

*A. H. L.*

ANNALS  
OF  
PHRENOLOGY.

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Committee of Publication.

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## PROSPECTUS

FOR PUBLISHING

A QUARTERLY PERIODICAL

TO BE ENTITLED

## ANNALS OF PHRENOLOGY.

TO CONSIST OF

ARTICLES FROM THE EDINBURGH, PARIS, AND LONDON PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNALS, AND OF SUCH ORIGINAL PAPERS AS MAY BE SELECTED AND APPROVED BY THE ‘BOSTON PHRENOLOGICAL SOCIETY.’

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# ANNALS OF PHRENOLOGY.

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## ARTICLE I.

*Utility of Phrenology.* BY REV. GEO. BRADBURN.

THE question is often asked, 'Of what use is Phrenology, admitting it to be true?—This is asking in other words, 'Is there any utility in truth?' It would give us pleasure to state, at large, some of the prominent proofs of the science, for the satisfaction of our readers, but this would lead us, beyond the limits allowed us, as it would, also, aside from the object which we have proposed to ourselves, which is, not to establish the truth of Phrenology, and its claims to be ranked among the sciences; but to give a brief answer to the question, 'Granting the truth of Phrenology; what is the utility of it?' The qualification 'if it be true,' it will be necessary for our readers to keep constantly in mind. Some of the remarks which we shall make, in the progress of this article will undoubtedly be considered extravagant, by those who are wholly unacquainted with the subject, and be thought to ascribe vastly more to phrenology, than it can possibly merit. But we beg leave to assure all such beforehand, that so far from ascribing to phrenology more than, if true, it merits, we shall be obliged for want of time, to omit all mention of many advantages, which it is actually calculated to impart.

We observe, then, in the first place, that phrenology is useful as a system of moral and metaphysical philosophy. Whatever is

fitted to call the attention of man to his own constitution—whether to the structure and functions of his body, or to the apparently more mysterious workings of the immaterial principle within—cannot be void of utility. Hence, we cannot but regard as having been of some use, the multifarious and differing theories of morals and metaphysics, which have, at one time or other, obtained in the world, however imperfect, and pregnant with error, they may have been. For they have induced men to observe, and reflect upon the constitution of their own nature; and thus have called into action those higher powers of the mind, by which the human is exalted so high above the brute creation. That, therefore, which renders the writings of Locke, Descartes, Reid or Brown, valuable, would also render those of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, valuable, even though the latter were no nearer an approximation to the true philosophy of man, than the former; for we differ essentially from certain reviewers, who affect to discern neither learning, nor reflection, nor logical acumen in the writings of phrenologists. That is obviously the best, and consequently the most useful philosophy of mind, which most clearly accounts for, and explains, the mental phenomena. Now, phrenology claims to account for these, in a way that is at once more simple, consistent and rational, than is done by any other system. It claims to be, so far as it goes—for it does not pretend to know all that may be known of man—a correct exposition of his animal, intellectual, moral, and religious faculties. It specifies the distinct nature of each of these faculties, describes its peculiar functions, and the modes and conditions of their manifestation. And this, we say, is what has not been done in any of the one-hundred-and-one, clashing theories of moral science, which have been put forth, at different periods, by their respective and learned authors. Craniology, therefore, out of the question, and to say nothing of *bumps*, which by many are supposed to constitute the whole of phrenology, our science is valuable for its admirable classification of the human faculties, and its beautiful explanation of their innumerable phenomena. Yes; independent of the relation between the energy of the mental powers, and the form of the encephalon, which renders our science so directly practical,—and without even sup-

posing it to afford a truer analysis of those powers, than has been given by the old metaphysicians, it still has all the claims to usefulness, that can be urged in favor of any of the more generally received philosophies. But it will be borne in mind that the question which we are endeavoring to answer, supposes phrenology to be true. This granted, it has immeasurably higher claims to utility, than the others ; and for this plain reason, that the latter must be extremely imperfect, and, in many respects, erroneous. So that, viewed as a system of the philosophy of mind, our science possesses a value, far above what can be claimed by any other, which has yet been presented to the world. It furnishes a clear and rational explanation of numerous mental phenomena, of which it were vain to seek for any tolerable exposition in the recognized principles of other systems of physiological science. And it decides many important questions which have been, for ages, themes of perpetual controversy among metaphysicians. Of these, are those concerning the existence in man of a moral sense, and of a principle of disinterested benevolence — the source of compassion or pity — which the metaphysical Hobbes defines to be ‘ the imagination of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the observation of another man’s calamity ; ’ but which our science shows to be an affection of a special faculty, which, disregarding self, seeks only the welfare of others.

But it is not in furnishing a more just exposition of the mental phenomena, that the whole superiority of phrenology consists. It has this further, and, perhaps, still greater advantage, that it enables us to ascertain, without any tedious process of experiment or inquiry, what are the individual peculiarities, capacities and tendencies of men. And this is what renders the system so directly available in practice. The great fault with which all other theories of moral science have been charged, is, that they are not susceptible of a direct and easy application to the common practical concerns of life. So that even supposing any one of them to be true, its usefulness would always be comparatively small. But phrenology, showing as it does that each faculty acts by means of a special cerebral organ, and that its power of acting, other

things being equal, bears a direct and constant relation to the size of its organ, which may be judged of by inspecting the cranium, is pre-eminently practical, and susceptible of incalculable use, in well nigh every department of human affairs.

We proceed therefore to enumerate some of the directly practical applications of which this science is capable ; and mention, secondly, that it is fitted to be of great use in the business of education. That great improvements have of late years been made in our plans of education, cannot be doubted. Neither can it be denied, that the best plans now, in operation among us, are felt to be defective and inefficient. They fall far short of accomplishing the objects for which they were instituted. And when examined by the light which phrenology has thrown upon man, the reason of their inefficiency is no longer a problem. They are seen not to be adapted to the nature, with which the Creator has endowed him. Nor is this to be wondered at. For, before a system of education can be arranged in harmony with the constitution of human nature, that constitution must be understood. Before children can be educated as they ought to be, and as the Creator intended they should be, their faculties, and the conditions of their activity, must be known. And this knowledge, we say, was not attainable, until the establishment of phrenology. True, what of man's nature that could be known by one's 'reflecting on the subjects of one's own consciousness,' had been ascertained, and, in this way, many an ingenious theory had been produced. But, as no two persons are alike — as the subjects of their consciousness differ—so the various theories which have grown out of reflections upon consciousness, not only clash with each other, but give, in many respects, false and inconsistent views of human nature. In some, as in that of Hobbes, man is treated as if he were a being of pure intellection, and destitute, by nature, of all propensities or passions. In others, the innate differences in the capacities of different individuals are denied, and all the varieties of intellectual and moral character are attributed to the influence of external circumstances. We once conversed with a very intelligent preceptor of one of our literary seminaries, who strenuously

insisted that children are all alike by nature, and may, with the same efforts and the same educational advantages, make equal progress in any department of knowledge. And, in this opinion, we were obliged to admit, that he was supported by some of the most learned authorities.

To these, and other equally absurd views of humanity—and they are but the natural results of that mode of studying human nature, which has been usually adopted and recommended by metaphysicians — must be attributed, we think, much of the ill-success that has attended most of the plans of education, which have hitherto been in operation. They have not been based on a correct knowledge of our nature. Well nigh every person who has directed his attention to the subject, has, unfortunately, assumed his own to be a fair representation of the capacities and tendencies of men in general.

The consequence has been, that scarcely any two have been able to agree, either as to the best mode of teaching, or as to what should be made the most prominent subjects of education. He who is distinguished for his acquaintance with mathematical science, and finds a pleasure in its pursuits, will insist on the indispensable importance of appropriating much time to studying mathematics. He who finds mathematics a dull study, and that of the languages easy, will deem it equally important that all should be made linguists. Thus every one insists on the wonderful importance of that particular branch of learning, in which himself has chanced to make the greatest proficiency ; each serving to remind one of the corporal described by Sterne, who, because he had devoted many years to the soldiers' life, imagined that of all knowledge, the science of military tactics was the most important — the one thing needful, without which there could be no success in any calling, no, not even in the clerical profession !— And if those who have had the chief management of education have been generally agreed in any one thing, it would seem to be in confining education to the intellect, and leaving out of consideration the great fact, that children have feelings, and physical faculties, which need to be educated.

These evils, phrenology proposes to eradicate. It furnishes, as we have before stated, a correct exposition of human nature, on which alone all education should be founded. It shows, that children differ widely in their innate tendencies and capacities ; and, by unfolding the means of ascertaining those differences, it points out the kind and degree of education, which each is fitted to receive. The teacher, who is thoroughly versed in phrenology, has but to examine his pupil, to be informed, at once, of what he is capable, and of the measures that should be taken in order to confer on him the best education, and to fit him for the highest degree of usefulness of which his nature is susceptible. He will immediately perceive, as by intuition, what are the stronger, and what the weaker faculties of his pupil, and will adapt his instructions accordingly. If, for example, the moral and religious sentiments are comparatively weak, and the animal propensities strong, which too frequently happens to be the case, he will employ those means which are revealed by the science, to increase the strength of the former, and diminish the activity of the latter. And this would be educating the feelings ; which the non-phrenologist may indeed have thought of and attempted, but in which, from his want of the requisite information, he has never been able entirely to succeed. And need we be told, that a science which can do this — which makes known the true method of training the feelings, and adapting educational instruction to the peculiar capacities of the young — need we be told, that such a science may render inconceivable service to the interests of education ?

But it may be thought by some that these objects have been already attained, and without the aid of phrenology either. Such, however, is far, very far, from being the fact. Even the existence of all the special feelings is not yet known and acknowledged, in most, if in any, of our seminaries of learning. How, then, can it be pretended, that any proper attention is paid to the education of those feelings in these institutions ? Not that, in our schools and colleges, there has been any backwardness in endeavoring to reform refractory scholars, and subject them to order and good government. There has been no lack of

exertion here. But this is not educating the feelings. It is not even an attempt to do so. Still, as we have before admitted, the importance of educating these has not been wholly overlooked by non-phrenologists. It was perceived, and strongly recommended, by Milton and Locke. But few have listened to the advice of those great men on this subject, and fewer yet have attempted to follow it; and the small number who have made the attempt, have met with no very encouraging success, in consequence, as we think, of not being acquainted with the requisite means. The means by which they have endeavored to succeed — such as enlightening the intellect, announcing precepts, and inflicting various kinds of punishment—are demonstrably incompetent to effect the object desiderated. Indeed, there were no means of accomplishing this, in any considerable degree, until the discovery of phrenology. Aided by the lights of this science, the feelings may be educated as certainly as the intellect, and the young prepared for the love and practice of the moral law. And for this, therefore, if for nothing else, it is obviously of immense importance to those who are entrusted with the education of youth.

It is equally important to such in another respect,—which has already been adverted to—that of educating the intellect; for it shows how that may be cultivated to the greatest advantage, and what direction should be given it, in order that the possessor may acquire the greatest amount of knowledge of which he is capable.— Who is prepared to say, that much precious time is not wasted, and worse than wasted, by the prevailing practice in our colleges, of compelling all students to pursue the same routine of studies, without regard to their natural endowments? Who does not know, that, on the present plan, many a year has been thrown away by some, in the fruitless attempt to acquire a variety of languages, who had otherwise been distinguished for their mathematical knowledge? And who does not know also, that many a one has possessed an extraordinary aptitude for learning languages,—like Mezzofanti, who mastered no less than forty-eight—that could not, with years of painful effort, make any progress in the mathematics. And who does not know further, that there have been some, who, while they

could accomplish little in either of these departments of learning, were yet able to attain distinction as artists, statesmen, and metaphysicians. Whether generally known or not, these are undeniable facts ; and phrenology accounts for them. Yet, in our schools and colleges, they are almost utterly disregarded, and the same course of studies is marked out for every pupil. And this, in the just estimation of many, is a most serious defect in the laws of our literary institutions. The practice can be justified only on the supposition, that all are endowed with capacities equally adapted to any and every department of knowledge ; a supposition, which, if our science be true, displays a profound ignorance of human nature. And we suppose it was chiefly in a mistake of this kind, that the custom originated, and has been, by the same error, continued to the present time. We say it was in this mistake chiefly, because we are aware that the evil complained of is not to be attributed, solely, to this cause. Another error has operated to perpetuate, if it did not to produce it. It is this. The usually prescribed courses of study are supposed to be essential to good success, if not in the more common avocations of life, at least in the various learned professions. But what has the study of mathematics to do with giving success to one in the clerical profession, or to one who is occupied with the subject of moral philosophy ? Or, what have Greek and Latin to do with the successful prosecution of the science of astronomy, or chemistry ! Oh, it will be said, the study of mathematics is essential to the clergyman and moral philosopher, because it tends wonderfully to strengthen and discipline the understanding—to fit it for close, logical reasoning and investigation ; and that of Greek and Latin, because it makes us better acquainted with our vernacular language, and tends likewise to elevate and expand the mind. Now phrenology demonstrates, that there is no sort of relation between mathematical and moral reasoning — that they depend upon different and distinct faculties — and that, by necessary consequence, the former may be exercised forever, without in the least disciplining and improving the latter. And as to languages, it shows that a knowledge of them is obtained chiefly through the medium of a single faculty, which may be

powerfully active even in the semi-idiot, who is well nigh incapable of combining two ideas, and inferring from them a third one ; and facts prove, that persons, who are utterly unacquainted with Latin and Greek, may acquire an easy, a correct, and even an elegant style of English composition. Besides, it is not now, we believe, so much as even pretended, that there is an important idea, in any of the ancient classics, that may not be found clearly, intelligibly expressed in our own, and in other modern languages. But do not misunderstand us. Our object in these remarks is not to disparage the study of the noble classics of the Greeks and Romans, and still less that of the mathematics. We merely wish to show, what phrenology clearly proves, that the study of them is not, and cannot be, productive of all the advantages which are usually supposed to accompany it ; and to expose what we conceive to be an egregious mistake of those, who imagine that either is indispensable to great success in each and all of the liberal professions, and would therefore make an acquaintance with it a condition of our students' receiving the usual literary degrees. Both are important, and ought, undoubtedly, to be studied. But let them be studied by those, whose natural endowments fit them for such studies, and who think of entering a profession in which such knowledge is of manifest utility. Let not these studies be urged upon those, who have not the requisite capacities to succeed in them and who may therefore employ their time more profitably on other branches of learning. Here, again, the usefulness of our science appears. The time and labor which are now wasted, and the frequent, severe mortifications that are incurred, by compelling youths to pursue those studies, in which they have not sufficiently strong natural talents for succeeding, would all be saved by the adoption of phrenology. For, if this were done, then all would be educated according to their innate peculiarities of character : no pains-taking and precious time would be wasted on any, in attempting to make them what nature never intended they should be made. Not that no attempt should be made, to cultivate those faculties, which may be possessed by some in small endowment. **This should indeed be done, and phrenology unfolds the most di-**

rect means of expanding and invigorating such faculties. None of the special powers should be suffered to remain in a state of perpetual inactivity, but all should be brought into action, and directed to their appropriate objects. Not, however, with the view of producing among them an equalization of energy and power; for this, in many cases, at least, would be impossible; but because there is a peculiar, we may say, an exquisite pleasure, connected with the appropriate exercise of every human faculty.

We observe, in the next place, that phrenology is calculated to be of great use to parents. But, after the remarks which have been made on its utility in application to the business of education, little requires to be said on this point. So far as it is useful in education, it is manifestly of use to parents; for to them belongs the first and most important part of the education of children. It will teach them, among other things, in what way their children may best be governed — a kind of knowledge in which, it must be confessed, many parents are lamentably deficient. To them, it is often a matter of surprise, that their children do not all behave alike, since they are careful to treat them all in the same manner, and keep them under the influence of the same educational circumstances. But to the phrenologist, this would be no marvel. Indeed, he would recognize, in the source of the parent's wonderment, the true reason of the diversity of conduct in the children. He would see that it sprung from the very fact of their being treated alike. For he knows that there are often great differences in the natural endowments of children, even of the same family; and that, therefore, there must be a corresponding dissimilarity in the modes of treating them in order to produce a similitude of deportment and feeling. What might have an excellent influence upon one, he knows would be fatal to the virtue and well-being of another. He knows, too, that the means frequently employed to correct the wayward dispositions of the young, have a direct positive tendency to render them more turbulent, and less disposed to obedience. Of this he is just as well assured, as of the physiological axiom, that excitement and exercise of any particular organ, tends to increase its magnitude and power of action. And

this invaluable knowledge he derives from his science. Phrenology, therefore, must be of immense importance to parents and guardians, as an assistant to them in governing aright those whom the Creator has committed to their care.

And, that it is fitted to be of great use to them in selecting appropriate occupations or callings for their children, must be abundantly apparent, we think, from what has been already said. None, we trust, will pretend that something of this sort is not generally needed. It is well known, that in nothing are parents oftener perplexed, than in fixing on suitable professions or employments, for which to educate and prepare their children. In nothing, perhaps, do they oftener mistake. And when, as is frequently, if not commonly done, the subject of choosing his future occupation is left with the child, the probability of avoiding miscalculation is scarce increased. This would require a thorough knowledge of one's self, combined with a disposition to act on it. Few men can be said to know themselves. The number of youths of whom it may be said, is of course still smaller. They are usually guided by mere fancy, in making the selection, *not* by self-knowledge, and rational reflection upon their own powers; so that it not unfrequently happens, that we see a man in the pulpit, or at the bar, who ought to have been an artizan; and another at the anvil, whom nature has fitted to confer lustre and renown upon literature, oratory, and science.

It has been, and is, the misfortune of some to imagine, that mere learning, or the power to call things by different names, is enough to confer greatness and distinction. And on this principle, and in this hope, many a fond parent forces his son through a collegiate course of studies in absolute violation of the nature and capacities of the youth, who should have been put to a trade, or, perhaps, into some mercantile house, where he might be useful to himself and beneficial to others.

Parents, therefore, will not consider it as one of the least advantages of our science, that it is calculated to guard them against all miscalculation of this kind, and enable them to select for their children just that calling in life, which their natural endowments fit them to prosecute with success.

And there is yet another respect in which our science may be eminently advantageous to parents. We had thought to pass over it in silence, but further reflection convinces me that it is of too deep importance not to be adverted to. The advantage to which I refer is this : it will enable them to make a right disposition of their sons and daughters in marriage, or, at least, will prevent them from sanctioning and encouraging their matrimonial connections with persons, whose constitutional dispositions might render such connection a source of misery, and not of bliss, to the parties concerned. We need not be told, that many of the troubles and infelicities of the married state, and the numerous divorcements, with their concomitant evils, which are perpetually occurring, arise from the conjugal union of persons, whose natural failings, tastes, preferences, and peculiarities, utterly disqualify them for enjoyment of each other's society. Of this, we are all aware ; and are surprised, perhaps, that such persons do not more frequently discover their mutual unsuitableness for each other, in season to prevent these lamentable evils. But in order to have done this, either must have known the other's innate peculiarities of constitution. And of them they could only judge, by observing each other's actions, and the testimony, perhaps, of kindly friends or acquaintances ; very valuable sources of information, to be sure, and from which a correct judgement in the premises may often, but not always, be formed. Not always, I say, because the manifestations of conduct, which form the subject of observation, occur, it may be, in a widely different relation, and under very different circumstances. One, whose conduct would appear in the highest degree amiable, kind, and deferential, in some relations, might be sour, selfish, and tyrannical, in other and different relations. He who seems a saint in society, may be a savage in his family ; a contrariety of character which we could scarce imagine to exist in the same individual, were it not so frequently forced on our observation, but of which, nevertheless, we find a most clear and satisfactory explanation in the phrenological doctrines. And further ; the combination of natural qualities which would constitute one an excellent companion of this person,

would render such a one equally unfit to be the partner of that ; though in point of moral dispositions, the latter might not be at all inferior to the former. In view of these facts, then, and with only the customary means of judging of character, why should it be deemed strange that the calamities in question are not more commonly avoided ? And why should we wonder, that many have come to regard the much-talked of joys of the married life as mere chance-affairs, as unworthy to be assuredly reckoned on as the fortunate throw of a die, or as the certain success of a lottery ticket, where there are twenty blanks to a prize ? Ought we not rather be astonished, that this notion should not have won more converts than it even has, and that the evils we have adverted to, are not more numerous, and more widely extended through the social fabric, than they really are ? But these evils, numerous and extensive as they are, may be prevented, if not altogether, at least in a great measure, by the assistance which phrenology affords. They may, indeed, be in some good measure prevented, without phrenology, if persons would but act on the knowledge they already possess. But even this knowledge, they would be much more likely to practise upon, if acquainted with our science ; which, at the same time, would effectually secure them from many of the ills under consideration, to which they would otherwise be in imminent danger of falling victims.

The unthinking may smile at these announcements ; but if our science *be* a science, and not a chimera of the imagination—a wild delusion—no truth is capable of clearer demonstration than they. We need not add, how important it must therefore be to parents, who feel desirous of giving their sons and daughters such instructions, as, if observed, would guide them aright in the formation of matrimonial alliances ; and who will know when it is their duty to grant and when to withhold that assent which is usually and justly deemed of consequence to the consummation of such alliances. — We address no remarks on this subject directly to the younger members of community, whom it so vitally concerns ; because we are persuaded that if parents and guardians do but understand it, these will never be left long in ignorance of it. And

let both but know, and appreciate, and act upon its principles, and we dare affirm that a very great proportion of the misery with which society itself is afflicted would soon be got rid of; for, then, in selecting a partner, 'for better, for worse,'—which in this case, however, would always be 'for *better*,' regard would be had, not, as is now so often done, to the blandishments of wealth, and fashion, and exterior beauty, but to those eternal conditions on which the Creator has made social, intellectual, and moral enjoyments, to depend—to the physical organization, in connection with the natural endowments, the inward tendencies and dispositions of the mind, and the fitness of these last, in either party, to act in harmonious combination; all which, we say, are easily ascertainable by the lights of our new philosophy.

We mention, lastly, that phrenology is fitted to be of extensive usefulness to ministers of the gospel. In no profession is a thorough knowledge of man more indispensably important, than in the clerical. The clergyman's vocation brings him into contact with almost every imaginable variety of human character. The high and the low, the wise and the ignorant, the humble and the proud, the meek and the pugnacious, the cowardly and the daring, the cheerful and the melancholic, the credulous and the skeptical, the believing and the disbelieving, the virtuous and the vile,—all are alike the objects of his concernment, and to all he would be serviceable, by administering to their several wants and necessities. But, in order to operate successfully on persons of so widely differing dispositions and characters—to direct his efforts so as most effectually to promote their true interests respectively—it is necessary that he should know somewhat of the causes whence such diversity of character proceed; just as the physician should understand the cause of his patient's complaint, before he can prescribe the most effectual remedy. A just appreciation of these, would be to him of more real, practical usefulness, than would the utmost familiarity with all the homilies, and textual criticisms, and sectarian dogmas, and theological polemics, that have appeared since the days of the apostles. These causes, phrenology professes to unfold. It, therefore, must be of inestimable importance to

every teacher of religion — to every pastor, who would give to his flock 'a portion in due season,' and prepare their immortal minds for the society of the spirits of the just made perfect. It opens up to his view, what to others is involved in impenetrable obscurity, the principal origin of those motive-powers, which move and govern men in all the various, diversified spheres of human life. And it shows him with just what motives to ply individuals, when he would restrain them from, or direct them to, any particular course of action; a kind of knowledge, which, we think we may safely affirm, none more often feel the need of, than ministers of the gospel. Different persons are very diversely affected by the same circumstances. What would strongly move one, may be entirely inoperative upon another. All this may be generally known. But the reasons of it, are known to but very few. Hence, but very few succeed in exerting a controlling influence over numerous persons of differing qualities and dispositions. For nothing, perhaps, was the great Napoleon more distinguished, than for the power he possessed and manifested, of influencing and governing his fellow-creatures. And for this, he is supposed to have been in no small degree indebted to his deep knowledge of human nature, and his extraordinary tact in immediately detecting the peculiarities of all who chanced to come into his presence. He knew well the natural language of the various feelings, with which man is endowed. And this was, probably, the grand secret of his success in disciplining individual character, which enabled him so easily to bend men to the promotion of his own plans and purposes. But he knew not the causes which conspire to produce that diversity of character with which he was so familiar, and could so readily recognize. Phrenology only could have acquainted him with these — and a knowledge of this science, would have added much to the power, which he already possessed in so wonderful a degree. Now all will admit, that the peculiar power just adverted to, must be of immense value to all, who have much to do with influencing, governing, and directing mankind. For, it is a power which may be used for good or for evil — for engaging men in the service of Satan, or in that of the Saviour. Is

it not, then, especially important to the clergyman, who would rescue the souls of his charge from the dominion of sin, and train them up to habitudes of piety and of Christian virtue? This power may be derived from phrenology. Humble individuals may possess themselves of the invaluable boon. The clergyman, whose intellect is, as that of most men must necessarily be, immeasurably inferior to that of the gifted Napoleon, may yet derive from this science, a power of discriminating character, and a dexterity of plying individuals with just the motives and sanctions that would be most likely to effect the object aimed at, superior even to those of the renowned emperor of the French. We do not say — for we have no hope of human perfectibility here — that phrenology would enable him to make perfect saints of all, as things now are. We fear that nothing short of the exertion of a miraculous power could produce such a transformation in many. We only say, that, with it the Christian minister may do for his people, all that may be done for them, in the present circumstances of things. And this would be doing vastly more than has been or can be, done without. For centuries past, constant efforts have been making by the wise and great, to regenerate mankind; and yet, perhaps, it may well be questioned, notwithstanding all the *talk* which we hear, of the progress of our race in virtue, whether there has been a time, since the days of Melancthon and Luther, in which a great moral regeneration was more needed, than at this present period. And may we not, *a posteriori*, reasonably conclude, that other means are needed in addition to those, which the teachers of religion have generally employed, in order to make men what they should be? The unspeakable utility of preaching and praying can be doubted by none, who know anything of our nature. None can reasonably doubt, that the beneficial influence of these has been, and will be felt, by millions, both in time, and in eternity. Yet, we cannot but think, that if these means were of themselves sufficient to make mankind what they ought to be, they — those at least who live in Christian lands — had been made so, long since. It is our own humble opinion — it is, we suppose, the opinion of every phrenologist, that these means are *not* sufficient, how important soever

they may be, and that others *are* needed, to accomplish the great object proposed. Nay, as phrenologists, we not only believe, but strenuously maintain, that to accomplish for man in this life, what Christianity and Christian ministers aim to do, the highest degree of happiness of which his whole nature is here susceptible, other means as auxiliaries to the ones now used must be brought into operation. And what these are, may, we think, be learned from our science. But because we thus insist on their being employed, as an indispensable condition to accomplishing, so far as the present life is concerned, the high objects of Christianity, let no one presume to say, that we thereby undervalue the records of inspiration, and the institutions of our holy religion. The Bible is, indeed, or rather it should be, the rule of human conduct, and the directory of human faith. But it was never designed, we think, to point out all the means, by which men may be brought to regard that rule, and to cherish that faith. There was, it would seem, no necessity for this being done. For, the Author of Revelation had taken care to endow men with intellects, whereby, of themselves, they might seek out and apply many of the requisite means. He has also connected with the employment of those intellects, a consciousness of the most pleasing and grateful kind. It therefore is alike the duty and the privilege of man, to avail himself of all within his reach, that is adapted to aid him in the all-important work of conforming to the will of Heaven. And of such aid, we say, there is much to be derived from phrenology; a science, which, we believe, is, more than any other, calculated to be the handmaid of religion, and of every ennobling virtue. We need not, therefore, say anything further in proof of its utility to ministers of the Gospel. Yet it may not, perhaps, be amiss to cite the declaration of one, who has for many years enjoyed its advantages as a Christian pastor. We refer to the Rev. Dr Welsh, now Professor of Church History in the University of Glasgow, who is not only distinguished as a divine, but is, also, one of the most profound metaphysicians of the age. 'I think it right,' says the learned Professor, 'to declare, that I have found the greatest benefit from the science, as a minister of the Gospel. I have been

led to study Christianity anew in connection with phrenology, and feel my confidence in the truth of our holy religion increased by this new examination: in dealing with my people in the ordinary duties of my calling, the practical benefit I have derived from phrenology is inestimable.'

We have thus endeavored to answer the question, with which we began, 'Of what use is phrenology, if it be true?' We have, however, been able to say but little, in comparison of what might be said, on the subject of its utility. Some of the more palpable uses to which it may be applied, we have purposely left to be inferred by our readers. But enough, we trust, has been said to satisfy them, that phrenology, if true, has higher claims, on the score of usefulness, than can be justly set up in favor of any other system of moral science which has yet been known to mankind. If, indeed, in the little we have said of its merits, we have been guilty of no exaggeration—and we certainly have not been, if it is true—we think we may safely say, that, in respect of real utility, phrenology is surpassed only by the divine religion of our Saviour.

We have here a remark to offer for the consideration of those who would avail themselves directly of the practical advantages of our science. Before you can do this, my friends, you must make yourselves acquainted with its principles and true mode of applying them. This precautional advice may be deemed quite unnecessary; for it may be supposed no person of common sense would ever think of appropriating a thing to his service, without first knowing how it might be done. If so, you assuredly mistake. It is what may, it is what does happen, and not unfrequently. Every science has its sciolists. And these, unfortunately, often imagine, that all which needs, or can be known of it, is possessed by them. Phrenology, from the exceeding interest generally felt in the subjects it contemplates, is likely to have an unusual share of this sort of friends. There is uncommon danger, that many with but a mere smattering of the science, will set about applying it, or what they conceive to be it, to the practical concerns of life. Such may injure both themselves and others, and excite in more enlightened minds a most thorough contempt of phrenology and

of all that pertains to it. And it is, therefore, that I urge you to become acquainted with its principles, and the true mode of applying them, before you even dream of making the science practically useful to yourselves. We should not, perhaps, be so particular on this point if we had not already witnessed somewhat of the evil against which we admonish you. But we have seen, with emotions of sorrow, mere sciolists, and ignorant pretenders, manipulating the beads, and inferring the characters of persons, with all the gravity and assuredness of one who is a master of the science. Indeed, we think it but fair to apprise you, that it is not in the power of all to become practical phrenologists. Phrenology itself proves this, if it proves anything. The absurd assertion of a late reviewer, that 'any man, woman or child,' who will but procure a marked-plaster-bust, and read Spurzheim's description of the cerebral organs, may forthwith become a philosopher of this school, is one of the numerous slanders which have been cast on phrenology by the ignorant and the malicious. Let us not, however, rank the reviewer among those of the latter class. Charity prompts us to assign him a place in the ranks of the former. And, for ourselves, we have no doubt of his absolute unacquaintance with our science, and we found our opinion on the article itself. We feel quite sure it would have never been presented to the public, had not the author in some unlucky moment, imbibed the idea, which he has most unwittingly announced, that any one may know all of phrenology, who will take the trouble to look at a plaster-bust, and run over the leaves of Spurzheim's account of the faculties. Let those, therefore, who would know phrenology, and appropriate to themselves its inestimable benefits, beware of the stupid mistake of this reviewer, and remember, that this science, like every other that is truly valuable, can be learned only by a long-continued course of study, and careful observation. — I have said, that all may not become practical phrenologists. And the reason is, that all have not the requisite faculties sufficiently developed. One person may be profoundly skilled in the metaphysics of the science, and know scarce anything of what has been

called its organology — or, in other words, have scarce any ability to distinguish minute differences of size and configuration. Another may possess an unusual facility of perceiving the peculiar forms and dimensions of crania, and yet find it quite impossible to comprehend the philosophy of the science. Neither of them may become, what might be termed a practical phrenologist. To be able to apply the science to the common business-affairs of life, the excellence of both should be combined in the same individual. Both, however, and particularly the former, may be benefited by phrenology, and in a variety of ways ; but neither should attempt to infer character from actual développement, unless, perhaps, in very rare, extraordinary cases. Still, it may in truth be said, that men are generally competent to appreciate and apply the truths of this philosophy, if they will but bestow on the subject a reasonable share of their time and attention. But do not imagine that the benefits of phrenology will be exclusively confined to them who may have the happiness to understand it. This would be a great error. It may shed rich blessings on millions, who may live and die without so much as even hearing the sound of its name. Not one in a hundred reads Locke ; and not one in ten who does, can be said to understand him. Yet who will affirm that the world has not been benefited by the productions of that great metaphysician ? Has he not waked up in other minds, burning thoughts which have been diffused far and wide, to the unspeakable comfort and edification of millions, who know not that such a person as Locke ever existed ? The sciences of chemistry, mathematics and medicine — to what a comparatively small number are they known ! and yet, how extensive their blessings ! So of phrenology : its blessings can never be confined to those who know it. Like the benignant system of Christianity, phrenology may be of benefit to all men, and *especially* to them who know and believe its sublime discoveries.

ARTICLE II.

*Phrenology and Religion.*

Phrenology is not mere craniology. Its friends do not examine heads to become acquainted with the peculiarities of individuals, but to discover and modify the relation which nature establishes between cerebral development and mental manifestations.

The Phrenologist treats the external head as a good index to the innate tendencies of the mind ; but he values the fact that it is so, no further than it is a means for ascertaining the primitive faculties and classifying their phenomena. He studies man. He would know man—the whole man—and know for the purpose of discovering and adopting the means for his individual and social progress.

Phrenology is not a species of fortune-telling, valuable merely as a means of ascertaining individual character. It is a philosophy, a philosophy of man. It professes to throw light—a new and a strong light—on all the great problems which interest the student of human nature, whether in metaphysics, in morals, or in religion. Here is its profession. By this it would be tried, approved or condemned.

Its claims in all these respects are denied. It is said to be nothing in relation to metaphysics. It may be so, but that is worthy of inquiry. It is said, that so far from throwing any light on morals and religion, it leads to irreligion, establishes materialism, and materialism, as every body knows, must end in atheism. Perhaps so. The design of this article is to prove to the contrary—that phrenology is eminently a religious philosophy.

Phrenology is not an hypothesis, it is a science. It is not, therefore, to be tried by its consequences, but by facts. Facts will be facts. If a true knowledge of facts, which phrenology professes to be, lead to materialism, materialism is true ; if it tend to infidelity, then infidelity is true. Where religious theories and science come

in collision, religious theories, not science, must yield. Establish once that Phrenology is built on facts, be its consequence good, bad or indifferent, it is placed beyond the reach of attack. Truth, not Phrenology, would then deserve condemnation, if anything.

But this is gratuitous. Phrenology does not establish materialism. It does not teach, as materialism teaches, that the brain originates the mind, nor even that it is a condition of its existence. It merely teaches that the mind makes use of the brain as the medium of its manifestation. The brain does not think, love, hate; the man thinks, and performs all other mental acts by means of the brain, as he walks by means of his feet. The primitive faculties are not faculties of the brain, but of the man. That portion of the brain called the organ of benevolence, does not seek the good of others. The man does this. The eye does not see. The man sees. Yet he could not see very well without it. The same remark is to be made of all the cerebral organs. They do not give the faculties, they are merely the conditions of their manifestations.

The faculties are not so many distinct, independent beings. They are faculties, and of course faculties of something. They are attributes belonging to a substantive. The Materialist pronounces that substantive organized matter, the brain; the phrenologist says no such thing. He finds in that, the common centre, the unity of all the primitive faculties. All his reasonings assume it as one and indivisible as the man, the personality, the *I*. Transcendentalists, if they will, may find this *I* to be spiritual, and that it contains unity of consciousness, identity, freedom of the will, that which makes man accountable, a subject of praise or blame. If phrenology does not demonstrate that it is so, it decides nothing against it, and may be said even to demand it. Be this as it may, phrenology leaves unimpaired, all the arguments which ever have been, or can be urged in favor of spiritualism, if, indeed, it do not strengthen them.\*

These observations prove that phrenology does not establish

\* See an 'Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France, au XIX Siècle. Par M. Ph. Damiron.' Second Edition, Tome 1, page 206, et Seq.

materialism. It does not lead to irreligion ; so far from it, it is the only philosophy which is able to place religion under shelter from the blows of the infidel. The great question in relation to religion is, Has man a religious constitution, one which not only admits, but demands a religion ? Phrenology answers this question, and answers it without appeal.

To ascertain man's constitution, it is necessary to see him, to observe him. But he is seen only in action. Phrenology, therefore, takes him living, breathing, acting, and not by moieties, but wholly, soul and body—notes all the interior and exterior phenomena he exhibits ; and from them all determines what man is, what are the fundamental laws of his nature, from which he cannot depart without ceasing to be man. This is its method. Following this method, it comes to the conclusion, that man has a religious nature, and must always have a religion ; for wherever and whenever it finds him in the full possession of all his faculties, that is, a complete man, it finds him with a craving for something to worship, with some kind of religious belief or religious observance, and with cerebral organs whose special functions are to manifest the religious affections. This conclusion rests on precisely the same foundation as the conclusion, that it is natural for man to taste food, from the fact he craves it, has always taken it, and has the necessary organs for masticating and digesting it.

Phrenology, then, settles the question of religion, and settles it, too, in precisely the same way that any question in natural history is settled. It makes it a fact in the natural history of man, and rests it on a foundation, eternal and indestructible, as his own constitution. It declares man a religious being, and that it is as absurd to allege that religion is not natural to him, as it would be to allege that it is not natural for sheep to live in flocks, for bees to make honey, or lions to live in solitude. This places the question of religion or no religion beyond dispute.

But phrenology goes still further. It not only demonstrates that man has a religious nature, it explains all the phenomena that occur in his religious history. It gives the *why* and the *wherefore*, in reference to all the greater and minuter shades of religious be-

lief, feeling, or practice, which arrest our attention in different ages, different nations, different stages of civilization, in different individuals even in the same individual at different periods of his life. This is no slight source.

Phrenology divides the primitive faculties into three classes, the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect. These three classes of faculties are not always found bearing the same proportion in all individuals. In some the intellect may be most developed and active; in others the sentiments; and in others still, the propensities. Every difference of development and of activity, necessarily gives a different shade to belief and practice.

Religion depends on the sentiments. We do not reason ourselves into religion; we do not receive it from without: it grows out of our own nature. But the sentiments do not see religion,—they merely crave it. They determine us to religion, but do not determine what our religion shall be. They are blind. The intellect is their light, but if that be unenlightened, if that be dark, then the light which is in us is darkness, the blind, then, lead the blind, and both must fall into the ditch. The religious sentiments may be powerful in a man, may act with great energy; but if he have not a well developed and active intellect, his notions of religion will be low and worthless. His religious feelings will be strong, but his religious ideas will be puerile. Give the same feelings but a powerful and enlightened intellect, and you have a determinate religion of an altogether different character.

Religion does not depend on one faculty or tone. A man may have large Marvellousness, Wonder, and Ideality, but small Conscientiousness, Reverence, and Benevolence. Such a man will not have a religion of the same character, as the one who has the first-named three faculties small, and the last three large. Other things being equal, the man with the first three large, and the others small, will have much concern with the invisible, the mysterious, and the spiritual. He very possibly may be a great believer in spirits, in presentiments, in charms, in supernatural communications; but he will be careless of the welfare of his fellow-beings, and generally faulty in the moral part of his religion.

The one with the last three large, but the others small, will have a great reverence for the good, will always regard the right, and be exact in all his duties to man; but he may want faith in the invisible and the supernatural.

The sentiments are divided into superior and inferior. The superior sentiments may be the same, but if Self-esteem and Firmness be very large, the religious belief will be very different from what it would be, were they small and Approbativeness very large. Any one faculty, large or small, gives a shade to religion, though all the others be the same. This is true of the propensities. Large Destructiveness and Combativeness, with small Philoprogenitiveness and Adhesiveness, will not allow the same religious result, as there would be, were they reposed. The same, too, is true of the intellect. The sentiments and propensities being the same, any variation in the intellectual faculties will change the religious character. Give large perceptive, and small reflective powers, and you will have a different religion from what you would have from large reflective, and small perceptive powers. So give large Causality, and small Comparison, or large Comparison and small Causality, and you give a different shade to religious belief or practice.

Phrenology recognizes a plurality of primitive faculties. Each one of these faculties becomes an element in the religious character. There may, then, be as many religious differences among mankind, as there can be different combinations of the simple elements, or primitive faculties. From these different combinations result all religious differences, and indeed all diversity of character. The law of their combination is the size of their organs, and the education of the individual. Give the character of an individual, or indeed of a nation, and the phrenologist will give you the cerebral organization and education; or give him the cerebral organization and education, and he will give the religion, and the individual or national character. Here is a key to the past: phrenology, when it shall have attained its maturity, will throw a new light over the past; it will make it better known than it was to itself.

But phrenology does not stop with explaining the differences which have obtained, and which now obtain in men's notions of religion and in their religious practices ; but it gives the criterion by which every religion is to be tried, and the true one determined. This, in this age of sects and parties, when the multiplicity of creeds demanding belief is driving men to doubt, and filling them with perplexity, must give a peculiar value to phrenology, and render it peculiarly welcome.

The object of religion is the growth and perfection of the whole man. That is the true religion which demands the free, full, and harmonious development of all the primitive faculties. Phrenology, alone, determines the number and character of these faculties, and what is the order in which they should be developed, to produce the greatest possible degree of perfection ; it therefore, alone, has the power of determining what religion will answer the end of all religion, and thus prove itself the true one. Man is a threefold being ; he has three sets of faculties, animal, intellectual and moral. No religion which consults and exercises only one set of these faculties, can be the true one ; for it would, as far as it had any influence, mutilate the human mind, and present the incomplete, instead of the complete, man. A religious system, appealing to the animal nature alone, would not only want a really religious character, but the highest perfection it could give to man, would be only animal perfection. One appealing only to the sentiments, would offend the intellect and prevent its growth ; one simply to the intellect, would leave the whole affective nature, to wither or die, or merely breed corruption.

Phrenology determines the order in which the three classes should be developed, to give the greatest perfection to the whole man. The human mind is not a democracy. All its faculties are good, and equally good, in their places ; but not to be masters. The human mind is a hierarchy, and it makes some difference which is at its base or summit. Phrenology determines the highest position ; the supremacy belongs to the moral nature, the lowest position to the animal ; where this order is in part, or wholly inverted, the natural harmony is broken, and perfection is rendered

not only difficult, but impossible. True religion, then, will assign the highest place to the moral, and the lowest to the animal, nature. But as the moral and animal natures are both blind, it will make use of the intellect to enlighten, to discover the objects proper for them both to seek and possess.

Of the sentiments, too, some are more fit to rule than others. Marshalled under marvellousness, they will not attain to so great a moral eminence as under reverence, or benevolence. We may, however, say, that religion which gives the highest place, the greatest exercise to conscientiousness, reverence and benevolence ; the second place and next degree of exercise to marvellousness, hope and ideality ; the third to the inferior sentiments ; the fourth to philoprogenitiveness, inabitiveness, and adhesiveness, and circumspection ; the lowest to the remaining propensities, and appealing all the time to the whole intellect, especially to individuality and eventuality, causality and comparison, will be the truest to man's nature, and the one best adapted to his greatest possible perfection as an individual, as a member of society, and as a worshipper of God.

Here then, we have a test for all religions. Nearly all religions may be determined by the character of the being, or beings, they present as the supreme object of worship. Every religion has its impersonation in its God. Take the character of the Mahometan, the Jewish or the Christian God, at once determines the respective merits or demerits of the Mahometan, Jewish or Christian religion. The same remark applies to all possible systems of religion which have existed, or which may exist.

We should be glad to see the character of God, as presented by Christianity, phrenologically analyzed. The analysis would be interesting, and the best commentary that could be written on the Christian scriptures. We cannot attempt it, we can only indicate it. We may say, however, that he is one, invisible, spiritual, just, benévolent, holy, true, immutable, perfect, omnipotent, creator and controller of all events. Such a Being must satisfy, at least, Individuality, Marvellousness, Conscientiousness, Benevolence, Reverence, Hope, Ideality, Causality, Comparison, Order, and the inferior sentiments ; and when we add his paternal relation

to us, and his tender care of us, we find in him that which satisfies our whole nature, when the different elements of that nature are developed and exercised in their due order. When also we look closer, and observe that Christianity dwells particularly on God's justice, holiness and love, giving them the preëminence, we shall find its ideal of perfection, and that given by phrenology, are exactly the same. Man by Christianity is required to be like God, and from the character it gives of God, phrenology demonstrates that likeness to him would be the highest perfection of our nature.

Now appears the truth of Christianity. Suppose a heathen should have proposed likeness to his Jupiter, or Mars, or Apollo, or to the different excellences of all his gods, would he have proposed the true object of pursuit? Certainly not. No one, or all his gods put together, could give a model of perfection. The 'Deus optimus maximus' of the Greeks and Romans, although intellectual enough, had more of the lower than of the higher nature. He was greatly deficient in justice, holiness and love, consequently could never have given in his worshippers the greatest exercise to Conscientiousness, Reverence and Benevolence.

All religions seek to make the worshipper like the object he worships; but no religion except the Christian, presents an object of worship to whom likeness would be perfection. And even professed Christians do not always do this. Many sects present us a God, to whom we should deem it a reproach to be likened. But this is nothing strange. They make God after themselves; and not being perfect themselves, and not knowing what constitutes perfection, it is impossible that they should not make him imperfect. Phrenology will correct them. It tells them what are the elements of perfection, and how those elements should be combined; knowing this, they will cease to ascribe imperfection to God.

In determining the character of the Christian's God, we have determined the character of Christianity. But we may go still further; we may analyze the character of Jesus, or we may take the precepts and doctrines of the religion itself. In either case, we shall come to the conclusion that the Christian's and the phrenologist's ideas of perfection are precisely the same. In the phrenologist's estimation, Jesus is the model of a perfect man. The

phrenologist loves to contemplate the character of Jesus. He is struck with its harmony. It was a character of perfect symmetry. Every thing was in its place. Every part was so disposed as to give the greatest strength and beauty to the whole. It was complete. Nothing was wanting. He had the animal nature, but it was in subjection to the moral. He was tempted, felt the workings of ambition and self-esteem, but he never yielded. He cast the temper behind him. His courage and firmness blended in with his sense of right, his reverence and his love, and bore him onward in his career, though it was beset with dangers, and enabled him to meet unshrinkingly the painful death of the cross. His intellect grasped truth in its elements and universality, but was used only to enlighten his duty, his devotion and his philanthropy. Conscientiousness, Reverence, and Benevolence were his predominant faculties. He prayed to God, submitted to the will of God with the most perfect acquiescence, and went about doing good. Here is the phrenologist's ideal of perfection.

If we descend to the religion itself, we shall find it perfectly corresponding with the character already given of God, and of Jesus. Jesus was its impersonation. He was the image of God. A comparison of his character, as we have presented it, with that which we have also given of God, will prove that he was like God, was the manifestation of God, 'God manifest in the flesh,' the divine attributes shining out in all their glory, as far as it was possible for them to shine out in one in the flesh. We might decide in advance, then, that his religion must be like him,—one that contemplates a perfection modelled after his own. It is so. His religion everywhere gives the supremacy to the moral nature. It places worth in the heart, and values the man by what he is in himself. It exhorts him to keep the body, the animal or carnal nature, in subjection. It values right feeling more than right thinking. Its great law is love to God and man. Indeed it places the whole excellence of man in obedience to the law of love. A new commandment was given that we should love one another, as Jesus loved us. That which is declared to be the fulfilling of the whole law,—that on which hang all the law and the prophets, is,

‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.’

The only meaning of this is, thy whole nature, all thy faculties shall be in subjection to love to God, and love to man; that is, phrenologically, all thy faculties, thy whole nature, should be exercised in subordination to Reverence, love to God, Benevolence, and—love to man in scripture, always including the idea of the right—Conscientiousness. Reverence, Conscientiousness, and Benevolence have then the supremacy as they had in Jesus, and he is no true Christian in whom they do not govern. This is what Christianity teaches. It is what phrenology teaches. If one be true, so must be the other. We might pursue this subject further, but is unnecessary. What we have said, will be sufficient to open to the glorious field which the Christian philosopher should cultivate, and that was all we intended. We did not intend to exhaust our subject, but merely to throw out hints for others. We should, indeed, be glad to descend to particulars, and hope we shall be able, in a future number, to point out, in some respects, the value of phrenology as a Christian commentator. All that we can say now, is, that the Christian scriptures, precepts, and doctrines, interpreted fully and fearlessly by phrenology, will be seen to possess a truth, a power, a loveliness, which the warmest of their friends have not yet ascribed to them. We shall never be able to comprehend the religion of Jesus, till it is enlightened by a true philosophy of man. That religion is not itself a philosophy;—it is a religion;—it comes with truth and power, it breaks forth in a hymn of inspiration; but it gives no account of itself, none of the reasons for its being, and for what it does. We would know why it is the true religion, why it bears the character it does, why it is fitted to man, and wherefore it deserves to be supported. Phrenology answers all these questions, it renders an account of Christianity. Let it do this, and it will be called what it, indeed, is, **THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIANITY.**

ARTICLE III.

‘ *Christian Spectator.* ’

IN the numbers of the *Christian Spectator* for Sept. and Dec. 1834, has appeared, in two numbers, an article headed ‘ *Phrenology,* ’ being a review of three phrenological works. It is our wish to offer some considerations upon this piece.

It is rather a medley — bestowing upon the phrenologists some encomiums, as flattering, perhaps, as any they have ever received — and at the same time, assailing them with ridicule, which we should suppose was intended to be uncommonly severe.

The Reviewer commences by laying down the six fundamental propositions under which he will include the doctrines of phrenology, —viz.

1. The mind is dependent in this life upon organization, and more particularly upon the brain as its special organ.
2. The faculties are innate.
3. The brain is a congeries of organs ; each organ being the appropriate instrument of a fundamental faculty.
4. The size of the brain *measures*, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, the power of the whole mind ; and the size of the individual cerebral organs measures in like manner the energy of the individual mental faculties.
5. The situation of the several organs is susceptible of ascertainment, and has been made known by phrenologists.
6. Mental character, or the absolute and relative strength of the elementary faculties, may be readily discovered by observing the prominence or development of certain regions of the head which have been marked out.

We have no objections to this statement of phrenological doctrine, except with regard to the fifth and sixth articles ; upon these we shall remark hereafter.

The amount of what the Reviewer has said may be arranged under the following divisions :—

1. His argument in favor of the first and third propositions.
2. His remarks upon the fourth proposition, and on the fifth and sixth in connection.
3. His observations upon the phrenological system of mental classification.

With respect to the first we can only express our entire satisfaction, and the hope that the number of those who think in like manner may be multiplied. But as to the second, we are not satisfied ; for, to say nothing of the character of this part of the article, we consider the arguments, though specious, as entirely weak and inconclusive. They are briefly thus :—

‘ Size *measures*, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, the power of the whole mind,’ &c. the ‘ other things ’ are,

1. ‘ Health, which varies infinitely, and which there are no certain means of measuring.’
2. ‘ Particular cerebral organization, of which there is no infallible index.’
3. ‘ Habits of exercise which are all powerful in creating differences by the development of susceptibilities and capacities that might have remained dormant.’
4. ‘ Temperament, whose influence may be estimated in a rough and general way.’
5. ‘ Perhaps other states and conditions of the vital energies, which can neither be appreciated by our faculties, nor expressed by our language.’

The Reviewer admits, (p. 536) that these ‘ other things ’ modify the principle of size as measuring power, only as applied to *different individuals* ; for ‘ these circumstances may be safely considered as nearly equal, or at least not very diverse in the different parts of the same brain.’

Now, let it be observed, that between individuals, the only thing to be measured is the absolute force of the whole mind. For, this being decided, and the relative power of organs in each of the individuals separately, being settled, then the relative power of any organ, between the different individuals is known of course. For when one brain is more powerful as a whole, than another

its predominant organs will be more powerful than the predominant organs of the other; and so on. We shall then consider separately, each of the above five 'other things,' as modifying the principle of *size* as a measure of absolute force of different minds considered as wholes.

1. 'Health, which varies infinitely, and which there are no certain means of measuring.' It is evident, that if of two equal sized brains, one is healthy and the other not, they cannot be equal in power; or of two unequal brains, if the smaller be healthy and vigorous, and the larger be sickly and diseased, the former will ordinarily be the more powerful. Now it is evident that the terms healthy and unhealthy must be used in a general sense; for the usual or general degree of mental power can be only affected by the usual, or general degree of cerebral health. Now, can it be pretended that the relative health of two brains cannot be easily known? If there be no signs to the contrary, the cerebral health will be as the general bodily health; and every individual or his friends, or his physician can determine that with accuracy fully sufficient for all practical purposes,—and if there be signs to the contrary, they can be equally seen and appreciated. Wherein then is the principle of *size*, as measure of power, rendered useless by this item?

2. 'Particular cerebral organization, of which there is no infallible index.' In regard to this head, we differ totally from our Reviewer. He says that there is a certain fineness of texture, and perfection of organization, which, in case of the cerebral organs in particular, is an important element of power,—and which cannot be known, but by its effects, the force which it gives.—This 'theory' he pronounces to be abundantly supported by facts. And the facts are, that he has often noticed individuals whose character was directly at variance with the shape of their heads, and that 'every one must have observed' the same thing, except those who are blinded by prejudice. Thus, the argument is this:

1. There are numerous cases where character and cerebral development are at variance.

2. To account for this, there must be supposed some structural differences of organs.

3. This difference can be ascertained only by its effects. To this we reply. 1. We have already shown from the Reviewer's own admission, that these 'other things' apply only to differences between whole brains, and not to the separate parts of the same brain. How happens it, then, that this item is mentioned at all, since its effect, is only, according to the Reviewer's own showing, upon different parts of the same brain? and when, too, according to his own admission above quoted, it does not affect the value of the principle of size, as applied to different parts of the same brain,—since he admits that the 'other things' are equal, or nearly so, in reference to parts of the same brain.

2. Whatever the facts are which the Reviewer has often noticed, and which every body else must have noticed, they can have no weight, unless they be produced. Is the assertion of a single individual that he has noticed facts so and so, without any specification or reference to any one of them, the when or the where, to have any weight in deciding a point such as this? Let the Reviewer state and substantiate his facts, as phrenologists have done theirs, before he proceeds to reason upon them, and draw such important conclusions;—for ourselves we deny the existence of any such facts (until further evidence) as shall render it necessary to suppose any 'other particular cerebral organization,' than what is already included under the head of Temperament.

3. 'Habits of exercise, which are all powerful in creating differences by the development of susceptibilities and capacities that might have remained dormant.'

That this item is in the same predicament with the last, is evident,—for habits of exercise affect the relative strength of organs in the same brain, whereas the Reviewer applies all the 'other things,' only in case of comparing different heads; but even in the same head, this item, (according to the admission above cited and referred to) as one of the 'other things,' must be considered to affect all parts of the same brain, nearly if not

quite equally ; so that somehow there appears to be, in this neighborhood, something very like a palpable contradiction.

4. 'Temperament, whose influence may be estimated in a rough and general way.'

Under this head is included everything that respects particular fineness of cerebral structure, or the reverse. Whatever the Reviewer may have read, or not read on the subject, we venture to assert that the rules for judging of the different temperaments *are* laid down in the principal phrenological writers, particularly in the volume of Spurzheim, treating of Physiognomy. A work which, owing to his apparent ignorance on the subject, and his assertion, 'that the fathers of the science, Gall and Spurzheim, scarce mention' this, among the other particulars 'at all,' — it is to be supposed he has not read, and which we recommend to his speedy perusal.

5. 'Perhaps other states and conditions of the brain and vital energies, which can neither be appreciated by our faculties, nor expressed by our language.'

We cannot expect to accomplish anything in the consideration of so profound a subject. We can only express our wonder at the extent of the Reviewer's imagination, which can thus grasp at things which are past his comprehension and the comprehension of all the world beside. It is probable that these mysterious 'certain other states,' &c., could anybody once form a conception of them, would strike a death-blow to the principle in question ; but as nobody ever can, (not even the Reviewer,) we rest secure.

The general conclusion at which we arrive, then, is this,— there are two things which modify the principle, — that size measures power in relation to different heads, viz. Health and Temperament. The others we have shown to be irrelevant, and these two are not such as destroy and impair the utility of the general principle, inasmuch as they may be judged of with a good degree of accuracy.

The reasoning of the Reviewer has, chiefly, been thus far theoretical. And so has been our reply. We would now propose one question, which shall, at least, have some reference to facts.

How happens it, that Gall, Spurzheim, Combe, (to mention no others,) with 'a slight inspection of heads, thumbing of bumps,' and 'slurring over very slightly,' all these circumstances, which, individually, and far more in their collective force, modify the action of organs,' and which are such 'serious, and, in fact, insuperable obstacles' to accuracy, taking it for granted they were of slight moment,'— have nevertheless been able to read men's characters with such unvarying precision, and 'infallible truth.' The FACTS are notorious, and we will weigh them against the Reviewer's THEORY.

As to what is said of breadth being one of the elements of power in an organ, and of its being unascertainable, we remark—  
 1. In general, the breadth is to be supposed proportionate to the length. So that when an organ is very prominent, it is proportionately broad.\* 2. If this be not an invariable rule, the

\* 'In estimating the size of the organs, both length and breadth must be attended to. The length of an organ is ascertained by the distance from the *medulla oblongata* to the peripheral surface. A line passing through the head from one ear to the other, would nearly touch the *medulla oblongata*, and hence the external opening of the ear is assumed as a convenient point from which to estimate length. The breadth of an organ is judged of by its peripheral expansion; and it is a general law of physiology, that the breadth of any organ throughout its whole course, bears a relation to its expansion at the surface: the optic and olfactory nerves are examples in point. It has been objected that the breadth of the organs cannot be ascertained, because the boundaries of them are not sufficiently determinate.

In answer, I observe, that although the boundaries of the different organs cannot be determined with mathematical precision, like those of a triangle, a square, or rhomboid; yet, in a single case, an accurate observer may make a very near approximation to the truth; and, in a great multitude of cases, the very doctrine of chances, and of the compensation of errors, must satisfy any one, that these boundaries may be defined with sufficient precision for all practical purposes. Even in the exact sciences themselves, an approximate solution is frequently all that is attainable; and if the opponents would only make themselves masters of the binomial theorem, or pay a little attention to the expansion of infinite series, they would not persist in calling for a degree of accuracy which is impossible, or in neglecting an important element in a calculation, because it is involved in a certain liability to error within very narrow limits. The absurdity of the reason assigned for this omission, is rendered still more apparent by the case of the {prismatic spectrum, which I conceive

judgment of the examiner, perfected by practice, will enable him to assign the correct boundaries ; which it seems such men as above referred to have done, probably on account of their large development of the organ of 'Gullibility,' in which the Reviewer is so lamentably deficient.

Before proceeding to the examination of the Reviewer's remarks upon classification, we will introduce one or two quotations in regard to another topic

The fifth and sixth general propositions of phrenological doctrine, as laid down by the Reviewer have been already quoted. We consider them, and many assertions of a similar bearing, as er-

to be exactly in point. Now, what is it that this beautiful phenomenon displays ? The seven primary colors, arranged in a peculiar order, and glowing with an almost painful intensity. But each of these colors occupies a certain space in relation to the whole, the boundaries of which it may be impossible for the hand or eye to trace with geometrical precision, although the relative space in question has nevertheless been made the subject of measurement, and a very close approximation obtained from the mean of a vast number of trials. According to the principle followed by some antiphrenologists, however, *breadth* should be altogether neglected, because the boundaries of the respective colors are, forsooth, "purely ideal," as if a mathematical line were not the most perfect idealism or abstraction which the mind of man can possibly form. This idealism, or abstraction, however, has no more to do with those approximations which may be obtained practically by repeated trials, than the mathematical definition of a line with a metallic rod ; and it is a mere quibble to pretend, for example, that we ought not to measure the length of the rod, because it may not correspond with the definition of the line. Upon the strange principle which some opponents have adopted, they must be prepared to maintain, that the boundaries of a hill or hillock are purely *ideal*, and depend in *every* instance on the *fancy* of the measurer.\*

The science of Geology affords another illustration. The leading rocks bear so many characteristic marks of distinction, that no ordinary observer can mistake them ; yet particular specimens approach the same standard so nearly that the most skilful observers will sometimes err, and believe basalt to be clay-stone, — or gneiss, granite. In teaching this science, however, the leading features of the rocks are found sufficient to guide the student to knowledge of the principles ; and his own sagacity, improved by experience, enables him in due time to deal successfully with the intricacies and difficulties of the study. The same rule ought to be followed in cultivating phrenology. — *Combs*. Ed.

\* *Caledonian Mercury*, 11th June 1839.

roneous. The fifth assumes that phrenologists consider the science as complete, and the organs as all established. The sixth states that character may be *readily* discovered by examining developments. Now, we distinctly affirm that both of these assumptions are untrue. Many of the organs in the present phrenological system are laid down as '*probable*,' and open to farther discussion ; and it is admitted by all the principal phrenologists that the science cannot be considered complete, and that new organs are probably yet to be discovered, in those parts of the brain hitherto unappropriated.

Moreover, it is clearly laid down in all phrenological works, that to read character, something else is required beside examination of developments ;— viz. a knowledge of health and previous education, and temperament. The first and last in reference to different individuals ; the second in the organs of the same individual ;—and that it is not a matter which can be **READILY** performed, but requiring, in the operator, a peculiar conformation and much practice. These things the Reviewer appears to be ignorant of, or to have forgotten, when he makes such quotations as these :

'But, were phrenology based upon unmixed and immutable truth ; were its data fixed instead of being variable ; had its rules all the accuracy and universality which its stanchest advocates claim for them ; still we would say, it is not a science calculated to be so extensively and practically useful as is pretended.' ( p. 537. )

'But were the phrenological classification of the mental powers the best, all things considered, which the world has ever known ; it does not follow as a consequence, that every other classification must be worthless, or fanciful, or absurd, as phrenologists seem to think.' ( p. 540. )

'They have presented us with dross for gold, chaff for wheat, while at the same time they maintain, with singular pertinacity and not a little noise, that they deal in nought but immaculate truth—that their science never misleads, never errs.'

One more, to which we forbear to give a name :—

'They say that their mode of ascertaining character and peculiar

endowments, is incomparably the best that has ever been invented : THAT THE VERIEST DUNCE IS ADEQUATE TO LEARN AND FOLLOW IT.'

In regard to this latter assertion, we risk nothing in saying that no phrenologist should be so audacious as to say that the Reviewer was adequate to learn and follow it, and it is very strange to hear such a charge from the man who shortly after says thus :—

'It is no easy matter to acquire that facility in marking and measuring protuberances, that precision in estimating and balancing the influence of organs and faculties, and those habits of rapid observation and combination, which ALL AGREE to be necessary to make an accomplished and successful practitioner of the art. \* \* \* \* \* There are *very few* who have observing and combining powers at all adequate to such nice discrimination, comparison and judgment.' Yet phrenologists say that the *veriest dunce* is adequate to learn and follow ! but it is passing strange that such a charge should be made in the face of their repeated and deliberate assertions of directly the opposite.

In respect to classification, still assuming the same thing that phrenologists consider their system perfect, the Reviewer goes on to show that it is not, by establishing the 'redundancy' of the following faculties : Form, Individuality, Eventuality, Comparison, Firmness, and Constructiveness.

The argument by which he establishes the 'redundancy' of Form, is peculiarly lucid ; it is this. Size involves Form. 'The former faculty in every exercise of its function necessarily performs the function of the latter.' Should we adopt the same method of argument as this, it were easy to refute the Reviewer's position by saying that size does not involve form ; nor does the function of the former include that of the latter, and the one assertion, for aught the reviewer has said to the contrary, has as much weight as the other.

We choose, however, to assign reasons for our opinion.

The assertion amounts to this,—that we cannot judge of size without judging of form at the same time. But if a cube be com-

pared to a sphere, we can judge them to be equal in *size*, and yet different in shape ; but does the same faculty appreciate in objects two different qualities ? and are not size and shape different and distinct ?

The shape of a circle is the same, be it large or small ; the size of a mountain is the same, be it round and smooth, or rugged and abrupt ; but if size involves form, they may always bear some relation to each other in objects ; but as they evidently do not, they are independent and separate—and consequently cannot both be judged of one mental faculty.

In respect to Individuality, the Reviewer's argument is that it merely repeats the work already accomplished by size, number, form, &c. This is not true—Individuality does not perceive either form, color, size, &c. in an object—but merely the object itself, which is made up of these. It is the faculty which conceives of as *ONE*, something which is compound. Tree is a compound, colors, shapes, &c. ; but the conception awakened in Individuality by the name Tree, is a simple idea of a *thing*. So of the terms *man*, *army*, and all general names of a like nature ; without Individuality we could conceive of a multitude of shapes, sizes, colors, &c. but could never embody them in single conceptions, as we now do in every thing which has a *name*.

What the similar course of reasoning is by which the Reviewer would show the redundancy of Eventuality, we cannot say, and only observe, that by a similar course of reply, we would show that it is not redundant.

The Reviewer thinks ' that it can be shown that the functions, which are attributed to Comparison are included in those assigned to other ( the perceptive ) faculties ; ' what reasons he has for thinking so, we are not informed. But if he be correct, we would ask which of the perceptive faculties is it, that can trace resemblances between one abstract train of thought and another ? Can tune compare a sound with color, or can *color* do it ? Can any perceptive faculty compare a sound with a size or shape ; but these things are done ? different sounds of the musical scale are regarded by almost every one as having different colors. We speak of round, smooth, full

notes, sharp, rugged, harsh sounds, of great noises, or of *small silvery* tones. Now, will it be said that these are all metaphorical and figures of speech? True—but they are founded on RESEMBLANCE—a sound is compared with a shape when it is called round, smooth, sharp, &c.; with a size when called great or small. Now what perceives this analogy? It is obvious that none of the perceptive faculties can do this—each can compare the objects of its own perception together—but cannot compare them with those of another—hence there is necessity for comparison.

The Reviewer defines Firmness to be the organ which gives constancy and perseverance to the action of the other faculties. This is as much of a definition, as though we should define a cannon to be ‘that which makes a great noise.’

True, firmness *does* what is attributed to it in this definition, and so does the cannon do what is attributed to it—but they are neither of them defined or described.

The true function of this organ is very difficult to be set forth in words, although all have seen and felt it in a greater or less degree. We shall attempt it by showing the difference between the character governed, as the Reviewer says, by some predominant faculty without Firmness, and the one where firmness is predominant.

When the latter has once made a resolve, no matter what the consequences may be, he will abide by it, he becomes as inflexible as steel, whether the determination be, or be not according to the prompting of the faculties next in size to firmness. But with the former it is not so; he will, it is true, *in the main* gratify the predominant organs, and so he would with firmness; but he may make resolutions by scores, and in the rise of circumstances and changes of excitement, they will vanish like straws before a driving wind; to-day he will decide to gratify his ruling propensities one way, to-morrow another; and thus will he veer to all points with every wind that breathes.

Suppose a father whose predominating traits are Firmness, Philoprogenitiveness and Combativeness, powerful in the order in

which we have mentioned them. Under a sudden and violent excitement of Combativeness, he may exile from his roof his beloved son. The anger passes away, and Philoprogenitiveness resumes its sway ; without Firmness, the recall of the son would immediately ensue — but in the case now supposed, *never*. The fiat is gone forth, and though his heart may yearn — though he may weep in secret over his lost son, never will he revoke the sentence. By the action of firmness he becomes as marble, immoveable, unchangeable.

Such cases as this are not uncommon, and they establish the principle. Next, the Reviewer proceeds to strike out Constructiveness. He asks why it prompts bees to build after one only pattern, beavers after another, &c. &c. And since phrenologists cannot explain the reason, and therefore the faculty ‘explains nothing,’ why suppose it to exist?

Constructiveness is the propensity to construct : does the Reviewer mean that this propensity does not exist, because in some animals it is exercised in one way, and in others in another ?

Why does the organ of Tune prompt one man to play the guitar, another the violin, the piano, flute, &c. &c. ?

Why does one man’s Causality delight in mathematical reasonings, and the same organ in another, delight in abstract metaphysics ?

Why does one man’s propensity to acquire, lead him to amass wealth ; that of another, pictures, relics, old books, &c. ; another, horses, grounds, &c. ?

Tune is still the faculty of judging tones, though it prefers one set of tones to another ; Causality is still the power and disposition to reason from cause and effect, though it prefers one set of causes and effects to another ; Acquisitiveness is the propensity to acquire, though it desires to acquire sometimes one kind of things, sometimes another ; so, also, Constructiveness is still the propensity to build, though in one animal it is directed in one way, and in others in different ways.

The Reviewer here concludes that he has done enough to illustrate the imperfection of the Phrenological Classification. We do not contend that it is perfect — but we think that the Reviewer has

not made a very judicious selection of the points of attack. The Reviewer goes on to add, that if phrenology *be true*, it does not prove that other systems are false ; that in mental, as in natural philosophy, there may be different systems of classification— We reply :—

The entire phrenological system is founded wholly on the great fundamental law, of the dependence of all mental phenomena upon cerebral organization, and the observation of physiological facts. All other systems are founded differently, leaving this principle entirely, or almost entirely out of the question. Hence, the phrenological classification is based upon actual observation of man, **AS HE REALLY IS**. Other systems are founded upon an exclusive observation of mental facts, disconnected with cerebral organization, and consequently upon the observation of man **AS HE REALLY IS NOT**. Whether systems so differently based, can be equally true, or equally useful, seems to us as a problem of no difficult solution.

The following assertion deserves rebuke. Phrenology ‘says nothing of cause and effect ; it says nothing of the grand and all-pervading principle of Association’—both assertions are false, and that the Reviewer may enlighten his eyes on the subject, we invite him carefully to peruse the following Articles. Spurzheim’s Philosophy, Vol. II. Articles, ‘ASSOCIATION,’ and ‘Modification of the affective and intellectual phenomena’—passages which we presume have hitherto escaped his notice. Also, the article in Mr. George Combe’s work on Phrenology, headed ASSOCIATION ; which, as it is in one of the volumes under the Reviewer’s notice, must be supposed to be casually absent from the edition which he used.\*

In the number of the Spectator for June, 1835, there has appeared another article upon Phrenology, headed, Phrenological

\* The remainder of this article was received after the first part was in type, and was intended for a separate insertion in this journal ; but, as the first had not been put to press, and both relate to articles which appeared in the Spectator, we have concluded that it would be more acceptable to our readers to present them in connexion. [ED.]

Improvements in Mental Science and Education. To this we propose to call the attention of readers for a few moments.

It has a list of five phrenological works prefixed to it—upon each of which it bestows a short notice, in commencing, and afterward by occasional references. The justice of the remarks upon these works can best be estimated by the public, by an examination of the works themselves—by their own merits let them be judged. We wish to attend to other points in the Article. And first,—

It is to be lamented that a periodical of the acknowledged worth and dignity of the Christian Spectator, should have admitted to its pages an article written in such a *spirit* as that of the one in consideration. In the discussion of a subject of such great interest and importance as the science of Phrenology, a subject admitted to be important, even by enemies—nothing can be more ill-judged than the tone of flippant ironical jeering, and overbearing sarcastic ridicule, which characterizes the article from beginning to end. The author seems to have mounted his throne of criticism, and to look down upon ‘these phrenologists,’ ‘this fraternity,’ ‘these cran- iological doctors,’ ‘these presumptuous dogmatists,’ with the most supreme hauteur—as though phrenological sentiments were a grievous thing to be laid to a man’s charge, a sign of mental imbecility, or monomania, or something of the kind. He displays the unfortunate phrenologist in the most ludicrous and mortifying attitudes his wit can invent, and yet in an off-hand, careless manner, as though he were a god descended from Olympus, amusing himself with the frailties of puny mortals.

The writer would perhaps have been wise, to have reflected that this style of treating Phrenology, has had its day successively in France, England, and Scotland, and that having in each of the three countries become old, stale, and ridden to death, and been driven like a gloomy ghost across the dark waters of the Atlantic Styx, it could scarce avail more, even under the banner of the Christian Spectator, than its pristine vigor was able to accomplish in the land of its nativity. But lamentations will not avail; the piece is before us as it is, and we must take it as it is.

We proceed to examine the subject matter of the piece, in doing which we find it necessary to take notice of a series of eleven misrepresentations, which we shall take substantially in the order of their succession in the piece before us : we shall be obliged to introduce many quotations, but no more than is absolutely necessary to exhibit our meaning.

Misrepresentation 1. 'The purpose of the fraternity, if we rightly interpret their writings, is, to recast, in the Phrenological mould, all feelings and principles, all modes of speaking and acting now in vogue ; that this idea of theirs is deliberate and well digested, not a wild dream or momentary phrenzy, caught up for the time being, is manifest from the radical nature, and tremendous scope of their plans of improvement. They mean to begin with the babe, at its first entrance into being. No sooner does it breathe the vital air, than it shall inhale the delicious odors of Phrenology. They mean to carry this new regimen forward through all the stages of its ascent to the maturity of being ; so that all the notions of men, political, social, moral, intellectual, and religious, are to be dyed through and through, in the colors of this science. They intend to root out the old ideas of teaching and preaching from among men, since, in spite of them, we still have the abounding ignorance, iniquity and misery of a fallen world. They see clearly how their *inventions* can remedy these disorders. To this end, governments must be torn down and reconstructed, education metamorphosed, and religion new-fangled, according to the latest phrenological discoveries.' pp. 274, 5.

Here we have a most astounding charge—Phrenologists, ('the fraternity') 'have a deliberate and well-digested' plan to (1) recast in the phrenological mould *all* feelings (!) and principles, *all* modes of speaking and acting (!! ) now in vogue ; (2) 'to dye through and through in the new colors of this science' 'all the notions of men, political, social, moral, and intellectual ;' (3) 'to root out the old ideas of teaching and preaching from among men ;' (4) 'to tear down governments and reconstruct them' to 'metamorphose education,' 'to new-fangle religion,' and all this by the influence of their own 'INVENTIONS !'

Let it be observed that the whole length and breadth of this charge, is hurled in huge ruin upon the heads of the whole 'fraternity' of phrenologists, without specification. They, as a body, have a 'deliberate well-digested idea' of doing all this. Yet on page 300 the writer is disposed to censure phrenologists, rather for what they have omitted to do, than for what they have done. What! when he is aware of their having formed this stupendous 'well-digested' design? Marvellous charity. But the truth is—'the fraternity' have not any such 'well-digested' plan. What they really do expect may be hereafter shown; but to charge upon all this, is as absurd as to charge them with a well-digested plan to visit the moon, to examine the heads of the inhabitants thereof:—Moreover, phrenology is not a set of *inventions*, as the writer of the article very well knows—but of *discoveries* of truths written by the finger of God in the constitution of man.

Misrepresentation 2. 'The first doctrine of these writers, which requires examination and comment, is, that they have been the first to discover a true science of mind based on immutable facts, and differing from all former philosophy, in substituting observation for conjecture, and capable of accounting for all phenomena.' —p. 279.

That phrenologists consider their science as par excellence the true one, and based on immutable facts, none can deny. But that it is capable of accounting for *all* phenomena, they do not pretend, and this is not asserted in the quotations adduced to prove the assertion—not even the one from Mr. Chenevix, which proves only that Mr. Chenevix *thinks*, that phrenologists think, that their science is a key *effacing contradictions* from all *moral* phenomena, not 'accounting for *all* phenomena.' For Mr. Chenevix, though so especially smuggled into the first ranks of phrenological writers, is nevertheless only giving what *appears to him* the argument on both sides of the question.

Moreover, phrenologists do not claim as the distinctive feature of their science, in distinction from the old systems, that it is 'founded upon observation,' and we will attempt to state what is the distinctive feature.

The old systems were founded upon the observation of mental phenomena, merely, regardless of the dependence of all mental exhibitions and operations, upon the brain ; and, therefore, they were *defectively* founded upon observation of man as he really is *not*.

On the contrary, phrenological philosophy of mind is based entirely on the observation and analysis of mental phenomena in strict connection with their entire dependence upon cerebral conformation, — thus being correctly founded upon the observation of man as he really *is*. Hence, all that the author of the article has said about ‘ observation ’ with so much stress, is nugatory.

Misrepresentation 3. P. 282, ‘ But they add that these swells on the head are protruded by separate interior masses of brain. \* \* \* \* \* They utterly scout the idea of the mind’s unity.’ The brain is, it is true, a ‘ congeries of organs,’ but these organs are in no sense ‘ separate masses,’ except that they perform separate functions. On the contrary, they blend together, and are only territories of the same brain, which is a unit.

The question whether the mind be a simple unit, incapable of having *parts* and acting at times through one organ, and sometimes through others ; or whether it be a congeries of faculties, which, though distinct, yet are united in *one* mind, — is *not* decided by the science of phrenology. — It is *expressly* left to the option of all, whether they take one ground or the other ; as either so far as present investigations go, seems equally consistent with the fundamental principles of the science. Mr. Chenevix, gives his opinion of the belief of phrenologists in favor of the former. Mr. Levison, as quoted on this point only, proves the plurality of cerebral organs : so that it is not true, that phrenologists ‘ scout the idea of the mind’s unity.’

Misrepresentation 4. ‘ From the whole, then, we gather that their idea is this, The mind is not only conditioned in its actions by the organ through which it works, but is, in its essential nature, subject to the laws of that organ. \* \* \* \* \* Thus man feels, wills, and even knows in any particular way, impelled by a blind instinct so to feel, will, and know. He is a compound of instincts, like

irrational and irresponsible animals, instead of being endued with any responsible power of intelligence and self-control ;' p. 285. ' Men act according to organization, by necessity, as brutes do.' p. 293.

Now we expressly deny that the science of phrenology, in its fundamental principles, or that its followers as a body, meddle at all with the ' essential nature ' of the mind. Its modes of operation and manifestation, and the laws that govern it therein, are all that phrenologists discuss as a part of their doctrines.

With respect to the matter of necessity, it will be particularly noted, that phrenologists are stated to hold, as their *belief*, that man is a bundle of instincts in the same sense that brutes are, and without any responsible power of intelligence or self-control ;— in a word, that he is on a perfect level with the brutes. To be indignant at such a charge as this, would be useless, — to attempt to *reason* the point, more useless. We can only, in the simplest manner, deny the truth of the statement in all its parts : such sentiments, more than any others, have often been disavowed in the most public manner by phrenologists ;—nay, in the very works which this writer is reviewing,—and have been shown, time and again, to be *no part* of the system, and no fair inference from it. Yet this writer comes forward in one of the most respectable periodicals of the day, and deliberately repeats the charge, as though it never had been made before, and as though it had not as often been refuted.

Misrepresentation 5. ' Among these is the study of the Ancient Languages, which the phrenologists laugh to scorn, in spite of the wisdom and experience of ages.'

That some phrenologists consider the study of the Ancient Languages as useless altogether, and others unnecessary in its present extent, may be true ; and so do many wise and good men, who are not phrenologists ; but that phrenologists as a body (which is the unavoidable construction of the passage) do laugh to scorn the study in question, is not true ; neither has any evidence been shown to support the assertion.

Misrepresentation 6. ' Phrenologists entirely reject the humdrum

faculties of perception, memory, imagination, which mental philosophers have been so long discussing. The powers of association, judgement, taste, &c. which were formerly matters of interest to philosophers, are put under the same ban. How do they explain them? They call them modes of activity of the thirty-five fundamental faculties. Amativeness, combativeness, reverence, love, judge, perceive, and the like.' p. 287. It might be asked here, What edition of what phrenological work, did this writer study? In all which are now extant, there is nothing to be found like this. We suspect the author's copy, if it contain these things, must be of antediluvian times;—the present system of phrenology regards attention, perception, memory, judgement, &c. as exclusively modes of action of the Intellectual faculties, which are not yet thirty-five in number. Moreover, Amativeness, Reverence, Combativeness, as they belong to the affective, and not to the intellectual faculties, cannot perceive, judge, &c.; and though amativeness gives one species of love, we never heard before of *combativeness* being a seat of that feeling. The writer seems to have a peculiar taste for the ludicrous in his representations of phrenology.

Misrepresentation 7. 'Large and projecting eyes constitute this organ.' (Language.) p. 208.

This is a beautiful specimen of the accuracy with which this writer is accustomed to speak concerning phrenology. It is only necessary to say, that the organ in question, exists just as really when the eyes are small and sunken, as when 'large and projecting;' and that it is constituted by a certain portion of the brain, not by eyes of one kind or another.

Misrepresentation 8. 'But the error of these men grows out of a misconception of the true purpose of education. It is no less than the egregious blunder of supposing that the *accumulation of facts* is the great work of mental discipline.' p. 289.

The phrenological system of education comprises two distinct parts; the first is the *accumulation of facts*, or the discipline of the perceptive faculties; the second, and by far the most important part, is reflection upon these facts, or the education of the

reflective faculties. Now, the 'error' of the writer 'grew from' his 'egregious blunder' in supposing the first part of phrenological education to constitute the *whole thereof*; — having thus set up a man of straw, he falls to demolishing it with the most edifying vigor.

Misrepresentation 9. 'Hence their idea is, that all bad dispositions and criminal acts are referable rather to disease than guilt. All wrong character is a brain disorder, as much as a fever is a disease of the body. Such ideas as sin, wickedness, punishment, have utterly crept out of their nomenclature, except the latter, against which they loudly and incessantly protest. \* \* \* \* Punishment for crime and reward for well-doing, are both utterly foreign to their system.' p. 293.

There are two distinct parts in this charge : — 1. That phrenologists believe *all* wrong character to be a *disease* of the brain. We challenge the writer if he can, to sustain himself by a single quotation from any phrenological writer of eminence, to prove such a strange position as this : he has given no evidence, and we publicly declare that the assertion cannot be sustained. — Phrenologists believe that disease of the brain is the cause of *many* deeds which have heretofore been treated as *crimes*, and they are sustained in thinking so by 'immutable facts,' but that *all* wrong character is caused by disease, no phrenologist of note ever has said, nor have phrenologists, as a body, ever thought.

2. That punishment and reward are entirely foreign to their system. What evidence is brought to sustain this accusation ? There are two quotations, one from Mr Levison, and one from Mr Simpson. The first writer spends a considerable portion of his attention, in pointing out *what* punishments are *advisable*, and what not, — what rewards have a good tendency, and what a bad one. Yet, he is quoted to prove that phrenologists entirely discard, and loudly declaim against *all* punishment and reward ! The other writer, Mr Simpson, in the mere quotation given, proves nothing to the point : what the context is, we cannot say, — not having yet had the opportunity to read the work, — in the passage quoted, however, nothing is said against punishment generally, but merely,

that with regard to those whose transgression is the fruit of disease, a penitentiary should be a hospital, and the length of their confinement depend upon the continuance of their disease. It is not said or intimated that *all* delinquents sin from disease, nor that those who sin without disease should not be punished. But suppose he did say so,—do all phrenologists, therefore, agree with him ?

Misrepresentation 10. ‘The bundle of instincts of which the mind is composed, it seems, destroys the certainty and uniformity of revelation.’ p. 297.

In this part of the article after a number of quotations from Dr Spurzheim, which are taken disconnected from their original accompanying sentiments, and consequently misinterpreted, Dr S. is accused of ‘vulgar infidel rant,’ of jeering at the true servants of God, and of unsettling the certainty and uniformity of revelation ; which accusations are, by a certain sleight of hand, for which this writer is distinguished, made to implicate the phrenological body in one general condemnation. We say again, let the public read Dr Spurzheim himself, that they may judge for themselves ; for our own part, we consider the version of him, given in the article, to be incorrect, and a libel upon the fair fame of that illustrious man. But even if it were not so, if all were true which is thus attempted to be fixed upon Dr S. as a stigma are these statements a part of the phrenological system ? or any fair inferences from it ? Why then are they brought upon the heads of the whole body of phrenologists ? Are they to be supposed to think everything that Dr S. might have thought ? Really in this part of the article, we poor phrenologists are treated as little better than benighted infidels — ignorant of the Bible, of the Gospel, and seeking to reduce men to the level of the brutes.

Misrepresentation 11. On page 300, phrenologists are spoken of as ‘honestly imagining that they were the first to discover and advance any adequate motives to lead men to be sober, temperate, just and good. Thus a system of intellectual and moral philosophy, is treated as though it were a homily on duty, and men, who have been investigating, establishing, and en-

deavoring to apply those principles written by the Creator of all things in the constitution of man, are represented as a set of visionaries, who have attempted to manufacture a scheme of *motives*.

Having, at length, waded through the tangled mass of ignorance, carelessness, misrepresentation, and attempt at logic, contained in the article before us, for the purpose of selecting, and exhibiting to the public the most glaring of the inconsistencies which beset the path, we will turn from the subject of misrepresentation to take a short view of some points of the writer's philosophy.

'The mind is an 'agent' or 'fundamental faculty,' a unit, incapable of 'decomposition.' It performs three species of operations, under the relations of feeling, intellect, will; these functions perform, each separately, a great variety of operations.

Now, what are '*these functions?*' Obviously, they are the 'three species of operations.' Thus we are presented with the simple and definite proposition that the mind performs three species of operations, each of which species of operations performs separately a great variety of *operations*. This is the statement of the foundation truth of that luminous philosophy of the old schools, founded upon 'observation,' by men who saw more of the mind than 'our philosophy ever dreamed of.' The '*species of operations*,' 'under the relation of intellect,' performs such operations as association, memory, judgement, &c. The '*species of operations*,' under the relation of will' is the 'source of its own operations.' 'Those moral qualities, the absence of which in any man is guilt, to possess which is a duty of states, or self-begotten determinations of' a 'species of operations under the relation of Will' Now, what is meant by a 'self-begotten determination of a species of operations,' we apprehend can only be understood by some of those 'great master-thinkers of the human race,' who have 'studied mental operations as such.'

The writer says a great deal about the mind's being the cause, or the originator of its own actions. Of the *will's* originating its own volitions, (we give the idea, not the words,) and much stress is laid upon this.

We humbly conceive, that, to speak of an agent causing its own

action, is as great an absurdity in logic as can be committed. For, if an agent causes its own action, it must either act previous to action, or it must cause the action to take place without any previous action; but to *cause* is to act — to speak, therefore, of causing an act, while at the same time remaining passive, is a contradiction. Again; the Will ‘begets’ its own volitions; if so, it acts in begetting them — for it cannot ‘*beget*’ while at the same instant in a state of passivity — but by the nature of the case every *act* of the will is a *volition*. Therefore, every volition is ‘begotten’ by a *previous* volition, which resolves itself into the old Armenian notion of an infinite series of volitions, each caused by the one preceding, which was long ago exploded by President Edwards. On the whole, we feel bound to return our grateful acknowledgements to the writer of the article, for the inimitable specimen he has given us, of the clearness, accuracy, definiteness, and beauty of those old systems of philosophy, formed by the ‘great master-thinkers of the human race,’ &c.

Before closing, it will be well to make some simple statements of the truth on some of those points of phrenological doctrine, where the article seems to have left darkness and fog, rather than light.

1. Accountability. Three things are requisite to this: 1. Intelligence — to understand duty, to trace cause and effect, and know the consequences of acting. 2. Desires. 3. The power of doing what the intellect decides is best to be done, after a consideration of all the desires and consequences of the case. These, all are found in the phrenological system, — and they form the only basis of accountability, upon any system whatsoever.

2. Education. Generally speaking, children ought never to be educated, so as to benefit one or two organs at the expense of others. It is true, notwithstanding the contempt with which the proposition is treated by the writer of the article, that the exercise of one organ will not benefit another; — can a man spell any better for studying arithmetic? Can a man reason any better from cause to effect, by the cultivation of musical taste, or the organ of tune? Is a blacksmith’s *leg*, as well as his arm,

stronger than other men's? The use of a muscle strengthens itself, not its neighbors, except in so far as in exercising it, *they* are exercised too.

Education should be commenced by the education of that class of the intellectual faculties, called 'perceptive faculties, which the writer terms 'accumulation of facts.' When the proper period arrives, (which can be ascertained by experience,) the reflective faculties should be brought into use, and receive their course of training. This is the most general outline of the plan. Hence, if the study of languages appeal only to the single organ of Language, it is improper that they should constitute near so large a part of the scheme of education as they now do. But, with due deference to the opinions expressed by Mr Simpson, (we think it is he,) we cannot admit that the fact is so; a slight examination of the process of studying a language, must show that Causality and Comparison are continually requisite; and hence we are inclined to the opinion, that though languages are a valuable and indispensable part of a complete education, yet they are not proper for young children,—but should be reserved till the time of educating the reflective faculties.

3. Punishments—should be so managed as not to excite the passions they are intended to suppress, and should always aim to render predominant the moral sentiments:—the same is true of rewards.

4. While there are certain general fundamental truths admitted by all phrenologists, which, together with the details, which are inseparable from them, constitute a *science*. Yet it is, by no means, true, that all the notions of every phrenologist, upon other points *than these*, true or false, are the opinions of the whole body of phrenologists, or are a part of the science. A position, of which the author of the article of the *Christian Spectator* seems to have been practically, at least, entirely ignorant.

5. Phrenologists regard their science, considered *as a system*, as far superior to all that have preceded it, though by no means perfect. Time and continued labor must yet fill out its proportions in perfect symmetry and beauty. They consider that their

principles *can* be, and ought to be applied to use in education, physical, moral, and intellectual; and that when so applied in their full efficacy, great results may be expected. They are also proceeding firmly, but cautiously, by investigation and experiment, to make a trial of their principles, and to ascertain when, where, and how far they can be applied. And as we believe the system to be no human invention, but the work of GOD, in the formation of man, we bid them 'God speed.'

One word, in closing, for the author of the article. If he would acquit himself of *wilful* misrepresentation, it can be only by the plea of ignorance and carelessness. If he do not choose to adopt that plea, we recommend him, without delay, to commit to memory the Ninth Commandment, which saith, '*Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.*'

Yours, &c.

C. S.

*Walnut Hills, Ohio, 1835.*

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ARTICLE IV.

*Report of a Committee on a Skull, whose history was unknown, and which was presented to the Boston Phrenological Society, upon condition that a Committee would report upon it, without knowing any circumstance respecting it.*

The Committee to whom was referred a human skull, presented to the Society by Dr Winslow Lewis, Jr., and who were required to examine and report upon the indications of character developed upon its exterior, respectfully say, —

That this first trial of the phrenological knowledge of our Society is made under some disadvantages, which should be

mentioned, that they may be borne in mind, when the Committee, from the premises they may lay down, shall endeavor to infer the character of the mind whose organs were once enclosed in the cranium under consideration.

No phrenologist needs to be informed that an accurate knowledge of the *temperament* is necessary to enable him to form a correct judgement of character, — but the Committee are entirely ignorant of the temperament of the person to whom this cranium belonged.

Again : the circumstances in which an individual is placed, are all-important, to enable us to determine the particular bias, to which the mind was exposed. The Committee know nothing of the circumstances, education or manner of life of the individual in question. They do not even know the sex, age, or nation. The grounds, therefore, of the decision they have formed, are very imperfect, and they are obliged to speak in terms much qualified and more guarded than would have been necessary, had these pre-requisites for a correct judgement been furnished.

The Committee are of opinion that the skull is that of an adult man of the white or Caucasian race, between the ages of 30 and 40. The skull is thicker than usual ; and, small as some of the organs appear, the Committee think that a vertical section of the cranium would show that they appear better than they ought. The general measurements are as follows :—

	Inches.
From Lower Individuality to Occipital Spine.....	7
.... Destructiveness to Destructiveness.....	5 1-2
.... Secretiveness to Secretiveness.....	5 3-4
.... Cautiousness to Cautiousness.....	5 5-8
.... Orifice of ear to Individuality.....	4 3-4
.... . . . . . Occipital Spine.....	3 1-2
.... . . . . . Firmness.....	5
Largest circumference of Base.....	20 3-4

The head was an unfortunate one for its possessor. The frontal region is extremely small, the sincipital is extremely shallow, and the lateral and occipital are alarmingly full. These pro-

portions stamp the general features of the character. The man was a mere animal. To ascertain what the peculiar instincts were, by which he was impelled, a more careful examination was necessary, and the following is the opinion of the committee as to the developement of each particular organ :—

- 1 Amativeness, full, but not large.
- 2 Destructiveness, large ; — predominant.
- 3 Philoprogenitiveness, moderate.
- 4 Adhesiveness, moderate.
- 5 Inhabitiveness, small.
- 6 Combativeness, large ; — predominant.
- 7 Secretiveness, very large ; — predominant.
- 8 Acquisitiveness, moderate.
- 9 Constructiveness, moderate.
- 10 Cautiousness, large ; — predominant.
- 11 Approbativeness, full.
- 12 Self-esteem, moderate.
- 13 Benevolence, small.
- 14 Veneration, small.
- 15 Firmness, moderate, perhaps large.
- 16 Conscientiousness, moderate at best.
- 17 Hope, small, deficient.
- 18 Marvellousness, full.
- 19 Ideality, moderate for so bad a head.
- 20 Mirth, deficient.
- 21 Imitation, deficient.
- 22 Individuality, moderate.
- 23 Form, moderate.
- 24 Size, moderate.
- 25 Weight, small.
- 26 Color, very small.
- 27 Locality, moderate.
- 28 Order, moderate.
- 29 Calculation, small.
- 30 Eventuality, small.
- 31 Time, small.
- 32 Tune, moderate.
- 33 Language, supposed to be small.
- 34 Comparison, moderate.
- 35 Causality, rather full, compared with the neighboring organs, but small at best.

If the judgment of the committee be correct in the particulars, they think themselves authorized to draw the following inferences:

1. That the man was a debased being, in every respect.
2. That his animal propensities knew little or no restraint, but fear and superstition.
3. That he was uneducated and destitute of ingenuity and practical skill. That he was not fitted to get an honest living.
4. That he was quarrelsome, but mean and cowardly.
5. That he was hard-hearted and probably cruel.
6. That he was not avaricious, and, if guilty of theft or murder, as he may have been, it was not so much for gain as to gratify the animal propensities of anger and revenge, or in self-defence, or to conceal crime.
7. That he was of a gloomy temper, very desponding and sullen.
8. That he was rather superstitious than religious, but he may occasionally have been courteous for one so debased.
9. That, possibly, amongst the *low* he may have been somewhat distinguished for refinement of thought.
10. He was, probably, careful about his personal appearance, although not self-willed or proud.
11. That he was, probably, a rover, a hypocrite, an unprincipled villain, and, perhaps, a suicide.

The Committee are aware that in the infancy of phrenological knowledge amongst us, they have risked much in this report ; but they are willing to risk something to ascertain whether they have learned any thing. They feel that they might safely have stopped at *general* statements, but they supposed that something further was expected, and they were willing to *set* an example, even at the risk of being *made* an example.

WM. B. FOWLE, }  
H. T. TUCKERMAN, } Committee.

*Boston, January 15, 1835.*

*To the President of the Phrenological Society.*

*Thursday.*

‘Dear Sir: It being out of my power to attend the meeting of the Phrenological Society this evening, and understanding that a report

will be submitted on the cranium, which I recently gave to the Society,—will you have the kindness to state that the skull in question is that of *Delgado*, the person who committed suicide, previous to his trial on a charge of piracy. I have endeavored, but in vain, to ascertain something of the peculiar characteristics of this individual. His deep implication, however, in the nefarious transaction, for which his associates are now under sentence of death, will somewhat *tarnish* his reputation for *fair dealing*, and must have diminished that part of the cranium, which indicates an appreciation of the *meum* and *tuum*.

Yours, respectfully,

WINSLOW LEWIS, Jr.?

*Additional Report on the skull of Delgado, read July 3, 1835.*

The Committee to whom was referred the skull, now known to be that of the supposed pirate *Delgado*, with instructions to collect what further particulars they could, in regard to the life and character of the said suicide, respectfully report, — That various circumstances have prevented them from obtaining the desired information. No one of his accomplices speaks English; and as all protest their innocence, it could not be expected that they would confess any thing in regard to *Delgado*, that would implicate themselves. *Perez*, who seems to have known most of *Delgado*, left the city before the committee was appointed, and no one of the pirates lately executed, has left any memoir of the transaction, in which it is alleged that *Delgado* was concerned. As the latter committed suicide before his trial, his name is only incidentally mentioned in the reported trial, but the committee have thought it their duty to select the few passages alluded to, and they are as follows :

Capt. *Butman*, in his evidence, p. 9, says, ‘ When we got on board the brig, they directed me to go into the cabin, which I did, and two or three of them followed. When I reached the cabin, two of them presented their knives to my breast, and demanded the money that was on board. I was alarmed, and told them where it was. One of the two, who drew their knives on me, in the cabin, recently committed suicide in jail.’

*Perez* (State’s evidence) says, p. 17, — The third mate, boatswain, carpenter, and *one sailor* jumped into the boat, and pro-

ceeded to the brig. *The sailor, named Manuel Delgado, died in gaol.* P. 22, he says, 'The Captain gave the mate \$2400; boatswain \$500; Garcia, a seaman, \$400; Castillo, Montenegro, and Perez ordinary, seamen, \$250 each; *Delgado*, \$300. Again, p. 23, Perez says, 'They told him, (Perez) that, if he did not tell all about the matter, he would be hung, and then his heart failed him, and he confessed. *Delgado* also confessed a short time afterwards. The governor told *Delgado*, he need not be afraid, for he would write to England and get his pardon. Presents or money were never offered to *Delgado* to make him confess. His own *fear* made him tell all. He was told if he spoke truly, he might get off with a short imprisonment.' P. 24, he repeats the same in substance. P. 25, we are told that *Delgado* was handcuffed to Perez, when they landed in Salem, and that *Delgado* came from Spain to Cuba in company with Perez.

P. 41, It is said, that 'Nicolas Costa wore black shoes, but Castillo and *Delgado* white ones.'

The committee, besides the leading facts that *Delgado* was a pirate and a suicide, think they discover, even in these few allusions to him, some further reason to think, that in their former report they did not entirely mistake his character. He belonged to the lowest grade of seamen, and only received 50 dollars more than the other ordinary seamen, although he was the only sailor that boarded the brig. (See inferences 1 and 2.) His volunteering to board the brig, and his threatening the captain, do not necessarily imply avarice, cruelty, or courage. He had nothing to fear from an unarmed brig; and when he threatened the captain, the captain was alone and *he* well supported by his companions. The greatest coward might have volunteered from love of approbation, or in the hope of escaping from his companions, should an opportunity offer; and he might have threatened loudly, to avoid the suspicion of lukewarmness. He received but a small share of the plunder, and this implies that he performed no extraordinary service, and his quiet reception of it, neither indicates avarice nor courage. Besides '*his fear made him tell all.*' It does not distinctly appear, and indeed, it is hardly probable, that



## ARTICLE V.

*Observations on Combativeness ; being an attempt to determine the elementary Faculty to which that name is generally applied.* By Mr ROBERT COX. [From the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, No. XLII. Art. IX.]

ONE of the most efficacious methods employed by Dr Gall to determine the functions of the different parts of the brain, was to observe, at every opportunity, the heads of persons distinguished by any peculiarity of disposition or talent, and to note in what particular region a large development appeared in them all. Having, in the course of his researches, collected in his house a number of persons belonging to the lower ranks, such as porters and hackney-coachmen, his attention was drawn to the fact, that while some individuals were spoken of by their comrades as remarkable for provoking disputes and contentions, there were others, of a pacific disposition, whom they regarded with contempt, and called poltrons. 'As the most quarrelsome,' says Gall, 'found great pleasure in giving me very circumstantial narratives of their exploits, I was anxious to see whether anything was to be found in the heads of these heroes which distinguished them from those of the poltrons. I ranged the quarrelers on one side, and the peaceable on the other, and examined carefully the heads of both. I found that, in all the quarrelers, the head, immediately behind and on a level with the tops of the ears, was much broader than in the poltrons. On other occasions, I assembled, separately, those who were most distinguished for their bravery, and those who were most distinguished for their cowardice. I repeated my researches, and found my first observations confirmed. I, therefore, began to conjecture that an inclination to contention (*penchant aux rixes*) might really be the result of a particular organ. I endeavored to find out, on the one hand, men of acknowledged superior

bravery, and, on the other, men known to be great cowards. At the combats of wild beasts, at that time, still exhibited in Vienna, there appeared a first-rate fighter, of extreme intrepidity, who often presented himself in the arena, to sustain alone a fight with a wild boar, or a bull, or any ferocious animal whatever. I found him, in the region of the head just pointed out, very broad and rounded (*bombée*.) I took a cast of this head, and likewise of those of some other *braves*, that I might run no risk of forgetting their particular conformations. I examined also the heads of some of my comrades, who had been expelled from several universities for continual duel-fighting. Among these was one who knew no greater pleasure than that of establishing himself in an ale-house, and mocking the workmen who came thither to drink,—and when he saw them disposed to come to blows, putting out the lights, and giving them battle in the dark, chair in hand. He was, in appearance, a little and weakly man. He reminded me of another of my comrades, a Swiss, who used to amuse himself at Strasburg by provoking quarrels with men much stronger and bigger than himself. I visited several schools, and had pointed out to me the scholars who were the most quarrelsome, and those who were the most cowardly. I prosecuted the same observations in the families of my acquaintance. In the course of my researches, my attention was arrested by a very handsome young woman, who, from her childhood, had been fond of dressing herself in male attire, and going secretly out of doors to fight with the blackguards in the streets. After her marriage, she constantly sought occasion to fight with men. When she had guests at dinner, she challenged the strongest of them, after the repast, to wrestle with her. I likewise knew a lady, who, although of small stature and delicate constitution, was often judicially summoned, because of her custom of striking her domestics of both sexes. When she was on a journey, two drunken waggoners, having lost their way in the inn during the night, entered the chamber, where she was sleeping alone: she received them with such vigor with the candlesticks, which she hurled at their heads, and the chairs, with which she struck them, that they were forced to betake themselves to flight. In

all these persons, I found the region in question formed in the manner above described, although the heads were shaped in other respects quite differently. These observations emboldened me, and I began, thenceforward, to speak, in my lectures, of an *organ of courage*, as I then called it.\* The existence of this organ has since been fully established.

Let us now attend to its manifestations in a state of disease. Pinel mentions several cases. One of these is that of a man affected with a very inveterate periodical mania. 'His paroxysms,' says Pinel, 'generally continue for eight or ten days every month, and seem to present the most perfect contrast to his natural state. During his lucid intervals, his physiognomy is calm — his air mild and reserved — his answers to questions put to him, timid and proper. He manifests urbanity of manners, rigid probity, and even a desire to oblige others, and expresses the most ardent wishes for the cure of his disease ; but on the return of the paroxysm, particularly when marked by a certain redness of the face, excessive heat in the head, and a violent thirst, his walk is precipitate, his tone of voice is strong and arrogant, his look is full of audacity, and he experiences the most violent propensity to provoke those who approach him, and to fight with them furiously.' †

When the organ of Combativeness is deficient, the character is altogether pacific ; the individual hates contention, and never willingly gets into a brawl. To this branch of the subject I shall have occasion to advert at greater length hereafter.

Gall and Spurzheim confine their remarks on Combativeness almost entirely to what may be termed its physical functions ; the consideration of its effects in a moral point of view, being dismissed in a single brief sentence. 'Learned men, who find everywhere occasion for bitter controversy, and impassioned pleaders, have probably,' says Gall, 'this organ very much developed.' ‡ To this topic also I shall afterwards return.

Having thus seen the effect of great vigor of the organ

\* Gall sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, tome iv. pp. 3—6.

† Pinel sur l'Aliénation Mentale. Seconde Edit. p. 101, sect. 116.

‡ Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, tome iv. p. 14.

No. V., both in health and in disease, let us proceed to inquire what is the elementary faculty, which prompts to the performance of actions such as those above described.

The attention of Dr Gall having been at first always fixed on the extraordinary manifestation of a quality or faculty, and consequently on the result of an excessive development of an organ, it is obvious that it was impossible for him to *discover* any fundamental power in its primitive destination. 'In certain cases,' as he himself observes, 'it is much more easy to discover the organ which determines a certain mode of action than the fundamental quality or faculty itself. Actions which are the result of the extraordinary activity of an organ are much more obvious than the primitive destination of that organ, and its ordinary manner of acting. It is for this reason that at first I observed almost all the organs, and all the faculties in their *excessive activity*. When faculties are once recognized as peculiar and independent, it is possible thence to infer, by degrees, the primitive destination of an organ.' \* *Courage*, we have seen, was the name which Dr Gall at first gave to the propensity now under discussion. Afterwards, however, he substituted for this name that of *Quarrelsomeness*, and then that of the *Instinct of Self-Defence and Defence of Property*, (*Instinct de la Défense de soi-même et de la Propriété; penchant aux rixes; Courage*,) which appellation he retained till his death. None of these designations of the faculty met the approval of Dr Spurzheim. 'Physical courage,' says he, 'and the capacity to meet and repel attack is necessary to animals, as soon as they are attached to females, to progeny, to dwellings, or to friends; for, according to the arrangements of nature, it is necessary to fight in order to defend. Such a propensity must therefore exist for the purposes of defence; but it seems to me that it is, like all others, of general application, and not limited to self-defence. I, therefore, call the cerebral part in which it inheres, the organ of the *Propensity to Fight*, or of *Combativeness*.' †

\* Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, tome iv. p. 1.

† Spurzheim's Phrenology, section on Combativeness.

With all deference, it appears to me that Dr Spurzheim here falls into an error of the same kind, though perhaps not the same in degree, with that which he points out in the appellation bestowed on the organ by Gall. To employ — *mutatis mutandis* — the expressions used by himself, in objecting to Gall's appellation of another primitive faculty, — the organ No. V. is certainly essential to fighting, but it often acts, without there being any intention to fight, and is also satisfied in various ways not necessarily connected with such a purpose. 'We do not usually speak,' says Dr S., 'of the nerves of the instinct of nutrition, but of those of hunger and thirst. The same language should be used when speaking of the organ in question. Gall's name does not express the whole sphere of activity of the faculty. Now, I constantly insist on the importance of adopting titles which do not designate determinate actions.'\*

To the soundness of these principles, I cordially assent, and Dr Spurzheim seems to have applied them successfully in analyzing the faculty No. VII. which Gall termed *Cunning*, but to which he gave the name *Secretiveness*. 'I grant,' says he, 'that this power too often acts as cunning; but I do not think that this name indicates the special propensity itself. This was to be determined without considering the objects upon which, and the manner in which, it acts; and in considering the proceedings of sly animals and cunning men, and all the functions depending on this power, I conceived it to be the propensity to conceal — to be secret in thoughts, words, things, or projects.' †

I cannot avoid thinking that Dr Spurzheim somewhat overlooks his own principles, when he speaks of an 'organ of the propensity to fight.' On the one hand, this name, to use his own phrase, 'does not express the whole sphere of activity of the faculty;' and on the other, it is very like an expression which 'designates a determinate action.' Fighting, in the case

\* Phrenology; section on *Amativeness*. — Gall's term is, *The instinct of Propagation.*

† Phrenology; section on *Secretiveness*.

of man, is most frequently the result of the faculty, when ill regulated or too energetic ; or rather, as I shall afterwards endeavor to show, it is the effect of such an endowment in combination with another propensity — Destructiveness. ‘The most exalted action of an organ,’ however, as Dr Gall well remarks, ‘is merely a gradation of the fundamental power, but not that fundamental power itself. The fundamental quality or faculty,’ says he, ‘is common to all the individuals of the species ; but the degrees of its manifestation vary in one individual and another, according as the organ is more or less developed. If we disregard all the accidental modifications, and pay attention only to what, in that quality is common to all individuals, we shall have found the fundamental quality or faculty.’\* This, I am persuaded, is the only mode in which elementary faculties can be arrived at ; and before the phrenological nomenclature can be accurate, we must designate each faculty by a term which, in the words of Dr Spurzheim, already repeatedly cited, shall ‘express the whole sphere of its activity.’

It appears to me, that both Gall and Spurzheim have failed to discover, or at least to expound, what, in the faculty under discussion, ‘is common to all individuals.’ This elementary, ultimate, primary, or fundamental quality or faculty, I have been led by much reflection to conclude, is, when stripped of all its ‘accidental modifications,’ neither more nor less than **THE INSTINCT OR PROPENSITY TO OPPOSE** ; or, as it may be shortly expressed, **OPPOSITIVENESS**.

The word **OPPOSE** I use both in its primitive and in its secondary sense, applying it to acts both physical and moral.

To **OPPOSE** literally signifies *to set one’s self against*. According to Dr Johnson, it means, *to act against ; to be adverse ; to hinder ; to resist ; to place as an obstacle*. And **OPPOSER** he explains to be *one that opposes ; antagonist ; enemy ; rival*.

\* Tome iv. p. 20, 21. — Gall adds : ‘As, in this matter, much is left to the sagacity of each philosopher who devotes himself to it, there will always be a great diversity of opinions even among organologists, on the subject of the denomination of the fundamental qualities or faculties.’

OPPOSITION may be either aggressive or defensive : we may act *against* another, either by *attacking* or by *resisting*.

Let us now examine how far OPPOSITION characterizes the actions to which, according to phrenologists, Combativeness leads. Mr Scott's acute and comprehensive essay on this faculty, in the Transactions of the Phrenological Society, may be selected as the best subject for comment. That gentleman has the merit of having first clearly elucidated the *moral* functions of the faculty.

'By itself,' says Mr Scott, 'it is a blind impulse, delighting in OPPOSITION, for its own sake.' *Obs.* Every faculty delights in the performance of actions prompted by itself.

*Mr Scott.* — 'A restless spirit of contention, without end or object.' — *Obs.* Contention is the action of two or more parties in OPPOSITION to each other. There can be no contention without OPPOSITION and *resistance*.

*Mr Scott.* — 'Under the direction of higher powers, it gives boldness and force to the character, and enables these to act with energy and effect.' — *Obs.* Here, also, there must be OPPOSITION. 'Boldness' is an impulse to face dangerous objects ; to *set one's self against* them. Large No. V. enables a man to meet them without shrinking, nay even with pleasure. It matters not whether the dangerous object be a living creature or an inanimate object. In swimming against a rapid stream, persons in whom this faculty is weak will speedily become faint-hearted, if, indeed, they venture into the water at all ; while they, who are amply endowed will continue, so long as their muscles are capable of resisting the torrent, to

— ' buffet it  
With lusty sinews ; throwing it aside,  
And stemming it with hearts of controversy.'

*Mr Scott.* — 'It does not show itself in fighting only. In all cases where we have difficulties to encounter, where a severe struggle is necessary to command success, this power is of eminent use ; and nothing can supply or make up for it, if it is

wanting.'— *Obs.* We *set ourselves against* the difficulties, or rather against the persons causing them. We *resist* them. The word 'struggle' may be defined, *strenuous* OPPOSITION, either offensive or defensive, to an adversary—an intense degree of OPPOSITION.

*Mr Scott.*— 'In the ancient games, it was the same internal impulse which strained to the utmost the speed of the racer, and gave force to the arms which wielded the disc or the cestus.'— *Obs.* The rivalry of OPPOSITION is here: the racers and quoit-throwers were *antagonists* and *rivals*, contending for victory and applause. This faculty gives to the sports of foot-ball, wrestling, &c., and also to card-playing, backgammon and the like, a large share of their attractions. Set a man to play against himself, and this will quickly become obvious.

*Mr Scott.*— 'It is of use not merely in the contests of the field, but in the collisions of civil life, whenever our views happen to clash with, or be opposed to, those of others. It may display itself in the bloodless contests of the bar or the senate, and even among the softer sex, in the rivalries of the boudoir and the ball-room, no less than in the arena or in the field of battle.'— *Obs.* The words 'collision' and 'clash' are strongly expressive of OPPOSITION. When very large, the organ prompts to litigation, the very essence of which is OPPOSITION; one party is *versus* the other. Contest and rivalry likewise imply OPPOSITION.

*Mr Scott.*— 'In every contest he who is endowed with this power, dashes through obstacles, and struggles on to the last.'— *Obs.* He *sets himself against* the obstacles; he OPPOSES and *resists* them.

*Mr Scott.*— 'He who has it not is easily discomfited; and with every desire to get forward, feels himself worsted, baffled, and beat down in every quarter, by those more highly endowed with Combativeness than himself.'— *Obs.* He has little propensity to OPPOSE: he cannot *resist*: he sinks before an *antagonist*. The words here employed by Mr Scott to describe the inconvenience occasioned by deficiency of Combativeness, are felicitous and ex-

pressive. The utility of this faculty in the business and bustle of life is indeed very great. It enables its possessor to meet and struggle with obstacles, to put forward and support boldly his just pretensions, and to repel the encroachments of selfish and dishonest men. Where the organ is small, and Cautiousness full, the individual is utterly dismayed when he is under the necessity of competing with an opponent. On the approach of a conflict, Cautiousness overpowers him, and if possessed of sensibility, he is rendered exquisitely miserable: 'his countenance is changed; his thoughts trouble him, so that the joints of his loins are loosed, and his knees smite one against another.' When, on the other hand, the organ is large, opposition is a powerful incentive to redoubled exertion, and is felt to be positively agreeable. Men of this class are able to bring whatever talent they possess into operation; they execute their plans in a dashing and vigorous style, and frequently impress the shallow and inexperienced with a mistaken idea of their great intellectual superiority, and even men of high talent but deficient Combatiueness with admiration of the ease and vigor with which they act in circumstances that paralyze and unnerve the minds of persons differently constituted. This idea is forcibly expressed by Lord Bacon, in his Essay on Boldness. 'It is a trivial grammar-school text,' says he, 'but yet worthy a wise man's consideration:—A question was asked of Demosthenes, what was the chief part of an orator? He answered, Action: what next? Action: what next again? Action. He said it that knew best, and had by nature himself no advantage in that he commended. A strange thing, that that part of an orator which is but superficial, and rather the virtue of a player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of invention, elocution, and the rest; nay, almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plain. There is in human nature generally more of the fool than of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's minds is taken, are most potent. Wonderful like is the case of boldness in civil business: What first? Boldness: what second and third? Boldness. And yet boldness is a child of ignorance and baseness, far inferior to other parts; but, nevertheless,

it doth fascinate and bind hand and foot those that are either shallow in judgment or weak in courage, which are the greatest part; yea, and prevaileth with wise men at weak times.'

In private society, also, individuals with large Combativeness and Self-esteem often make a far greater figure in the eyes of superficial and ignorant observers, than men whose moral and intellectual qualities are vastly superior. An excellent illustration of this occurs in an amusing paper of Addison's, in the *Tatler*, where he treats of the various sorts of conversation which are current in society, and likens the speakers, to different musical instruments, according to the nature and manner of the conversation of each. The first sort mentioned is the drum. 'Your drums,' says he, 'are the blusterers in conversation, that with a loud laugh, unnatural mirth, and a torrent of noise, domineer in public assemblies; overbear men of sense; stun their companions, and fill the place they are in with a rattling sound, that hath seldom any wit, humor, or good breeding in it. The drum, notwithstanding, by this boisterous vivacity, is very proper to impose upon the ignorant; and in conversation with ladies who are not of the finest taste, often passes for a man of mirth and wit, and for wonderful pleasant company. I need not observe, that the emptiness of the drum very much contributes to its noise.' The author next proceeds to the lute, which, says he, 'is a character directly opposite to the drum; that sounds very finely by itself, or in a very small concert. Its notes are exquisitely sweet, and very low, easily drowned in a multitude of instruments, and even lost among a few, unless you give a particular attention to it. A lute is seldom heard in a company of more than five; whereas a drum will show itself to advantage in an assembly of five hundred. The lutenists, therefore, are men of fine genius, uncommon reflection, great affability, and esteemed chiefly by persons of good taste, who are the only proper judges of so delightful and soft a melody.' In this description of the lute, it is not difficult to recognize an admirable and strikingly accurate picture of the character of Addison himself. In large mixed companies, he was silent and reserved; but among a few choice friends, he freely gave vent to that wit and humor, which, embodied, during his solitary hours, in essays contributed

to the *Tatler*, *Spectator*, and *Guardian*, have since delighted millions, and will yet add to the enjoyment of many generations.

Phrenology is of great use in helping us to see through the blustering surface of presumptuous, but ignorant and narrow-minded men, and to discover merit in persons whose modesty and diffidence are apt to prevent the display of the talents which they possess. Many young men of excellent parts, but deficient in *Combatiweness*, and, it may be, in the quickness of perception, which *Individuality* confers, feel themselves brow-beaten and cast down when brought into collision with persons of the drum species, and readily take up the impression that their own intellectual qualities are of a much inferior grade. To such youths Phrenology is of the highest service, by enabling them to discriminate between reckless pretension and solid ability, and also to form a just estimate of their own characters. An apposite illustration of this is published in the fourth Number of the *Phrenological Journal*, in an article entitled, 'Phrenology applied to the Education of a Youth.' In childhood, the individual in question was remarkable for good nature, simplicity, diffidence, and bluntness of manner, and at school was uniformly made the fag of boys more roughly constituted than himself. Having only a moderate development of the knowing organs, he made extremely little progress in his education till after the age of puberty. He then studied, among other branches of science, Phrenology; and his observations on this topic are particularly deserving of attention. 'As to Phrenology,' says he, 'I am convinced I owe as much, if not more, to it, than to any other of my studies. The extreme diffidence, which formed so remarkable a feature of my disposition, arose partly from natural timidity; but it was greatly aggravated by my being conscious of deficiency in some intellectual powers, compared with other persons, and entertaining most exaggerated notions of the impediments which these defects threw in the way of my attaining even ordinary proficiency in any thing. In short, before I knew Phrenology, I was persuaded that I was a blockhead, and my whole character and conduct were on the point of being formed and regulated on this principle. When, however, I was told

that my timidity arose from a deficiency of Combativeness, joined with large Cautiousness, Conscientiousness, and Love of Approbation, I felt the truth of the observation instinctively ; and as I have a good Self-Esteem, and no deficiency of Firmness, I felt as if a mountain had been taken of my shoulders, and hoped that I should yet be able to hold up my head in society. The knowledge, also, that the confidence of many of my associates, whose presence of mind I had envied and attributed to great intellectual superiority, arose, merely, from larger Combativeness, and less Cautiousness than mine, gave me additional courage ; and I found that this theory of their dispositions was correct, not only by observing their heads, but by comparing with these their manner and conduct when boys, and discovering how beautifully it explained them. I had a natural tendency to implicit belief in all that was presented to my mind, and took every one's pretensions for actual attainments ; and in this way could never feel that I was half wise enough to act on my own opinion, if any human being chose to call it in question. Phrenology gave me a valuable insight into character, and enabled me to distinguish the chaff from the wheat ; and also to try my own views by the standard of nature, and not by the mere notions of other men. The knowledge of character which it has communicated, is as valuable as at least ten years' experience of the world would have been to a mind such as mine. My timidity and want of confidence are naturally so great, that I can scarcely imagine the time when I would have had courage to place myself in situations calculated to afford experience. Possessed of Phrenology, I feel myself invested with something like the invisible ring of the fairy tales ; I enter into society with an instrument which enables me to appreciate individuals with truth and accuracy : this knowledge makes me know my real situation, and feel safe, and then I am enabled to act without fear or embarrassment. Phrenology has placed my mind at peace also with itself. I know my deficiencies, and avoid reliance upon them ; while I know also the powers that are given, and the purposes to which they may be applied ; and gratitude

to Providence, with a due feeling of responsibility, have succeeded to fear and diffidence, which can never exist in a high degree, without some portion of discontent. Much, therefore, as Phrenology is despised, I must always regard an acquaintance with it, as one of the happiest circumstances of my life ; and have no doubt that others will entertain the same opinion when they are practically acquainted with its truths.' But it is time to return to Mr Scott's analysis.

*Mr Scott.* — 'This propensity sometimes manifests itself very strongly, where there is no opportunity or pretext for any serious or actual opposition. There are some men, in whom it appears in the course of the lightest or most amicable conversation. Such men are your great arguers. The spirit of contention and opposition is so strong in them, that they cannot prevail upon themselves to assent to the simplest proposition. There are men who make a point of contradicting almost every thing that is said ; who, whatever question is broached, are sure to take the opposite, 'and even though vanquished they can argue still.' Such persons cannot endure to have their opinions assented to. If you are convinced by their arguments, they will go over to the opinion you have left, — 'Confute, change sides, and still confute.'

*Obs.* This is a pure tendency to OPPOSE. Such persons love to contradict aggressively, and to resist defensively. With large Destructiveness and Self-Esteem, and little Benevolence, a great endowment of Combativeness gives rise to that species of detractor described by Dr Johnson in the *Rambler*, under the title of *The Roarer*. 'If the wealth of a trader is mentioned, the Roarer, without hesitation, devotes him to bankruptcy ; if the beauty and elegance of a lady be commended, he wonders how the town can fall in love with rustic deformity ; if a new performance of genius happens to be celebrated, he pronounces the writer a hopeless idiot, without knowledge of books or life, and without the understanding by which it must be acquired. His exaggerations are generally without effect upon those whom he compels to hear them ; and, though it will sometimes happen

that the timorous are awed by his violence, and the credulous mistake his confidence for knowledge, yet the opinions which he endeavors to suppress, soon recover their former strength, as the trees that bend to the tempest erect themselves again, when its force is past.\*

From a similar cause proceeds that peevish disposition, which is displeased with every thing that is done, and would be equally displeased were it omitted to be done:—

‘Some fretful tempers wince at every touch :  
 You always do too little or too much ;  
 You speak with life in hopes to entertain —  
 Your elevated voice goes through the brain ;  
 You fall at once into a lower key —  
 That 's worse — the drone-pipe of an humble-bee.  
 The southern sash admits too strong a light ;  
 You rise and drop the curtain — now 't is night.  
 He shakes with cold — you stir the fire, and strive  
 To make a blaze — that 's roasting him alive.  
 Serve him with venison, and he chooses fish ;  
 With sole — that 's just the sort he does not wish.  
 He takes what he at first professed to loath ;  
 And in due time feeds heartily on both.’\*\*

Large Combativeness makes people act, as well as speak, in opposition to other men. Many parents succeed in getting their children to do what is wanted by ordering them to do exactly the reverse. A pertinent illustration of the same quality occurs in one of Steele's papers in the *Tatler*, in which are printed sundry memorials for admission into the ‘Infirmery for people out of humor.’ One of the invalids is Thomas Sudden, Esq. of the Inner Temple whose memorial sets forth, —

‘That Mr Sudden is conscious that he is too much given to argumentation.

‘That he talks loud.

‘That he is apt to think all things matter of debate.

‘That he staid behind in Westminster Hall, when the late shake of the roof happened, only because a counsel on the other side asserted it was coming down.

\* Cowper's ‘Conversations.’

‘That he cannot, for his life, consent to anything,’ &c.

It is extremely probable that Mr Sudden’s character and actions were those of an individual known to Steele. This, however, is of no importance; there can be no doubt that such a disposition is frequently seen in society. Mr B., whose case is detailed in the 36th Number of the Phrenological Journal, and whose organ of Combativeness is very large, says of himself, — ‘I have a curious penchant for praising a man whenever I hear him depreciated, and depreciating him when I hear him praised. Somehow I always side with the opposition in Parliament, whatever that may be. This is absurd, but I cannot help it.’\* Peter Bayle is said to have made it a general rule in writing, to take the side in opposition to other people; and hence it has been remarked, that the way to make him write usefully was to attack him only when he was in the right, for he would then combat in favor of truth with all the energy of a powerful mind. What is this but OPPOSIVENESS?†

*Mr Scott.* — ‘True Combativeness shows itself in prompting to strike, whether there be occasion or no.’ — *Obs.* If Mr Scott mean that this organ is the *direct* prompter of blows, I cannot assent to his opinion. It appears to me that without Destructiveness, neither blows nor wounds can be given, for the mere pleasure of doing so. The latter propensity urges to the infliction of *injury*, — physical or moral, mortal or trivial, — on the persons or property of ourselves or others, or on the reputation of those whom we dislike; and from it originates every action which has for its object the production of pain, uneasiness, destruction, mutilation, or defacement. The name of this faculty, as well as of that more particularly under consideration, is, therefore, by no means sufficiently comprehensive; for it incites men not merely to destroy, but to torment, disable, punish, hate, annoy, slander and take revenge. In fighting, both Combativeness and Destructiveness come into operation; and the lat-

\* Phren. Jour. viii. 226.

† See an allusion to a similar trait in the character of the poet Burns, in the 41st No. of this Journal, p. 62.

ter seems to me quite as indispensable in the character of a pugnacious man as the former. It is Destructiveness alone, I repeat, which is gratified by the infliction of a blow. When Combativeness is deficient, or is overborne by Cautiousness, blows are directed against some defenceless object, and the well-known phenomenon of a ferocious coward appears. When Combativeness is large and Destructiveness moderate, fighting is resorted to for the purpose of gratifying the love of opposition and contention; and the blow is inflicted by Destructiveness rather with the view of raising up an antagonist, than for the pleasure of causing pain. Wrestling is a species of contest where Combativeness acts with little, if any, Destructiveness. When a man boldly walks up to, and attempts to disarm, a highwayman whom he sees awaiting his approach, he acts under the impulse of Combativeness alone: when blows are added, Destructiveness also comes into play; he not only *acts in opposition* to the highwayman, but also inflicts injury upon him. In such a case, he whose Combativeness is large, and Destructiveness small, will probably desist as soon as the highwayman is in his power; he in whom *both* are large, will continue still to belabor him; while he who has Destructiveness and Cautiousness large, with Combativeness deficient, will decline the conflict altogether, and at once take to his heels—or, if a companion should fight with the highwayman, will keep out of the fray till the enemy is overcome; upon which, he will suddenly acquire magnanimity, and apply himself with vigor to the duty of chastisement and revenge. It is to be observed, however, that a remarkable sympathy exists between the two organs in question, probably from their juxta-position in the brain. When one of them is highly excited, the other seldom remains quiescent. It is with great difficulty that persons who engage in contention avoid becoming angry and ill-natured; while, on the other hand—as Dr Thomas Brown has remarked, though in too unqualified terms—‘when anger arises, fear is gone;—there is no coward, for all are brave.’\* This simultaneousness of action appears to be the

\* Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, iii. 24.

principal cause why the functions of *Combativeness* and *Destructiveness* have hitherto been so much confounded.

The skulls and dispositions of the Peruvian Indians afford a strong confirmation of the views now proposed. The *Phrenological Society* possesses several of these, closely resembling each other. *Combativeness* is in them very little developed, while *Destructiveness* and *Cautiousness* are quite enormous. In accordance with this, we are told in the *Edinburgh Review*, (vol. ix. p. 437,) that the Peruvian Indians are 'dastardly in moments of danger, savage and cruel after victory, and severe and inexorable in the exercise of authority.' Equally striking are the following remarks of that most sagacious observer of human character, *Montaigne*. 'I have often heard it said, that cowardice is the mother of cruelty; and I have found by experience, that malicious and inhuman animosity and fierceness is usually accompanied with feminine faintness. . . . Valor, whose effect is only to be exercised against resistance, stops when it sees the enemy at its mercy; but Pusillanimity not having dared to meddle in the first act of danger, rushes into the second of blood and massacre: . . . like cowardly house curs, that in the house worry and tear the skins of wild beasts they durst not come near in the field.'\*

*Combativeness* then is a chief element in the propensity to fight; but *Destructiveness* is not less indispensable. When the latter is deficient, or when *Cautiousness* is very large, *Combativeness* will incline to seek gratification in some of the bloodless and blowless fields above adverted to—in moral, rather than physical contention—and in wrestling rather than fighting. If *Language* be greatly developed, a love of verbal disputation will be the probable result.

If man be destined—as there is good reason to believe that he is—to reach that point in the scale of civilization where the propensities will act under the guidance of the higher sentiments and intellect, physical contention will altogether cease, except in

\* *Essays*, vol. ii. ch. 27.

those countries where fierce and ravenous animals remain. When this period shall arrive, what sphere of activity will there be for Dr Spurzheim's 'propensity to fight?' The only field which will then exist, is that of mental opposition and discussion.

For these reasons, I humbly submit, 1st, That Dr Spurzheim's definition of the function of the organ No. V. is incorrect and incomplete; and, 2dly, That the word *OPPOSIVENESS*, as above defined, includes every form of action to which the propensity leads, expresses the fundamental or elementary function with precision and clearness, and ought, therefore, to be substituted for the term *Combativeness*, now almost universally in use. At all events it is superior to the present name, by embracing the moral as well as physical actions to which the faculty prompts. The title *Courage*, originally bestowed by Gall, is objectionable as not sufficiently comprehensive, and also because it expresses a state of mind in which the tendency to oppose prevails over the dictate of Cautiousness; for it seems to me that the same development of the organ No. V. may render one man courageous, but fail to produce this effect on another in whom Cautiousness predominates. It may be said, that a name is of little importance, provided the real nature of the faculty is understood. To this I reply, first, that Dr Spurzheim's definition gives an erroneous view of the real nature of the faculty; secondly, that though advanced phrenologists may, notwithstanding, have accurate notions about the faculty, students of the science are puzzled and misled; and lastly, that people who judge of the nature of the faculties merely from their names, have their prejudices against Phrenology increased by the belief, needlessly forced upon them, that phrenologists have discovered an organ the natural and legitimate function of which is to induce mankind to fight.

Whether the foregoing observations be well founded or not, they may at least be useful in drawing more of the attention of phrenologists than has of late been given to the analysis of the fundamental faculties, and to the mode in which such inquiries ought to be pursued.

## ARTICLE VI.

*Commercial Distress.* [From the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal.]

It is a fundamental doctrine of ours, that the faculties common to man with the lower animals are inferior to those proper to man ; and that the Creator has so arranged the world, that misery is the natural result of the predominance of the former, and happiness of the latter. We shall endeavor to apply these principles in accounting for the commercial distress which has of late so painfully engaged public attention.

In a period of profound peace, and immediately after one of the finest summers and most abundant harvests ever showered by a bountiful Providence on Britain, this country has been a theatre of almost universal misery. In October and November, 1825, stocks began to fall with alarming rapidity ; in November, numerous bankers in London failed ; in December, the evil spread to the country bankers ; in January and February, 1826, the distress overtook the merchants and manufacturers, thousands of them were ruined, and their workmen thrown idle ; agricultural produce began to fall, and suffering and gloom have extended over the whole empire. These events have carried awful misery into the bosoms of numberless families. The Phrenologist, who knows the nature of the propensities and sentiments, and their objects, is well able to conceive the deep, though often silent agonies that must have been felt when Acquisitiveness was suddenly deprived of its long-collected stores ; when Self-esteem and Love of Approbation were in an instant robbed of all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of wordly grandeur, that, during years of fancied prosperity, had formed their chief sources of delight ;—and when Cautiousness felt the dreadful access of despair at the ruin of every darling project. The laceration of those feelings hurried some unfortunate victims to suicide, and

spread mental and bodily distress widely over the land. So dire a calamity indicates to our minds, in the most unequivocal manner, some grand departure from the just principles of political economy, or, in other words, from the dictates of the higher sentiments, which we hold to be the real basis of all sound political philosophy.

This distress appears to us to have originated in [our paper currency, which, so far as we at present perceive, is founded in injustice, and, consequently, is unsound and dangerous in its consequences.

Suppose A to possess £20,000 in money invested in land, houses, government stock, or some other fixed and productive form, yielding a return of 4 per cent., or £800 per annum; that he pledges this investment to the public, and is permitted on the security of it to issue bank-notes to the value of £20,000; in this case real property could be made forthcoming in case of necessity to retire the notes, and, according to the general opinion, no harm would arise to the public from the transaction. Let us, however, trace out its effects.

Suppose A to confine himself to the proper business of banking, and that he puts £20,000 in notes into circulation, he would draw first £800 a-year of interest from his capital, and £1000 a-year of interest at 5 per cent. from his notes, in all £1800 per annum. It is obvious that he could afford to discount bills with his bank-notes, or lend them at interest at a lower rate than if he carried on the same operations with real money, which could not both be laid out at 4 per cent. in land or stock, and remain at its owner's disposal, yielding five per cent. more at one and the same time. The moment, therefore, A with his notes comes into competition as a banker or money-lender, with other individuals who employ real capital in these operations, he is able to beat them out of the market by lowering the rate of interest. If he draws 3 per cent. for his notes, and 4 per cent. of regular return from the invested capital, he will receive 7 per cent. in all, when other capitalists, who do not first invest their money productively, and then issue notes, are drawing only 3 per cent.

This is unjust ; and yet this was the real state of matters during the prodigious fall of interest in 1824 and 1825. The bankers issued their paper in floods ; and, to keep it in circulation and increase its quantity, they lowered and lowered the rate of interest :—nevertheless, bank-stock rose, trade increased, and every one seemed to flourish except the holders of money capital, who were impoverished by the impossibility of finding investments, or obtaining a moderate interest for their stock. The bankers were well able to do this ; for those who had capital profitably invested to the extent of their notes, drew the above-mentioned double return, and actually realized 7 or 8 per cent., when other capitalists were receiving only 3 or 4. Those bankers, again, of whom there seems to have been many in England, who had no invested capital or real stock of any kind, could discount bills with notes, or lend at a very low rate of interest ; for, as their notes cost nothing beyond paper, engraving, printing, and stamp, and as they had nothing behind them to lose, whatever interest they received, if it exceeded these expenses, was all gain.

From these principles, it follows, that every man who first invests his capital productively, and then issues bank-notes at interest on the credit of it, places himself in a situation of great advantage over those individuals, who act as bankers, or lenders at interest, with money capital itself ; and that the latter can never compete on equal terms with the former, except by investing their capital also in a productive form, and issuing bank-notes on the credit of it to the same extent as their rivals. If, to protect himself, every one were to issue notes to the extent of his invested capital, paper would become so redundant as to have scarcely any value, and would speedily be put down as a public nuisance ; and yet unless every man, who possesses real property does this, he is injured by the issue of notes.

The effects of the paper system may be further illustrated. Let us suppose the trade of a country to be carried on by means of gold and silver as the medium of exchange,—then the following results will take place. The precious metals are real com-

modities, which cannot be increased instantaneously to an unlimited extent. They are procured by labor, and require time for their increase, A small trade requires a small supply, while a great trade demands a proportionate quantity of them. If trade increases faster than the supply of gold and silver, they will become relatively scarce, and their value will rise; or, in other words, the price of goods will fall. This fall will check production until the supply of gold and silver has increased in proportion to the trade, when prices will again rise, and production proceed.

According to this principle, while gold and silver are the circulating medium, full scope is given for a gradual production of wealth, because those metals can be increased by time and labor in proportion to the increase of population and the natural augmentation of commodities. At the same time a positive check to over production in every branch of industry is supplied, because the metals cannot be instantaneously and indefinitely increased. Whenever goods are produced with undue rapidity, money will become relatively scarce, and prices fall.

On the bank-note system the order of nature is exactly reversed. If immense manufacturing, buying, and selling, take place, even without corresponding consumption, bills are multiplied, and when bills are multiplied, discounts increase, and where these abound, the paper circulating medium increases: when the circulating medium increases, prices rise; and, hence we have the absurd anomaly of rising markets in the face of a most enormous over-production. We have also the oddity of interest falling as trade increases, and the difficulty of finding employment for capital reaching its acmé, when transactions to a most unwonted extent are going forward, requiring a vast amount of circulating medium. The result of this system renders the error of principle involved in it still more conspicuous. The bankers, tempted by the flood of wealth that flowed in upon them in the form of interest for their notes, preserved no bounds to their issues; they discounted bills at 6, 9, and 12 months date, lent on mortgages, and in England bought mills and lands, and

even commenced manufacturers themselves. When their notes were returned, these securities were not convertible, the bankers failed, a panic arose, and paper was poured back upon them in a stream of frightful magnitude and extent. Those bankers, who had nothing to give in return for their notes, except the bills of merchants for which they had at first issued them, called on the merchants to pay; the latter, however, had nothing except the goods which the bills represented. The goods, unfortunately, had not been produced to meet the real wants of society, but had been fostered into existence by the temptation of profit, which dazzled first the manufacturer, then the banker who discounted his bills; and at last, when the paper currency ceased to flow, and the goods required to be bought by real capital, they fell 50 per cent.; the merchants were unable to pay, and bankruptcy stalked far and wide over the land.

If, as in Scotland, the bankers had land, houses, stock, or other property behind their notes, they were able to make up the deficiency arising from the failure of the merchants; but they became alarmed at the extent of their losses, drew in their notes, lessened the circulating medium, and depressed the prices of goods to the lowest ebb. Real capital then came into request, interest rose, and £100 in real cash bought more goods than £150 would have done while the country was deluged with paper.

Matters will remain in this state until the stock of manufactured articles is brought below the natural demand; trade will then revive, and for a time be profitable; confidence will be restored, bills again be granted, discounts will follow, paper currency will increase, prices will continue to rise, production will be pushed to the last extremity, everything will appear to flourish for a time, till another crash arrives, and then we shall be told about the calamities of life and commercial distress, and perhaps see a little deeper into the causes, and at last look for a remedy.

According to our view, instead of the abolition of one-pound bank-notes being an evil, the only fault of the measure is, that it does not go far enough, and do away with bank-paper altogether. We fear that the national debt would become an intolerable bur-

den if this was done ; but, nevertheless, as long as we suffer a paper currency to exist, a currency which can be produced without labor, and increased without limits, and which enables the issuer of it to reap *double* profits at the expense of those who do not issue bank-notes, so long will the nation be doomed to suffer the punishment which follows every departure from justice and sound principle. It has been said, that the holder of £20,000 of capital may lend this sum, and he will easily get credit for other £20,000 on the faith of it, and that thus he will be on a par with a banker who invests his capital, and then issues notes. But there is this difference, the banker and capitalist are, no doubt, on a par in both drawing a return for their £20,000 if they lend them ; but when the latter goes to market, and asks credit for £20,000 worth of goods he has to pay the *credit* price, or 2 1-2 per cent. for three months, whereas the issuer of notes pays his notes for the goods, and gets this per centage of discount. Here the injustice of the principle is equally obvious.

Our limits prevent us from tracing out all the evils of the paper system in their minute ramifications ; but we take our stand here, that its principles are unjust and unnatural, and that all its consequences must be evil. We proceed, therefore, to apply phrenology to this subject. According to our view, the Creator has framed the world on the principle of the predominance of the higher sentiments ; that is to say, if mankind will condescend to seek their chief gratifications in the exercise of Benevolence, Veneration, Conscientiousness, and intellect they will be exempt in an amazing degree from calamity, while they will suffer continually-recurring misery, so long as they place their highest enjoyments in the gratification of the lower propensities. It is an undeniable fact, that the inhabitants of Britain, generally, are involved in a chase of wealth, power, and personal aggrandizement, or the gratification of Acquisitiveness, Self-Esteem, and Love of Approbation to the exclusion, of everything like systematic cultivation of the proper human faculties before enumerated. Now, if our principle be correct, they never can be happy while this is the case. If the Creator has intended the higher powers to pre-

vail, his whole arrangements must be in harmony with them, and the world must be so constituted that it is possible for every individual to reap the enjoyment for which existence is given. By the gratification of the human powers, we do not mean mere psalm-singing and superstitious devotion, but enlightened religion, the exercise of habitual benevolence, justice and respect between man and man, the reciprocal communication of knowledge, and the systematic exercise of the intellect in studying the laws of creation. For these ends a portion of time every day is requisite; but on the present system the whole energies, bodily and mental, of millions of our population, are expended in ministering to the gratification of Acquisitiveness, Self-Esteem, Love of Approbation, and still lower animal propensities; and, if suffering follows this course of conduct, men have themselves to blame. If, by the arrangements of the Creator, the labor of six or seven hours a-day is amply sufficient for the full satisfaction of every desire that mere physical objects can gratify, and if the other hours not necessary for sleep, were intended for the exercise and gratification of the moral and intellectual powers, then men, by devoting their whole time to the former, and neglecting the latter, must necessarily produce evil to themselves. Accordingly, this is the actual state and result of matters in Britain at the present time. The laboring population are forced to work ten or twelve hours a-day; this creates a great redundancy of goods; then they are thrown entirely idle, and suffer infinite misery, and their masters are involved in bankruptcy and ruin. The bank-notes, by enabling the masters to force production at this rate, which without them would be impossible, greatly contribute to this evil. The Creator's laws, at the same time, show themselves paramount even in the breach of them; for, if the months, days, and hours of idleness which follow regularly on every stagnation of trade, had been distributed over the working days, they would have reduced each day's toil to the precise extent that was *really necessary* for the satisfaction of actual human wants;—and the same law will continue to rule the world, whether men recognize it or not. If the masters could be persuaded to establish schools, libraries, and

every means of moral and intellectual cultivation, and allow their workmen systematically to cultivate their human faculties for three or four hours a-day, trade would go regularly on, there would be no gluts of the market, profits would be steady, crime would diminish, and a flood of moral and intellectual enjoyment would spread over the land, that would render earth the porch of heaven.

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## ARTICLE VII.

*Shakspeare's Othello.* [From the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal.]

THOSE who are unacquainted with Phrenology may smile at the attempt to apply it in analyzing a character which probably never had any existence beyond the pages of the volume in which we find it described. They ask us, what have we proved, when we have traced each indication of passion, or feeling, or intellect, to what we call an elementary source, and designated that source by a phrenological name? The argument in favor of our science, which is thus afforded, is certainly not of that obvious and palpable kind, which is likely at once to carry conviction to a mind whose attention is for the first time directed to the investigation; but to those who have already made some progress in the study, it is, though an indirect, a most beautiful and convincing proof that nature and phrenology are one. They discover in it the elements of the most various and opposite appearances which the mind of man does or can assume. And if a system so perfect and complete is assigned by its enemies to the invention of Gall and Spurzheim, they assert what, in truth, it is harder to

believe, than the proposition which they themselves reject on the mere ground of its incredibility.

In the character of Othello, such as it is drawn by Shakspeare, the first thing we remark is its power and energy. He seems to move along among the personages of that inimitable drama, as if conscious of his superiority, and these seem to recognize that superiority by the submissiveness and awe with which his presence affects them. There is, in whatever he utters or performs, that indescribable force, which, had he really existed, we must have immediately assigned to the general largeness of his cerebral organization. It is not, however, the ascendancy which results from the possession of a commanding intellect, as will presently be seen from the analysis of his character, but rather that superiority which flows from the elevation of sentiment, stimulated by the fire of passion. The propensities and sentiments, indeed, are, with few exceptions, so strongly manifested as to occasion little difficulty in describing their proportions. Of the intellectual faculties the indications are less complete, and the difficulty of deciding on their relative energy is consequently greater. Their general vigor is undoubtedly inferior to that of the two other great divisions, under which, together with this of intellect, the different faculties of the human mind are classed by Phrenology. The preponderance of the intellect is manifested in man, by the complete subjection in which it holds the inferior parts of his nature. Whether that subjection may prove effectual for good or for wicked purposes, will in a great measure depend on the strength or deficiency of the sentiments ; but no influence of passion will be allowed to interfere with the accomplishment of an object. In Othello, on the other hand, the force of his propensities may be frequently seen sweeping intellect along in a tide, which, but for the opposition offered by counteracting sentiments, would have been altogether resistless.

Self-Esteem is the prevailing feature in his character ; being combined, however, with large Conscientiousness and Love of Approbation, its presence is manifested rather by a conscious greatness and magnanimity, than by the more offensive and less

dignified indications with which we are apt to associate its predominance. Under this form it is discoverable in the first words he utters. In the second scene of the first act, he is introduced in conversation with Iago, whose immense Secretiveness and powerful intellect enabled him thoroughly to comprehend the character of his general's mind, and whose whole speech accordingly is directed to this combination which it immediately excites. Brabantio's merits and influence with the duke are stated so as to contrast them with the Moor's, and his reply finely exhibits the combination to which I have adverted ;

*Oth.* Let him do his spite :

My services, which I have done the signiory,  
 Shall out-tongue his complaints. 'T is yet to know,  
 (Which, when I know that boasting is an honor,  
 I shall promulgate,) I fetch my life and being,  
 From men of royal siege ; and my demerits  
 May speak, unbonneted, to as proud a fortune  
 As this that I have reached : For know, Iago,  
 But that I love the gentle Desdemona,  
 I would not my unhousted, free condition,  
 Put into circumscription, and confine  
 For the sea's worth. —

A more accurate display of Self-esteem, Love of Approbation, and Conscientiousness, could hardly be produced. It is not the disgusting apotheosis of self, which results from the first of these sentiments, when the others are deficient, nor the idle boasting of a Captain Bobadil, who, with his single arm, and his good toledo, could kill ' his twenty men per day,' demonstrating the vigor of love of Approbation, and the weakness of Conscientiousness and Self-esteem,—for the latter sentiment acts as a restraint on boasting, as may be seen in the character of Coriolanus,—but it is the simple assertion of conscious merit, of services which he knows he has performed, and whose value he can fully estimate.

But there is something more unfolded in this passage : —

I would not my unhousted free condition

Put into circumscription and confine  
For the sea's worth —

proves the general largeness of his propensities, communicating, with his large Self-esteem, to his temperament a fire and restlessness, which is averse from every species of control :— and the words which precede,

But that I love the gentle Desdemona,  
evinced also in particular the power of his Amativeness and Adhesiveness, producing a motive strong enough to overcome this aversion to bondage. It is these two faculties which give birth to conjugal love, — a love, which, when they are largely developed, clings to its object with a devotedness, which seems to hold life and love, as of synonymous import. Such it was in Othello, —

Were't to renounce his captain, — (says Iago,) —  
All seals and symbols of redeemed sin,  
His soul is so unfettered to her love  
That she may make, unmake, do what she list : —

When we have noticed the proofs of his large Combativeness and Destructiveness, we shall have before us the great elements of action in the Moor's mental constitution ; and which being directed into a particular channel by the fiendish cunning of his officer, lead to the main incident which the drama involves. Of the energy of these two propensities we have ample testimony, as well from every word he utters, as from every deed he performs. He had been, as he tells the senators in the 'round unvarnished tale' he delivers in justification of his marriage with Desdemona, a soldier from childhood ; and if the pith of his little arm could not at seven years be very terrible to his enemies, his disposition to raise it 'in the tented field' spoke of the spirit which was nursing the future hero. But it is not alone in these 'seats of broils and battle' in which his life has been spent, that we discover the vigor of the two propensities in question. It is true, that wherever they are strongly developed, they communicate to the character an instinctive desire to encounter, and struggle

with and conquer opposition ;— and Othello tells the senators of Venice, —

I do agonize  
A natural and prompt alacrity —  
I find in hardness.—

Like the war-horse when the trumpet sounds the onset, and the din of arms startles his ear, spurning the earth with his impatient tread, and panting for the shock of battle, the rider, sharing the spirit of the noble animal which bears him, longs for the command that bids him rush like a destroying angel to scatter destruction among the foe. Conjoined, however, with the sentiments which Othello possessed in such distinguished proportion, the natural fierceness of these propensities would be restrained, until a strong exciting cause was presented. But their operation was not therefore suspended. Even in this quiescent state, they impart to every accent of command, an expression which can never be misunderstood by those to whom it is addressed ; conveying, although uttered with all the external seeming of coolness and composure, an intimation, — to use the words of Mr Scott, — of the will of the speaker, coupled with the farther intimation, expressed or implied, that disobedience will be attended with fatal or inconvenient consequences.

There is a striking exemplification of this, in the second scene of the first act, where Othello thus replies to the puny clamors of the aged and feeble Brabantio and the party he leads —

Keep up your bright swords, for the dew will rust them. —  
Good signior, you shall more command with years  
Than with your weapons —

And again, after every abusive epithet has been lavished upon him — far from being chafed by an opposition, his Self-esteem, Combativeness, and Destructiveness, give him an inward consciousness of power, to crush by a single movement of his arm, — he calls to those of both parties who were preparing to bring the matter to the decision of arms, —

Hold your hands,  
 Both you of my inclining, and the rest :  
 Were it my cue to fight, I should have known it  
 Without a prompter. —

Othello is now the husband of Desdemona, the object of his entire and unmeasured affection. The sentiments of Self-esteem, Love of Approbation, and Conscientiousness, which we have seen so powerfully indicated would entitle us to predicate that pleasure and dalliance, though fully enjoyed, would never relax one necessary exertion in the cause of his country. The sense of his own dignity, of the opinion of the world, and of duty, which they must naturally produce, are offerings too valuable to be sacrificed on the shrine of the Cyprian goddess. We feel assured, when his sails are spread to carry him to the seat of war, that he will not, like another Antony, spend those hours on the couch, or at the festive board, which should have seen him 'turning the tide of battle with his arm,' at the head of his legions ; nor fly like the luxurious Roman, to hide the ignominy of defeat and overthrow in the bosom of his mistress. We recognise the ruling principles of his previous character, when he speaks thus to his Venetian masters :—

And Heaven defend your good souls, that you think  
 I will your serious and great business scant,  
 For she is with me : No, when light-winged toys  
 Of feathered Cupid seal with wanton dulness  
 My speculative and active instruments,  
 That my disports corrupt and taint my business,  
 Let housewives make a skillet of my helm,  
 And all indign and base adversities  
 Make head against my estimation.

As it is at this period the great event on which this drama is made to turn begins to be evolved, it may be useful, in order fully to comprehend how the crafty insinuations of Iago operate, and the consequences to which they lead, to glance at those features in the Moor's character, which have not hitherto been adverted to. Of the propensities we seem already to have noticed all of which

there is any indication ; of the sentiments not one appears to have been deficient ; Firmness, Hope, Ideality, Cautiousness, Benevolence, and Veneration, if less expressly manifested than the three others, whose combined activity has been pointed out, discover at the same time their influence, in every modification of mind, into which they could enter. Firmness, Hope, and Ideality, when in vigorous existence, produce, even where Cautiousness is full, a sanguine and decided disposition. And if it happens as in Othello's case, that Self-esteem is a prevailing sentiment, undisturbed confidence in his power to execute what he undertakes will be the result which this combination will generate. Othello's intellect would seem to have been of a knowing, rather than of a reflective and philosophic cast. It is not from any individual and particular indication we are led to this conclusion, but rather from the general tone of the whole character. Such personages as Macbeth, and Richard III. give proofs of a superior intellect in almost every sentence they are made to utter. We find in nearly all their soliloquies a tracing of cause and effect from abstract propositions, which at once demonstrates the vigorous action of those faculties we have noticed as defective in Othello, in whose whole language we cannot discover above one or two such manifestations, and these in the simplest form. The consequence of this deficiency cannot be more forcibly stated than in the words of Iago, by which Shakspeare undoubtedly meant to convey a true idea of his hero :—

The Moor is of a free and open nature,  
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so ;  
And will as tenderly be led by the nose  
As asses are.

In this particular he is strongly contrasted with Iago, whose powers of this class are far beyond the reach of his General's grasp. The contrast indeed is deepened by the different degrees of Secretiveness which they possess ; and we omitted to notice, that in the Moor it could only have been of moderate size ; while the thick veil which it enables his officer to draw over

thoughts already too profound to be scanned by Othello's penetration, well entitle him to exclaim,

For when my outward action doth demonstrate  
The native act and figure of my heart  
In compliment extern, 't is not long after  
But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve,  
For daws to peck at: I am not what I am.

But a powerful intellect was not necessary to Othello's office as a general; not even to his being the great and redoubted one which the tragedy describes him. He had a mind exactly fitted to obtain a high ascendancy in the camp or in the field of battle. With Cautiousness sufficient to prevent rashness, with Combative-ness and Destructiveness, and Love of Approbation, to make him fight from inclination, as well as from the desire of fame, with Firmness and Self-esteem, to make him persevere against ten thousand obstacles, with that benignity of deportment, and genuine humanity, which spring from Veneration and Benevolence; we see in Othello, at once the joy of his soldiers, and the scourge and terror of his enemy. It remains to observe how these elements of domestic love, of noble dignity, of severe justice, are converted into a burning sense of disappointed affection, insulted pride and implacable revenge. It remains, in a word to trace the progress of Othello's jealousy.

Before proceeding with this part of our task, however, perhaps it may not be deemed inappropriate to make a few general remarks on jealousy itself.

It is a truth not less indisputable than it is melancholy, that many of those feelings of our mental constitution, which the hand of nature planted there, to add to the security, and happiness, and dignity of our existence, do often become, by perversion and abuse, the very means by which we are rendered strangers to each and all of these much-desired, and truly desirable objects. The passion of jealousy,—to use the common phraseology,—is but one exemplification of this statement, out of the long catalogue which the history of humanity presents. It is a passion into whose composition several elementary principles enter, and the

different aspects it assumes, spring from the variety in number and in modes of combination in which these principles unite. As it is not our present purpose, however, to examine and discriminate between the features by which these modifications are severally characterized, we shall merely observe in proceeding, that Self-esteem is the root from which they all originate. That wherever this faculty exists in large proportion, and is accompanied by a vigorous Love of Approbation, together with a deficient sentiment of Conscientiousness, the individual in whom this combination exists will be very liable to entertain a jealousy, which will take its distinguishing character from some other prominent point in his mental constitution. Unless in cases where Love of Approbation is itself the prevailing feature, and in such, jealousy of fame will be the tone it will assume.

The Self-esteem of such a person is wounded when those about him rise to higher eminence than himself, in the department which, from his cast of mind, he considers as peculiarly his own ; because he is thus compelled to admit, though it be only in the secrecy of his own bosom, that he is inferior ; and the bitterness which this admission carries along with it, is increased tenfold by the injury his sentiment of the Love of Approbation receives, by witnessing the tide of human applause flowing rapidly towards these detested objects. Had Conscientiousness been large it would have impressed him, in spite of himself, with the feeling that the award was just ; he would more easily have submitted to receive the inferior portion of fame, which his merits might still secure to him ; and he would have looked with less bitterness on the names that occupied a higher station than his own in the scale of excellence.

Saul, King of Israel, is a striking exemplification of the kind of jealousy we have been describing. When the virgins met him returning from battle and sung to the notes of their instruments of music, that ' Saul had slain his thousand, and David his tens of thousands,' the king was very wroth and the saying displeased him.' In this instance, Destructiveness was also powerful, which, being stimulated by the combination above specified, prompted

him to destroy the object of his jealousy. The poet, with these sentiments, combined in the manner and degree described, is jealous of the authorship of his rivals in the favor of the sacred nine; the architect looks with a scowling and discontented eye on the rising towers and swelling arches, which he sees growing up under the rod of a more potent wizard than himself; the artist hates every line of beauty which the marble assumes under the more skilfully guided tool of a brother sculptor; and the loveliest Madonna that ever graced the walls of a cloister, would fail to draw from him one regard of worshipping admiration. But the principle on which the passion proceeds being explained, it is unnecessary to dwell on the modified forms it may, in different individuals, assume. Jealousy, in all the states to which we have yet alluded, is insignificant and contemptible, and generally is consistent with a constitution of mind, which, even if this passion were abstracted, would neither be truly great nor amiable. But there is a jealousy which can excite the deepest sympathies of our nature, which can be insinuated into a mind of the noblest mould, and make him, who once was great and good, 'fallen in the practice of a cursed slave,' to assume the form of a revengeful demon. Such a cursed slave was Iago, and Othello was such a victim to his malignity.

The great elements of Othello's character, whose influence and operation we have remarked in the early part of his history, continued throughout to give equally incontestable evidence of their presiding power. The clouds were now gathering, which were soon to shut out for ever from his soul every beam of happiness; but even amid the storm which followed, and in the ruin of which it was the cause, we find no deviation from the principles with which Shakspeare at first invested his mental constitution. There reigns, from beginning to end, a conformity and a truth to nature, which in this, as in every other portrait sketched by the same hand, renders our great poet the glory of his country. Othello loved his wife,—loved his friends,—loved honor,—and hated the very appearance of deceit or injustice; and yet withal, he becomes the murderer of that wife,—dooms his truest friend

to the dagger of an assassin,—and, finally, to these adds the crime of suicide; yet nature is never once violated. Othello, in the last scene of the play pointed at with the finger of amazement and horror, is the same Othello, whom in the first act we had seen honored by the Venetian senate as the prop and bulwark of the empire.

Iago himself informs us of the plan he is now preparing to execute. Thoroughly acquainted at once with the strength and weakness of his General's mind, he knew every avenue through which his devilish insinuations could be introduced with the greatest safety and the most perfect effect. I will, he says,

Make the Moor thank me, love me, and reward me,  
For making him egregiously an ass,  
And practising upon his peace and quiet,  
Even to madness.

His Adhesiveness, his Love of Approbation, his Self-esteem, and even his Conscientiousness, are all to be assailed, and every proof of Desdemona's infamy is to be made to carry that stamp which will render its impression irresistible to such a mind.

At the first step, Cassio is brought into disgrace, and the detail of the event brings out, into a strong light, some of those leading features in Othello's character to which we have been adverting. Love had not lulled to sleep, as we observed might have been predicated, the Cautiousness of the soldier, even on the bridal night.

Good Michael (he says to Cassio,) look you to the guard to night:  
Let's teach ourselves that honorable stop,  
Not to outsport discretion.

By the machinations of Iago, however, the honest Lieutenant's wits are confounded by a too liberal sacrifice to Bacchus, and his choleric temper being thus unmuzzled, the court of guard becomes a scene of uproar and confusion. The alarum bell is rung, and the inhabitants of a 'town of war get wild, the people's hearts brimful of fear,' thrown into a state of commotion. The scene,

the third of the second act, which ensues, is finely descriptive of the disposition of mind we have assigned to Othello, illustrated alike in what he himself utters, as in the crafty wording of Iago's explanations :

*Oth.* Hold, for your lives.

*Iago.* Hold, hold, lieutenant — sir, Montano — gentlemen, Have you forgot all sense of place and duty ?

.... The general speaks to you ; hold, hold, for shame !

*Oth.* Why, how now, ho ! From whence ariseth this ?

Are we turned Turks ; and to ourselves do that

Which Heaven hath forbid the Ottomites ?

For Christian shame put by this barbarous brawl :

He that stirs next to carve for his own rage,

Holds his soul light ; he dies upon his motion.—

Silence that dreadful bell ; it frights the isle

From her propriety. — What is the matter ?....

Honest Iago, that looks dead with grieving,

Speak, who began this ? on thy love I charge thee.

Hitherto Self-esteem, Conscientiousness, Firmness, and the Benevolence which was diffused through his nature, keep his kindling Destructiveness in subjection ; but when, on farther investigation, he cannot obtain the true account how 'this foul rout began,' his anger begins to break through all restraint, while his higher faculties still struggling against its rising power, make him aware of the consequences which are about to ensue :

*Oth.* Now, by Heaven,

My blood begins my safer guides to rule ;

And passion, having my best judgment collid,

Assays to lead the way : If I once stir,

Or do but lift this arm, the best of you

Shall sink in my rebuke.

Iago being thus apparently driven to avow the truth, arranges his words with such a depth of cunning, as to make it appear to the Moor that his 'honesty and love doth mince this matter, making it light to Cassio,' when in truth he has told all, and infused into the General's mind suspicions of much more. He thus gains the double object of prepossessing the latter in his favor,

while he utterly ruins Cassio, and by this means lays the groundwork of all his subsequent operations.

Conscientiousness accompanied by Self-esteem, and stimulated by Destructiveness, manifest their presence in circumstances like those in which Othello is now placed, by the stern and severe application of justice to punish so palpable a breach of duty as appears to have been committed; the more especially, since that duty had arisen from a command issued by himself. What follows, therefore, is in strict harmony with nature. The faithful soldier and the valued friend must submit to the stern decree of inflexible justice :

Cassio, I love thee ;  
But never more be officer of mine.

The scene which follows soon after, wherein Iago first insinuates the damning suspicion into his General's mind, is perhaps the finest in the whole play. He does not begin by hinting at once that the intimacy of the Lieutenant with Desdemona exceeded propriety ; but as if merely expressing aloud a thought which had suddenly passed across his mind, he cries, —

Ha! I like not that.

*Oth.* What dost thou say ?

*Iago.* Nothing, my lord : or if — I know not what.

*Oth.* Was not that Cassio parted from my wife ?

*Iago.* Cassio, my lord ? No, sure I cannot think it,  
That he would steal away so guilty like,  
Seeing you coming.

Othello himself is thus made to suggest the idea on which Iago had himself apparently just lighted ; and in the dialogue that ensues, the crafty ancient puts his interrogatories with the air of one who desires simply to satisfy his own mind. Othello's attention being thus arrested, and a gleam of suspicion darting across him, he becomes himself the inquisitor ; and every word which Iago now utters has the appearance of being forced from him, and wears the complete aspect of friendship and truth :

*Iago.* My lord, you know I love you.

*Oth.* I think thou dost;  
 And, — for I know that thou art full of love and honesty,  
 And weigh'st thy words before thou giv'st them breath,—  
 Therefore these stops of thine fright me the more:  
 For such things in a false disloyal knave,  
 Are tricks of custom; but, in a man that's just,  
 They're close denotements working from the heart,  
 That passion cannot rule.

The complete confidence he reposed in Iago's friendship, in the honesty of his disposition, and in his zeal for his service, gave to every half-uttered and broken syllable the force of an appeal from Adhesiveness, Self-esteem, and Conscientiousness, in the one, to the same faculties in the other. But the Moor's love for his wife was too strong, and his trust in her virtue too well founded, to give way to bare suspicions:

'T is not to make me jealous,  
 To say — my wife is fair, feeds well, loves company,  
 Is free of speech, sings, plays, and dances well:  
 Where virtue is, these are more virtuous.

But his Destructiveness, Self-esteem, and Firmness, all of which we have seen to maintain a powerful sway in his character, are strongly manifested in the following declaration:

Think'st thou I'd make a life of jealousy,  
 To follow still the changes of the moon  
 With fresh suspicions? No! — to be at once in doubt,  
 Is once to be resolved.

Iago's object is now attained. Othello has been made himself broadly to express and entertain what his insidious enemy hardly ventures to breathe; the 'iron has entered his soul,' and is left corroding his very vitals.

But every obstacle is not yet removed. His conjugal affection arising from his large Amativeness and Adhesiveness, still clings fondly to its object, and the paroxysm to which it leads suggests the possibility of his suspicions being false. The course of Conscientiousness being thus for a moment turned, reproaches him

for having wronged a faithful wife ; and Destructiveness, kindling within him at the thought of such baseness, he holds over the head of his insidious foe the sword of a just and terrible revenge, ready to stab him to perdition, if his information should prove false :

Villain! be sure you prove my love a whore ;  
 Be sure of it ; give me the ocular proof ;  
 Or, by the worth of mine eternal soul,  
 Thou had'st better have been born a dog,  
 Than answer my waked wrath.

Immediately, however, there is a reaction of Conscientiousness, and he fears he has wronged the object of his threats :

Nay, stay :— thou shouldst be honest.

The current of this passion is now arrested, and flows towards another object. The Love and Conscientiousness which a moment before had been as a spur to urge him on to avenge a calumniated wife, now stimulate him to doom to assassination her supposed seducer, and to find ' some swift means of death,' for the ' fair devil ' herself.

In the dialogue which ensues here between Othello and Iago, we see those faculties in the mind of the former, which we have noticed as being the most predominant, in a state of alternate activity, according as his jealousy or affection gets the ascendant :

*Oth.* O, Iago!

*Iago.* And did you see the handkerchief?

*Oth.* Was that mine?

*Iago.* Yours, by this hand, &c.

*Oth.* I would have him nine years a killing :—

A fine woman! a fair woman a sweet woman!

*Iago.* Nay, you must forget that.

*Oth.* Ay, let her rot, and perish, and be damned to night ; for she shall not live: No, my heart is turned to stone ; I strike it, and it hurts my hand. O, the world hath not a sweeter creature, &c.

*Iago.* Nay, that's not your way.

*Oth.* Hang her! I do but say what she is :— So delicate with her needle!— An admirable musician! O, she will sing the savageness out of a bear!— Of so high and plenteous wit and invention!

*Iago.* She's the worse for all this.

*Oth.* O, a thousand times, a thousand times: and then of so gentle a condition!

*Iago.* Ay, too gentle.

*Oth.* Nay, that's certain: but yet the pity of it, Iago!—O, Iago, the pity of it, Iago!

*Iago.* If you are so fond over her iniquity, give her patent to offend; for, if it touch not you, it comes near nobody.

*Oth.* I will chop her into messes:—Cuckold me!

*Iago.* O, 't is foul in her.

*Oth.* With mine officer!

*Iago.* That's fouler.

*Oth.* Get me some poison, Iago; this night:—I'll not expostulate with her, lest her body and beauty unprovide my mind again:—this night, Iago.

We see here **Combativeness** and **Destructiveness** directed chiefly against Cassio, but also in a high degree against Desdemona. Then **Amativeness**, **Adhesiveness**, **Ideality** and **Veneration**, come into play, and he enumerates all his wife's admirable qualities. Again wounded **Self-esteem** and re-kindling **Destructiveness** cry out for revenge, and thus the balance sways from side to side several times before it settles in the bloody resolution, which it requires all Iago's art to keep fixed and steady. It is this circumstance in the progress of jealousy,—this vibration from love to hatred and revenge,—which induced Collins so to portray it in his inimitable *Ode to the Passions* :

‘Thy numbers, Jealousy, to nought were fixed,  
Sad proof of thy distressful state;  
Of differing themes the veering song was mixed,  
And now it courted love, now raving called on hate.’

However strange the assertion may seem, it is in the works of the poet, rather than of the philosopher, we are to look for correct delineations of human nature and human feelings. The latter, ever wedded to some favorite hypothesis, saw facts through a medium which often entirely changed their aspect, and even distorted the information which was supplied by his own consciousness. The poet, on the other hand, describes what he has seen in others, or

has experienced within himself, with no other view than to give it force and effect ; and the consequence has been hitherto, that, while the one has generally exhibited 'an airy nothing,' the other frequently produced the reality of life.

To return to Othello. — His Love and Pride are lacerated and torn by the wounds they have received ; his Destructiveness is excited to revenge his wrongs ; and Conscientiousness, deeply offended by the base return he has received for all the love, and friendship, and honor he had preserved so inviolate, lends even more than an approving voice to the deed he meditates. There is a speech occurs here, in which Othello, now contemplating the completeness of his misery, almost portrays his own character :

Had it pleased Heaven, (he says,)  
 To try me with affliction ; had he rained  
 All kinds of sores, and shames, on my bare head ;  
 Steeped me in poverty to the very lips ;  
 Given to captivity me and my utmost hopes —  
 I should have found in *some part of my soul*  
*A drop of patience*: But (alas !) to make me  
 A fixed figure for the time of scorn  
 To point his slow unmoving finger at, —  
 O ! O !  
 Yet could I bear that too ; well, very well :  
 But there, where I have garnered up my heart ;  
 Where either I must live, or bear no life ;  
 The fountain, from the which my current runs,  
 Or else dries up to be discarded thence !  
 Or keep it as a cistern for foul toads  
 To knot and gender in ! — turn thy complexion there !  
 Patience, thou young and rose-lipped cherubim ;  
 Aye, there, look grim as hell !

Self-esteem and Firmness would enable him to bear any physical hardships. Of these, as we learn from his speech to the senate, he had already borne many, and was even proud of the endurance of them. Acquisitiveness being in all probability moderate, the idea of poverty carries with it nothing very terrible or alarming ; and under its pressure he feels that Conscientiousness and Hope

would supply him with the 'drops of patience,' of which, in such circumstances, he would stand in need :

But, alas! to make me  
A fixed figure, &c.

To a mind in which Self-esteem is a presiding sentiment, and where Love of Approbation is also large, contempt is much harder to bear than poverty. If conscious, however, that the contempt is undeserved, Conscientiousness may enable it to endure even the 'world's dread laugh :'

Yet could I bear that too:——  
But there, where I have garnered up my heart, &c.  
————— to be discarded thence!  
Or keep it as a cistern for foul toads  
To knot and gender in! — turn thy complexion there!

There, indeed, the last drop of patience had been dried up. This large Amativeness and Adhesiveness, producing such a love for Desdemona as rendered his soul a chaos of unutterable darkness when its light was withdrawn, influenced, as is usual in the indications of his character, by his great Self-esteem, which comes out conspicuously in the last lines of his speech, had sustained a laceration that was altogether intolerable. He has now parted with all that constituted the happiness of his life and made existence desirable ; and the speech in which he does so, is a beautiful and striking emanation from those propensities and sentiments which we have seen so predominant in his character :

O now, forever,  
Farewell the tranquil mind! farewell content!  
Farewell the plumed troop, and the big wars,  
That make ambition virtue! O, farewell!  
Farewell the neighing steed, and the shrill trump,  
The spirit-stirring drum, and the ear-piercing fife,  
The royal banner; and all quality,  
Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war!  
And O, you mortal engines, whose rude throats  
Th' immortal Jove's dread clamors counterfeit,  
Farewell! Othello's occupation's gone.

It is unnecessary to carry our analysis through all the scenes which precede the completion of what he has resolved. Iago continues to adduce his damning proofs, until no prop remains on which he can sustain a single doubt of his dishonor. His mind is a prey to a succession of paroxysms, and the energy of his character seems to but drive him from misery to madness. Accordingly, when he enters Desdemona's chamber to execute the purpose with which he was fraught, Reason seems almost tottering on her throne. It is not alone, however, the deed he was about to commit which produces the dreadful agitation of mind under which he labors, but rather the shock his prevailing propensities and sentiments have sustained by the information he has received. The abruptness of the soliloquy here renders its meaning somewhat obscure, which Johnson has noticed and explained in the following words. :— ' I am here, says Othello, in his mind overwhelmed with horror. What is the reason of this perturbation? Is it want of resolution to do justice? Is it the dread of shedding blood? No. It is not the action that shocks me; but it is the cause,—it is the cause, my soul! Let me not name it to you, ye chaste stars,—it is the cause.' It is very probable that this is the true meaning Shakspeare meant to convey by these words; but we are inclined to suspect Othello would have been deceiving himself had he really uttered them. His Benevolence and Adhesiveness, in the prospect of such a violation of the feelings they are calculated to generate, must have produced, independent of the *cause* which appeared to render such a violation necessary, a considerable share of his mental agony and agitation. In proof of this opinion we see the influence of these very faculties staying his murderous arm, and half subduing, for a moment, the dreadful frenzy which filled his soul :

O balmy breath, that doth almost persuade  
Justice to break her sword!— One more, one more.—  
Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee,  
And love thee after.

And it is not till these traces of lingering affection have awakened

his unhappy wife, and that the transient calm had been succeeded by the storm of rage which he excites by recurring to the evidences of her guilt, that the opposition of these restraining faculties is overcome, and the deed of horror is committed. — We have said, that Conscientiousness lent even more than an approving voice to the commission of this foul deed. Wounded Self-esteem and Destructiveness appear, indeed, to have been the feelings under whose influence the murder was first resolved on, and it is evident they had again the ascendancy at the moment of its perpetration, During the whole period that intervened, however, the voice of Conscientiousness may be distinctly heard speaking in aid of his resolution. When Iago suggests to him to strangle her on the bed she had contaminated, he answers,

Good. The justice of it pleases me.

Afterwards in the chamber, when he says he will not shed her blood, he adds,

Yet she must die, else she will betray more men.

When he kisses her before the murder, he says,

Oh balmy breath that doth almost persuade  
*Justice* to break her sword.

And again, when he justifies the deed to Emilia,

O, I were damned beneath all depth in hell,  
But that I did proceed upon just grounds  
To this extremity.

No sooner are his eyes opened to the treachery that had been practised to deceive him, than the combination which produced his jealous fury changes its mode of action : Conscientiousness, Love of Approbation and Self-esteem, are again in vigorous exercise ; but it is only to tell him that a blind and headlong passion has made him the murderer of an innocent and affectionate wife ; that henceforth he must regard his proud name as stained with the foulest of crimes ; that the reputation of him that ‘ was Othello ’ is lost forever. When the story of the handkerchief is explained, and Othello sees how completely he has been gulled by Iago, all

his sentiments and propensities are turned against him, and against the deed he has committed. Self-esteem and Love of Approbation, tortured by the idea of his being so cheated, and so blind as not to see the cheat, are finely indicated in the exclamation he utters when every doubt has been removed.

O fool! fool! fool!

All his fondness for his wife revives, and what he had so lately persuaded himself was an act of justice, now wears the horrid features of foul and atrocious murder. Of what description his feelings now were, we judge from the following words, in which his paroxysm exhausts itself :

O cursed, cursed slave! — Whip me, ye devils,  
From the possession of this heavenly sight!  
Blow me about in winds! roast me in sulphur!  
Wash me in steep-down gulfs of liquid fire! —  
O Desdemona! Desdemona! dead?

He is reduced to a perfect wreck, and his faculties are in such a state of internal warfare, that even his usual valor forsakes him :

I am not valiant neither,  
But every puny whipster gets my sword.

And again,

Man but a rush before Othello's breast,  
And he retires.

Remembrance of the dreadful deed he has committed, sets in array against him every nobler sentiment of his soul. He feels that a stain has fallen on his reputation which nothing can remove; that he has inflicted a wound upon himself which ages could not heal; and, racked with such intolerable misery, he hurries to find a shelter in the arms of suicide.

## ARTICLE VIII.

*Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft.* Addressed to J. G. LOCKHART, Esq. By SIR WALTER SCOTT, Bart. [From the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal.]

‘IN the present condition of human knowledge,’ *every* thing that comes from our gifted countryman’s pen is pronounced to have of course the impress of his genius ; and is ushered into notice by all the journals, with the opinion reduced to a formula, that ‘no other man but Sir Walter Scott could have written the matter or thing now before us.’ With regard to his volume on Demonology, however, there is a certain set of heretics to this faith, whom posterity, at least, will not laugh to scorn when they bring that imposing work to *their* bar ; and, in so far as it is anything more than a compilation of ghost and goblin stories, with no essential advantage over Mother Bunch, in point of literary exaltation, — in other words, in so far as it attempts to supply a philosophical solution of its subject, — pronounce it one of the most solemn failures, Dr Hibbert’s not excepted, which the prevailing non-philosophy which yet darkens and deranges human thinking, could have brought forth.

Phrenologists claim an especial title to tell Sir Walter Scott when and where he fails, when and where his order of talent and kind of acquirements are at work in a wrong direction ; just because they, of all his critics, have done him the most honor when occupying his own peculiar and high literary station, and have best understood and appreciated his legitimate efforts of genius ; for they alone have applied to them a test, which they have been found to stand, a strict philosophical analysis on those principles of human nature which their science has demonstrated to be true. They have repeatedly said, and have never seen reason to alter or even modify the opinion, that Sir Walter Scott, like Shakspeare, is a painter, and not a philosopher. Although endowed with

matchless powers of observing, and also of delineating human phenomena, (and we have in our critiques of many of his works minutely analyzed these powers,) in other words the manifestations in human conduct which result from the human faculties as springs of action, he is not only uninformed of the right analysis of these powers, as single or compound impulses, but resists and ridicules that analysis, under the despised name — in ignorance despised — of Phrenology. Yet this very Phrenology, as no *impartial* person who knows what it is can for one moment deny, completely illustrates all the pictures which he draws, and accounts for the effects which they produce upon his readers, whose nature responds to them. It follows that whenever, after painting a character of eccentricity, incongruity, or contradiction, he attempts a philosophical *rationale* of it, we are not aware of one instance where he has succeeded. Shakspeare is too wise ever to make this attempt. He contents himself with faithfully giving the likeness; but we do not remember an example of his offering its philosophy. He gives us the *what*, with a truth to which all our feelings vibrate, but he never speculates about the *wherefore*.

It is one of the most humiliating proofs of the truth of Mr Stewart's confession, that 'the philosophy of mind is yet in expectation,' that the very obvious distinction between what Sir Walter Scott can do, and cannot do, has a very slender chance of being comprehended by any but phrenologists. We have heard it said sardonically, What! a writer who is so true to nature in all his delineations of human character, he not profoundly skilled in human nature! How could he draw his pictures, without knowing intimately and minutely the whole anatomy of the human heart! and how could he marshal and manœuvre his numerous characters, each speaking and acting in the exact line marked out for it, in all its appearances, and reappearances on the stage of the story, and that without a perceptible inconsistency, if he did not know and discriminate with philosophical precision, in all their finest shades, the springs and impulses of human conduct, and all the varieties of human motives! To

this we answer, that Sir Walter Scott *observes* the phenomena of life, and, in imitating these in his fictions, does no more than the historical painter, who places before us *his* imitations of human passions and feelings in the expressions of human faces, and the attitudes of human bodies. But the painter does not require to go deeper. He observes these expressions and attitudes as indicating, or rather always accompanying, certain human feelings, often in considerable combination; but his picture does not absolutely, depend for its accuracy, — for there exist very perfect works of art without it, — on his analyzing these feelings, tracing them to their primitive impulses, or anatomically pointing out the nerves which contract the muscles of the countenance into a smile or a frown, a glance of haughtiness or a look of submission, a leer of cunning, or an aspect of guilelessness; and still less on following these nerves to their origins in the brain, where all the feelings have, to human ken, their ultimate connexion or dependence. We say, does not *absolutely* depend on such knowledge; although the possession of it must be, and, we have the testimony of artists of the first eminence, who are phrenologists, for saying, *is* an instrument of immense power in elevating the character and testing the truth of their works; and so would it be, in his line of art, to Sir Walter Scott.

In short, without being possessed of a true analysis of mind, a writer can but guess at the *causes* of human conduct; and although he may occasionally guess aright, especially in those simpler manifestations, which constitute every-day character and conduct, he cannot advance into more complicated combinations, without suffering from his ignorance of some important and essential element, for want of which his theory will be utterly inapplicable.

It is from this very defect that Sir Walter Scott's philosophy of demonology is false. It is almost all contained in his first chapter; the other nine being devoted to details (in which much antiquarianism and much learning, *valeant quantum*, are displayed,) of the various modes in which the belief and love of the supernatural have operated in different ages of the world;

of the curious connexion which existed and exists between the superstitions of various ages and nations ; of the ferocious persecutions for imputed sorcery and witchcraft ; with a great number of instances of apparitions and supernaturalities of all descriptions and denominations, with none of which we have anything to do. We have in a former Number (page 504 of Volume VI.) given a sufficiently ample detail of these specific sufferings of the misdirected faculties of man, to enable us to arrive at certainty in our conclusions as to what these faculties are. Sir Walter Scott has given several of the same instances, and some additions ; but with this difference, that he has not correctly traced their connection with the human mind ; and indeed, with the exception of the phenomena of apparitions which he does endeavor, although erroneously, to account for, he does not even attempt to explain philosophically man's tendency to believe in supernatural agency ; but merely details historically the varied manifestations of this tendency, in witch and ghost and goblin stories without end ; and thereby only amplifies the literature of that delightful horrifier of our childhood, Mother Bunch.

Sir Walter's philosophical chapter commences with this announcement :

'I do not mean to combat the systems of those by whom I am anticipated in consideration of the subject, or to erect any new one of my own ; but to confine myself to narratives of remarkable cases, and to the observations which naturally and easily arise out of them. A few general remarks on the nature of demonology, and the original *cause* of the almost universal belief in communications betwixt mortals and beings of a *power superior* to themselves, and of a nature not to be comprehended by human organs, are a necessary introduction to the subject.'

We agree with the author that his views of this *cause* are not new. But as they are adopted by him, and will by that adoption gain currency, we feel it our duty, holding them, as we do, to be erroneous, to point out wherein their error lies. He states as a cause of this universal belief of communication between

mortals and beings of a power superior to themselves, the belief of the immortality of the soul, and its separate existence, which lead to the conclusion, that 'myriads of disembodied spirits,' which once inhabited human bodies, exist somewhere, and *may* have the power granted them of 'revisiting the glimpses of the moon,' by miracle of course. Now, it is evident that the author has forgotten that he cannot throw the slightest light on the belief of gods and demons, by showing how the belief of what may be called mere *human* ghosts has come to prevail. The firm belief of gods and demons, and of their concern in the affairs of men, has prevailed and does prevail in nations who had and have no idea of the immortality of the soul, and who could never have got the notion of *superior* beings through that channel. Such a non-sequitur would never have been committed, had the author been in possession of the knowledge that there is in man's nature a faculty which performs that function directly by its own specific activity; which, by rendering universal a belief in superior existences, and, in combination with another faculty which impels him to worship superior beings whose existence he believes, constitutes man essentially a religious being. These faculties are Wonder and Veneration; and we have shown in our article on Demonology, already alluded to, in what way the excessive or diseased action of these two faculties produces all the phenomena of the wildest superstition. But the existence of these faculties not being known when the author studied the human mind at college, it was not to be expected that he could have the benefit of their ready solution of the difficulty in his way, — a difficulty which he has either purposely evaded, or attempted to explain by a theory which has no connection with it. If gods and demons, we repeat are objects of human belief, — however erroneously as to their supposed nature when intellect is unconsulted, — in consequence of the blind impulse of a primitive feeling, a complete demonology may exist, and has existed, without the belief of the immortality of the soul.

But as, in the rest of the chapter, the author abandons the question of the belief of *superior* beings, and limits himself to

the philosophy of more vulgar apparitions, we are of opinion, that, on his own showing, there may exist a firm belief in the reality of even these, without a belief in the immortality and separate existence of the soul; and the grounds of that belief would be, that spectral illusions, with all the impression of a terrible reality, are a specific state of disease, and have, because they must have been experienced by individuals in all ages and states of society, and all varieties of religious belief. We should, therefore, reverse the order of cause and effect, as stated by the author, and conclude that, putting Revelation out of the question, these apparitions might be an occasion instead of consequence of the belief in the immortality of the soul.

We may remark, in passing, that Sir Walter's share in the vulgar, yet presumptuous notion, borrowed from the mythology of the Styx, that the souls of men exist, like so many ghosts or thin shades, ready to appear in human shape, if so commanded, only shows the abject thinking on the sublime subject of a future state, which, in its prevalence, infects minds even of the highest order; while both Scripture, which refuses all warrant to such low conceptions, by declaring 'that it is not given us to know what we shall be,' and sound philosophy, leave us in total ignorance of what is beyond human ken, the *modus existendi* of immortality:—'that which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.'

We think the author just as unfortunate in his account of the *causes* of spectral illusions themselves,—as *illusions* sufficiently real,—to which, exclusively, he confines the remainder, indeed, almost the whole of this his introductory and philosophical chapter.

First, According to the author, enthusiastic feelings of an impressive and solemn nature, such as recent bereavement of beloved friends, or the still darker case of murder committed; in other words, 'the *imagination*, favored by circumstances, *has power to summon up to the organ of sight* spectres which only exist in the mind of those by whom their appearance is witnessed.'

It must be evident to every one, that the only part of this most vague theory which is unquestionable, is that the apparitions are unreal; but is of the very essence of that unsatisfactory vagueness, which has hitherto been called philosophy, to say that the *imagination* summons up spectres to the organ of sight; for, as to the proximate cause, we are left here just as wise as we were.

Secondly, There follows an exceedingly confused allusion, or it is little more, to Professor Stewart's utterly gratuitous theory of spectres,—that they are essentially dreams, which come at that point between sleeping and waking, (how did Mr Stewart know this?) when the individual is really asleep, but believes himself awake, and is the sport of a sort of lively dream. We answer, that such dreams may create a belief in the dreamer that a spectre appeared to him, but will never explain the spectral illusions of broad waking experience, of which Mr Stewart seemed to have no knowledge whatever. From this, as an explanation of spectres, Sir Walter glides off, as is often his manner, into a perfectly distinct subject, namely, those coincidences which are thought to realize dreams, and all those presages founded on dreams, which in ignorant times were mistaken for revelations from heaven.

Thirdly, 'Somnambulism and *other* nocturnal deceptions, frequently lend their aid to the formation of such *phantasmata*, as are formed in the middle state between sleeping and waking,'—and an instance of a sleep-walking sailor seeing a ghost is given. Now, it happens that the somnambulist is just as much and as really asleep as any other dreamer, only superadding the power of locomotion, the result of a power in the brain, in most cases fortunately suspended in sleep, and sadly struggled with in nightmare. The spectres of somnambulism are therefore not in question, for they are only dreams; besides, there are many somnambulists, as well as other dreamers, who do not see spectres, or, seeing them, believe in their reality.

Fourthly, The spectre of Brutus is cited and explained most unsatisfactorily by the vagueness of a state of eager anxiety or

excited exertion, the recollection of Cæsar's murder, and the doubts and fears of the impending battle of Philippi. These feelings may have led remotely to a spectral apparition, which, of course, was not seen by any one but Brutus himself; but, if it cannot be denied that such feelings do not always produce spectral visions,—on the contrary, do so very rarely,—it is plain, that, by citing the case of Brutus, in the manner he has done, the author has not arrived at what alone can be called the *cause* of these illusions, namely, that which must necessarily produce them in all cases where it is present and operating.

Fifthly, The instances of whole armies believing that they have seen gods and saints fighting for them, prove nothing. These are only examples of weak credulity, when the cry is raised for a purpose; and the victory is won, as Sir Walter himself says, before the mistake, or rather the trick, is discovered. 'It is a disposition,' says the author, 'to see as much of the supernatural as is seen by others around, or in other words, to trust to the eyes of others rather than to your own.' A Castilian cavalier is mentioned, who fought in one of the Mexican battles, in which St Jago assisted, mounted on a white horse. The cavalier firmly believed in the miraculous interposition, but honestly and naively adds, that he did not see the apparition himself;—indeed, he saw another cavalier, Francisco de Morla, mounted on a *chestnut* horse, fighting in the very place where the saint was seen by others. But there was nothing in that to the excited Wonder and Veneration of the cavalier, who exclaims, 'Sinner that I am, what am I that I should have beheld the blessed apostle!'

Lastly, The author gets, at least, into the road to truth, when he proceeds to state, that it is 'now universally known and admitted that there certainly exist more than one disorder known to professional men, of which one important symptom is a disposition to see visions.' This frightful disorder is not properly insanity, although it is somewhat allied to that most horrible of maladies, and may, in many constitutions be the means of bringing it on; and although such hallucinations are proper to both. The difference I conceive to be, that, in cases of insanity, the *mind* of the patient is principally affected,

while the *senses* or *organic system* offer in vain to the lunatic their decided testimony against the fantasy of a deranged *imagination*. Perhaps the nature of this collision between a disturbed imagination and organs of sense, possessed of their usual accuracy, cannot be better described than in the embarrassment expressed by an insane patient confined in the Infirmary of Edinburgh.' Here follows the well-known anecdote of the lunatic, who, believing himself a prince, wondered that even his choicest viands tasted of oatmeal, that being his principal, if not sole food. 'Here, then, is one instance of actual insanity, in which the sense of taste controlled and attempted to restrain the ideal hypothesis adopted by a *deranged imagination*. But, the disorder to which I previously alluded is entirely of a *bodily* character, and consists principally in a *disease of the visual organs*, which present to the patient a set of spectres or appearances *which have no actual existence*. It is a disease of the *same* nature which renders many men incapable of distinguishing colors, only the patients go a step further, and pervert the external *form* of objects. In their case, therefore, contrary to that of the maniac, it is not the *mind*, or rather the *imagination*, which imposes upon and overpowers the evidence of the senses, but the sense of seeing (or hearing) which betrays its duty, and conveys false ideas to a sane *intellect*!'

It is only upon the mind of a phrenologist that the accumulated errors, the sum of nonsense — we speak with personal deference — of the foregoing short passage, expands with its full and unqualified effect. It is all we have for the philosophy of the first genius of the age; and as there is no philosophy yet possessed by any of the other leading men of the age, which enables them to question it, it is lauded as absolute wisdom, which no man could have written but Sir Walter Scott! But we must not interrupt our analysis. Several learned physicians, according to the author, have assigned different causes for this malady. One of these, though it is rather the disease itself than its cause, is the blue devils of habitual intoxication. These visited a young man of fortune, who had lived a vicious life in London, in the shape of the dancing figures of the opera; a common spectral apparition, for we know several instances. He got quit of them by retiring to the country, but, unluckily, having ordered the London furniture to follow him, the dancing figures came with it.

‘There is reason to believe that such cases are numerous, and that they may perhaps arise not only from *the debility of stomach* brought on by excess in wine or spirits; which derangement *often sensibly affects the eyes and sense of sight*, but also because the *mind* becomes habitually predominated over by a train of fantastic visions, the consequence of frequent intoxication; and is thus like a dislocated joint, apt again to go wrong, even when a different cause occasions the derangement. It is easy to be supposed that habitual excitement, by means of any other intoxicating drug, as opium, or its various substitutes, must expose those who practise the dangerous custom to the same inconvenience. Very frequent use of the nitrous oxide, which affects the senses so strongly, and produces a short but singular state of ecstasy, would probably be found to occasion this species of disorder. But there are many other causes which medical men find attended with the same symptom, of embodying before the eyes of a patient imaginary illusions which are visible to no one else. This persecution of spectral illusions is also found to exist, when no excesses of the patient can be alleged as the cause; owing, doubtless, to a deranged state of the blood or nervous system.’

The author introduces the case of our old friend Nicolai, the Berlin bookseller, as commented upon by Drs Ferriar and Hibbert, and by them imputed to depression of spirits, and neglect of periodical bloodletting, as confessed by the patient. One circumstance in Mons. Nicolai’s visions is noted by Sir Walter Scott, much more valuable to the phrenologist than to himself, viz. : — ‘After a certain time, and some use of medicine, the phantoms became *less distinct in their Outline, (Form,) and less vivid in their Coloring*; faded as it were on the eye of the patient, and at length totally disappeared.’

Dr Hibbert, whose crude philosophy on the subject we exposed five years ago, (vol. i. p. 541,) is greatly lauded by Sir Walter, as having most ingeniously, as well as philosophically handled this subject; and as having also treated it in a medical point of view, as arising from plethora, febrile and inflammatory disorders, inflammation of the brain, nervous irritability, hypochondria, gout, and excitation from several gases.’ It must be obvious to every one who reflects for a moment, that the enumeration of a set of diseases, to which this symptom is only *some-*

*times allied, can throw no light on its proximate cause. This is as little accomplished by a mere enumeration of cases, which follows. One borrowed from Dr Gregory is, as a case, new to us, and worthy our recording :—*

‘ A patient of his, of some rank, having requested his advice, made the following extraordinary statement of his complaint. “ I am in the habit,” he said, “ of dining at five, and exactly as the hour of six arrives, I am subjected to the following painful visitation :— The door of the room, even when I have been weak enough to bolt it, which I have sometimes done, flies wide open ; and an old hag, like one of those who haunted the heath of Forres, enters with a frowning and incensed countenance, and comes straight up to me with every demonstration of spite and indignation, which could characterize her who haunted the merchant Abudah, in the Oriental tale. She rushes upon me, says something, but so hastily that I cannot discover the purport, and then strikes me a severe blow with her staff. I fall from my chair in a swoon, which is of longer or shorter endurance. To the recurrence of this apparition I am daily subjected ; and such is my new and singular complaint.” ’

Dr Gregory came to dine with his patient, to try whether the presence of another person would prevent the apparition ; but, as was to be expected, the hag came again, and the poor gentleman dropped back in his chair ; upon which, the physician, prescribed bleeding, ‘ satisfied that the periodical shocks arose from a tendency to apoplexy.’ This is not the proximate cause yet, else apoplexy would always bring apparitions.

Sir Walter adds another case, for which we also thank him ; for it is important that patients laboring under these distressing illusions should be satisfied that the disease is far from unusual. A gentleman, high in the law, was long attended by the spectre of a cat, which was succeeded by that of a gentleman-usher in a court dress, who preceded him even when he visited, but was evidently invisible to all the company but himself ; and ultimately of a skeleton the emblem of death itself. This last apparition was visible to the unhappy narrator at the moment of stating his case to the physician ; and the latter going to stand where he was directed as the place of its presence, screened it from the patient’s

view, all but the head, which he said peered over the Doctor's shoulder. This occasioned a movement of alarm in the latter before he could recollect himself! The unhappy patient, in the full knowledge of the apparition being unreal, sunk under its persevering persecution, and died. Sir Walter continues:—

‘Having added these two remarkable instances to the general train of similar facts quoted by Ferriar, Hibbert, and *other* writers, who have *more recently* considered the subject,\* there can, we think, be little doubt of the proposition, that *the external organs* may, from various causes, become so much deranged as to make false representations to the *mind*; and that, in such cases, men really *see* the empty and false forms, and hear the ideal sounds, which, in a more primitive state of society, are naturally enough referred to the action of demons or disembodied spirits.’

He then propounds, what is very true, that these apparitions may be occasional as well as habitual, and may even, with all the impression on the ignorant of a visit from the other world, appear but once, as in the case of Brutus, and on some great occasion. Of these he gives some instances which are well known; such as the apparition of Maupertuis to M. Gleditsch, in the hall of the academy of Berlin; the apparition of a diseased friend to a Captain C——, a catholic; and, what is still more interesting, one of Lord Byron to ‘a literary friend,’ evidently the narrator himself. These sudden apparitions Sir Walter rightly considers as more likely to be taken for glimpses of a world of spirits, than when their chronic continuation, as it may be called, gives the sufferer time to trace them to bodily disease, producing illusions which the author perseveres in erroneously concluding to be *optical*. Indeed, he goes on to show how the other senses may be deceived; as hearing, when the apparitions speak; and touch, when they strike, or grasp with a cold hand. He sums up the whole argument, by holding it demonstrated, that ‘sometimes our violent and inordinate passions, originating in sorrow for our

\* We marvel if our humble selves are here meant; for we have given greatly more instructive examples than either Hibbert or Ferriar, and that more recently.

friends, remorse for our crimes, our eagerness of patriotism, or our deep sense of devotion—these, or other violent excitements of a moral character, in the visions of the night, or the rapt ecstasy of the day, persuade us that we witness, with our eyes and ears, an actual instance of that supernatural communication, the possibility of which cannot be denied.’

This, it will be observed, is what Sir Walter calls the imagination deceiving the senses. But at other times, he says, it is the reverse, for ‘the corporeal organs impose upon the mind, while the eye and the ear diseased, deranged, or misled, convey false impressions to the patient.’

Such is the philosophy which, we would venture any odds, will be taken as perfectly satisfactory by ‘the great in literature and science,’ just because they have nothing better to put in its stead. We, the ‘small authors,’ as we have been styled, are not so easily satisfied; and even had we not ourselves given several years ago a very different explanation of spectral illusions, we should have easily shown Sir Walter’s to be inconsistent and absurd. We should have dismissed at once all pretence of aid from what he calls the *possibility* of the appearance of real, independently-existing spectres, and these, the disembodied spirits or souls of men, as a puerile assumption of knowledge of the mode and manner of man’s existence after death, and, moreover, as inferring a miracle, a way in which the Creator does not manifest his ordinary providence. And as to spectral illusions, which although unreal, have been seen, we should have said that both of the author’s explanations are erroneous. *First*, because it is an unproved assumption, that what are vaguely called the *imagination*, or the *passions*, or the *mind*, can ‘persuade the eyes and ears, that they see and hear what does not exist;’ and, *secondly*, because optical, or auricular, or tactual deceptions, can only be produced by real external objects—the eyes, ears, and hands having no power but to transmit to the brain the impressions made upon them by what, in one modification or another, exists externally. The eye is a mere medium or channel, like the lens of a pair of spectacles, and is just as little capable of transmitting to the mind

an impression which has never been made upon it by an external object, as that lens. Optical illusions must have a real basis. For example, a straight rod is seen by the eye crooked in the water ; but an actual rod exists. The voice of the famous invisible girl seemed to come from the ball suspended in the middle of the apparatus ; but a real female spoke, though she was not in the ball. And when we feel a pea double, by rolling it under two fingers crossed, there is still an actual pea to create the sense of touch at all. But, to settle this point at once, the instances are numerous where the apparitions were equally present whether the eyes were open or shut. Illusions of sense are, therefore, out of the question, unless something *external* be admitted, which it is *not*, by Sir Walter Scott himself ; the only truth in his system.

We think it important, by way of contrast, to remind our readers of the simple and beautiful *rationale* furnished by Phrenology, which we published five years ago ; and of the proofs which we have subsequently adduced that that *rationale* is right.

In answer to Dr Hibbert's fancies, we stated, (vol. i. page 547):—

‘The brain consists of a congeries of organs, each of which manifests a particular power of the mind. Among these organs, one serves to perceive Form, another Color, a third Size, while other and *distinct* faculties and organs experience emotions and reflect. Each faculty being active, produces the special kind of ideas which it is fitted to form ; and each may become active by an *internal* stimulus of its organ. The organs may be excited by an unusual influx of blood into the vessels which supply them by inflammation, or by nervous irritation. If the organs of Form, Coloring, and Size, were stimulated into excessive activity by any of these causes, the mind would be presented with the kind of conceptions which each of them, by its natural constitution, is fitted to produce ; or, in other words, forms, invested with the attributes of color and magnitude, would be presented involuntarily to the mind. If the organs of the reflective faculties did not participate in the affection, their functions would not be disturbed, and the mind would feel and reflect in a state of perfect sanity. It is almost unnecessary to point out how completely this theory accords with, and explains the foregoing phenomena ; the most striking feature

in all of the cases having been, that the mental disease extended only to particular kinds of conceptions, and that the other functions of the mind remained unaffected. This indicates irresistibly that there must be distinct organs, by means of which different mental operations are accomplished; for, if the organ of mind were single, it is against all logic to suppose that it can be both deranged and sound at the same time.'

To this we added Mr Combe's opinions from his *Elements*, also that of Gall and Spurzheim, that Wonder, or *Surnaturalité*, has influence in leading to the *belief* of supernatural appearances, and, when extremely exalted, would stimulate the *knowing faculties* to conceive such appearances; but these faculties must themselves be excited, actually to have the perceptions. Of vision-seers with large Wonder we gave three instances, in one of which *there was a pain in the very spot*.

The above explanation has been in print for five years. A few months afterwards it was followed up (vol. ii. p. 290) with the instructive case of Miss S. L., who saw as many visions, both of the living and the dead, as all the instances of Ferriar, Hibbert, and Sir Walter Scott, put together; and who, without having an idea of the seats of the organs, pointed to Form, Size, Color, Order, Number, Sound, and Wonder, as the points of the head where she experienced the most acute and pointed pain, when her spectres appeared to her. Nay, felt these pains successively, — first in Form, when her figures were mere forms, colorless like cobweb; then in Color, when they *gradually*, from fainter to stronger, assumed the quality of color; and in Size, when they varied from gigantic to miniature, &c.; the converse of Nicolai's waning figures, which became less distinct, by degrees in form and color.

To these powerful facts we added some time afterwards, (vol. v. p. 210, 319, and 430, and vol. vi. p. 260,) four additional cases, two without and two with the important accompaniment of pain in the region of the organs which perceive form, color, size, &c. The first was the case of a member of the English bar, whose visitant was a fair lady, in white of course, for some time

very pleasing, but ultimately as disgusting, from his having seen a dissection of a half-decayed body, which was ever after shockingly mingled with the form and features of his 'white lady.' This gentleman, like Miss S. L., was much relieved by assuming an erect posture, which probably diminished the rush of blood to the forehead. The next case is that of Mrs D., who had many of the visitations experienced by Miss S. L., together with some of the sensations described as those of Mr John Hunter, of London, and the opium eater, (vol. ii. pp. 302, and 426-8.) 'Mrs D. then described the pain which accompanied her illusions, viz. acute pain *in the upper part or root of the nose*, the seat of the organ of Form, *and all along the eyebrows*, which takes in Individuality, Size, Weight, Coloring, Order, and Number.' This lady suffered at the time under puerperal fever; and we are assured by medical men that such illusions are not uncommon in that disease. The third case, one furnished by Mr Levison, of Hull, was that of a retired tradesman, who was visited sometimes by a set of agreeable, and sometimes by a party of ugly and demon-like figures. He possessed the singular and unique power, as far as we have heard, of calling up the agreeable, and dismissing, or, as he called it, *starting* the unpleasant spectres. Mr Levison asked him whether it made any difference whether he opened or shut his eyes; to which he answered that it made none. This was true also of Miss S. L., which of itself at once puts an end to all idea of optical illusion. Mr Levison further asked him, whether he felt pain when his apparitions came, when he answered, 'that every time before he experienced this peculiar power of seeing figures he invariably felt pain *in, and between his eyes, and, in short, all over his eyebrows.*' The last case mentioned was that of a patient of Dr Andrew Combe's, who was greatly troubled by a disagreeable, noisy French woman, with a red cap on her head, who sat at the foot of his bed, sometimes grinning at him and screaming, and sometimes singing pleasantly enough. He very seriously asked Dr Combe if he could not use his influence with the proper authorities to have her removed.

The valuable instances where pain is present produce a two-

fold demonstration ; *first*, that in the region of the eyebrows are situated the organs by means of which external objects are perceived ; and, *secondly*, that these organs are capable of performing their specific functions, in consequence of activity from internal excitement ; in other words, of experiencing spectral illusions, and those other deceptions of perverted equilibrium, &c. under which Mr J. Hunter and the opium eater so severely suffered. On conversing with medical practitioners, we find that there are few of them who have not met with instances—some of them with many—of this specific disease of spectral apparitions ; and one, who is a phrenologist, has assured us that, knowing the morbid excitement to exist in the superorbital brain, he has banished the spectres by producing discharge immediately over the eyebrows.\*

We have resorted to the rather unusual course of quoting from our former articles, in order to bring into a focus the simple and satisfactory philosophy of apparitions which Phrenology had arrived at years before Sir Walter Scott girded his loins to settle the question, ‘in a manner that none but himself could have achieved!’ The exhibition which he has made is just one of those ‘judgments,’ with which nature unsparingly visits all who set themselves against truth. She has no respect for the errors of the great, or the follies of the wise ; and while she continued to smile upon this truly gifted man, while shining in the sphere of accordance with her unbending laws, she meets him with a frown when she finds him out of his orbit, and wandering in a vain attempt to oppose her resistless course ; in which attempt all real greatness must vanish. Like the sage, who said ‘Come with me, and see with how small a portion of wisdom mankind are governed,’ we would say, Come with us and see what a destitution of sound philosophy is compatible with a place among ‘the great in literature and science,’ and in the present state of human knowledge, suffices to add the highest philosophical to the highest literary reputation !

\* Dr Abercrombie, in his recent work on the Mind, has narrated no less than fourteen examples of spectral illusions, the majority of them cases of patients of his own.

## ARTICLE IX.

*Injuries of the Brain not always attended by manifest disorders of mind.—Analogy between such injuries, and those of other organs.*

CASES occasionally present themselves, in which, after a severe injury or loss of a portion of the brain, the patient continues perfectly collected, and answers rationally any question which may be put to him. From these facts, it is often triumphantly inferred that the phrenological views of the faculties of the mind being manifested by different portions of the brain, cannot possibly be true, otherwise some striking mental deficiency would always be apparent after accidents of this nature.

Those who rely on such objections forget that the brain is double, and that one side may be injured without destroying the function of the other, just as one eye may be lost without the person becoming blind in both; and they also overlook the fact, that there is not a single organ of the human body, in which extensive disease has not taken place, in some rare instances, without exciting disturbances in the corresponding function, sufficient to have been observable during life, even to a careful inquirer. In one case which fell under the notice of Dr. Abercrombie, and on which he lays considerable stress, the left side of the brain was almost entirely disorganized, and yet the lady was well enough to spend the evening preceding her death at a party in a friend's house. The same thing happens with the liver. It has been found almost wholly disorganized where no striking biliary disorder was observable during life. Even the lungs, which sustain so important a part in the animal economy, are sometimes diseased to an extraordinary extent, without any remarkable disturbance of respiration. In the number for July, 1833, of our able contemporary, the Glasgow Medical Journal, it is mentioned that in a patient at the Stirling Dispensary, six pounds of fluid were

found in the right cavity of the chest, compressing the corresponding lung into "a mere membrane" "a fourth of an inch in thickness;" and yet, that during life, "breathing, although a very little hurried, *appeared to be fully and freely performed*, and the man had *no symptom which indicated, in the most remote degree, the existence of thoracic disease.*" p. 254. Dr Ferrier also describes a case of pleurisy attended with effusion into the chest and pericardium, and causing death, but in which there was 'no cough, no difficulty in breathing, nor pain in his breast;' and Dr Ferrier 'could not find, from the most careful inquiry, that he had ever made such complaints.' (Mackintosh's *Practice of Physic*, vol. i. p. 367.)

Our opponents infer from cases of diseased brain, that that organ cannot be necessary for the manifestations of mind. By a similar mode of reasoning, therefore, we ought to infer from the above facts, that the liver is not required for the secretion of bile, nor the lungs for the function of respiration. In the one instance as in the other, we have the function *apparently* unaffected by extensive organic disease, and consequently the same inferences ought to be drawn from both. In reality, however, it is only by means of Phrenology, that the phenomena relative to the brain admit of explanation at all. If the brain were not composed of two halves, one of which can continue to act, although the other is injured, it would be impossible to believe it to be really the organ of mind. Whereas, if we admit the organs of the brain to be double, we can as easily explain why the mind is not palpably disturbed when only one side is hurt; as we can explain why we continue to see with one eye, or hear with one ear, after the other is destroyed. If, on the contrary, we possessed only one eye, instead of two, and a single brain instead of one composed of two similar halves, it would be very difficult to conceive how vision could continue unimpaired when half of that eye was diseased, or the mind remain sound when half of its organ was gone. The difficulty, therefore, lies entirely on the side of the objectors, and does not affect the phrenologist.

There is, however, another ground of fallacy which must be kept in mind. In disease we are apt to affirm that the mind is

unimpaired, merely because the patient is calm and collected, and answers a question with readiness. But we would ask, Is there no difference between being able to answer a common question, and being able for those vigorous mental efforts required for treating successfully an abstract or difficult subject? are we not all conscious of possessing different degrees of mental power, even at different periods of the same day, although even when at the lowest ebb we are still reasonable beings? and is the mind to be considered *unimpaired*, when its organ is no longer able for the clear thinking and vigorous emotions in which it formerly delighted? So far as we have ever observed, there are no instances of extensive lesion of the brain in which *all* the mental powers continue to be exercised *with undiminished energy*. On the contrary, there is scarcely any cerebral affection which does not impair or alter in some degree the condition of the mind. Even a common cold in the head reduces the powers of thinking for a time; and the true statement ought to be, that all injuries of the brain are not attended with marked aberration, or weakness of mind, or delirium: but it is a gratuitous delusion to maintain, on that account, that all the faculties remain in their original strength. In the case of the lungs again, it is quite credible that the patient may not have been sensible of any shortness of breathing in walking leisurely about the wards of an hospital, where no great exertion is needed; but if he had been made to ascend a hill, or to engage in labor requiring full respiration, the deficiency would have become obvious enough. In the one case there was sufficient mind for commonplace purposes, just as in the other there was breath enough for a moderate exertion; but had either patient been called upon for an effort to which any person in ordinary health would be perfectly equal, he would assuredly have been found wanting. It is true, that when one side is rendered inefficient from disease, the other takes on increased action to make up for the loss; but it rarely if ever happens, that the increase thus produced goes sufficiently far to compensate entirely for what is subtracted.

## NOTICES.

LOUISVILLE.—[*Extract of a letter.*] ‘Phrenology is making rapid strides in the West. Popular courses have been delivered in all our principal cities and a high degree of interest and curiosity excited. The work thus commenced will no doubt continue until an acquaintance with its principles is generally diffused.’

‘A Society, meeting semi-monthly, has been formed in this place, devoted to the cultivation of Phrenology. Lectures, public discussions, &c., have excited great interest.’

DR CALDWELL. We are happy to hear that Dr Caldwell has been lecturing on Phrenology in Lexington, Ky., and in the vicinity of that place. He is certainly one of the ablest professors of this country, and one of the most efficient friends of true science.

GALL'S WORKS. Marsh, Capen, and Lyon have in press the works of Dr Gall, translated from the French by Dr Winslow Lewis, Jr. These works will make the first six volumes of the Phrenological Library. The same firm has just published a new and materially revised edition of Spurzheim's work on Insanity.

NEW YORK. A Phrenological Society was organized in the city of New-York June last. Dr J. Barber was elected President, and L. D. Chapin, Secretary.

PREMIUM. The Boston Phrenological Society has offered a Premium of \$100 for the best article against Phrenology. The Committee appointed to award the premium is composed of professional gentlemen of the first respectability. The following notice has been published, stating the requisitions of the Society.

‘NOTICE TO ANTI-PHRENOLOGISTS. The subscriber in behalf of the Boston Phrenological Society is authorized to offer a premium of One Hundred Dollars for the best original Essay, the design of which shall be to *disprove* the Science of Phrenology. All articles offered for the premium must be forwarded (in the usual envelopes) to the subscriber before the first of March 1836, free of expense to the Society; they must contain, at least, fifty pages of small pica print, octavo; and whether successful or not, be considered at the disposal of the society. The premium will be awarded by a committee of five gentlemen of high reputation, in their several professions, and who are all unbelievers in the doctrines of Phrenology, provided any article in their estimation worthy of the premium shall be offered.

‘July 18, 1835. J. S. SLEEPER, Secretary Boston Phrenological Society.

☞ N. B. Editors of papers friendly to the cause of science will confer a favor by copying the above.’

## ERRATA.

In justice to the author of the first article in this number, it should be stated that the paper was written for the Boston Phrenological Society without a view to publication, and owing to the illness of the Editor at the time it was put to press, the following errors escaped uncorrected:—

Page 133, 6th line, after *would* insert *be*.—Page 134, 2d line from bottom, after *form* insert *and volume*.—Page 135, 14th line, instead of *physiological*, read *psychological*.—Page 142, 13th line from bottom, for *sprung* read *sprang*.—Page 144, 3d line, for *me* read *us*; 14th line for *failings* read *feelings*; 20th line for *them* read *these*.—Page 145, 7th line from bottom, for *will* read *would*.—Page 146, 8 and 9th line from bottom, for *diversity* read *diversities*.—Page 147, 12th line from bottom, for *disciplining* read *deciphering*.—Page 148, 18th line, after *without* insert *it*.—Page 150, 16th line from bottom, dele *my friends*.—Page 150, 15th line after *and* insert *the*.—Page 151, 1st line dele the *comma* after *is*; and for *I* insert *we*.—Page 151, 1st line from bottom, after *and* insert *yet*.—Page 152, 11th line, instead of *actual* read *cerebral*.

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