

RAM

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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ON PRACTISING MYSTICISM

Prof. K. C. Varadachari describes mysticism as "the highest manifestation of spiritual life". The cultivation of mysticism must, therefore, be recommended. The term has been misinterpreted as well as misapplied, as has that other term—Occultism. In reality there is no difference between Mysticism and Occultism, and the inner life of the mystic and the hidden life of the occultist are identical; the perception and power resulting from superior knowledge and the beneficent use made of it are also identical.

Our contributor puts forward three propositions concerning the mystic life; in doing so, we presume, he takes it for granted that the human soul is the eternal pilgrim in the universe of matter and progresses through self-effort aided by the Law of Karma and the process of Reincarnation. The human soul being in essence the same as the Universal Spirit contains within itself all

the powers and potencies of the latter. Evolution implies the progressive awakening of the human soul to the realization of its identity with the Universal Spirit—impartite and impersonal. Men of our race and civilization have reached the stage where in the majority reason is the highest faculty. But it is not that clear, pure and compassionate Reason which is Intuition. The three propositions laid down by Prof. Varadachari indicate the effects of this higher development in the individual; but in them are implicit the steps to be taken by anyone who desires to become a mystic-occultist. That such an undertaking is possible, nay more, is desirable is the conviction of every genuine mystic. It is part of his programme of altruistic service to awaken the aspirations of others and encourage in them the practice of soul life. We will, therefore, translate, from that point of view, the three propositions put

forward by our contributor.

(1) Man is an immortal soul, divine in origin and not born in sin. The human soul contains within itself certain potentialities; powers already developed, the highest of which is reason, do not enable man to understand the mystery at the heart of the universe. Man must go beyond mind, which is but an instrument of the Soul, and perceive and use a subtler and higher instrument, which is *Buddhi* of the Esoteric Philosophy, the Pure and Compassionate Reason or Intuition which, in the words of H. P. Blavatsky, "soars above the tardy processes of ratiocinative thought" and "through which direct and certain knowledge is obtainable" (*The Secret Doctrine*, I, pp. 1 and 46). The unfolding of this faculty follows only when man has learnt to look upon himself not as a product of matter, like a candle-flame which goes out of existence when the candle is spent, but as an emanation from the Universal Spirit—a ray of the Spiritual Sun. The perception of the indissoluble link between Universal Spirit and the human soul leads to the realization that "I am verily the supreme Brahman."

(2) Man must also learn to rise above the distinctions of body—sex and colour of the skin; above the belief that the religion into which he is born is superior to other creeds; above the superstition that a finer type of blood circulating in his veins makes him socially superior. In place of a narrow nationalistic outlook he must learn to acquire a cosmopolitan and universal view of humanity as one and indivisible.

(3) Because of this knowledge the conscientious treader of the mystic way must learn to render loving service to all mankind, not enslaving the wills of others, but giving them that knowledge which throws light on their path, which enables them to attune themselves to the voice of the silence and ultimately makes them wielders of the secret doctrine.

For this practical work of achieving rebirth the Book of the Golden Precepts belonging to the Esoteric School, from which H. P. Blavatsky selected and translated some fragments "for the daily use of Lanoos—Disciples", is the best and the most reliable treatise. From it we give below some verses appropriate to the three propositions we have been considering :—

(1) Alas, alas, that all men should possess Alaya, be one with the Great Soul, and that possessing it, Alaya should so little avail them!

Behold how like the moon, reflected in the tranquil waves, Alaya is reflected by the small and by the great, is mirrored in the tiniest atoms, yet fails to reach the heart of all. Alas, that so few men should profit by the gift, the priceless boon of learning truth, the right perception of existing things, the knowledge of the non-existent!

(2) Thou shalt not let thy senses make a playground of thy mind.

Thou shalt not separate thy being from BEING and the rest, but merge the Ocean in the drop, the drop within the Ocean.

† So shalt thou be in full accord with all that lives; bear love to men as though they were thy brother-pupils,

disciples of one Teacher, the sons of one sweet mother.

Of teachers there are many ; the MASTER-SOUL is one, Alaya, the Universal Soul. Live in that MASTER as ITS ray in thee. Live in thy fellows as they live in IT.

(3) Let thy Soul lend its ear to every cry of pain like as the lotus bears its heart to drink the morning sun.

Let not the fierce Sun dry one tear of pain before thyself hast wiped it from the sufferer's eye.

But let each burning human tear drop on thy heart and there remain ; nor ever brush it off, until the pain that caused it is removed.

These tears, O thou of heart most merciful, these are the streams that

irrigate the fields of charity immortal. 'Tis on such soil that grows the midnight blossom of Buddha, more difficult to find, more rare to view, than is the flower of the Vogay tree.

Now bend thy head and listen well, O Bodhisattva—Compassion speaks and saith : "Can there be bliss when all that lives must suffer ? Shalt thou be saved and hear the whole world cry ?"

Canst thou destroy divine COMPASSION ? Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of LAWS—eternal Harmony, Alaya's SELF ; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal.

MYSTICISM AND REASON

A recent writer on religious thought criticised Mysticism for its blindness. His definition of Mysticism was that it was "cognition without clear understanding". This misinterpretation is not new. We have the statement of Prof. George Santayana that it is a vegetative stupor: "Mysticism is the most primitive of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments of intellectual arrests and dissolution." Lytton Strachey considered mysticism as unfit for the ordinary man: "The mystic's creed comes upon the ordinary man in the rigidity of its uncompromising elevation, with a shock which is terrible and almost cruel." Then there is the famous attack of Leonard Woolf upon

mysticism as all quackery. Against all these criticisms we have to weigh the emphatic statements and the still more clear and emphatic activities of real mystics.

The tendency of Mysticism is one thing, its principles or content another. What we have to discriminate between is this two-fold nature of mysticism, its phenomena and its real content. On the one hand we have the uncompromising rigidity of the mystic vision, its categorical imperative, an imperative that comes from its being so near a vision and an effect. On the other hand its moral elevation makes its utterances seem supremely indifferent to the actual historical situation. Its creative power in one sense despises the actual

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reality of obstruction and in the other sense it is absolutely realistic. This dual nature at once confuses its critics and attracts the worship of its admirers.

It is untrue to say that any one who holds steadfastly to a dogma or who is a devout votary of a belief is a mystic. Even a person's feeling and intense devotion to any cause without any rhyme or reason will not justify us in calling such a person a mystic. It would be an unwarranted identification of the mystic with the fanatic, who produces more heat than light, or rather, to adopt a fine description of fanaticism by Professor Bhattacharyya, produces "heat without Light". Thus Hitler is regarded as a mystic even by such an eminent thinker as Bertrand Russell, being judged seemingly by his fanaticism rather than by his vision, by his frightful emotional outbursts rather than by his thought. Sincerity is not the only criterion in mysticism, or for that matter in anything. Not even the claims of identification of individual ideals with cosmic purpose, as in the case of Hitler at the present time, should be taken to be the real content of mystic life. Not a little of the modern criticism of mysticism owes its origin to this non-analysis of the *content* of true mysticism and to the pre-occupation with outer behaviour signs.

In the most interesting part of *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Henri Bergson claims the mystic to be a moral and religious pioneer.

The ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative

effort of which life is a manifestation.

The mystic is one who leads mankind from the *closed* society into the open, from the customary cast-iron morality of the mass of the people into the conscience-morality of high reason and intuition.

The great mystic is to be conceived as an individual being capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, thus continuing and extending the divine action.

The mystic tries to leap over the forms and the framework of life that have been constructed by man through the long history of his planetary career. Living for the ordinary man consists in adapting himself to his environment; for the mystic it is the adaptation of the environment to his own inward and spiritual life. The mystic thus makes a supreme demand upon the environment, and, according to Bergson, the passage through the centuries has been indelibly marked by the appearance of such mystics. The mystic's cognition refuses to be the handmaid of practical and immediate interests. It thus cannot be understood by either realists or idealists, though certain mystics who have withdrawn themselves from this supreme moral or social vocation into contemplation might well be called idealistic.

The life of contemplation that the usual type of mystic seeks is indeed due to the presence of the supreme rational element rather than to its lack. Plotinus and Shankara have held that the intellectual or rather the contemplative attitude is the highest mystic attitude. Spinoza too was a God-intoxicated man only

intellectually. The mystic seeks the permanent behind the changing, or rather he seeks the permanent relationships of things amidst or abiding within temporal events.

Prof. Das Gupta in his *Hindu Mysticism* contends that mysticism holds Reality to be super-rational, that it is beyond the rational intellect, that reason cannot understand it. A quite different type of experience, an intuition or *daiva*, or direct cognition alone can make us apprehend reality. Absolutist thinkers like Bradley also claim such a possibility, and of course Bergson has always been the champion of the cause of supra-reason. We have to examine this view carefully. The whole definition seems to deal with the *manner* rather than the *matter* of cognition. Mysticism surely lays stress on the directness of apprehension, without the medium of relational thought. But the truth of mystical experience lies not in its directness but in its *content*, its import, its validity, its universality and its lack of personal uniqueness.

Every mystical experience, singularly enough, reveals at the beginning the *partialitas*-nature of the individual, but this stage yields immediately to the cognition of the intimate and integral if not utterly identical nature of the part with the whole, of the individual with the All (*sarva*). The modes or individuals cannot be thought of apart from the whole, and the life of the All suffuses, sustains and illumines even the darkest corners of individual experience. The mystic from then on becomes an instrument, a receiving station, passive in the hands of the

Divine All. Spinoza, the most notable rationalist, and Plato, the most thorough-going realist, both entered into the mystical experience after a rich and full and complete inward process of the realization of the All. Knowledge, as Nietzsche said in one of his most lucid moments, became a powerful affect in their case. This supreme crowning achievement of reason that thinks in terms of the whole and reveals the relationship, abiding and enduring, which is the meaning of the word eternal, between the individual and the All, is a mystical experience of the highest order. The quality of emotion in such an experience would be of the most sublime and could never approach the wild and untutored fanaticism which Professor Bhattacharyya attributes to it in his *Foundations of Living Faith*.

One other significant aspect of the mystical experience is that it leads to a more and more quiescent understanding of reality rather than to vitalistic and regressive manifestations in conduct. It leads to the ever greater apprehension of the welfare and progress of all rather than to nationalistic or racialistic creeds or even to the desire for the mere possession of arbitrary power. The charge of regression in conduct arising from mysticism is untenable. The greatest mystics of all time, Buddha, Shankara, Confucius, Jesus, have been the greatest forces for the peaceful regeneration of the race itself. Their power has been exercised towards peace, and their methods were not by any means dictatorial but only persuasive, as typified at their best by Gandhiji in his doctrine

of Non-violence or *Satyagraha*.

Thus the significant fact emerges that a mystic is a constructive and creative thinker in the interests of the peace, the welfare and the true spiritual and moral progress of all life and not specifically of mankind. The gospel of the true mystic is the antithesis of imperialism and nationalism or racialism. The *satvika-upasana*, the practice of harmony in his moral and spiritual nature, is the true test of a mystic. To confuse this elevated state of mysticism with vegetative stupor, langour and lethargy of soul and thought, or with blind dogmatism and passion, shows an utterly false interpretation of mystic consciousness. The mystic does not aim at the annulment of life any more than he aims at egoistic self-assertion. He is neither a nihilist, nor a fanatic.

True mysticism reveals first that it is the realization through discrimination and synthetic reason, which seeks a synoptic vision, which has become inward and sympathetic and which through such a keen exercise of its powers becomes almost direct and immediate *insight*. Such an insight, through its utter consecration to the highest purposes of life, discovers the interrelationships existing between the so-called parts and the whole, which might be called God, Substance, Brahman, the All.

Secondly, it displays the cultural

unity of all through a dynamic activity that reveals the fullest qualities of the moral pioneer, who seeks to raise the customary and habit morality of the many to the level of universal truth. "Their revelation, whatever else is to be said about it, makes no claim to be any private truth." The mystic's morality is not solipsistic.

Thirdly, the mystic can never be the sponsor of material or naked power. He is so full of love for all in his realization of his unity with All that he is a worker against aggression and untruth and mere might. Mystics, though apparently solitary and retiring or contemplative beings, are not unsocial. Unlike Nietzschean supermen, who are antisocial, egoistic, aggressive and even parasitic, the mystics seek to live in the interests of society and to promote its growth and welfare. The Hindu as well as some Christian mystics never knew what it was to be anti-social, and growth for them meant a deepening sense of unity and identity with all life.

Mysticism is not superstition; it is the highest manifestation of spiritual life. It is not less mysticism that we need, but more of the true mysticism that comes from a devoted life of thought, thought that succeeds in becoming an 'affect' as Nietzsche said or a 'sensation' as Keats expressed it.

K. C. VARADACHARI

THE NATURE OF VALUE

[Here are three articles which present three distinct points of view on the interesting subject of evaluation.—EDS.]

I.—THE WESTERN VIEW

In his new book *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*¹ Professor Radhakrishnan makes an interesting distinction between kinds or categories of religion. Religions falling into the first category are concerned with the nature of the *object* of religious experience. Is there God, they ask, and if so, what are His nature, His motives in creating the world, His intentions in regard to mankind, and so on? Religions falling into the second category concentrate upon the nature of the religious experience *itself*. "With the first", he writes, "religion is an attitude of faith and conduct directed to a power without. With the second, it is an experience to which the individual attaches supreme value." The first attitude is broadly that of the West, the second that of the East, of which the Hindu and Buddhist religions are the most eminent examples.

The distinction seems to me to be significant and I propose to apply it to the case of Value. My argument broadly will be as follows: In opposition to the prevailing tendency of Western thinkers, I believe and in various books² have endeavoured to maintain that Values are real and objective. Whereas most of my contemporaries are inclined to assert

that the expression "This conduct is right" means merely "This is conduct of which 'I' or 'my society' or 'my social class' happen to approve", and that the expression "This is beautiful" means merely "This is what happens to give me a certain kind of pleasurable feeling", I should argue that moral judgments are the expressions of the spirit's recognition of an objective moral law, æsthetic judgments of its response to an objective principle of beauty which is manifested in works of art. But—and this is the point of the article—the Values are for me in fact objective, objective and external; they are not, that is to say, within me, but external to me, and recognized by me as being wholly other than myself. Thus my attitude to Value corresponds to that which Radhakrishnan designates as the typically Western attitude to religion.

With the Indian attitude I am not well acquainted, but I suspect that it conforms to what has been defined as the typically Eastern attitude, that, in other words, for the Eastern mind, Values are the expression of a reality which expresses itself no less in the spiritual activity involved in their recognition, so that it is not merely works of art, right conduct and truth which are valuable, but

¹ Reviewed in our last issue by J. D. Beresford.—EDS.

² See especially my *Return to Philosophy and Matter*, *Life and Value*,

also the spirit's response to them in æsthetic contemplation, in moral experience, and in philosophical and religious endeavour. Thus value is within us as well as without and in recognizing what is real we are merely discovering our true selves. Hence, on the Hindu view—if I interpret it rightly—we discern Value as we achieve salvation, by concentrating upon the nature of our experience, it being of course premised that the experience is that of the true and not of the apparent self.

Here I can only give in brief some of the reasons for my own view of Value, throwing its externality, as it were, into relief in the hope that my account may provoke a statement of the view which commends itself to the exponents of the philosophy for which THE ARYAN PATH stands.

I have space here only to glance at a few of the logical and historical considerations. I take an example of logical argument from the realm of morals. If goodness belongs not to things in themselves but to our appreciation of them, then to say "X is good" is not to make a statement about the qualities of X, but is to make a statement about the attitude which some mind or body of minds maintains towards X. To say "X is good" is equivalent to saying that "X is found pleasant", or "is judged expedient", or "is approved of by me or by the society to which I belong", or "is approved of by most human beings".

Now that this is very often all that people do mean when they say of something that it is good is, I think, clear. Thus an Englishman is never at a loss for an argument to

show that he is doing his duty, when he wants an excuse for making himself disagreeable. Most of what is called sexual morality, which is kept going by the old for the benefit of the young, is little more than an organised system of calling of sour grapes at pleasures which are denied to the old by their lack of opportunity or charm. But that "This is good" or "This is right" does not always mean the same as "This is pleasant" or "This is expedient" may, I think, be seen if we ask ourselves the question, "How is it, if there is no difference between good on the one hand, and pleasant, right or expedient on the other, that the distinction between them came to be made?" There is not the slightest doubt that in ordinary life we do habitually make this distinction. "This", we say, "is what I should like to do, because it is pleasant; but that is what I ought to do, because it is right." Or we say, "X is a pleasanter companion, but he is not such a good man as Y." If what is good or right is, in the last resort, exhaustively analysable into what is expedient or pleasant or useful, it is impossible to explain how such a distinction came to be made. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that the words "good" and "right" stand for concepts which we specifically distinguish from those denoted by the words "pleasant", "expedient" and "useful".

The reasons usually advanced in favour of subjectivist theories of Value are derived from the relativity of moral notions. People in all ages have called different actions right, and have bestowed moral approval

upon different qualities and characters. What is more, what they *call* right, what they *approve of* as moral, has a definite and ascertainable relation to non-ethical factors. Thus I may and probably will call right the kind of conduct which, in general, is advantageous to me personally, which conduces to my pleasure, or which assists my survival; or, again, I may and probably will call right the kind of conduct which is advantageous to my class or my country or to the governors of my country; or again, since there is a time-lag before moral notions catch up with social needs, which was *once* advantageous to my class or my country or to the governors of my country, and of which, after centuries of approval by my ancestors, I have an inherited instinct to approve as part of my initial psychological make-up. The conclusion is that, when I say "X is right", I do not mean that X has an objective characteristic of rightness which is independent of my approval; I mean only that a certain person or certain persons approve of it.

These arguments do not, however, establish the conclusion asserted. What they show is that people have always evinced a disposition to *call* some things right, some things good, and some things moral, and that what they will *call* right, what good, what moral, depends upon circumstances. The argument shows, in other words, that circumstances determine people's views about right and good and morality; it does not show that circumstances determine what is right and good and moral. Nor, unless we are to suppose that

people's views on these matters are views about *nothing*, does it show that there are no such things as right and good and morality for people to have views about. If, indeed, there *were* no such things as right and good and morality, then, in using such expressions as "This is right" "He is good", "That is moral" we should be making meaningless noises.

I take a further consideration from the realm of aesthetics.

By the phrase "a good picture", it is sometimes said, we mean simply one which is appreciated by people of good taste. How, then, are these to be defined? I can think of only one definition; a person of good taste is a person who likes good pictures. We thus find ourselves perambulating the circumference of a vicious circle. A good picture is defined as one which persons of good taste appreciate; persons of good taste are defined as those who appreciate this good picture and others like it. It follows that we cannot establish a standard by which to determine what is beautiful by appealing to persons of alleged good taste. The conclusion seems to be that, if the subjectivist account of values is true and we can assess the value of a picture solely by reference to some person's or body of persons' appreciation of it, the only way to determine which works of art are beautiful is to find out which are the works people actually like; by the same reasoning the greatest work of art will be that which most people like. Thus jazz is greater than Beethoven, pictures of cattle by Scottish lochs are greater than pictures by El

Greco, and the latest gangster film from America is greater drama than the plays of Shakespeare. Nevertheless, this is a conclusion in which nobody believes, since everybody does in fact hold in regard to something, let it be an old house, a view, a garden, a tree, a statue, a picture, a piece of music, that it is *really* beautiful, pretty, nice, elegant—it is a matter of indifference precisely what epithet is used—in some sense in which a crumpled sardine tin on a rubbish heap or the latrine of a slum tenement is not. On this issue I am prepared to trust the insight of mankind; if everybody believes that some things really are more beautiful than others, it is because beauty exists and some things *are* more beautiful than others.

I accordingly deduce that works of art have value in their own right, just as they have shape, weight and colour in their own right, and that they have value independently of the opinion which any mind or body of minds entertains in regard to them. The fact that no mind appreciates them does not then necessarily mean that they have no value, any more than the fact that all minds appreciate them means that they have it. A person of good taste may, on this view, be defined as one who normally succeeds in discerning beauty when it is present, and appreciating it. Taste can, it is obvious, be improved, just as intelligence can be improved, by instruction and training. A man can within limits be trained to see what is beautiful, just as he can be trained to recognize a good character or a right action.

What these arguments tend to

show is that goodness and beauty are real and objective. They do not show that they are identical or even that they are connected. I mention the point more particularly in its bearing upon the Indian view, the underlying Monism of which would, I imagine, issue in some sort of union of the values, or, perhaps, in their merging in a reality more ultimate than themselves. On this issue I remain, I am afraid, unrepentantly pluralistic. "Beauty is truth, truth beauty", said Keats. "That is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."

I should say that we know nothing of the sort. That 2 and 3 make 5 seems to me to be demonstrably true—if this proposition is not true, then I should like to know what is—but in no sense at all does it seem to me to be beautiful, and my response to it is psychologically different from that which I accord to beauty.

My conceptions of beauty are mainly derived from music. Bach's Double Violin Concerto in D Minor seems to me to be infinitely beautiful, but I cannot conceive what could be meant by calling it true, nor does it seem to me to have any affinity with those moral qualities the recognition of which leads me to use the words "right" and "good".

I turn for a brief glance to the historical reasons for the reality of Values. I should say that the record of the progress of mankind witnesses an advance, an advance not continuous but intermittent, from activities which are purely utilitarian, and because utilitarian in the last resort self-regarding, to those which are disinterested. The law which

initially governed the relations of human beings was that of the jungle. Each man was for himself and the hand of each was against his fellows, with the result that human life, in Hobbes's phrase, was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". It is only at a later stage that altruism develops, and men sacrifice themselves for one another, are martyred for ideals, and give their all for a cause. Thus, as evolution proceeds, purely self-regarding actions sometimes give place to actions dictated by the pull of moral obligation. As Socrates would put it, men begin by acting in order to advance their own ends, but they have already reached a stage at which they are sometimes capable of acting disinterestedly in pursuit of the good.

Art again is initially utilitarian. Music was cultivated originally to arouse martial enthusiasm or as an accompaniment for the dance, which was itself, psychologists tell us, an expression of the play impulse. Music is now pursued disinterestedly for its own sake, and men weave tapestries of sound solely in order that they may give concrete expression to the beauty which they have apprehended.

Poetry was invented because it was easy to remember and, because easy to remember, easy to recite; and what the bards recited were the glories of chiefs and kings. It was only later that poetry came to be written for its own sake and ceased, incidentally, to be easy to remember. Painting, again, begins with a representation of objects, but develops until the object becomes incidental,

and the painter seeks to trap and convey by means of arrangements of line and colour the essence of significant, that is to say, of beautiful form.

In the realm of truth, science, which began by being utilitarian—the early Egyptians, for example, invented geometry in order that they might mark out their fields—developed into disinterested research. Scientists now explore the nature of the universe simply because they want to know what it is like. Knowledge, in other words, comes to be pursued for its own sake.

Now through all these parallel developments there seems to me to run the same clue, and the clue is the increasing response of the human mind to the fact of value. It would not, I think, be going too far to suggest that the object of evolution—assuming, of course, that we take the evolutionary process seriously—is so to develop and refine the spirit that it may become more fully conscious of the world of value, or, if the phrase be preferred, of the real world.

Now in all that I have said I have sought to represent Value as something other than the recognition of it. The mind of man apprehends Value, I have suggested, but in no sense becomes one with that which it apprehends. There are, I think, two considerations which induce me to lay emphasis on this "otherness". The first is logical, or rather, epistemological. For various reasons connected with the theory of knowledge I hold that the act of knowing is always directed upon something other than itself. Mind, that is to say, cannot ever know itself for

the reason that as known, that is to say, as the object of knowledge, our experience is necessarily different from what it is when it is lived through as an act of knowledge by the knowing subject. If the object of experience is always different from the experience of it, it will follow that the object of æsthetic and moral experience is also different from the experience of it. The object in question is, I have argued, in the case of moral experience, goodness, in the case of æsthetic experience, beauty. It follows, if I am right, that beauty and goodness are not themselves characteristics of or involved in the experiencing of them. Secondly, there is what I suppose I must call

an emotional reason. The perfect is for me always identified with the non-human; nor am I able to see how the human spirit, which is fallible and changing, can ever come to participate in the being of or to exhibit the characteristics of that which is perfect and eternal. The human spirit can advance in power and knowledge and spiritual refinement, but it can never emancipate itself from the world of time, change and imperfection without ceasing to be human. Now Value is perfect and timeless; hence though the human spirit may recognize and respond to it, it can have no part in what it recognizes.

C. E. M. JOAD

II.—THE INDIAN VIEW

There are two main questions relating to Value which need consideration. The first is the question of the objectivity of value, the second that of the unity of value.

The Western view of Value is the common-sense view. According to it, Value is essentially objective. Something is valuable because it is so, and not because I approve of it. This common-sense view, however, is very partial and in the end untrue. It requires to be supplemented. The objectivity of Value cannot indeed be wholly annulled, but it can be seen to be subordinate to the subjective.

The first thing that we note is, the relativity of the Value-concept. This relativity is absent from the notion of being. Whatever has being

is independent of my knowing of it. Being is nothing if it is not *being-in-itself*. I may know it, but my knowing makes no difference to it. At least such is the meaning of true knowledge. It is different with Value. Value cannot *be-in-itself*. Value is *for me*. It has a necessary reference to an intelligent end or purpose. Something is valuable only in so far as it realizes a certain end of mine. This may be pleasure or some other form of good. But nothing is good or bad and nothing has any value which does not further or obstruct my ends. Indeed, we speak of an end which is good, as though goodness were a character of the end. But this is only metaphorical. It has reference to comparative good. In truth, every end, simply because it is an

end, is a form of good. It satisfies a certain demand or a want, and is in that sense necessarily good. Even a vicious end has negative value. It realizes a good which is really and ultimately no good. We cannot have value without reference to ends. And all ends are essentially subjective.

Does any analysis of our experience indicate the objectivity of Value? Now it is true that all our experience is subject-object experience. But this experience does not have a uniform character. Its character is dependent upon the way the subject functions. The subject functions differently; and the way in which it functions determines the metaphysical status of the object. When I am said to know, the object may be understood to have real being or independent being. When I will, the willed situation, which is the object here, has no being in itself; its being is evidently dependent upon the willing. When I feel, the relationship again is quite different. We maintain that it is this form of relationship which is found in the case of our experience of Value. The felt object is not independent of the feeling of it; it is in indistinguishable unity with the feeling.

We shall take, as an instance, the objects of æsthetic enjoyment. A picture which we regard as beautiful is, objectively speaking, nothing but certain lines and patches of colour. If we were truly impassive or unfeeling subjects, we should merely take note of the given sensible matter as it directly affects our visual organ, or as it may be intellectually interpreted to symbolise certain real or possible objects. We

could by no stretch of imagination read into the coloured patches the quality which we call "beauty". This quality is part of the æsthetic feeling or the appreciation of beauty. Take away from beauty the subjective element of joy, and see whether beauty can survive. It is as little possible as a headache without a feeling of headache. A world in which there was no intelligent being to appreciate beauty or to feel the peculiar joy of the beautiful, would be a world without beauty, and so without æsthetic value.

The same thing is true of music. A sequence of sounds of a certain pitch, timbre, etc., would be no more than a series of peculiar sounds. The untrained mind, as we call it, hears the sounds for what they are. But it derives no pleasure from them. It does not appreciate the music. The trained mind does so, not because it grasps any objective quality of those sounds, but because it feels pleasure, or, as we say, goes into raptures over them. Take away this rapture, and you have taken away the music. The value lies in the feeling of it.

It might now be argued that feeling does not enter into our judgment of moral values. A course of action is moral because it is moral. My feeling plays no part. A rule of conduct is right or it is wrong, irrespective of whether I like it or not. My approval seems consequent upon the validity of an objective moral standard.

In this connection, it is important to make a distinction between the epithet "good", and the epithet "right". The epithet "good", which alone indicates value, is of wider sig-

nificance. It is inclusive of what is called "right". It is good to do what is right. The "goodness" of a certain course of action has once again to do with feeling. Unless this is so, we can well ask, "Why should I do what is right? What value has it for me?" This value can only be determined in reference to some satisfaction which I feel. This satisfaction may be the satisfaction of my higher nature. Certainly, I feel unhappy if I do wrong. Does this not indicate the element of feeling in moral valuation?

But let us suppose that feeling plays no part. I must do the right, because it is right, and not because it serves any interest of mine to do it. Even so, are moral values really objective? We contend that the quality of being moral is not the objective quality of any act. We have not merely to examine an act in order to pronounce it moral. An act by itself is neither moral nor immoral. To say that truth-speaking is moral is not like saying that a flower is yellow. The act is moral, not by itself, but only in so far as it has a direct reference to my doing of it. It is what I *ought to do*. A moral judgment is not like a judgment of knowledge. That is moral which I ought to do, and that is immoral which I ought not to do. But if the moral is to be traced back to the "ought" or the categorical imperative, the question naturally arises, "What is the nature of the obligation implied in the ought?" Is it not possible to analyse away this obligation, and to show that the obligation arises because of certain considerations based upon self-in-

terest, expediency, social opinion, custom, etc.? I know of no valid argument in Western philosophy against such a reduction.

The only way to save the substance of morality is no longer to think of it in terms of an external authority such as God, or of an internal authority like conscience or the moral sense. It is wrong to identify morality with set rules of conduct—Thou shalt do this or thou shalt not do that; or again, this course of action is right and that course of action is wrong. All these rules are only partial expressions of one fundamental law. That is the law of freedom. Anything which I do out of perfect freedom is moral. But what I do out of the inner compulsion of desire, which is the only limitation of my freedom, is immoral. This desire or self-interest takes various subtle forms. It must be rejected in all those forms. It is not confined merely to personal happiness. It includes the happiness of the family, the society and the nation. It includes every interest of an individuated self. The universal alone has no self-interest. Rules of conduct are, in the end, man-made. The law of freedom alone is divine. If we follow this law, there can be no restriction upon our acts; nor can there be any injunction to do this act or that. The essential thing is that we do whatever we do out of perfect inner freedom.

If our analysis is correct, there is no act which, as such, is either right or wrong. An act is right or wrong as it is an expression of my freedom or lack of freedom. The seat of moral value is the subject, not the

act done. The act may be by all outward standards wrong, and yet the person who has done it may be internally free. This alone is what matters for morality. Can we, under the circumstances, argue that even moral values are objective?

We have so far seen that the objectivity of Value cannot be maintained. The second question is that of the unity of Value. It is evident that all objections against the unity of Value are based upon empirical considerations. It is argued that we fail to see how truth can be beautiful, or the beautiful can be moral, etc. Poets and mystics have indeed given expression to this unity. But it is not intelligible to the layman.

We admit this. But does it mean anything more than that we do not understand the mystics? No mystic has ever asserted the unity of all Values in an empirical sense. If the unity is real, it is real in some other sense which we might yet seek to understand. What is quite certain is that if we recognise something as A and something else as B we cannot assert that A is B. The unity can only be real in some sense in which the distinction is lost. We cannot proceed from the distinction to the unity. But it is possible to perceive the unity and to perceive the distinction as unsubstantial and unreal and so lost in the unity.

What might be the nature of this unity? Evidently, we cannot construct it by putting different kinds of Value together. What is possible is that truth, as we know it empirically, is not real and ultimate truth; beauty, as we know it, is not real beauty, etc. They are, merely partial

expressions of a certain ideal which is eternally accomplished; and this ideal is one and the same for all Values. In the realm of the ideal, there are no distinctions. What truly exists is truly free, and its nature is that of pure joy or bliss.

Let us take beauty. What is the ideal of beauty? It is evident that the ideal cannot be objective. Objectively speaking, beauty is necessarily imprisoned in form. But so long as it is so imprisoned, there can always be more and more of it. We cannot stop anywhere and say, "This is the most beautiful object." All that we can perhaps say is that we have not seen anything more beautiful. The ideal of beauty can never be realised under the limitation of form. Beauty expresses itself in form; but the form is in the end inimical to it. Similarly with music. Music can be more and more rapturous. But what is the limit, the ideal? There may be a pure rapture in which all form has evaporated.

The same argument applies to moral values. Virtue is virtue only in so far as some imperfection has been conquered. If we conceived of a being who had no motive for evil, he would have no occasion for virtue. Virtue is entirely human. But for that very reason the ideal of virtue cannot be realised in moral activity. Somehow the imperfection must cease. When, however, this is the case, virtue has become more than virtue. The ideal is beyond good and evil.

The ideal of beauty must transcend all limitations of form in which beauty is ordinarily and humanly expressed. The ideal of

morality must transcend all motives of action in which morality is expressed. The ideal must transcend every empirical limitation. It must be something transcendental and not objective. But if that is so, there can be no room for any distinctions in it. It is at once the highest beauty, the highest morality, and the highest truth. It includes the reality and the substance of all the values. What is lost is the unsubstantial form which divides one kind of value from another kind.

What is the nature of this unity? If it is true, as we have shown to be the case, that all Value is *for* the self, then there can be nothing higher than the self. Everything is dear for the sake of the self. The self is not dear for the sake of anything else besides it. It is of the nature of pure bliss. It thus sums up in its very being all Value. It alone is *Value in itself*, or absolute Value.

We can distinguish in an æsthetic object the qualities which belong to it as an existent and the æsthetic quality which is relative to feeling. Thus value and being fall apart. We can distinguish in the moral act the

act as a mere existent and its moral quality which is relative to the freedom of the doer. We cannot distinguish, in the case of the ultimate and the true Self, its being from its bliss. It is the perfect unity of being and value. It is without any distinctions. We read distinctions into it because of our limited standpoint, where distinctions are the rule.

It is said that man is imperfect, while Value belongs to the perfect. Man must recognise Value; he cannot create it or make it. But the perfect cannot be objective. The object stands for limitation, and so for imperfection. The perfect must be unlimited. Hindu thinkers conceive of it as the Highest Self. This Self is the Self of all. The imperfection of man is due to his misconception of the nature of his own true Self. If he sees himself as he truly is, he will become the infinite and the absolute. The Self is the seat of all perfection. Perfection is not to be sought outside in the object, or in some being other than our self. To know the true Self is to realise all the perfection that there is.

G. R. MALKANI

III.—THE THEOSOPHICAL VIEW

Ignoring the less fundamental utilitarian and exchange values of the economic theorist, the philosopher goes to the root of the problem of value and concerns himself with the deeper need of clarifying the concept of its nature as expressed in terms of the true, the beautiful and the good. The two preceding articles present with admirable succinctness

the case, on the one hand, for moral, æsthetic and veridical values existing objectively, *i.e.*, independently of their cognizer, and for the plurality or the essential unrelatedness of such values; and, on the other hand, for the subordination of the objective to the subjective element in the determination of value and for the merging of all three types of value in a

transcendent unity.

The Esoteric Philosophy of Theosophy, upholding an objective idealism, not only recognizes the cogency of the arguments put forward by both writers but also points the way to the reconciliation of their contentions. Let us disclaim in advance the imputation, even indirect, of defective vision to either of our learned contributors. Both are right as far as they go, but their pictures are incomplete.

Their reconciliation is possible, in fact, only in the light of the ancient Indian doctrine of *Maya* (Illusion), with its vast ramifications and its still vaster implications. According to that teaching, as set forth in *The Secret Doctrine* by H. P. Blavatsky, the objective universe and all that it contains are *Maya*, because, compared to the eternal immutability of the one boundless and unknowable Principle which is symbolized by absolute, abstract Space, they are all temporary and evanescent, from the ephemeral life of a fire-fly to that of the Sun. The phenomenal, the world of illusion, men and things, is but the reflection and the shadow of the noumenal, the Reality behind the veil of *Mahamaya*, the great Illusion.

Theosophy draws a practical distinction, however, between that *Mahamaya* or collective illusion and the objective relations between the various conscious Egos. The Universe is real enough to the latter, who are as unreal as it is itself.

In addition to the collective illusion to which all common mortals are subject, each man is enveloped by his own *Maya*, which is real to him. To the madman, for example,

the shadows in his deranged mind are as actual and as real, for the time being, as the things which the sane people around him see.

As the element of *Maya* enters into all finite things, the appearance which the underlying reality assumes for any observer depends upon his power of cognition. It is questionable whether the defenders of the existence of objective values on this plane could point to a single object or action or idea which everybody would concede to be beautiful or good or true. Will the portrait or the landscape which the educated eye recognizes as beautiful mean anything to the untrained eye of the savage but a confusion of streaks and daubs of colour? Similarly, will the standard of right and wrong of the civilized man be any more adequate by the standard of the saint than that of the savage would be in the eyes of the former? Will the fetich-worshipper see any truth in the philosopher's concept of the Indwelling God?

No, the values known to us are but relative values, depending for their sanction upon the response of the perceiver. As new knowledge is acquired and as consciousness unfolds, values on the plane of *Maya* change. The upward progress of the Ego is described as a "series of progressive awakenings". At each such advance a man recognizes that what he had taken for realities before had been but shadows, but in each case the new "realities" which he perceives are only less shadowy, though he will realize that fact only when the next veil falls from his consciousness.

The pure object apart from con-

consciousness is inconceivable at present to the perceiving Ego, who knows only the mental states which the object excites in him. In this Maya in which we live there are cognizable values, to be sure, but they are only shadows, like the objects to which we attach them, correspondences, so to say, of real values unknowable to us as long as we do not know how to free our consciousness from the thralldom of the senses and to break through the barrier which separates the personal Ego from a knowledge of "things in themselves".

For, although on the plane of relativity values are largely subjective, coloured and to a great extent determined by the reaction of the perceiver, real values do exist, Absolute Values—the immortal aspects of ideas and of objects. Those truly are objective values, values in themselves, as Mr. Joad contends. But on that plane of the Real there is true unity of values, the thesis which Mr. Malkani defends.

Let us take Mr. Joad's own illustration of a statement which is true but to which he denies a moral or an æsthetic quality, *i.e.*, that $2 + 3 = 5$. We maintain that this formula has not only an aspect of goodness in its conformity to Law but also a potential of beauty which reflection upon the rôle played by numbers in the differentiation of matter and in the evolution of the manifested universe brings out. The real Science of Numbers, a very different thing from what passes in the world for Numerology, reveals the beauty in rhythmic vibration, from the whirling of the electrons in the atom to the majesty of the ordered march of

the spheres.

Order, in fact, is not "Heaven's first law" alone; it may in one sense be said to be Heaven's only law, and to stand on our plane as the symbol of that unity in which all values meet. In one aspect this Order or Harmony is Compassion, the Law of Laws. To the extent that an action, including its motive, subserves the maintenance of the universal harmony, or the restoration of that harmony if it has been disturbed, it is a good action, and is properly described in moral terms as "right". The act which Mr. Malkani describes as done out of perfect freedom, freedom from every desire for benefit from the act for oneself or for any group smaller than the universal, would be such a right action. To the extent that an object of æsthetic appreciation follows the laws of proportion and achieves a balancing of colour, line or tone, to the extent that the visible or audible representation approximates to or realizes a certain harmony with the artist's or the musician's idea, it is a thing of beauty and, in Keats's immortal phrase, "a joy for ever". And what is the true if not the concept of the integral, the all-inclusive Whole in which all of the parts are united in perfect balance and harmonious functioning? Granted that the true in this sense is the ideal, the presently unrealizable, still anything that falls short of this ideal or that contravenes it is so far false because impermanent and of the nature of illusion.

While presently unrealizable by the ordinary man, the *real* values are, however, knowable and are known by Those who have attained human per-

fection. The production of such Cognizers of true values is the culmination of the progressive awakenings which the unfolding consciousness experiences. Their co-operation with Nature implies action in accordance with that full knowledge. They are true philanthropists because they aid others to realize their own inherent perfection.

For each man is Divine and Perfect in essence and in the process of evolution, he realizes and expresses more and more that which he is.

Alone the Initiate, rich with the lore acquired by numberless generations of his predecessors, directs the "Eye of Dangma" toward the essence of things in which no Maya can have any influence. (*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 45)

A STUDENT OF THEOSOPHY

The following is extracted from a speech by Shri C. Rajagopalachariar, Prime Minister of Madras, as reported in *The Hindu* :—

Democracy implied that the power of administration should be vested in the hands of a select few. Freedom did not mean licence for everyone to do as he liked. If they wanted to have a feast, they must give a certain amount of freedom to the cooks. The cooks must be given the choice to serve the preparations in the order and in the manner which they felt to be convenient. People would have to sit before the leaves and the cooks would serve them all one by one. They would have to submit themselves to that amount of discipline. If they became impatient and began to ask why the cooks should have so much power, the whole feast would end in a fiasco and they would have to go without food.

Self-government implied discipline and willing submission to the exercise of authority by a select few. If every one wanted to exercise power in the name of liberty, there would be chaos. If they had at any time entertained the idea that the Congress Government would mean power in the hands of all, they were wrong. At that rate they might not be able to reach their goal. There must be unity and there should also be discipline. Power could pass from one set of people to another set; it could not pass into the hands of all people. The latter case would mean chaos.... Freedom of speech and freedom of association were possible only if people submitted themselves to be regulated and controlled. Otherwise the result would be disorder. Discipline was, thus, an important factor of freedom. Now they had themselves to exercise that power which prevented disorder. To govern themselves, they would have to pass orders on themselves.

Their differences would disappear only if they practised unity (said the Premier). They should get into the habit of liking one another and trusting one another. It would be difficult in the beginning to acquire that habit. But when the habit was established, there would be happiness. In the past, India had a message for the rest of the world. Knowledge went from this country to other countries. India taught *dharma* to them. In the recent past also, India had a lesson to teach to the world. While in other countries the way of freedom was stained with blood, India, under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, demonstrated that there was a peaceful and non-violent way of attaining freedom. India would again show to the world how Hindus, Muslims and Christians could live together peacefully, free to worship differently and yet united by a common purpose.

THE STUDY AND CONTEMPLATION OF NATURE

A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO MYSTICISM FOR THE WESTERN MIND

[Fully aware that modern education encourages superficial and inattentive habits of thought, Elizabeth Pearl Cross, herself an educationist of Great Britain, suggests in this article a practical remedy. She recommends deliberate and regular exercises, taking Nature's objective garment as the field for attentive and concentrated study. This, if seriously undertaken, will lead to an evaluation of the subjective significance of all things and phenomena. We agree with her view that Nature's impersonal beauty calms the wandering mind and heals the disturbed emotions. Furthermore, the true mystic sees in every phenomenon but the objective symbol of a spiritual truth and learns thus to read the Book of Nature correctly. For that reason does *Light on the Path* contain such injunctions as: "Regard earnestly all the life that surrounds you." "Inquire of the earth, the air, and the water, of the secrets they hold for you."—Eds.]

To-day, perhaps more than ever, the Western world, over-industrialised and divorced from fundamental rhythms, is lacking in that spiritual depth which alone can give true calm and meaning to the individual life. Everywhere people are finding this surface-living unsatisfying, but do not know how to achieve the contact with spiritual truth and power that they need.

There is little real knowledge or possibility of harmony with the realities of nature, with the growing and harvesting of food, with the alternations of the seasons or the cycles of the heavens. The individual's own instinctive, life (shared with beast and plant) is often necessarily frustrated through the demands of a mechanised society. Thus we have an innate sense of unfulfilment, a cutting off from the main stem of life, demonstrating itself in the neuroses and general lack of poised calm that seem to be the hall-mark of present-day Western civilisation.

Many feel this lack of harmony, this loss of contact with the greater creative mind of the universe. They seek help in many ways, from the various Churches, from different religious movements, from political parties, or, in despair, they try to distract themselves still further with constant amusements that serve only to make their condition worse. In the knowledge of their own spiritual poverty they do their best to avoid self-examination, and by constant distractions they try to evade the truth.

Others, realizing that true happiness cannot be achieved by any adult mind without the refreshment that comes through the exercise of the whole personality (particularly the exercise of the highest powers with the consequent refreshment from the unseen), make an attempt to cultivate spiritual insight. Many try to follow different schools of mysticism, both Eastern and Western, and some succeed to a certain degree. These are

the fortunate ones, with whom I am not now concerned. I wish to make some effort to help those who have tried and have been discouraged through lack of success, or who have not even had the courage to try.

It is generally agreed by many eminent thinkers that contemplation is the beginning, and may be the end, of our attempts to grow in harmony with the highest powers. Contemplation, by its very nature needing concentration, true attention, a shutting out of the external world, is of incredible difficulty to the normal Western mind. The average individual is accustomed to a wide field of consciousness, to giving slight and momentary attention to many things at once, with frequent shiftings of attention. Much of our noisy and mechanical civilisation demands this shallow but wide attention. Take driving a car, for instance, in a big city. The driver is paying some attention to the machine, some to the traffic, some to the signals of the policeman, and some to the conversation of his passenger. In almost all daily life this same shallow, divided attention is general. Deeper thought, accurate concentration on one object, even in the external world, let alone concentration on one *thought*, is practically impossible. From birth upwards the Western child has been gradually weaned from single-mindedness. His play has been interrupted, his home-lessons done to the accompaniment of wireless or conversation, and he has become more and more incapable of depth of thought.

Thus it is that only people of exceptional ability usually succeed in achieving spiritual depth, and very

many more are discouraged by their lack of success. Many thinkers advocate short periods of concentration on some simple object, held in thought, as a means by which the mind may be calmed and trained. This seemingly simple exercise is in reality too difficult for the majority of us. We need re-education before we can reach such a level.

It seems that this re-education, in its small way an approach to mysticism, may come through the study and contemplation of Nature. We have to realize the limitations of the adult Western mind, and work from the wide and shallow field of consciousness, with its capacity for appreciating the external world, in order gradually to reduce the focus of attention until it is possible to contemplate a thought without external stimulus.

Most people can be led to take a certain pleasure in natural phenomena, from an interest in the movement of animals and birds to the general beauty of plant and landscape. This pleasure may help to fix the attention and form a starting-point for contemplation. The suggestions about to be given can, naturally, be modified according to individual needs, but they have been found helpful and encouraging to those who desire to free themselves from the limitations of their own daily life but are not able to understand or achieve very much as yet.

I (a) Take a short walk, each day if possible, with the firm idea of paying attention only to natural phenomena. This precludes any thoughts about personal affairs, and demands that all the interest and attention be

given to the outward forms of trees (colour of leaves, texture of bark etc.), the behaviour of birds, the shape of the clouds and so on. This gives a wide and somewhat shallow field of consciousness, as has been usual, and asks for no creative thought. All that is required is attention to the world of nature that is living in harmony.

(b) Each morning contemplate one natural object (for preference a tree or a long-living plant) and concentrate on its external appearance for a few moments. Always have the same object if it is at all possible.

II (a) Later, after the first exercise has become possible without strain or alternately with the first exercise, take a short walk in which natural objects are noted with attention, but with a main thought held throughout. For example, in Spring the thought might well be one of *Renewal* or *Re-birth*. Each object that claimed the attention should be linked up, by an act of conscious thought, with the main theme. The mind should be allowed to penetrate through the external appearances (an advance on exercise I). Thus green grass gives more than colour and texture ; it means an awakening from the earth, an offering of food to the world ; it is a symbol of the virtue of the sun.

(b) The contemplation of the one object, for a few moments, may also now go beyond the external. The tree may evoke a thought of strength or patience or tranquillity. With the physical eye fixed on the object, it may now be found that some reflections of peculiar value may make their way into the mind that is receptive. This "listening" attitude

marks a great advance on the way to true contemplation.

III Some may find help and considerable peace in the method of "identification". The old self may be put aside, as it were, and the whole being imagined as a part of nature. The body is no longer the harassed individual, but a channel for the vital forces of life, at one with the animals and plants, growing and being renewed through the powers of wind, sunlight and rain. It may be possible to identify the self, momentarily, with a rugged tree, a swift bird, a calm landscape ; to feel and grow supple, strong, recharged with vitality.

Many people have found immense help in the contemplation of a tree. Some are able to gain more by studying the matter scientifically, in order that they may have a fund of conscious knowledge concerning the activities of plant life, while others find that a store of poetic or philosophical information is more stimulating to fresh contemplation. A tree is extremely rich in symbolism, having been chosen to figure in almost all mythologies and religions, and can supply many subjects for thought : strength, fruitfulness, shelter, to name only a few.

After some practice in these avenues of approach, the individual may begin to feel an inner rhythm of life. This often takes the form of a consciousness of activity, followed by a dormant period when fresh power is flowing in. Later it may be found that the individual will be able to rely more and more on mental vision, when, from a starting-point of some remembered sight, he will be able to

fix the mind on the inner reality of its meaning. For the average European, however, with his practical external bias, the general contemplation of nature on the lines indicated will go far in aiding calm peacefulness and greater depth of spiritual insight.

Many will find much to criticise in the foregoing suggestions which seem to lay so much emphasis on the

external world, whereas true mysticism seeks to set free the powers within. These criticisms are quite justified, but it may be put forward in extenuation that we are offering only an approach, a gradual weaning away from the external, a re-education, in which simple success may encourage greater efforts on the path.

ELIZABETH PEARL CROSS

The term "God"—unless referring to the Unknown Deity or *Absoluteness*, which can hardly be supposed *acting* in any way—has always meant in ancient philosophies the collectivity of the working and intelligent Forces in nature. The word "Forest" is singular, yet it is the term to express the idea of thousands or even millions of trees of different kinds. Materialists have the option of saying "Nature", or still better—"Law geometrizes" if they so prefer. But in the days of Plato, the average reader would hardly have understood the metaphysical distinction and real meaning. The truth, however, of Nature ever "geometrizing" is easily ascertained. Here is an instance: Heat is the modification of the motions or particles of matter. Now, it is a physical and mechanical law that particles or bodies in motion on themselves assume a spheroidal form—this, from a globular planet down to a drop of rain. Observe the snowflakes, which along with crystals exhibit to you all the geometrical forms existing in nature. As soon as motion ceases, the spheroidal shape alters; or, as Tyndall tells us, it becomes a flat drop, then the drop forms an equilateral triangle, a hexagon and so on. In observing the breaking up of ice-particles in a large mass, through which he passed heat rays, he observed that the first shape the particles assumed was triangular or pyramidal, then cubical and finally hexagonal, &c. Thus, even modern physical science corroborates Plato and justifies his proposition.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

SHELLEY AND GANDHIJI

[Shri V. A. Thiagarajan of Mysore is writing a book on Shelley. In our following issues we shall publish a series of three studies on this great poet by an American author.—EDS.]

Shelley writes in "A Philosophical View of Reform" that the people of India should not pride themselves on their knowledge of Rousseau and Hume, but should turn to the deeper aspects of their own culture. He remarks, "The thing to be sought is that they should, as they would if they were free, attain to a system of arts and literature of their own." The poet has anticipated the course of events by a century. We who are in the midst of the Indian Renaissance have come to learn that we can raise the superstructure of our thought only on the foundations of our ancient culture. The Indian Renaissance therefore marks a return to the culture of the *Upanishads*. Just as Shelley's view of life can be traced back to Plato, or forward to the exponents of idealism in the recent past, so also the Indian view of life can be traced either to the Eastern prototypes of Plato, the seers of the *Upanishads*, or to the living exponents of our ancient culture. Just as the Himalayas culminate in Everest, so also we have in Gandhi the culmination of the vision of the *rishis* of the past. This will explain to us the large measure of agreement in thought that we find between Shelley and the thinkers of India, especially Gandhiji.

To Shelley, Nature is our living environment. Although he is aware of the beauty of Nature, as every artist is, for him Nature becomes a

symbol of the creative activity of the One Spirit that animates all. Love is the name he gives to the spiritual unity that binds all life. To him, Deity is the highest expression of this love which is Reality. His political philosophy and his economic ideals are merely applications of the law of love.

To the seers of the *Upanishads*, as to Shelley, Nature is the manifestation of a living Spirit. The *Swetaswatara Upanishad* says that the One distributes Himself in the many in order to bring out His hidden purpose. The *Isavasyam* says that everything is pervaded by the Lord. The *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* points out that he who perceives only apparent diversity experiences death after death. Among our living philosopher-mystics this sense of spiritual unity is brought out by Babu Bhagavan Das who writes, "Nature—God's Nature—Nature's God is a breakless continuum." Gandhi, our modern saint, similarly points out that behind the magnificent and kaleidoscopic variety of Nature there is an unmistakable unity of purpose, design and form.

If the world is a spiritual unity, we can perceive it only by following the law of love. According to Shelley, love is the irrefragable law of our lives. He traces all pain, sorrow and discord to the violation of this law. Gandhiji similarly points out that we are all bound by the law of love. He

regards love as the centripetal force that binds society as surely as the law of gravity binds the atoms of the earth. He also points out that our knowledge of Deity is in exact proportion to our making love a live force in society.

Shelley points out that Deity ever remains the unapproachable. The immanent does not exhaust the possibilities of the transcendent. This corresponds closely with the Indian view of God. When Deity is described in the *Purushasuktha* as having a thousand heads, or when the *Gita* catalogues the entire cosmos as the true form of God, we have the immanent held out to our vision. That is why God is again referred to as the supreme Meditator and the supreme Meditation. But the dwellers in the *Thapovana* point out by a simile that comes naturally to them that just as one finds cattle by their footprints, so also one finds God by His footprint in the human soul; and that just as the sun is not sullied by earth-born clouds, so also God is not sullied by human defects. When they say that three-fourths of God is in heaven and only one-fourth on earth, they hold before us the transcendent ideal of Deity.

Shelley desires that we should seek God by looking into ourselves "through the veil and the bar of things that seem and are". To the sages of India meditation and internal purification become the means by which man approximates to the divine. To Gandhiji God is truth and love. Prayer becomes, according to this point of view, not a wearying of the gods for more, but meditation and spiritual attunement. Gandhiji points

out that the individual as well as the world is the manifestation of a single supreme Spirit, and that there is no break between man and Nature.

If, as Shelley says in "Julian and Maddalo", "there is one road to peace and that is truth", let us see whither this road will lead us in politics and economics. Both Gandhiji and Shelley consider that politics without religion are a snare. While Shelley is an introvert, in Gandhiji we have a proper balance between the introvert and the extrovert. That is why in him action and meditation go together. Gandhi is a *Karmayogi*, but his point of view is identical with that of Shelley who is a *Dhyanayogi*. If everything is enveloped by the Lord, there is no place for the enemy. The *Upanishads* say, "Verily a second person is a rival. He who knows this has no rival." It follows that the enemy lies in our imperfect comprehension of ourselves. In the words of the *Upanishads*, "We suffer from ourselves, none else compels, none else compels."

Both Shelley and Gandhiji desire that the political liberation of man shall be gained by an appeal to the moral nature of the enemy. The enemy then becomes our friend, and the good that we seek becomes our common good.

Gandhi's insistence on purity of motives in politics is based on his spiritual outlook on life. He appeals only to truth and to non-violence, for he considers that an angry man is unfit to be entrusted with his own, much less with others' freedom. Love, self-purification and intellectual resistance to evil become the means of realizing a better social order. In

Shelley's *Prometheus* we have the true ideal of a *satyagrahi*. The essence of *satyagraha* lies in advancing a noble cause by cheerfully suffering for it. Gandhi says, "Love ever suffers, never resents, never revenges itself."

It may be urged that Shelley's Prometheus is a god, and that he has only to play a waiting game with Zeus. To raise such an objection is to forget the true nature of the self. The self is not a bundle of impulses or a group of atoms. The self is what it includes. Shelley's *Prometheus* is collective man only because he is "one soul of many a soul". Thus Gandhi says, "Those who believe in the soul know that the soul never dies. The souls of the living as well as of the dead are all one." That is why *satyagraha* resolves itself into soul force. The *satyagrahi* does not trouble himself about the fruit of action. To him full effort is full victory. He repeats to himself the words of Yagnavalkya to Maitrei, "Lo, verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the soul is all dear."

If it is possible to spiritualise politics, it is equally possible to spiritualise economics. Shelley considers the attainment of economic equality as the greatest task before civilisation, but he desires that this equality shall be gained by love and not by force. Gandhiji similarly points out that the *Isa Upanishad* admits of even a communistic interpretation. He, in common with Shelley, requires each man to consider himself in relation to his property as the trustee of the public. The equality that is gained by violence argues a materialistic and a pluralistic outlook on life, and

a denial of Deity. As an economist, Gandhiji takes his stand on the Upanishadic precept that we should learn self-control, be generous, and have compassion on men and on animals. He points out that God, of Himself, seeks the heart of him who serves his fellow men.

We see in Gandhiji one of the physicians of our Iron Age. He has brought to a sick world the pure gold of practical idealism, and has made it potable. He says, "For me, the road to salvation lies through incessant toil in the service of my country, and therethrough of humanity. I want to identify myself with everything that lives. Thus in the language of the *Gita* I want to live at peace with both friend and foe." Such men as he are among the guardians of humanity. He stands in the same class as men like Plato. Gandhi as the authentic voice of India speaks of the fundamental unity of humanity, "for all is one though we seem many". If in the dawn of the Indian Renaissance we turn to Shelley or to any other European writer for light, it is not because we accept at its face value the need for the white man's burden. Nor do we claim omniscience either. We have all to learn from each other in joy and in sorrow. Let us salute all the major prophets of humanity, and associate with them the names of Shelley and Gandhiji. The one is the authentic voice of England, the other that of India. They have shown us how we can ennoble our lives by following truth, peace and non-violence which alone will triumph in the end.

V. A. THIAGARAJAN

THE UPANISHADS AND MODERN THOUGHT

[Miss K. W. Wild, M.A., is the author of *Intuition*, reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH for August 1938 by Sri Krishna Prem.—Eds.]

In 1937 an Indian scholar and an Irish poet combined to make accessible to English readers some of the time-honoured wisdom of the East, by translating a number of the Upanishads.¹

As my sense was charmed by the rhythmic prose of W. B. Yeats when I first read the little book, my mind was no less charmed by the matter, for the reliability of which (having no Sanskrit myself) I had to put my faith in the integrity and competence of Purohit Swami. I was amazed at the extent to which the ideas of the Upanishads fitted in with, cast fresh light on and modified the ideas I had been assimilating from twentieth-century thinkers.

It is true, no doubt, that the translators chose with some deliberation those of the ancient books most likely to appeal at the present time. It is also true, I feel convinced, that in the present epoch there is a steady tendency from Western to Eastern modes of thought, and that a careful observer will note how, in many unexpected places, in many creeks and inlets, the Eastern main is indeed slowly flooding in.

At the first reading it was the poet who made the greater appeal: "May peace, and peace, and peace be everywhere." These are not words which will easily be banished from the mind's ear. From the mat-

ter I felt a certain alienation because of the absence of what we are so accustomed to look for—system, classification, logic. Not that these are really absent from the Upanishads; there seems indeed to be a very real educative system based on Descartes' dictum: "Proceed from the simple to the less simple." And classification there is too, but of a kind that lacks the familiar grading and mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of scientific classification, and resembles to a distracting degree the apparently wanton divisions of the *Arabian Nights*; as when, for instance, we are told: "Out of spirit came air; out of air, wind; out of wind, fire; out of fire, water; out of water, earth; out of earth, vegetation; out of vegetation, food; out of food, man." We feel that the world has wobbled on its axis and things have got mixed.

A second reading, however, brought two considerations. First, that the grouping was not so illogical as had at first appeared, but grew in rationality as one considered and read the commentary with greater care. But, more to the point came the realization that the mode of attaining wisdom is so different in the East and West that my ignorance or thoughtlessness was driving me to expect a method of approach which, in this realm of thought, could bear but

¹ *The Ten Principal Upanishads*—put into English by Shree Purohit Swami and W. B. Yeats. Reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH for October 1937 by Shri D. S. Sarma.—Eds.

barren fruit. In the West, and particularly in modern times, we are so busy learning—all our lives often,—that there is neither time nor desire for meditation. We are given, or give, our conclusions out “just so”, neatly arranged and with immediate appeal: conclusion must follow from premise; effect from cause; residue from subtraction; and a whole from the summation of its parts.

But that is not the only way of informing and developing the mind. Concentration and meditation were the Eastern modes. Then a man arrived at his own conclusions (modified and corrected, it is true, by the almost inevitable *guru*, but still his own). What need of classification when any one sentence could yield tens and hundreds of implications; when by meditation on one word, one fact, the universe might be mastered? “Flower in the crannied wall” was a reality in the East hundreds of years ago. It did not seem to matter very much from what point the start was made; in the end, if the meditator persevered, nothing need be hidden from his mind. And how full of admirable jumping-off grounds the Upanishads are! We turn the leaves and, one after another, phrases and sentences leap to our eyes. In our Western restlessness we long to take each one as a text and preach, or as a theme for essay or monograph; but the wise men of the East preferred to meditate on and enjoy such microcosms as these which I select from about fifty that I made a note of:—

To doubt Spīrit is to live in terror.

The finest quality of the food we swallow rises up as mind.

With faith man thinks; faithless he

cannot think.

Who in man's body wishes, sleeps, dreams, enjoys?

The passionate never learn.

Such meditation he is able to enjoy because of his training in concentration. To such an extent is this followed that concentration itself comes to be considered of value quite apart from its object; indeed the most trivial of objects is often chosen in order to make command over will and mind the more complete. We in the West concentrate, truly; almost any work worth doing demands it, but it is to us strictly a means, not an end, and a means which, apart from its actual use in particular cases, is so little valued that we do not trouble to cultivate it except indirectly. The average man, then, whose natural gift of concentration is high, achieves; while the greater genius, whose feeble power of concentration has not been developed, fails. Our foolish Western, saying that “genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains” declares our weakness, or, perhaps, our strength; for there are, after all, two sides to the question.

But alluring as are these bright humming-birds of wisdom, it was not in them that I chiefly felt the strong attraction of the Upanishads, but rather in the way these books of wisdom in part, and even in the whole, developed from a slightly different angle the ideas which seemed to me to be some of the more interesting among modern philosophical theories.

One or two of these I should like to develop. But not the most obvious; not, therefore, the mysticism which has always found a place in Western thought from the time of the

Greeks with Pythagoras and Plato (who perhaps themselves derived it from the East) and since the advent of the great religions, originally Eastern, of Mohamet and Christ.

Neither will I deal with magic, which, whether in the study of yoga or psychic phenomena or the cults and practices of primitive peoples such as the South Sea Islanders, is absorbing at the present time many curious and able intellects.

Nor, again, must I be tempted to moralise on the part taken in religious and philosophical discussion and inquiry by the women in the Upanishads and that denied to them only a little while ago by one of our own most honoured universities.

Neither will I linger over the interesting subject of Illusion, for the matter that I find most interesting of all and which I should like to work out in a little more detail is the correspondence between many of the teachings of the Upanishads and Whitehead's *Philosophy of Organism*.

One of the charms of Whitehead's *Philosophy of Organism* is that it fits itself into or at least makes more acceptable so many other philosophies. Of these that of the Upanishads is one. The selection made by Purohit Swami and W. B. Yeats both opens and closes with these words, I had almost said, with this incantation: "That is perfect. This is perfect. Perfect comes from perfect. Take perfect from perfect the remainder is perfect."

This, in an epigram, is the doctrine of any 'Absolute' school of thought. I do not know whether Professor Whitehead would care to have his philosophy so described, but his

theory of a universe mutually interdependent in all its parts and so forming a perfect though constantly changing whole will bear such an interpretation.

Though, to Whitehead, every item (event) is indissolubly knit to every other, the creative force, or soul, or essence, allows of an infinite possibility of change. A perfect whole on the one hand and omnipotent creativity and so infinite possibility on the other. To me this seems the most fascinating of doctrines. It bears out Spinoza's feelings which we find expressed for him in the Upanishads :

It lives through all that lives, hearing through the ear, thinking through the mind, speaking through the tongue, seeing through the eye. . . . Life falls from Self as shadow falls from man. Life and Self are interwoven, but Life comes into the body that the desires of the mind may be satisfied.

The whole *Philosophy of Organism* seems to me to be contained in the following extract :—

He wanted every form, for He wanted to show Himself ; as a magician He appears in many forms. He masters hundreds and thousands of powers. He is in these powers ; these millions of powers ; these innumerable powers. He is Spirit ; without antecedent, without precedent ; without inside ; without outside ; omnipresent ; omniscient.

It is true that Whitehead would mean by 'He' *creativity*, but he certainly would not object to the capital 'H'.

And how could the energy of Whitehead's doctrines be better expressed than by Angiras :—

It is the undying blazing Spirit, that seed of all seeds, wherein lay hidden the world and all its creatures. It is life,

speed, mind, reality, immortality: It is there to be struck. Strike it, my Son!

Do but change 'Spirit' into 'creativity' and Whitehead is speaking.

In the same way we feel the Spirit of his doctrine of the Eternal expressed when the seer exclaims: "Lord fill me with intelligence that I may grasp immortality."

Whitehead's theory of 'prehensions', or the mutual influence of all events, suggests something of Spirit or intelligence throughout the universe rather than their limitation to man or animals, and in this sense his 'creativity' may be described as 'will' and elucidated, or at any rate expounded, in the words of Sanatku-mār :—

Everything is founded on 'will', everything forms will; everything lives on will. Heaven and earth will; wind and air will; water and light will; rain wills because water and light will; speed wills because life wills; actions will because speech wills; world wills because actions will; everything wills because world wills. Such is will. Worship will.

The negative aspect, too, of Whitehead's reading of the universe, its unfulfilled possibilities, finds Hindu expression :—

If a man leaves this kingdom without knowing that he owns the kingdom of Self (creativity), that Self is of no service to him; it remains like the unread Vedas, or a deed not done.

And the modern philosopher's insistence on the eternal opposites in Being in spite of, even as an aspect,

of, its perfection is expressed in his own mood in the words :—

Spirit has two aspects: measurable and unmeasurable; mortal, immortal; stable, unstable; graspable, ungraspable.

It must be clear from the above comparisons that I do not suppose that Whitehead's *Philosophy of Organism* was anticipated by the Hindu sages, only that their wisdom, read in the light of his, makes both glow with a clearer meaning.

Who sees through the eye, *knowing that He sees*, is Self, the eye an instrument whereby He sees; Who smells through the nose, knowing that He smells, is Self, the nose an instrument whereby He smells; Who speaks through the tongue, knowing that He speaks, is Self, the tongue an instrument whereby He speaks; Who hears through the ear, knowing that He hears, is Self, the ear an instrument whereby He hears; Who thinks through the mind, knowing that He thinks, is Self, the mind an instrument whereby He thinks. He looks through the mind's eye, his spiritual eye; in that eye Heaven is made and all desires arise.

The endless patience of the East!

One is amazed at the power of truth. However diverse the doctrines, a sincere following of them leads the most opposite to much the same conclusions. The Upanishads give wider meaning to the most modern of twentieth-century studies, and reiterate eternal desires:

"May peace, and peace, and peace be everywhere."

K. W. WILD

THE ETHICS OF CONSCRIPTION

[We comment in "Ends & Sayings" upon this article by George Godwin who has just finished the writing of a book which is an official history of Queen Mary College, University of London.--Ebs.]

For the man who thinks at all conscription involves a tremendous moral problem; for it brings him face to face with a clash between fundamental religious doctrine and the claims of the State--backed, to his bewilderment, by the State Church.

I write, of course, as a citizen of a country, nominally at least, Christian. And I find that to get this article written at all I shall have to depart from custom and introduce a personal note.

I was reared in the faith of the Church of England; in what is known as the Evangelical school, I was taught that Christ was the Son of God, miraculously conceived and as miraculously restored after death to His Father.

Further, I was taught that the way of life taught by Christ was that ordained by His Father; that His Commandments were God's commands to human beings.

One of those Commandments, of course, tells us not to take human life: *Thou shalt not kill.*

Quite aside from the circumstance that the majority of human beings have a natural repugnance to the idea of taking the life of a fellow, this Commandment possessed for me a very great force. When I say that having called a brother a fool I suffered torments because my nurse reminded me that: *He who calls his brother a fool is in danger of Hell*

fire, my reactions to the Ten Commandments can be imagined.

I was ten when the Boer War broke out. That was after an earlier childhood largely made enjoyable by a collection of toy soldiers and the war games of the nursery floor. I was, of course, too young to see any incongruity in the behaviour of adults who made me repeat nightly a prayer to a God of Love; who took me to a Church where, every Sunday, I had to repeat the Ten Commandments, and then proceeded to give me a toy cannon to play with.

I suppose that by 1899 I was quite prepared for the acceptance of the British indictment of Krueger and the wave of hatred against the Boers which swept over England then. My elder brothers departed for that war firmly believing themselves to be heroes, and they returned (I am now convinced) wiser and sadder men.

At my Public School I went through the Officers' Training Corps. I found it tedious, but with compensations, and its war implications were not so apparent as its play value. There was one boy who had received exemption. He represented my first encounter with the moral issue. He was despised, but not persecuted; in which, I reckon, he was fairly fortunate.

I now knew that there were people who felt very strongly about the O. T. C. and thought a little about it myself.

By later adolescence my reading had taken me to Tolstoi, to Maurice, one of the first of the Christian Socialists, and to others who were preachers of love and abominators of war. Most of all the Russian coloured my far too receptive mind. I felt that he had the root of truth in him; and when he told me that all men should perform bread labour he won me completely.

By twenty-two I was married and earning my bread by the sweat of my brow in the forests of British Columbia. There, living in that simple milieu, I felt that I could see, reduced to a size suited to my simple mind, issues that had been confused in the complex civilization of my native country.

I saw that love of money without work made for social inequalities; that much that I had been taught as a child was poisonous and pernicious. (Now, if you want to *get on*—and you *do* want to *get on* etc.) I saw that cruelty and greed, coupled with lack of imagination, were the major causes of unhappiness and human suffering.

When the Great War broke out I was already a father. I was convinced that war was never justified, and if ever a man could, hand on heart, have pleaded a conscientious objection, I was that man.

Yet I went.

I went because, very simply, I examined my heart in the solitude of the forest—the forest that was the first temple—and I realized that the only man who can take that stand is the man of impeccable life. What the conscientious objector should be asked is not: “Do you really believe

that you must obey this Commandment?” but: “Do you apply the same high standard to the other less inconvenient nine?”

I found that I had been guilty of breaking several of the commandments and that I had become generally dirtied by life to the extent, at least, that to take suddenly so high and fine a stand seemed hypocritical. If I pleaded a conscience, I saw, it would be because I loathed the idea of war: it would be, as the psychologists put it, a rationalization.

So I went, and during the next four years, and for more than a year after the end of hostilities, I had ample time to ponder the problem involved. Was it right to force any man to do what I had done of my own volition?

I came to the conclusion that it was not. I am still of that opinion. Whether, at the behest of the magistrates—our militant bishops’ way of justifying wars from which they themselves claim exemption—it can ever be right to force a man to take human life, is the issue involved.

I consider it a plain issue and I have stated my own belief, namely, that before this point is reached, the rights of the community over the individual have reached their limits. The State cannot override God, and God’s command, according to the State religion of this country at least, is definite and beyond the chicanery of episcopal special pleading.

As every man is forced to do to-day, I ponder this, the central problem of the human race to-day. How is war to be overcome? How are countries that desire war and who wage it to be countered by a force

that shall be superior to physical resistance and the mass murder of the modern battle-field ?

The erudite will confound my personal solution and as like as not regard it as absurd. The game of war, as I see it, is a survival from the childhood of mankind—from that period in our history which I lived out as an individual on my nursery floor.

So long as force is countered by force ; so long as killing is sanctified by the State, with the backing of the priests, wars are inevitable. We shall have to be braver than we are when we arm ourselves against our fellows : we shall, indeed, have to be brave enough to *disarm*. There is no greater or more damnable lie abroad in the world to-day than that which has it that the best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. *Sooner or later*, some nation has to prove its heroism by laying down its arms. The alternative to this, the application of Christ's law—"Put up your sword"—is the inevitable total destruction of civilization ; the decimation of the race and a regression to the Dark Ages.

So much, then, for how one citizen regards conscription and its claim to override Christian teaching—and the teaching of most of the great sages of the world. There remain other considerations, other doubts that creep into the mind, I must believe, of the most omnivorous reader of Jingo literature. I refer to the specious claims made in justification of war.

In the Boer War the young and the old alike shared a simple belief in the righteousness of the British cause in South Africa. To-day, where will you find a single apologist for our conduct then ?

During the Great War we were fighting for democracy. I confess I believed in that and blush to recall it. And to-day ? To-day we are fighting or are about to fight an ideology. Dear ! dear !

I will not deal here with the numerous other aspects of the subject which will, no doubt, have passed through the reader's mind : the profit that is made from armaments and the secret rôle played by great international groups. But they fill my own mind with deepest suspicion. I recall how, giving evidence before a court of enquiry, a director of a great armaments firm remarked : "I never got any harm from a gun", a statement that I, for one, readily accept. But I have battlefield memories that turn a knife in my heart when men so declare their inhumanity.

So we come back to our point of departure, for conscription is the learning of war and, more, the forcing of such learning upon all who can bear arms.

That is why I do not believe in it.

No earthly claim can override divine law.

But let that man who takes this stand look well into his own heart first ; there is not but one Commandment : there are ten.

GEORGE GODWIN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM*

[Faiz B. Tyabji, himself a cultured Muslim, here reviews an important publication.—EDS.]

Such personality as a reviewer can lay claim to must presumably be of too tenuous a nature to permit the luxury of an apology. Were any such privilege available, its function in the present instance would be to state that Professor Hitti's work is so concentrated and so well documented that a reviewer, unless himself a specialist, must be singularly bold who would undertake to pronounce opinions on the work without careful consideration extending over a prolonged period.

The volume presents the story of the Arabians and the Arabic speaking people from the earliest times to the Ottoman conquests of the early sixteenth century. Though independent research into every part of this wide field is not claimed, the narrative is based to all appearance on what must be recognized as first-hand authorities. All unnecessary statements are scrupulously avoided. The text of the book is consequently concentrated and perhaps not always easy to read at a stretch, though it is instructive throughout and in most parts absorbingly interesting. But in any case, readers who have any interest in or any occasion to seek information regarding Muslim history will find the volume a serviceable and reliable book of reference. Information can be obtained on the main trends of the political history of Islam and on Arabic literature, architecture, society, education, political institutions, fine arts, civilization and culture generally—information not confined to one period or territory: Arabia, Spain, Afghanistan, Egypt, Sicily are all represented. India as a whole came under the effective influence of Islam a little later than the end of the period covered by the work.

But certain territories like the Punjab and Sind came into contact with Islam in the initial stages of its history, and the book under review contains appropriate reference to these countries.

The reader is first furnished with a preliminary survey of the pre-Islamic age in Arabia, including accounts of the Arabs as Semites and of the peninsula of Arabia as the cradle of the Semitic race, its inhabitants, its climate, its fauna and its internal political conditions, as well as its relations with Egypt and other surrounding countries, its wars, its language and its poetry. Then follow comparatively short but by no means inadequate accounts of the Prophet of Islam and his life, of the teachings of the *Koran*, of Islam as a religion and as a force of conquest, expansion and colonization. These matters naturally lead to expositions of the administration of the newly founded states by the followers of the newly established religion. Information may be obtained on empires or civilizations, schools of learning or of scientific research, which in popular imagination are symbolized in the glory and mysterious attraction of a single personality such as Haroon-al-Rashid, Saladin, Chingiz Khan, Hulagu Taimurlane or Mahmood-e-Ghaznavi, or in the fame of one supreme architectural effort like Alhambra, or in names that hardly any one is unacquainted with but which are hardly more than names to the great majority, Averroes (Abu-al-Wahid Muhammad bin Ahmed bin Rashid), Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Umar Khayyam. Some may pause over the many words of Arabic origin like "admiral" current in English and other European languages which for the ear that can hear are

* *History of the Arabs*. By PHILIP K. HITTI, Professor of Semitic Literature, Princeton University. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 31s. 6d.)

accompanied by echoes of long past history ; others may be attracted by tales of old romance represented by names such as Leila. The treatment of all these matters is admirable in its sense of proportion and in the confidence begotten of knowledge based on reliable authorities.

It seems inevitable with human activities that there should be division and internal disunion amongst those who take part in great human movements. Islam is no exception. Dissension permeated Islam almost from the first, but for several centuries it did not prevent its marvellous expansion. Expansion took place indeed with unparalleled rapidity. To trace the inner springs of these dissensions is a task fascinating from the historical aspect, requiring the most delicate appreciation of character and human tendencies and acumen in the weighing of evidence.

The attention of all who are interested in the history of Islam is arrested, while thinking Muslims are touched to the quick, whenever the subject of the dissensions in Islam is under discussion. The contemplation of these dissensions is truly tragic from the larger aspect of human capacities and weakness. They present to our sight the subjects of this dynamic force, the religion of Islam, so divided amongst themselves that some of its greatest and ablest agents win nothing but vituperation from (in some instances) the entire body of Muslims, or (in others) from large sections of them. In part this is easy to understand. When Islam suddenly overspread the lives of a considerable portion of mankind, bringing with its expansion great wealth and power to its main agents and all those who accepted it, it was inevitable that ambitious men bent on the acquisition of the good things of this world should have been alert in seizing the opportunity of satisfying their cravings under the cloak of religion. But it must be observed to the credit of mankind that during such epochs others arise—fewer perhaps but still not negligible in numbers—whose eyes are turned to the spiritual aspects of the new force more yearningly than to

the worldly gain that accompanies the march of events. The majority of people are, however, neither exclusively of the one kind nor of the other. They are swayed in turn, as the wind blows, by the attractions of worldly good and spiritual welfare. When worldly-minded people are in the ascendant, the majority of mankind become worldly-minded. When a Prophet arises and teaches, explains, exhorts, allures or warns, the spiritual parts of their nature begin to function sometimes feverishly. Here again the history of Islam is no exception. It exemplifies all these tendencies.

Bearing these human characteristics in mind, we must allow that it would be an achievement worthy of the greatest historian if the character of men and events in the history of Islam were considered and weighed with unbiased mind, and an exposition full and complete in every detail were presented. But the work would in that case extend over many volumes and be no unworthy fruit of a noble lifetime. The present work is on a different scale and serves another purpose. Nevertheless, when an author with the equipment of Professor Hitti undertakes the writing of even a comparatively short history such as the present, expectations are raised of finding therein detached views on matters steeped in bitter, unending, senseless controversy amongst the Muslims themselves. With reference to the Prophet himself and many of the greater personalities, the opinions expressed in this work are carefully balanced, and there is much to indicate such preliminary consideration as gains the confidence of the reader. But in a great number of other cases, particularly where there have been sectional controversies amongst the Muslims, an apparent absence of anything to show that the subject has secured such balanced and scrupulous examination must be reluctantly admitted. The presentation of a great character in history based solely on the account of his admirers or of his detractors is full of perils. To take an example, Hannibal's character drawn entirely in accord with the Roman estimate would be admitted

by all students of history to be manifestly inadequate and defective. In his case, as there are no accounts extant by the Carthaginians, the inevitable errors, exaggerations and misconceptions in the Roman narratives must in many respects be conjectures. But in cases where Muslims have divided into two opposite camps, we often have presentations from both sides. Had there existed contemporary and subsequent accounts and estimates of Hannibal and Scipio from the Carthaginian side as well as the Roman, the two pictures would have differed as much as black from white. The historian's task, then, would have been not merely to determine whether the one or the other view, taken as a whole, was the more correct, or the less likely to be erroneous, and to adopt and present that view bodily as the true one, but also to examine each aspect of life or character, each incident that had been the subject of differences. In the result a decision would probably have been reached corresponding in every detail neither to the one presentation nor the other. The controversies within Islam have apparently still to be dealt with in this manner. It may be said with great deference and diffidence that this excellent history does not create the feeling that the views of the minorities have been sufficiently considered. In such matters, not to sympathize is emphatically not to understand. It is true that sympathy is difficult where the view adopted is

distorted, one-sided and grotesque. Those who have failed to succeed—the minority—are apt in their bitterness to adopt views that are distorted, just as those who have won are apt to be arrogant, impatient and intolerant. But it is the historian's task to sympathize with each in turn in order to bring out the genesis of each view, and then to determine how far, if at all, each represents the truth and how far it must modify the view presented by the other side. May one not surmise that such a critical examination would reveal new possibilities for arriving at more human and realistic estimates of some of the great names in Islamic history? Again, speaking with the greatest deference, it seems as if Prof. Hitti has been too apt to accept the most obvious presentation without considering the views of those who, it may be, are eager controversialists rather than judges, but whose partisan views must be considered if the whole truth is to be discovered. May one venture to suggest too that Prof. Hitti has been too little sympathetic with the spiritual aspirations in the case of the lesser names of the history of Islam?

These and similar omissions are perhaps a necessary sacrifice when so much information is compressed in such a small space. The excellent index, the numerous illustrations and other aids contained in the volume make it suitable for constant reference as well as for consecutive reading.

FAIZ B. TYABJI

THE JEWISH PROBLEM

I

Know This of Race, By CEDRIC DOVER. (Secker & Warburg, Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

Twenty years after the "Palestine Problem" was created (as the result of pledges given to Jews and Arabs alike), a fresh policy for its settlement is now being offered. But the "Palestine Problem" is a world problem; and it will

not be solved by supplying Hitlerism with a scapegoat.

The recent tragic events in Germany, with their inevitable repercussions elsewhere, are grappled with by Cedric Dover who has made a special study of them. His book, "addressed mainly to ordinary folk", is also one for the serious student. Within the narrow compass of

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little more than a hundred pages is covered a wide sweep. Anti-Semitism and the myths with which half the world is being duped are here exposed in pungent fashion.

In his chapter on "Race", the author points out that racial problems are largely connected with blood tests. But while there is such a thing as transfusion, there is also confusion. This is apt to be experienced in efforts to establish paternity. Owing, however, to our lack of precise knowledge, there is still a great deal of loose talk about "blood purity". This quality is difficult to define, since no one—either Aryan or Jewish—is absolutely "pure". In the same way, the expression a "Semitic race" is a misnomer. Those held to belong to it have, in the course of time, sprung from a dozen others, with different languages,

customs and culture.

Notwithstanding the Third Reich's metaphysical status of Aryanism, a race is nothing more than a division of species. As to what is, and what is not, a species, the concepts and conclusions of biologists differ. As Walt Whitman says, "a vast similitude interlocks us all"; and, despite their claims to be regarded as such, Germans are not pure Nordic. While they have a strong infiltration, they also suggest an admixture of something else.

Mr. Dover contends that, if history is to be trusted, the technique of race-purification was not started by the Jews. For the contention that other nations had a hand in the process, he gives chapter and verse. Altogether, a thoughtful and worth-while book, and one with an "appeal".

HORACE WYNDHAM

II

History of the Jews (A New Edition). By PAUL GOODMAN. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

This is the seventh edition of Mr. Goodman's authoritative work, covering the period from Abraham of Ur to the present time.

After Abraham's death his descendants settled in Egypt, becoming so numerous as to be a menace to the Pharaoh, who enslaved them. Their Exodus occurred about 1220 B.C. The Jewish religion, founded on the Torah (Law) of Moses, was monotheistic. The rule of the patriarchs was succeeded by that of judges, kings and prophets.

David, second king of the Jews, was both warrior and poet. He conquered Jerusalem, making it his capital. Though David is credited with the authorship of the Psalms, many were probably composed by Akhnaton (Amenhotep IV) of Egypt, who introduced monotheism into Egypt and was therefore known as "the heretic king".

At Solomon's death, the country was divided into two kingdoms, Judah and Israel, Judah surviving until 586 B.C., when Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, conquered it and destroyed Jerusalem.

After the prophets came Jesus of Nazareth, crucified by the Jews. This fact may explain, though it does not excuse, their ceaseless persecution by the "Christian" Church.

In A.D. 200 Jewish teaching was incorporated in the *Talmud*, which recorded the Jews' religious and intellectual life from the time of the Babylonian captivity.

During the atrocious persecutions of the Crusades, Jews were actually charged with using the blood of Christian children in their Passover ritual! Their character, vitiated by ceaseless oppression, began to deteriorate and from 1540 onwards there was a succession of Jewish claimants to Messiahship.

In the sixteenth century the Polish Jews were practically exterminated by Cossacks, whilst from 1290 Jews were proscribed from England, until in 1655 Manassch ben Israel came from Holland to intercede with Cromwell for their readmittance.

From 1905 until the Revolution in 1917, Jews were cruelly maltreated and massacred in Russia, whilst from the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71 anti-Semitism was rampant in

France—culminating in the terrible *Affaire Dreyfus*.

But in spite of every effort throughout the centuries to break their body and their spirit, the Jews' amazing vitality and genius have preserved them, and directly persecution ceased they swiftly rose to "place and power". Heine, the German poet, Disraeli, Ottoligh, a Jewish general commanding the Italian army, Luzzatti, Prime Minister of Italy, Léon Blum, Socialist Prime Minister of France, and the Rothschilds are only a

few examples.

And now comes a recrudescence of atrocities which we hoped were dead for ever, excused on the assumption that all Jews are lower in culture and moral development than Germans who claim the title of Aryans.

The book is timely, and provides a profoundly moving and infinitely sad story of the unremitting, fanatical persecution of a great people, bravely and nobly endured.

R. E. BRUCE

Buddhism, Its Doctrines and Its Methods. By ALEXANDRA DAVID-NEEL. Translated by H. N. M. Hardy and Bernard Miall. (John Lane, The Bodley Head, London. 6s.)

This attractively got-up book is an authorized translation of Madame David-Neel's work in French. Mme. David-Neel writes effectively for the ordinary reader. Her interpretations, though authoritative, are in a number of instances personal and give to a book of this type a definite charm. The authoress herself is a practising Buddhist, and her collaboration with Lama Yongden stamps the present volume with what may be called the expert touch.

The reviewer found the volume particularly helpful where the authoress successfully attempts to clear up certain misconceptions in the popular mind, and especially in the West, about Buddhism. She writes:—

It is difficult to find in any European language a word which is a correct translation of the term *sannyasin*. The things represented by it do not exist in the West, and India seems to have the monopoly of it. . . . The rejection of the *sannyasin* differs completely from the "renunciation" of the Christian monk.

This explanation is followed by a brief but lucid account of the Buddha's search for spiritual illumination.

The chapter on the basis of the Buddhist Doctrine is a masterpiece of compression of the manifold tenets of the

religion. The pages dealing with the "Eightfold Path" form stimulating reading for all interested in the control of the mind. This is one of the most exhaustive chapters in the book, and deservedly so, for it is on personal conduct that Buddhism lays so much stress.

Karma is another topic fairly fully discussed; and in presenting the orthodox views with force and conviction, the authoress has not denied the reader a passing acquaintance with heterodox beliefs in the Buddhistic world. "Be your own torch and your refuge", a saying by Buddha, and the Tibetan Tantric rule, "No one can guide thee but thyself" form appropriate conclusions to this chapter.

In the seventh and final chapter on Nirvana, Mme. David-Neel is at her best. "As a rule", she asserts, "the various conceptions of Nirvana which are current in the West are very far removed from those accepted by Buddhists." The usual Western notion that Nirvana consists in the annihilation of the soul after death, she points out, is totally erroneous. After showing what it is not, she discusses many beliefs Buddhists themselves hold as to what Nirvana is. Among many authoritative definitions given, Chandrakirti's may be quoted here: "The essence of Nirvana consists simply in the suppression of all the constructions of our fertile imagination." The appendices contain gems of Buddhist wisdom.

R. RAMASWAMI

Beware Familiar Spirits. By JOHN MULHOLLAND. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. \$2.50.)

The Mystic Light: The Script of Harzael-Harzael. By WALTER H. DUDLEY and R. ALBERT FISHER. (Rider and Co., London. 15s.)

Bridging Two Worlds. By WALLIS MANSFORD. Vol. III. (Rider and Co., London. 5s.)

The reviewer repeats fervently the title of the first of these three books as she emerges half-asphyxiated from their unwholesome atmosphere. The course of Spiritism is strewn with moral wrecks. Its history during the last century would make sorry reading enough if Mr. Mulholland had contented himself with the facts, but his account is less than fair. He is as sceptical of the genuineness of most mediumistic phenomena as the most uncompromising materialist could desire, but in his role of prosecuting attorney he introduces prejudicial and unprovable reports such as no court would admit to its records. Some statements it is difficult to characterise otherwise than as idle if not deliberately malicious gossip, e.g., the gratuitous slur upon Madame Blavatsky. Ignoring her reiterated warnings against mediumship, he repeats this irresponsible gossip against the defenceless dead :

I have heard, but cannot verify, a story that Mme. Blavatsky had been a medium professionally in Brooklyn, New York, before founding the Theosophical Society. She definitely had lived in Brooklyn and her writings contain many references to mediums and their phenomena.

They do indeed—and an illuminating exposition of all the genuine phenomena of the séance-room which Mr. Mulholland's sweeping denunciation of frauds leaves wholly unexplained. If Mr. Mulholland implies that writing about mediums points to the writer's being one, he certainly lays himself open to a *tu quoque* retort. His bit of libel, which would be actionable if its victim were living and which he does well to admit he cannot verify, falls to the ground of its own absurdity.

The Mystic Light claims to be "inspirationally scribed and diagramed" by the first author and "interpreted and adapted to earthly comprehension" by the second. The unsympathetic reviewer is fairly warned in advance :

To those who read herein and love not
the words of the Writing—
Let them close the book and turn away
their eyes,
And remember them not until *their* time
appointed,
That neither heaven, nor the earth, be
offended.

Truth demands the risk. The reviewer loves not the words of the Writing, nor its grandiose quasi-scriptural style, nor its strained symbols nor its general fuziness of concept. Why must "inspirational" writing of this type rush into word-coining without a philological background and perpetrate such monstrosities as "soulic interpretation", "human mentation", "starried foot-steps" and "spiralic ways"? The inspirer's ideas of astronomy seem no less remarkable.

Mr. Wallis Mansford is a high-minded and an amiable soul, with a fondness for dead poets which mediums have convinced him is reciprocated. In this third book he describes his contact with the "Spirits" of Omar Khayyam and Fitzgerald, Shelley, Keats and Oscar Wilde. There are interesting side-lights (from *this* side) on these poets and some fine quotations from their works, but nothing worth recording from the dead. The poets' own post-mortem fame and Mr. Mansford's pilgrimages to places associated with each in his lifetime seem to interest them chiefly. "Shelley" makes a feeble joke about "the three H's" in his life, "H for Horsham, where he was born, H for Harriet, the name of his first wife, and H for Hurricane that caused his death". How are the mighty fallen!

Such a book renders a disservice to a world that needs assurance of true progressive immortality. The impression on the discriminating reader must be reactionary. Better, a thousand times, annihilation than an eternity of such

inanity ! But it should be apparent that whatever the communicating entity may be it is *not* the great soul that it impersonates.

E. M. H.

Politics in the World State. By A. G. F. MACHIN. (The World State Volunteers, Oxford.)

The recent acts of aggression in Central Europe and the consequent feeling of individual and national insecurity would naturally cause thinking minds to dwell upon possible new ways and methods of reforming the governance of human affairs. Mr. Machin's book elaborates his profound conviction that the only remedy for the present-day chaos in world politics is to recognise a higher, spiritual, and perhaps divine leadership; it contains the practical suggestion that an international volunteer police force should be established and entrusted with the task of fighting all obstructions to the peace and progress of humanity. The failure of the

League of Nations and the breakdown of collective security make one naturally sceptical about the efficacy of such ideal remedies. When Mahatma Gandhi, the other day, gave a message of peace to the world, suggesting that the Prime Minister of England should propose to the democratic powers simultaneous disarmament in order to disarm Hitler, it sounded like a voice coming from another world. This book, written in the usual pacifist style, exposes the fallacies of the doctrines of force and aggression. Present-day events conspire to challenge the ideals of humanity, but ideals possess objective and transcendent validity. The value of Mr. Machin's book lies in its forceful affirmation of faith in the ideals of freedom and justice.

D. G. LONDHE

The Mystic Way. By RAYMUND ANDREA. (No. 2, The Modern Mystic's Library, King, Littlewood and King, Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

This book is an excellent guide to the student of practical mysticism. It gives a detailed account of the various stages of the mystic's way to his goal, such as meditation, contemplation, the dark night of the soul, the final awakening and the culminating illumination.

The growing indifference to organised religion and to the churches should not be interpreted as a sign of the advance of scientific materialism. It is the sign of the deepening spirituality which points out that religion is primarily the spiritual experience of the individual. The special contribution of Indian Philosophy to the world's thought is the affirmation of the reality of the Spirit and the possibility of the realization of

that by every human being. Mysticism is the core of religion and the inward essence of spiritual life.

Mysticism is the future hope of religion, and guarantees the self-certifying nature of religious experience. It is opposed to *Naturalism* which categorically denies the existence of Deity. It is surprising to find the great Christian theologians contending that Christian mysticism is life-affirming and ethical, while Eastern mysticism is life-negating and unethical. The concept of *jivanmukti* points out that the mystic loves to create and find the City of God on earth. In the face of facts it is not fair to contend that Eastern mysticism is unethical. The spiritual aspirant begins with a good life and ends in a godly life. The good life is indispensable to the godly life, but is not in itself the godly life.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

Civil Journey. By STORM JAMESON. (Cassel and Company, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Civil Journey takes the reader through the journeyings of Miss Jameson's mind, and how refreshing indeed it is! Most of the pieces—the book consists of the author's reflections on a number of subjects—are presented in chronological order "so that they mark the stages of a mind, my mind". The outstanding feature of the volume is its frankness, and it makes its appearance at a most opportune moment in the struggle for democratic and individual freedom against the forces of a different ideology, by whatever name it may be known.

The chapters on "Patriotism", "Defence of Freedom" and "Twilight of Reason" give us valuable glimpses into Miss Jameson's mind. She advises all who call themselves writers not to forsake the cause of freedom at this critical hour: "I am amazed that any artist should choose at this moment to apply for leave of absence." The compulsion which some European States impose on accredited writers to praise what they do not approve is deservedly condemned.

The enthusiasm of Miss Jameson (who, by the way, is at present President of the P. E. N. Club in London) for the cause of freedom is such that she once convened a distinguished company of writers to prepare a book exposing the horrors of modern war. This type of work is all the more necessary when war is being praised by such men as Mussolini, who is quoted as claiming that nothing but war can bring out the best in a man. Alongside this must be given the view of distinguished generals, who consider there is nothing chivalrous in modern war; the weapons military science has forged make of war an inhuman massacre. To her searching analysis of the flaws in the reasoning adopted by totalitarian States, she adds an intimate knowledge of many features, both good and bad, in the lives of the people affected by Fascist regimes. How democratic ideals in Germany were shattered beyond hope is portrayed in the chapter, "The Youngest Brother".

"Democracy in Germany died by default."

In another set of chapters relating to the domain of the novel Miss Jameson makes penetrating observations on current trends. She is sure that fiction as written in the past has hardly a chance in the coming years, because popular taste is all in favour of stark realism. "More and more the finest minds will reject fiction, and will write directly of what they have felt and known." She quotes the instances of E. Blunden and S. Sassoon, two of the finest and most creative of modern minds, who do not write fiction.

"The Craft of the Novelist" offers suggestions on what in Miss Jameson's view should be the guiding principle of the writer. "To be judged complete, a novel must give an account of the whole and the activities which relate him to his fellows." A writer's ability to succeed is determined by his capacity to live in the widest sense of the term; "his craft is truly his capacity for living." The earnest student of the novel will find in Miss Jameson's comparison of American and English fiction very stimulating material. To those who are interested in developing the proletarian novel she offers the advice that the best start is to collect and publish unimpeachable data for the use of some future genius. These cameos should be free from all such sentiment as vitiates most outbursts by amateur observers of slum life and should be clean cut as a documentary film. In "Novels and Novelists", the reader will find some examples of masterly fiction reviewing, including a review of a book by Somerset Maugham.

A third set of chapters, if a reviewer may thus split up the author's chronological arrangement, relate to the hard facts of life, and to how the author considers life should be lived. She admits having lived too much in the future and neglected the present. "I learn, though slowly, not to leave myself naked to the weather moods of those I live with. My weak need to be approved—a child afraid of the incomprehensible

anger of others—grows less with each time I ignore it. I learn patience, too." "Technique of Living" is as much a confession as a stimulant.

Though it is easier to describe water than genius, the nature of genius seems to involve "an extreme sensitivity to the sounds, sights and hidden essential forms of all life". Those who are clamouring for the debasing of the standards of learning and culture will receive a shock on reading Miss Jameson's criticism of the present educational system: "It makes no attempt to train the taste and sensibility which would reject commercialised fiction, vicious press stunts and the rest." "A man trained to use his mind will—use it", she concludes.

In "Patriotism" she does not mind admitting to the reader that she is a Little Englander unashamed and would love her country without any of its possessions. What she is more particular about is a square deal for all Englanders in this age of plenty and enlightenment.

Throughout the book runs an under-current, the author calls it her obsession, against war. Most people may condemn the "conscientious objector" as a queer fish, but one has to read Miss Jameson to understand the fire of her hate against war—the cause of which goes deeper than the fact that she lost a brother needlessly in the last war and may lose her son in a future war.

R. RAMASWAMI

Browning and Modern Thought. By DALLAS KENMARE. (Williams & Norgate, Ltd., London. 6s.)

In the fifty years since his death Browning has been much misjudged by his critics who have valued his idealism at a discount and labelled him Victorian. But this view is wrong. For Browning's realization of the Absolute Truth that there is one mind common to all individual men, one cosmic principle, one conscience permeating the universe, lifts him above time and place. Mr. Dallas Kenmare refutes these critics:

Entirely free of Victorian delicacy, and because he was a profoundly religious man, he feared no aspect of truth and recorded his perceptions of evil and sin as honestly as his perceptions of beauty. Only the impure fear truth; the saint faces vice undismayed, seeing with the eye of compassion. On this count alone it would be difficult to label Browning Victorian.

As a poet of courage and love, a staunch fighter in the cause of truth and humanity, Browning has a special significance at the present time when a courageous and constructive approach to our problems is all that is needed.

In the world of to-day peace cannot come by Communism and Fascism but only by Love and Christianity as they were expounded by Browning. As Mr. Dallas Kenmare says:

The Christian would be the first to agree that we are far from the Kingdom of Heaven, but no bloody revolution can save the world. . . . The first Christians, having all things common, living in fellowship, in obedience to the command to love their neighbours as themselves, understood the only way to social salvation.

If this divine vision were to dawn upon men all over the world as it dawned upon Browning, all feelings of antipathy and hatred, all prejudices of caste and colour would soon be dissolved in the purity of its flame, and brotherly relations, so essential for world peace, established among the people of the world.

Browning and Modern Thought is a timely publication and Browning's inspired voice is the trumpet call to the world to-day.

"Hold on, hope hard in the subtle thing
That's spirit."

C. N. ZUTSHI

The Rise of a Pagan State. By A. MORGAN YOUNG. (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

In this book we are offered a sketch of Japan's history set against a mythological and religious background. The tone cannot be said to be friendly.

In the presentation of the religious ideas of the Japanese, Shinto naturally receives most attention. The statement that "Shinto is destitute of moral ideas" is hardly supported by a Rescript to the Japanese Army and Navy in which men are asked to be kind, courteous, brave and frugal, inspired by fidelity and integrity. . . . "anything can be achieved by a true heart". Presumably this Rescript is based on Shinto morality.

Buddhism is considered as having but slight influence on Japanese thought and life. One rather suspected this, in view of recent horrors in China. Mr. Young has an appreciation of orthodox Buddhism, though in such a book as this his references to it are few. Zen is said to influence Japan more profoundly, and the author considers that it has contrib-

uted to her artistic and social life that "enthusiasm for beauty which is Japan's greatest contribution to the world's culture". But it is not fair to say that the ineffable doctrines of Zen are supported by a "farrago of unedifying anecdotes".

The book will be appreciated by the ordinary reader (outside Japan!) rather than by the student. The tone of unfriendliness is not wise, even from the standpoint of practical politics; still less wise from the standpoint of Universal Brotherhood. I have before me a copy of the London *Daily Telegraph* in which it is stated that "brains and ability are slowly conquering militarism in Japan. . . . Sanity in public life" is returning. Japan has a great future before her, and the present unhappy phase in her movement towards fulfilment will yield to those loftier ideals more truly hers, as soon as a whole world (blind with materialism and thus in conflict) hears once again the recall to the luminous teachings of the Buddha and the Christ.

E. V. HAYES

The Sum of Things. By SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND. (John Murray, London. 7s. 6d.)

In these days of progressive insanity when the tramp of soldiers' feet grows louder and louder in the capitals of the most highly civilised countries of the world, and the best brains of those countries are concentrated on the production of new and more diabolical methods of mass destruction, this book with its sanity, its profound depths and its message will not come amiss.

In this, his autobiography, Sir Francis Younghusband gives us his "last impression of the sum of all things". It is not an autobiography in the ordinary sense of that word, but is in a broader sense an autobiography of the soul—a recapitulation "of all that I had been thinking about, writing about, speaking about for many years". In the final summing up he arrives at the conclusion

that "when all is weighed in the balance it is Happiness that will count—not Power, nor even Wisdom, but just Happiness, the last end as well as the original begetter of love".

This is the exposition not of a hedonist who has lived and found pleasure in the transient things of life, but of a man with a mellow brain—one of the mellowest of our times—who has discovered that idyllic happiness can be attained if we set about attaining it in the right way. Sir Francis Younghusband's approach is religious, but he is not the credulous clergyman in the pulpit enunciating beliefs that he has received, and is content to receive, 'on trust'. He is the philosopher who sees a 'corrective spiritual sympathy' in all religions, and understands that any seeming imperfections in any of them are the odds and ends we have added.

ENVER KUREISHI

The Gita—A Critique. By P. NARASIMHAM, M.A., L.T. (Huxley Press, Madras. Rs. 2-8.)

Since the interest in India and abroad in the teachings of the *Bhagavad-Gita* took concrete shape, countless volumes, booklets, and pamphlets have appeared on the doctrines of the delightfully delusive dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna, so that the traditional teachings embodied in classic commentaries have been practically lost sight of or ignored. Compromises in philosophic interpretation being detrimental to truth-determination, I welcome Prof. P. Narasimham's view of the *Gita* which is frankly revolutionary in the sense that it does not hesitate to reject tradition, as such rejection is deemed necessary. The *Gita*-episode is *not historically true*. The value of the *Gita* lies entirely in the Upanishadic citations it contains. The whole episode is artificial. The real problem of Arjuna, why he should kill his kith and kin is *not answered at all*. The aim of the *Gita* is to prepare us to gain a proper perspective and make us fit to tread the Higher Path of Real

Life.

While in the past, perfectly foolish and childish comparisons have been drawn between the *Gita* and the Bible, the *Gita* and Kant and so forth, Prof. Narasimham has indeed done well in restricting himself to a running interpretation. Prof. Narasimham is convinced that Arjuna's problem has not been solved and that his question has not been answered. May I ask what answer Prof. Narasimham himself would give? One striking feature that has been uniformly missed by all modernists is that Arjuna at any rate felt that his doubts had vanished, and fought to the finish. If Arjuna was convinced he should fight, does it matter that others in 1939 are not convinced? Critics of to-day and a host of others who talk glibly about the *Gita* are all arm-chair philosophers. They are emphatically *not fighters* in the sense that Arjuna was a fighter. They do not stand on the battlefield. They talk of the *Gita* in drawing-rooms. Prof. Narasimham's book is thought-provoking. I cannot admit however that it has answered the question of Arjuna.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

CORRESPONDENCE

CHRISTIANITY AND WAR

I

Mr. Leslie J. Belton, in THE ARYAN PATH for April 1939, has stated, "Already the Christian Church has ceased to dominate Europe." He may, or may not, deplore that fact; but he and others are justified in concluding from it that the Christian Church has need now to defend itself against any and every kind of attack. In no way, however, is it reasonable to conclude that the spiritual permanence, or the immortality, of Christ can require any defence that has not true spiritual force and prompting behind it.

There is comfort in the truth that strong men entangled in nets may yet be

freed by even such insignificant creatures as mice, which are capable of gnawing a way to freedom for them. The cords which are disabling the churches run criss-cross; they consist of the dissensions which through the ages have spread among their congregations. It is essential to keep in mind the fact that spiritual differences are responsible for this material splitting up of the Church into a number of churches which have different rituals and even fundamentally differing creeds. No one church, by itself, can at present establish its claim to be "The Church of Christ".

That very many Christian churchmen

The Gita—A Critique. By P. NARASIMHAM, M.A., L.T. (Huxley Press, Madras. Rs. 2-8.)

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That very many Christian churchmen

are unsuccessful imitators of Christ requires no verbal demonstration in view of the facts which are abundantly evident. None the less, as a fact, does Christ remain Christ for all who would try to follow him and his example.

In his lifetime to those who opposed him and eventually caused him to be crucified, Christ never counselled, countenanced, or offered physical resistance. The only force that he believed has power to triumph over evil is the force of the Spirit.

The killing of men by their fellows constitutes an age-old crime. Christ's judgment on those who slew Him was, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Could the spirit of Mercy be more completely exemplified?

Religion, which is a "binding again", is plainly the true and only remedy for the disruption of the Christian Church, and willing Christian spirits are the sole necessity for its consummation.

Such a reunion of many Christian churchmen would, moreover, prove a real step towards the material progress of civilization, through the power of the united religious forces of Christian men.

The ocean of Religion that is Love needs the tributaries of every flood of religion that flows towards the ultimate harmonious Oneness.

T. H. WORGAN.

*Peterculter,
Aberdeen.*

II

It is quite possible that the usefulness of THE ARYAN PATH may be limited if the first two articles in the June issue are allowed to pass without comment. It is my purpose to deal with them together, for in both of them I can read the emotion "prejudice". But from the two novels by L. A. G. Strong that I have read I know that he would not like such a charge to be made against him.

In his article on "The Failure of the Christian Churches" he is strongly of the opinion that the failure lies in the prevention of war, and, so far as he is concerned, he has confined himself, quite fairly, to the thesis laid down for him. But the question arises, "Was it quite fair to print such a thesis in a magazine which makes copious use of the maxims of other great religions and which is printed in the East?" Are we to deduce from this article, for instance, that Buddhism has proved a glowing success, when it is remembered that one of the greatest Buddhist countries in the world has for some years been killing men, women and children without a declaration of war, and not with the sword only but by every fiendish means that could be invented? Are we to gather that the Sudra's lot has been such a glorious one under Hinduism or Brahmanism with that doctrine of the Evil

Powers which teaches that his shadow defiles the person and food of the high-born? It is futile to talk, as you do in the first article, of the Karma of Europe. If there is any reality in the idea of Karma, surely retribution will be as terrible for India and Japan. The authors of both the articles I refer to have ignored, perhaps not intentionally, the obverse side of the shield, and this, unfortunately, too often happens in our thinking.

I have in my possession a book called *The Practice of Yoga*. It was printed in Madras, and to those who wish sincerely to transform their lives to higher ways of thinking, it is invaluable. But I had to burst out laughing when reading page 116 where the author discusses the ways of killing out desires. He goes on:

"A vegetarian goes to England to prosecute his studies. By mixing with people who take meat, he begins to taste meat. It gives him pain, distaste, nausea to start with. He continues taking for some days, for some weeks. Then he likes meat heartily. In six months he can take 4 lbs. of raw meat at one stroke and becomes an inveterate meat eater.

Let me say that even if a man did not die after such beastly gluttony, such things are not done here, and anyone trying to do such a thing would be shunned by his fellows. But this incident

shows how prejudice can influence even the best intentioned people, and because his intentions were good, I shall not name the Swami who wrote the book.

But the point is that not only Christianity but all the great religions are either dead or dying, and War has nothing to do with it; war is not a cause, it is an effect, and while the whole world, East as well as West, continues in its present way of thinking, War will always be; and though its incidence is cruel and ruthless, its aftermath is, to a certain extent, beneficent and healing.

Every religion has failed because of human greed; the desire to obtain money by fair means or foul, and the power and luxury and all that money means. This greed brings the sword into the domestic home and the international arena, and unfortunately this canker has assailed most strongly the priestly castes of both the East and West. For in both hemispheres the priest never tires of teaching the superstition that money given to him is given to God. In order to support the argument both Temple and Church make unjust and untrue claims that they are responsible for most of the public beneficial services, such as hospitals, better conditions of

[We fully agree with our correspondent that war is an effect and that all religious creeds, and not only Christianity, have contributed to its causes. Christianity was stressed by us as we were commenting on Mr. L. A. G. Strong's article, and, moreover, at the present hour, Christendom claims for itself the privilege of being the centre of civilization. We also agree with our correspondent's view that all creeds are dead or dying. His words bring to mind what Mme. H. P. Blavatsky wrote in 1877:—

"Be this as it may, *the religion of the ancients is the religion of the future*. A few centuries more, and there will linger no sectarian beliefs in either of the great religions of humanity. Brahmanism and Buddhism, Christianity and Mahometanism will all disappear before the mighty rush of facts. 'I will pour out

work, etc., when in fact they have opposed reform. How anyone can believe that by giving to a priest they give to God passes my comprehension, and were I able to fulfil the fantastic rôle of a universal dictator, my first three actions would be: (1) to destroy every church and temple; (2) to print copies of the Bible, the Koran, Talmud and Upanishads and deliver them free to the appropriate households; (3) to compel every person to give a part of his earnings to some charitable institution.

The best way to get rid of war, the best way to make any religion an experience to be known rather than a pretty collection of fables to be believed, is to get rid of commerce with its competition and all the cruelty this competition implies; transmute commerce from a greed to an altruism and the world will be Elysium; there will be no failure of any religion that teaches such a creed, and war will be forgotten. But for our present shortcomings, East and West and West and East are equally culpable.

H. R. C. MONTANI

Southport,
Lancashire.

my spirit upon all flesh', writes the prophet Joel. 'Verily I say unto you.... greater works than these shall you do', promises Jesus. But this can only come to pass when the world returns to the grand religion of the past; the *knowledge* of those majestic systems which preceded, by far, Brahmanism, and even the primitive monotheism of the ancient Chaldeans. Meanwhile, we must remember the direct effects of the revealed mystery. The only means by which the wise priests of old could impress upon the grosser senses of the multitudes the idea of the Omnipotency of the Creative will or FIRST CAUSE; namely, the divine animation of inert matter, the soul infused into it by the potential will of man, the microcosmic image of the great Architect, and the transportation of ponderous objects through space and material obstacles."—E. S.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

Elsewhere we publish an article by George Godwin on "The Ethics of Conscription" which while presenting a personal point of view also involves an important principle. The issue raised by him concerns the extent to which the state is morally entitled to dictate to any one of its citizens a course of action which goes against his own free-will. Conscription forces a citizen to do something to which in thought and desire he may be opposed and against which he feels justified in pitting his own free-will. The same problem, but from an altogether different angle, is raised when people oppose the wholesome efforts of the state to introduce reforms which are irksome to some citizens; the Bombay Government, for example, experienced strong opposition from some people whose vision was so befogged that they could not see that alcohol is a poison and who fought against the governmental effort to make Bombay an area of total abstainers. Between liberty and license the pendulum of human life swings. Unless an individual possesses sufficient philosophy, which means *self-knowledge*, he cannot help being swayed on the one hand by his passions and their expression, license, and on the other by his moral aspirations which rest on the liberty of the Soul. A licentious person cares nothing for the good of his neighbour; a liberty-loving individual is a philanthropist who sacrifices himself in behalf of all bondmen. The former is an anarchist, the latter an altruist.

Mr. Godwin stresses another idea: when a person is violent and uses the force of fury in a dozen different directions in his own daily life, is he truly and righteously conscientious in opposing the law of conscription imposed by the state—in his particular case by a government in whose election he himself had a share? But the line of thought which we want to stress is this: are the Democracies, which are conscripting hands, heads and hearts to fight for the cause of liberty and against the anarchical actions of the totalitarian states, themselves free from the taints of tyrannical autocracy? Unless a man sees his own weaknesses he cannot overcome them; when he identifies himself with his defects he becomes deluded; when he is blind to his delusion he is afflicted with the delusion of delusions. What is true of individuals is true of nations. Have we unmistakable signs that Britain, France and the U.S.A. have seen the error of their methods of government in the past? The Democracies do not desire a new war, but are they prepared to forego the loot of previous wars? The Democracies have had excellent opportunities for two decades to bring about the conditions necessary for a world state, founded on peace. By the pooling of resources, physical, moral and intellectual, the age of plenty would have ushered in an era of real progress, had the victors in the last war been less savage and more sagacious. The savagery of the victorious nations aroused

savagery in the vanquished states. Unless the Democracies purge themselves of Hitlerian tendencies in their own constitutions, real victory will never be achieved and real peace will never dawn. The great Mahābhārata War was undertaken by the Pandavas to right a wrong which the Kauravas embodied in themselves, and under no less a leader than Krishna who warned the anarchical Duryodhana not to be the cause of the impending carnage. And carnage there was! The destruction of a civilization ensued through the destruction of its governing caste.

At the end of the *Mahābhārata* in the "Swargarohanika Parva" there is a story which has a moral for the soldiers of to-day. It is narrated that when the eldest of the Pandavas, Yudhishtira, entered heaven, he was shocked to find his enemy the evil-minded Duryodhana there—"endued with prosperity and seated on an excellent seat". Beholding the prosperity of his erstwhile enemy, on whom all looked as the very embodiment of evil, Yudhishtira "became suddenly filled with rage". He did not "desire to share regions of felicity with Duryodhana". Nar-

ada's instruction that in "heaven all enmities cease" found no response in Yudhishtira's heart. "That is heaven where those brothers of mine are. This, in my opinion, is not heaven." Then Narada conducted him to where his brothers and friends were—it was hell, and there he said he would stay. Mahadeva, the Lord of the Gods, approached Yudhishtira and said: "Thou shouldst not yield to wrath. Let the fever of thy heart be dispelled. Hell has to be experienced because in kings both good and bad inhere. You deceived Drona in the matter of his son and so you have experienced your own hell. Similarly, Bhima and Arjuna and Draupadi having sinned have had to experience hell." Even the victors suffer hell for their weaknesses as the vanquished enjoy heaven for whatever virtue they possess. Only by purging themselves of their own sins do nations, as individuals, gain the peace necessary for progress. "The Pandavas and the Kauravas when freed from human wrath enjoyed each his celestial state of unalloyed peace and bliss." So goes the *Mahābhārata* allegory.