Ā Ū Ṁ

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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THE FEAR OF DEATH

Preparations for protection against war atrocities are being carried on on an immense scale in London, Paris and elsewhere. Millions of rupees are being spent and time and energy bestowed in devising ways and means of saving lives—and war means loss of bodies by the million! If thought-energy and imagination were used with equal zest and care for preparations which would ensure peace itself, and if the same amount of money were given to support peace plans, a better and more orderly world would emerge.

Among the preparations some are detrimental to health, physical and psychical; others are superstitions, even though they be sponsored by men of science. But our purpose is not to call attention to this or that item of protective preparation, but to the fact of that preparation itself.

Why are people so afraid of dying? We know that there are those who do not fear death, but even they want to prolong the life of the body as much as possible. Why? A wrong philosophy and a faulty understanding of the human constitution are responsible for the fear of death, as also for the prolongation, by fair means or foul, of bodily existence. Over half a century ago, an Oriental Rishi said:

As we find the world now, whether Christian, Mussulman, or Pagan, justice is disregarded and honour and mercy both flung to the winds. How are we to deal with that curse known as the "struggle of life", which is the real and most prolific parent of most woes and sorrows and all crimes? Why has that struggle become the almost universal scheme of the universe? We answer, because no religion, with the exception of Buddhism, has hitherto taught a practical contempt for the earthly life, while each of them, always with that one solitary exception, has through its hells and damnations inculcated the greatest dread of death....

Teach the people to see that life on this earth, even the happiest, is but a

burden and delusion, that it is but our own Karma, the cause producing the effect, that is our own judge, our saviour in future lives, and the great struggle for life will soon lose its intensity.

The false doctrine of Christian theology is greatly responsible for the dread of death: no educated Christian believes that all Christians go to heaven and all heathens to hell, any more than he believes in the debasing doctrine that man is born in iniquity and sin. From that crass and foolish blind-belief men and women in their thousands have gone to the other extreme, also of blind-belief, that man is his corpus and that its death leaves behind nothing but a disintegrating carcass. If man comes into existence at the birth of his body and dies at its death, then naturally all means to keep it alive become fair and can be justified. But the ancient Aryan teaching of Karma shows that man the Soul is the Thinker, who never was not and will never cease to be. As thinker he comes "into this world of conditioned existence, drawing together the five senses and the mind in order that he may obtain a body and leave it again", to quote the teaching of the ancient *Bhagavad-Gita*. Successive lives on earth become a necessity for that Thinker: in one single incarnation, even of threescore years and ten, there is no possibility of learning everything about the universe of matter; where is the time even for sowing the seeds necessary for all experiences, let alone for harvesting the full and complete crop of perfection in one life only?

Moreover, Man, the Thinker, has the function of raising the lower kingdoms of Nature, through which he himself learns so much. Under the Law of Interdependence he gives to them in compensation for what he receives from them; involving himself in the kingdom of material forms, he gains the faculty of precision and also aids in the evolution of those forms. The way in which he handles and treats them will produce his hindrances and opportunities in a succeeding life; his limitations in this incarnation are self-made, as are his possibilities for fresh and further achievements. Karma is the Law of Justice which does not reward or punish but always offers opportunities through its adjustments, though these opportunities may take the form of rewards which please or punishments which agonize. Thus Karmic justice is the greatest mercy.

Men and women, if they perceived that they were not the bodies but the Thinkers dwelling in them, would not only lose the fear of death; more, they would not consent to befoul their bodies merely to keep these alive for a few years longer. The constituents of the body—know them as life-atoms—which we use to-day have formed the bodies of our past lives, and we, as Thinkers, will find them again in future incarnations. This is the real basis of the much misunderstood Hindu doctrine of men reborn as animals. Evolution is proceeding in two circles: soul, the Thinker, is the real man, and having attained that stage by self-effort in the past he remains man and does not become an animal. In body, on earth, he gathers knowledge through joy as through sorrow, and in disembodied existence—which is entire-

ly subjective and meditative—he garners earth experiences, thus building in his own consciousness added strength and power, moral as well as mental. Then he returns, attracted by those life-atoms referred to above. The second circle is traced by those life-atoms and *kāmic* elementals, which are left behind by the Thinker ere he falls into the subjective state of dream-meditation. These elemental lives—gross and sensuous and therefore unfit to form the basis for the Thinker's ideation—are automatically attracted to forms in the lower kingdoms, especially the animal, and this migration has been spoken of as incarnation into animal forms. They gain their own experience while the Thinker is meditating ; these await him on the threshold of rebirth, and become constituents of his new personality, including the body of flesh and blood. However difficult, and even bizarre, it may appear, patient and careful examination will convince any judicious man of its reasonableness. We debase the body because we do not look upon it as a holy of holies in which Man, the Thinker, is dwelling and meditating. A proper understanding of Reincarnation and Karma will not only deprive death of its terror, but will also give man the courage to face the sorrows of earthly life, " to welcome each rebuff ", " to learn, nor account the pang ". Progress will be endowed with a new meaning, life with a divine purpose, civilization will no more be a matter of securing material comfort and economic sufficiency, but of attaining moral order and spiritual dignity. Profoundly inspiring are the words of Master Krishna who taught his disciple Arjuna on the battle field of Kurukshetra, in the midst of the flying arrows. He did not say : " Be inoculated with all the sera. Get your gas-mask ready. Is somebody prepared to give his blood to Arjuna ? " and the like. No, He said :

> Never the spirit was born ; the spirit shall cease to be never ;
> Never was time it was not ; End and Beginning are dreams !
> Birthless and deathless and changeless remaineth the spirit for ever ;
> Death hath not touched it at all, dead though the house of it seems !

And to show that spirit embodies itself not aimlessly but with a purpose, which, as shown above, is dual and which is carried out by repeated births in the world of matter ; that Death, analogous to sleep, is but a state in which rest and recuperation take place ; Krishna taught Arjuna—remember on the battle field—the inspiring truth :—

> Nay, but as when one layeth
> His worn-out robes away,
> And, taking new ones, sayeth,
> " These will I wear to-day ! "
> So putteth by the spirit
> Lightly its garb of flesh,
> And passeth to inherit
> A residence afresh.

The above was written long before the great excitement which prevails in Europe to-day.—26th August, 1939.

WHITMAN TO-DAY

[Early last June the 120th anniversary of Walt Whitman's birth was celebrated. On that day the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C., broke all precedents and had an exhibition exclusively devoted to his poetry. Several other honours have been rendered in his country to the "Good Gray Poet", making this a Whitman year. He who was called "a New York tough" and upon whom abuse was poured has now come to be considered as the author of the D[illegible] of Independence for American Letters and as the poet who gave a "grand, sane, towering" America to the world. In this thoughtful article **Hugh I'A. Fausset** brings out the contrast and duality evinced by this unconventional American writer, this practical altruist who loved his fellow-beings and rejoiced in spending himself in their service.—EDS.]

Thoreau said of Whitman that he *was* democracy. But the remark was evoked by a personal contact with the man which impressed him so favourably that he was no longer disturbed by "any brag or egoism in his book". The distinction between the man Whitman and what he wrote is important and has a considerable bearing on the judgment both of those of his own generation who hailed him as a seer and of some latter-day critics who dismiss him as a fraud. The former experienced the healing radiations of the man; the latter see only the elements of deception and self-display in the writer. A true estimate of him has to take account of both these aspects. Obviously the man and the writer cannot be separated. The latter was an expression of the former. But it is arguable that Whitman more completely realized his gospel of democracy in his physical person than in the impersonations of *Leaves of Grass*. Many outside the hospitals where he tended the wounded so devotedly during the Civil War have testified to the powerful benignity of his presence, to the atmosphere of purity, too, which emanated from him whatever his surroundings. In one of his early notebooks he wrote of a quality in some persons which unbound the hearts of all the people they met. "To them they respond perhaps for the first time in their lives—now they have ease—now they take holiday....they can be themselves—they can expose their secret failings and crimes." That was the kind of man he aspired to be, a man to whom people would open their leaves as to a spring sun. And years later he issued the same invitation in the opening lines of one of his most challenged poems, "To A Common Prostitute":—

> Be composed—be at ease with me—I am Walt Whitman, liberal and lusty as Nature,
> Not till the sun excludes you do I exclude you.

There is no doubt that a magnetic sun did shine through him and warmed and tranquillised those who received its rays. He was a channel for a spiritual virtue which his severest critics overlook, but which was of more creative value than their intellectual superiority. Yet they are right in saying that he was a divided man, at once simple on one

level of his nature and complex on another. He himself was well aware of

> The vehement struggle so fierce for unity in one's-self.

And the key to what is unsatisfying in his gospel of comradeship and delusive in his celebration of the ego is to be found in his failure ever to resolve this struggle truly in the depths of himself. He hoped to do this by being passively hospitable to everything however contradictory.

> Do I contradict myself?
> Very well then I contradict myself,
> (I am large, I contain multitudes.)

A capacity for including opposites and reconciling them in the unity of imagination is, indeed, the mark of a true seer as it is of a great artist. But Whitman for the most part included without reconciling. The contradictions remained; the multitudes of thoughts and things which he drew into the boundless current of his verse were never organically related except as units in a loose sequence. And this was because there was no deep creative centre in himself. The faculties of passive experience and of active intelligence in him were in curious conflict.

The virtue which he radiated as a man was a quality of his physical being. It was not merely that he enjoyed perfect physical health. He had the secret of so relaxing his body that he lost all sense of separation, while around him spread "the peace and knowledge that pass all the argument of the earth". In this experience he realised his greatest happiness, and so it is not surprising that his aim should have been "to sing, and sing, to the full, the ecstasy of simple physiological Being". But unity can be experienced on different levels of man's being and can only be complete when it is experienced on all levels at once. In his effort to achieve this man is impelled to sacrifice, if need be, even physical health for creative ends, to endure the tension of consciousness that mind and body may together become spiritualized. Whitman valued his bodily well-being too much to enter deeply into this struggle. And so, despite his exceptional sensitiveness to the radiations of life in things and the fact that his body was in touch with some deep fount of magnetic power and peace, so that his skin even in middle age was soft and fresh as a child's, his mind was very imperfectly illuminated. No one with an ear at all sensitive to spiritual truth can fail in reading *Leaves of Grass* to be jarred frequently by the false note with which he celebrates his ego, exemplified at its most extreme in such lines as

> I dote on myself, there is that lot of me and all so luscious.

And the egoism is the more ambiguous because it is a perverse expression of the truth that each self is innately divine. Whitman never tired of proclaiming this, and that by virtue of its divinity his Ego made "holy whatever I touch or am touch'd from". But he never suggested that such a spiritual realization of life cost anything to achieve. It was enough to loaf and invite the soul and to mix genially with "powerful uneducated persons". And though we must sympathise with his rejection of all morbid preoccupation with sin and with Puritan

repressions and inhibitions, he merely evaded a basic fact of human experience when he disregarded the tragic struggle which every man has to sustain who would spiritualize his natural impulse. Life for Whitman was an "Open Road" that stretched to infinite horizons and offered an endless series of comradely contacts. He never pictured it as being also a difficult ascent, upon which man might discover not so much a limitless freedom to roam as the concentrated freedom of a continual arrival.

It was this integrity which he was trying to define when he wrote that neither pride nor sympathy "can stretch too far while it stretches in company with the other". As in so many of his statements he had glimpsed here a profound truth, nothing less than the marriage in perfect being of the active and passive principles, and that to affirm the self truly is also to surrender it. Such is the condition of a true integrity in which pride is wholly innocent of arrogance and humility of subservience. The self is utterly assured because it is utterly devoted. But in Whitman the two principles were never brought into satisfying creative relation. He had a measureless physical sympathy with men and things, with life on its elemental and little differentiated level. And in expanding this sympathy he indulged the feminine side of his nature. Such feeling, however, indulged to excess meant a loss of personal identity and to correct it he was driven to assert his ego falsely and even to lay claim to a full-blooded masculinity which existed only in his mind. As a result the cosmic self which he proclaimed in his verse spoke often in tones of arrogance or betrayed a Narcissine taint. It was the impersonation of a mind imperfectly rooted in being. On the other hand, his feeling tended to flow diffusely over things, at best bathing them in a genial radiance, but seldom entering into them and informing them from within with a meaning by which they ceased to be things and became symbols of reality, reflecting the divine order and coherence of beauty.

To realize this order in which the outer world is recreated in the self and the self continually replenished through communion with the non-self demands an intensity and a singleness of being which it was not in Whitman's nature to achieve. As a writer he chose the easier path of declamation, of celebrating and dilating his ego, and of investing the material world with an âura of universality. And in the measure that he failed to marry the infinite and the finite in an imaginative act and by so doing to free his ego from the weight of mere things or the harassment of mere thoughts, he found his highest ideal in death. In praise of it, of "the low and delicious word death", with all it spelt to him of dissolution into an elemental infinite, he wrote his finest poetry. He felt it so poignantly because to him it meant the return to the Great Mother of a child who had never really grown up. And it is this immaturity in Whitman, this inability to grow through and beyond the realm of physical sensation to that of spiritual self-hood which prejudiced his message as a mystic

and as the prophet of democracy.

Many have separated falsely the natural and the spiritual, but it is no less an error to identify them indiscriminately. In doing so Whitman proclaimed the basic equality of all men and women and practised the comradeship he preached, but was almost blind to the real spiritual distinctions which, unlike the artificial ones of wealth or of rank, do not divide human society but enrich it. And for the same reason he assumed far too easily that ordinary men and women by merely expressing their natural impulse could form a creative community. True democracy, as we have begun to learn, costs more than this. A new world of brotherhood can be born only of new men and women who have cast off the old Adam and won enlightenment of will and of mind. In them nature will be renewed and fulfilled on a higher level. As a mystic Whitman, despite his experiences of at-onement with life and the undoubted virtue which he derived from them and communicated to others, had, judging by his writings, a very partially illuminated consciousness. This did not prevent him from declaring much that is vital and liberating. There is, too, a lasting value in his unwearied wonder at things, in his capacity for simple happiness and for being at home with simple people, and in his large acceptance, patience and imperturbability. In all these qualities he was a true mystic as he was a true democrat. And of the elemental nature which he evoked, of the great movements of men in which he delighted to merge, and of the death which allured him as into the arms of love, he was a true poet. But to mankind struggling in the grip of consciousness and feeling itself impotent in the conflict of its higher and lower nature, he has no clear message to give, and even at times seems to invite it to evade what must be lived through at any cost.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

In the light of the preceding article it is interesting to turn back to an essay by the famous English critic Edmund Gosse and to find what he has to say about this enigmatic but colourful personality. In 1885 Gosse visited Whitman in New Jersey and eight years later he recorded his impressions of his visit together with general observations on Whitman's poetic powers.

We print below an extract from the essay. It contains an interesting theory which does much to explain the widely divergent views of Whitman's critics :—

"Therefore I propound a theory. It is this, that there is no real Walt Whitman, that is to say, that he cannot be taken as any other figure in literature is taken, as an entity of positive value and defined characteristics ... Whitman is mere *bathybius* ; he is literature in the condition of protoplasm—an intellectual organism so simple that it takes the instant impression of whatever mood approaches it. Hence the critic who touches Whitman is immediately confronted with his own image stamped upon that viscid and tenacious surface. He finds, not what Whitman has to give, but what he himself has brought. And when, in quite another mood, he comes again to Whitman, he finds that other self of his own stamped upon the provoking protoplasm."

THE PROBLEM OF HEREDITY
TWO VIEWS

I.—THE MECHANISM OF HEREDITY

[The second of these two articles carries forward the explanation offered by ancient Theosophy on the subject of Heredity; the position reached by modern science up-to-date is described in the first article by Waldemar Kaempffert, Science Editor of *The New York Times*.—EDS.]

Two hands and two feet, each with five fingers or toes. Forearms and forelegs, each with two bones. One nose, two eyes and two ears. A spinal column. Two lungs, a heart, a system of veins and arteries through which blood is pumped. And then a brain and a nervous system. Compare yourself thus dismembered with your forefathers. They were similarly equipped. How does it happen that you resemble them so closely? Ask yourself such questions and you ask yourself about the processes of inheriting both your physical and your mental characteristics.

Until a scientific foundation for biology was laid, it was thought that cabbages and kings transmitted themselves as whole collections. Human beings were like those highly compressed Chinese paper flowers that open in water. To-day it is known that the characteristics of living things are as separate as the stones, cornices, windows and doors of a house, though blended to produce an individuality. A science of genetics has sprung up, a science that deals with heredity and that seeks to explain why plants and animals both resemble their parents and depart a little from them. It is still a sketchy science which raises more questions than it answers. Yet, such as it is, it gives us a coarse picture of a mechanism and suggests many theories which may or may not be true. To explain how this science of genetics or heredity arose we must of necessity go back to Darwin. Given heredity and change, we have evolution.

At about the time that Darwin was developing his theory of natural selection, the Augustinian Abbot, Gregor Mendel, was crossing edible peas under control in his garden. In 1865 he formulated his now famous law of inheritance. Unfortunately he presented his results in a paper read before an obscure society in Brünn, Austria. Had it come to the notice of English biologists possibly Darwin might have modified his conception of species as well as his views on natural selection. De Vries in Holland, Correns in Germany and Tschermak in Austria rediscovered Mendel's laws of heredity at the beginning of this century and thus started the mutation theory on its course.

They are simple enough—these laws of heredity as they were framed by Mendel, de Vries and the other early experimenters. Given a set of physical characteristics in two parents (tallness, shortness, hair colour, eye colour and the like), it

is possible to predict what the offspring will be in the next generation. After that Mendel and de Vries could predict nothing and had to rely on a mathematical treatment of chance, which in turn indicated how many plants or animals would have the characteristics studied but not the individuals that actually would possess them. Sports or mutants obeyed precisely the same laws as normal organisms—a powerful argument in favour of the mutation theory.

A tremendous forward leap was taken. It looked as if Weismann might be right after all—old Weismann who had preached that the germ-plasm is the all-important factor or, in other words, that the germ cells are the product not of the body in which they are found but of the germ cells of the previous generation. With the acceptance of the mutation theory the explanation of evolution had been guided into new fields. But what made the germ plasm change again and again so that out of some primitive tree-climbing mammal both the ape and man evolved?

Within the cells Weismann and others saw little bodies now called "chromosomes"—literally "colour bodies"—because they can be easily stained and thus made visible under the microscope. Fanciful properties were attributed to them. Montgomery and Sutton pointed out the parallel between the behaviour of the chromosomes and the factors of heredity that obey the laws of Mendel. Dr. Thomas H. Morgan and his associates were thereupon able to reveal how these factors are arranged within the chromosomes. With the inspiration of genius he decided to experiment with the now famous *Drosophila melanogaster*, a fruit-fly that breeds a new generation every nine days. In a single year he could study twenty-five generations or the equivalent of five hundred years of human family life. If germ plasm, especially the chromosomes in cells, could be modified, fruit flies would tell the story in their aberrations from their ancestors. With a patience buoyed only by the stimulus of a great idea, Morgan bred flies by the million and kept a carefully indexed *Almanach de Gotha* of their children and their children's children. Few human families are as sure of their ancestors as he is of his fruit flies' progenitors. He and his school examined over 20,000,000 flies and found about 400 mutants that bred true. To-day about 600 such mutants of fruit flies are known.

Out of this work came a momentous discovery. The chromosomes in the cell are always definite in number for each species of animal or plant—8 for the fruit-fly, 14 for the garden and sweet pea, 42 for wheat, 54 for the monkey, 48 for man. Note that these are all even numbers. Can it be that the chromosomes are paired, so that one half belong to the male and the other half to the female? The experiments left no doubt that this is indeed the case.

By classifying his fly mutants Morgan found that they fell into four groups. Note the number. Half of eight—the number of Drosophila's chromosomes. Morgan asked himself: Do the four groups correspond to the four male and the four female chromosomes? They did. Hence

the chromosomes must be bundles in which the actual characteristics of heredity were packed. In fact Morgan became so skilful that he could predict what would happen when fruit flies were mated. For instance, if a fly with a black body and twisted wings was crossed with a normal fly, the grandchildren that happened to have black bodies also had twisted wings. The pedigrees of millions of flies left no doubt about this. Always there were these linkage groups, and always the number of groups equalled half the number of chromosomes. There was no need to call in a mathematician to figure out how many flies of certain linked attributes there would be in the grandchildren. Morgan could predict correctly ninety-nine times out of a hundred.

But why did the law fail in the hundredth case? The answer was Morgan's greatest contribution to biology. Obviously something must have interfered in the grandchildren with the normal process whereby male and female chromosomes were linked. Morgan made one of those imaginative inductions that place him among the great in science. He assumed that the chromosomes are not the final units of heredity. Like the atom, which is composed of electrons, they might be composed of smaller entities—so small, in fact, that they could not be seen in any microscope. He imagined these entities strung like beads in a straight line within the chromosomes. "Genes" the invisible beads are called. There must be from 2,000 to 2,500 of them, each different from every other in a string, each playing its own distinctive rôle in the highly complicated economy of the cell. He assumed that the genes of the male chromosome exactly matched the genes of the female. Thus the genes that control wing shape in one chromosome lie opposite the corresponding genes in the other chromosome. So with the matching genes that determine eye colour, length of hair and the hundreds of other attributes of a fruit fly. Genes crossed over from one chromosome to the other, the children receiving genes from both mothers and fathers. Since the dominant characteristics are thus inherited, the children may be indistinguishable from their parents. But interbreed the children and the effect of the original mating becomes apparent. Again there is an interchange of genes, with the result that the grandchildren are not all absolutely like their grandfathers or absolutely like their garndmothers. A few of the grandchildren will combine attributes of the grandfather and grandmother—the eccentric one per cent. This is true for characteristics which are linked or carried by different chromosomes. Since chromosomes are assorted and there is such a phenomenon as crossing-over, a grandchild is rarely a replica of any ancestor.

Morgan could see exactly how far from one end of a given chromosome lies the power of an unborn fly to inherit wings of a peculiar shape, even though he could never hope to see the genes themselves. Yet, despite this and other proofs that genes and chromosomes are as real as atoms in molecules, it was sheer inference, although the inference of genius.

Not yet had it been proved by some definitive experiment other than breeding that by modifying the genes in some way, changing them directly and violently, new mutants of fruit flies would arise.

There now began ingenious efforts by many biologists to jolt the genes —change their constitution and their arrangement. It seemed at first as hard as changing mercury into gold. The experimenters tried everything—drugging, poisoning, intoxication, anæsthetizing, bright illumination, utter darkness, suffocation, whirling in centrifugal machines, mechanical shaking, mutilation, heating, chilling, parching, overfeeding. In vain. The cell always resisted. Then Dr. H. J. Muller decided to adopt the methods of the atomic physicists. If, he reasoned, X-rays can tear an electron from an atom and thus convert it into so very excited a bit of matter that it glows, what if they were turned on the genes?

The result was startling. What actually happened is not yet clear. Apparently the genes were either changed chemically or shifted out of their places—perhaps both. Instead of 400 mutants in 20,000,000 Muller got 150 times as many. He had accelerated the evolutionary process 15,000 per cent. And what monstrosities! Flies with eyes that bulged, flies with eyes that were sunken; flies with purple, white, green, brown and yellow eyes, flies with hair that was curly, ruffled, parted, fine, coarse; flies that were bald; flies with extra legs or antennæ or no legs or antennæ; flies with wings of every conceivable shape or with virtually no wings at all; big flies and little flies; active flies and sluggish flies; sterile flies and fertile flies. What had happened? "The roots of life—the genes—had indeed been struck and had yielded" in the words of Muller. Could there be any doubt after this that genes exist—that Morgan's divination was right? Or that the method whereby the differences that distinguish one generation of organisms from its predecessors are inherited is at last revealed? Or that differences in genes do arise suddenly to bring about large variations?

Muller has suggested that natural radiation may be in part responsible for the evolution of life, but only in part. Radium and other radiactive substances in the earth pouring out gamma rays which are more powerful than X-rays, cosmic rays which come from outer space and which are in turn more powerful than gamma rays —surely these must have their effect on germ cells. "It can... scarcely be denied that in this factor we have found at least one of the natural causes of mutation and hence of evolution" is Muller's conclusion. But there must be other forces at work, as Dr. Muller himself has insisted. Natural radiation alone cannot account for the universal mutation rate in aged seeds.

We are now at the rock-bottom of life—the gene. What is it? A bit of matter, but matter endowed with what we call life. Yet a chemical machine, in Morgan's opinion. "All the evidence that we possess at present indicates that only those particular chemical substances that are characteristic of each species can make the organism what it is", he says. How did these substances

come together? Through accident or design? How is it that they manage to change and perpetuate themselves, whereas iron, gold and other matter remains on the whole what it is?

It is clear to Morgan and his school that the gene must henceforth be regarded as a complex chemical compound. Not until its chemistry is fathomed, not until the changes that take place when it is bombarded by X-rays or affected by other agencies are known, can biologists hope to throw light on the processes of heredity and evolution. "Acquired characters", "use inheritance", "survival of the fit", "struggle for existence"—these have an imposing ring, but they explain nothing. By giving names to mysterious activities we thought we understood them. We were only romancing in a scientific fashion in an attempt to explain the infinite variety and beauty of nature.

Suppose the biochemist does delve deeper into the chemical mysteries of chromosomes and genes—what then? We are still left with old puzzles. For instance, there are two types of cells—germ cells and body or somatic cells. The germ cells transmit the units of heredity from one generation to the next. But how does it happen that the germ cells develop spontaneously as they do? They seem to say "grow a hand here, a nose there, a brain in the head" and the designated organs appear in the designated places. The germ cells never make the mistake of causing an ear to appear in the hand or a brain in the abdomen. Why? No answer can be given.

There also remain questions about mentality and emotion to answer. The mind is not a function of the brain, as, for example, hearing is a function of the ear or seeing of the eye, though we could not think without brains. The most crass of material psychologists recognize that mind is something that can be developed as strength is developed in muscles. Even if we could follow the process of thinking and responding to the beauty of nature to the uttermost brain cell, we would not know what mind is. Yet there can be no doubt that brain cells have everything to do with thinking.

Can man take his destiny in his hands, and by controlling heredity make use of his latent mental powers more effectively? No doubt something can be done by applying the methods of the scientific plant and animal breeder. We need some billions of brain cells with entirely new functions. But the acquisition of these is a matter of evolution. Our successors may have these brain cells. If so, our yearnings, premonitions, intuitions will be more highly developed. But if that superhuman successor of ours, with his differently organized brain, is to come, he must pass through us, just as we passed through all the life that preceded us in the sense that it had to be created before we could appear by the process of evolution.

WALDEMAR KAEMPFFERT

II.—HEREDITY EXPLAINED

That something more than matter is operative in heredity has been suspected now and again by the more intuitional among modern scientists, those who dream better and bolder dreams than the rest, such, for example, as Sir Bertram C. A. Windle, F.R.S., who twenty years ago (*Current Opinion*, February 1919) questioned whether protoplasm is merely a chemical compound and concluded that "there must be some superior, at least widely different, agency at work than one of a purely chemical character, something which transcends chemical operations". Mr. Kaempffert's article, however, is an excellent summary of the present-day position of orthodox biochemistry on the problems of heredity.

Mr. Kaempffert admits that the scientific theory leaves unsolved, among other puzzles, the question of how the germ cells which transmit the units of heredity from one generation to the next develop unerringly the designated organs in the designated places. And, as he points out, even deeper delving into the chemical mysteries of the germ cell with its chromosomes and the mysterious factors within the latter, called "genes", will not solve this problem. Nor, he might have added, would the delineation of any number of genes throw the slightest light upon the cause and the nature of their power to transmit characteristics.

Modern science can never solve the problems of embryology as long as it ignores consciousness as the governing factor in the process, the purposive creative intelligence within and behind matter, which alone can reconcile genetic heredity with the constant evolutionary change seen in nature. The stupendous complexities and marvels of the human body in particular defy the formula of "variability of type" apart from the supervisory presence of a quasi-intelligent impulse. "Spontaneous variations" or "accidental divergences" anywhere in a universe governed by law would be irreconcilable anomalies. Trying to elucidate the problems of heredity by referring even physical traits to particles of inert matter or to chemical activity alone is as vain as trying to explain the action of a locomotive while leaving out the steam. The parts of the locomotive and their geometrical and dynamic relationships may be described in the most elaborate detail, but to what avail if what makes the machinery move is left out of account?

There is nothing in the Theosophical explanation which negates the fact established by science—that the characteristics of a "new" being have a definite relation to the arrangements of the genes within the chromosomes. But Theosophy stands squarely opposed to the materialistic assumption that basic character is due to a mechanical arrangement of blind molecules. The reverse, Theosophy affirms, is the case. The plasmic formations studied in genetics are instrumental, not causal. Life is not a fleeting chemical activity but the striving of a permanent *conscious* Force for self-realization.

The Theosophical explanation of

heredity, briefly summarized, is that there is one Life, Consciousness or Spirit underlying all forms of matter, animate or " inanimate ", and that progressive intelligence is the fulcrum of all evolution in form and in character. Descent into materiality and re-ascent into spirituality is the description of the cyclic pilgrimage of consciousness, of which Darwinian evolution takes up the study only at its midway point. The physical evolves gradually from the spiritual, the mental and the psychic.

Madame Blavatsky pronounces almost correct and in harmony with the teaching of the ancient Aryans the Weismann theory of the germinal cell not having its genesis at all in the body of the parent but proceeding directly from the ancestral germinal cell passed from father to son during long generations, that one infinitesimal cell, out of millions of others at work in the formation of the human body, determining the correct image of the future man. And Theosophy would add that the unknown, invisible influence which radiates from that focus in the incipient embryo, differentiating the cells as it proceeds, absolute master of its materials and of the future form, is a spiritual potency in the individual soul, the Ego. The latter carries in the hidden layers of his consciousness the pictures of the past which become the patterns of the future. Drawn by his affinities, he enters the environment most akin to his nature, with those of qualities best attuned to his own. By the power of imagination which, science to the contrary notwithstanding, does not depend upon a physical brain, the Ego forms the pattern for his bodily vehicle.

This explanation applies *mutatis mutandis* to the lower kingdoms, in which the ocean of consciousness has not divided into its constituent drops, for the radical unity of all Nature and of the evolutionary plan is a fundamental tenet of Theosophy.

There *can be no objective* form on Earth (nor in the Universe either), without its astral prototype being first formed in Space. From Phidias down to the humblest workman in the ceramic art—a sculptor has had to create first of all a model in his mind, then sketch it in one and two dimensional lines, and then only can he reproduce it in a three dimensional or objective figure. And if human mind is a living demonstration of such successive stages in the process of evolution—how can it be otherwise when NATURE'S MIND and creative powers are concerned? (*The Secret Doctrine,* Vol. II, p. 660, footnote)

That pattern of finer than physical matter is called in Theosophical terminology the astral body, on the belief in, and the demonstration of the independent existence of which, Madame Blavatsky declared, depends the whole issue of the quarrel between the profane and the esoteric sciences. On that gradually developing model the physical molecules arrange themselves. This guiding ethereal pattern not only explains as nothing else can the process of formation of the human fœtus but also it furnishes the clue to how it is that the seed produces always its own kind and that all sentient beings bring forth their like. For animals, vegetables and minerals all have their ethereal doubles.

The fact that Nature has followed a fundamental unity of structural plan in fashioning her creatures does not preclude a distinctive primitive

germ from which each of these kingdoms has developed. At the root of the evolutionary process are the workings of the subconscious intelligence pervading matter, ultimately traceable to a reflection of the Divine Wisdom, or of that of the conscious Divine Powers who are the active manifestations of the One Supreme Energy and the embodiments of those manifestations of the ONE LAW which we know as "the laws of Nature". For Theosophy denies that evolution is a blind or automatic process, affirming that, on the contrary, the universe is worked and guided from within outward by endless Hierarchies of sentient beings, agents of the fundamental Law inherent in the whole. Among these there are "designers" or "builders", centres of creative power for every root or parent species of the host of forms of vegetable and animal life.

In the *creation* of new species, departing sometimes very widely from the Parent stock, as in the great variety of the *genus Felis*—like the lynx, the tiger, the cat, etc.—it is the "designers" who direct the new evolution by adding to, or depriving the species of certain appendages, either needed or becoming useless in the new environments. Thus, when we say that *Nature* provides for every animal and plant, whether large or small, we speak correctly. For, it is those terrestrial spirits of Nature, who form the aggregated Nature. (*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 732)

The law of action and reaction, of cause and effect, under which all evolution proceeds, assumes, in its bearing upon man, the aspect of Karma or moral retribution and "in the case of *human* incarnations the law of Karma, racial or individual, overrides the subordinate tendencies of 'Heredity', its servant". (*Ibid.*, II, 178)

A simple mathematical calculation shows that the number of any individual's ancestors a comparatively few generations ago was equal to the entire population of the earth. The incarnating Ego has an almost infinite number of physical traits in his ancestral stream. From among them he selects, not self-consciously and deliberately at the time of coming into incarnation but in terms of electric and magnetic affinities previously formed, and in that selection he emphasizes some traits and neglects others.

The physical body is influenced chiefly by the astral or model body, the superphysical transmitter of heredity; and the astral body in turn is influenced by the soul, the moral self, which is the carrier of the individual's own heredity from past lives. Good or bad, all mental and moral characteristics are inheritances from a man's own past and not from his parents. They are brought over as mental deposits within the internal basis of consciousness. When the Egoic pattern seeks corporification, however, it is modified by parental thought and by race thought and also by the living sentient points of which the physical body is composed, as these rush to unite with the returning Ego in a new, yet old, personal nature.

Occultism teaches that—(*a*) the life-atoms of our (*Prâna*) life-principle are never entirely lost when a man dies. That the atoms best impregnated with the life-principle (an independent, eternal, conscious factor) are partially transmitted from father to

son by heredity, and partially are drawn once more together and become the animating principle of the new body in every new incarnation of the Monads. Because (*b*), as the *individual* Soul is ever the same, so are the atoms of the lower principles (body, its astral, or *life double*, etc.), drawn as they are by affinity and Karmic law always to the same individuality in a series of various bodies. (*Ibid.*, II. 671-2)

Given the indwelling energy of the permanent conscious Force, striving for self-realization, and the progressively developing pattern of superphysical matter, pre-existent and mental in nature, still the process by which the concretion of physical matter within the astral matrix takes place cannot be understood if those "elemental lives" are left out of account. The physical body of man as of every other creature is shaped by the lowest terrestrial lives, through physical, chemical and physiological evolution. These "lives" are the "genii" described by Hermes Trismegistus as "present in our nerves, our marrow, our veins, our arteries, and *our very brain-substance*....at the moment when each of us receives life and being he is taken in charge by the genii (Elementals [belonging to one or other of the great elements, Fire, Air, Water, Earth and Ether]) who preside over births". They are among the "designers" and "builders" previously mentioned.

In a note of reasonable length it is hardly possible to convey any adequate idea of the wealth of information on evolution and hereditary transmission—the subjects are inextricably intertwined—which is contained in *The Secret Doctrine*. A broad outline has been attempted, but it has not been possible even to touch upon some points. We may only refer in passing, for example, to the important rôle of electricity—quite unsuspected by modern science—in the impression of ideas upon matter, which opens up a whole new line of thought.

Madame Blavatsky wrote in 1888 that the two chief difficulties of the science of embryology, namely, what are the forces at work in the formation of the fœtus, and the *cause* of hereditary transmission, would never be solved until the Theosophical theories were accepted. Certainly Mr. Kaempffert's article makes it plain that science has not yet approached the solution of either of these perplexing questions. Are there to-day scientists sufficiently open-minded to give a hearing to the explanation of those problems accepted by the ancient scientists and restated by their modern heir, Theosophy?

A STUDENT OF THEOSOPHY

MORALITY AND RELIGION

BERGSON'S THEORY

[This interesting essay on the philosophy of Bergson disposes of the usual argument against the great French philosopher, namely, that he looks upon man "only as a biological entity". The writer is **Hugo Bergmann**, Professor of Philosophy in the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, who himself remains puzzled; for he cannot explain what to him is an inconsistency, the theory that "absolute morality is produced by a *betrayal* by man of his natural obligations ..." We suggest that the only possible reconciliation of this apparent paradox lies in the realization that man is both a God and an animal, "a beam of light immaculate within, a form of clay material upon the lower surface". Evolution for man consists precisely in the overcoming of the law of the beast, and, through the control of mere animal instincts, the realization and expression of the law of the Spirit, which is that of Compassion Absolute.—EDS.]

When Henri Bergson became world-famous about twenty-five years ago, and the leaders of philosophical public opinion began to discuss his views, many of his critics argued that in his philosophy there was no room left to the individual as such for his anxieties and requirements; that it was impossible to build upon Bergson's basic thoughts either ethics or metaphysics. The eternal questions which each generation asks anew remain, so to speak, outside his attention. He sees the world only as a biological process: a great current of creative energy, which is the substance of the world, is precipitated into matter to wrest from it what it can. This current of vital energy, coming from an unknown source, when rushing through matter divides itself into two main lines, evolves in two divergent directions. At the extremity of these two lines lie instinct and intelligence. The culminating points of the evolution are the hymenopterous insects such as ants and bees on the one hand, and man on the other, representing respectively instinct and intelligence. Instinct is intuitive, intelligence considered and reasoned. Instinct performs at one stroke, by the very simplicity of one act, things which seem very complicated and difficult to intelligence. Ants and bees solve, so to speak, the most complicated questions without even feeling the difficulties of the problem. They do it in a somnambulant state; they resemble the sleep-walker who walks safely alongside a precipice without feeling the danger. A man awake could not walk this way: he would become dizzy and fall because he reflects and reasons. Man as an intelligent being sees the difficulty, because he distinguishes a multitude of elements and functions which have to be co-ordinated to reach the aim. But to the instinct the work of organisation is a simple act like the making of a footprint, which instantly causes a myriad grains of sand to cohere and form a pattern. Human intelligence has not this directness and simplicity of the instinct. Man uses means and tools in order to reach his aim; his mind is versatile and elastic; he

knows many roads towards his goal and chooses among them, while instinct sees only one direct way or, to put it more accurately, does not see the way at all, but goes ahead and acts. A bee builds its cell or hive. *We* see many possible ways of building it and admire the fact that the bee chooses the simplest and the most expedient. But the somnambulary instinct of the bee does not see the variety of possibilities; he acts in one direct stroke.

Both these two ways in which the vital impetus of creative energy has developed have advantages and disadvantages. Intelligence is not so direct and certain as instinct, but it is flexible and able to adapt itself to different situations.

That Bergson treated man in a certain way as a peculiar species of animal was the essence of the criticism brought forward against him by philosophers who endeavoured to show that there was no place in his system for ethics or religion. Bergson himself, it is true, did not touch upon these questions in his books. Only recently he published a book dedicated to these problems—*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* I want to examine the question of whether he succeeded in this book in establishing ethics and religion on the suppositions of his teaching.

Now there is one point to which I would like to draw your attention from the first. The argument against Bergson is that he sees man only as a biological entity. But Bergson succeeded in showing through his system that man himself can lift himself above the command of "bios", of life, that he can circumvent the intention of nature and thus become a human being. Man has outwitted nature. Nature, for example, intended that man should beget man endlessly; she took the most minute precautions to ensure the preservation of the species by the multiplication of individuals; hence she had not foreseen, when bestowing intelligence upon us, that intelligence would at once find a way of divorcing the sexual act from its consequences, and, as Bergson puts it, that man might refrain from reaping without foregoing the pleasure of sowing. This example shows that intelligence, which was from the first destined to be a servant of physical life in the same way that instinct is, freed itself from this bondage. Man betrayed nature, and Bergson makes use of this betrayal in order to free his own system from the bondage of a purely biological aspect and to add to his system a higher type of ethics and metaphysics which is not quite in harmony with the fundamentals or, at least, does not derive from them. By betraying the command of physical life we fulfil a higher order: we create morals and religion.

There are, according to Bergson, two kinds of morals and of religion, one born of biological necessities and one born through this revolution against the order of life. This differentiation is the most interesting point in Bergson's new system. From the biological point of view human society resembles the hive and the ant-hill. There is a social instinct which unites the elements of human society by invisible ties.

Vainly do we try to imagine an individual cut off from all social life. Robinson Crusoe on his island remains in contact with other men, for the manufactured goods which he saved from the wreck and without which he could not have survived kept him within the bounds of civilization and consequently within those of society. He drew energy from the society to which he remained attached. Bergson mentions Kipling's Forest Officer in *Many Inventions* alone in his bungalow in the heart of the Indian wilderness, who dresses every evening for dinner to preserve his self-respect in his isolation. Connection with society and obedience to its commands are a biological necessity for the individual. But the morals emanating from this necessity are confined to a *closed society*. Our societies resemble in this respect the ant-hill or the bee-hive. Their essential characteristic is to include a certain number of individuals and to exclude others. Nature in making man a social animal intended that this solidarity should be very close. The social instinct which is the basis of social obligations always has in view a closed society, however large; it is not concerned with humanity. The group should be closely united, but between group and group there should be virtual hostility. Between the group, however big, and humanity lies the whole distance from the finite to the infinite. From the purely biological point of view, the attachment to an open society, to humanity as a whole, is an act of treason.

But we have already seen that man is a traitor to the commands of physical life. Of all the creatures that live in society, man alone can swerve from the social line designed by life. He can do it by giving way to selfish preoccupations—no bee or ant could do it; he can do it by a leap forward from the closed society to *open* society. I say a leap. It is not by expanding our narrower feelings that we can embrace humanity. A new creative effort is necessary to create a new, an absolute morality. In all times there have arisen exceptional individual men who have created this morality *against* the biological morality of the closed society. It is a difference in kind, and not merely in degree, between the biological morality with which we have been dealing up to now and this absolute morality. Biological morals spring up from necessities of life; their generality consists in the universal acceptance of a law ordained by nature. They can be reduced to impersonal formulæ. The *absolute* morality, on the contrary, is incarnate in a person who dares to leap from the known and familiar, the closed society, into the unknown universal humanity. The generality of this absolute morality consists in a common imitation of a model, a great moral personality. Bergson recalls the tone and accents of the Prophets of Israel. It is their voice we hear when a great injustice has been done and condoned. From the depths of the centuries they raise their protest. They imparted to justice the violently imperative character which it has kept and which it has since stamped on a substance grown infinitely more extensive. But these

extensions did not occur spontaneously either. On each one of them a competent historian could put a proper name. Each step in the development from the closed to the open society was a creation, and indeed the door will ever stand open to fresh creations.

Whereas natural obligation is a propulsive force of nature, complete and perfect morality has the effect of an appeal of a great master. We all, at those momentous hours when our usual maxims of conduct prescribed by the ethics of closed society strike us as inadequate, wonder what such and such an one whom we recognize as a model personality would have expected of us under the circumstances. That is why it is comparatively easy to formulate the first morality imposed by nature itself, but not the second which is the expression of a living personality.

The passage from the closed society to the open is due to Judaism and Christianity; it has not been brought about by mere philosophy. Philosophers have skirted around it, touched it and yet missed it. Plato certainly includes the idea of man among the transcendent ideas. From this it was but one step to the idea that all men as human beings were of equal worth and that the common essence conferred on them the same fundamental rights. But the step was not taken by Plato; slavery was not condemned. Foreigners, being barbarians, could claim no right. The leap was made by Judaism and Christianity out of a new feeling, which burst open the boundaries of the closed society.

But the "clan moral" of the closed society continued. We need only think of what happens in time of war. Murder and pillage and perfidy, cheating and lying, not only become lawful but are actually considered praiseworthy. Would this be possible, would the transformation take place so easily and so generally, if there were not deep within our soul the principle of the closed society, of the biological morality overruling the feeble beginnings of a higher morality? This new anti-biological morality is only in its beginnings.

In the same manner as Bergson thus discerns two kinds of morality, so he discerns two kinds of religion. There is a biological or, as Bergson puts it, a static religion, as there is the biological morality of the closed society. What is the biological function of religion? Bergson reminds us that it is towards an expression of intelligence that the vital impulse of the vertebrate tends, man being the culminating point of this development. But intelligence is a dangerous gift. What would happen to human society if the individual under the influence of his intelligence would cease to perform the duties of society imposed on him by nature? Society must first of all be able to maintain itself. And here again is the great danger of a revolt of human intelligence. It is connected with man's *knowledge about death*. Animals do not know that they must die; they do not realise that they are bound to die a natural death if they do not die a violent one. But man knows he will die. All other living creatures, clinging to life, are simply carried along by its

impetus. But with human intelligence reflection also appears.

The thought of death must slow down in man the movement of life. The certainty of death arising at the same time as reflection runs counter to nature's intention. Nature, then, looks as if she is going to stumble over this obstacle of intelligence. But she recovers herself at once. To the idea of inevitable death she opposes the image of a continuation of life after death. This idea, flung by her into the field of intelligence where the idea of death has just become installed, straightens everything out again. Religion in this biological sense is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation by intelligence of the inevitability of death.

If intelligence, as we have just seen, now threatens to break up the will to live and to beget children, who will be, as man premeditates, children of death, there must be a counterpoise, at these points, to intelligence. That is the rôle of the *myth-making faculty* which Bergson ascribes to religion. Since intelligence works on representation, this faculty will call up imaginary representations which will hold their own against the representations of a sad and intolerable reality and will succeed, through the agency of intelligence itself, in counteracting the work of intelligence. This is the task of the myth-making faculty of religion. It brings added strength to the individual, it strengthens his will to live and to preserve the species by the multiplication of individuals. At a point when there was a danger that man would outwit nature through his intelligence, nature finds a way to outwit man's intelligence through his myth-making faculty.

Its rôle is to elaborate that religion we have been considering, a *religion with a pure biological function.* Bergson calls it static religion—a very inappropriate terminology. He says himself that he would call it natural religion if that term were not already used in another sense. It is a natural religion in the sense that it is a defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual and might disintegrate society, when the exercise of intelligence revealed the certainty of death. Precisely because intelligence is a successful creation of nature no less than is instinct in the other line of the development of life, it could not be posited without an accompanying tendency to eliminate any obstacle to the production of its full effect. Religion in its function of a static biological religion restores the balance by its myth about a life after death, brings peace and counteracts the elements of disquiet and weakness entailed in the application of intelligence to life. The unrest of intelligence and the myth-making faculty of religion counteract and nullify each other. As a result of this natural function, man surrounds himself with phantasmic beings of his own creation, living a life akin to his own on a higher plane, but bound up with his own life, beings which are helpful, consoling, comforting.

This explanation of religion is not new, as Bergson himself takes pains to declare. But it is a mistake to believe that such biological requirements as these are able to explain

the whole phenomenon of religion. Beyond biological or static religion there is what Bergson calls dynamic religion, the religion of the mystic. Bergson explains it in the following way : The substance of the world, the great current of creative energy which created the world in its different lines of development, is precipitated into matter, but is at the same time stopped by matter, growing stiff and torpid within the husks and shells of matter, if I may use the expression common to Jewish mystics. Bergson does not know the Jewish mystics' theory of the "klipah", the "husk", as resistant to the sparks of the Holy Ghost spread in the world, but he comes very near to it. The results of this process of stiffening the current of creative energy are the species and individuals created. The vital impetus—*élan vital*—and matter are thus complementary aspects of creation, life owing its subdivisions into distinct beings to the matter it traverses. The potentialities which life, or the vital impetus, bears within it, realize as much as the spatiality of the matter which displays them permits. Our planet was, in Bergson's view, ill-adapted to favour life's impetus. The original impulsion had therefore to split into divergent lines of evolutionary progress—instinct and intelligence. But can we rise above ourselves sufficiently to discover the current of life beyond the boundaries imposed on it by matter, beyond the splitting caused through the pressure of spatiality? Bergson in his previous works sought the way to the unity beyond the dualism of instinct and intelligence through reflection and reasoning only. Now he thinks that he has found the way to the source of energy and life through *direct experience*. It is the experience of the mystic, the experience of dynamic as opposed to static religion which shows the way. Mysticism to Bergson is far more than a mere fervent faith or an imaginative form such as traditional religion is capable of assuming in passionate souls. *Dynamic religion* or mysticism, while assimilating as much as it can from static and traditional religion, turning to the latter for confirmation and borrowing its language, still possesses an original content, drawn straight from the very well-spring of religion, nay, of life itself. Mystic experience is to Bergson a continuation of the reasoning which led him to the doctrine of the vital impetus as the essence of the world. The final state of the mystic soul, a state of unmixed joy, lying beyond pleasure and pain, is the identification of the individual soul with the source of life, the "vital impetus", a participation of man in the divine essence.

Dynamic religion is the victory of the source of life over the individual stiffened form it took in materializing into matter. The mystic is carried to the roots of his being, and thus to the very principle of life itself. To him the universe is the mere visible and tangible aspect of the creative emotion or, as Bergson puts it now in the language of religion, the visible and tangible aspect of love and of the need of loving. The universe is the appearance of living creatures in which the creative emotion finds its complement on our

earth and probably on other planets. Creation appears to the mystic as God undertaking to create that He may have, beside Himself, beings worthy of his love. The mystic finds the way to associate and unite himself with this creative love.

But are we allowed to trust to the experience of the mystic without being able to verify for ourselves his individual experience? Is it not alleged that these experiences of the mystics are exceptional and cannot be verified by the ordinary man? Bergson replies: It is by no means certain that a scientific experiment or an observation recorded by science can always be repeated or verified. In the days when Central Africa was a *terra incognita*, geography trusted to the account of one single explorer, if his honesty and competence seemed to be above suspicion. The route of Livingstone's journeys appeared for a long time on the maps and atlases. It is true that verification was potentially, if not actually, feasible and that other travellers could go, see and verify if they liked. But the mystic too has gone on a journey that others can potentially, if not actually, undertake; and those who are actually capable of doing so are at least as many as those who possess the daring and the energy of a Stanley setting out to find Livingstone. Further, besides the souls capable of following the mystic way to the very end, there are many who go at least part of the way and take a few steps, either by an effort of will or from a natural disposition, and all those generally agree among themselves. The path followed is the same, even admitting that the stopping-places by the way are at different intervals. It has in any case the same terminal point. In the descriptions of the final state we find the same expressions, the same image, the same comparisons, although the authors are generally unknown to each other.

That is Bergson's way to an absolute, dynamic religion.

I have analysed Bergson's theory of morality and religion as objectively as possible. May I add a few words of criticism? I return to the question raised at the beginning. If we look upon man as a biological creature only, as a sort of animal—and it makes no difference from a fundamental point of view if it is an animal endowed with instinct like the bee or with intelligence like man—are a morality and a religion possible? The interesting point in Bergson's theory is that absolute morality is produced by a *betrayal* by man of his natural obligations confined to a closed society. It is, so to speak, an inconsistency of nature which produces the absolute morality. I wonder if this inconsistency is due to nature or to Bergson's own system. I am not sure whether man betrayed nature while leaping from the closed to the open society or whether Bergson betrayed his system while building a higher store of an absolute and even an anti-biological system of ethics on a conception of man as a purely biological creature. Bergson's new system shows that his starting-point was too narrow. We cannot understand the morality of man with his imperative will, his determination to change the world, as long as we conceive of man

as an animal, even as the culminating development of animals. A biological conception of man has surely great merits and may open for us new gates of understanding of the behaviour of man; but it cannot serve as a basis for a morality when only through a "betrayal" can the way of development be found from the *homo sapiens* as a species of animal to man as directed by morals and religion.

And as for Bergson's theory of religion, its culmination is the mystic's self-identification with the energy that creates the world. Now here again we find in man a potentiality never found in an animal. Bergson himself admits: "No doubt we are here going beyond the conclusions we reached in *Creative Evolution*." It is true he adds: "We wanted to keep as close as possible to facts. We stated nothing that could not in time be confirmed by the tests of biology." But, I would ask, is not Bergson's explanation of the experience of the mystic identical with the words of the serpent in Genesis: "You will be like God"? And does not such a conception of man as potentially identical with God necessitate a thorough *revision* of a philosophy which saw man only as the culminating point of the development of animals?

HUGO BERGMANN

Why is it the European assumes that he and his civilization are superior to anything in the Orient? Through ignorance chiefly, and then through confidence in the artillery. (There is more in it than that, but not much more than factory organisation.)

H. M. TOMLINSON

THE HUMAN AURA

[The writer, **Major Harding de Fonblanque Cox, LL.B.,** describes in the following article, extracted from his forthcoming book *Fringes of Philosophy*, his own psychic experience and relates it to that described in *The Sunday Express* some years ago by Mr. William Gerhardi. Mr. Gerhardi narrated how he was, on five occasions, objectively conscious while his physical body lay asleep and how he was able to travel a little in the vicinity of where it lay. Such an experience can be understood rationally only when the existence of the *linga sarira* or astral body is admitted. We refer interested readers to an article "Ghosts and Astral Bodies" in *The Theosophical Movement*, Vol. V, p. 37.—EDS.]

On the 21st of October 1934 there appeared in a popular Sunday paper an article by William Gerhardi which immediately enchained my earnest attention. For the weird experiences which the writer therein recounts have a distinct bearing upon what I take to be rare, if not abnormal, inflictions which, from time to time and at irregular intervals, have befallen me and which none of my friends who are supposed to be possessed of erudite professional knowledge in the fields of medicine, therapeutics, biology and physical and psychical investigations, have been able to identify and account for—much less to diagnose.

The nearest a certain highly placed physician of the Harley Street brand could approach to a solution—in the least degree satisfactory to my own estimate of the trouble—was to suggest that the phenomena attending these attacks seemed to point to a minor form of *catalepsy* (which might be described as "pseudo-catalepsy")—in the same way that a certain form of dyspepsia which produces symptoms of heart trouble is sometimes alluded to as "pseudo-angina".

I must also premise that Gerhardi's allusion to *his* experiences as being *supernatural* "leaves me cold"! *Supernormal* they—like my own—undoubtedly are; but I see no reason why the axioms of "Cause and Effect" should be abandoned just because no lucid explanation of the phenomena is immediately available.

Well, here is an epitome of my own symptoms and sensations:—

I have been afflicted—for many years past—with a form of inertia suggestive of "sleepy-sickness", which obtrudes itself whenever I take up a book or a newspaper with the intention of enjoying the "story" or the information which either affords; no matter how interested in the context of either I may be at the outset, I cannot continue to read more than a page or two of the one or a full column of the other without suddenly passing into a deep sleep; generally dreaming vividly, but sometimes having no subsequent memory of any subconscious activity which may have supervened.

As a rule I wake up automatically, or am aroused by some demonstration that takes place in the vicinity of my unsought siesta.

In either case, my return to consciousness is instantaneous. At once I am in possession of my full faculties, without any reactions of

drowsiness or headache. But it is not always so !

From time to time—and at long intervals—I wake up, or *imagine* that *I have done so* ! I get up to fetch a book or a paper, to write a letter, or even with the intention of leaving the room. The intention is never carried into effect.

In the first or the second case I find, on returning to the chair or sofa upon which I had yielded to the seductions of a persistent " Morpheus ", that I had not *in fact moved from it,* nor have I in my hand the newspaper or other object which I had intended to fetch when, as I had imagined, I arose from the said chair or sofa upon which, to my intense amazement, I now find I am still prone and inert.

My eyes are open : I look at the clock and note the time. A club friend, or waiter, or—when at home —one of my family, comes in, looks at me and, being benignly reluctant to wake me up, passes on without comment and leaves the room.

Again I rise—or imagine that I do so—and again I *find that I have not moved an inch.* If reclining at full length on a sofa or in an armchair with my feet on another one or on a high stool, I can see my feet. I attempt to move them to the ground, and am confident that I have done so ; but no, there they are ! They have not stirred the fraction of an inch. If my feet have not been originally in a raised position, but if my hands are resting on the arms of the chair, a similar attempt to move them meets with a similar result. Now I am growing anxious ! I am determined to wake up normally, so I concentrate strenuously upon the endeavour to do so !

This mental strain is *exceedingly distressing.* At intervals I essay to repeat my endeavours to regain control over my physical powers of action ; but in vain !

Then I bethink me that if I allow myself to fall back into peaceful slumber, I shall, in due course, wake up automatically and normally. Easier " thought " than done !

Then, all of a sudden, there is some diversion : I am spoken to or there is a noise, such as the slamming of a door, and *instantaneously* I am fully awake ! I spring to my feet easily and without any trace of my erstwhile abnormal inertia, or any unpleasant reactionary or nervous sensations whatever.

Now although Gerhardi's experiences, as meticulously described in the article to which I have alluded, are infinitely more startling and far-reaching than those which I have described, I feel confident that there is a distinct connection between their respective origins, import and developments, and that mine can be regarded as *undeveloped* phenomena which, in Gerhardi's case, have provided such startling revelations.

For the moment, leaving his description of the strange bodily exaltation whereby he was able to *see himself asleep* whilst being conscious of occupying a separate and ethereal position remote therefrom, I would " ear-mark " the fact that though his imagined physical movements and my own were practically identical, Gerhardi, in the state which he emphatically states was *not a*

dream or the phantasmagoria of ordinary subconscious demonstrations, *was able to pass out of the room* where his physical "corpus" lay—or was "*pushed through*" a door (which he could not himself open) by some hidden and irresistible force. I, in *my* "pseudo-cataleptic" state (if such it can be called), *have never passed from the room* in which my abnormal slumber takes place, and, although I am able to see my feet or my legs in a cataleptic or paralytic state of complete inertia, I have never been able to gaze upon the *whole* of my body whilst in thrall of the infliction—as Gerhardi professes to have done.

Nevertheless it is possible that when I am thus temporarily "paralysed" it may be my "Aura" (or Astral Entity) which leaves the inert flesh and essays to carry out some unspoken mental desire, such as the fetching of a newspaper from a remote corner of the room.

Now if I were to find, on regaining my normal activity, an evening paper at my feet which was not there before I fell asleep, such would afford a most intriguing subject for occult speculation; for it would undoubtedly suggest that whilst I lay inert and only semi-conscious, my "Aura" had actually fetched the paper and, after bringing it to its fleshly "alter ego", had dropped it and had gazed upon the latter.

But there is no profit or satisfaction in bringing "ifs" and "ands" into such considerations as are toward. No such paper was there!

At times (but very infrequently) I have dreamed that I was looking at my own corporeal form dead or asleep; but when I awaken I never for a moment imagine that it was anything but a rather eerie dream; moreover, I recall that during its unfolding I was quite unaware that the occurrence denoted anything out of the ordinary so that all the time I felt quite complacent.

The very unpleasant habit (if "habit" it be, and not some inherent physical or cerebral weakness) of unwillingly and unwittingly falling asleep whilst reading or writing is, evidently, hereditary, for my father was similarly afflicted; which fact provided his loving relations, singly and collectively, with food for unseemly mirth. An evening came when he *failed to awaken*, and our mirth was drowned in tears.

Gerhardi says that so positive is he that these visitations, which he has suffered on more than one occasion, are not dreams or anything like dreams that "If the whole world united in telling me that it *was* a dream, I would remain unconvinced!" This is a declaration of hidebound certitude (which I can readily understand and endorse) in connection with my own abnormal obsessions; though the latter are far less amazing and mystifying in their details than are his.

There is no question of my experiences in this direction being prompted by reading Gerhardi's amazing screed, for the simple but all-sufficient reason that they "came upon" me, and were duly registered, long *before his article appeared*. In fact, although I am unable to recall the exact date of the first occasion of their occurrence, it must have

been when I was in my "thirties"; nor can I, with any approximate accuracy, even guess at the spaces of time which elapsed between attacks. I only know that such were exceedingly irregular, a hiatus of several years often intervening in some cases; whereas, in others, the recurrences followed comparatively closely upon each other's elusive trail.

By the end of 1933 I had had only one such during that year, and that was in August; since then, I have been immune; but I am not inclined to indulge in the traditional triumphant requiem of assuming Brer Fox's demise "with a whoop" before I am quit of the "arboreus shades" of the covert! (Pray pardon the sporting metaphor of a one-time M.F.H.)

Like myself, Gerhardi was greatly struck by Gerald Heard's most interesting article in the same paper (the fifth of a series entitled "What Happens When You Die") which had been published during the foregoing September.

The account of how the "aura" of dying creatures of various grades of evolutionary processes was unexpectedly revealed by photography—at the moment when the last "electron" to leave the cell to which it had been attached "exploded", annotating the complete severance of "Life" (Soul) and the exact fraction of a moment when Death was thus fully established, though to all appearances it had taken place an inestimable but infinitesimal space of time prior to such "explosion"—reveals an amazing advance in scientific, psychological and physical investigation.

It will be remembered by all who have read Gerald Heard's enthralling revelations (and those who have *not* most certainly should lose no time in remedying the omission) that quite unexpectedly (to be exact, in 14 cases out of 50), contemporaneously with the "explosion" of the said electron there appeared in the misty vacuum, which had been purposely prepared, a nebulous, yet easily recognisable simulacrum or aura of the dead body that lay immediately beneath it, from which the last spark of life had just departed.

The natural and inevitable conclusion was therefore arrived at that "an astral body" or "Aura" pertains to all living creatures which death releases from their mortal coils and, incidentally, that it is due to the Law of Cause and Effect and therefore, though supernormal, not supernatural.

HARDING DE FONBLANQUE COX

STUDIES IN SHELLEY

I.—HIS BACKGROUND

[This is the first of a series of three articles by **Miss Katherine Merrill**, a teacher by profession and a citizen of the United States, on Shelley, "poet, prophet and philosopher". In it she draws the picture of the influences at work upon Shelley and the age he lived in—influences both outer and inner. The latter Miss Merrill examines in the light of Theosophy, of which she is a student. The second article deals with Shelley's poetry and the third considers his prose.—EDS.]

"The World is my country. To do good is my religion", declared Thomas Paine, fearless presenter of the Rights of Man. A large group of men during the half century around the crucial year of 1775 held shares in Paine's country and religion. Of this group the English poet Shelley was an eager disciple and honorable member. With the others, too, a victim. Decried and almost exiled legally from his family and birth-land, he proved the universality of his nature through the breadth and depth of his work. Says a perceptive writer * :—

> The world he created was not for him alone, but for the whole human race. The banquet of beauty was spread that all men, like a band of brothers, might participate...For his subjectivity was purely social; in this, as in much else, Shelley was a pure Platonist....He took the whole of humanity into his embrace. He was humanity-intoxicated. His gospel of love knew no difference of race, creed or talent.

Plato was an Initiate into the Mysteries of Greece, which were expressions of the ancient Wisdom-Religion of India; and he taught many of the ideas that again prevailed in the Western world a century and a half ago—prevailed in a measure because of the very study of Plato himself. Indeed, the writer of the comment just cited unconsciously placed Shelley in the van of the late eighteenth-century section of the great world-movement known as Theosophical. Little acquainted with his fellow-travellers on that path, pathetically ignorant of his and their relation to Those behind the scene, and utterly unaware of the real nature and positive operation of the Influence constantly shed upon men, Shelley was, nevertheless, able to "bear his part, while the one Spirit's plastic stress sweeps through the dull dense world, compelling there all new successions (him as others) to the forms they wear". (Shelley, *Adonais*, Stanza XLIII.

This brief passage, although Shelley did not know it, tells the whole story of evolution as taught by Theosophy—each individual carrying his own share, while the great unitive unfolding Power moulds the whole of Nature through countless forms and the experiences which these bring into harmony with Itself.

To view Shelley in the light of the Esoteric Philosophy it is necessary to glean what few hints one may of the process in

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* P. M. BUCK, *Social Forces in Modern Literature*, pp. 219, 243.

him of reincarnation. Not to recall that his period was part of the fifteen-hundred-year-cycle of reappearance for old Greeks, Platonists and Neo-Platonists, is to fail to see the real nature of the collective higher human spirit of the time. And to reject this element of interpretation for the individual man might leave one blind to the original expression in Shelley himself of the important ideas set forth by various European philosophers, especially the French and the English, just preceding him. For even a study of his school period, though to be found only in fragmentary records, shows that he was not to be merely a borrower of the prevalent philosophy. Rather, it is judicious and indeed unavoidable to account for the exalted fervour and power of his production—to account, for example, for the noteworthy passage just quoted from *Adonais*—by recognizing that he was an additional and largely an independent expounder of what came to him, not only through the thinkers just before him, but also through egoic transmission from his own past.

True, indeed, Shelley did not have an intelligent familiarity with reincarnation as a doctrine, yet even in boyhood he was deeply concerned with the two aspects of it he could know about. The Before Birth and the After Death even then beat upon his heart, driving him to pursue "hopes of high talk with the departed dead". And preëxistence was a concept he met with in Plato as well as in Wordsworth. The mere title of Wordsworth's *Intimations of Immortality from the Recollections of Early Childhood*, falling like a bright star into the darkness of usual English thought, was enough to make Shelley meditate on his own experience and its mysteries. Such puzzled notions as he could reach, such brooding efforts, and his reading of Plato, led to a remarkable incident in his later youth at Oxford. Meeting a young mother with her infant, he suddenly cried :

"Will your baby tell us anything about preëxistence, madam?"

"He cannot speak", said the mother seriously.

"...but, surely, the babe can speak if he will. He cannot have forgotten entirely the use of speech in so short a time..." Shelley sighed deeply. "How provokingly close are these new-born babes!...but it is none the less certain, notwithstanding the cunning attempts to conceal the truth, that all knowledge is reminiscence."

"We call *reminiscence* the *memory of the soul*", says H. P. Blavatsky.

And it is *this* memory which gives the assurance to almost every human being, whether he understands it or not, of his having lived before and having to live again.

Reincarnation accounts also, of course, for many of the otherwise hardly explainable weaknesses in Shelley's nature and follies in his outward life. Biographers patiently record these without any real perception of their bearing. A student of the Wisdom-Religion recognizes them as the working of *skandhaic* remains, or karmic results of previous action, and yet he may not find them of special interest; because too extraordinary proofs are given by this Ego of its past victories and spiritual attainments. The egoic

overflow of these achievements into the activities of the known incarnation is perceived by theosophic receptivity as a fact, though common sense prevents more than a bare statement of it. Yet, even so, it is an electric torch on the road of the commentator, explaining several further facts; namely, that this poet's work—which was ended by death when he was only thirty years old—manifests very wide experience in life and soul; that, therefore, it has a corresponding range of philosophic and historic values; and, further, that it nevertheless centres all in a single supreme humanitarian ideal. A variety of noble earth-lives gives such a result. Nothing else can.

Though the inner egoic breadth can be only dimly sensed, the outer range, that of his known life, may be more fully traced. It is possible to state some of these philosophic and historic values—to indicate partly what in the immediate past reached a literary focus in the output of Shelley.

The eighteenth century in Europe was a time of decaying idols and reappearing ideals. The social standards and the political methods of the Bourbon monarchs dominated Europe in general, though England remained measurably free from them. The French monarchical tastes and policies contained, through their inherent selfishness, the germs of a rapid down-growth in France into dissolution of the existing order. The great idol called the Divine Right of Kings began to be condemned early in the century and throughout its middle years was openly repudiated by social philosophers. Repudiation of divine rights in monarchy was accompanied by attacks on many other firmly established idols in both church and state. The mind of the mid-century was full of political and religious agitation. Destructive and creative processes went on together. Thought was indeed struggling to be free; and in such conditions the Theosophical Movement is ever active and effective. With it are necessarily associated its great Inspirers and Guardians, the Adepts of the East.

At that time, the Adept most active and important in the West was known in his personality as the Comte de St. Germain. He was prominent both as a scientist and a statesman. He and a few associate Adepts worked among rulers and upper classes in several countries and received much attention; but the general mind was too fast shut to permit an effective transfer of influence from the Great Lodge except to individuals. The aim of the Adepts was twofold—to instil into the rising political and religious thought the feeling and purpose of Brotherhood; to make the world wiser and happier; and to guide the awakening scientific intellect to reach beyond the material envelope of Nature into the realms, untouched by science, of the astral-physical, the psychic and the spiritual. Statements published by H. P. Blavatsky give proof of both these aims. Also, St. Germain "prophesied before" the French Kings and the Queen.

What could those prophesies have concerned except the coming of the now-called French Revolution?

What in general could have been the messages of such an Adept to the rulers and chiefs of the Western world except pleas for more sane, broad, humane efforts and methods in every department of life? And in later times, when pleas and inspiration had proved largely ineffective, what could his messages have become but statements and warnings of the certain devastation, unless they, rulers and chiefs, quickly dropped their policies of royal and national selfishness, transformed their motives by genuine untheoretical recognition of the value of every human being—unless they learned more of the true inner nature of man, and perceived their own duties as servitors of all mankind. In America, indeed, under the leadership of several great statesmen, the Adept impulsions met with some worthy response in the formation of the Republic of the United States. But in Europe not one of those rulers directly appealed to by the Adepts proved capable of following in a large way the guidance offered, and the European world reeled on into its debauch of destruction and anarchy.

Yet, even there, the Influence of the Great Lodge could not be wasted. It bore a rich harvest in the works of some metaphysical philosophers and also of several French and English writers concerned with important practical questions of government, religion and politics. The leaders of thought in France were the well-known three—Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau. These three men were all materialists, yet they were all ardent liberals and philanthropists, all denouncers of governmental tyranny and especially of religious intolerance, bigotry and fanaticism. Rousseau, like the others, applied in many directions his purpose "to set all the powers of his soul to smash the fetters of opinion". Diderot exclaimed :—

> The tyranny of the priest and the monarch is written all over the history of the world. Religious enthusiasm drives men mad with hatred and can do no good to morals...The Christian God, as developed by theologians, is a fiend...the terrible ravages religion has caused and will cause...the most violent (inter) national hatreds...in the same country divisions rarely suppressed without the shedding of blood...in society and the family the most lasting hatreds.

Voltaire made his fight concrete and dramatic. For example, in a supposed vision a spirit, showing him vast heaps of human remains, thus answers his wonder :—

> "These are the bones of the Christians who have cut one another's throats over metaphysical disputes. They are divided into several mounds of four centuries each. A single mound would have reached way up to heaven."
>
> "What!", I cried, "brothers have treated their brothers thus,—and I have the misfortune to belong to this brotherhood!"
>
> "Here", said the spirit, "are the remains of twelve million Americans killed in their native land because they had not been baptised."

In England also there were recipients of influence from Adepts. Chief among these was Thomas Paine. Paine may have been aided by the French writings, but he had within himself and his national thought-inheritance vigorous impulses of liberalism, and needed little more to lift him into openness to the Adepts' influence. He found his

place of action among the English Colonies in America, and made there his great contribution to liberty. It is well to observe a few instances of Paine's political sanity. In the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* he states :—

> Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights... these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty...The law ought to prohibit only actions hurtful to society....No man ought to be molested on account of his opinions, not even... his religious opinions, provided his avowal of them does not disturb the public order established by the law.

Paine's writings and his political services are placed by theosophists among the results of the eighteenth-century activity of the Great Lodge.

Another important English expression of liberal thought was Godwin's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Justice*. Godwin was a lesser soul than Paine, yet he too was altruistic enough to receive from the same Source, and he gave valuable service. His book was largely a compendium of previous English and French radical philosophy. It became to younger men a Living Voice. On Shelley, particularly, it was influential. To Godwin, "monarchy is a species of government unavoidably corrupt". Perfectibility of the race was one of his tenets ; that if men will raise their acts above injustice and impropriety to others, vice will disappear ; all men will follow the principles of pure reason, seeing for themselves that violence is deplorable, and that calm discussion is the only means necessary to bring desired changes.

Contemporary with these thinkers in France and England, there was also a notable group of philosophers in Germany. They were not concerned with practical government, but rather with lofty metaphysics, including the system of Plotinus and other neo-Platonists. This revival, too, was an effect of Adept influence collateral with the French and English politico-religious philosophy. Among Englishmen, Coleridge particularly was akin to these men ; and he did much, especially through talk, to spread the influence of the German idealists. Shelley may have owed to this reworking of Platonism more than has been realized.

Much indeed has been said about Shelley's debt in the way of subject-matter, especially to Godwin. It is undeniable that he was a borrower—from many sources, in fact ; but not by any means because his own cruse was empty of oil. Rather, he knew intuitively the value of using the light of his predecessors. Besides, he did not allow his borrowed lamps to grow dim through lack of polishing. The debt to Godwin's book was indeed great, yet in his use of it Shelley added as much as he took. Nor must one fail to see that his most characteristic and fruitful topics, namely, the natural liberty of man, the natural freedom from injustice, the necessary struggle to regain this natural inherent right, and man's final victory in that struggle—these, too, found an unusual development even in his early boyhood. As a child of ten at his first boarding-school, the prevalence of fagging aroused in Shelley a strong

instinctive outflaming opposition. This boyish form of domineering and brutality fired him to be what he always remained—an ardent defender of all who underwent persecution. He grew to feel himself a sensitive register of the sufferings of others. "Me—who am as a nerve o'er which do creep the else unfelt oppressions of this earth", he exclaimed through a character in *Julian and Maddalo*. And in the *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty*, VI, he showed that while still a child he had risen from an experience of school torture to an exalted dedication of himself to the service of "some unseen Power", which is the "Spirit of Beauty", of "Love, Hope", an "awful Loveliness".

These passages, expressive of his early life, give ample evidence, if any is needed, of his inherent independence in consciousness throughout his lifelong battle for liberty. Even when, as a schoolboy, he first came across Godwin's *Political Justice*, he was not finding a guidebook so much as a confirmation. His boy's philosophizing was suddenly confronted, as it were, by phases of itself in maturity. Moreover, though then accepting the book without noticing its flaws, Shelley promptly and greatly modified within himself its doctrines. For into the cool dispassion and entire dependence on reason characteristic of Godwin, Shelley poured his own fiery enthusiasm and exalted faith. To this he quickly added a profound recognition of Love as the chief redemptive power. In later youth, too, he proved his independence of spirit by publicly challenging the justice of the court sentence against the printer of Paine's *Age of Reason;* and himself distributed as far as he could Paine's *Declaration of the Rights of Man.* At that same time he was working in Ireland for Irish freedom. All this was done against rather than with the advice of Godwin and other friends. The only fair conclusion seems to be that his devotion to liberty and his persistent revolt against tyranny in government and religion were intuitive and self-born in Shelley's own nature. He was far less a disciple than a co-worker, a colleague and an ardent practitioner. Godwin codified the French philosophy. Shelley enacted it in daily life and embodied it in his poetry.

Can a theosophist, willing to see the working of higher natural laws, accustomed to seek causes behind effects, contemplate the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the West and yet reject the thought that the Adepts found and used all these men as natural though partially obstructed channels for Their impartations of Wisdom and Compassion to the World? All that the West could then bear—far more than it has yet assimilated—was actually given it by those eighteenth-century Adepts and their spokesmen.

KATHERINE MERRILL

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIAN LOGICIANS

A STUDY IN INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHIZING *

It is one of the merits of Professor Chatterjee's admirable book that he enriches his account of the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge with continuous references to parallel systems in Western philosophy. It may, then, be helpful if, instead of describing his book in detail, since it is largely concerned with technical problems of interest only to professional philosophers, I say something about the characteristic differences between Indian and modern Western philosophies which his argument continually throws into relief.

Indian philosophy belongs traditionally to what I should call the heroic school of philosophizing. Affirming the primacy of mind or spirit in the universe, it affirms, too, that the problems of knowledge and existence can be successfully tackled by the unaided activities of mind and intuition, by reflection, meditation, and speculation. The typical Indian philosopher encloses himself in his study—or should I say his monastery, or even his temple?—reflects upon the universe and, setting his speculative reason to work, proceeds to prove what the universe must of necessity be. He does not at any point—I am summarizing here a familiar Western criticism of the heroic method—feel under an obligation to check the results of his reasoning by taking a look at the universe and seeing what it demonstrably is; he does not, that is to say, make it his business to supplement and verify his conclusions by the methods of science. When what he has proved that the universe must of necessity be is at variance with what sense observation and scientific experiment show that it demonstrably is, his general conclusion seems to have been, so much the worse for sense observation and science!

Proceeding along these lines Indian philosophers have with impressive unanimity reached certain common and distinctive conclusions. The universe, they have affirmed, is fundamentally mind or spirit. Reality is a unity; it has, that is to say, the characteristics of a system rather than of an aggregate, and the components of that system are not independent entities existing each in isolation from the rest, but expressions of a fundamental reality which is immanent in them. The human soul is such an expression, and a particularly direct one, being in its fundamental nature continuous with the reality of the universe which informs it. Thus Indian philosophies are typically idealist and monist.

Against this way of thinking the modern West brings certain important criticisms. Indian systems, Western thinkers have affirmed, are in origin nothing but the organized expres-

* *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge.* By S. C. CHATTERJEE. (University of Calcutta.)

sions of wish fulfilments : the mind prescribes to the universe what it must be instead of taking the trouble to find out by observation and experiment what it is, and it does this because what it demonstrably is, a collection without uniformity and a sequence without purpose, is intolerable to the spirit of man demanding comfort and reassurance in the light of his obvious insignificance in an alien universe. Hence it is no accident that the fundamental nature of things, as Indian philosophers conceive it, should be altogether more congenial than the obvious facts ; should be more friendly to our aspirations and more conformable to our wishes, and enshrine at the heart of things a principle which is akin to the human. Indian philosophies, in short, are rationalizations of our wishes rather than products of our reason. As Professor Chatterjee puts it, " the charge is often heard against Indian philosophy that its theories are not based on logical reasoning but on religious authority and, therefore, they are dogmatic rather than critical ".

Modern Western philosophies, on the other hand, have been pluralistic in metaphysics and logical in method. They have been willing to take their problems one by one and to suggest tentative solutions of isolated questions ; they have not, that is to say, sought to erect systems and they have not contended that their conclusions were absolute. It is not necessary, they would affirm, to have a complete theory of the universe in order to reach fruitful results in regard to particular parts of it ; for if the universe is neither a unity nor a system, there *is* no complete theory of it. A further characteristic of modern Western philosophy is the elaboration of a new technique, the technique of analysis followed by mathematical logic. In the light of this technique many of the problems traditionally studied by philosophers, such as, for example, those relating to the nature of being, the continuity of the self and the categories of Identity and Diversity, are seen to be meaningless, and the conclusions which the heroic schools have reached in regard to them nonsensical.

Now the significance of the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge as expounded by Professor Chatterjee lies in its implied refutation of these charges. The Nyāya Theory is realist and not idealist. It 'holds' that the mind is in direct contact with an external world, and that " knowledge is the presentation of an object as what it really is ". It asserts with the Western realists the correspondence theory of truth according to which " the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence to real facts ", and it anticipates Western pragmatists by its assertion that " the test of truth lies in its pragmatic value ", that is, in the usefulness of beliefs which are " true " regarded as aids to practical living. So far from taking consciousness to be a necessary and fundamental characteristic of all that is, it holds that even the individual soul " is not essentially conscious, but has the quality of consciousness when it comes into relation with external objects through the senses ". Finally, it has perfected an elaborate logical technique in the course of the application of which many of the

problems which to-day concern Western philosophers, for example those raised by the denotation of words, are fruitfully discussed, and many of the conclusions of the contemporary school of Logical Positivism anticipated.

The significance of all this lies, I say, in its rebuttal of the charge that Indian philosophy is always moral and religious rather than logical and critical, an expression of unconscious wishes rather than a conclusion of reason. As Professor Chatterjee justly contends, "the Nyāya applies the method of logical criticism to solve the problems of life and reality. It is by means of a sound logic that it tries to ascertain the truth and defend it against hostile criticism. Many of the contributions of this logic are of great value even at the present day."

Professor Chatterjee's book, which is full, thorough and clear, is a model of philosophical writing and can be confidently recommended to those who wish to acquaint themselves with the doctrines of this important Indian school. There is, however, one matter which rather puzzles me. On the last page but one Professor Chatterjee, who throughout the book has scrupulously kept his own beliefs in the background, tells us what they are. 'They are uncompromisingly idealist. He believes in a transcendent self and in the fundamental reality of knowledge; he holds, that is to say, that the distinctions between mind and body, life and matter, are distinctions made within the concrete whole of knowledge which transcends them. He believes also that the world is a system..... Here, one would have said, is a good Hegelian, and so, I make no doubt, he is. Why, then, does he devote so much learning to the exposition of the tenets of a school of philosophy which must appear to him to be fundamentally mistaken? Is not this, from his point of view, a waste of the riches of scholarship?

C. E. M. JOAD

MOSES THE EGYPTIAN

Any work by the eminent Austrian exponent of psychology, Sigmund Freud, must inevitably cause a sensation. The theories which he has propounded are still the basis for violent controversy among rival schools of thought, and anything from his pen must be awaited with interest by supporters and opponents alike. His latest work *Moses and Monotheism** has already been acclaimed by reviewers as startling and novel. Professor Freud has developed the theory that the Hebrew patriarch Moses was not a Jew but an Egyptian who led the Jews out of Egypt and imposed a new monotheistic religion on them, that the Jews ultimately rebelled against his rule and reverting to a Canaanitish Baal-worship killed Moses. From this, Freud goes on to develop a general theory of monotheism which links up with the conclusions he drew twenty-five years ago in *Totem and Taboo*.

The various implications of the theory are too far-reaching to be treated in the scope of a short article. The question

* *Moses and Monotheism*. Published by the Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 8*s*. 6*d*.

problems which to-day concern Western philosophers, for example those raised by the denotation of words, are fruitfully discussed, and many of the conclusions of the contemporary school of Logical Positivism anticipated.

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C. E. M. JOAD

MOSES THE EGYPTIAN

Any work by the eminent Austrian exponent of psychology, Sigmund Freud, must inevitably cause a sensation. The theories which he has propounded are still the basis for violent controversy among rival schools of thought, and anything from his pen must be awaited with interest by supporters and opponents alike. His latest work *Moses and Monotheism** has already been acclaimed by reviewers as startling and novel. Professor Freud has developed the theory that the Hebrew patriarch Moses was not a Jew but an Egyptian who led the Jews out of Egypt and imposed a new monotheistic religion on them, that the Jews ultimately rebelled against his rule and reverting to a Canaanitish Baal-worship killed Moses. From this, Freud goes on to develop a general theory of monotheism which links up with the conclusions he drew twenty-five years ago in *Totem and Taboo*.

The various implications of the theory are too far-reaching to be treated in the scope of a short article. The question

* *Moses and Monotheism*. Published by the Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 8*s*. 6*d*.

with which we wish to deal here is that of Moses' origin, and we shall seek to show that the theory put forward by Professor Freud is not after all so novel and revolutionary. Students of Theosophy will be aware that Madame Blavatsky accepted the fact of Moses' Egyptian origin and that she made many references to it in her various works. Professor Freud maintains a complete silence concerning this authority, which is surprising in view of the fact that both *The Secret Doctrine* and *Isis Unveiled* contain much corroborating evidence for several of his theories. On the other hand there are several important questions over which Madame Blavatsky differs considerably from the theories held by Freud. It will therefore prove valuable to consider the arguments contained in *Moses and Monotheism* in the light of certain passages from the writings of H. P. Blavatsky.

It is generally accepted that the account of the Exodus as contained in the Hexateuch—that is, the five books of Moses together with the book of Joshua —was not written until at least several hundred years later. Some scholars consider that the first version was composed in the time of King David. Madame Blavatsky attributes the writing of the account to the prophet Ezra. Whatever the actual date may be, it is evident that in the period which elapsed before the Hexateuch was completed the original facts of the Exodus must have been overlaid and obscured by different traditions and that the final account must have been composed as much to conform with the Jewish religion as it then existed as to preserve the original story. There is a profound dualism running through the Hexateuch which bears witness to two divergent forces in the early history of the Hebrew religion. Professor Freud's theory is an attempt to account for the early monotheism which was taught by Moses and which later re-emerged as the principal foundation of the Jewish faith. It is necessary to keep in mind this relatively late compilation of the Hexateuch when considering the question of the significance of Moses.

Very briefly Freud's theory is developed as follows. The name Moses is Egyptian in origin, 'mose' being simply the Egyptian for 'child' and being frequently used as an abbreviation for longer names of which it formed a part. This fact has been recognized by several historians, who have, however, left the matter there. Freud follows up this point by examining the story of the birth of Moses. He points out that around all great figures in remote ages myths have been woven. The story of Moses bears a certain resemblance to the myths surrounding other semi-legendary figures such as Romulus, but it differs in one important detail. Whereas it is a common feature of many myths for the hero to be born the son of a royal house but for various reasons to be cast out at birth, saved by some humble person and brought up in lowly surroundings, only to come into his own later, Moses reverses the usual process. The Biblical account describes him as a son of a Jewish family, who is brought up by Pharaoh's daughter as her own child. Instead of descending, Moses ascends in the social scale. Freud argues that this divergence from the usual form of myth, which is inexplicable if Moses was a Jew, can readily be understood if he was an Egyptian. The Jews would naturally seek to transform the great leader of the Exodus into one of their own race, and to do this they would have to give some cogent reason to account for his upbringing in the family of the Pharaoh. Hence the story of the ark in the bulrushes.

But if Moses was an Egyptian of royal or at least noble birth, why should he place himself at the head of an alien race and lead them out of Egypt, at the same time imposing a strict form of monotheism upon them? Freud holds that Moses was a follower of the Pharaoh Ikhnaton who established a new religion in Egypt in the form of a strict monotheism, and that when, after the death of the king, a reaction set in, and the new religion was swept away,

Moses tried to preserve the teachings of that religion by allying himself with a foreign people and imposing his religion upon them. He further suggests that this Moses and the Moses of Midian are two separate personalities. The Moses of Midian is the priest of the God Jahve, whom Freud believes to have been a volcano god. The two traditions were combined later, when, according to Freud, a compromise was reached between the exponents of the Jahve religion and those who after the murder of the Egyptian Moses had remained faithful to his religion. The outcome of this compromise was that the god of the Egyptian Moses gradually supplanted Jahve and ultimately became the supreme deity of the Jewish race.

Let us now turn to the evidence furnished by Madame Blavatsky. She leaves no doubt that Moses was an Egyptian by birth. She says that he is mentioned by several old historians as an Egyptian priest (*Isis Unveiled*, I, 555), while in another part of the same work the following significant passage occurs: " .... and if this ex-Egyptian priest must, from theological necessity, be transformed into a Hebrew patriarch, we must insist that the Jewish nation was lifted with that smiling infant out of the bulrushes of Lake Moeris." (II, 216) Further proof that Madame Blavatsky was convinced of the Egyptian origin of Moses will be forthcoming when we consider her other teachings with regard to the leader of the Exodus. As far as the story of Moses' birth and his exposure in the bulrushes is concerned, Madame Blavatsky considers that it is influenced by the story of the Babylonian Sargon. Except for the royal birth of Sargon, the form of the two stories is very similar. Sargon also is placed in an ark of rushes in the river. She deduces that the Moses story was composed by Ezra after the Captivity in Babylon, where he had learnt the myth of Sargon.

We now come to the most important part of Madame Blavatsky's teaching regarding Moses. According to her, Moses was an Initiate of the Esoteric Wisdom of the Egyptians. She mentions him in several places as "learned in the Esoteric Wisdom of Egypt". This fact was admitted in the Acts of the Apostles, while an historian of the standing of Breasted has accepted it without drawing the significant conclusions that can be deduced. We learn from *The Theosophical Glossary* and from a passage in *Isis Unveiled* (I. 25) that Moses learned his wisdom from Batria, the wife of Pharaoh, who was an Initiate herself, and to whom the Jews thus "owe the possession of their prophet".

Now what significance attaches to this teaching? First, if Moses was an Initiate, we have an additional proof of his Egyptian birth. "Did the idea never strike the reader of the *Bible* that an alien born and brought up in a foreign country *could not* and *would not* possibly have been admitted—we will not say to the final initiation, the grandest mystery of all, but even to share the knowledge of the minor priesthood, those who belonged to the *lesser* mysteries?" (*Isis Unveiled*, I. 556)

The second point we have to consider is how far the religion of Ikhnaton can be identified with the Esoteric Wisdom.

Freud points out that Ikhnaton never denied his accession to the Sun Cult of On (Heliopolis). In the two hymns to Aton which are preserved on rock inscriptions, the sun is praised as the creator and preserver of all living things. But Ikhnaton worshipped the sun not as a material object but as a manifestation of Divine Being. This is the theory held by such eminent authorities as Breasted and Erman. Madame Blavatsky tells us (*Isis Unveiled*, II, 305) that Moses "was initiated at Heliopolis, where he was educated". Moreover, she records that Diodorus mentions that the God of Moses was Iao; Iao, she explains, is the name "adopted from the highest antiquity by all who participated in the esoteric knowledge of the priests" and must be distinguished from "his phonetic counterparts, whom we find treated with so little reverence by the Ophites and other Gnostics". (*Isis Unveiled*, II, 301)

It may be equated with Iacchos (Bacchus) of the Greek Mysteries and with Y-ha-ho the sacred Egyptian word which signified "the one eternal and concealed deity" in nature and man (See *Glossary* under Yâho). Now all these names are closely bound up with the Sun. We may conjecture how far the God of Ikhnaton, as interpreted by Freud, can be identified with Iao of the Mysteries. Assuming for the moment that such an identification is possible and bearing in mind that Ikhnaton was branded as a heretic by the Egyptians after his death, it is interesting to observe the following passage from *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 352):—

> When the Theosophists and Occultists say that God is no BEING, for IT is nothing, *No-Thing*, they are more reverential and religiously respectful to the Deity than those who call God a HE, and thus make of Him a gigantic MALE.

Was it this that the Egyptians failed to perceive in the religion of Ikhnaton?

There is one further aspect of Madame Blavatsky's teaching with regard to Moses which should be considered with care, and that is her interpretation of the incident of Midian. The Biblical account describes how Moses fled into Midian and married Zipporah, the daughter of the Midian priest; Freud, it will be remembered, holds that this Moses is a distinct and separate person from the Moses of the Exodus. Madame Blavatsky interprets the incident as an allegory connected with Moses' initiation. The elders of Midian were known in the Bible as great soothsayers and diviners. The priest of Midian of the Biblical account is thus interpreted as the Initiator of Moses, the Egyptian pupil.

> The student must be aware that Jethro is called the "father-in-law" of Moses; not because Moses was really married to one of his seven daughters. Moses was an Initiate, ... and as such an ascetic, a nazar, and could never be married. It is an allegory like everything else. Zipporah (the shining) is one of the personified Occult Sciences given by Revel-Jethro, the Midian priest Initiator, to Moses .... The "well" by which Moses sat down in his flight from the Pharaoh symbolizes the "well of Knowledge". (*The Secret Doctrine*, II, 465)

The "well" had a deep significance in the various Mysteries, while the mystic number seven is found in the allegory of Moses in the seven daughters of the priest, who represent the seven occult powers.

The present article does not claim to do more than touch on the fringe of the various significant implications that are contained in these teachings. Further it will be noted that the question of chronology has been completely ignored. So much controversy still rages over the possible date of the Exodus that to introduce the question would have been merely to confuse the main issue, which is simply whether Moses was an Egyptian. It has been demonstrated here how two great thinkers, varying considerably in their approach and methods, have, whatever their differences, reached the same main conclusion.

B. J. SAMUEL

The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyid Din-Ibnul 'Arabī. By A. E. AFFIFI. (Cambridge University Press. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

With the teaching of Ibn al-'Arabī, known as Al-Shaykh al-Akbar—the Grand Master of Ṣūfism—Islamic mysticism, at first a purely religious movement, developed into a pantheistic system of philosophy. Born at Murcia in Spain in A.D. 1164, Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabī went as a child to Seville, then the centre of Spanish Ṣūfism. In 1201 he travelled to the East, visiting Egypt, Palestine and Arabia, and finally settled at Damascus, where he died in A.D. 1240.

Ibn al-'Arabī was a prolific writer, and the importance and value of his work has long been realized by Orientalists, but no comprehensive account of his mystical philosophy has been produced until now. Dr. Affifi's work is therefore most welcome.

Ibn al-'Arabī teaches that there is only One Reality in existence, which may be regarded either as the Essence of all phenomena or as the phenomena manifesting that Essence. Reality and Appearance, the One and the Many, are only names for two aspects of the Ultimate Reality—God, Who is both transcendent and immanent. God, he holds, does not create out of non-existence; "creation" means the manifestation of an already existent substance. "The universe is eternal, infinite, and everlasting, because it is the outward expression of the eternal, infinite and everlasting One." The One Reality may be regarded as without attributes, Absolute and Unmanifested, or as God in action, manifested in the universe, Oneness in multiplicity. "The world of Nature", he writes, "consists of many forms in One mirror: nay, One form in diverse mirrors." As all things, then, are attributes of the One, there is no real difference between God and the universe, between the Creator and His creatures.

With his pantheistic monism, Ibn al-'Arabī combines a doctrine of the Perfect Man[1], who combines in himself the creative and creaturely attributes of the One and is represented individually by the prophets and saints, who are "gnostics"—a doctrine which is derived from Neo-Platonism, Manichæism, Gnostic and Christian teaching.

The human soul, Ibn al-'Arabī holds, includes the animal soul and the "rational" soul, which is pure spirit. This latter is essentially identical with Universal Soul but is a "particularisation" of it. Through knowledge of itself the soul comes to know its relation to God and can raise itself again to Universal Soul, but this, as the author makes clear, is not to "become" one with God—the mystic is already one with the Divine—but to *realise* its oneness. The mystical "union" with God, to Ibn al-'Arabī, means a state in which an already existent union is being realised: it is the passing away of the self, when the perfect mystic "recognises both Essence and 'form', but realises their essential unity and the absolute non-existence of the form".

Ibn al-'Arabī is deeply interested in the question of determination and free-will. Man is responsible in the sense that his actions come from himself, whether good or evil—"so let him praise none but himself and blame none but himself"—but these are determined by his own nature and the laws which govern it. Human beings have, therefore, no real choice; they *must* choose what is determined by their own necessary laws.

All evil, in Ibn al-'Arabī's view, is relative; what we call evil is subjective, not objective; all that really exists is good, since all things are manifestations of the Good.

Love finds a predominant place in Ibn al-'Arabī's teaching, for it is Love which underlies all the manifestations of the Divine Reality. The cause of "creation" was the desire of Divine Love to be manifested, and it is love which makes the mystic seek to realize

1. Cf. my *al-Jīlī*, The Apostle of Modern Thought (THE ARYAN PATH, *December*, 1931) where the doctrine of the Perfect Man is more fully discussed.

his essential unity with the Beloved. Love is the cause of the self-manifestation of the One in the many, and it is also the cause of the return of the many to the One—"Love is the working principle in all manifestations of the One, from the highest to the lowest. Through Love, the Whole is bound together and through it the object of creation is realized."

With these words Dr. Affifi closes his book. He is concerned mainly with the principle, but it is to be noted how Ibn al-'Arabī carried this principle into his contacts with his fellowmen. He was a universalist, tolerant of all forms of religion. "I follow the religion of Love", he said, "and wherever Love's camels lead, there is my religion and my faith." Man must live at peace with his fellows, it was not for him to destroy the Divine image, nor to praise or blame actions determined by necessary law. Charity towards, fellowship with others was the first duty of the mystic, for love to man, as well as God, was, in Ibn al-Arabī's opinion, the highest form of worship.

In dealing with Ibn al-'Arabī's sources, Dr. Affifi perhaps lays too little emphasis on his debt to the Sūfī mystics who preceded him, *e.g.*, much of his psychology and epistemology is derived directly from al-Ghazālī. But all students of mysticism will be grateful to the learned author for this clear exposition of a complicated subject and to his publishers for a book most beautifully produced.

MARGARET SMITH

The Kings of Min Zamān. By C. R. ASHBEE. (Oxford University Press. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

In the preface to this book, Mr. Ashbee tells us that "The Englishman and the Moslem who looked beneath the surface found themselves at one, and that they were at work, subconsciously, at a synthesis of Christianity and Islam." As to the kings of Long-ago (Min Zamān), Mr. Ashbee says :—"In the Christian-Moslem synthesis there were plenty to choose from." He mentions the Sultān-al-Kāmil and Akbar, then adds : "Some of our Kings indeed were not even of Min Zamān ; but we knew they would become so." He instances Kitchener, Cromer, Milner and Allenby.

This book is a dialogue in verse between the author, "having returned from Palestine", and Mahmoud, "having returned from England", and presumably represents an attempt at that synthesis referred to in the preface.

Whether or not Mr. Ashbee would have discovered what he had to say with greater precision if he had written in prose is an open question. What seems certain, however, is that he mars the effects he wishes to create by the frequent use of such colloquialisms as "Love wins through"—"That English girl of whom you heard me tell"—and "A penny for your thoughts".

The following passage not only enshrines the author's dominant theme, but also represents the higher level of his verse :

> It is your code ; let no man rob you of its gold,
> Or any Westerner filch its beauty from you.
> The Kings of Min Zaman are his and yours.
> While as for me and you—
> Both humanists—let us accept as true
> Such truths as Bolshevism
> Or any other shifting faith contains,
> But hold a golden mean, of one thing sure ;
> To a wise man whether in life or death
> No ill can come.

Instances of Mr. Ashbee's verse on a lower level could also be given, as for example some stanzas from the section entitled "The Brief Sunset Passes", but it seems best not to quote them.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Twenty Jātaka Tales. By NOOR INAYAT. (George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London. 5*s.*)

A delightful book admirably suited for young children and beautifully illustrated, in which Buddha's central message of love, compassion and self-sacrifice is the key-note. The author has made an excellent choice from among the Jātaka Tales and has retold them in simple and charming language. Each story can bring to the heart of the child not only entertainment and instruction, but also inspiration. "As we think, so we become." To provide beautiful thoughts for the children to dwell upon is to bring them the opportunity to build noble and generous characters. Through these tales the imagination of the little ones is stirred, their interest held and their innate sense of the unity of all Nature awakened. While the child under seven may respond only to the narrative as such, the older child will also learn to appreciate the embodiment of Compassion, the Law of Laws, as it manifests in flower and beast and man, culminating in the Enlightened One. The book starts with these beautiful words put in the mouth of the Buddha :

"My children, I have not come now among you as your Buddha for the first time ; I have come many times before ; sometimes as a child among the little children, sometimes among the animals as one of their kind, loving them as I love you now; sometimes in Nature, among the flowers, I traced a way for you and you knew it not."

S.

The Spirit of Indian Civilization. By DHIRENDRANATH ROY. (The University of Calcutta.)

A book on Indian Civilization would always be welcome. But it would be a difficult book to write. There are so many factors that make up a civilization ; and Indian Civilization is one of the oldest and the most complex. The writer of this book, however, has greatly simplified his problem. He has not entered into a detailed consideration of any aspect of Indian civilization, but has confined himself to certain very general questions.

The author was a professor of philosophy at Manila. His object in writing this book is to vindicate Hindoo civilization against the unjustified attacks of certain agents of foreign countries. The main conclusion of the book is that Indian civilization is one of the two oldest civilizations of the world that survive to this day, that it is wholly indigenous, that it has an internal vitality enabling it to withstand the onslaught of foreign ideas, that it is inspired by very high ideals of morality and religion, and that its institutions are best suited to the life and the ideals of the people of the land. Indeed the author disclaims any attempt at making a comparative study of civilizations, or at showing that Indian civilization is the best of all civilizations. But he nevertheless seeks to achieve this purpose indirectly. In one place he says:

> The Hindoos are not mere children in the school of civilization. They have far longer and greater experience in it than any other people on earth. Compared with them their Western aggressors are like cultural babies making a lot of noise about the very limited knowledge which they acquired only yesterday and much of which comes originally from the former.....

The book is evidently written by a Hindoo for Hindoos. It cannot convince an outsider or anybody who is not already convinced. The author has not taken a very dispassionate attitude towards the institutions of Hindoo society. He has tended to eulogise everything Hindoo, without caring to see that there might be another point of view. The most orthodox beliefs and practices of Hindoos are defended by him without very good reasons. For him, "the present state of the Indian situation requires the maintenance of an iron faith in India's past, lest in the process of cleaning the house the gold goes with the dust". He naturally therefore finds salvation for India in the tenacity of those sections of the people who cling in

everything to the ancient modes of thought and life.

This kind of argument does not carry us far. Every country and every racial group could argue on similar lines and conclude that its civilization was the best. For did it not express the soul of the people? What we expected was a critical examination of all those elements which constitute the greatness of the Hindoo civilization, and the distinguishing of the permanent from the impermanent in it. Nothing of the sort has been attempted. Neither Hindoo religion nor Hindoo philosophy, which are the most abiding elements of Hindoo civilization, come in for any detailed or critical examination. Instead we have some discussion on such matters as "The sacred Ganges and the Jumna", "New Fetish of Sex Equality", "Bogey of Individuality", "Our Cultural Renegades", etc. There can be two opinions on all these matters. But we are presented here with one opinion only.

What argument the book contains could easily be compressed. Moreover, it is not written in an uniformly good style. There are not a few lapses from good English. Perhaps its chief recommendation is that a conservative-minded Hindoo would find the general trend of the ideas most congenial to his spirit.

G. R. MALKANI

The Origin of the Human Race. By MERTON STARK YEWDALE. (Published by the Author, American Book-Stratford Press, Inc., New York. $ 1.00)

Genealogy is a subject of universal appeal. In this volume Mr. Yewdale traces the physical ancestry of humanity back over a period in comparison with which the oldest family tree is a seedling. For the reader convinced of repeated incarnations as the process of soul growth—a teaching which this book curiously ignores—the latter possesses an interest like that which attaches to one's childhood photograph. For if reincarnation be a fact and the theory which Mr. Yewdale outlines be correct, the life which now animates us once found expression through the forms here described.

For these the author has drawn freely on the ancient "Stanzas of Dzyan", translated in Madame Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* which is largely based upon them. Here are numerous quotations from the latter work; Mr. Yewdale acknowledges his indebtedness to it, "not only as a mine of rich data, but as a source of inspiration". While the citations are not verbally accurate in all cases, this book is in substantial agreement, as far as it goes, with that monumental work and presents additional corroborative evidence for several of the latter's theses, such as the giant stature of early humanity and the hermaphroditism which preceded the differentiation of mankind into sexes.

Hermaphroditism admittedly characterizes the old fauna, and on the grounds of analogy and on that of the existence of one universal law in physical evolution, the presumption of a hermaphrodite form for early humanity is strong. It is substantiated by the presence of the hermaphrodite in the scriptures and the traditions of almost every nation and by the occasional examples of human hermaphroditism to-day.

Mr. Yewdale's claim to differ from *The Secret Doctrine* in holding that the original human hermaphrodite had the outer form of a woman is puzzling. Is it because the generic name "Adam" is applied in *The Secret Doctrine* to the hermaphrodite humanity that Mr. Yewdale assumes Madame Blavatsky's ascription to the hermaphrodites of the outer form of a man?

Mr. Yewdale's original speculation in the chapter entitled "The Four Human Forms" seems a not implausible deduction from his premises, but *The Secret Doctrine* indicates a more fundamental division of humanity.

Whether the scientific world will heed this elaboration of a portion of a work which it has, to its detriment, ignored as a whole, is doubtful, but at least this volume will broaden the mental horizon of the open-minded lay reader.

Ph. D.

Guide to Modern Wickedness. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

This is an omnibus volume which gives us an engaging blend of autobiography, philosophy and dialectics, hovering round a central theme which may be stated as the problem of the good life under the distracting conditions of the modern world. Dr. Joad is both a prolific and a facile writer, thinks impeccably within the limitations of thought, and compels attention by the force of a style which is clear, supple and incisive. His general attitude should by now be clear enough to all who are interested in the translation of philosophy from the closet to the market place. It is that of an uncompromising rationalist in an age in which philosophy has not hesitated to give the benefit of the doubt to a bewildering variety of escapist solutions. His strength lies in his dispassionate survey of present *disconnections*, while his weakness is an inability to provide a centre of spiritual authority, or a point of transcendent reference without which the human adventure loses all its significance. We are given a series of cross-sections which lay bare the maladies of our lives. But while the diagnosis is complete, the doctor leaves us without giving any prescription ; or rather implies that if we want one badly we must go elsewhere for it.

The book is divided into four parts under the general titles : Values, Applications, Remedies(?), and Relief. Needless to say, the main title is to be taken with a suitable irony. It emphasizes a recurrent idea which fills the rôle of a Greek Chorus in relation to the main purpose of the book. The world has arrived at its present parlous state because mankind does not see the good, or has not the will to do the good it sees. All the sins declaimed against have always been with us. We have struggled on to our present outlook in spite of them. But Mr. Joad does not give a sporting chance to such an optimistic view. Instead he demonstrates with melancholy satisfaction the failures of organised society, state and religion to avert the breakdown which we see impending before our very eyes. For a philosopher, Dr. Joad has a quite disproportionate anxiety about the future of civilization. This anxiety to save it from imminent barbarism implies that some portion of it at least is worthy of being saved. If this is conceded, does it not weaken the major premiss which the author expounds eloquently in the first section—that we have either failed to see the good, or seeing it have failed to pursue it ?

Another aspect which casts an excessive and gratuitous gloom over the book is the quite unphilosophical obsession with the phenomenon of dictatorship. It is by no means new to history. In the sixteenth chapter of the *Gita*, Krishna has anticipated the rise of dictators and has given us a composite portrait of them which epitomises at once the oldest as well as the newest of their kind. We are further given the assurance (also borne out by history) that destruction overtakes dictators, not mankind. There are sound reasons to hope even to-day for a similar consummation.

Another idea which is discussed in the course of the book has also, we think, contributed to the prevailing pessimism of the author's general outlook under present conditions. Reference is made to Spengler's theory of the rise and fall of civilizations. It suggests the more spacious conception of our own ancients who postulated the idea of Cycles or *Yugas*, of *Manvantaras* and *Pralayas* to mark the processes of evolution. With the characteristic bias of the West to hustling, Spengler shortens the intervals between epochs very considerably. In other respects his theory undoubtedly represents an attempt to formulate long-range views of 'progress', which do not easily fit the dogmatic framework of Christianity.

Dr. Joad's summing up of Christianity is by implication a summing up of all religions, and a conclusion is reached which goes heavily against them. The failure of Christianity, whether of the Church or of Christ, is emphasized in

relation to the problem of Pacifism. He expounds at length the pacifist's attitude to war, only to suggest an inglorious escape from his dilemma. He admits in effect that the utterly pacifist attitude is impossible to most of us, albeit for different reasons. It even leads us to wonder if Jesus himself was a hundred per cent pacifist. For either he must have formulated a humanly impossible code of conduct, or his injunction admits of an exception. In either case, the uncompromising severity of his ethic is watered down.

The last section of the book dealing with Relief is something of an anti-climax. It is light cargo, being an inconsequential assembly of abject orts and ends. The article dealing with England and the English is a delightful sample of self-conscious deprecation which is thoroughly British!

A Guide to Modern Wickedness does not help us to visualise ancient virtues, if any. The reader, moreover, feels something missing from the entire book. The challenge is almost exclusively to the mind. But the spirit rebels, perhaps because it has been so ostentatiously ignored.

P. MAHADEVAN

Dadabhai Naoroji, the Grand Old Man of India. By R. P. MASANI. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 16s.)

Students of psychology and of Theosophy will find food for thought in this life. It is a readable biography in which events are marshalled in an order and by a method which are in keeping with the flow of waters of a life at times turbulent, at others smooth, at the end peaceful. It is well that Mr. Masani did not prepare this life after the pattern of the new school of biography. Aiming at presenting a biography, Mr. Masani has given us history—an important chapter of Indian history from which politicians will learn much.

The book, however, has a special message for the Young India of to-day. With the passage of time, political programmes and manœuvres change. Dadabhai's clarion call of Swaraj at Calcutta in 1906 does not sound to the ears of to-day the bugle-note it was then, especially for the young. Therefore what Dadabhai said, did and achieved is not of first-rate importance to the patriotic youth of the Motherland. The abiding message of the book, its soul, is its hero's character. Dadabhai showed strength, tenacity, courage, above all honesty, in all his dealings—in private as in public life. His words were like a steady fire fed by knowledge diligently and assiduously acquired. His intellectual honesty impelled him not to speak or write without full investigation. His good-heartedness checked his indignation against the grave injustices he clearly saw done to his native land. Mr. Masani has given us a true and faithful picture of a great character on which the young need to reflect to see if their own conduct measures up to Dadabhai's to any extent.

Among the thrilling chapters of the book are XII-XIII and XIV which narrate the story of Mulharro Gaekwar from his accession to his deposition. There are personalities who focus in themselves the force of folly to such an extent that they become living embodiments bringing home to all the truth that man is his own enemy; and that the fool within cannot be, for he will not be, saved by any outside help, however good or however great. Events in these chapters reveal traits of Dadabhai's character reminiscent of those of Abraham Lincoln when he handled some of his colleagues with great patience and with undaunted courage.

Similarly, there is the amazing story of the British Liberal Party almost fighting its own member and candidate, who, holding to his fine liberal principles, set the whole party an example of justice and generosity.

Thus it is not so much what Dadabhai did as how he did it that constitutes the message of Mr. Masani's book. He was a reformer and not only a politician,

and his liberalism showed him his country's limitations in social and other spheres, which with a patriot's ardour he set out to remove. He advocated reforms some of which still remain to be carried out. All see the necessity of reforms, but how many are there possessing the mental integrity of Dadabhai to achieve them? Herein the book reveals its message.

S. B.

The Boundaries of Science. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (Faber and Faber, London. *7s. 6d.*)

Science has become the master of man. Man's energies are being devoted to the one all-consuming passion for the progress of Science, its exaltation and deification. Whilst this growth in the importance of Science has been phenomenal, legitimate and fruitful, it suffers serious limitations. Science is only one part of life. The celebrated triumphs of Science in Physics and Mathematics, all of which for the sake of convenience omit to take into account the subjective 'intention' or motive force, are really not logical. Science, in so far as it is an *objective observational* study, is pertinent only within the limited domain wherein the subjective 'facts' are not obtrusive. Strictly speaking, the domain of fact, of pure unadulterated physical fact, is the realm of physics, and no sooner do we enter into the fields of biology and psychology than we find that the facts of Science cease to be facts and turn out to be only the strivings and feelings of human individuals. It is in the central part of the book, in the chapter on "Psychology of Psychology", that Prof. Macmurray with characteristic thoroughness and incisive analysis exposes the fundamental paradox of the scientific spirit in the domain of psychology. Science is unable to explain the fundamental intrinsic nature of the living mind.

Whilst religion has taken account of human intentions, Science has sought to show that however vital and necessary these intentions may be, the knowledge of environment and of the instruments by which we could best alter environment is absolutely necessary. Primarily Science is utilitarian, and it is only when it becomes reflective that it theorises about reality. Prof. Macmurray finds that it is exactly this reflective aspect of Science that leads to self-contradictions and antinomies. In so far as Science aims at instrumental knowledge it is legitimate and has a place in the scheme of reality. Science delivers to us the World-as-Means, and Religion (though Prof. Macmurray does not use the word) delivers to us the World-as-End. Both these form aspects of the total, and the one does not lead to the other. And if anything it is Science that suffers under the strain of self-contradiction and antinomy rather than Religion, because Science owes its origins and growth to the human struggle for ends and values. Science is instrumental Knowledge; it is only another kind of knowledge that can give us the truth of the intrinsic nature of reality. There are other worlds and other knowledges of which Science never dreams. It always moves in the outer court; the inner sanctuary is closed to it. It defeats itself. There is for it no self-transcendence. This is the valuable thesis which Prof. Macmurray has brought out with great lucidity.

K. C. VARADACHARI

Self-Restraint Versus Self-Indulgence. Part II. By M. K. GANDHI. (Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad. Re. 1.)

Nothing perhaps in Mr. Gandhi's teaching has created more controversy than his views on chastity in marriage. And these articles, reprinted like their predecessors from his paper *Harijan*, are likely to intensify it. This is all to the good. For however extreme and one-sided some of his views may seem to a Western reader, no one can doubt the single-minded sincerity of his search for truth in this as in other matters. And such sincerity provokes truth-seeking in others, even if the truth they reach is not quite his. Real chastity or *bramacharya*, as he frequently insists, means purity not merely of the body but of both speech and thought also. Ideally it is control over all the senses. But it is more than control. It is a glad surrender of all the faculties of being to the creative will in which they are harmonised and become the expressive organs of a true self-hood. Only the ideal man can attain perfectly to such a state, but in making progress, however small, towards it, self-devotion is as necessary as self-control. There is a danger in being too concerned with one's own purity, too vigilant of one's own salvation. And in so far as there is a negative strain in Mr. Gandhi's teaching on marriage, as there was in his master Tolstoy's, it is because he emphasizes control at the expense of devotion. Love between the sexes should be a creative act in which the joy of communion and the instinct of procreation combine. But Mr. Gandhi in reacting against those who have reduced it to sensual gratification maintains the false division by reducing it to procreative duty. For him sexual union can never in itself be anything but self-indulgence. And it is only allowable as a self-controlled act of duty performed only once for offspring, which he asserts, in the face of much evidence to the contrary, cannot fail to ensue. He adopts in fact Manu's arbitrary definition of the first child as 'duty-born' and any others as 'lust-born' and confesses that he himself 'believes in no children'. This denial of any virtue to sexual love because its true creative joy is so often perverted into sensual pleasure surely betrays a false bias against the unity of life. It is understandable in view of the diseased sexuality rampant in the world to-day, and much that he writes on self-control as the only right form of birth-control is urgently true. But his extremer views on marriage are for me at once too rigid and too self-centred to do justice to its possibilities as a creative adventure and a sacrificial mystery.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Evidence of Identity. By KENNETH RICHMOND. (G. Bell & Sons Ltd., London. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

When F. W. H. Myers published his *Human Personality* in 1903 he dealt briefly with the problem of identity in the case of communications through mediums. He suggested that the deceased should have left a sentence in a sealed envelope, and then, after death, should try to reproduce it. Efforts have been made for many years now to establish identity; but with only a small measure of success. As long ago as 1877, that veteran Spiritualist Mr. W. Stainton Moses pointed out (*Spiritualist*, March 2nd, 1877) that it was erroneous to assume that all phenomena are caused by the action of departed human spirits, and he complained that spiritualists "have not looked into the powers of the human spirit". It is in this matter of identity that we find the most disappointing result of what Mr. Richmond calls the "methodical and critical thinking of psychical research". Even in the famous case of the Oscar Wilde scripts of 1923-4, Mrs. Sidgwick's examination of the evidence "does not offer us material for a clear answer to the question, 'Was it Wilde, or not?'."

In this valuable addition to the series based on material in the possession of the Society for Psychical Research, there

is a reference to the suggestion made by Mr. Gerald Balfour in 1906 that we are in this world "polypsychic beings, *i.e.* made up of a number of units having personal character". The most that Mr. Richmond can say, from study of the evidence, is that the enquiry "points to an extended view of human personality". It would seem to be along these lines that students of psychical research will find the most fruitful results, taking as their starting point this very subject of "human personality" and its relationship to the enduring spirit of man.

B. P. HOWELL

Jesus the Heretic. By CONRAD NOEL. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

Mr. Noel tells us in his preface that "The theme running through the whole work is that the 'heresy' of one age becomes the orthodoxy of the next..." This seems an absolute statement of a relative truth, but we will accept it for the time being. Then follow chapters on such diverse subjects as "Why Catholics should be Socialists", "Why Socialists should be Catholics", "Problems of Pacifism", "The Battle of the Flags", "God Save the King", and so on.

Half this book consists of quotations, and it is thought that the most direct way of indicating its quality is to quote certain of Mr. Noel's statements on practical affairs. Then, possibly, the reader will be able to infer the value of his pronouncements on spiritual issues.

Having suggested that Great Britain should abandon her empire on the instalment system, Mr. Noel adds :—

> The objection that immediately springs to mind is that, if Great Britain released such and such an area, some still more voracious empire would immediately seize it. But I am assuming that if the English people were Christian enough to give a country its liberty, they would be Christian enough to defend it; here, indeed, would be an example of the "just war".

Mr. Noel then suggests that

> There must be a reformation and revival of the League of Nations, a League no longer of the victor powers, with smaller satellite States round it, but of powers who had abandoned all idea of imperialist conquests, and had given some very practical earnest of this abandonment.

Apparently, it has not occurred to Mr. Noel that, if these solutions were practical, the problems to which they relate would not exist.

Later, he advocates an international congress at which the delegates "should be able to understand each other". To this end, Mr. Noel proposes the use of Esperanto as the simplest remedy.

And here is the author's suggestion for dealing effectively with big-scale air raids :—

> The air-mine is a meteorological balloon, about the size of a child's balloon, and can be sent up to any height, charged with a high explosive; shoals of such mines can put any number of bombers out of action. Fresh clusters of these mines would have to be sent up every few hours to take the place of the spent balloons, but they are comparatively inexpensive. They would, of course, put our own aeroplanes out of action, but if we are not contemplating counter-attack this would not matter.

The Epilogue to this book presumably represents Mr. Noel's personal creed, although it is not in the first person. It is interesting to learn that "Evil conditions are the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual rascality on the part of the few, and inward and spiritual apathy on the part of the many...." Interesting, because the naïve conception that evil exists primarily as a result of "rascality on the part of the few" is reflected in the many facile criticisms of others which this book contains.

Finally, although it is a truism that contemporary judgments have been notoriously wrong in certain outstanding instances, it is nevertheless a fact that many charlatans were rightly dismissed as such by their contemporaries. The rectitude of those judgments is forgotten because the subjects of them passed quickly into that total obscurity to which they belonged.

The majority is not always wrong. And minorities are not always right.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

CORRESPONDENCE

ON THE DEGREES OF HONESTY IN VARIOUS OCCIDENTAL RELIGIONS

[Last month we printed two letters on the subject of the influence of religions, and especially of organized Christianity, on the life of the people. Below we print another on the same theme. Ezra Pound, poet and essayist, writes it out of personal experience. To the above captions he adds—"as encountered in the past thirty years of one lifetime".—EDS.]

It being impossible for me to speak in the abstract with finality, I can only offer the following paragraphs as certified data. It so happens that I have never met any one save an archbishop who ventured to defend *any* church as such, I mean as an organism.

I have more than once been visited by members of the lower clergy, or received from them denunciations of the insincerity of their superiors. I know of no officially Christian publication of *any* sect which stands up and answers a theological question, however soberly put. You might as well expect a straight answer from a banker's son-in-law about money, or from a hired professor about economics!

Taking the more prevalent creeds in order and with respect to their scriptures, I think no impartial examiner will deny that the ethics of the Old Testament are merely squalid. The two-standards system of Geneva cannot be blamed on the Semites, but the Semitic avoidance of their own law on usury while wishing to be accepted as neighbours is on a par with Geneva, and Geneva is at heart (in soul and to the uttermost atom) the frontage of Basel and the international bank of that usurers' stronghold.

The Protestant almost invariably accuses the Catholic of lack of downright honesty. But I cannot see that this is done on comparative grounds.

No Protestant sect is honest *by programme* about money. After Anthony Trollope's careful analysis it seems mere waste of time to try to state the case against the Church of England in mere general statement.

A noted Dean, as disgusted as I am with his superior and just as far as I am from suspecting his immediate overlords of sincerity or real honesty, yet after preaching peace merely relapses into silence when I suggest that he meet some one from the other side to see if two men not immediately embroiled in a present war can agree on just terms of settlement.

A parson in the antipodes writes to me denouncing his archbishop almost as the incarnation of evil and as the most evil man who has occupied a given see for the past thirteen centuries.

It is quite certain that Christianity appears or has in known instances appeared both immoral and anti-

statal to the serious Chinese literate. He saw it as such when the Jesuits were inserting it into China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Disruptive of family life, disturbing to the quiet and order of the empire, inducing disrespect to the dead and destructive to Confucian ethics.

Under stress the Christians promptly lied, and caused themselves thereby great inconvenience. They claimed that their churches were built by an Emperor's order, whereas no such order existed, and this fact was perfectly demonstrable by documentary proof.

The whole story is in many ways typically Christian in its inconsequence. A few most admirable Jesuits carried in Western science, something totally dissociated from their religion. In fact there had been that little case against Galileo, and it was Galileo's mathematics that gained them their favour, along with a dash of quinine and an aptitude in the founding of cannon (military not ecclesiastic).

An Emperor finally ousted 'em with an answer full of sobriety.

If any Christian writer or controversialist ever faced a question or answered it, I should like to know whether he thinks or they think the New Testament is or is not anti-Semitic in the sense that it is a repudiation of a great deal of pre-Nazarene teaching.

It has long appeared to me that the protagonist of those very peculiar documents, the Evangels or Gospels, disliked Semitism very intensely and set about reversing its attitude, but, being partially Semite, several items escaped his notice. He merely took 'em for granted, and they have infested his sect until now. It is in many ways a sect headed for disorder, and does not conduce to a very developed sense of responsibility.

Under stress of emotion, the Jew seems to lose his sense of reality. When a causal sequence would result to his personal disadvantage, he is not alone in losing his sense of causality. Example *re neschĕk*. During the past three years I have found very few Jews who would follow me through a discussion of *neschek*, either from the point of view of the Mosaic code or of the social consequence of this evil. Dante, Shakespeare and, I am told, the earlier Elizabethans were interested in the problem. Since the time of Claudius Salmasius historians have been very weak in their treatment of it. Most of them are headed for the ash-can because they did *not* analyze monetary pressures. You can't on this ground blame the church fathers; there exists a canonist tradition worthy of study and not the least out of date. What is out of date is the ignorantism coming from Calvin, Cromwell, Baxter, and persisting through the mercantilist era.

In trying to get a focus, or to see whether race comes into the problem of ethics, one sees empirically that Anglo-(so called) Saxons do not cling to their Wode epoch. They do not howl for a return to the ethos of their more savage days. In fact you can see only the Jew proclaiming the ethos of a nomadic era (unless the *Koran* does).

I don't see that the erudite Jesuits came out very well against

Yong Tching in the 1720's. Both this emperor and his father seem to have acted "in malice toward none", and with impeccable frankness, recognizing services rendered, writing without heat and with personal appreciation of the high personal merits of the individual Jesuits. These latter could not deny certain known facts nor could they claim absolute singleness of intention, though they objected to being mixed up with dirty Dutch traders and masters of frigates.

From the Confucian base, as I understand it, one wants to see the actual texts of their accusers. Were they accused of being exiles from Europe, or do the texts simply mean that they had left their own countries, meaning that they had left them *before* using their utmost efforts to improve them, to set up within them (as a basis for world peace or peace over more of the planet) a social order worthy of being copied by others or such as would conduce to such imitation.

The state of Europe in 1725 was no more fit to be imitated by any foreign man or nation than it was under the grilling heel of international filth and usury in 1925.

The problem of missions is difficult, but it is inherent in the looseness of the Christian programme, and shows a sketchiness in the disordered (often brilliant and lofty) injunctions huddled together in the curious Greek of the Early "Church".

One sees utterly illiterate Occidentals rushing into the Orient to teach savants. True, they go often to the outcast, to the lower people, and it seems undeniable that in many cases they have exercised what George Washington called "benign influence".

But in the matter of proportion, in a sense of the relative weight, is this tendency to go off half-cocked of as much ethical weight as the conviction *that order should be promoted from where one is; that order should start inside one's own cerebrum,* in the *directio voluntatis*?

On the supposition that my infant mind was attracted to or distracted by Christianity at a tender age and in Sunday School, I might almost say that for a period of nearly fifty years I have never met Christian FAITH. I have heard faith once over the radio, and it was concentrated in the two syllables *Schicksal,* uttered in a context that might have been taken from the testament of Kang Hi.

Confucian faith I can conceive. I can conceive of a man's believing that if, and in measure as, he brings order into his own consciousness (his own "innermost") that order will emanate from him. The cycle of Chinese history, the reception of the "mandate" (called the mandate of heaven) by various dynasties, seems to offer demonstrable evidence of this process.

In the present very imperfect state of half-knowledge I fail to see that the history of China, or Chinese historic process, suffers a dichotomy or split into two opposite forces, as does that of Europe. Not, that is, unless you want to set Buddhism and Taoism together as a sort of Guelf Party. And even then that wouldn't be a decent analogy.

The Papacy *as ideal* is, in this dimension, equivalent to the ideal of the empire. It is a Roman ideal of order and subordination, and *inside* itself has always shown us a spectacle similar to that of Hochang and Taoist struggling against the order of Empire.

As I see it, the literate Christian explorer found nothing in Confucius to object to; there was nothing that the most sincere Catholic missionary could wish to remove from Confucius' teaching. They were reduced to asking about the technical meaning of the Lord of Heaven and as to how far Kung was, or was not, incarnate or inpietrate or present in the cartouche or tablet.

So far as I make out, Christianity did not ask the Chinese to assume any new responsibility; it only offered him relaxation from various duties.

This is quite possibly too rough a statement. Obviously the missionary is convinced, or the first few missionaries and martyrs are and must be convinced and oblivious of minor objections. It is their method of implementing their fervour that I would bring up for examination.

Modern Europe has merely dumped mediæval thought about *la vita contemplativa*. That doesn't mean that there are no Western mystics, but again the European schizophrenia has split their being. Instead of the *vita contemplativa* being conceived as the dynamo of the active life, it is merely sidetracked, and commonly regarded as "useless".

I am aware that no mystic, no recluse, no Hindoo would say that it is so. I am stating a general contingency. The Occident regards the contemplative as a do-nothing. An empiric test would probably "give him reason", if it did not prove that his estimate was correct in ninety-eight per cent of all cases. This is a very sad state of affairs, at least from some angles.

How far are religions honest? How far have they ever been honest in Europe?

In the condemnation of Scotus Erigena? In the wrangle of Bossuet's correspondence with Leibnitz? How far can any man to-day who wants a straight answer to *any* ethical query (let alone a query about a vital and demonstrable infamy such as the monopoly of money or the frauds of international exchange) expect to get that answer from Christian, Jew, Protestant, Catholic, Quaker or any minor sect in the Occident?

A most valuable study of usury in India could and should be written by some one with knowledge of Hindoo theologians. So far one has heard little about it save picturesque details of vicarious penances for this prevalent sin.

The Nordic will, I think, always want to know from the Indian: how far is religion effective? One of the widest gulfs between East and West might be bridged if some sort of survey and mensuration were set up to take this dimension.

From what history I have been able to learn, it appears to me that Confucius has in this dimension a preëminence over other founders of ethical systems; while yielding nothing to any of them in other

domains. (By which I don't mean to offer any homage at all to academics who have exploited the label Confucian without meditating the texts, or even to bright young Chinese journalists who have a merely superficial notion of the text of the *King*, the accepted Confucian books.)

Were we in a meeting I should rise to express my doubts as to the spiritual value of the *Koran* in relation to the philosophy of the Arab philosophers, with Avicenna at the apex. I see almost no spiritual elevation in the *Old Testament*, and the *Talmud*, if one is to judge by current quotations, is not an ethical volume at all but a species of gangster's handbook. After the loss of faith in the Roman Church, the Christian sectaries produced no first-rate theology and little that can be considered intellectually serious.

I defy any Christian to produce more than *one* element in Christianity, if that, which is not anticipated in the cult practised by the Chinese literati. I leave it to their ingenuity to discover what I consider the basic intuition of Nazarene genius. When you find the Emperor Yong Tching spending all his efforts to govern well that he might bring comfort to the soul of his father, "deceased emperor now in heaven", you have at least a savour of piety. Research might well be directed to how much of whatever Christianity has brought us, including some of its ceremonial gestures, preëxisted in China.

As to sacrifices, I think the body of notes on this subject, everything that has ever come to my attention, is just plain stupid to the point of imbecility. "Pleasing to heaven", etc. Various ideas of pleasing the spirits are all very well, but there could still be a lesson in animal sacrifice for any group that had evolved beyond primitive stages. Animals are killed now in abattoirs; the sight of a killing can remind us, in the midst of our normal semi-consciousness of all that goes on in our vile and degraded mercantilist ambience, that life exists by destruction of other life. The sight of one day's hecatomb might even cause thought in the midst of our democracy and usuriocracy.

In praise of the Christian religion, despite its manifest incompetence to maintain decency or even any strong tendency toward economic justice in any Occidental country, I can at least say this. In favourable circumstances Christianity or several of its ideals could and should conduce to a deeper understanding of the cult of the Chinese literati than is prevalent among half-educated Chinese. Both Confucianism and Christianity propose a state of sincerity which is almost unattainable, but the Christian proposals are mixed with all sorts of disorder, whereas a Confucian progress offers chance for a steady rise, and defects either in conduct or in theory are in plain violation of its simple and central doctrine.

EZRA POUND

ENDS AND SAYINGS

Speaking at the fortieth Annual Dinner and Reunion of the Rationalist Press Association in London on May 13th last, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede said :—

I sometimes wonder whether we have not got to make an attack because there are some mischievous forms of superstition which ought to be shown up, especially if they seem to be gaining ground.....

He then went on to mention a friend of his

who is in close contact with a great German seventeenth century composer, who is telling her how she ought to play his fugues and his partitas. Argument is useless ; but what I feel is that there is a certain sadness which comes over me when I find people carried away in that direction, because I believe that it is the beginning of an incipient insanity. It is in these cases that I myself am inclined to make a direct attack.....

While we endorse the truth implicit in both these statements by Lord Ponsonby and recognise the necessity of attacking error and superstition because of the danger to sanity and, more, to morality, we fail to see how mere attacks and denials can curb the rising tide of spiritism and psychism. It will not help to say to a medium and to those who follow mediums : " Nonsense ! You are just mad and your communications are the result of brain-fever and insane fancy." To the medium the communication *is* real, and, if the true danger of such dabbling with " invisible entities " is to be warded off, the phenomenon must be understood and its rationale perceived. The basis of true rationalism lies in a precise ascertainment of the facts before either believing or disbelieving, and it is not rational to attack without previous investigation and without trying to learn the truths involved. Merely to " believe that it is the beginning of an incipient insanity " will not provide the remedy for a return to sanity. Knowledge is the only effective weapon against superstition and error.

This craze for the abnormal, the invisible, is natural to the human mind, which is ever curious to extend the boundaries of knowledge. Modern science has been silent, sometimes even contemptuous, about such matters, and so, face to face with phenomena, people have talked about and dabbled in dangerous experiments.

Another type of person has followed the lure of the marvellous and the magical in a different way, as can be inferred from the " Hocus-Pocus " Exhibition which is now being held at the sedate and scholarly Bodleian at Oxford. It comprises " books on legerdemain, tricks, puzzles, natural magic, every aspect of the craft ", reports *The Observer* (London, July 2nd). Has it never occurred to the rationalists that if there have been such varied pseudo-magical tricks down the ages, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there is perchance a true science of magic which remains concealed and yet is accessible to the unprejudiced and disinterested seeker after truth ? If on arriving in a foreign country a traveller is handed counterfeit coins and paper bills, will that not point

to the existence of a true currency? Thus it is with magic. The grotesque imitations point to the existence of the real. In India we are told that such knowledge cannot be bought but has to be attained through self-purification and fearless investigation. True Magic posits as its first axiom that there are no miracles in Nature. So too does modern science, yet, as Max Planck remarks in his book *Where is Science Going?* :—

> Though chance and miracle in the absolute sense are fundamentally excluded from science, yet science is confronted to-day, more than ever before perhaps, with a wide-spread belief in miracle and magic.

Is it not possible that this tendency to believe in the power of mysterious agencies, which according to Max Planck is "an outstanding characteristic of our own day", springs from orthodoxy in religion and dogmatism in science itself? Because science has to dismiss with a shrug of disbelief so much that does take place and that should be investigated, people turn away from science to fall back upon irrational systems such as pseudo-occultism and spiritism.

This deplorable condition will persist until degrading superstition and even more degrading brutal materialism give way to spiritual understanding, which uses metaphysics and extends the reign of law to the invisible.

Outside metaphysics the rational explanation of all phenomena is not possible. Science tries to explain the aspirations and affections, the loves and hatreds, the most private and sacred workings of the mind and soul of the living man, by an anatomical description of the chest and brain of his dead body. So it fails again and again in all that pertains to the realm behind the veil of gross physical matter, as revealed in some of the articles appearing in this issue.

The invisible is not all spiritual. The Astral Body, known as *Linga Sarira* among the Hindus, is also material, though it consists of a different degree of matter from the physical outward covering. Such phenomena as are described in the article on "The Human Aura" for example will not be comprehensible to science until it has recognised the existence of that second body, the foundation and model for the physical body, and has studied the higher laws of electricity and magnetism which govern it.

To deny the invisible and to fall into materialism is indeed to become "that strange thing, a being which cannot see its own light, a thing of life which will not live, an astral animal which has eyes, and ears, and speech, and power, yet will use none of these gifts".

Similarly is it the case with the gaps in the mechanics of heredity and with the seeming contradictions in Bergson's philosophy dealt with in articles we print elsewhere. These will remain until the Light of Truth Eternal is accepted and humanity realizing its divine origin replaces the law of the jungle by that of altruism and self-sacrifice.