement of Arnold's faith of yesterday:—

In poetry, where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay.

A. VENKAPPA SASTRI

# EDUCATIONAL ADVANCE IN INDIA

## AN INTERVIEW WITH SIR JOHN SARGENT

[ Taking advantage of the holding at Bombay, from January 9th to 11th, of the thirteenth session of the Central Advisory Board of Education, a member of our staff interviewed Sir John Sargent, Education Adviser and Secretary to the Department of Education of the Government of India, whose active interest in Indian education is widely known.—ED. ]

It was stimulating to get at first hand some of the views of the author of the famous Sargent Plan for educating India. He was modestly at pains to explain that the Plan was the Report of the Central Advisory Board of Education, which had adopted it some four years ago; he had drafted it and so it "happened" to bear his name but it was in fact based on the reports of a number of Committees appointed by the Board in recent years to study the main aspects of educational development.

Typically English in appearance, and in vigour of thought and expression, Sir John is a thorough democrat by conviction. He has all the Englishman's shyness of abstractions, but the recognition of human brotherhood and of the dignity of man as man is tacit in his insistence on equality of opportunity for all.

As he spoke about the latter, into my mind flashed the memory of the manly little fellow in the Western Ghats who last autumn had guided our party capably to a waterfall. We had asked him if he went to school and he had answered in the negative and had added by way of explanation that he was a "gaonwalla." School, he implied, was not for village boys like him.

Among its many admirable provisions, the Sargent Plan calls ultimately for bringing into the schools every

Indian child between the ages of six and fourteen years. It is heartening that already most of the Provinces are proposing to take steps to advance education along the lines laid down in the Report:

How could the broadened scheme of education serve the bringing about in India of the greater unity so vitally important? In particular I suggested the considerable possibilities in that direction offered by a common script. Now, before the additional millions had known anything different, seemed a uniquely favourable time to introduce it.

Sir John shook his head. The question had come up at this session of the Central Advisory Board but had been put aside as impracticable at this time. Too many loyalties were bound up with the distinctive scripts. Whether or not it might be possible at some future time to introduce a common script, it was not believed to be so now.

The possibilities of the non-partisan teaching of history, another obvious desideratum, I suggested, were, he said, under consideration by UNESCO, collaboration with which was, of course, planned. Each member State had been asked to set up a National Commission to serve as liaison office between UNESCO and the State Government, supplying information to the former and passing on UNESCO's recommenda-

tions to the latter. With certain modifications and some expansion, the Central Advisory Board of Education might, he thought, become for India almost exactly such a National Commission as was contemplated, and a Committee had been appointed at this session to consider requirements in that connection.

Within the country, Sir John explained, the function of the Central Board was, as its name indicated, entirely advisory. Parity of standards was obviously desirable and Provinces lagging behind could be urged to strengthen their educational systems, but education was a subject left entirely to the Provinces and only in cases where the Central Government gave grants, as at present to some Universities, could it exercise any measure of supervisory control.

Asked for his views on the propriety of Government grants to denominational schools, Sir John thought the important thing was holding denominational schools to the minimum requirements in connection with secular subjects as a condition of their receiving State grants. The choice of school rested with the parents and, as long as some parents demanded the kind of education that the denominational schools gave, such schools were likely to continue. Pupils of all communities would, of course, be brought together in the Government schools, but India was far from ready to give up denominational schools. As long as strong communal feelings existed, some parents would want their children educated in schools of their own community.

In the case of children of other communities attending denominational schools, including missionary schools

(the issue recently prominent in Travancore), parents could always invoke the conscience clause. If they were so indifferent that they did not care whether their children were exempted from sectarian instruction or not, they could not complain if now and then a child embraced the teachings of the other creed.

Was anything planned in the way of substituting the training of children to think and reason for themselves for the present system of memory training?

That was an educational goal accepted today all over the world; the problem was how to attain it in practice. It was a vast undertaking in India, and the general outlines would have to be filled in as time went on.

Was it contemplated to find a substitute for the existing examination system, which fostered competition and selfishness?

A certain amount of competition was necessary, Sir John declared. "Every child can't be Prime Minister." Unless you were going to make universal education free right through the universities—which he thought would be a mistake and which was not, so far as he knew, done anywhere,—some system of selection was necessary. There was much to be said, he thought, for examinations as devised in accordance with the most advanced educational theory, as a method of evaluating the capacity of individual children to benefit by further education. The Plan provided for liberal financial assistance, where necessary, to those showing real capacity.

Sir John described in interesting detail an experiment in Essex some fifteen years ago, by which primary-school children in the ten to eleven

years age group had been chosen for the limited number of vacancies—about 1,500—in the secondary high schools. The examination, lasting three or four hours, had been given locally wherever possible, to save the children the strain of taking it in strange surroundings. It had been expertly designed on the accepted modern lines to test intelligence rather than actual knowledge, while bringing out the children's acquaintance with simple rules and their ability to write simple English.

Those examined had been selected by the primary-school heads on the strength of their previous performance, except that, as a democratic safeguard, any children not recommended but whose parents wanted them examined anyway were included in the group. In all but a few cases the examinations had confirmed the judgment of the school heads, a great tribute to their discrimination and fair-mindedness. Where the examination had not confirmed their favourable judgment, the child's previous record was called for and in most cases re-examination had been arranged for. As the justice of the school heads' decisions had become apparent, the number of unrecommended children admitted to the examination on the parents' request had dropped rapidly in subsequent years.

The children who had passed the examination had been divided into two groups, those in the higher "recommended" group assured of admission into a secondary high school in which vacancies existed, unless the head of the school could give a satisfactory reason for refusing them. Allotments for the remaining vacancies had been made by a small committee from the other group of "qualified" children.

Sir John said that he would like to see something like such a selective test developed in India, but feared the existence of all sorts of difficulties in the way of its fair working, *e. g.*, communal considerations on the part of teachers, etc.

He was emphatic about the need for adult education. "You have got to go on offering, to everybody who will take them, facilities for continuing education after school-leaving age." In England and America many facilities were available for training in various crafts, recreational facilities, etc. In the beginning it was planned that selected villagers, one or two from each village, would be given training so that they could take their craft or recreational training back to their fellow-villagers. Anything in the nature of the Danish Folk High-Schools would not be practical for India, at least for a very long time, but something on similar lines might be useful for training village teachers.

But the making of all adults in India literate was an essential part of the Plan. It provided for immediate attack on adult illiteracy and visualised completion of that effort in a quarter of a century. Voluntary helpers would doubtless be available in numbers for this part of the work, college students during their vacations, etc., but the problem could never be solved without a nucleus of trained and experienced people to direct their efforts.

A major problem was to provide the teachers' teachers in sufficient numbers and of the requisite quality. Already students were abroad studying the best modern pedagogical methods and on their return they would form the staff of the teachers' colleges, which would

doubtless also absorb the best graduates for some time. "Ploughing in the best of the crop," I suggested, and he agreed.

It would be years hence, he said, before teachers would be ready in sufficient numbers to bring all children under the scheme. Salaries would have to be raised if teachers were to be attracted, but, in any case, until the number attending high school was greatly increased, the supply available for teachers' training would remain inadequate. The ratios had been carefully worked out.

Universal primary education, free for all who could not afford to pay, would come, but Sir John considered forty years a conservative minimum for the bringing of the plan into full operation over the whole country.

(Alas for my poor little *gaonwalla*!)

I raised the question of the preservation of the traditional moral values of India. Was there not a danger, unless a definite effort was made to reiterate those values and to raise the country's present moral tone, that a social revolution might follow the rapid spread of education without a corresponding economic advance?

Sir John doubted whether you could have considerable educational advance without accompanying economic change. "Education creates discontent. I am all for it as long as it is 'divine discontent.'" Education, he said, was always a revolutionary force—not necessarily leading to bloodshed. The more education, however, the less prejudice and the more tolerance there should be. Half-educated people were dangerous.

But in what country had the major-

ity ever been fully educated? The "good old times" of nostalgic longing were generally, he believed, the "bad old times," with a few exceptions, such as, perhaps, the flourishing period of Athens and of Florence.

"And," I suggested, "the reign of Asoka in India."

But even in Athens the bulk of the people had been slaves, he went on. And in India there had been too much acquiescence in things as they were. "If the situation is such that a social revolution is desirable, let it come! If you are going to have a democracy, you have got to take the chance. The people must be educated. Standards are not going to be good and democracy is not going to be safe till every child is given equal educational opportunities." Things had been static too long, Sir John declared. Now something was doing, things were moving, and that was all to the good.

"If only," I said, "they do not move too fast and things of value are not scrapped along with things that ought to be discarded!" And to myself I thought that, after all, the light of knowledge, like that of the sun, but furnishes the conditions of intenser vital action. Its effect depends on where it falls. The same sun that quickens growing things hastens the process of decay in others. The light that serves the eagle blinds the owl. But still the light must be allowed to shine for all. "If you are going to have a democracy you have got to take the chance."

But forty years no longer seems so long. It is perhaps as well that universal literacy will be some time in coming, lest Indian eyes, so long accustomed to the quiet gloom, left by the fading from mind of ancient wisdom, be dazzled by the sudden flash of modern half-knowledge, and Indians fall an easy prey to irresponsible agitators through the printed word.

## ENDS AND SAYINGS

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“ \_\_\_\_\_ *ends of verse*  
*And sayings of philosophers.*”

HUDIBRAS

Shri K. Natarajan writes pertinently in *The Indian Social Reformer* for 11th January and 1st February, challenging recent statements of Indian leaders about India and religion. (See our “Ends and Sayings” columns for February 1947.) India, he declares,

is more soul than body. She has lived on despite starvation, disease and all kinds of distress, merely because of her faith in the unseen, which like fountains of sweet water in the sea has kept her whole.

Modern planners can never altogether quench in Indian hearts devotion and that “faith in the unseen” which have sustained them down the ages. “There is no empiricism about Indian religion,” Shri Natarajan writes. “It is realised truth” and the Indian seers have pointed the way to realisation to others. It is by virtue of that heart perception that India has survived; through it, that she can render her greatest service to the world.

Shri C. Rajagopalachari, laying recently the foundation stone of a metallurgical institute at Jamshedpur, had expressed the hope that science might succeed, where religion had failed, in uniting the communities of India. Scientific leaders do not share such optimism, Shri Natarajan writes. Man’s power over Nature has vastly increased but “man himself has remained aggressive, greedy, cruel.”

It seems indeed incongruous, as Shri Natarajan writes, that

when the West disappointed, disillusioned, turns to India for light, our leading men

are busy collecting the garbage of a decomposing system and holding it up for India to guide herself by. There is actually strong revival of religion in the West, while our great men decry it as the cause of our divisions, our economic depression, our political ineptitude.

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The *Report of the Care of Children Committee* appointed in 1945 to inquire into existing methods of providing for the 30,000-odd children deprived for any cause of normal home life with their relatives, presented to Parliament last September (Comd. 6922. 3s.), should be read by all who have child welfare at heart.

In the child’s need of a home or a good substitute for one, and for normal outside contacts, affection and personal interest are no less important than physical care, which the Committee found to be, on the whole, good. The former were found more likely to be forthcoming in happy foster homes than in institutions. But, though in certain of the latter they found over-regimentation, dreariness and dirt, in others the children were leading very happy, normal lives. The description of some of the best of these, warm with understanding sympathy, bright with flowers, rich in toys and with well-filled low shelves of books, would certainly be classed with fairy-tales by the inmates of some of India’s Children’s Homes, so bleak and all too few.

In general, the drab uniforms of an earlier day that set the children of an

institution apart from other children, were no more. There seemed, too often, however, to be more attention paid to variety in costume than to fitting treatment to individual child needs. In many Homes the children were found to be considered merely in the mass, with no individual rights or possessions, no quiet place to which they could retreat. In only a few Homes was there found appeal to a child's social conscience, for which a system of rewards and punishments is obviously a poor substitute. Perpetual dependence during childhood, the Committee warned, might tend to later lack of initiative and responsibility. The youth in his own home, moreover, can count on continuity of interest in his welfare. A chief criticism of most Homes was the haphazard character of vocational guidance and after-care.

England recognises her homeless children as potential national assets. India has yet to accept hers officially as inescapable responsibilities.

Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, himself an eminent Sanskritist, pleaded, in an address published as the first Kala Pamphlet, for a Sanskrit University for India. In such a University as he visualises, Sanskrit would be the medium of instruction in all subjects, though "Indian culture will be only the centre ...not the circumference of this cultural circle." All subjects of interest in the humanities would be taught; ancient and modern lore would be brought together and the ancient Indian spirit of breadth, tolerance and continuity in learning restored. The wealth of ancient Indian science, prominently psychological science, would be tapped. Dr. Raja predicts a great

future for such a University as a centre of modern scientific research. Other languages than Sanskrit would be studied and the philosophies of other religions than the Hindu, but "the great function of the Sanskrit University shall be to restore religion into the life of the nation," religion being not a set of dogmas, he explains, but "virtuous life."

The advantages of a truly All-India University to cement national unity and to counteract the tendency towards a too strong provincialism or communalism are obvious. So is the desirability of bringing the wisdom of our ancients to bear on modern problems.

Dr. Raja charges that the existing Sanskrit *Pathashalas* have fostered narrowness of outlook. If that can be avoided by his Sanskrit University, if indeed "students from all communities, from all races, from all religious denominations and all stations of life will live together as a fraternity," Dr. Raja's vision may hold the key to many of our difficulties. We cannot, however, avoid the reflection that our existing Universities are far indeed from doing all that they could in these directions. A Sanskrit University on the lines indicated would not lessen their responsibility, though it would by contrast bring out their shortcomings the more forcibly.

The rapid growth of Roman Catholicism in the U.S.A. is a legitimate cause for concern abroad, because of that country's dominant position in the world of today and tomorrow. The appearance, therefore, of *The Vatican and the U. S. A.* by Avro Manhattan in "The Thinker's Forum" (Watts and Co., London) is to be welcomed.

The statistics of recent gains in the Roman Church's strength, especially in urban centres, covering not only churches and adherents but also educational institutions and the Roman Catholic press, are disquieting. So is the close, albeit still unofficial, diplomatic relation between the President and the Vatican, maintained through the former's personal Ambassador to the Holy See.

There is abundant evidence, in history and in official declarations, of the totalitarian temper of the Roman hierarchy. Its opposition to Communism has been open and bitter, but expediency has dictated caution, while the Roman Church is still in the minority, in moving against democratic ideals such as freedom of worship and of speech.

The Vatican has tolerated, even encouraged for the nonce, the growth of "American Catholicism" of outwardly more liberal outlook, has let go unchallenged a Catholic presidential nominee's advocacy of absolute freedom of conscience, equality between Churches and absolute separation of Church and State. How far that is from the Church's official pronouncements in different contexts warns of the iron hand within the velvet glove. Has not an "infallible" Pope solemnly pronounced it "altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff"?

Meantime the Vatican bides its time and non-Catholic America sits nodding while the tentacles of the Roman hierarchy spread over the press, over labour organisations, over the film industry, over education and, potentially most dangerous of all, over public policy.

Prof. P. S. Naidu's presidential address before the Section of Psychology and Educational Science of the recent Indian Science Congress dealt with "Psychology and the Rehabilitation of Human Society." He saw hope in psychology for the reconditioning of human nature, especially necessary since scientific and material advance had outstripped moral progress. Professor Naidu named, in ascending order, efficiency, happiness and self-realisation as worthy goals, pertaining, respectively, to body, mind and soul. Analytical psychology, he said, could serve occupational adjustment; depth psychology, the establishment, by sublimation and repression, of the hegemony of a worthy master sentiment, in which the secret of happiness lay; while Indian psychology supplied the keystone in putting forward as the highest goal the realisation of the Absolute.

Professor Naidu made some valuable points, as in repudiating the power of mere environmental changes to reshape the mind and in stressing sympathetic induction, by which emotions and sentiments might be transmitted unawares. But the "National Psychoanalytic-psychiatric Service" which he proposes would be fraught with danger. Modern psychology, though confidently declaring the mind "merely a bundle of instincts," has admittedly not explored fully its "dense impenetrable jungle." For it to rush half-blindly into the "cleansing of the unconscious" is to invite disaster.

Let sleeping dogs lie and men's attention be directed rather to the superconscious, *terra incognita* for Western psychology, but which ancient wisdom calls the divine nature in man.

Shadows will not trouble him whose face is kept turned towards the light.

Is there a better treatise on the Science of Psychology than, say, the *Gita*? Occidental psychologists are the poorer for their non-acquaintance with ancient texts of Oriental Psychology and their Indian chelas should not be blind to their teachers' deficiency.

Among the excellent contributions to *The Hibbert Journal* for January, Captain Liddell Hart's article "The Need for a Spiritual Commonwealth" is specially welcome. Himself weaned from war by the study of war, he declares that peace depends on moral order, and not on organisation, and that there is a convergence in religion as in economics and politics. If any religion claims monopoly of truth it leads inevitably to the idea of the superior race, to aggressiveness, greed and war. One may feel more at home in one faith, but the barriers must come down between it and the others, to realise the fundamental unity-in-goodness of the upward converging paths. Christianity, incredible by historical standards, should be presented as spiritual truth, a divine parable, not a factual record. It would thus "bring out the sense of continuous revelation and evolution." The continuance of goodness and self-sacrifice in a world where, by human standards, these are unprofitable, is evidence itself of the Supreme Spirit shining through man. Sectarian dissensions are due to imperfect interpretations, and we must sympathetically recognise we are not the sole possessors of truth, that morality is universal. Even if the idea of a spiritual Commonwealth will not avert

immediate disaster, it may influence general thought and behaviour sufficiently to give people time to find their religious balance. For good manners and good morals are not separate, as we have made them, and history shows their reciprocal relationship. The balanced application of the universal "Golden Rule" is due to contributions from all the faiths.

The proposal to eliminate capital punishment in Britain for an experimental five-year period was referred to in our January issue (p. 16). Mrs. Theodora Calvert has brought out a convincing brochure: *Capital Punishment*, with the subtitle "Society Takes Revenge: An Examination of the Necessity of Capital Punishment in Britain To-day." The conclusion is that the death penalty is as unnecessary as it is barbarous and harmful to society. The evidence gathered in 1929-30 by the Select Committee on Capital Punishment, whose Majority Report recommended the proposed suspension, was overwhelming. Other countries had abolished it without any observable change in trend of the murder rate, which had been generally downward. The substitution of certainty of conviction and punishment, the latter aiming at reform, not at revenge, would, Mrs. Calvert urges, divest murder trials of their melodramatic appeal, spare relatives of the offender, relieve penal administrators and workers of a terrible and brutalising rôle and rob the always-present possibility of an unjust conviction of its irrevocable character. Mrs. Calvert writes:—

Our feet are set on the road that leads to the elimination of crime by improved social conditions, better education and a patient and enlightened treatment of delinquency... The Death Penalty... has no place in a modern system of penal administration, and it is high time that it was swept away.